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PETITIONER:

MURARI & ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/11/1996

BENCH:

KULDIP SINGH, FAIZAN UDDIN

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:

With transferred cases No. 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,

28, 29, 30, 31/1995

Nos.13961-14029/96

With Civil Appeals/arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 2395, 2397,

2399, 2400, 2401, 2421, 394, 484, 305, 430-432, 1026, 1084,

2403, 740, 744, 2439, 2440, 1212, 802, 2608, 2669, 2601,

2815, 3434, 3611-3613, 3964, 5563, 5344, 4463, 4465, 4243,

5398, 4161, 4181. 1264, 1270, 2523, 2527, 2528, 3968, 3969,

4344, 5738, 5749, 5781, 5911, 5914, 5916, 5771, 6060, 6061,

6064, 6066, 5567, 7908, 6362, 7700, 8012, 8018, 8019, 8026,

8027, 8036, 7889 & 7875/1996. SLP(C) No.21671/96 (CC

1607/96)

J U D G M E N T

Faizan Uddin, J.

Leave granted,

1 .The appellants in the appeals enumerateted herein

above had challenged the acquisition proceedings in respect

of their respective lands acquired under he Land Acquisition

Act, 1894 for purposes of planed development of Delhi by

filing various writ phitions before the High Court of Delhi.

The said write petition were dismissed by a Full Bench of

the Delhi High Court by judgment dated December 14, 1995

against which these appeals have been preferred by special

leave. Various notifications were issued from time to time

under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for

acquisition of land for the public purpose of

planneddevelopment of Delhi. The said notification covered

the land belonging to the transfer petitioners, appellants

and some other persons. The transfer petitioners like others

had also filed writ petitions in the High Court of Delhi

being writ petitions No. 2179, 2178, 2140, 2139, 2197, 2083,

2138, 2144, 2199/1983 and civil writ petitions No. 810-

812/1984 challening the acquisition of their respective

lands on various grounds. These writ petitions were pending

in the High Court. However, during the course of hearing of

writ petition (C) No. 4677/1985 pending before this Court it

was felt necessary to transter all the aforesaid writ

petitions from Delhi High Court to this Court. Consequently

on the basis of Interlocutory Applications No. 20 and 21 of

1995 in W.P. (C) No. 4677/1985 this court by order dated

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December 14, 1994 directed that all the aforementioned writ

petitions be transferred to this court. This is how those

writ petitions stand transferred to this court which have

been registered as transfer cases Nos. 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,

26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 of 1995. As said earlier besides

the aforementioned transfer cases large number of writ

petitions filled by various persons were already pending

before the High Court of Delhi challenging the acquisition

of their respective lands for the public purpose of planned

development of Delhi which were dismissed by a full Bench of

the High Court of Delhi by the impugned common judgment

dated December 14, 1995 against which the appeals referred

to above have been filed by special leave. Since the common

question of law and facts arise in all these transfer cases

and appeals and, therefore, they were clubbed together and

are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. The facts in brief leading to the transfer cases and

the appeals may he narrated thus:-

Various notifications under Section 4 of the Land

Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were

issued from time to time between 1959 and 1965 for the

acquisition of several thousand acres of land for the

common, public project, namely, planned development of

Delhi. Declarations under Section under Section 6 of the Act

were also made between the years 1966 and 1969, while the

making of the awards was deferred till the year 1979-80. The

master plan of Delhi was brought into force in September

1962 giving the details of the facts and circumstances under

which it became imperative to have a development plan of the

city of Delhi. It is common knowledge that after the

partition of the country there was enormous and huge

migration of population into India mainly at Delhi which

resulted into a phenomenal growth of population of the

settlers in Delhi besides considerable growth of industrial

and commercial activities, which gave rise to various

residential and occupational problems as a result of which

various sub standard structures, complexes and colonies came

into being without proper layouts and other essentials of

life. No lands was available at reasonable price and within

the reach of common man. It was in these circumstances and

with a view to give a proper shape to the city of Delhi, the

capital of India, the Central Government had set up a Delhi

Development Authority in 1950 and later in December 1955 a

Town Planning Organisation was set up under the

administrative control of Delhi Improvement Trust to monitor

the planning development in the National Capital Territory

of Delhi. It was in this background that planned development

of Delhi was conceived of and to achieve that objective

various notifications under Section 4 of the Act were issued

from time to time between the period from 13.11.1959 and

21.11965 whereby large chunks of land were sought to be

acquired. after issuance of notices under Section 9 and 10

of the Act a spate of writ petitions were filed challenging

the acquisition proceedings on various grounds whose lands

were sought to be acquired, most of which were dismissed

including the Letters Patent Appeal by the High Court by an

earlier judgment dated April 29,1972 vide I.L.R. (1971)

3. The said judgment was challenged in appeal before this

Court which was also dismissed by judgment dated August 23,

1974 by a Constitution Bench of this Court which is reported

in 1975 (1) SCR 8O2 = AIR 1974 SC 2077 Aflatoon & Ors. Vs.

