2026 INSC 573 Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 1 of 17

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. …………………… OF 2026

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.32390 of 2025)

A. SHAHUL HAMEED … APPELLANT (S)

Versus

N. MALLIGARJUNA AND ORS. … RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.

Leave Granted.

2. The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment and decree dated

25.06.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in S.A. No.905 of

2017, whereby the High Court partly allowed the Second Appeal preferred by the

Plaintiff-Appellant. The High Court dismissed the suit qua the relief of specific

performance, however, it directed the Defendant(s)-Respondent(s) to return a

sum of Rs.9,30,000/- along with 12% interest per annum from the date of the suit,

i.e., 10.03.2011, till the date of realization to the Plaintiff-appellant.

3. For the sake of convenience, the appellant herein shall be referred to as the

plaintiff and the respondent(s) herein shall be referred to as the defendant(s).

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 2 of 17

4. The facts of the case in a nutshell are as follows. The plaintiff (purchaser)

entered into a sale agreement dated 19.03.2010

1

with the defendant(s) (vendors)

for the purchase of the property bearing Survey No.75/1

2

for a total sale

consideration of Rs.9,30,000/-, out of which a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- was paid as

earnest money. The balance amount of Rs.30,000/- was agreed to be paid at the

time of execution of the sale deed, within four months. According to the plaintiff,

he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and, in July

2010, approached the defendant(s) to complete the sale transaction, however, they

sought further time. In December 2010, when the plaintiff again insisted on the

execution of the subject sale agreement, the defendant(s) allegedly became

evasive and demanded more money and when the plaintiff refused, they

threatened to alienate the property to a third party. As a result, the plaintiff issued

a legal notice dated 01.02.2011, calling upon the defendant(s) to receive the

balance consideration and execute the sale deed in accordance with the

agreement. Since no reply thereto was furnished, the plaintiff instituted OS No.35

of 2011 before the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Hosur

3

, seeking specific

performance of the Agreement to Sell dated 19.03.2010.

5. The defendant(s), in their written statement, denied the averments made in

the plaint in toto and contended that the subject sale agreement dated 19.03.2010

was only a nominal agreement and was never intended to be acted upon as a

genuine agreement for sale. According to them, the subject sale agreement was

merely executed as a ‘security document’ in relation to an earlier sale transaction

involving purchasers from Bangalore

4

. It was their case that under an earlier sale

agreement dated 17.07.2009, certain lands were agreed to be sold to the

Bangalore Buyers, however, since one portion of the land could not be conveyed

1

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘subject sale agreement’.

2

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘subject suit property’.

3

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’.

4

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Bangalore Buyers’.

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 3 of 17

due to defects in title, the subject sale agreement came to be executed in favour

of the plaintiff (relative of ‘Bangalore Buyers’) as a security to ensure completion

of the sale of the remaining portion of land. Reliance was also placed on the

alleged reconveyance deed executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant(s)

on the same date in respect of the subject suit property. Although the receipt of

the legal notice was admitted, it was contended that no reply was sent, as the

plaintiff had orally stated that the notice could be ignored. The defendant(s)

further denied receiving Rs.9,00,000/- as sale consideration and disputed the

plaintiff’s readiness and willingness to perform the agreement.

6. Upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court vide

judgment dated 21.12.2012 decreed the suit for specific performance in favour of

the plaintiff. The Trial Court noted that the defendant(s) had admitted execution

of the agreement, including signatures thereon, and had not raised the plea of

forgery either in the written statement or during trial. The defence that the

agreement was merely a security document in respect of the unsold portion of

land was found to be improbable and unconvincing. The Trial Court further noted

that, despite being in receipt of the legal notice, the defendant(s) failed to reply

to the same denying the transaction. Accordingly, the Trial Court held that the

subject sale agreement dated 19.03.2010 was genuine, valid and enforceable and

directed the plaintiff to deposit the balance sale consideration and the defendants

to execute the sale deed within two months.

7. In appeal, the First Appellate Court

5

vide judgment dated 28.08.2014,

partly modified the order of the Trial Court. While concurring the finding

returned by the Trial Court that the subject sale agreement dated 19.03.2010 was

genuine and valid and that the defendant(s) have failed to establish that the

5

Third Additional District Session Court, Hosur in Appeal Suit No.09/2013.

