CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 1 of 30

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of reserving Judgment: 21

st

May, 2026

Date of Decision: 22

nd

September, 2026

IN THE MATTER OF:

+ CRL.A. 578/2010

BEER SINGH .....Appellant

Through: Mr. Anshu Mahajan, Mr. Rajesh

Kaushik and Ms. Anjali Sharma,

Advs.

versus

CBI .....Respondent

Through: Mr. Rajesh Kumar, SPP-CBI with

Mr. Changez Khan and Ms. Mishika

Pandita, Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIMAL KUMAR YADAV

JUDGMENT

VIMAL KUMAR YADAV , J.

1. The present appeal in hand has been filed against the judgment

(hereinafter referred to as the impugned judgment) dated 20.04.2010 and the

order (hereinafter referred to as the impugned order) on sentence dated

24.04.2010 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Patiala House Courts,

New Delhi, whereby the Appellant, Beer Singh, was held guilty for offences

punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the PC Act”).

Vide the impugned order, the Appellant herein was sentenced to undergo

Rigorous Imprisonment (“RI”) for a period of 02 years with fine of ₹5,000/-

in default of which to undergo RI for a period of 06 months under Section 7

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 2 of 30

of the PC Act and RI for a period of two years with fine of ₹5,000/- in

default of which to undergo RI for a period of 06 months under Section

13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, both the substantive

sentences having been directed to run concurrently.

2. The prosecution’s case is that during the Appellant’s tenure of service

as an Assistant Sub Inspector (Ministerial) in the Sports Cell, CISF

Headquarters, New Delhi, the Complainant Inspector Ajay Kumar Vats

(PW-10), had represented the Indian Junior Judo Team as Coach in the 5th

Asian Junior Judo Championship held at Doha, Qatar in the year 2004, and

was entitled to receive kit allowance amounting to ₹10,000/-. According to

the prosecution, the Appellant, while dealing with the processing of the said

allowance, demanded illegal gratification of ₹5,000/- from the complainant

for release of the cheque. Subsequently, a written complaint was lodged by

the complainant with the Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”), A trap

consequently, was organised on 28.10.2004, during which the Appellant was

apprehended while accepting ₹3,000/- from the complainant. The tainted

currency notes were recovered from his possession, the hand wash and

pocket wash allegedly tested positive for phenolphthalein. After the

completion of investigation and grant of sanction for prosecution, the

Appellant was sent to face trial as a chargesheet was filed by CBI.

3. The learned Trial Court, pursuant to framing of formal charge under

Sections 7 and 13 (2) PC Act and upon appreciation of the oral and

documentary evidence led by the prosecution, held that the prosecution had

successfully established the essential ingredients of a case under Sections 7

and 13 of the PC Act i.e. demand, acceptance and recovery of illegal

gratification and that the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 3 of 30

Act stood attracted. The main line of defence put forth by the Appellant that

the recovered amount represented repayment of a friendly loan was rejected

as improbable and unsupported by evidence. Consequently, the Appellant

came to be convicted and sentenced in the manner noticed above. Aggrieved

thereby, the present appeal has been preferred.

4. Before adverting to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the

parties, it would be appropriate to briefly notice the factual matrix giving

rise to the present proceedings.

5. In the case in hand, complainant Inspector Ajay Kumar Vats (PW-10),

was nominated as Coach of the Indian Junior Judo Team for participation in

the 5th Asian Junior Judo Championship held at Doha, Qatar. As per the

departmental policy, a sportsman or in this case, the complainant, became

entitled to receive kit allowance amounting to ₹10,000/- once the

recommendation received from the Judo Federation of India was processed

in the Sports Cell of the CISF Headquarters. Thereafter, approval of the

competent authority was obtained and a bearer cheque bearing No. 921765

dated 27.10.2004 for a sum of ₹10,000/- came to be prepared in favour of

the complainant.

6. According to the prosecution, on 26.10.2004, when the complainant

visited the Sports Cell to enquire regarding release of the kit allowance, he

was informed that the Appellant was dealing with the relevant file and it was

during this inquiry/ visit that the Appellant demanded an illegal gratification

of ₹5,000/- and further stated that unless the said amount was paid, the

complainant would not receive the kit allowance. It is the further case of the

prosecution during the evening of 27.10.2004, the Appellant himself visited

the residence of the complainant carrying the cheque for the kit allowance.

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 4 of 30

Simultaneously, according to the prosecution, the Appellant once again

reiterated his demand of ₹5,000/- and instructed the complainant to bring the

amount on the following day at the place specified by him. The complainant

accepted the cheque but, instead of complying with the alleged demand,

approached the CBI on the next morning and submitted a written complaint

Ex. PW-10/B.

