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PETITIONER:

BINAY KUMAR SINGH

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

THE STATE OF BIHAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31/10/1996

BENCH:

A.S. ANAND, K.T. THOMAS

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

THOMAS. J.

A veritable holocaust took place in a Bihar village

(Paras Bigha in Gaya District) on a moonlit night in early

February, 1980. In that massacre lives of 13 human beings

were snuffed out and 17 others were badly mauled, a large

number of mute cattle were burnt alive and many dwelling

houses were gutted. The venue of that macabre was the area

where houses of Harijans and people belonging to Backward

Classes were clustered together in Paras Bigha village.

After investigation the police charge-sheeted 56 persons for

various offences committed in connection with the aforesaid.

incident, but due to different reasons only 44 of them were

put on trial. Sessions Court convicted 37 among them of

various offences ranging from Section 302 IPC (read with

Section 149) to minor offences such as Section 429 IPC and

sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years for the

principal offence and to lesser terms of imprisonment for

the lesser offences. The Patna High Court confirmed the

conviction and while dealing with the sentences rectified an

illegality in awarding a sentences of imprisonment only for

10 years for the offence under Sections 302/149 IPC by

enhancing it to imprisonment for life. The maximum fine

imposed by the Sessions Court was reduced from Rs.5,000/- to

Rs. 3,000/- and made it applicable to all the convicted

accused. We are now dealing with the appeals filed by the

convicted persons in this Court by special leave.

During the pendency of these appeals the appellant in

Criminal Appeal No.91 of 1994 (Surendra Prasad Singh) died

and hence his appeal has abated. We may point out that

appellant Moiddin Mian(ranked as 7th accused in the trial

court) has not filed any appeal before the High Court and

hence the conviction and sentence passed on him remained

unchallenged. He is one of the many appellants arrayed in

Criminal Appeal NOs.280-283 of 1987 in this Court. But he

could not have Come to this Court without approaching the

High Court in appeal first. We, therefore record that his

appeal before us is not maintainable and hence the

conviction and sentence passed on him the Sessions Court

would remain undisturbed. We, therefore dismiss his appeal

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filed in this Court.

Due to the crowding of many accused person in this case

we deem it convenient to refer to the individual appellant

as far as practicable by the rank in which the were arrayed

in the trial Court. We do not think it necessary to

mention the facts elaborately yet a brief narration of the

story would be advantageous to deal with the questions

raised before us.

One Ram Niranjan Sharma (father of A-3 Madan Mohan

Sharma) was Killed on 28.10 1979 for which the police

charge-sheeted certain persons including Sukhdev Bhagat (PW-

32) and some other prosecution witnesses who were all

inhabitants of the venue of this crime. From then onward

tension was mounting up this lacality. Police patrol as well

as bandobust were provided and some measures, such as

initiation of security proceeding under Section 107 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Code') for easing

down the tension and to preserve law and order situation,

were adopted but the Police perambulation was subsequently

lifted. On the occurrence night these appellants and lot of

their henchmen formed themselves into an unlawful assembly

arming themselves with deadly weapons, gun, rifles and

cutting instruments. When the inhabitants of the place Of

occurrence were sleeping the rioters made a blitz on them

around 11 in the night. Many houses occupied by the victims

in this case were set on fire and (heap of straws) were set

blaze. The occupants who emerged out of the burning houses

were sot at by the appellant though some of them could

escape either by fleeing off or by hiding from then spewing

barrels of the firearms which prowled for them. when the

assailants were satisfied that they had accomplished their

objects they. all retreated from the scene.

The Sub-Inspector of Jehanabad Police Station got

information From Rabindra Bhagat (PW-36) about some serious

occurrence involving arson and a large number of people He

then rushed to the scene. He spotted PW-32 (Sukhdev Bhagat)

and elicited statement from him (Ext.14). he Forwarded it

to the Police Station where an Fir was prepared on its

basis. Investigation was commenced and inquests were held

autopsy on the dead bodies was arranged and hospitalisation

of the injured was ensured. On completion of the

investigation charge sheet was laid as aforesaid.

