2026 INSC 887

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 1 of 22

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3931 OF 2026

(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) NO.12908 OF 2025)

PRAMOD KUMAR SHUKLA ….APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS ….RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) The present Appeal lays challenge to the impugned order dated

05.06.2025 in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.11886/2025 passed by the

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, rejecting the appellant’s petition

seeking quashment of proceedings emanating from F.I.R No.405/2024.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3) Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts lie thus: On 24.12.2024, the

complainant/respondent No.4 filed a complaint alleging that the present

appellant had represented that he possessed influence in the Directorate of

Education, Prayagraj, and could secure appointments for the complainant's

son, Akhilesh Pratap Singh, and grandson, Kaushik Pratap Singh, to the

post of Clerk upon payment of a sum of ₹20,00,000/-. It was further alleged

that, when the complainant visited the residence of the appellant, the

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 2 of 22

latter's father assured him that the appellant had secured employment for

several persons and that, in the event the appointments could not be

secured, the amount paid would be returned.

4) Proceeding on such assurance, the complainant alleged that he

transferred various sums to the appellant through his State Bank of India

account maintained at Gohari Branch, Prayagraj, namely ₹50,000/- on

12.01.2023, ₹25,000/- on 13.01.2023, ₹50,000/- on 16.01.2023 and

₹50,000/- on 17.01.2023. It was further alleged that no interview for the

purported appointments was ever conducted.

5) The complainant further states that on 19.05.2024, when the

complainant, accompanied by his son and grandson, was proc eeding to the

residence of the appellant at Kazia, Prayagraj, they encountered the

appellant near Prachi Hospital, Shantipuram, Prayagraj. It is alleged that,

upon being questioned regarding the money paid and the non -fulfilment of

the promised appointments, the appellant abused the complainant and his

family members and threatened to implicate them in a false case and to kill

them if they persisted in demanding return of the money. The complainant

informed the Station House Officer, Police Station Phaphamau, Prayagraj,

regarding the said incident on the very same day and enclosed photocopies

of the bank statements evidencing the t ransfers allegedly made to the

appellant as well as a photocopy of a purported result of the Directorate of

Education, Prayagraj, which, according to the complain ant, had been

furnished by the appellant.

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 3 of 22

6) On the basis of the said complaint, FIR No.405/2024 was registered

against the appellant for offences under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468,

471, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

7) It is pertinent to note that, prior to the registration of the impugned

FIR, the complainant/respondent No.4 had filed an application under

Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

1

before the Court of

the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Prayagraj, seeking a

direction for registration of an FIR against the appellant on the allegations

substantially similar to those contained in the present complaint. Before

passing orders on the said application, the learned Additional Chief Judicial

Magistrate called for a report from the Police Crime Branch,

Commissionerate, Prayagraj. Upon consideration of the averments made in

the application and the report so submitted, the learned Magistrate, by

order dated 11.09.2024, recorded, inter alia, that the Police report reflected

that the dispute pertained to a transaction relating to purchase and sale of

land, whereas the application alleged that money had been paid to secure

public employment. Observing that the version set up by the complainant

was contrary to the material contained in the Police report, the learned

Magistrate rejected the application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC. The

revision preferred there against was subsequently dismissed by the Sessions

Court.

8) Aggrieved by the registration of FIR No. 405/2024, the appellant

invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

1

For short, ‘Cr.PC’

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 4 of 22

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking quashing of the

aforesaid FIR and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.

9) By the impugned order, the High Court dismissed the writ petition

holding that the rejection of an earlier application under Section 156(3) of

the Cr.PC could not, by itself, operate as a bar to the subsequent

registration of an FIR if the information otherwise disclosed the commission

of a cognizable offence. Upon a prima facie reading of the allegations

contained in the impugned FIR, the High Court observed that cognizable

offences were made out and that the a ppellant's defence regarding the

nature of the monetary transactions was a matter falling within the domain

of investigation and, therefore, rejected the appellant's petition.

10) Aggrieved, the appellant is now before this Court.

11) Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant and

the complainant/respondent no.4 were property dealers having a long-

standing commercial relationship involving several land and monetary

transactions. It was submitted that the Police report dated 17.07.2024 itself

recorded the dispute to be civil in nature, arising out of a land transaction.

