No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
1 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
2024:CGHC:49305
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
[Judgment reserved on : 11.12.2024]
[Judgment delivered on: 13.12.2024]
In
MISC. APPEAL NO. 88 OF 2019
(Arising out of Judgment dated 27.7.2019 passed by District
Judge, Raigarh in Regular Civil Appeal No.31 of 2016)
1(a)Smt. Kaveri Patel, Wd/o Jivdhan Patel, aged about 60
years,
1(b) Devendra Patel, S/o Late Jivdhan Patel, aged about 38
years,
1(c) Omprakash Patel, S/o Late Jivdhan Patel, aged about
33 years,
All the above 1(a) to 1(c) are residents of Tikrapara,
Darogapara, Raigarh, Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
1(d) Smt. Meena Patel, D/o Late Jivdhan Patel, aged about
35 years, R/o Village Dhabra, Tahsil Dhabra, District
Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
... Appellant(s)
Defendants No.1(a) to 1(d)
Versus
1(a)Gandharv Sen Patel, S/o Late Daulatram Patel, aged
about 52 years,
1(b) Smt. Mathura Patel, Wd/o Late Daulatram Patel, aged
about 72 years,
1(c)Hemant Patel, S/o Late Daulatram Patel, aged about
49 years,
All the above 1(a) to 1(c) are residents of Village
Sangitarai, Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
2 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
1(d)Smt. Smt. Kalavati Patel, D/o Late Daulatram Patel,
aged about 42 years, R/o Village Bhedikona, Tahsil
Dhabra, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
2(a)Ravibhushan Patel, S/o Late Kanhaiyalal Patel, aged
about 58 years, R/o Dharogapara, Raigarh, Tahsil
and District Raigarh (C.G.)
2(b)Smt. Chandrakala Nayak, D/o Late Kanhaiyalal, aged
about 65 Years, R/o Village Gindola, Tahsil Kharsiya,
District Raigarh (C.G.)
2(c) Bhagwati Prasad Patel, S/o Late Kanhaiyalal Patel,
aged about 56 years, R/o Village Sangitarai, Tahsil
and District Raigarh (C.G.)
2(d)Smt. Satyabhama Patel, W/o Mohanlal, aged about
50 years, D/o Late Kanhaiyalal Patel, R/o Village
Kosamda, Tahsil Pussaur, District Raigarh (C.G.)
2(e)Smt. Nishikant Patel, W/o Kaushal Prasad Patel, aged
about 45 years, D/o Late Kanhaiyalal Patel, R/o
Village Kotmi, Tahsil Dhabra, District Janjgir-Champa
(C.G.)
3.Vijay Shankar Patel, S/o Baldau Singh Patel, aged
about 70 years, R/o Village Sangitarai, Tahsil and
District Raigarh (C.G.)
4(a) Smt. Padmavati Patel, Wd/o Late Saligram Patel, aged
about 70 years,
4(b) Kedar Patel, S/o Late Saligram Patel, aged about 45
years,
Both the above 4(a) & 4(b) are R/o Village Sangitarai,
Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
4(c) Smt. Madhuri Patel, D/o Late Saligram Patel, aged
about 48 years, W/o Lokendra Prasad Patel, R/o
Village Palgada, Tahsil Kharsiya, District Raigarh
(C.G.)
4(d) Smt. Usha Patel, D/o Late Saligram Patel, aged about
46 years, W/o Babulal Patel, R/o Village Indira Nagar,
Puchapara, Raigarh, Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
5.Purshottam Patel, S/o Late Sahebram Patel, aged
about 55 years, R/o Tikrapara, Darogapara, Raigarh,
Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
3 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
6(a) Leena Patel, W/o Deepak Patel, aged about 30 years,
R/o Village Saraipali, Post Saraypali (C.G.)
6(b) Sourabh Patel, S/o Late Bhuneshwar Patel, aged
about 25 years, R/o Darogapara, Mastagali, Ward
No.15, Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.)