We do not propose to refer to the evidence regarding

the injuries sustained by the victims nor to the records

showing the extensive damage inflicted on the cattle as

well as to the dwelling houses. The trial court and High

Court have dealt with those aspects in extenso and reached

findings substantially in favour of the prosecution. In

fairness to all the learned senior counsel(who argued for

the appellants) we must observe that none of them disputed

before us that on the dreadful night the devastating carnage

took place at this place in which those 13 persons died and

a number of other persons were injured at the hands of

armed assailants. The nub of the points stressed by the

leaned counsel is that these appellants were not the

miscreants involved in the incident. In other words,

basically the only point now to be considered is whether

appellants were also among the assailants in the said

occurrence ?

A number of witnesses examined by the prosecution have

identified these assailants in the trial court. Leaned

Sessions Judge and the High court did place reliance on the

evidence of large of such witnesses on that aspect.

However, the trial court did not act on the evidence of Raja

Dev Bhagat (PW-5), Peru Bhagat (PW-2), Feken Yadav (PW-17)

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and Chandrika paswan (PW-19).

Learned counsel pointed out that neither the trial

court nor the High court has treated Ext.14 (statement of

PW-32 sukh Dev Bhagat) as forming the FIR in this case,

instead the statement made by PW-36 Ravindra Bhagat which

was marked as Ext.10/3 was treated as the FIR. True it is

that before the Sub Inspector of Jehanabad Police Station

(PW-42 Kalika Prasad) could record the statement of Sukhdev

Bhagat (PW-32) some information had already reached the

Police Station when Rabindra Bhagat (PW-36) went there by

early morning. It has been marked as Ext 10/3. That

information was entered in the station diary in the

following words.

At this time Rabindra Bhagat Son of

Soharai Bhagat resident of Paras

Bigha, P.s Jahanabad came to Police

Station accompanied by Bhangi Yadav

resident of village Titai Bigha and

gave the information that the sons

(probably he meant sons and grand

sons) of late Ram Niranjan Sharma

had collected with large number of

persons in his collected, with

large number of persons in his

village and they have set fire to

the houses and piles of straws and

had fled away seeing the fire and

he was not aware of the full facts

as to what had happened."

But we do not f ind any error on the part of the police

in not treating Ext 10/3 as the first information statement.

for the purpose of preparing the FIR in this case It is

evidently a cryptic information and is hardly sufficient for

discerning the commission of any cognizable offence

therefrom. Under Section 154 of the Code the information

must unmistakably relate to the commission of a cognizable

offence and it shall be reduced to writing (if given orally)

and shall he signed by its maker. The next requirement is

that the substance thereof shall be entered in a book kept

in the police station in such form as the State Government

has prescribed. First Information Report (FIR) has to be

prepared and it shall be forwarded to the magistrate who is

empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon such

report. The officer incharge of a police station is not

obliged to prepare FIR on any nebulous information received

from somebody who does not disclose any authentic knowledge

about commission of the cognizable offence. It is open to

the officer incharge to collect more information containing

details about the occurrence, if available, so that he can

consider whether a cognizable offence has been committed

warranting investigation thereto. (Tapinder Singh vs. state

of Punjab, 1971 (1) SCR 599; Some Bhai vs. state of Gujarat

AIR 1975 SC 1453; sc 1453; State of U.P. vs. P.A.Madhu AIR

1984 sc 1523).

Learned counsel who argued for the appellant, however,

contended that first information statement in this case is

neither Ext.14 nor Ext.10/3, but it should have been the

statement which PW-32 (Sukhdev Bhagat) had given before

Jehanabad Police Station much prior to the other two

statements. Learned counsel submitted that the police had,

for reasons best known to them, hushed up that statement.

Basis for the above submission is the evidence given by DW-

19 ( Nawal Kishore Prased) a member of the Board of Revenue

of the State of Bihar who conducted an official enquiry into

the administrative lapses involved in this incident. Of

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course, DW-19 claimed that one Sukhdev Bhagat had told him

during such enquiry that his first statement was not

recorded at the village but at the police station.