12) Learned counsel submitted that FIR No. 405/202 4 amounted to an

impermissible second round of proceedings on allegations substantially

identical to those raised in the complainant's earlier application under

Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, which had been rejected by the learned

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate by order dated 11.09.2024 after

considering the Police report. The said order having been affirmed in

revision and never challenged, it was contended that the subsequent FIR

was legally unsustainable. Reliance was placed on Mohan Karthik and

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 5 of 22

Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another

2

, to submit that once an

application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC is rejected on merits, the

complainant's remedy lies only by way of a complaint under Section 200 of

the Cr.PC.

13) It was further submitted that, even accepting the allegations in the

FIR at face value, no cognizable offence is disclosed. Reliance was placed on

State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others

3

and Neeharika

Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra and Others

4

to

contend that the proceedings deserved to be quashed, as the essential

ingredients of Sections 420, 406, 467 and 471 of the IPC were absent. It was

further urged that the alleged transaction, being one for securing public

employment through influence, was void under Section 23 of the Indian

Contract Act, 1872 and incapable of giving rise to criminal liability.

14) Learned counsel also contended that the FIR was actuated by mala

fides and fell within category (7) of Bhajan Lal (supra), having been lodged

only after the rejection of the application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC.

Reliance was also placed on Priyanka Srivastava and Another v. State of

Uttar Pradesh and Others

5

to submit that indiscriminate resort to

proceedings under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC results in abuse of the

criminal process.

15) On these grounds, it was submitted that the impugned order warrants

interference and the FIR, along with consequential proceedings, deserve to

be quashed.

2

Criminal Appeal No.2193/2026 decided on 27.04.2026 .

3

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

4

(2021) 19 SCC 401

5

(2015) 6 SCC 287

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 6 of 22

16) Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent-State submitted that

the impugned FIR was founded upon fresh material furnished after the

rejection of the application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, including an

audio recording contained in a pen drive, details of monetary transactions,

and forged documents such as admit cards and results, which had not been

placed before the learned Magistrate earlier.

17) Reliance was placed on V. Ravi Kumar v. State Represented by

Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Salem, Tamil Nadu and

Others

6

, Shivshankar Singh v. State of Bihar and Another

7

and Anju

Chaudhary v. State of U ttar Pradesh and Another

8

, to submit that a

subsequent complaint or FIR is not barred where it is founded upon fresh

material or distinct facts not considered in the earlier proceedings.

18) It was further submitted that the appellant has a history of

committing offences of a similar nature, with five other FIRs registered

against him at two different Police Stations involving substantially similar

allegations, which lends credence to the prosecution’s case and warrants a

thorough investigation rather than interference at the threshold. Learned

counsel submitted that the High Court had rightly held that the impugned

FIR disclosed cognizable offences, the appellant having admittedly received

money from the informant in his account, and that the appellant's

explanation that the money pertained to some other transaction did not

inspire confidence and required investigation.

6

(2019) 14 SCC 568

7

(2012) 1 SCC 130

8

(2013) 6 SCC 384

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 7 of 22

19) To bolster his submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent-

State placed reliance on M/s Jayant Vitamins Ltd. v. Chaitanyakumar

and Another

9

to submit that investigation into an offence is a statutory

function of the Police, superintendence over which vests in the State

Government, and that Courts ought not to interfere with an investigation

absent compelling and justifiable reasons.

20) Learned counsel submitted that there exists no express legal bar

under the Cr.PC to the institution or continuance of the present

proceedings, and that the Police were well within their powers to register the

FIR upon the discovery of fresh incriminating material, notwithstanding the

earlier rejection of the Section 156(3) application on the material then

available.

21) Predicating upon the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the

respondent-State submitted that the impugned order does not warrant

interference and the present Appeal deserves to be dismissed.

ANALYSIS

22) Heard the learned counsel for either side, and now the rival

submissions fall for our consideration.

23) The question which arises for consideration before this Court, in casu,

is whether the High Court was justified in declining to quash the subject FIR

and the proceedings arising therefrom, despite the rejection by the learned

Magistrate of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC founded on

substantially the same allegations.

9

(1992) 4 SCC 15

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 8 of 22

24) It would be useful, at the outset, to trace the statutory architecture

within which an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC operates.