Ltd. Governor of Delhi, in which amongst others the

contentions before this Court were raised that (1) the

public purpose specified in the notification under Section 4

of the Act was vague as neither master plan nor zonal plan

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was in existence on the date of notification; (2) that there

was inordinate delay in finalising the acquisition

proceedings by reason of which the land owners were deprived

of the benefits of the appreciation of price between the

date of notification under Section 4 and the date of taking

possession of the property; (3) that provisions of Section

23 of the Act laying down that the compensation should be

determined with reference to the market value of the land as

on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act was

unreasonable restriction and affecting the fundamental

rights of the land owners. but this Court repelled all the

contentions and dismissed the appeals and the writ petitions

by maintaining the validity of notices issued under Section

4 of the Act laying down that in the case of an acquisition

of large areas of land belonging to different persons, the

specification of public purpose can only be with reference

to the acquisition of the whole area for it may be difficult

to specify the particular purpose for which each and every

item of land comprised in the area is needed but unlike the

case of an acquisition of a small area. The said

Constitution Bench of this Court dispelled the challenge of

the acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay by

holding that the appellants of that case did not move the

Court in the matter even after the declaration under section

6 was published in the year 1966 but they preferred to

approach the Court with their writ petitions only in 1970

when notices under Section 9 were issued. This Court further

took the view that the appellants of that case allowed the

Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the

basis of the notifications under Section 4 and declaration

under Section 6 of the Act which were available to them at

the time when the notifications were published and if their

objection is allowed to stand it would amount to putting a

premium on dilatory tactics adopted by them. On the question

of delay in completing the acquisition proceedings the

Constitution Bench in the aforementioned case observed that

about 600 objections were filed under Section 5-A of the Act

and civil writ petitions were also filed challenging the

validity of the acquisition proceedings. Consequently the

Government unnecessarily had to wait for disposal of those

objections and petitions before proceeding further in the

matter and, therefore, it was bound to result in delay. It

was further held that the Land Acquisition Act being a pre

constitution Act its provisions are not liable to be

challenged on the ground that they are not in conformity

with the requirement of Article 31(2) of the Constitution.

The land owners, therefore, could not complain about the

payment of compensation computing with reference to the

market value of the land as on the date of notification

under section 5 and Section 23 of the Act could not be held

to be bad, as such a challenge is precluded in view of

Article 31(5) of the Constitution. This Court further held

that it is true that there could be no planned development

of Delhi except in accordance with the provisions of Delhi

Development Act after that Act came into force but there was

no inhibition in the acquisition of land for planned

development of Delhi under the Act before the master plan

was ready.

4. Before the High Court a number of controversies and

objections were raised and the acquisition proceedings were

sought to be challenged on various grounds including

challenge to the validity of the declarations made from time

to time under Section 6 of the Act using the notification

issued under Section 4 of the Act as the reservoir and that

more than one declarations under Section 6 of the Act were

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issued which according to the transfer petitioners and the

appellants were not permissible. A plea was raised that

after the lapse of a long period and inordinate delay in

completing the proceedings, the proceedings must result in

the abandonment of the acquisition proceedings and no award

on the basis of such proceedings can validly be made. It was

also contended that more there one award is not contemplated

by law in respect of the land, which was the subject matter

of one declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act. A

further contention raised before the High Court was with

regard to the interpretation of Section 55 of Delhi

Development Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Delhi

Act). It was contended that some of the land owners had

issued notice to the Central Government under sub-section

(1) of Section 55 of the Delhi Act with regard to the

requirement of the designated land under the master plan or

sta zonal development plan but the Central Government failed

to acquire the land within a period of 6 months from the

date of receipt of the said notice as required by sub-

section (2) of Section 55 and, therefore, the said omission

on the part of the authorities to complete the acquisition

proceedings within the stipulated time would result in

abandonment of the acquisition proceedings completely in

respect of such land to which Section 25 of the Delhi Act

was applicable. It was also contended before the High Court

by some of the transfer petitioners and appellants that

according to Article 31-A of the Constitution the

appropriate value of the land forming part of an estate

which is sought to be acquired would be the market value

prevailing at the time of award and not the value prevailing

on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act as

contemplated in Section 23 thereof. The appellants of the

civil writ petition No. 325/1982 (Ram Phal Vs Union of

India) before the High Court took the plea that the Central

Government had issued an order under Section 48 of the Land

Acquisition Act withdrawing the acquisition proceedings in

respect of their land and, therefore, the acquisition

proceedings in respect of the said land be quashed. The High

Court repelled all the aforementioned contentions as well as

some other grounds on the basis of which the acquisition

proceedings were sought to be quashed and dismissed the writ

petitions by the common judgment as said earlier against

which these appeals have been preferred. To some extent same

grounds are advanced by the learned counsel appearing for

the land owners in the transfer cases.

5. The main attack by learned counsel appearing for all

the appellants and those representing the transfer

petitioners was advanced for quashing the acquisition

proceedings on the ground of delay in completing the

acquisition proceedings. M/s. Soli Sorabjee, Venugopal, P.N.