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 4 of 17

agreement was executed for merely for security purposes, the First Appellate

Court denied to grant the relief of specific performance on the ground that the

plaintiff had failed to establish his readiness and willingness in terms of Section

16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act 1963

6

. It was observed that since the plaintiff did

not issue the legal notice within the time period stipulated in the subject sale

agreement, i.e., immediately after the expiry of four months, he has failed to prove

that he was ready and willing to perform the contract. Accordingly, the First

Appellate Court directed the defendant(s) to refund the advance amount of

Rs.9,00,000/- along with 6% interest.

8. Against the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, a second

appeal was filed before the High Court, wherein the following substantial

questions of law were formulated:

“(i) After having concurred with the findings of the trial Court on the point of

genuineness of the agreement and enforceability of the same, can the Lower

Appellate Court reverse the judgment and decree of the trial Court for specific

performance of the contract finding that the appellant/Plaintiff has not come to the

court within the time stipulated in the agreement dated 19.10.2010 [sic, should be

19.03.2010]?

(ii) Whether the readiness and willingness shown by the appellant in the notice

issued under Ex.A-2 dated 01.02.2011 and his averment in the plaint that he is ready

and willing to perform his part of the contract having parted with a sum of Rs.9.00

lakhs are not sufficient compliance of the requirement as contemplated under

Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act to decree the suit for specific performance of

the contract?”

9. The High Court, vide the impugned judgment dated 25.06.2025, partly

allowed the second appeal preferred by the plaintiff and modified the judgment

of the First Appellate Court by holding that the subject sale agreement was never

intended for sale of suit property and was executed merely as a security for the

earlier transaction involving the Bangalore Buyers. It further held that the

6

Hereinafter referred to as ‘SPA 1963’.

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 5 of 17

plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence to prove his willingness to perform the

contract within the stipulated time period i.e., on or before 19.07.2010. Thus,

while affirming denial of the relief of specific performance, the High Court

directed the defendant(s) to pay a sum of Rs.9,30,000/- along with 12% interest

per annum from the date of suit i.e., 10.03.2011 till the date of realization to the

plaintiff. For ready reference, the relevant portion is extracted hereunder:

“19. To sum up, this Court concludes that Ex-A.1 - Sale Agreement was never

intended for sale of Suit Property and it was executed only as a security, as insisted

by the Bangalore buyers in favour of plaintiff, for either getting Sale Deed executed

in respect of Survey No.76I/lB or returning Rs.9,30,000/-, which the first defendant

owed the Bangalore buyers in lieu of non-execution of Sale Deed in respect of

Survey No.761/lB. There is no evidence available on record to show that first

defendant got Sale Deed executed in respect of Survey No.761/1B in favour of the

Bangalore buyers. The defendants cannot absolve their liability. Hence, the First

Appellate Court was right in ordering return of money but it failed to consider that

the first defendant's liability is to the tune of Rs.9,30,000/-, though it seem to be

only Rs.9,00,000/- as per Ex-A. I. Further, considering the fact that the transaction

in this case, being one of real estate, is commercial in nature and hence, the First

Appellate Court ought to have awarded 12% interest considering the facts and

circumstances of the case. Hence, this Court directs the defendants to pay the

plaintiff a sum of Rs.9,30,000/- with interest at the rate of 12% from the date of

plaint till the date of realisation. Further, to enable the plaintiff to realise the said

amount, a charge shall be created on the Suit Property.

20. The First Appellate Court’s concurred with the Trial Court's finding that Ex-

A.1 - Sale Agreement is true and valid but the First Appellate Court went on to hold

that the plaintiff failed to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of

the contract within 4 months and hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of

specific performance. The First Appellate Court has not denied the relief of specific

performance on the ground that the plaintiff failed to approach the Court on time.

Hence the first Substantial Questions of Law does not arise at all in this case. As

regards the second one, mere pleadings do not amount to proof. As stated supra. the

payment of a major chunk of the alleged sale consideration as advance by the

plaintiff may show his readiness, but there is no evidence available on record to

prove his willing to perform his part of the contract within the stipulated time period

i.e., on or before July 19, 2010. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific

plea by the opposite party, in view of Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act,

1963, the plaintiff has to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of

the contract. The plaintiff is bound to prove his readiness and willingness during

the stipulated period of performance till the conclusion of trial but in this case Ex-

A.2 - Notice issued quite long after the lapse of period of performance cannot be

termed to show his readiness and willingness during the period of performance.