7. On receipt of the complaint, Inspector C.B. Ojha (PW-14) constituted

a trap team and associated two independent witnesses, namely Manoj Kumar

Devnath (PW-7) and Peeru Lal (PW-8), both officials from the Sales Tax

Department. The complaint was first subjected to verification. During the

verification proceedings, a telephonic conversation between the complainant

and the Appellant was recorded. As the complainant expressed his inability

to arrange the entire demanded amount of ₹5,000/-, it was decided to

proceed with ₹3,000/-. Thirty currency notes of ₹100/- denomination were

treated with phenolphthalein powder, their particulars were recorded in the

Handing-Over Memo. The complainant was instructed to hand over the

tainted currency to the Appellant only upon a specific demand. Manoj

Kumar Devnath was directed to act as the shadow witness and observe the

transaction. It was on appreciation of the transcript of the pre-raid

verification that the Trial Court had given its comment that the accused was

overly fixated primarily on two things, firstly the amount and secondly

regarding the date/ time or the urgency with which he required the money.

Relevant portion of PW-10’s examination-in-chief is reproduced as

hereunder:

“Court Comment- The accused is speaking with great emphasis

on the words “aaj wo paise dene hi dene hai”

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 5 of 30

8. Pursuant to the alleged instructions received from the Appellant, the

trap party proceeded towards the CISF Headquarters. According to the

prosecution, after a brief conversation between the complainant and the

Appellant, the latter reiterated his demand, whereupon the complainant

handed over the tainted currency notes to him. The Appellant allegedly

accepted the same and kept the amount in the pocket of his trousers.

Immediately thereafter, the pre-determined signal was given by the shadow

witness, whereupon members of the trap team apprehended the Appellant.

The tainted currency notes were recovered from the Appellant which tested

positive for phenolphthalein test. The serial numbers which were previously

noted down during the pre-raid proceedings were also tallied and matched

with those recorded in the handing-over memo and the hand washes as well

as the relevant pocket wash which turned pink when treated with sodium

carbonate solution. The solutions were preserved, sealed and subsequently

forwarded to the Central Forensic Science Laboratory for examination (Ex.

PW-9/A).

9. During investigation, the Investigating Officer seized the

departmental records relating to the processing of the kit allowance,

including the note sheets, cheque register, attendance register and other

connected documents. The recorded conversations were transcribed,

specimen voice samples of the Appellant were obtained and forwarded for

forensic examination. The voice expert opined that the questioned voice

matched the specimen voice of the Appellant. The chemical examiner

reported presence of phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate in the wash

samples. Upon obtaining sanction for prosecution from the competent

authority, a charge-sheet came to be filed against the Appellant for offences

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 6 of 30

punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC

Act.

10. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution examined fifteen

witnesses. The evidence comprised the testimony of the complainant, the

independent witnesses associated with the trap proceedings, departmental

officials from CISF, scientific experts from the Central Forensic Science

Laboratory, the sanctioning authority, the Trap Laying Officer and the

Investigating Officer. Various documentary exhibits including the

complaint, pre-trap proceedings, recovery memos, departmental records,

sanction order, forensic reports and voice transcripts were also proved

during the course of trial.

11. In his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the Appellant has denied

the allegations in toto and has vehemently asserted that he had been falsely

implicated and in furtherance of the same, he has taken a consistent stand

that the recovered amount was not a part of any illegal gratification, rather it

was repayment of a friendly loan earlier advanced by him to the

complainant. According to the Appellant, the complainant and he were

known to each other much prior to the alleged incident, had cordial personal

relations and frequently visited each other’s residences. The Appellant

asserted that the complainant had borrowed money from him during

financial difficulty and had agreed to repay the same after receiving the kit

allowance. The Appellant further stated that the cheque had already been

delivered to the complainant prior to the alleged trap, which was in turn

confirmed by the complainant in his examination-in-chief, thereby leaving

him with no official leverage to demand any illegal gratification.

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 7 of 30

12. The learned Trial Court, after examining the evidence on record had

concluded that the complainant had consistently deposed regarding repeated

demands of illegal gratification made by the Appellant and that his

testimony stood substantially corroborated by the shadow witness, the

recovery witness, the recorded conversations, the scientific evidence and the

testimony of the Raid Officer. The learned Trial Court held that the defence

of repayment of a friendly loan had remained unsubstantiated and was

insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC

Act. Consequently, the Appellant was convicted and sentenced in the

manner already noticed.

13. Against the backdrop of aforesaid facts and circumstances, learned

counsel for the Appellant has relied on the following judgments in support

of his argument that the prosecution has failed to prove the essential

ingredients of demand, acceptance and recovery in the case in hand:

a) G.V. Nanjundiah v. State, 1987 Supp SCC 266;

b) State of Punjab v. Sohan Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 444;

c) C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779.

14. At the outset, the learned counsel for the Appellant has assailed the

impugned judgment by contending that the learned Trial Court had failed to

appreciate the evidence in its proper perspective and had returned findings

contrary to the material available on record. It was submitted that the

foundational facts necessary for attracting Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act,

namely demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification, had not

been proved beyond reasonable doubt. According to the Appellant, the

learned Trial Court attached undue significance to the recovery of tainted

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currency while overlooking serious infirmities affecting the prosecution

case.

15. Elaborating on his preliminary submissions, the learned counsel for

the Appellant argued that the Appellant neither possessed the authority to

sanction the kit allowance nor was it within his official capacity to issue the

cheque for the kit allowance in favour of the complainant. It was submitted

that the cheque had already been prepared, duly approved by the competent

authority and, more importantly, had actually been delivered to the

complainant on 27.10.2004 itself i.e. a day prior to the alleged trap.