6(c) Champa Patel, W/o Bhuneshwar Patel, aged about 58
years, R/o Village Darogapara, Mastagali, Ward
No.15, Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.)
7(a) Naresh Agrawal, S/o Netram Agrawal, aged about 58
years,
7(b) Suresh Agrawal, S/o Netram Agrawal, aged about 61
years,
Both 7(a) & 7(b) are R/o Gaurishanker Mandir Road,
Nayaganj, Raigarh, Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
8. Shoukilal, S/o Late Holoram, aged about 50 years,
R/o Village Bendrachuha, Raigarh (C.G.)
9(a) Ramkumar Patel, S/o Late Khushiram Patel, R/o
Village Sangitarai, Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
9(b)Rajendra Patel, S/o Late Khushiram Patel, R/o
Deendayal Colony, Phase-2, Chote Atarmuda,
Raigarh, Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
9(c) Mathura Bai, Wd/o Late Khushiram Patel, aged about
70 years, R/o Village Sangitarai, Tahsil & District
Raigarh (C.G.)
10.Nanki Dau alias Keshav Prasad Patel, S/o Chandan
Singh Patel, aged about 60 years, R/o Village
Sangitarai, Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
11. Babulal Patel, S/o Chakradhar Singh Patel, aged
about 69 years, R/o Village Sangitarai, Tahsil &
District Raigarh (C.G.)
12(a)Brajesh Kumar Patel, S/o Late Kalesh Ram Patel,
aged about 35 years, R/o Village Sangitarai, Tahsil &
District Raigarh (C.G.)
12(b)Khagesh Kumar Patel, S/o Late Kalesh Ram Patel,
aged about 30 years, R/o Village Sangitarai, Tahsil &
District Raigarh (C.G.)
12(c)Smt. Vidyamati Patel, Wd/o Kalesh Ram, aged about
60 years, R/o Village Sangitarai, Tahsil & District
Raigarh (C.G.)
4 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
13(a)Anjani Patel, Wd/o Late Ramchandra Patel, aged
about 60 years, R/o Village Sangitarai, Post
Chhatamura, Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
13(b)Prahlad Patel, S/o Late Ramchandra Patel, aged
about 43 years, R/o Village Sangitarai, Post
Chhatamura, Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
13(c)Krishna Patel, S/o Late Ramchandra Patel, aged
about 40 years, R/o Village Sangitarai, Post
Chhatamura, Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
14.Girdhari, S/o Chote Dau Patel, aged about 69 years,
R/o Village Sangitarai, Tahsil & District Raigarh
(C.G.)
15(a)Dwarka Patel, S/o Late Gopichand Patel, aged about
48 years, R/o Village Sangitarai, Post Chhatamura,
Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
15(b)Shanti Patel, W/o Khemnidhi Patel, aged about 55
years, R/o Village Loharsingh, Kodatarai, Tahsil &
District Raigarh (C.G.)
15(c)Indu Patel, W/o Shri Ram Prasad Patel, aged about
42 years, R/o Kanshiram Chowk, Kabir Chowk,
Raigarh, Tahsil & District Raigarh (C.G.)
15(d)Basanti Patel, W/o Shri Ram Patel, aged about 40
years, R/o Village Bawlikunwa, Raigarh, Tahsil &
District Raigarh (C.G.)
15(e)Malti Patel, D/o Late Gopichand Patel, aged about 45
years, Village Sangitarai, Raigarh, Tahsil & District
Raigarh (C.G.)
15(f)Nandai Patel, Wd/o Late Gopichand Patel, aged about
60 years, Village Sangitarai, Post Chhatamura, Tahsil
& District Raigarh (C.G.)
16. Sundarlal Patel, S/o Late Neelkant Patel, aged about
70 years,
17. Chandrabhan Patel, S/o Late Neelkant Patel, aged
about 65 years,
Both 16 & 17 above are R/o Village Padigaon, Tahsil
Pussaur, District Raigarh (C.G.)