Hence, the plaint pleadings, Ex-A.2, as well as payment of Rs.9,00,000/- as advance

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 6 of 17

does not prove the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. Thus Section 16 (c) of

the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is not complied with by the plaintiff. …

… … …

22. Resultantly, the Second Appeal stands partly-allowed and the Judgment and

Decree of the First Appellate Court is modified as hereunder:

(a) The Suit is dismissed qua the relief of specific performance and decreed for

return of money;

(b) The defendants are directed to pay a sum of Rs.9,30,000/- along with 12%

interest per annum from the date of Suit i.e. March 10, 2011, till the date of

realization to the plaintiff;”

10. It is in this background that the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal

before this Court. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused

the material on record, the issues that arises for our consideration are: (a) whether

the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908

7

, was justified in reversing the concurrent findings of the

Courts below holding the subject sale agreement dated 19.03.2010 to be genuine

and valid; and (b) whether the plaintiff had established continuous readiness and

willingness in terms of Section 16(c) SPA 1963 so as to entitle him to the relief

of specific performance.

11. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it would be apposite to briefly

reiterate the principles of law governing the power of the High Court under

Section 100 CPC. It is a well settled legal position that Section 100 confers

jurisdiction on High Court to entertain a second appeal, only when it is satisfied

that the case involves a substantial question of law. Re-appreciation of evidence

and interference with concurrent findings of fact is impermissible unless such

findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or suffering from

material illegality or misreading of evidence. Merely because another possible

7

Hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’.

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 7 of 17

view may arise from the same material on record would not justify interference

under Section 100 CPC.

11.1. In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar

8

, this

Court has held that if, from a given set of circumstances, two inferences are

possible, then the one drawn by the lower appellate Court is binding on the

High Court. Relevant extract is reproduced hereunder:

“4. … In exercise of the powers under this section the findings of fact of

the first appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept

in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right

attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be

regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The

conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a

second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add to or

enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely

equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts howsoever erroneous

cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this

section. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a

substantial question of fact. …

5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds

on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the

first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not

ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of

credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial

court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is

found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so.

In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are

possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High

Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible.

The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first

appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower

appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions

of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements

made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or

arrived at without evidence.”

(emphasis supplied)

8

(1999) 3 SCC 722.

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 8 of 17

11.2. This Court in C. Doddanarayana Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy

9

,

while placing reliance on Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail

Madris-Un-Niswan

10

, held that the scope to interfere with the finding of

facts in second appeal is limited and observed as under:

“25. The question as to whether a substantial question of law arises, has

been a subject-matter of interpretation by this Court. In the judgment

in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-

Niswan [Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-

Niswan, (1999) 6 SCC 343] , it was held that findings of the fact could not

have been interfered within the second appeal. This Court held as under :

(SCC pp. 347-48, paras 12-15)

“12. This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the High

Court to interfere in second appeal under Section 100 CPC is

limited solely to decide a substantial question of law, if at all

the same arises in the case. It has deprecated the practice of the

High Court routinely interfering in pure findings of fact

reached by the courts below without coming to the conclusion

that the said finding of fact is either perverse or not based on

material on record.

13. In Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu [Ramanuja

Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu, (1996) 3 SCC 392] , this Court

held : (SCC p. 393)

‘It is now well settled that concurrent findings of fact of trial

court and first appellate court cannot be interfered with by the

High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of

the Civil Procedure Code. The Single Judge of the High Court

totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second

appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did.’

14. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna

Chetty [Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty, (1996) 6 SCC

166] , this Court held : (SCC p. 166)

‘Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below

by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided

unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High

Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to

replace the findings of the lower courts. … Even assuming that

another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same

evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as

it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court

was based on no material.’

15. And again in Taliparamba Education

Society v. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N. [Taliparamba

9

(2020) 4 SCC 659.

10

(1999) 6 SCC 343.

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 9 of 17

Education Society v. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N.,

(1997) 4 SCC 484] , this Court held : (SCC p. 486, para 5)

‘5. … The High Court was grossly in error in trenching upon

the appreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC and

recording reverse finding of fact, which is impermissible.”

(emphasis supplied)

11.3. In State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal

11

, it was held as under:

“15. It is a trite law that in order to record any finding on the facts, the trial

court is required to appreciate the entire evidence (oral and documentary)

in the light of the pleadings of the parties. Similarly, it is also a trite law

that the appellate court also has the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence

de novo while hearing the first appeal and either affirm the finding of the

trial court or reverse it. If the appellate court affirms the finding, it is called

“concurrent finding of fact” whereas if the finding is reversed, it is called

“reversing finding”. These expressions are well known in the legal

parlance.

