1

AFR

Court No. - 42

Case :- HABEAS CORPUS WRIT PETITION No. - 562 of 2019

Petitioner :- Aashif

Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 4 Others

Counsel for Petitioner :- Sunil Singh, Chandrakesh Mishra

Counsel for Respondent :- G.A., A.S.G.I., Annapurna Singh,

Kuldeep Singh Chauhan, R.P.S. Chauhan

and

Case :- HABEAS CORPUS WRIT PETITION No. - 564 of 2019

Petitioner :- Adil

Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 4 Others

Counsel for Petitioner :- Sunil Singh, Chandrakesh Mishra

Counsel for Respondent :- G.A., Annapurna Singh

Hon'ble Manoj Misra,J.

Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J.

These two habeas corpus petitions have been filed by

uncle (Aashif) and nephew (Adil) questioning their detention

under the provisions of the National Security Act (for short the

Act, 1980) under separate detention orders dated 16

th

April,

2019, passed by the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad in exercise

of powers under Section 3(2) read with Section 3(3) of the Act,

1980.

As the impugned orders seeking detention of the

petitioners are based on identical grounds and the arguments

advanced by learned counsel for the parties are same in both

the petitions, with the consent of learned counsel for the

parties, these petitions are being decided by a common

judgment and order.

We have heard Sri Daya Shanker Mishra, learned senior

counsel, assisted by Sri Sunil Singh and Sri Chandrakesh

Mishra, for both the petitioners; Sri Deepak Mishra, learned

A.G.A. for the State as well as the other State-Officers including

2

the detaining authority in both the petitions; Sri G.P. Singh

holding brief of Sri R.P.S. Chauhan for the Union of India in

Habeas Corpus Petition No. 262 of 2019; and Ms. Annapurna

Singh for the Union of India in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 564

of 2019; and have perused the record.

The impugned detention orders dated 16

th

April, 2019

would reveal that the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad (the

Detaining Authority) has passed the order of detention by taking

notice of an incident dated 25.05.2019 relating to a clash

between two group of persons, namely, the petitioners along

with seven named associates and others on the one side and

Ata Ilahi and his seven named associates on the other side, at

Rawali Surana Main Road near Bilal Masjid, which had

breached public order. The order of detention was passed to

prevent repeat of such activity so as to ensure maintenance of

public order and essential services as well as civil supplies.

A perusal of the grounds of detention would show that on

25.3.2019 the police received an information that at Rawali

Surana main road, near Bilal Masjid, two group of persons were

indulging in exchange of fire and brickbats to establish their

authority and hold over the area thereby causing utter

confusion and panic in that area. Upon receipt of that

information, the police reached the spot. The perpetrators, upon

seeing the police, dispersed and escaped. From the spot few

cartridge empties were recovered. Upon enquiry from persons

found there, information was gathered regarding involvement of

the petitioners and others in the incident. FIR was lodged

naming 20 persons including the petitioners, though five or six

others were left unnamed. FIR was registered as Case Crime

No. 262 of 2019 at P.S. Muradnagar, District Ghaziabad, under

Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 341, 336, 504, 188 I.P.C. and

3

section 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1934. It was alleged

that by the said activity of the petitioners, despite prohibitory

orders issued under section 144 CrPC in view of impending Lok

Sabha elections, there had been a breach of public order

including disruption in movement of vehicles as well as civil

supplies. The grounds of detention drew support not only from

the police reports but also newspaper reports dated 26.03.2019

published in Hindustan; Dainik Jagran; and Amar Ujala. The

news daily Hindustan reported that in the middle of the road for

half-an-hour there was exchange of brickbats and fire between

two groups. The news daily Dainik Jagran reported that at

Muradnagar there had been indiscriminate firing. News daily

Amar Ujala reported that there was exchange of fire and

brickbats between two groups on account of money dispute.

After narrating the incident as above, in paragraph 8 of

the grounds of detention, on the one hand it was stated that the

petitioner and his family members are habitual criminals

whereas, on the other hand, it was stated that no other case is

reported against them. Though it was added that no one dares

to lodge a complaint against them. The criminal history of Aas

Mohd., who is brother of Aashif and Uncle of Adil, comprising

42 cases relating to abduction; murder; attempt to murder;

Goonda Act; Arms Act; Gangster Act; and Extortion, was cited.