Concluding on this line of argument, the learned counsel for the Appellant

submitted that once the complainant had already been granted or had already

received the very benefit for which the alleged bribe was demanded, then in

that case there remained no reason for the complainant to be compelled or

obligated to move forward with meeting the demand of alleged bribe by the

Appellant, and in turn the Appellant himself would not have any leverage in

demanding any form of bribe or illegal remuneration against the

complainant to even attempt to demand any bribe, thereby rendering the

prosecution version inherently improbable.

16. Secondly, it was further submitted by the learned counsel for the

Appellant that the complainant had deliberately suppressed his prior

acquaintance with the Appellant. Attention was invited to admissions made

during cross-examination to the effect that the Appellant had earlier visited

the complainant's residence, the complainant had also visited the residence

of the Appellant and there had been prior personal dealings between them,

including an admitted petrol card transaction. According to the Appellant,

these admissions add to the strength of the defence version that the parties

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 9 of 30

shared cordial relations, despite the disparity in rank between the Appellant

and the complainant and that the money recovered during the trap

represented repayment of a friendly loan rather than illegal gratification.

17. Learned counsel for the Appellant further contended that the

Appellant had consistently maintained from the inception that the recovered

amount was in fact, repayment of a loan that he had earlier lent to the

complainant and nothing else. In support of this contention, the learned

counsel for the Appellant has primarily placed reliance on the Appellant’s

immediate explanation at the time of apprehension during the raid in saying

“mein loan leh raha hu”. The learned counsel for the Appellant, in

furtherance of this submission further argued that the very fact that the

Appellant, on being suddenly challenged as to why he was taking money

from the complainant by the raid officer at the time and place of the raid,

was able to declare without hesitation or pause, that he was taking back a

loan amount from the complainant, further adds to the defence version that

the money that was accepted did not represent any bribe amount but it was,

in fact, the loan amount being returned by the complainant to the Appellant.

18. The learned counsel for the Appellant further submitted that the

Appellant and the complainant were familiar to each other and knew each

other long before the circumstances of the current case came into existence,

and to this effect the statement of the complainant Ajay Kumar (PW-10) was

also read in corroboration towards this fact as he had, in his cross

examination stated that 27.10.2004 was not the first time the Appellant had

come to his house and that he himself had gone to visit the Appellant at his

house once or twice in the past. Learned counsel for the Appellant has gone

a step further and has submitted that the Appellant and the complainant were

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 10 of 30

in fact, friends with the sort of familiarity and closeness that despite their

disparity in rank, they would often address each other and converse using

casual language. The apparent casual nature of the recorded conversations,

the informal manner in which both parties conversed with each other and

various surrounding circumstances, all of which, according to the Appellant,

were wholly inconsistent with the prosecution’s version of a demand for

illegal gratification.

19. It was next argued that the prosecution evidence suffers from several

material contradictions. Learned counsel referred to inconsistencies

regarding the attire worn by the Appellant, the manner in which he arrived at

the spot, the pocket from which the tainted currency was recovered, the

precise words allegedly spoken by the Appellant after his apprehension and

other discrepancies emerging from the depositions of the prosecution

witnesses. It was submitted that these were not isolated inconsistencies but

cumulative circumstances creating a reasonable doubt regarding the

truthfulness of the prosecution version.

20. Learned counsel for the Appellant in conclusion submitted that the

prosecution had not been successful in proving beyond reasonable doubt the

vital ingredients to sustain a conviction under sections 7 and 13 of the PC

Act, i.e. demand, acceptance and recovery and that the statutory

presumption under Section 20 of the PC could not have been invoked unless

the prosecution first discharged its burden of proving demand and voluntary

acceptance beyond reasonable doubt.

21. Per contra, learned SPP for CBI stood by the impugned judgment and

submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based

upon a proper appreciation of both oral and documentary evidence. It was

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contended that the complainant has remained consistent on material aspects

such as the repeated demands, first on 26.10.2004 and then on 27.10.2004

when the Appellant had himself come to the house of the complainant as

well as the pre and post trap proceedings, coupled with the corroboration of

the panch witness, Raid officer, the pre raid verification (Ex. PW- 7 E-H)

and the official complaint (Ex. PW-10/B). It was further submitted that

acceptance of the tainted currency by the Appellant stands proved beyond

doubt through recovery of the tainted notes from his possession, the positive

hand wash and pocket wash reports and the forensic evidence. Learned

Special Public Prosecutor contended that the voice identification report, call

detail records and other contemporaneous documentary evidence lend

further assurance to the prosecution case.

22. Learned SPP further submitted on the point of defence that the money

exchanged was representing a friendly loan that had earlier been lent by the

Appellant to the complainant is a wholly unsupported plea. It was argued

that neither any documentary material nor any independent witness has been

produced to establish the alleged loan transaction. It was further argued by

the prosecution that the Appellant, on being challenged, did not specifically

say that he was “taking back” the amount that was loaned to the

complainant, rather he stated that he was “taking a loan”, further it was

submitted that if in fact this was simply a lapse or slip of the tongue in the

heat of the moment then the Appellant could have easily taken the time to

clarify on that aspect. Therefore, the explanation furnished by the Appellant,

according to the prosecution, was rightly rejected by the learned Trial Court

as being incapable of rebutting the statutory presumption arising under

Section 20 of the PC Act.