25) Section 154 of the Cr.PC prescribes the ordinary mode of setting the

criminal law in motion. Information relating to the commission of a

cognizable offence, whether given orally or in writing to the officer-in-charge

of a police station, is required to be reduced to writing, read over to the

informant, and entered in the book maintained for the purpose, this is what

is conventionally, though not statutorily, termed the First Information

Report. Sub-section (3) of Section 154 provides a further safeguard, where

the officer-in-charge refuses to record such information, or fails to do so, the

informant may address the substance of the information in writing to the

Superintendent of Police, who, upon being satisfied that a cognizable offence

is disclosed, may either investigate the matter himself or direct investigation

by a subordinate officer.

26) Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC empowers a Magistrate to order

investigation of a cognizable offence. Ordinarily, recourse to the Magistrate

under this provision is engaged where the remedies contemplated under

Section 154(1) and 154(3) have not resulted in registration of an FIR.

27) Section 190 of the Cr.PC empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of

an offence in three distinct contingencies, such as (i) upon a complaint of

facts constituting an offence; (ii) upon a police report of such facts; or

(iii) upon information received from a source other than a police officer, or

upon his own knowledge. Read together, Sections 154, 156(3) and 190

disclose a graded statutory scheme, the ordinary and primary recourse of an

informant lies with the Police under Section 154 Cr.PC, recourse to the

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 9 of 22

Magistrate under Section 156(3) is a step properly taken where that primary

recourse has failed or been refused and cognizance under Section 190 is a

distinct and subsequent stage, triggered by any of the three contingencies

noted above, and not confined to a police report consequent upon a Section

173 of the Cr.PC direction alone.

28) This Court, in Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others

10

delineated the statutory scheme governing the exercise of jurisdiction under

Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC. It was observed that where an informant is

aggrieved by the refusal of the Police to register a First Information Report

under Section 154 of the Cr.PC, the remedies contemplated under Sections

154(1) and 154(3) of the Cr.PC are required to be availed of before invoking

the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC. The

Court further explained that Section 156(3) operates as a statutory check

upon Police inaction or an unsatisfactory investigation and empowers the

Magistrate to direct registration of an FIR, ensure that a proper investigation

is conducted, and, where the circumstances so warrant, monitor the

investigation so as to secure compliance with the mandate of law. It was

further clarified that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3)

is independent of the power of the investigating agency to conduct further

investigation under Section 173(8) of the Cr.PC.

29) The nature of the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC came

to be authoritatively explained by this Court in Devarapalli

10

(2008) 2 SCC 409

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 10 of 22

Lakshminarayana Reddy and Others v. V. Narayana Reddy and

Others

11

wherein it was observed thus :

“17. Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption:

“Information to the Police and their powers to investigate”;

while Section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading:

“Of complaints to Magistrates”. The power to order police

investigation under Section 156(3) is different from the

power to direct investigation conferred by Section 202(1).

The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The

first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second

at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is

in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a

complaint regarding the commission of a cognizable

offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by

the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence

under Section 190(1)( a). But if he once takes such

cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in

Chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the pre -

cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3). It may be

noted further that an order made under sub -section (3) of

Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or

intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of

investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation

embraces the entire continuous process which begins with

the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with

a report or charge-sheet under Section 173. On the other

hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has

been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter

XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to

the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation,

the Magistrate is empowered under Section 202 to direct,

within the limits circumscribed by that section an investigation

“for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient

ground for proceeding”. Thus the object of an investigation

under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report

but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already

instituted upon a complaint before him.”

(emphasis supplied)

30) The aforesaid principle has been consistently followed by this Court.

In SAS Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana and Another

12

, it was

reiterated that a Magistrate, while directing investigation under Section

156(3) of the Cr.PC, does not take cognizance of the offence. Cognizance is

taken only where the Magistrate, upon application of judicial mind, chooses

11

(1976) 3 SCC 252

12

2024 SCC OnLine SC 4046

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 11 of 22

to proceed under Chapter XV of the Code by resorting to the procedure

contemplated under Section 200 of the Cr.PC.

31) The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions leave little room

for doubt as regards the nature and scope of the jurisdiction under Section

156(3) of the Cr.PC. The provision is intended to secure the exercise of the

statutory power of investigation under Chapter XII where the Police fail or

refuse to discharge their statutory duty. An order passed thereunder is, in

substance, a judicial direction requiring the Police to exercise the powers

vested in them under Section 156(1) of the Cr.PC.

32) It follows that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the

Cr.PC, the Magistrate does not embark upon the procedure contemplated

under Chapter XV of the Code, nor does he take cognizance of the offence.