18. Smt. Fulkuwar Patel, D/o Neelkant Patel, aged about
60 years, R/o Village Tadola, Tahsil Pussaur, District
Raigarh (C.G.)
5 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
19.State of Chhattisgarh, through: Collector, District
Raigarh (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Appellants/ :- Mr. Hari Agrawal,
Defendants No.1(a),1(b), Advocate.
1(c) & 1(d)
For Respondents/ :-Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha,
Plaintiffs No.1(a),1(c), Advocate.
2(a), 2(c), 3 and 4(b)
For Respondent/State:-Mr. Sharad Mishra,
Panel Lawyer.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Single Bench)
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
C A V Judgment
1.The present Misc. Appeal filed under Order 43 Rule 1
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’)
was admitted for hearing by formulating the following
substantial question of law for consideration:-
“Whether the First Appellate Court is justified
in setting aside the order passed by the Trial
Court and allowing the appeal filed by the
respondents/plaintiffs by recording a finding
which is perverse and contrary to well settled
law in this regard?”
2.For the sake of convenience, the parties herein shall
be referred to in terms of their rank and status before
the Trial Court.
3.The aforesaid question of law arises on the following
factual backdrop of the case:-
6 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
a)On 17.8.1992, the original Defendants No.6 to 20
(Khusiram and others) had sold a piece of land
situated at Khasra Nos. 21 & 30/1 in favour of
the original Defendants No.1 to 3 (Late Jivdhan
Patel, Purushottam Patel and Late
Bhubaneshwar Patel) for a sale consideration of
Rs.52,000/-. On the same day itself, the said
Defendants No.6 to 20 had also sold a piece of
land situated at Khasra Nos. 21 & 30/4 in favour
of the original Defendant No.4 (Late Smt. Harbai
Devi) for a sale consideration of Rs.52,000/-.
Subsequently, on 24.10.1992, the Defendants
No.6 to 20 again sold a portion of the land
situated at Khasra No.16/1 in favour of the
original Defendant No.5 (Late Holoram) for a sale
consideration of Rs.5000/-.
b)On 2.12.1992, the original Plaintiffs (Late
Daulatram, Late Kanhaiyalal, Vijay Shanker and
Salikram) instituted a civil suit primarily averring
that the Plaintiffs and Defendants No.6 to 20 are
family members and the suit property fell into
the share of the Plaintiffs, but the Defendants
have illegally sold the suit property and thus
7 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
prayed for a declaration of the three sale deeds,
dated 17.8.1992, 17.8.1992 and 24.10.1992, to
be illegal and null & void and also sought for
confirmation of possession and if possession is
not found then, in alternative, the possession of
the suit property be restored in favour of the
Plaintiffs. However, for the purpose of court fees,
the Plaintiffs valued their suit affixing the court
fees as under:-
S.N. Description Valuation/
Court Fees
1.Valuation of declaration/
cancellation of three sale deeds = Rs.900/-
Fixed court fees affixed = Rs.90/-
2.Valuation for restoration of
possession = Rs.64/-
(allegedly valued to be 20 times
of the land revenue)
Court fees affixed = Rs.07/-
3.Valuation for the purpose of
permanent injunction = Rs.300/-
Fixed court fees affixed = Rs.30/-
Valuation for the purpose of
Pecuniary jurisdiction = Rs.900/-
Rs.64/-
Rs.300/-
Rs.1264/-
Court fees paid = Rs.90/-
Rs.07/-
Rs.30/-
Rs.127/-
c)On 1.3.1993, the original Defendants No.1 to 4
filed an application under Section 151 of CPC
8 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
praying for dismissal of the suit on the ground
that the suit does not fall within the jurisdiction
of the Trial Court i.e. Second Civil Judge, Class-
II, Raigarh.
d)Subsequently, on 22.10.2008, eight issues were
framed by the Trial Court for consideration.