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 12 of 30

23. It was lastly submitted that the contradictions highlighted by the

Appellant pertain only to non-material aspects which, in totality, do not

undermine the consistent evidence regarding demand, acceptance and

recovery of illegal gratification and therefore, the appeal deserves to be

dismissed and the judgment of conviction and the order on sentence are

required to be affirmed.

24. Before proceeding to appreciate the evidence on the aforesaid aspects,

it would be apposite to first notice the legal position governing the offences

with which the Appellant has been charged. The law with regard to the

necessity of proving demand and acceptance of illegal gratification for

sustaining a conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act is no

longer res integra. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731, while

considering the earlier pronouncements including B. Jayaraj v. State of

Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 55, has reiterated that proof of demand

and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant is a sine qua non

for establishing guilt under the aforesaid provisions. The prosecution is

required to prove these facts in issue either by direct evidence, which may

be oral or documentary, or by circumstantial evidence. Mere recovery or

receipt of money, without proof of the circumstances in which it was

received, cannot by itself complete the offence. The relevant portions of

Neeraj Dutta (Supra) have been reproduced hereunder:

“88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised

as under:

88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification

by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine

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qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public

servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the

prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification

and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in

issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the

nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.

88.3. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand

and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by

circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and

documentary evidence.

88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand

and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the

following aspects have to be borne in mind:

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without there

being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply

accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is

a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case,

there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and

the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded

gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it

is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior

demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public

servant. This is an offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of

the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe-

giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to

be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words,

mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without

anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or

Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively of the Act. Therefore,

under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence,

there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver

which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an

offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when

accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a payment made

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 14 of 30

which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of

obtainment under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and

acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be

made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the

foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and

documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the

basis of the material on record, the court has the discretion to

raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of

demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a

presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in

the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns “hostile”, or has

died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand

of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of

any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or

by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case

by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it

result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.

88.7. (g) Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the

proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise

a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose

of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said

presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption

or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also

subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Sections

13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

88.8. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20

of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above

in sub-para 88.5(e), above, as the former is a mandatory

presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.”

25. The legal position which emerges from Neeraj Dutta (supra) is that,

in a case under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, proof of

demand of illegal gratification and its acceptance is indispensable. Mere

recovery of the tainted amount, by itself, cannot sustain a conviction where

the foundational fact of demand has not been established. The presumption

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under Section 20 of the Act also does not arise in a vacuum and can be

invoked only after the foundational facts relating to acceptance of

gratification have been proved by the prosecution. The same principle would

govern the allegation under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, insofar as the

prosecution alleges that the accused obtained a pecuniary advantage for

himself by abusing or employing his position as a public servant. In the

present case, therefore, the question is not merely whether a sum of ₹3,000/-

was recovered from the Appellant. This Court is required to examine

whether the evidence, viewed cumulatively, establishes that the said amount

was accepted pursuant to a demand for illegal gratification and whether such

demand was connected with the official work of the complainant. The

contentions of the defence relating to the status of the Appellant, the

delivery of the cheque, the prior acquaintance between the parties and the

explanation of the Appellant that he was taking a loan are, therefore,

required to be considered in this context.

26. It is not in dispute that the Appellant was working as an ASI (Clerk)

in the Sports Cell of CISF Headquarters. Dalel Singh (PW-2), Assistant

Commandant, has deposed regarding the duties performed by the Appellant

in the Sports Section and has identified his signatures on the relevant file

and documents. J.S. Payal (PW-3) has deposed regarding the preparation

and issuance of the cheque and has stated that the cheque in question was

prepared in his handwriting and signed by the competent authority. Thus, the

evidence does establish that the Appellant was not the final sanctioning

authority in respect of the kit allowance and that the cheque was not signed

by him.

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 16 of 30

27. The aforesaid circumstance, however, cannot be considered in

isolation. The prosecution case is not that the Appellant himself sanctioned

the kit allowance or that he had the authority to draw the cheque. The

evidence is that he was the dealing hand in the Sports Cell and was

associated with the processing of such matters. PW-3 has further stated that

the Appellant had taken the cheque from the almirah and that the cheque

was ultimately handed over to the complainant by the Appellant himself.

The fact that the Appellant was not the ultimate sanctioning authority,

therefore, does not by itself exclude the possibility of his demanding an

illegal gratification in connection with the official work with which he was

dealing.

28. At the same time, the circumstance which requires particular

consideration is that the cheque for ₹10,000/- had already been handed over

to the complainant before the trap. This is a significant circumstance and

cannot be dismissed merely by observing that a subsequent demand was

legally possible. The prosecution itself alleges that the Appellant demanded

₹5,000/- as a reward in connection with the handing over of the cheque.

Once the cheque had actually been delivered to the complainant, the alleged

reason or cause for the Appellant’s initial demand was no longer as

straightforward as it would have been had the cheque continued to remain

with the Appellant.