The order merely sets the investigative machinery under Chapter XII in

motion, leaving the investigation to be conducted by the Police in

accordance with law and to culminate in a report under Section 173 of the

Cr.PC. The jurisdiction under Section 156(3), therefore, is con fined to

directing investigation.

33) Before proceeding further, it is necessary to notice that the

observations in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra), insofar as

they describe the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC as being

exercisable only at the pre-cognizance stage, no longer represent the

prevailing legal position. In Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others v.

State of Gujarat and Another

13

this Court, upon an analysis of Sections

13

(2019) 17 SCC 1

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 12 of 22

2(h), 156(3) and 173(8) of the Cr.PC, held that the expression "investigation"

occurring in Section 156(3) is of wide amplitude and includes further

investigation under Section 173(8). It was accordingly held that the

Magistrate's power to ensure a fair and proper investigation continues until

the commencement of trial and is not exhausted merely upon the taking of

cognizance. The clarification in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (supra),

however, concerns only the temporal ambit of the Magistrate's jurisdiction

and does not alter the essential character of an order under Section 156(3)

of the Cr.PC.

34) It is, therefore, evident that an order passed under Section 156(3) of

the Cr.PC is not one rendered upon an adjudication on the merits of the

allegations against the proposed accused but is confined to regulating the

commencement of investigation in accordance with the statutory scheme of

the Code. The question which therefore arises is whether rejection of an

application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC attains such finality as to

preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same or

substantially similar allegations by operation of the doctrine of res judicata.

35) The contours of the doctrine of res judicata in criminal proceedings

recently came to be comprehensively examined by this Court in S.C. Garg v.

State of Uttar Pradesh and Another

14

, authored by one of us (Prashant

Kumar Mishra, J.), wherein this Court undertook an exhaustive survey of

the earlier authorities on the subject and reconciled the seemingly divergent

14

2025 SCC OnLine SC 791

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 13 of 22

lines of precedent. The discussion, being of direct relevance to the issue

arising in the present case, is reproduced hereunder:

“13. The question as to the applicability of principle of res

judicata in criminal matters have been considered by this

Court in several decisions. In the matters of Pritam Singh v. The

State of Punjab, (1972) 2 SCC 466, Bhagat Ram v. State of

Rajasthan

8

& The State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand Jain, (1974)

3 SCC 72, this Court has consistently laid down the principle

that the principle of res judicata is equally applicable in

criminal matters. However, in two later decisions,

namely, Devendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 7 SCC 495,

and Muskan Enterprises v. The State of Punjab, (2024) INSC

1046, in which one of us was a member (Justice Prashant

Kumar Mishra), this Court observed in the context of

maintainability of second petition under Section 482 Cr.

P.C. that principle of res judicata has no application in a

criminal matter. Considering divergence of opinion, it would be

appropriate for us to have deeper examination and reading of

the law laid down by this Court in the earlier decisions.

14. In Pritam Singh (supra), a three Judge Bench of this Court

speaking through Natwarlal Harilal Bhagwati, J. placing

reliance on Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federal of

Malaya, [1950] A.C. 458, decided by a Bench of Five Judges of

the Judicial Committee, opined that maxim res judicata is no

less appliable to criminal than to civil proceedings. In the said

matter, accused Pritam Singh was earlier tried for an offence

under the Arms Act basing recovery of a weapon from him. In

the said case Pritam Singh was acquitted. In a subsequent

trial, the same recovery was again sought to be used by the

prosecution as one of the circumstances in an offence of

murder. In these set of facts, this Court recorded the following

findings as to the applicability of principle of res judicata in

criminal matters:

“15. In regard to the recovery of Ex. P-14 the learned

Additional Sessions Judge had not put any reliance on

the acquittal of the accused by the learned Additional

Sessions Judge, Faridkot, of the offence under the Arms

Act, observing that any expression of opinion contained

in the judgment was not only not binding on him but was

irrelevant under the Indian Evidence Act.

On a perusal of the evidence led by the prosecution in

this behalf he had held that the recovery of Ex. P-14 was

proved against the accused and considered that as

connecting Pritam Singh Lohara with the incident. The

High Court, on the other hand, relied upon the

observations of Lord MacDermott at p. 479

in Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federal of

Malaya, [1950] A.C. 458 (A):—

“The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a

competent Court on a lawful charge and after a lawful

trial is not completely stated by saying that the person

acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To

that it must be added that the verdict is binding and

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 14 of 22

conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the

parties to the adjudication.