After completing the narrative, as above, by showing

awareness that the petitioner(s) is/are in jail in connection with

case crime no. 262 of 2019 (supra) and are striving for bail, it

was observed that as there is likelihood of they being released

on bail and indulge in activity that would disturb public order,

with a view to prevent them from acting in a manner that might

be prejudicial to the public order, it was necessary to detain

them under the Act, 1980.

4

The grounds of detention were accompanied by reports of

the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ghaziabad/ Senior

Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad; Superintendent of Police,

Rural, Ghaziabad; Circle Officer, Sadar, Ghaziabad; and

Prabhari Nirikshak, P.S. Muradnagar, Ghaziabad as also

photocopies of the Act, 1980 and Article 22 of the Constitution

of India.

The report of the Superintendent of Police, Rural,

Ghaziabad disclosed that the petitioners had filed Crl. Misc.

Writ Petition No. 8099 of 2019 for pre-arrest protection which

stood disposed off on 01.04.2019 by giving protection to the

petitioners for a specified period with liberty to move for bail

within that period. It was also reported that pursuant to the

order dated 01.04.2019 the petitioners had surrendered on

10.04.2019 in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,

VIth and had applied for bail which was rejected but, on the

same day, bail application was moved in the Court of District &

Sessions Judge, which was pending. The report also indicated

that the Additional District & Sessions Judge-II, Ghaziabad,

after hearing both sides on the bail prayer, had rejected the

prayer for interim bail but had fixed 16.04.2019 for

consideration of prayer for regular bail. With that background, it

was reported that there was real possibility of the petitioners

being released on bail.

The order of detention dated 16.04.2019 was approved

by the State Government, under Section 3(4) of the Act, 1980,

and, thereafter, upon receipt of positive report from the Advisory

Board, by order dated 24.05.2019, the same was confirmed

and detention was directed, provisionally, for a period of three

months. This detention period has been extended up to six

months, starting from the date of initial detention, vide order

5

dated 12.07.2019.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the

detention order passed against the petitioners is discriminatory.

It has been submitted that the incident which forms the basis of

the detention order is in respect of exchange of fire and

brickbats between two group of persons in which no person

received injury of any kind. Moreover, as per allegations in the

FIR, the moment the police force arrived, the accused persons

dispersed without offering any resistance to the police. The

police, thereafter, named as many as 20 persons, including the

petitioners, and left 5-6 other accused unnamed. But, except

the two petitioners, detention order was not imposed against

anyone else which suggests that the petitioners have been

maliciously picked up for depriving them of their liberty.

In paragraph 7 of both the writ petitions, it has been

stated that brother of the petitioner (Aashif), namely, Sri Vahab

Chaudhari, who is uncle of the other petitioner (Adil), is MLA

from Bahujan Samajwadi Party. It is stated that for Lok Sabha

Elections 2019, the voting at Ghaziabad was in the first phase

and, therefore, prohibitory order, under Section 144 Cr.P.C, was

in existence. The petitioners along with family members were

campaigning in support of the Mahagathbandhan (opposition)

candidate, that is against the ruling party. The alleged incident

was shown with a view to implicate the petitioners so as to

exert pressure upon them.

It has been urged that if the incident had the potentiality to

disturb the public order then all the persons named ought to

have been detained. But the detention order is only against the

petitioners, which is clearly reflective of misuse and abuse of

executive power.

It has also been submitted that even assuming that the

6

incident narrated had the potentiality to disturb the public order,

detention could be justified only if there was any material to

show or suggest that upon being released on bail, the

petitioners would have repeated such activity that would be

prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. It has been

submitted that the petitioners admittedly had no previous

criminal history and the extraneous material relating to the

criminal history of Aas Mohd, the brother of Aashif (petitioner of

H.C. Petition No. 562 of 2019) and uncle of Adil (petitioner of

H.C. Petition No. 564 of 2019), is completely irrelevant so as to

infer that the petitioners would indulge in repeat of the act if let

out.