Lekhi, Kapil Sibal, Rajiv Dhavan, H.N. Salve, G.L. Sanghi

learned senior counsel and host of other advocates appearing

for the appellants made a concerted effort to show that

there was unreasonable delay of about 15 to 20 years in

completing the acquisition proceedings by the respondents by

reason of which the land owners were deprived of the

reasonable and real price of their properties who have been

offered only a pittance of compensation after a long lapse

of time while the prices have gone up many times high in

between the period from the date of notification under

Section 4 to the date of making the award and taking

possession of the properties. It was submitted that the main

purpose in issuing the notifications under Section 4 of the

Act during the period from 1959 - 1965 was to freeze the

price of the land causing great loss to the land owners. The

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decision rendered in the case of Ram Chand Vs. Union of

India 1994 (1) SCC 44 was sought to be distinguished by

contending that the same cannot stand as a bar in cases for

the reason that though the award had been made in the year

1980 but no possession was taken from the land owners and,

therefore, Ram Chand's case has no application to the facts

of the present case. Shri Soli Sorabjee further added that

there is internal inconsistency in the decision of Ram

Chand's case and the same cannot be taken to be an authority

on the proposition in all situations but different

principles have to be applied on circumstances of each case

when the fact situation is different. It was vehemently

urged by all the learned advocates that the award of

interest at the rate of 12 percent after the expiry of two

years from August 1974 in respect of the awards made prior

to the amendment of Section 23 of the Act would not mitigate

the loss suffered by the land owners. The 18th report of the

Public Accounts Committee of the 7th Lok Sabha on the

working of the Delhi Development Authority was also sought

to be pressed in service to support the aforementioned

submissions in addition to various decisions of this, Court.

It was stated that the Public Accounts Committee in its

report dated 26.4.1981 at page 101 stated in para 5.29 that

it is well known fact that the D.D.A. acquires land from the

land owners at a very low rate and after development sells

it at exorbitant rates thereby earning huge profits. It was

stated that even where land is acquired for a public

purpose, a reasonable compensation has to be paid but in

cases where land is acquired and later sold by auction or

for commercial purposes, as has happened in most cases, the

ommittee feels the land owners/farmers should not be

compelled to part with their holdings at throw away price,

the committee therefore recommended that the Land

Acquisition Act may be suitably amended so that the interest

of the farmers are properly safeguarded.

6. After giving our thoughtful consideration to the

submissions made above, it may be stated that the report of

the Public Accounts Committee referred to above and on which

great emphasis was laid is nothing but recommendations for

the necessary amendment in the Act. The recommendations of

any authority howsoever high it may be cannot be enforced

unless the same take the shape of law. The provisions of the

Land Acquisition Act as they stand today have to be

interpreted and applied in accordance with existing position

of law and in its true sense of perspective in respect of

which this Court has made authorotative pronouncements on

the points raised and contended by the learned counsel. In

the present case as stated earlier after issuance of the

notifications and notices under Section 9 and 10 of the Act

not only large number of objections were filed by the land

owners whose land was sought to be acquired but a number of

writ petitions were filed in the Delhi High Court

challenging the validity of the notification under Section

4 as well as the declaration under Section 6 in which

interim orders of stay were passed by the High Court which

resulted in the considerable delay. Thus the authorities

alone were not responsible for the delay but the land owners

were equally responsible for the same . In such

circumstances and on consideration of several decisions of

this Court including those rendered in the case of Bihar

State Housing Board Vs. Ram Behari Mahato AIR 1988 SC 2134;

and Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran Vs. Raj Kumar Johri 1992 (1)

SCC 329 this Court in the case of Ram Chand Vs. Union of

India 1994 (1) SCC 44 took the view that in any case

there. was no justification for the authorities to make the

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award in 1980/1981/1983 when the declaration under Section 6

was made in 1966-69, but at the same time, in view of the

facts of delay caused by land owners themselves in

approaching the Courts and the developments already made on

the lands for public use, quashing of acquisition

proceedings would not be appropriate. But at the same time

in the said decision this Court also took the view that the

land owners alone were not responsible for the entire delay

that was caused in completing the acquisition proceedings.

This Court in the said decision pointed out that all those

writ petitions were dismissed by this Court on August 23,

1974 in the case of Aflatoon Vs. Ltd. Governor of Delhi yet

no effective steps were taken by the respondents till 1980-

81 and in some cases even till 1983 for which the

respondents could give no justification for that delay on

their part in completing the acquisition proceedings even

after the judgment of this Court in Aflatoon's case. This

Court having regard to the fact that the Delhi

Administration and Delhi Development Authority after taking

possession of the lands various developments have been made

and third party interest have also been created and,

therefore, having regard to the larger public interest

declined to quash the acquisition proceedings on the ground

of delay but at the same time having regard to the interest

of the land owners who were likely to suffer loss in rating

the price of the land with reference to the date of

notification under Section 4, directed payment of an

additional amount of compensation to be calculated at the

rate of 12 percent per annum after expiry of two years from

August 23, 1974, the date of judgment of this Court in

Aflatoon's case (supra) till the date of the making of the

awards by the Collector to be calculated with reference to

the market value of the lands in question on the date of

notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. We do not find

any inconsistency in the said decision (Ram Chand's case)

and find ourselves in respectful agreement to the view taken

by this Court in the case of Ram Chand (supra). The same

principle has to be applied in those cases in which the

possession is not taken and there is no reason to

distinguish such cases from the application of the

principles laid down in Ram Chand's case merely on the

ground that possession is not taken from some of the land

owners. In this connection the fact could not be lost sight

of that the land owners have enjoyed possession all these

years and have taken the benefit of the usfruct and other

advantages out of the said land and, therefore, they stand

even in an advantageous position than those land owners from

whom the possession was taken earlier.