29. The said circumstance, however, has to be considered in the light of

what the complainant (PW-10) himself has stated regarding the events of

27.10.2004. According to him, when the Appellant came to his residence in

the evening, he again demanded ₹5,000/-, showed him the cheque of

₹10,000/- and asked him to pay the demanded amount. PW-10 stated that he

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 17 of 30

did not have the money. The Appellant obtained his signatures on the receipt

and handed over the cheque to him. PW-10 thereafter told the Appellant that

he would give him the money on the following morning. The complaint was

then lodged by PW-10 on 28.10.2004. The relevant portion of PW-10’s

examination in chief is reproduced hereunder for reference:

“In the evening at about 6 pm to 7 pm I received a telephonic call on my

mobile phone No. 9810772522 from ASI Beer Singh. I asked him as to

what happened to my case and he asked me to give my address and he

would talk to me. After about half an hour he came in a rickshaw at my

residence at Trinagar. He again asked me for money. he also told me

that the money which he was getting me would not have gotten by me at

all but for him. I told him that I was a sportsman and why should he ask

for money from me. He showed me a cheque of Rs. 10,000/- and a

receipt. He asked me to sign the receipt in token of receipt of the cheque

which he had already given to me and he also told me that he would me

some money on the spot itself and some money would be given on the

next day by him. I told him that I would neither accept any money nor

would give any money and I told him that I would meet him in the

morning and would give him any money after withdrawing the same

from the bank. The receipt (D-22) is now (Ex. PW 10/A) and bears my

signatures at point A. I have also seen cheque (Ex. PW 1/3) and it is the

same cheque which was given by accused to me.”

30. Thus, the prosecution’s own case does not proceed on the basis that

the cheque remained withheld until the trap. Rather, the prosecution’s case

can be squarely summarized by saying that the Appellant continued to insist

upon payment even after handing over the cheque. The fact of delivery of

the cheque, therefore, does not by itself contradict the prosecution’s case,

while it may require a much more careful analysis to see whether it

successfully meets the requirement or crosses the threshold of being proved

beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently a clear and concise determination

requires to be made as to whether that subsequent demand is independently

established by reliable evidence and whether it bears the character of illegal

gratification.

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 18 of 30

31. The answer to the aforesaid question is found not merely in the

testimony of PW-10, but in the circumstances preceding and accompanying

the trap. PW-10 had initially approached the Appellant regarding his kit

allowance on 26.10.2004 and has deposed that the Appellant demanded

₹5,000/-. He again met the Appellant on 27.10.2004 and stated that the

demand was repeated. Thereafter, the Appellant contacted him

telephonically, obtained his residential address and went to his residence,

where, according to PW-10, the demand was again made. The subsequent

complaint was thus not founded upon an isolated recovery of money, it

followed a sequence of alleged demands spread over 26.10.2004 and

27.10.2004. More importantly, the pre-raid verification proceedings

conducted on 28.10.2004 provide contemporaneous evidence which cannot

be disregarded. The prosecution relies upon the transcript as corroborative

evidence of the demand and the recorded conversation contains repeated

references to money and also reflects the Appellant speaking about his

financial circumstances and the urgency attached to the payment. However,

it must be clarified that the significance of the recorded conversation itself is

not that every individual sentence therein, taken separately, constitutes an

express demand for a bribe. The conversation has to be read as a whole and

in the factual setting in which it took place. The relevance of the recording

lies in the fact that it captures a conversation between the Appellant and the

complainant concerning the payment of money, following the earlier

allegations of demand. The voice expert PW-5 has also identified the

questioned voice with the specimen voice of the Appellant. The defence has

questioned the methodology and has suggested the theoretical possibility of

similarity or manipulation, however, no material has been brought on record

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 19 of 30

sufficient to displace the evidentiary value of the scientific opinion when

considered with the other evidence.

32. The testimony of Manoj Kumar Devnath (PW-7) and Peeru Lal (PW-

8) further assumes significance in relation to the trap itself. PW-7

accompanied the complainant and deposed regarding the meeting with the

Appellant, the conversation concerning the money and the subsequent

apprehension of the Appellant. PW-8 also deposed regarding the recovery of

the currency notes from the Appellant. Inspector C.B. Ojha, the Trap Laying

Officer (PW-14), corroborated the broad sequence of the pre-trap and trap

proceedings, including the apprehension of the Appellant and recovery of

the tainted currency.

33. It is true that the independent witnesses do not furnish a completely

identical account of every peripheral or minute detail. There are variations

regarding the motorcycle, the person who was driving it, the precise pocket

in which the currency was kept and certain details concerning the

Appellant's clothing. PW-7, for instance, described the currency as having

initially been kept in one pocket and subsequently referred to another

pocket, while PW-8 spoke of recovery from the left side pant pocket.

Similarly, there is variation regarding whether the Appellant himself was

driving the motorcycle or was sitting as a pillion rider.