However, on 13.1.2016, considering the
objections and pleadings of the parties, two
additional issues were framed by the Trial Court,
out of which the Issue No.9 which holds
“Whether this Court has the pecuniary
jurisdiction to hear and try the suit”, was ordered
by the Trial Court to be treated and considered
as a Preliminary Issue.
e)On 29.1.2016, after hearing the arguments of the
parties on the Preliminary Issue No.9, the Trial
Court found that the valuation of the suit was
undervalued and since the relief of possession
was also sought for, the ad-valorem court fees
which ought to have been paid was not found to
be paid by the Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Trial
Court, in exercise of powers conferred upon it
under Order 7 Rule 11(b) of CPC, granted time to
9 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
the Plaintiffs to correct the valuation and pay the
ad-valorem court fees, fixing the matter for
30.1.2016.
f)However, on 30.1.2016, the Plaintiffs filed a
review petition under Section 114 read with
Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC for review of the Order
dated 29.1.2016, which was dismissed by the
Trial Court by order dated 2.2.2016. Ultimately,
for non-compliance of the order dated 29.1.2016,
the Trial Court by its Judgment/Order dated
2.2.2016 dismissed the civil suit in view of Order
7 Rule 11 of CPC.
g)Plaintiffs assailed the Judgment/Order dated
2.2.2016 passed by the Trial Court by filing
Regular Civil Appeal No.31/2016 under Section
96 of CPC before the First Appellate Court i.e.
District Judge, Raigarh who, however, by its
Judgment/Order dated 27.7.2019, set-aside the
Order dated 2.2.2016 and remitted the matter
back to the Trial Court for consideration of the
suit on merits.
h)Feeling dissatisfied and aggrieved by the
Judgment/Order dated 27.7.2019 passed by the
10 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
First Appellate Court, the Defendants No.1(a),
1(b), 1(c) and 1(d) have preferred the present
Misc. Appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC
questioning the impugned Judgment/Order on
the ground that the First Appellate Court is
absolutely unjustified in reversing the well
merited Order dated 2.2.2016 passed by the Trial
Court dismissing the civil suit in view of Order 7
Rule 11 of CPC.
4.Mr. Hari Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing for
Appellants/Defendants No.1(a), 1(b), 1(c) and 1(d),
would submit that the suit is admittedly covered
under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as
the Plaintiffs are also seeking for the relief of
confirmation/recovery of possession, in light of the
decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the matter
of Suhrid Singh alias Sardool Singh v. Randhir
Singh and Others
1
. He would further submit that for
the purpose of valuation, the Suit Valuation Act, 1887
and the Rules framed thereunder nowhere provide for
any statutory scheme for making a valuation of the
property for the purpose of jurisdiction for which a
1 (2010) 12 SCC 112
11 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
declaration has been sought. Though the Plaintiffs’
valuation of the plaint has to be accepted ordinarily,
but in the instant case the suit is demonstratively
undervalued. Plaintiffs should have correctly taken
the value of the sale deeds at Rs.1,09,000/- which
they have opted not to correct/amend. Therefore, the
Trial Court has rightly held the valuation of the suit to
be Rs.1,09,000/- for sale considerations for the
purpose of jurisdiction. In this regard, he would rely
upon the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in
the matters of Tara Devi v. Sri Thakur Radha
Krishna Maharaj
2
and M/s Commercial Aviation
and Travel Co. & Ors. v. Vimla Pannalal
3
and also
on the decision of the Madras High Court in the
matter of Vasireddi Veremma v. Marupudi
Butchiah
4
in which guidelines have been issued for
determination of valuation for the purpose of
jurisdiction. He would thus submit that the finding
recorded by the Trial Court is in accordance with law
and it ought not to have been turned down by the
First Appellate Court without following the principles
of law as laid down in the aforesaid decisions and as
2 (1987) 4 SCC 69
3 (1988) 3 SCC 423
4 (1926) SCC OnLine Mad 261
12 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
such the impugned Judgment/Order passed by the
First Appellate Court is liable to set-aside.