7. It was then contended that it was not open to the

Government to issue more than one declaration under Section

6 of the Act with regard to the land comprised within one

notification under Section 4 of the Act. In other words it

was submitted that the notification under Section 4 cannot

be treated as a reservior from which land could be taken

from time to time and declaration one after the other may be

made under Section 6 of the Act which is not permissible

under the Act and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings

were liable to be, quashed on this ground. In this

connection we feel it necessary to mention some of the facts

and circumstances which are relevant to the submissions made

above and to see whether the submissions have any merit or

not to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It

may be stated that similar question was raised before this

Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Vishnu Prasad Sharma

AIR 1966 SC 1593 decided by a Bench comprised of three

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learned Judges of this Court. The majority view taken was

that the provisions in Section 17(4) of the Act do not lead

to the conclusion that Section 6 of the Act contemplates

successive notification following the notification made

under Section 4 of the Act. It was held that the intention

of Section 4, 5-A and 6 of the Act was not to have

successive declarations under Section 6. It was observed

that even in a case of emergency there can at the most be

only two notifications under Section 6 following one

notification under Section 4(1), one relating to the land

which is covered by S.17 (1) and the other relating to the

land which is not covered by Section 17(1), provided both

kinds of land are notified by one notiication under Section

4(1) of the Act. In order to meet the situation created by

the judgment in the case of Vishnu Prasad Sharma (supra) the

President of India promulgated the Land Acquisition

(Amendment Validation) Act No. 13 of 1967, Section 2 of

which purported to amend Section 5-A of the Principal Act

permitting more than one award in respect of the land which

had been notified under Section 4 of the Act; Section 3 of

the said amendment Act purported to amend Section 6 of the

Principal Act by empowering different declaration to be made

from time to time in respect of different parcels of land

covered by the same notification made under Section 4(1)

irrespective of whether one report or the different reports

had been made under sub-Section 2 of Section 5-A of the

Principal Act. Further Section 4 of the Amendment Act, 1967

purported to validate all acquisitions of land made or

purported to have been made under the Principal Act before

the commencement of the ordinance dated January 20, 1967,

notwithstanding that more than one declaration under Section

6 had been made in pursuance of the same notification under

Section 4(1) and notwithstanding the judgment decree or

order of any Court to the contrary. The validity of the

aforesaid Amending Act has been upheld by this Court in the

case of Uday Ram Sharma Vs. Union of India 1968 (3) SCR 41 =

AIR 1968 SC 1138 which has been further reaffirmed by this

Court in the case of Aflatoon (supra). Some of the learned

counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the

aforementioned Amending Act was promulgated with a view to

over reach the decision of this Court rendered in the case

of Vishnu Prasad Sharma but such a submission could not be

accepted in view of the decision of this Court referred to

above upholding the validity of the said Amending Act.

8. Dr. Siddhu learned counsel appearing for the appellants

in the civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 2669/1978 as

well as some other counsel contended that the land in

village Masodpur sought to be acquired is in personal

cultivation of the land owner which is a small area and by

virtue of the second proviso of Article 31-A of the

Constitution it will not be lawful for the State to acquire

any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit

applicable to the land owner under any law for the time

being in force. It was also asserted that the market price

of the land prevailing on the date of taking over the

possession of the land should be ascertained and paid to the

land owner and not the price prevailing on the date of

notification under Section 4 of the Act. Reliance was placed

on the decision rendered by this Court in the case of D.G.

Mahajan Vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1977 SC 915 wherein it

has been observed that the second proviso of Article 31-A

confers a right and this right is higher than the one under

clause (2) of Article 31 on a person in respect of such

portion of land under his personal cultivation as is within

the ceiling limit applicable to him and if the Act by

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creating an artificial concept of a family unit and fixing

ceiling on holding of agricultural land by such family unit,

enables land within the ceiling limit to be acquired without

payment of full market values it would be taking away or

abridging the right conferred by the second proviso. Thus

even according to this decision the land within the ceiling

limit may be acquired but on payment of the full market

value. The question, therefore, arises whether the market

value prevailing on the date of the award or taking of

possession of the land or the one with reference to the date

of notification made under Section 4(1) of the Act is

payable as the just and proper compensation.

9. In the present case it may be noted that the provisions

of sub-Section (1) of Section 23 of the Act provide the

payment of the compensation of such land, building or

structure prevailing on the date of publication of the

notification under sub-Section (1) of Section 4, the

validity of which was upheld by this Court in the case of

Aflatoon (supra) wherein it was observed at page 809-F.G. of

the report as under:

"The Land Acquisition Act is a pre-

Constitution Act. Its provisions

are not, therefore, liable to be

challenged on the ground that they

are not in conformity with the

requirement of article 31(2). What

the appellants and writ petitioners

complain is that their properties

were acquired by paying them

compensation computed with

reference to the market value of

the land as on the date of the

notification under S. 4 and that S.