It was urged that the incident, as reported in the first

information report, did not disclose any organized activity from

which it could be inferred that there was likelihood of the

petitioners repeating such activity.

In addition to above, it has been submitted that as the first

information report discloses that the moment the police arrived

on the spot the accused persons escaped, without offering any

resistance to the police, the incident did not have the

potentiality to disturb the public order and was a mere breach of

law and order. It has been urged that the statement that doors

were shut and shutters of shops were downed is only to add

color to the case for detaining the petitioner.

In addition to above, various other submissions were

made by learned counsel for the petitioners, which are being

noticed, in brief, below:-

(i)That before extension of the period of detention,

which was initially for a period of three months only, a

report was obtained from the District Magistrate but

copy of that report was not supplied to the petitioners

7

to enable them to effectively represent against the

order extending the period of detention.

(ii)That the sponsoring authority though furnished

the criminal history of Aas Mohd, the brother of

petitioner (Aashif) and uncle of petitioner (Adil), but the

criminal history was incomplete as it did not provide

complete information regarding the current status of

those cases and, otherwise also, papers relating to

those cases were not provided, which has affected the

right of the petitioners to make an effective

representation against the order of extension of

detention.

(iii)That the Sponsoring Authority in his report though

disclosed about filing of Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 8099 of

2019 but copy of that writ petition was not supplied to the

detaining authority and its copy was also not provided to

the petitioners even though the same was a relevant

document inasmuch as it contained the defence of the

petitioners.

Per contra, the learned A.G.A. submitted that the

grounds of detention reflect that the detention order was

passed upon consideration of the activity of the petitioners with

reference to the incident dated 25.03.2019 which had clearly

disturbed public order inasmuch as parties had exchanged

brickbats as well as fire on a busy street near Bilal Masjid.

Hence, as the detention order was passed after showing

awareness that the petitioners were in jail and striving for bail

and on being released on bail they would indulge in similar

activity which had the potentiality to disturb the public order, the

satisfaction of the detaining authority, having been arrived at on

the basis of relevant material, cannot be questioned and,

therefore, no case for interference is made out. It has also been

8

urged that the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be

questioned on the ground that no detention order has been

passed against co-accused. It was also urged that the copy of

the Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 8099 of 2019 was not relevant

as it sought quashing of the FIR which prayer was not accepted

by the writ court. Otherwise, copy of the order passed therein

was supplied by the sponsoring authority to the detaining

authority.

Learned A.G.A. also urged that mere mentioning of

criminal history of relative of the detenu would not vitiate the

detention order on the ground that extraneous material had

been taken into consideration because the detention order can

be sustained on a solitary ground in view of Section 5-A of the

Act, 1980.

It was also submitted that once the Advisory Board opines

that the grounds of detention are sufficient and germane to

detain a person under the Act, 1980, the period for which the

detenu is to be detained is in the exclusive domain of the State

Government and, therefore, if, for taking decision, to review the

period of detention, the State Government considered report of

detaining authority, which is confidential in nature, such report

need not be supplied to the detenu. It has been submitted that

Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India provides for supply of

grounds of detention to afford earliest opportunity to the detenu

to make a representation. The material relating to the period for

which a detenu is to be detained would not fall within the

meaning of the phrase “the grounds of detention”, therefore

such material need not be supplied/shown to the detenu. It has

thus been argued that neither the detention order suffers from

any infirmity nor the continued detention has been rendered

illegal, hence the petition is liable to be dismissed.

9

We have considered the rival submissions and have

carefully perused the record.

Although several submissions have been noticed by us

but since we propose to allow both the petitions on ground

hereinafter stated, we do not propose to deal with the merits of

the other submissions raised.

Before we deal with the ground on which we propose to

allow the petition, it would be useful for us to notice the legal

position as to when an order of preventive detention can

lawfully be passed on a solitary act of the detenu. In this regard,

it would be useful for us to notice the decision of nine-judges

Bench of the Apex Court in Attorney General For India vs

Amratlal Prajivandas and others reported in 1994 (5) SCC

54. In paragraph 48 of the judgment, as reported, the apex

court has held as follows:-

“48. Now, it is beyond dispute that an order

of detention can be based upon one single

ground. Several decisions of this Court have

held that even one prejudicial act can be

treated as sufficient for forming the requisite

satisfaction for detaining the person. In Debu

Mahato v. State of W.B. it was observed

that while ordinarily-speaking one act may

not be sufficient to form the requisite

satisfaction, there is no such invariable rule

and that in a given case one act may suffice.