34. These discrepancies undoubtedly require consideration, but they do

not touch the central question of whether the Appellant accepted the

currency from PW-10. Human testimony concerning a rapidly unfolding

trap cannot reasonably be expected to reproduce every peripheral detail with

mathematical precision. The material circumstance is that the witnesses

consistently place the Appellant with the complainant at the relevant time,

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 20 of 30

speak of the transaction involving the currency and depose regarding the

immediate apprehension and recovery. The discrepancies therefore do not,

by themselves, render the core version unacceptable. The non-examination

of the person who was allegedly driving the motorcycle also does not, in the

facts of the present case, destroy the prosecution case. The identity of that

person is not itself an ingredient of either offence with which the Appellant

stands charged.

35. The learned counsel for the Appellant has placed considerable

emphasis and reliance upon the statement attributed to the Appellant

immediately upon his apprehension, namely, "Main loan le rahahoon." It is

submitted that the statement furnishes the Appellant's immediate but abrupt

explanation that the money was being received as a loan and not as illegal

gratification. The statement in itself cannot be ignored but at the same time,

its evidentiary value has to be assessed in its proper setting. The words, if

literally understood, convey that the Appellant was “taking” a loan. They do

not themselves establish from whom, on what occasion, under what prior

arrangement or for what consideration such loan was allegedly being taken.

There is no independent documentary evidence of a loan placed on record.

Nor can the statement be treated as conclusive merely because it was made

immediately upon apprehension and in the spur of the moment. Therefore

the surrounding circumstances and evidence require examination in this

context in order to determine as to whether they lend independent support to

the explanation presented by the Appellant.

36. In this connection, the prior acquaintance between the Appellant and

PW-10 is also relevant. The evidence and the recorded conversation indicate

that the parties were not complete strangers. The complainant (PW-10)

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 21 of 30

accepted in cross-examination that he had visited the Appellant's residence

and that the Appellant had also previously visited his residence. The

recorded conversation between the Appellant and the Complainant contains

informal expressions and references such as “Beeru” and “Bhai”. The

Complainant also acknowledged the existence of a prior transaction

concerning a petrol card. However, the existence of prior familiarity, by

itself, does not prove the defence that the exchange was regarding a loan.

Equally, however, it cannot be blindly treated as proof of a bribe. Its

relevance is narrower, specifically that it provides the factual setting in

which the Appellant's explanation of a personal monetary transaction has to

be tested. The question that is presented at this juncture is whether that

explanation is reasonably capable of displacing the prosecution’s otherwise

corroborated account of a demand for illegal gratification.

37. The answer, in the present case, must be in the negative. The reason

being, that the alleged loan explanation is not supported by any particulars

of the alleged loan transaction. More importantly, it has to be considered

against the recorded conversation, the actual trap proceedings and the

recovery of the currency from the Appellant. The mere use of the expression

“Main loan leh raha hoon” immediately after apprehension cannot, in these

circumstances, neutralize the evidentiary chain which had already developed

against him.

38. The fact that the complainant (PW-10) lodged the complaint after

receiving the cheque also deserves separate consideration. Learned counsel

for the Appellant has vehemently argued that once the complainant had

obtained the ₹10,000/- cheque, there was no reason for him to initiate a CBI

proceeding. The question is, therefore, not whether such conduct was

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 22 of 30

theoretically possible, but whether the prosecution has furnished a credible

explanation for it. The explanation furnished by PW-10 is that receipt of the

cheque did not bring the alleged demand to an end. His evidence is that the

Appellant continued to insist upon payment and that PW-10 told him that he

would arrange the money on the following morning. The learned Trial Court

also considered this precise circumstance and found that the complaint was

lodged because of the Appellant’s persistence in demanding money despite

the delivery of the cheque.

39. This explanation is not inherently inconsistent with the sequence

proved on record. It is entirely possible, as a matter of fact, for a public

servant to demand gratification even after an official document has been

handed over, particularly where the demand is alleged to be a reward for an

act already performed. The more important consideration is whether the

evidence establishes that such a demand was actually made. In the present

case, the testimony of PW-10 regarding the continuing demand is supported

by the contemporaneous verification conversation and the subsequent trap

proceedings.

40. In this regard the observations by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sita

Soren v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 629, can be relied upon as

reproduced hereunder:

“IV. Delivery of results is irrelevant to the offence of bribery

119. Another aspect that arises for consideration is the stage at

which the offence of bribery crystallises. It has been urged by

the Solicitor General that the offence is complete outside the

legislature and is “independent” of the speech or the vote.

Therefore, the question of privilege does not arise in the first

place and the question is answered by the provisions of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Similarly, Mr Gopal

Sankarnarayanan, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 23 of 30

the offence of bribery is complete on receipt of the bribe well

before the vote is given or speech made in Parliament. It has

been urged that the performance of the promise is irrelevant to

the offence being made out, and hence, the distinction made

in P.V. Narasimha Rao [P.V. Narasimha Rao v. CBI, (1998) 4

SCC 626 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1108] is entirely artificial.