23 is, therefore, bad. This, in

substance, is nothing but a

challenge to the adequacy of

compensation. Such a challenge is

precluded by reason of Article

31(5). In other words, the

appellants and the writ petitioners

cannot challege the validity of

S.23 on the ground that

compensation payable under its

provisions is in any way

inadequate, because, such a

challenge would fly in the face of

Article 31(5)."

That being to, the argument advanced by the learned

counsel could not be accepted. Here a reference may also be

made to the decision in the case of P.V. Mudaliar Vs. Deputy

Collector 1965 (1) SCR 614 (621-H) in which it has been

observed as under:

"Under Article 31(2) and (2A) of

the Constitution a State is

prohibited from making a law for

acquiring land unless it is for a

public purpose and unless it fixes

the amount of compensation of

specifies the principles for

determining the amount of

compensation. But Article 31-A

lifts the ban to enable the State

to implement the pressing agrarian

reforms. The said object of the

Constitution is implicit in Article

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31-A. If the argument of the

respondents be accepted, it would

enable the State to acquire the

lands of citizens without reference

to any agrarian reform in

derogation of their fundamental

rights without payment of

compensation and thus deprive

Article 31(2) practically of its

content. If the intention of the

parliament was to make Article

31(2) a dead letter it would have

clearly expressed its intention.

This Court cannot by interpretation

enlarge the scope of Article 31-A.

On the other hand the Article , as

pointed out by us earlier, by

necessary implication, is confined

only to aqrarian reforms. Therefore

, we held that Article 31-A would

apply only to a law made for

acquisition by the State of any

"estate" or any rights therein or

for extinguishment or modification

of such rights if such acquisition,

extinguishment or modification is

connected with agrarian reform."

(emphasis supplied)

In the same report it has been further observed at page

631-D as under:

One of the elements that should

properly be taken into account in

fixing the compensation is omitted:

it results in the inadequacy or the

compensation but that in itself

does not constitute fraud on power,

as we have explained earlier. We,

therefore , hold that the Amending

Act does not offend Article 31(2)

of the Constitution."

A reference may also be made to the decision in the

case of Nagpur Improvement Trust Vs. Vithal Rao 1973 (1) SCC

page 500 para 35 which reads as under:

"The learned counsel was not able

to satisfy us that the above case

was distinguishable. We are of the

opinion that the case was rightly

decided and must govern this case.

In this view of the matter, it is

not necessary to refer to all the

cases referred to us at the Bar. We

may mention that Mr. Tarkunde also

placed reliance on Article 31(A)

(l)(a) of the Constitution. It is

now well settled that Article 31(A)

(1)(a) has relevance to agrarian

reforms and development. It has

nothing to do with acquisition of

land for building of a capital of a

State.

10. further, a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case

of Vajravalu Vs. Sp. Dy. Collector - AIR 1965 SC 1017

observed in para 14 page 1083 Col. IT as under:-

" A scrutiny of the amended Article

discloses that it accepted the

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meaning of the expressions

"Compensation" and "principles" as

defined by this Court in Mrs Bela

Banerjee's case, 1954 SCR 558 (AIR

1954 SC 170). It may be recalled

that this Court in the said

expressions and then stated whether

the principles laid down take into

account all the elements which make

up the true value of the properly

appropriated and exclude matters

which are to be neglected, is a

justiciable issue to be adjudicated

by the Court. Under the amended

Article, the law fixinq the amount

of compensation or laying down the

principles governing the said

fixation cannot be questioned in

any court on the ground that the

compensation provided by that law

was inadequate."

10. It is thus clear from these decisions that Article 31A

has got nothing to do with acquisition of land for building

of a capital of a State. In the present case before us also

the land is not said to be acquired for purposes of any

agrarian reforms and development but for the planned

development of Delhi and that being so the argument advanced

by the learned counsel in this behalf that the land

belonging to a small agriculturist within celling limit

cannot be acquired or the value of the land of the

agriculturists sought to be acquired should be determined on

the price/value prevailing on the date of award or taking of

possession and not on the value prevailing on the date of

notification under Section 4(1) cannot be accepted. In the

case of Ram Chand (supra) also in para 4 of the report this

Court while dealing with Article 31-A took the view that the

Constitution ensures under the second proviso to Article 31-

A that where any law makes provision for the acquisition by

the State, of land held by a person, under his personal

cultivation, within the ceiling limit, it shall not be

lawful for the state to acquire any portion of such land

"unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land,

building or structure provides for payment of compensation

at a rate which shall not be less than the market value

thereof". It has been further observed in the same para

that by Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978,

clause (f) of Article 19 and Article 31 have been deleted

and, as such, to hold property is no more a fundamental

right. But still the mandate under second proviso to Article

31-A continues regarding payment of market value in respect

of the land, the subject matter of acquisition, and that the

Act provides for payment of compensation in respect of the

acquisition made, at the market value of the land, as such

it is consistent with the second proviso to Article 31-A.