That was a case of wagon-breaking and

having regard to the nature of the Act, it was

held that one act is sufficient. The same

principle was reiterated in Anil Dey v. State of

W. B. It was a case of theft of railway signal

material. Here too one act was held to be

sufficient. Similarly, in Israil SK v. District

Magistrate of West Dinajpur. and Dharua

Kanu v. State of W.B. single act of theft of

telegraph copper wires in huge quantity and

removal of railway fish-plates respectively

was held sufficient to sustain the order of

detention. In Saraswati Seshagiri v. State of

10

Kerala , a case arising under COFEPOSA, a

single act, viz., attempt to export a huge

amount of Indian currency was held

sufficient. In short, the principle appears to

be this: Though ordinarily one act may not be

held sufficient to sustain an order of

detention, one act may sustain an order of

detention if the act is of such a nature as to

indicate that it is an organised act or a

manifestation of organised activity. The

gravity and nature of the act is also relevant.

The test is whether the act is such that it

gives rise to an inference that the person

would continue to indulge in similar

prejudicial activity. That is the reason why

single acts of wagon- breaking, theft of signal

material, theft of telegraph copper wires in

huge quantity and removal of railway fish-

plates were held sufficient. Similarly, where

the person tried to export huge amount of

Indian currency to a foreign country in a

planned and premeditated manner, it was

held that such single act warrants an

inference that he will repeat his activity in

future and, therefore, his detention is

necessary to prevent him from indulging in

such prejudicial activity. If one looks at the

acts the COFEPOSA is designed to prevent,

they are all either acts of smuggling or of

foreign exchange manipulation. These acts

are indulged in by persons, who act in

concert with other persons and quite often

such activity has international ramifications.

These acts are preceded by a good amount

of planning and organisation. They are not

like ordinary law and order crimes. If,

however, in any given case a single act is

found to be not sufficient to sustain the order

of detention that may well be quashed but it

cannot be stated as a principle that one

single act cannot constitute the basis for

detention. On the contrary, it does. In other

words, it is not necessary that there should

be multiplicity of grounds for making or

sustaining an order of detention.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

11

In Surya Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P and others :

1994 (Supp.) (3) SCC 195, the petitioner was already in jail in

connection with a murder case. The petitioner had no criminal

history though there was a solitary case of broad day light

murder registered against him. The argument raised before the

apex court was that on the basis of that solitary case against

the detenu, there could be no apprehension in the mind of the

detaining authority that the detenu on being released would

indulge in any such activity that would be prejudicial to the

maintenance of public order. The apex court found that there

was no cogent material placed before the court or before the

detaining authority to enable an inference that the detenu on

being released on bail would indulge in such offence that would

be a threat to public order. The apex court, accordingly,

quashed the order of detention and, while doing so, in

paragraphs 5 and 6, as reported, observed as follows:

“5.The question as to whether and in what

circumstances an order for preventive

detention can be passed against a person

who is already in custody has had been

engaging the attention of this Court since it

first came up for consideration before a

Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw v.

District Magistrate, Burdwan, [1964] 4 SCR

921. To eschew prolixity we refrain from

detailing all those cases except that of

Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v.

Union of India, AIR (1990) SC 1196

wherein a three Judge Bench, after

considering all the earlier relevant

decisions including Rameshwar Shaw

(supra) answered the question in the

following words:

“The decisions referred to

above lead to the conclusion that

an order for detention can be

validly passed against a person in

custody and for that purpose it is

necessary that the grounds of

12

detention must show that (i) the

detaining authority was aware of

the fact that the detenu is already

in detention: and (ii) there were

compelling reasons justifying such

detention despite the fact that the

detenu is already in detention. The

expression "compelling reasons" in

the context of making an order for

detention of a person already in

custody implied that there must be

cogent material before the

detaining authority on the basis of

which it may be satisfied that (a)

the detenu is likely to be released

from custody in the near future and

(b) taking into account the nature

of the antecedent activities of the

detenu, it is likely that after his

release from custody he would

indulge in prejudicial activities and

it is necessary to detain him in

order to prevent him from

engaging in such activities."