This extract is taken from Sita Soren v. Union of India, (2024) 5

SCC 629 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 229 at page 709

120. Interestingly, the judgment of the majority in P.V.

Narasimha Rao [P.V. Narasimha Rao v. CBI, (1998) 4 SCC 626:

1998 SCC (Cri) 1108] did not consider this question at all. The

minority judgment, on the other hand, discusses this aspect and

notes that the offence is complete with the acceptance of the

money or on the agreement to accept the money being concluded

and is not dependent on the performance of the illegal promise

by the receiver. Agarwal, J. observed : (P.V. Narasimha Rao

case [P.V. Narasimha Rao v. CBI, (1998) 4 SCC 626 : 1998 SCC

(Cri) 1108], SCC pp. 675-76, para 50)

“50. The construction placed by us on the expression “in

respect of” in Article 105(2) raises the question: Is the

liability to be prosecuted arising from acceptance of bribe

by a Member of Parliament for the purpose of speaking or

giving his vote in Parliament in a particular manner on a

matter pending consideration before the House an

independent liability which cannot be said to arise out of

anything said or any vote given by the Member in

Parliament? In our opinion, this question must be

answered in the affirmative. The offence of bribery is made

out against the receiver if he takes or agrees to take money

for promise to act in a certain way. The offence is complete

with the acceptance of the money or on the agreement to

accept the money being concluded and is not dependent on

the performance of the illegal promise by the receiver. The

receiver of the money will be treated to have committed the

offence even when he defaults in the illegal bargain. For

proving the offence of bribery all that is required to be

established is that the offender has received or agreed to

receive money for a promise to act in a certain way and it

is not necessary to go further and prove that he actually

acted in that way.”

(emphasis supplied)

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 24 of 30

41. The delivery of the cheque therefore does little to assist the case of the

Appellant as it fails to establish that there was no demand for illegal

gratification. It certainly demonstrates that the Appellant was no longer

withholding the physical possession of the cheque, but it does not erase the

preceding demands attributed to him, nor does it render the subsequent

demand inherently impossible. The prosecution's case is that the Appellant

had already performed the act of handing over the cheque but nevertheless

persisted in seeking ₹5,000/- from the complainant. The evidence of PW-10

on this aspect is specific and forms part of the very chronology which

culminated in the complaint and trap. The learned counsel for the Appellant

has also not furnished any explanation, nor can one be found even by

inference based on the material on record, that the complainant’s decision to

approach the CBI must necessarily have been motivated by an intention to

falsely implicate the Appellant.

42. The defence has further relied upon the fact that the Appellant was

subordinate in rank to the complainant and was not the ultimate authority

competent to sanction the kit allowance. This circumstance, while having

some relevance in establishing the relationship between the Appellant and

the Complaint, is not decisive in the overall picture of the case, the reason

being that a demand for illegal gratification clearly does not become

impossible merely because the public servant is not the final or competent

authority for completing a task. What has to be examined is whether the

accused was, in fact, making a demand for illegal gratification in connection

to an official task which would have affected the complainant, regardless of

whether the Appellant himself was officially competent to be able to

perform or deliver on such an action or task.

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 25 of 30

43. Learned counsel for the Appellant has also pointed to the fact that the

amount demanded was ₹5,000/- whereas the amount ultimately produced

and recovered in the trap was ₹3,000/-. This variation is not sufficient, in the

circumstances of the present case, to discredit the prosecution version. PW-

10’s evidence is that the demand was for ₹5,000/- and that he was unable to

arrange that amount. The trap was consequently conducted with ₹3,000/-.

The amount ultimately accepted need not necessarily be identical to the

amount initially demanded.

44. This Court is conscious that the complainant (PW-10) is not to be

treated as an infallible witness merely because he was the bribe giver. His

testimony has, therefore, been examined with reference to the other evidence

in order to check both its veracity and whether it is corroborated by other

evidence on record. His account concerning the demand finds corroboration

in the recorded conversation, the evidence relating to the trap, the recovery

of the currency and the scientific evidence concerning the washes and voice.

The case is consequently not one in which the conviction rests upon the

uncorroborated word of PW-10. The discrepancies pointed out by the

learned counsel for the Appellant, when viewed individually and

cumulatively regarding their ultimate effect and importance to material

aspects of the case, do not warrant attention. Variations concerning the

motorcycle, the precise pocket in which the currency was placed, the

clothing of the Appellant or the precise timing of particular post-trap

proceedings do not directly negate the repeated demand proved through PW-

10 and the contemporaneous recording, nor do they explain away the

recovery of the tainted currency from the Appellant.

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 26 of 30

45. Learned counsel for the Appellant has sought to derive considerable

support for his arguments from the informality of the recorded conversation

despite the disparity in ranks between the complainant and the Appellant. It

is true that the conversation contains familiar expressions and does not

resemble a formally worded negotiation or a typical conversation between a

higher ranked officer with a lower ranked officer. But an illegal demand is

not required to be made in any particular formula. Public servants and

private persons involved in an illicit transaction may, as a matter of fact,

communicate in indirect or informal language. What is material for the

matter of this case is the actual substance or the crux of the conversations

and not the manner or type of speech in which it was made.

46. In the case in hand, the conversation contains repeated references to

arranging money and also contains statements attributed to the Appellant

reflecting urgency regarding the payment. The statement that the money was

to be given that day, coupled with the surrounding conversation, assumes

significance when read alongside with the complaint, the verification

proceedings and the subsequent trap. The conversation cannot therefore be

isolated from the events immediately preceding and following it.