But in view of sub-section (1) of Section 11 and sub-section

(1) of Section 23 the market value of such land is to be

fixed with reference to the date of the publication of

notification under section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective

of the dates on which declaration under Section 6 or award

under Section 11 are made or possession is taken under

Section 16 of the Act. In this view of the matter the

contentions raised with regard to Article 31-A could not be

accepted and are accordingly rejected. The acquisition

procedings, therefore, could not be quashed on that account

also.

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11. Dr. Sidhu learned counsel appearing for the appellants

in appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 2669/1996 further

submitted that Khasra No. 364/21 was not notified under

Section 6 of the Act as the land to be acquired yet an award

has been made in respect thereto also which deserves to be

quashed to the extent of the land of the said khasra No. He

submitted that forgery was committed by changing the khasra

No. 264/21 into khasra No.364/21 as in the gazette

notification the land notified was khasra No.264/21 and not

khasra No. 364/21. This contention of the learned counsel

may be disposed of without going into the merits of the

submissions in view of the fact that the learned counsel

himself admitted that a review against the said mistake is

pending in the High Court itself.

12. Learned counsel for the appellants as well as the

counsel appearing for the transfer petitioners also

strenuously urged with great force that the land was sought

to be acquired for the planned development of Delhi and,

therefore the provisions of Delhi Development, Act, 1957

became applicable to such acquisition of land and the

acquisition or land can be made only in accordance with

master plan and zonal plans to be framed under the Delhi

Development Act. It was contended that on the issuance of

the notification under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition

of the land for planned development of Delhi it has to be

inferred that the land which was notified under Section 4 of

the Act for planned development of Delhi is the land

designated for compulsory acquisition within the meaning of

Sub-Section (1) of Section 55 of the Delhi Act but as the

land sought to be acquired was not so acquired within the

period of six months from the date of service of notice

under sub-section (2) of section 55 of the said Act by the

land owners, therefore after the expiry of the period of 10

years of the coming into force of the master plan, the land

sought to be acquired went out of the compulsory acquisition

and the same would be deemed to have been released from

acquisition. It was submitted that sub-section (2) of

Section 55 provides that the owner of the land may serve on

the Central Government a notice requiring his interest in

the land to be acquired and if the Central Government fails

to acquire the land within the period of six months the same

shall have the effect as if the land were not required to be

kept as an open space or unbuilt or were not designated as

subject to compulsory acquisition. It was asserted that

since some of the land owners whose land was sought to be

acquired had given such notice to the Central Government but

the Central Government did not acquire the land within the

specified period and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings

must be quashed on that account. After a careful

consideration of the submissions made above, we are of the

view that there is absolutely no merit in this contention.

It must be shown that the particular land is designated in

the master plan of zonal development plan which is the

subject matter of acquisition.

13. It may be pointed out that in the present case before

us no zonal development plans were prepared with regard to

the said land. In the master plan there is no

particularisation of any land which can be said to be

required for compulsory acquisition under the Delhi Act.

Neither Section 55 nor any other provisions of the Delhi Act

contain any inhibition for acquisition of the land for the

public purposes of planned development of Delhi under the

provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. As said earlier, the

notifications under section 4 of the Act were already issued

between the period from 1959 to 1965 as a result of which

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the application of Section 55 of the Delhi Act was locked up

by virtue of acquisition process under the Land Acquisition

Act. This apart the land cannot be acquired within the

period of six months as contemplated in Section 55 of the

Delhi Act unless an agreement under Section 11(2) of the Act

has reached because if the objections are filed under

Section 5-A or in response to notice under Section 9 and 10

the proceedings are bound to consume considerable time

beyond the prescribed limit of six months contained in

Section 55 of the Delhi Act. It is for these reasons that

Section 15(1) was enacted in the Delhi Act which provides

interalia that if in the opinion of the Central Government

any land is required for the purpose of development , or for

any other purpose, under the said Act, (Delhi Act) so the

Central Government may acquire such land under the

provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. It is thus

distinctly clear that despite the enforcement of the Delhi

Development Act, 1957 Section 15 (1) thereof lays down that

the land for the purposes of development may be acquired

under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. This

contention was also advanced before the High Court, The Full

Bench of the High Court after considering the arguments at

length and taking all the facts and circumstances of the

case into consideration recorded the following conclusion:-

Assuming that the argument advanced

by Mr. Lekhi is correct that once

the land is notified for compulsory

acquisition in Section 4 and 6 of

the Land Acquisition Act, it would

be deemed to have been so

designated in the master plan, even

then the provisions of Section 55

would not come into force till the

zonal development plan is also

prepared and thereafter 10 years

period had elapsed and the land so

designated is not acquired within

the stipulated period after service

of notice, only in that situation,

it may be possible to say that the

land has gone out of the expression

of compulsory acquisition used in

Section 55 of the Act. It is not

possible to agree with the

contentions that the land is deemed

to be designated for the purpose of

master plans it would not be deemed

to be designated by same inference

for the purpose of zonal

development plan."

We find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by

the High Court referred to above. Thus the argument based on

the provision of Section 55 (1) and (2) of the Delhi Act

have no merit and, therefore, the same cannot be sustained.