The maxim ‘res judicata pro veritate accipitur’ is no less

applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings. Here, the

appellant having been acquitted at the first trial on the

charge of having ammunition in his possession, the

prosecution was bound to accept the correctness of that

verdict and was precluded from taking any steps to

challenge it at the second trial.”

15. In Bhagat Ram (supra), a two Judge Bench of this Court

speaking through H.R. Khanna, J. again applied and

approved Sambasivam (supra) and Pritam Singh (supra).

16. Thereafter in Tarachand Jain (supra), this Court referred

to Bhagat Ram (supra) and Sambasivam (supra) to hold thus:

“13. ……….The question as to what is the binding effect

of a decision in subsequent proceedings of the same

original matter was considered by this Court in the case

of Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan, [(1972) 2 SCC

466 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 751] and it was held that the

principle of res judicata is also applicable to criminal

proceedings and it is not permissible in the subsequent

stage of the same proceedings to convict a person for an

offence in respect of which an order for his acquittal has

already been recorded. Reliance in this context was

placed upon the observations of the Judicial Committee

in the case of Samba Sivam v. Public Prosecutor,

Federation of Malaya. [[1950] A.C. 458] In Bhagat Ram

case [(1972) 2 SCC 466 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 751] a Single

Judge of the High Court to whom a limited question had

been referred because of a difference of opinion between

two Judges of the Division Bench, not only decided the

question referred to him, he also interfered with the

acquittal of the accused regarding certain offences in

respect of which an order for acquittal had already been

made earlier by the Division Bench. It was held that it

was not within the competence of the Single Judge to

reopen the matter and pass the above order of conviction

in the face of the earlier order of the Division Bench for

acquittal. Although Bhagat Ram case [(1972) 2 SCC

466 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 751] related to acquittal, the

principle laid down in that case, in our opinion, holds

good in a case like the present wherein the question is

about the binding effect of the earlier Division Bench

judgment regarding the validity of the sanction for the

prosecution of the accused-respondent.”

17. We shall now have a look at the subsequent

matters Devendra (supra) and Muskan Enterprises (Supra)

wherein it is held that principle of res judicata is not applicable

in criminal proceedings. In Devendra (supra) was a case where

after dismissal of first petition under Section 482 Cr.

P.C. seeking quashing of the FIR, the appellants therein

preferred another application under Section 482 Cr. P.C., after

the Magistrate took cognizance of the matter, which was

dismissed by the High Court. In this Court, it was argued by

the opposite party that the first order of the High Court

dismissing the petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 15 of 22

operate as res judicata. Negating the said argument, a two

Judge Bench of this Court held in para 25 as under:

“25. Mr. Das, furthermore, would contend that the order

of the High Court dated 17-10-2005 would operate as res

judicata. With respect, we cannot subscribe to the said

view. The principle of res judicata has no application in a

criminal proceeding. The principles of res judicata as

adumbrated in Section 11 of the Code of Civil

Procedure or the general principles thereof will have no

application in a case of this nature.”

18. In Muskan Enterprises (supra), similar was the position.

The first petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. was dismissed as

withdrawn without liberty obtained to apply afresh, the High

Court dismissed the second petition under Section 482 Cr.

P.C. as not maintainable. Referring to Devendra (supra), a two

Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a member

(Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.) observed thus in para 17:

“17. That the principle of res judicata has no application

in a criminal proceeding was reiterated by this Court

in Devendra v. State of U.P.”

19. Reading three earlier decisions vis-à-vis the two later

decisions parallelly, we do not think that considering the

context and the stage of the proceedings in which the matters

stood and agitated before this Court, there is any diversion in

the applicability of the principle of res judicata. While three

earlier decisions in Pritam Singh (Supra), Bhagat

Ram (supra) and Tarachand Jain (supra) were decided

basis acquittal in previous trial, the subsequent decision

in Devendra (supra) and Muskan Enterprises (supra) have

been decided at the stage of quashing petition under

Section 482 Cr. P.C., thus, in both the matters, there was

no final adjudication of merits. While in Devendra (supra),

the first petition was for quashing of the FIR and the second

petition was preferred after the Magistrate took cognizance of

the matter; in Muskan (supra), the first petition was dismissed

as withdrawn whereas the second petition was held not

maintainable due to earlier withdrawal without any liberty.

Thus, these two cases are totally distinguishable.