In this context, we may point out that Sukhdev Bhagat

(PW-32) has stated in his evidence in the trial court that

many officials would have recorded his statements though he

could not remember precisely whether an officer by name,

Nawal Kishore Prasad would have examined him. PW-32 has

further said in his evidence that Ext.14 statement was

recorded at the place of occurrence and that he had not

given any other statement to the police. If he was to be

contradicted with any other statement, the defence should

have adopted the procedure prescribed in Section 145 of the

Evidence Act. Learned counsel contended that it is enough if

he was asked questions in cross-examination with reference

to such statement. In support of it he relied on the

decision of this Court in Bhagwan Singh State of Punjab, AIR

1952 SC 214.

The credit of a witness can be impeached by proof of

any statement which is inconsistent with any part of his

evidence in court. This principle is delineated in Section

155(3) of the Evidence Act and it must be borne in mind when

reading Section 145 which consists of two limbs. It is

provided in the first limb of Section 145 that a witness may

be cross-examined as to the previous statement made by him

without such writing being shown to him. But the second limb

provides that "if it is intended to contradict him by the

writing his attention must, before the writing can be

proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used

for the purpose of contradicting him." There is thus a

distinction between the two vivid limbs, though subtle it

may be. The first limb does not envisage impeaching the

credit of a witness, but it merely enables the opposite

party to cross-examine the witness with reference to the

previous statements made by him. He may at that stage

succeed in eliciting materials to his benefit through such

cross-examination even without resorting to the procedure

laid down in the second limb. But if the witness disowns

having made any statement which is inconsistent with his

present stand his testimony in Court on that score would not

be vitiated until the corss-examiner proceeds to comply with

the procedure prescribed in the second limb of Section 145.

In Bhagwan Singh's case, Vivian Bose J. pointed Out in

paragraph that during Cross-examination of the witnesses s

concerned the formalities prescribed Section 145 are

complied With. The cross-examination in that case indicated

that every circumstance intended to be used as contradiction

was put to him point by point and passage by passage.

Learned Judges were called upon to deal with an argument

that witnesses attention should have been specifically drawn

to that passage in addition thereto. Their Lordships were

however satisfied in that case that the Procedure adopted

was in substantial compliance with Section 145, and hence

held that all that is required is that the witness must be

treated fairly and must be afforded a reasonable oportunity

of explaining the contradictions after his attention has

been drawn to them in a fair and reasonable manner. On the

facts of that case, there is no dispute with the

proposition laid therein.

So long as the attention of PW 32 (Sukhdev Bhagat) was

not drawn to the statement attributed to him as recorded by

DW-19(Nawal Kishore Prasad) we are not persuaded to reject

the evidence of PW 32 that he gave Ex.14 statement at the

venue of occurrence and that he had not given any other

statement earlier thereto.

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Learned counsel for the appellant next pointed out as

a peculiar feature in the case that none of the injured had

identified the assailants (except two or three appellants)

but only those witness who did not sustain any injury have

claimed to have identified a bulk of them. Even if so, it

cannot have any adverse impact on the credibility of the

witness relied on by the two courts as it could happen many

a times that person sustaining injuries in a mass of attack

night not be in the same position to observe men and events

as the non injured persons. It is quite probable that the

vision of the injured might get blurred, as their focus of

attention would instinctively get diverted to the injuries

sustained by them. They could then be in a less advantageous

position to watch or observe the events than the non-injured

witnesses.

That apart, there is no justification in drawing a

hiatus between injured witnesses and noninjured witnesses in

this case as for the capacity to identify the assailants

while in action. PW-4 (Babanand Bhagat), PW-9 (Doman

Bhagat), PW-14 (Krishna Das), PW-27 (Damyanti Devi), PW-33

(Ajay Kumar) are the witnesses who sustained injuries in

this episode. Among them PW-14 is a small boy who said he

got up from sleep on hearing gun shots and even at the first

sight of occurrence he fell under a shock and become

unconscious. The other injured witnesses have said that they

woke up from sleep and on seeing the surroundings in flames,

they ran for life and some sustained gun shots during the

flight while the others sustained burns. If this was the

position, we cannot find fault with then as to their

inability to identify a good number of assailants.

Some of the appellants have putforth the plea of alibi.

The appellants who resorted to the plea of Alibi in this

case are A-1 (Krishnadev), A-2 (Shyam Sunder Singh), A-3

(Madan Mohan Sharma ) and A-34 (Vinay kumar Singh). As

against the testimony of a large number of witnesses who

claimed to have noticed those appellants actively

participating in the occurrence the above noted appellants

have led evidence to show that during the relevant time

they were at far away places. Such plea was emphatically

reiterated by the learned counsel in this Court also.