14. A half hearted argument was also advanced to the

effect that the life span of the master plan was 20 years

but the acquisition proceedings are not yet complete and

therefore, the notifications issued for acquisition of the

land for planned development of Delhi have lost their value

and the acquisition proceedings should be quashed. These

argument is also without any merit for the simple reason

that Delhi is the capital of the largest democratic country

of the world. There is inflow of more than a lacs of people

every year to this city. It is ever expanding cosmopolitan

commercial and industrial city with multifarious national

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and international activities. The city of Delhi is

confronted with serious housing problems due to enormous

growth and ever expanding population. Consequently Delhi

Development is a continuous unending process for which no

terminal point for the completion of such process can be

visualised. In these facts and circumstances simply because

there is a delay which in the facts and circumstances of the

present case was bound to occur, it cannot justifiably

contended that the notifications issued were rendered

ineffective. As pointed out by the High Court and in our

opinion rightly so that large tracks of land was sought to

be acquired for purpose of constructing huge residential

colonies and commercial areas and, therefore, the delay was

bound to occur in completing the acquisition proceedings.

However, the Legislature appears to have taken notice of

such delays and it was for these reasons that it came to the

rescue of land owners by amending the Land Acquisition Act

by introducing Section 11-A in the Act providing the

completion of the acquisition proceedings within the time

frame stipulated therein in order to save the land owners

from undue loss with regard to the price of land sought to

be acquired compulsorily.

15. Shri P.N. Lekhi, Shri Rajiv Dhavan and various other

counsel appearing for the appellants contented that the

Government by its order dated August 4, 1995 had withdrawn

its notification issued under Section 4 of the Act involving

certain areas of land sought to be acquired in exercise of

its power under Section 48 of the Act and, therefore, it was

submitted that if one part of the land is released for the

public purpose the whole land covered under the notification

will stand released as the Government cannot give a

differential treatment which will be get by the principles

enunciated in Article 14 of the Constitution. As against

this the learned counsel for the respondents refuted the

allegation with regard to the withdrawal of certain land

from the acquisition for the planned development of the city

of Delhi. Alternatively it was submitted that the withdrawal

of certain land included in the notification under Section 4

could be effected only by denotifying the release and since

there is no such notification denotifying the release it

could not be regarded as a release within the meaning of

Section 48 of the Act. In other words Section 48 of the Act

may be applied only when the release is published in the

official gazette in the same manner as the notification

under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act

are published in view of the provisions contained in Section

21 of the General Clauses Act and since no such notification

was published in the official gazette mere information give

with regard to the withdrawal from acquisition will be of no

consequence. Various decisions were cited for and against by

the parties at the Bar but we do not propose to burden this

judgment by citing them all except those which are most

relevant on the point in controversy.

16. It may be noticed that Sub-Section (1> of Section 48 of

the Act contemplates that except in the case provided for in

Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw

from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not

been taken. This Section thus confers power on the

Government to withdraw any land from the acquisition but

such power can be exercised only before taking the

possession of the land sought to be acquired. In this

connection before we proceed to examine the relevant

decisions it would be appropriate to refer to the

observations made by the Full Bench of the High Court in the

impugned judgment with regard to this controversy. The

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original record in which the Minister concerned is said to

have passed the order for withdrawal was produced before the

High Court which was perused by the Full Bench. The

photostat copies of the notings were also placed on record

of the High Court and after the perusal of the original

record the Full Bench found that in fact no order has been

made by the Minister concerned which may be said to be an

order for withdrawal of acquisition. The High Court observed

that mere communication of the misconstrued orders by the

officials would not have the effect of an order of the

Government withdrawing from acquisition. The High Court on a

careful perusal of the original file and the noting

contained therein and approved by the Minister came to the

definite conclusion that the Minister had directed that the

matter be taken up with the N.C.T Delhi for denotifying and

for release of the land immediately which was indicative of

the fact that the Minister had not himself passed the order

for releasing the land from acquisition and the release from

acquisition was left to the decision of N.C.T, Delhi and

since N.C.T Delhi did not give its consent the release of

the said land was not denotified. The High Court, therefore,

took the view that the communication sent to the appellants

concerned purporting to be an order under Section 48 of the

Acat is invalid and the land acquisition proceedings cannot

be quashed on the basis of such invalid communication. In

our opinion the view taken by the High Court cannot be said

to be erroneous calling for any interference by this Court.

17. Here it would be relevant to refer to some of the

decisions of this Court on the question of release of the

land under Section 48 and its validity under the law. In the

case of Chandra Bansi Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.

1984 (4) SCC page 316 this Court observed that perhaps the

appellants wanted to persuade this Court to strike down the

entire notification so that when a fresh notification is

issued they may be able to get a higher compensation in

view of sudden spurt and rise in the price of land and other

commodities in between the period when the acquisition was

made and when the actual possession was taken. This Court

took the view that it was not acceptable to uphold the

aforesaid process of reasoning. The release was declared to

be bad as a result of which the entire notification issued

under Section 4 would be deemed to be valid and the land

specially belonging to the land owner would form part of the

acquisition. It has been further held that the release being

a separate and subsequent act of the Collector, could not

invalidate the entire notification but would only invalidate

the portion released, with the result that the original

notification would be restored to its position as it stood

on the date of its notification. Assuming therefore, that

there was release of certain areas of land belonging to

certain land owners, the entire notification could not be

rendered invalid. Further this Court in a recent decision

rendered in State of Maharashtra Vs. Uma Shankar Rajabhau &

JT 1995 (8) SC 508 took the view in para 3 of the report as

follows:-

"It is brought to our notice that

after the notification was quashed

by the High Court, no further steps

were taken by the Government. It is

not necessary since it is being

challenged in the appeal in respect

of these three plots. A submission

was made that the Corporation does

not need these three plots of lands

for the employees. So long as there

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is no notification published under

Section 48(1) of the Act

withdrawing from the acquisition,

the Court cannot take notice of any

subsequent disinclination on the

part of the beneficiary."