16. When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the

appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded

dehors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or it was based on

misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against

any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting

judicially could reasonably have reached. (See observation made by

learned Judge, Vivian Bose, J., as his Lordship then was a Judge of the

Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar v. Dashrath

Narayan Chilwelkar [Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar v. Dashrath

Narayan Chilwelkar, 1942 SCC OnLine MP 26 : AIR 1943 Nag 117] para

43.)”

11.4. Recently, this Court in Ramachandra Reddy v. Ramulu Ammal

12

,

through one of us (Sanjay Karol, J) reiterated the principle that the

jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with concurrent findings in second

appeal is limited and held as under:

“28. The above conclusion apart, it was also to be demonstrated by the

High Court that the reversal of concurrent findings by the courts below

was justified. The jurisdiction to interfere in findings where the courts

below have been ad idem, is limited and such limitation is well expounded.

We may only refer to a few authorities.

29. Dalveer Bhandari, J. in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki [Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki,

(2007) 1 SCC 546] referred to various earlier judgments in the following

manner: (SCC pp. 561 & 565-66, paras 55-56, 73 & 81)

11

(2019) 8 SCC 637.

12

(2025) 8 SCC 788.

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 10 of 17

“55. This Court again reminded the High Court in HRCEC v. P.

Shanmugama [HRCEC v. P. Shanmugama, (2005) 9 SCC 232] that the

High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the

finding of facts.

56. Again, this Court in State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi [State of

Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi, (2005) 10 SCC 139] has reiterated the same

principle that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the

concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that, in doing so, the

High Court has gone beyond the scope of Section 100 of the Code of

Civil Procedure.

***

73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as in 1890

stated [Durga Choudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri, 1890 SCC

OnLine PC 10 : (1889-90) 17 IA 122] that there is no jurisdiction to

entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact,

however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, and they added

a note of warning that no court in India has power to add to, or enlarge,

the grounds specified in Section 100.

***

81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court

and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100

has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a

large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the

High Court interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the

amendment of Section 100CPC in 1976. The High Court would not

have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in

this case even prior to the amendment of Section 100CPC. The

judgment of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of Section

100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention.”

(emphasis supplied)”

12. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, upon

appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, concurrently held

that the subject sale agreement dated 19.03.2010 was genuine, valid, and duly

executed between the parties. The defendant(s) had admitted the execution of the

subject sale agreement and their signatures thereon, and had not raised any plea

of forgery either in their written statement or during trial. The testimony of PW1,

plaintiff, was found to be duly corroborated by PW2, an attesting witness to the

agreement, and PW3, the scribe of the document. Both PW2 and PW3

consistently deposed that a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- had been paid by the plaintiff

towards advance sale consideration and only a balance amount of Rs.30,000/-

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 11 of 17

remained payable at the time of registration of the sale deed. The Courts below,

therefore, concluded that execution of the agreement and payment of substantial

consideration stood clearly established from the evidence on record.

13. The Courts below further rejected the defence of the defendant(s) that the

subject sale agreement was merely a nominal/security document executed in

relation to an earlier transaction involving Bangalore Buyers. Upon a thorough

analysis, both the Trial and First Appellate Court found the said defence to be

wholly improbable and unconvincing. It was observed that if the Bangalore

Buyers were genuinely interested in securing title over the remaining land, they

could have entered into a sale agreement directly with the original owners. The

explanation furnished by the defendant(s) that the subject agreement came to be

executed in favour of the plaintiff because he was related to the Bangalore Buyers

did not inspire confidence.

14. The execution of the alleged reconveyance deed was also disbelieved, inter

alia, on the ground that the scribe had not signed the document and evidence of

the attesting witness (DW-2) was weak and unreliable inasmuch as he admitted

during cross-examination that he was unaware of the contents of the document,

the survey number mentioned therein and even the year of its execution.

Additionally, DW-2 did not employ the term ‘security’ for the executed sale

agreement. Consequently, the reconveyance deed was held to lack credibility.

15. Even otherwise, assuming arguendo, that the subject sale agreement and

reconveyance deed were executed only as a security arrangement in relation to

the alleged transaction with the Bangalore Buyers, the defendant(s) failed to place

any material on record to substantiate such a plea. No evidence was adduced to

establish that the alleged sale transaction with respect to the unsold portion of

land with such Bangalore Buyers ever materialized. Further, the defendant(s)

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 12 of 17

neither revoked the subject sale agreement upon expiry of such four months nor

filed suit for specific performance of reconveyance deed. Pertinently, the

defendant(s) have failed to examine Bangalore Buyers to prove the claim of

alleged security arrangement or to show that an amount of Rs.9,30,000/- was

payable and intended to be returned to them.