In addition, it is important to bear that Sambasivam (supra)

was decided by Five Judges of the Judicial Committee

and Pritam Singh (supra) was decided by a three Judge Bench,

whereas all subsequent decisions have been rendered by the

two Judges Bench. Therefore, Pritam Singh (supra) is binding

insofar as the issue concerning the applicability of principle

of res judicata in a criminal proceeding is concerned.”

(emphasis supplied)

36) The discussion in S.C. Garg (supra) clarifies that there is, in fact, no

inconsistency between the earlier authorities recognising the applicability of

the doctrine of res judicata in criminal proceedings and the later decisions in

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 16 of 22

Devendra and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh

15

and Muskan

Enterprises and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another

16

. As

noticed therein, Pritam Singh and Another v. State of Punjab.

17

, Bhagat

Ram v. State of Rajasthan

18

and State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand

Jain.

19

were rendered in proceedings where the issue had already

culminated in a final adjudication, whereas Devendra (supra) and Muskan

Enterprises (supra) arose in an altogether different procedural setting,

namely successive petitions under Section 482 of the Cr.PC, where no

adjudication on the merits had taken place. It was in that limited factual

and procedural context that this Court held the doctrine of res judicata to be

inapplicable.

37) The reconciliation undertaken in S.C. Garg (supra), therefore,

demonstrates that the applicability of the doctrine in criminal proceedings

cannot be determined in the abstract. The decisive consideration is the

character and legal effect of the earlier proceeding. Where the earlier

proceeding has culminated in a final adjudication determining the issue, the

doctrine may operate in accordance with law. Conversely, where the earlier

proceeding has not resulted in such adjudication on the merits, as was the

case in Devendra (supra) and Muskan Enterprises (supra), the question of

applying the doctrine does not arise.

38) The inquiry before this Court must, therefore, proceed on the same

doctrinal footing. The issue is not whether an earlier application under

15

(2009) 7 SCC 495

16

(2024) INSC 1046

17

(1955) 2 SCC 446

18

(1972) 2 SCC 466

19

(1974) 3 SCC 72

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 17 of 22

Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC had been preferred or rejected. Rather, the

determinative question is whether an order rejecting such an application

possesses the character of a final adjudication on the merits so as to attract

the doctrine of res judicata.

39) In our considered view, the answer must be in the negative. As already

discussed, an order passed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC is confined to

directing, or declining to direct, the exercise of the statutory power of

investigation under Chapter XII of the Code. Such an order neither entails

an adjudication on the merits of the allegations nor determines any right or

liability of the proposed accused. Applying the same principle, the rejection

of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, being an order rendered

at the threshold without any adjudication on the merits after trial, cannot be

accorded such finality as would attract the doctrine of res judicata so as to

bar the subsequent registration of an FIR or the continuation of criminal

proceedings founded upon the same or substantially similar allegations.

40) The above conclusion also receives direct affirmation from the order of

this Court in Mahendri and Others v. State of U.P. and Another

20

, where

the precise contention urged before this Court was that once an application

under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC had been rejected, it was impermissible

for the complainant to subsequently lodge an FIR founded on the same

allegations. Repelling the said contention, this Court observed thus:

"We have given our thoughtful consideration to the solitary

contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for

the appellants. As noticed hereinabove, it is apparent that the

application filed by the complainant under Section 156(3) of

the Criminal Procedure Code was declined by the Court of

competent jurisdiction at Deoband vide order dated

20

Criminal Appeal No.2021 of 2009 decided on 18.03.2015.

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 18 of 22

04.10.2007. The prayer made by the complainant in the

aforesaid application was to order further investigation in the

matter. The declining of the aforesaid prayer, would not

affect the merits of the controversy, nor would it reflect

the veracity of the allegations made by the complainant in

the First Information Report which was subsequently

lodged on 10.10.2007. …..it is not possible for us to say,

that the order passed by the concerned Court on

04.10.2007 would have any effect on the veracity or the

merits of the allegations made by the complaint on

10.10.2007 or the proceedings which would emanate

therewith….”

(emphasis supplied)

41) The reasoning in Mahendri (supra) is wholly consistent with the

statutory scheme discussed hereinabove. The Court unequivocally held that

rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC neither

determines the merits of the controversy nor reflects upon the truthfulness

of the allegations subsequently made in the FIR.