18. The same view was expressed by this Court in yet

another decision in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam Vs. M/s Kalra

Properties (P) Ltd. In this view of the matter even if we

assume that there was an order for release of certain land

from the acquisition the same could not be given effect to

in the absence of a notification denotifying the acquisiton

of land.

19. Some of the learned counsel for the appellants also

submitted that even the land shown in the green colour in

the master plan which has been sought to be acquired but it

is not understood as to for what purpose the said land is

being acquired. It was also submitted that there are large

number of structures and complexes raised on the land sought

to be acquired in which schools, sports and other

recreational activities are going on Shri G.L. Sanghi,

learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal

arising out of SLP (c) No.5771/1996 and Civil Appeal arising

out of SLP (c) No.740/1996 as well as other advocates

appearing for some other appellants submitted that there

exist factories, workshops, godowns and MCD school besides

residential houses and quarters over the land belonging to

the appellant Partap Singh situated at Roshanara Road, Sabzi

Mandi, Delhi which has been acquired and that there exist

modern and well developed farm house with modern facilities

in the land belonging to the appellant Roshanara Begum,

where there are a good number of other structures and fruit

bearing trees. Consequently these areas do not require

further development as they are already developed and,

therefore, the said land should be released from

acquisition. Mr. Sanghi , learned counsel appearing for some

of the appellants urged that the concerned appellant had

developed a sports complex providing modern amenities

therein and if the same is demolished there would be great

national waste. It was, therefore, urged that such Complexes

and built up areas should be deleted from the acquisition.

It may be pointed out that in the master plan the land

indicated in green colour is reserved for recreational

facilities. The recreational facilities are also part of the

planned development of Delhi and it cannot be disputed that

recreational amenities are also part of the life of the

people and an important feature of a developed society.

Therefore, no legitimate objection can be made in the

acquisition of such land which are shown in green colour. So

far as the structures and constructions made on the land are

concerned there is no material to show that they were made

before the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the

Act. It is also not clear whether such constructions were

raised with or without necessary sanction/approval of the

competent authority. No grievance therefore can legitimately

be raised in that behalf as the same would be regarded as

unauthorised and made at the risk of the land owners. Here a

reference of a decision of this Court in the case of State

of U.P. Vs. Pista Devi - AIR 1986 SC 2025 may be made with

advantage, para 7 of which reads as under:

"It was next contended that in the

large extent of land acquired which

was about 412 acres there were some

buildings here and there and so the

acquisition of these parts of the

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land on which buildings were

situated was unjustified since

these portions were not either

waste to or arable lands which

could be dealt with under S. 17(1)

of the Act. This contention has not

been considered by the High Court.

We do not, however, find any

substance in it. The Government was

not acquiring any property which

was substantially covered by

buildings. It acquired about 412

acres of land on the outskirts of

Meerut city which was described as

arable land by the Collector. It

may be true that here and there

were a few superstructures. In a

case of this nature where a large

extent of land is being acquired

for planned development of the

urban area it would not be proper

to leave the small portions over

which some superstructures have

been constructed out of the

development scheme. In such a

situation where there is real

urgency it would be difficult to

apply S. 5-A of the Act in the case

of few bits of land on which some

structures are standing and to

exempt the rest of the property

from its application."

In the present case also a large extent of land

measuring thousands of acres has been acquired and,

therefore, it would not be proper to leave out some small

portions here and there over which some structures are said

to be constructed out of the planned development of Delhi.

We may, however, add here that during the course of the

arguments Shri Goswami learned counsel appearing for the

respondents-State made a statement that the Government will

consider each of the structures and take a decision in that

respect. We, therefore, leave this issue to the discretion

of the respondent.

20. After overall consideration of the issues involved in

these transfer cases and the appeals we find no ground to

take a different view than the one taken by the High Court

in the impugned judgment. Consequently, the acquisition

proceedings could not be quashed on any grounds. We also

find ourselves in respectful agreement with the view taken

by this Court in the case of Ram Chand (supra).

Consequently. the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. The

transfer cases are allowed in terms of the order made in the

case of Ram Chand (supra) directing that the tranfer

petitioners and the appellants shall be paid an additional

amount of compensation to be calculated at the rate of 12

per cent per annum, after the expiry of two years from the

date of decision of Aflatoon's case i.e. August 23, 1974

till the date of making of the awards by the Collector, to

be calculated with reference to the market value of the land

in question on the date of notification under Section 4(1)

of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case we

make no order as to costs.