5.Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, learned Counsel appearing
for Respondents/Plaintiffs No.1(a), 1(c), 2(a), 2(c), 3
and 4(b), would submit that the Judgment/Order
passed by First Appellate Court is absolutely justified
and is in accordance with law and as such the
present appeal deserves to be dismissed. He would
rely upon the decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court rendered in the matters of Santosh Chandra &
Ors. v. Smt. Gyansundarbai & Ors.
5
, Ram Prasad
Agrawal & Anr. v. Bhagwandas
6
, Ashish v.
Nageshwar & Ors.
7
and the decision of the Orissa
High Court in the matter of Indrajit Behera & Anr. v.
Bhaja Meher & Anr.
8
and also the decision of this
High Court in the matter of Smt. Neelam Dagla v.
Sarwan Gond & Anr.
9
.
6.I have heard learned Counsels appearing for the
parties, considered their rival submissions and also
perused the record of the case with utmost care and
circumspection.
5 AIR 1971 MP 1
6 2003 (1) MPHT 36
7 2017 (3) MPLJ 439
8 1968 SCC OnLine Ori 64
9 FA No. 557/2018, decided on 20.6.2019.
13 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
7.A careful perusal of paragraphs 10(a), 10(b) and 10(c)
of the plaint would show that three sale deeds were
executed by the original Defendants No.6 to 20 for a
sale consideration of Rs.52,000/-, Rs.52,000/- and
Rs.5000/- in favour of the original Defendants No.1 to
5 respectively, of which total valuation was done at
Rs.1,09,000/-. In all these three sale deeds, since the
Plaintiffs were not parties, in light of the decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suhrid Singh (supra),
the Plaintiffs were not required to seek cancellation of
the sale deeds. If the Plaintiffs being non-executants
and not being in possession, if they seek not only a
declaration that the sale deeds are invalid but also the
consequential relief of possession, they are required to
pay ad-valorem court fees as provided under Section
7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, as observed in
paragraph-7 in Suhrid Singh (supra) which states as
under:-
“7. Where the executant of a deed
wants it to be annulled, he has to
seek cancellation of the deed. But
if a non-executant seeks annulment
of a deed, he has to seek a
declaration that the deed is
invalid, or non-est, or illegal or
that it is not binding on him. The
difference between a prayer for
14 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
cancellation and declaration in
regard to a deed of
transfer/conveyance, can be
brought out by the following
illustration relating to `A' and
`B' -- two brothers. `A' executes
a sale deed in favour of `C'.
Subsequently `A' wants to avoid
the sale. `A' has to sue for
cancellation of the deed. On the
other hand, if `B', who is not the
executant of the deed, wants to
avoid it, he has to sue for a
declaration that the deed executed
by `A' is invalid/void and non-
est/ illegal and he is not bound
by it. In essence both may be
suing to have the deed set aside
or declared as non-binding. But
the form is different and court
fee is also different. If `A', the
executant of the deed, seeks
cancellation of the deed, he has
to pay ad-valorem court fee on the
consideration stated in the sale
deed. If `B', who is a non-
executant, is in possession and
sues for a declaration that the
deed is null or void and does not
bind him or his share, he has to
merely pay a fixed court fee of
Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of
Second Schedule of the Act . But if
`B', a non- executant, is not in
possession, and he seeks not only
a declaration that the sale deed
is invalid, but also the
consequential relief of
possession, he has to pay an ad-
valorem court fee as provided
under Section 7(iv)(c) of the
Act.”