6. When the above principles are applied

to the facts of the instant case, there is no

escape from the conclusion that the

impugned order cannot be sustained.

Though the grounds of detention indicate

the detaining authority's awareness of the

fact that the detenu was in judicial custody

at the time of making the order of

detention, the detaining authority has not

brought on record any cogent material nor

furnished any cogent ground in support of

the averment: made in grounds of

detention that if the aforesaid Surya

Prakash Sharma is released on bail 'he

may again indulge in serious offences

causing threat to public order", (emphasis

supplied), To put it differently, the

satisfaction of the detaining authority that

the detenu might indulge in serious

offences causing threat to public order,

solely on the basis of a solitary murder,

cannot be said to be proper and justified.”

In Yogendra Murari v. State of U.P. and others : (1988)

13

4 SCC 559, the apex court had the occasion to deal with a

submission whether the detention order could be considered

discriminatory on the ground of non-detention of co-accused in

the same incident. Rejecting the claim of discrimination, raised

on behalf of the petitioner, in paragraph 9 of the judgment, the

apex court observed as follows:-

“9. There is no merit whatsoever in the

petitioners grievance of discrimination on the

ground that the other co- accused persons

have not been detained. The role of the

petitioner and that of the others are not

identical and the reasonable apprehension as

to their future conduct must depend on the

relevant facts, and circumstances which differ

from individual to individual. It would have been

wrong on the part of the detaining authority to

take a uniform decision in this regard only on

the ground that the persons concerned are all

joined together as accused in a criminal case.”

From the decisions noticed above, what is clear is that

though ordinarily a solitary act may not be sufficient to sustain

an order of preventive detention but where that act is of such a

nature that it is reflective of, or has manifestation of, an

organized criminal activity, or is so grave that it reflects the

propensity of that person to repeat such an act, then even a

solitary act could well be made basis for passing an order of

preventive detention.

In the instant case, the incident which forms the basis of

the detention order by no stretch of imagination can be taken as

an incident of an organized crime. The incident appears to be a

clash between two group of persons. The clash is not shown to

be communal in nature. Though brickbats and fire is said to

have been exchanged but no injury is shown to have been

sustained by any one. In fact, a specific stand has been taken

by the petitioners that not a single person had sustained injury

14

and no private person has made any complaint. Admittedly, the

first information report was lodged by the police and a bare

perusal of the first information report would indicate that as

soon as the police arrived and challenged the persons, who

were exchanging brickbats, all of them escaped without defying

or challenging the authority of the police or even attempting to

throw a single brick at the police. Under the circumstances,

drawing an inference only against two participants, out of 25

odd persons who participated in that incident, that they were

likely to repeat their act and be a threat to maintenance of

public order, in our view, could not have been drawn merely on

the basis of gravity of that incident/ act. Rather, it appears to us

that it has been drawn on the basis of extraneous material that

is the criminal history of Aas Mohd., a relative of the petitioners.

Had the gravity of the incident been the reason to impose the

order of detention not only the petitioners but other participants

also would have been subjected to detention. Whereas, here,

admittedly, the detention order has been passed only against

the petitioners, which clearly reflects that the detention order

has been passed on the basis of some other material which

appears to be the criminal history of the relative of the

petitioners.

Interestingly, in the grounds of detention as well as the

report of the sponsoring authority, it is mentioned that there is

not a single case registered against the petitioner except the

one in respect of the incident dated 25.3.2018, yet, in

paragraph 8 of the grounds of detention it is stated that the

detenu and the members of his family are habitual criminals. In

support of that statement criminal history of 42 cases of Aas

Mohd., starting from the year 1995 and spread across two

decades and a half, without any supporting documents in

15

respect thereto, has been cited.