According to the appellants - Krishnadev (A 1) and

Shyam Sunder Singh (A-2) on 5.2.1980 evening they were

arrested by police in connection with case No.9(2)90 of

Kankerbagh police station and was remanded to judicial

custody by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna and were

interned in the Central Jail, Patna where they remained till

19.2.1980 and were shifted to sub jail at Jehanabad where

they remained till 23.2.1980 until they were released on

bail. Those appellants examined official and non-official

witnesses to prove the plea of alibi; the Public Prosecutor

in the trial court had mounted a severe onslaught on the

said plea by contending that jail records were manipulated

at the instance of these appellants, though perhaps in the

later period of incarceration in connection with the said

case those accused might have been detained in jail.

Appellant Madan Mohan Sharma (A-3) advanced his plea of

alibi by saying that he was on the security guard o a

Minister of the Bihar Government (Thakur Prasad Singh - DW

38) and that on the night of 6.2.1980 a dinner was hosted by

that Minister in his official residence and that A-3 (Madan

Mohan Sharma) was then attending his security duty at the

residence of the Minister. The said appellant examined a

number of witnesses including the Private Secretary to the

Minister and some MLAs, besides the Minister himself, to

establish his plea. Public Prosecutor who crossexamined the

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witnesses took the stand that PW-38 had stoopped down to

speak to the false evidence only to salvage himself from the

murk of accusation flung on him inside the legislative

assmebly that someone in his personal staff played the main

role in the carnage which shocked Bihar State.

Appellant, Binay Kumar Sharma (A-32) adopted the

defence that he was admitted as an inpatient at Nalanda

Medical College Hospital with accute appendicitis and was

treated there for a long period which covered this crucial

period of 6.2.1980 also. He examined Dr. Binod Bihari Sinha

(DW-6) and DIG of Police Kapil Dev Dubey (DW-8) to prove

his plea. The Public Prosecutor who cross-examined those

witnesses assailed DW6 - Doctor suggesting that he became

privy to the fabrication of documents to concoct the plea of

alibi.

The trial court and the High Court concurently

replelled in toto, the plea of alibi putforth by the above

appellants after dealing, in extenso, with the materials

produced them in the Court in support of the plea. Learned

counsel who argued for the appellants in this Court

submitted first that the strict view adopted by the two

Courts bellow that unless the plea of alibi is conclusively

eastablished no benefit. would enure to the accused, is not

a sound proposition in criminal cases. Learned counsel

further contended that if an accused succeeded in creating a

reasonable doubt regarding the- possibility of himself to be

elsewhere then the plea of alibi need acceptance.

We must bear in mind that alibi not an exception

(special or general) envisaged in the Indian Penal code or

any other law. It is only a rule of evidence recognised in

Section 11 of the Evidence Act that facts which are

inconsistent with the fact in issue are relevant.

Illustration (A) given under the provision is worth

reproducing in this context:

"The question is whether A

committed a crime at Calcutta on a

certain date; the fact that on that

date, A was at Lahore is relevant."

The Latin word alibi means "elsewhere" and that word is

used for convenience when an accused takes recourse to a

defence line that when the occurrence took place he was so

far sway from the place of occurrence that it is extremely

improbable that he would have participated in the crime. It

is basic law that in a criminal case, in which the accused

is alleged to have inflicted physical injury to another

person, the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the

accused was present at the scene and has participated in the

crime. The burden would not be lessened by the mere fact

that the accused has adopted the defence of alibi The plea

of the accused in such cases need be considered only when

the burden has been discharged by the prosecution

satisfactorily. But once the prosecution succeeds in

discharging the burden it is incumbent on the accused, who

adopts the plea of alibi to prove it with absolute certainty

So as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the

place of occurrence. When the presence of the accused at the

scene of occurrence has been established satisfactorily by

the prosecution through reliable evidence, normally the

court would be slow to believe any counter evidence to the

effect that he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened.

But if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a

quality and of such a standard that the court may entertain

some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene

when the occurrence took place, the accused would no doubt,

be entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt. For

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that purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be laid

down that in such circumstances, the burden on the accused

is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict proof is

required for establishing the plea of alibi. This Court has

observed so on earlier occasions (vide Dudh Nath pandey vs

state of Utter Pradesh (1981) 2 SCC 166; state of

Maharashtra vs Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple AIR 1984 SC 63).