47. It is equally significant that the Appellant’s conduct at the time of

apprehension was not that of a person who, according to the prosecution’s

evidence, had no monetary transaction with the complainant whatsoever. He

immediately furnished an explanation that he was taking a loan. That

explanation may be considered in his favour as a circumstance requiring

examination, but once examined, it does not satisfactorily account for the

sequence of repeated demands, the recorded conversation and the trap

recovery. The cumulative effect of the evidence is, therefore, materially

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 27 of 30

different from a case where a public servant is merely found in possession of

currency and the prosecution seeks to infer demand solely from recovery.

Here, the prosecution has led evidence of prior demands, a subsequent

demand after the cheque had been handed over, a contemporaneous recorded

conversation, the trap transaction, recovery of the currency and scientific

corroboration. The fact that the cheque had already been delivered is an

important circumstance, but it operates principally upon the explanation and

context of the subsequent demand, it does not, in the presence of the other

evidence, render that demand unbelievable.

48. Accordingly, the foundational facts relating to demand and

acceptance have been established by the prosecution through evidence

independent of the mere fact of recovery. The demand is supported by the

testimony of PW-10 and the contemporaneous recorded conversation, while

acceptance is supported by the evidence of the trap witnesses, the recovery

of the tainted currency and the positive chemical examination. Once these

foundational facts stand established, the statutory presumption under Section

20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is attracted in respect of the offence

under Section 7, subject to the accused’s right to rebut the same. The

Appellant's explanation that the money represented a loan has been

considered. However, the explanation, in the absence of supporting

particulars or evidence and when tested against the prosecution evidence as

a whole, does not rebut the statutory inference arising from the proved

acceptance of gratification.

49. The Court is mindful that the burden upon the accused to rebut the

statutory presumption is not equivalent to the initial burden upon the

prosecution. The prosecution must first establish the foundational facts, and

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 28 of 30

only thereafter does the statutory presumption operate. In the present case,

for the reasons already discussed, that threshold stands crossed. The same

evidence also establishes the requisite connection between the Appellant's

conduct and his official position for the purposes of Section 13(1)(d) of the

Act, as applicable to the occurrence in question. The Appellant was a public

servant associated with the processing and handling of the relevant official

matter; he had access to and ultimately delivered the cheque and he is

proved to have obtained money from the complainant in the circumstances

established by the prosecution. The evidence, therefore, cannot be reduced

to a purely private monetary transaction merely because the defence has

suggested the possibility of a loan.

50. The most peculiar circumstance in the case in hand is regarding the

cheque which had already been delivered by the Appellant on 27.10.2004

i.e. the evening before the raid was conducted. This issue was likewise

placed squarely before the learned Trial Court and was expressly considered.

The reasoning of the learned Trial Court in that, the complainant's

possession of the cheque did not prevent the Appellant from continuing to

demand money and that the persistence of the demand explained why the

complainant approached the CBI rather than simply proceeding to put an

end to the entire issue. On an independent re-examination of the evidence,

this conclusion does not warrant interference. There appears no sufficient

reason to disbelieve the complainant (PW-10) merely because certain

aspects of his testimony contain variations. His evidence, when coupled with

all the other circumstances that has come to light, create an almost tangible

chain of events. His initial approach to the Appellant, demand of ₹5,000/-,

repetition of the demand, meeting at his residence, handing over of the

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 29 of 30

cheque, continuing insistence for money, subsequent complaint and

participation in the trap, remains materially consistent.

51. The recorded conversation vis-à-vis the pre-raid verification when

read in the context of the prior meetings, the alleged demand and the

subsequent trap, the conversation supplies contemporaneous corroboration

of the monetary demand and the Appellant's insistence upon payment. The

submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant that the conversation

was merely between acquaintances discussing a private financial transaction

does not satisfactorily explain the entire sequence of events proved on

record. The Appellant’s immediate statement that he was taking or taking

back a loan has also been considered, but it does not create a reasonable

doubt sufficient to displace the prosecution’s case. There is no independent

evidence demonstrating the existence of such a loan, whereas the

prosecution’s evidence presents a connected sequence commencing with the

alleged demand and culminating in acceptance and recovery of the tainted

currency during the trap. The statement is consequently insufficient to rebut

the inference arising from the proved circumstances.

52. Upon an overall assessment, therefore, the evidence does not leave a

reasonable doubt as to the essential fact that the Appellant demanded and

accepted money from the complainant (PW-10) as illegal gratification. The

delivery of the cheque before the complaint, though a circumstance

requiring careful scrutiny, does not destroy the prosecution’s case because

PW-10 specifically attributes a continuing demand to the Appellant after

delivery of the cheque, and that assertion is supported by the

contemporaneous verification proceedings and the subsequent trap.

CRL.A. 578/2010 Page 30 of 30

53. The conviction of the Appellant under Section 7 of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988, is accordingly upheld. The conviction under Section

13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act also does not call for

interference.

54. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The Appellant shall surrender

forthwith to undergo the sentence awarded and shall be entitled to the

benefit of set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C., as already granted by the

learned Trial Court.

55. Appeal along with pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of

accordingly.

56. Copy of the judgment be transmitted to the Trial Court and Prison

Authorities for information and requisite compliance.

VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J.

SEPTEMBER 22, 2026/ij