8.The Preliminary Issue that was framed by the Trial
Court under Issue No.9 reads thus:-
15 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
“Whether this Court has the
pecuniary jurisdiction to hear and
try the suit”
9.For ready reference, paragraph-15 of the plaint is also
being reproduced herein:-
“15(v);g fd U;k;ky; ‘kqYd gsrq nkok dk ewY;
rhuksa c;ukek oknhx.k ds fo:) ‘kwU; ,oa voS/k ?kksf”kr
djkus ckor~ rhu rhu lkS :i;s rFkk dqy 900 : (ukS
lkS :i;ss) dk j[kk x;k gS ftl ij 90: (uCcs :i;k)
dk fuf’pr U;k;’kqYd vnk fd;k x;k gSA
15(c);g fd vxj oknhx.k dk dCtk oknxzLr
tehuksa ij u ik;k tk; rks dCtk okil fnykus ckor~
yxku ds 20 xquk ds vk/kkj ij dqy 64 :i;s ds ewY;
j[kk x;k gS ftl ij dqy 7 :i;s (lkr :i;ss) dk
jkT; ‘kqYd vnk fd;k x;k gSA
15(l);g fd LFkk;h fu”ks/kkKk ckor~ nkok dk ewY;
300 :i;s (rhu lkS :i;ss) j[kk x;k gS ftl ij jkT;
‘kqYd 30 :i;s (rhl :i;s) vnk fd;k x;k gSA”
10.In view of the aforesaid, it is quite vivid that for
valuation for declaration/cancellation of three sale
deeds, the Plaintiffs had valued the suits at Rs.900/-
and paid the fixed court fess of Rs.90/-; for
restoration of possession of the suit property, 20
times of the land revenue had been valued at Rs.64/-
on which court fees of Rs.7/- was paid and further for
the purpose of permanent injunction, the valuation
was done at Rs.300/- on which fixed court fees of
Rs.30/- was paid, thereby total Rs.1264/- was paid
16 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
for the valuation of pecuniary jurisdiction and total
Rs.127/- was paid as court fess.
11.Defendants No.1 to 4 had objected to the aforesaid
valuation which was accepted by the Trial Court
holding that the suit should have been valued at
Rs.1,09,000/- by Order dated 29.1.2016, the
operative part of which is being reproduced herein
under:-
“vr% vkns’k 7 fu;e 11([k)O;ogkj izfd;k lafgrk ds
rgr oknhx.k dks funZsf’kr fd;k tkrk gS fd vkxkeh
frfFk ij iz’uk/khu izdj.k esa pqukSrh fn;s x, fodz;
i=ksa ds dqYk ewY; 109000@& vuqlkj okn dk Bhd
ewY;kadu djsa] ;g Hkh mYys[kuh; gS fd ,slk djus esa
vlQy jgus ij vkxkeh dk;Zokgh dh tkosxhA
izdj.k vkns’k ds ikyu gsrq fnukad 30-01-2016A”
12.It is well settled by the decisions of the Supreme
Court rendered in the matters of S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp.
Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan
Chettiar
10
and Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v.
Venkatachalam Chettiar
11
, that in a suit for
declaration with consequential relief falling under
Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff is
free to make his own valuation of the reliefs sought in
the plaint and such valuation both for the purposes of
court-fee and jurisdiction has to be ordinarily
10AIR 1958 SC 245
11(1980) 1 SCC 616
17 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
accepted. It is only in cases where it appears to the
Court on a consideration of the facts and
circumstances of the case that the valuation is
arbitrary, unreasonable and the plaint has been
demonstratively undervalued, the Court can examine
the valuation and can revise the same. [See: Tara
Devi v. Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj
2
(Para 4)]
13.Now, the question is, as noticed herein-above, neither
the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 nor the Rules framed
thereunder provide for any statutory scheme for the
purpose of making a valuation of the property to
determine the jurisdiction for which a declaration has
been sought. In this regard, the decision of the
Madras High Court in the matter of Vasireddi
Veremma v. Marupudi Butchiah
4
may be noticed
herein, in which, relying upon the various decisions
governing the field, it has been held that where no
special method of valuation has been provided by
statute, the general principles deducible for valuation
for purposes of jurisdiction would apply:-
(1)Where the subject matter of a suit is wholly
unrelated to anything which can be readily, stated in
definite money terms, then the plaintiff, having to put
some money value for the purpose of jurisdiction,
must put a more or less arbitrary value, and, there
18 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
being no factors in the case from which the Court can
say his valuation is wrong or dishonest the Court will
accept that valuation, e.g.., suit for restitution of
conjugal rights, suit for a declaration that plaintiff is a
member of a charity committee, etc.