The appellants Krishnadev (A-1) and Shyam sunder Singh

(A-2) adopted the defence that they were taken to Central

Jail, Patna on 5.2.1980 on a remand order passed by the

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna. We need not vex our mind

with the evidence pertaining to the internment of those

appellants in the sub-jail, Jehanabad from 19.2.1980 till

23.2.1980 Let that be as they say. But their detention in

the Central Jail) Patna from 5.2.1980 which continued any

day beyond 6.2.1980 is the crucial period so far as this

case is concerned In considering that. crucial aspect the

first question to be pondered over is, why should they have

been arrested at all. Their case is that one Anil Kumar

lodged a complaint with the police alleging that these two

appellants had snatched Rs.10/-from one of the and so an FIR

was registered against them which included the offence under

Section 379 IPC and the arrest is said to have been made on

its basis. The two Courts below have observed that the said

Anil Kumar is a fictitious character and he was never traced

out Later. It was beyond comprehension for the two Courts as

to why these two appellants did not even move for bail

inspite of very clear advantageous factors for them. One is,

they are nephews of appellant Madan Mohan Sharma (A-3) who

was a police personnel on the security of one of the

Ministers and he was stationed at Patna itself.Second is,

bailing out the appellants would have been only a matter

for making a motion as the offences lodged against them were

seemingly trivial. Besides those incongruity, the very

unsatisfactory way the gate register of the Central Jail,

Patna was maintained has been specifically noticed by the

two Courts. In view of all such broad circumstances the

trial judge agreed with the contention of the public

prosecutor that a bogus complaint with the fictitious

complaint would have been created in advance for using it

for a plea of alibi. After exhaustively dealing with the

evidence on this aspect, the High Court also concurred with

that view.

Of course, Sri UR Lalit, learned Senior Counsel has

vehemently argued that the courts should have presumed the

genuineness of all official records and accepted the proof

as more than reasonably sufficient to discharge their

burden. We shall not forget that presumption is only a rule

in the realm of burden of proof and the reasons concurrently

weighed with the two courts below for disbelieving the plea

of alibi put forth by these two appellants are quite sturdy.

At any rate, in an appeal by special leave granted under

Article 136 of the Constitution, this Court would not be

inclined to upset the finding of fact based on such weighty

reasons, more so when the reasons advanced by both the

courts in support of the finding appeal to us also.

Sri UR Lalit, learned Senior Counsel, next contended

that the plea of Alibi advanced by the appellant Madan Mohan

Sharma (A-3) that he was on guard duty in the Minister's

bungalow should have been accepted. The distance between the

Minister's residence and the place of occurrence is 60

Kilometres. It is possible for anyone to cover the said

distance in two hours. Perhaps, he was doing guard duty in

the bungalow of the Minister but to hold that he was at the

Minister's bungalow on the night of 6.2.1980 the evidence

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must be very credit-worthy. Those defence witnesses who have

spoken to this aspect, including the Minister himself (DW-

36), have simply said long after that date that one

particular person was doing guard duty on 6.2.1980. It

should be remembered that Madan Mohan Sharma (A-3) had no

special role to play during the dinner hosted by the

Minister. The witness could not say who were the other

persons on guard duty on any other day. Those aspects apart,

it is revealed in the evidence of the Minister (DW-36) that

on the next day of occurrence a furore had erupted in the

Bhiar legislative Assembly with the allegation that a member

of the personal staff of the Minister, by name Madan Mohan

Sharma, was involved in the Paras Bigha massacre and then

the Minister has said on the floor of the Assembly that

Madan Mohan Sharma was not on his personal staff but was

only a security guard. He did not say, in the Legislative

Assembly, that Madan Mohan Sharma was at his official

residence at Patna during the relevant time. For these

reasons, we are satisfied that the trial court and the High

Court have rightly rejected his plea of alibi.