16. Therefore, drawing from the conspectus of the aforesaid facts and

circumstances, we are of the considered view that the High Court, while

exercising the power under Section 100 CPC, erred in interfering with the

concurrent findings of fact returned by the Courts below regarding the validity

and genuineness of the subject sale agreement. The Trial Court and First

Appellate Court had drawn their conclusion after appreciating the evidence

available on record. The High Court, while interfering with the said finding, failed

to demonstrate that the conclusions arrived at by the Courts below suffered from

any perversity, material illegality or were in ignorance of relevant evidence. In

effect, the High Court reappreciated the evidence so as to come to a different

conclusion, which is clearly impermissible within the limited scope of Section

100 CPC.

17. Insofar as the second issue regarding readiness and willingness under

Section 16(c) SPA 1963 is concerned, we find it difficult to sustain the findings

returned by the First Appellate Court and as affirmed by the High Court vide the

impugned judgment. It is trite law that in order to obtain a decree for specific

performance, the plaintiff must aver and prove that he was always ‘ready and

willing’ to perform the terms of the contract which are to be performed by him.

Such readiness and willingness of the plaintiff is to be gathered from the entirety

of facts and circumstances of the case, including the overall conduct of the parties

prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit. [See: Syed Dastagir v. T.R.

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 13 of 17

Gopalakrishna Setty

13

; Sughar Singh v. Hari Singh

14

; and Janardan Das v.

Durga Prasad Agarwalla

15

]

17.1 In C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy

16

, this Court, on consideration

of various decisions, culled out what is implied by the words ‘ready and

willing’. It was held:

“16. The words “ready and willing” imply that the plaintiff was prepared to

carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend

upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part

of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If

the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge

whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the

court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and

subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances.

The amount which he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be

proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution of the contract

till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform

his part of the contract. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances

whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready to perform his contract.

17. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao [N.P. Thirugnanam v. R.

Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115] , it was held that continuous readiness

and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of

the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant

and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to

grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must

fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part

of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the

plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other

attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to

the defendant must necessarily be proved to be available.

18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James [Pushparani S.

Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582] , this Court has

held that inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from the

conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances in a particular case.

It was held thus: (SCC p. 584, para 5)

“5. … So far these being a plea that they were ready and willing

to perform their part of the contract is there in the pleading, we

have no hesitation to conclude, that this by itself is not sufficient

to hold that the appellants were ready and willing in terms of

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This requires not only

such plea but also proof of the same. Now examining the first of

13

(1999) 6 SCC 337.

14

(2021) 17 SCC 705.

15

(2024) 19 SCC 276.

16

(2020) 3 SCC 280.

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 14 of 17

the two circumstances, how could mere filing of this suit, after

exemption was granted be a circumstance about willingness or

readiness of the plaintiff. This at the most could be the desire of

the plaintiff to have this property. It may be for such a desire this

suit was filed raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the said

Act makes it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has to be

proved.””

17.2 In Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap v. Pramilabai Chandulal

Parandekar

17

, this Court held that ‘readiness and willingness’ of the

plaintiff to perform his part of the contract has to be examined with reference

to all the facts and circumstances and held as under:

“13. When the agreements in question were for the sale of suit property, the

plaintiffs were entitled to take up the action seeking specific performance.

However, in order to succeed in their claim, the plaintiffs were required to

aver and prove that they were always ready and willing to perform their part

of the contract. …

… … …

13.2. The question as to whether the plaintiff seeking specific performance

has been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract is required to

be examined with reference to all the facts and the surrounding factors of the

given case. The requirement is not that the plaintiff should continuously

approach the defendant with payment or make incessant requests for

performance. For the relief of specific performance, which is essentially a

species of equity but has got statutory recognition in terms of the Specific

Relief Act, 1963 [ Its forerunner being the Specific Relief Act, 1877.] , the

plaintiff must be found standing with the contract and the plaintiff's conduct

should not be carrying any such blameworthiness so as to be considered

inequitable. The requirement of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff is

not theoretical in nature but is essentially a question of fact, which needs to

be determined with reference to the pleadings and evidence of parties as also

to all the material circumstances having bearing on the conduct of parties, the

plaintiff in particular. …

… … …

13.5. … when the plaintiffs had the limitation of three years for filing the suit

for specific performance, it cannot be said that during the aforesaid period,

the plaintiffs were required to show overt act by them in furtherance of the

agreement in question. … In Pushparani S. Sundaram [Pushparani S.

Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582] , the basic

requirements of Section 16 of the 1963 Act were reiterated. In contrast to

what is suggested on behalf of the appellants, we may point out that recently,

in R. Lakshmikantham v. Devaraji [R. Lakshmikantham v. Devaraji, (2019)

8 SCC 62] , this Court has again explained that when the suit for specific

17

(2020) 15 SCC 731.

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 15 of 17

performance is filed within the period of limitation, delay cannot be put

against the plaintiff. This Court has said: (SCC p. 66, para 11)

“11. … In the aforesaid circumstances, the High Court was also incorrect in

putting a short delay in filing the suit against the plaintiff to state that he was

not ready and willing. In India, it is well settled that the rule of equity that

exists in England, does not apply, and so long as a suit for specific

performance is filed within the period of limitation, delay cannot be put

against the plaintiff — See Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji

Rao [Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao, AIR 1965 SC 1405] (para

7) which reads as under: (AIR p. 1409)

‘7. Mr Lakshmaiah cited a long catena of English decisions to

define the scope of a court's discretion. Before referring to them,

it is necessary to know the fundamental difference between the

two systems—English and Indian—qua the relief of specific

performance. In England the relief of specific performance

pertains to the domain of equity; in India, to that of statutory

law. In England there is no period of limitation for instituting a

suit for the said relief and, therefore, mere delay—the time lag

depending upon circumstances—may itself be sufficient to

refuse the relief; but, in India mere delay cannot be a ground for

refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of

limitation. If the suit is in time, delay is sanctioned by law; if it

is beyond time, the suit will be dismissed as barred by time; in

either case, no question of equity arises.’ ””

(emphasis supplied)

18. In the present case, the plaintiff had specifically pleaded that he was always

ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The principal defence set up

by the defendant(s) throughout was not that the plaintiff lacked readiness and

willingness, but rather that the agreement itself was merely a nominal/security

agreement executed in relation to another transaction involving Bangalore

Buyers. Once such a defence has concurrently been held to be improbable by the

Trial Court and First Appellate Court, there appears no logical reason to hold that

the plaintiff lacked readiness and willingness to perform its part under the

contract, particularly when a substantial amount of Rs.9,00,000/-, out of the total

consideration of Rs.9,30,000/- already stood paid by him. Only a nominal amount

of Rs.30,000/- was left, which was payable at the time of execution of the sale

deed. If the plaintiff was unwilling to perform the contract, he would not have

paid nearly 93% of the sale consideration.

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 16 of 17

19. Merely because the legal notice came to be issued after expiry of four

months from the stipulated period mentioned in the agreement, the same by itself

cannot lead to an inference that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform

the contract, especially when the suit itself was instituted well within the

prescribed period of limitation. The readiness and willingness of the plaintiff

must be assessed in light of the overall conduct of the parties and the attending

circumstances of the particular case.

20. The plaintiff, in the present, has consistently pleaded and deposed that he

approached the defendant(s) within the stipulated period for completion of the

transaction, however, they sought further time. When the plaintiff again

approached the defendant(s) in December 2010, they became evasive and

demanded additional money. It was only thereafter that the plaintiff issued a legal

notice dated 01.02.2011 calling upon the defendant(s) to execute the sale deed

upon receipt of the balance consideration. Thus, the legal notice was issued soon

after the defendant(s) refused to honour their part of the agreement. Such conduct

clearly demonstrates continuous willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of

the contract.

21. It is also pertinent to note that despite admittedly receiving the legal notice,

the defendant(s) failed to issue any reply denying the agreement or disputing the

assertions made by the plaintiff therein. An adverse inference, therefore, arises

against the defendant(s), particularly when the defence sought to be raised

appears to be an afterthought. In view of the above discussion, we are of the

considered opinion that the plaintiff has sufficiently established continuous

readiness and willingness within the meaning of Section 16(c) SPA 1963.

Civil Appeal No….of 2026 @ SLP(C) No.32390 of 2025 Page 17 of 17

22. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and

decree dated 25.06.2025, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in

S.A. No.905 of 2017, as well the judgment and decree dated 28.08.2014, passed

by the First Appellate Court insofar as it denied the relief of specific performance,

are hereby set aside. The judgment and decree dated 21.12.2012, passed by the

Trial Court decreeing the suit for specific performance is restored.

Pending application(s), if any shall stand disposed of.

……………………………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

…………………………………….J.

(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)

NEW DELHI;

27 May 2026