(2) Where the subject-matter is so related to things
which have a real money value that the relief asked
for will affect these, then the value of the suit for the
purpose of jurisdiction is to be taken as the market
value of the property affected, e.g., a suit for a
declaration of fishery rights, a suit to set-aside an
award or a suit regarding liability to pay royalty.
But the market value must be the market value of the
whole of the property affected and not merely the
plaintiff's share.
14.Similarly, in the matter of M/s Commercial Aviation
and Travel Co. & Ors. v. Vimla Pannalal
3
, their
Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that where
the objective standards of valuation is available, the
plaintiff cannot be permitted to put an arbitrary
valuation de hors such objective standards and
materials, and observed in paragraph-16 as under:-
“16.Thus, where there are objective
standards of valuation or, in other
words, the plaintiff or the Court can
reasonably value the relief correctly
on certain definite and positive
materials, the plaintiff will not be
permitted to put an arbitrary valuation
de hors such objective standards or
materials.”
In paragraphs 13 & 14 it has also been observed as
follows:-
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(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
“13. But, there may be cases under
section 7(iv) where certain positive
objective standard may be available for
the purpose of determination of the
valuation of the relief. If there be
materials or objective standards for
the valuation of the relief, and yet
the plaintiff ignores the same and puts
an arbitrary valuation, the Court, in
our opinion, is entitled to interfere
under order VII, Rule 11(b) of the Code
of Civil Procedure . for the Court will
be in a Position to determine the
correct valuation with reference to the
objective standards or materials
available to it. In Urmilabala Biswas
v. Binapani Biswas & ors., AIR 1938
Cal 161 a suit was instituted for
declaration of title to Provident Fund
money amounting to a definite sum with
a prayer for injunction restraining the
defendant from withdrawing the said
money. It was held that there was no
real distinction between the right to
recover money and the right to that
money itself, and that the relief
should have been valued at the
Provident Fund amount to which title
was claimed by the Plaintiff. Thus, it
appears that although in that case the
suit was one under section 7(iv)(c) of
the Court Fees Act, there was an
objective standard which would enable
the plaintiff and the Court too to
value the relief correctly and, in such
a case, the Court would be competent to
direct the plaintiff to value the
relief accordingly.
14.In Kishori Lal Marwari v. Kumar
Chandra Narain Deo and another, AIR
1939 Patna 572 a question arose as to
the valuation of a suit for injunction
restraining a decree- holder from
executing his decree on the ground that
the decree was collusive and obtained
by fraud and, therefore, void and
incapable of execution. It was held by
the Patna High Court that the plaintiff
must value his suit according to the
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(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
amount of decree and must pay ad
valorem court fee on such amount. In
this case also, there was a positive
objective standard for the valuation of
the suit.”
15.Coming to the facts of the case, in view of the
principles of law laid down in the above-stated
decisions, it is quite clear that though in a suit for a
declaration with consequential relief of confirmation/
recovery of possession falling under Section 7(iv)(c) of
the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff is free to make his
own estimation of the relief(s) sought in the plaint and
such valuation both for the purposes of court-fee and
jurisdiction has to be ordinarily accepted, but in the
case where the Court finds that valuation is arbitrary
or apparently unreasonable and the plaint is
demonstratively undervalued, the Court can examine
the valuation and revise the same. In the instant case,
the objective materials are available for the purpose of
valuation of the relief(s) sought in the plaint, as the
Plaintiffs have sought for avoidance of the three sale
deeds executed for a sale consideration of
Rs.52,000/-, Rs.52,000/- and Rs.5,000/-, totaling to
Rs.1,09,000/- and which the Plaintiffs ought to have
valued for the relief(s) sought, for the purpose of
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(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
valuation of the suit, otherwise it would be the case of
valuation of the plaint to be arbitrary and
demonstratively undervalued, which the Trial Court
noticed. Though objective materials are available to
value the relief(s) sought in the plaint, the Plaintiffs
put in the valuation of suit for declaration, possession
and permanent injunction as Rs.900/- there being no
basis to value the same. In that view of the matter,
the Trial Court has rightly held that the valuation of
the suit was arbitrary and it ought to have been
Rs.1,09,000/- as per value of the three sale deeds
sought to be declared as illegal and void and further
rightly held that the Plaintiffs’ suit is undervalued and
despite the Plaintiffs having been granted time to
correct/amend the valuation, the Plaintiffs did not
value the suit properly and did not pay the ad-
valorem court fees and, accordingly, the Trial Court
proceeded to dismiss the suit by its Judgment/Order
dated 2.2.2016.