42) Independent of whether an application under Section 156(3) of the

Cr.PC has been allowed or rejected, the duty of the Police under Section 154

of the Cr.PC remains governed by the statutory mandate of the Code. The

obligation to register and investigate a cognizable offence does not emanate

from a direction issued by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) but flows

directly from Sections 154 and 156

21

of the Cr.PC. itself. This position

stands authoritatively settled by the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari

21

156. Police Officer's power to investigate cognisable case— (1) Any officer in charge of

a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognisable case

which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would

have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question

on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this

section to investigate.

(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above-

mentioned.

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 19 of 22

v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others

22

wherein it was held that

where the information furnished discloses the commission of a cognizable

offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory. The police officer cannot avoid

that statutory duty and at the stage of registration, the enquiry is confined

to whether the information ex facie discloses a cognizable offence, the

truthfulness, credibility or otherwise of the allegations being matters for

investigation and not for refusing registration.

43) The consequence is self-evident. The rejection of an application under

Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC cannot curtail or extinguish the independent

statutory obligation cast upon the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC. If,

notwithstanding such rejection, information disclosing the commission of a

cognizable offence is subsequently furnished to the Police, the statutory

duty recognised in Lalita Kumari (supra) continues to operate with full

force.

44) At this juncture, it is necessary to address the reliance placed by the

learned counsel for the appellant upon the recent decision of this Court in

Mohan Karthik (supra), in this case, the question before this Court was

whether the learned Magistrate had the jurisdiction to invoke Section 156(3)

of the Cr.PC for a second time, despite the earlier order whereby the learned

Magistrate had dismissed the initial application under Section 156(3) of the

Cr.PC, as well as the subsequent closure report filed by the Police pursuant

to the direction issued by the High Court to conduct a preliminary inquiry.

This Court held that the second round of resort to Section 156(3) of the

Cr.PC was nothing but an attempt to review the earlier order passed by the

22

(2014) 2 SCC 1

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 20 of 22

High Court. It was further noticed that the liberty granted by the High Court

was only for the purpose of invoking Section 200 of the Cr.PC and that the

complainant ought to have pursued that remedy instead of once again

invoking Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, the parameters governing the two

provisions being altogether different.

45) As already observed in the preceding paragraphs, the issue arising in

the present case is entirely different. We are not concerned with the

maintainability of a second application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC or

the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to entertain the same. The question arising

in the present case, therefore, bears no nexus to the dispute considered in

Mohan Karthik (supra) and the said decision has no application to the

controversy before us.

46) Having answered the principal question regarding the legal effect of

the rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, we may

now examine whether the High Court was justified in declining to exercise

its jurisdiction to quash the impugned FIR. The High Court has recorded

that, on a plain reading of the allegations contained in the First Information

Report, cognizable offences are prima facie disclosed and that the appellant's

defence regarding the true nature of the monetary transactions constitutes a

matter requiring investigation. We find no error in the approach so adopted.

47) It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of

the Cr.PC, the Court is concerned only with whether the allegations

contained in the FIR, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety,

disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. At that stage, the Court

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 21 of 22

does not embark upon an enquiry into the correctness, reliability or

probative value of the material relied upon by either side. This principle

stands authoritatively settled in Bhajan Lal (supra) and has been

consistently reaffirmed, in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd (supra). In the

present case, the FIR alleges that the appellant induced the informant to

part with substantial sums of money on the representation that he could

secure public employment for the informant's son and grandson, received

such amounts in his bank account, furnished forged admit cards and

examination results in furtherance of the deception, and thereafter

threatened the informant when repayment was demanded. We are also

conscious of the fact that the record indicates that the appellant is arraigned

in five FIR’s with substantially similar allegations. These allegations, if

accepted at their face value, unquestionably disclose the commission of

cognizable offences warranting investigation.

48) The various submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant

regarding the true nature of the monetary transactions, the police report

obtained in the earlier proceedings under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, and

the evidentiary worth of the audio recordings, bank transactions, admit

cards and other documents, are all matters falling within the domain of

appreciation of evidence in a trial. At this stage, Court cannot undertake an

examination of such material or determine which of the rival versions is

more probable.

SLP (Crl.) No.12908/2025 Page 22 of 22

49) Accordingly, finding no perversity in the findings rendered by the High

Court warranting interference, the present Appeal is sans merit and is

dismissed.

…………………..........................J.

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

.………………............................J.

(N.V. ANJARIA)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 19, 2026.