Sri Sushil Kumar, learned Senior Counsel arguing for

the appellant Binay Kumar Singh (A-34) pursued the plea of

alibi put forth by that accused in the trial court. He

examined one Dr. Binod Bihar Singh who was Associate

Professor of Medicine at Nalanda Medical College, Patna as

DW-36. The witness of course, said that appellant Binay

Kumar Singh was admitted as an in-patient of the said

Medical College Hospital for appendicitis and was not in a

position to move out of his bed even on 6.2.1980. The

witness said this with reference to the Bed-head Ticket

produced by him. But the cross-examination of DW-6 has

exposed the falsity of his evidence. That a patient admitted

for acute case of appendicitis in a Medical College Hospital

was never shown to a surgeon creates a serious doubt as to

whether this appellant was really admitted in that hospital

as claimed by DW6. The witness said in cross-examination

that the patient left the hospital soon after his admission

but again returned on the next day. PW-6 also admitted that

the Bed-head Ticket referred to by him did not contain any

entry made by him. No mark of identification of the patient

was noted in such bed-head Ticket and DW-6 had no previous

acquaintance with this appellant. No other document was

produced to support the plea. On such a meagre and

unsatisfactory evidence, the two Courts below have rightly

discarded his plea of alibi.

Turning back to the prosecution evidence regarding

identification of the appellants Sri Sushil Kumar, learned

Senior Counsel adverted to certain anomalies which crept in

the deposition of some witnesses; one such anomaly relates

to the evidence against appellant Binay Kumar Sharma.

There were two accused in this case bearing that name

Binay Kumar Sharma. One of them is the appellant in Criminal

Appeal No.277 of 1987 and he was arrayed as A-34 in the

trial court. The other Binay Sharma is from Sarthua Village

and he has jumped the bail and hence his trial was separated

from the rest of the accused as per order of the trial court

dated 15.5.1982. It is true that PW-11 ( Mithlesh Paswan )

who was examined in Court on 29.11.1982 mentioned two

persons as Binay Sharma as having been identified by him. On

the strength of it, learned senior counsel tried to make out

a strong point as seriously affecting the prosecution case

against appellant Binay Kumar Sharma (A-34). At the first

blush, we too felt that it has some serious implication on

the identification evidence of that appellant, but on closer

scrutiny, we are convinced that there is no merit in that

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contention. What PW-11, in fact, said was that he recognised

those two persons ticipating in the occurrence. It was not

as though he identified two persons in the trial court

bearing that name from out of the accused arrayed.

Arguments were addressed before us for reappreciation

of evidnece of the eye-witnesses on the strength of some

discrepancies highlighted from their testimony. But we are

not disposed to disturb the concurrent finding regarding

reliability of the evidence of those witnesses on such

discrepancies as they do not appear to us to be material or

serious.

We have noticed that Mritunjaya (A-23) and Parmanand

Sharma) and Madan Mohan Sharma son of Ambica (A-24) were

identified by more than two two witnessas as participants in

the occurrence. Out of those witness the testimony of PW-10

and PW-32 was accepted by both courts. As for the remaining

appellants both courts have accepted the testimony of at

least three witnesses each as referring to each appellant.

There is no rule of evidence that no conviction can be based

unless a certain minimum number cf witnesses have identified

a particular accused as member of the unlawful assembly. It

is axiomatic that evidence is not to be counted but only

weighed and it is not the.quantity of evidence but the

quality that matters. Even the testimony of one single

witness, if wholly reliable, is sufficient to establish tho

identification of an accused as member of an unlawful

assembly. All the same when size of the unlawful assembly is

quite large(as in this case) and many persons would have

witnessed the incident, it would be a prudent exercise to

insist on at least two relaible witnesses to vouchsafe the

identification of an accused as participant in the rioting.

In Masalti vs. The State of utter Pradesh (AIR 1965 SC 202),

a Bench of four Judges Of this court has adopted such a

formula. It is useful to extract it here :

"Where a criminal court has to deal

with evidence pertaining to the

commission of an office involving a

large number of offence and a large

number of victims, it is usual to

adopt the test that the conviction

could be sustained only if it is

suported by two or three or more

witnesses who give a consistent

account of the incident."

We feel that the said proposition can profitably be

followed in this case also as the said proposition has

stood the test of time.

We are satisfied that the two courts have considered

thew evidence form the correct angle and found the

appellants guilty of the offences keeping in view the above

proposition. There is no reason for us to interfere with the

conviction and sentences passed on the appellants. The

appeals are accordingly dismissed Bail bonds executed by

the appellants shall stand cancelled. They shall be taken

into custody to undergo the remaining part of sentence.