16.The First Appellate Court interfered with the said
Judgment/Order dated 2.2.2016 passed by the Trial
Court on the ground that since the suit is governed by
Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act, valuation of the
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(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
suit should be 15 times of the land revenue, ignoring
the fact that the suit squarely falls under Section 7(iv)
of the Court Fees Act and the fixed court fees under
Article 17 of Schedule 2 would not be applicable as
the Plaintiffs have specifically sought for confirmation
of possession and, in alternative, restoration of the
possession of the suit property in their favour and as
per Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act, in suits other
than those referred to in the Court Fees Act, Section
7, paragraphs v, vi and ix and paragraph x, clause (d),
court fees are payable ad-valorem under the Court
Fees Act and the value as determinable for the
computation of the court fees and the value for the
purpose of the jurisdiction would be the same. In that
view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that
the First Appellate Court is absolutely unjustified in
reversing the Judgment/Order dated 2.2.2016 passed
by the Trial Court dismissing the suit in exercise of
powers under Order 7 Rule 11(b) of CPC.
17.The judgments cited by learned Counsel for the
Respondents/Plaintiffs are quite distinguishable on
their own facts and therefore are not applicable to the
facts of the present case.
23 / 24
(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
18.Accordingly, the Misc. Appeal is partly allowed. The
Judgment/Order dated 27.7.2019 passed by the First
Appellate Court is set-aside. The Judgment/Order
dated 29.1.2016 passed by the Trial Court is affirmed.
However, the Trial Court’s order dated 2.2.2016
dismissing the Civil Suit is not restored/affirmed, as
the Trial Court ought to have given sufficient time to
the Plaintiffs to make proper valuation and take
consequential steps of payment of court fees etc., as
within three days of the passing of the Order dated
29.1.2016 the Civil Suit was dismissed by the Trial
Court in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(b)
of CPC.
19.Plaintiffs are granted time up to 17.1.2025 to make
proper valuation as per the Order dated 29.1.2016 of
the Trial Court. However, if the said compliance is not
done by 17.1.2025, the Trial Court would be at liberty
to pass fresh orders under Order 7 Rule 11(b) of CPC.
20.Before parting with the record, it is also pertinent to
mention that the original Civil Suit was instituted on
2.12.1992 and is pending consideration for 32 years.
In that view of the matter, if the proper valuation of
the suit as per the Order dated 29.1.2016 of the Trial
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(M.A. No. 88 of 2019)
Court is made and further consequential steps are
taken, the Trial Court will do well in expediting the
trial of the Civil Suit and dispose of the same as
expeditiously as possible. Both the parties will
cooperate in disposal of the suit looking to its long
pendency from last 32 years.
21.The parties shall bear their own cost(s).
22.Parties are directed to appear before the Trial Court
on 23.12.2024 positively.
23.Additional Registrar (Judicial) is directed to
immediately send a true copy of this judgment
through e-mail to the concerned Trial Court and the
original record of the case along with the true copy of
this judgement be also transmitted to the Trial Court
by a special messenger, for necessary compliance at
the earliest, looking to the long pendency of the
matter for last 32 years and also for the reason that it
may reach before the Trial Court by 23.12.2024 on
which date parties have been directed to appear
before the Trial Court.
Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal)
Judge
sharad
Legal Notes
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