In Khudiram Das v. State of W.B., (1975) 2 SCC 81, a

constitutional bench of the apex court while examining the

scope of judicial review of the court against a preventive

detention order, in paragraph 9 of its judgment, as reported,

had observed as follows:

“9. But that does not mean that the subjective

satisfaction of the detaining authority is wholly

immune from judicial reviewability. The courts have

by judicial decisions carved out an area, limited

though it be, within which the validity of the

subjective satisfaction can yet be subjected to

judicial scrutiny. The basic postulate on which the

courts have proceeded is that the subjective

satisfaction being a condition precedent for the

exercise of the power conferred on the Executive,

the Court can always examine whether the requisite

satisfaction is arrived at by the authority : if it is not,

the condition precedent to the exercise of the power

would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the power

would be bad. There are several grounds evolved

by judicial decisions for saying that no subjective

satisfaction is arrived at by the authority as required

under the statute. The simplest case is whether the

authority has not applied its mind at all; in such a

case the authority could not possibly be satisfied as

regards the fact in respect of which it is required to

be satisfied. …...................... Then there may be a

case where the power is exercised dishonestly or

for an improper purpose : such a case would also

negative the existence of satisfaction on the part of

the authority. The existence of “improper purpose”,

that is, a purpose not contemplated by the statute,

has been recognised as an independent ground of

control in several decided cases. The satisfaction,

moreover, must be a satisfaction of the authority

itself, and therefore, if, in exercising the power, the

authority has acted under the dictation of another

body...................the exercise of the power would be

bad and so also would the exercise of the power be

vitiated where the authority has disabled itself from

applying its mind to the facts of each individual case

by self-created rules of policy or in any other

16

manner. The satisfaction said to have been arrived

at by the authority would also be bad where it is

based on the application of a wrong test or the

misconstruction of a statute. Where this happens,

the satisfaction of the authority would not be in

respect of the thing in regard to which it is required

to be satisfied. Then again the satisfaction must be

grounded “on materials which are of rationally

probative value”. …....... The grounds on which the

satisfaction is based must be such as a rational

human being can consider connected with the fact

in respect of which the satisfaction is to be reached.

They must be relevant to the subject-matter of the

inquiry and must not be extraneous to the scope

and purpose of the statute. If the authority has

taken into account, it may even be with the best of

intention, as a relevant factor something which it

could not properly take into account in deciding

whether or not to exercise the power or the manner

or extent to which it should be exercised, the

exercise of the power would be bad.......

”

(Emphasis Supplied)

The practice of submitting reports to the detaining authority

touching the character of the detenu, without supporting

material, has been deprecated by the apex court, and in

Vashisht Narain Karwaria v. State of U.P., (1990) 2 SCC 629,

the detention was held bad for consideration of such

extraneous material.

In a recent decision of the apex court in Sama Aruna v.

State of Telangana and another : (2018) 12 SCC 150, the

apex court upon finding that the detention order was based on

stale grounds, while setting aside the order of detention, made

certain observations, in paragraph 17 of the judgment, as

reported, which are relevant and are accordingly extracted

below:-

“The detention order must be based on a

reasonable prognosis of the future behavior of a

person based on his past conduct in light of the

17

surrounding circumstances.”

Thereafter, in paragraph 26 of the said judgment, the apex

court further observed as follows:-

“The influence of the stale incidents in the detention

order is too pernicious to be ignored, and the order

must therefore go; both on account of being vitiated

due to malice in law and for taking into account

matters which ought not to have been taken into

account.”

At this stage, we may revert to the averments made in

paragraph 7 of the petition wherein it has been stated that the

other brother of the petitioner, namely, Vahab Chaudhary was

an MLA from Bahujan Samaj Party and the petitioners were

supporting the political party other than the ruling party. The

District Magistrate though in his counter-affidavit has stated

that the sub-Inspector has not lodged the FIR under political

pressure but the fact that the brother of the petitioner was MLA

and that they were supporting the other party has not been

denied.

When we take a conspectus of the facts and

circumstances of the case, we are of the view that except for

the criminal history of Aas Mohd., the brother of the petitioner

(Aashif) and uncle of the petitioner (Adil), there is no material,

cogent enough, to enable a logical inference, on the basis of a

solitary incident, that on being released on bail, the petitioners

would indulge in activity prejudicial to the maintenance of the

public order or supplies and services essential to the

community. The incident dated 25.03.2019 is not reflective of

organized criminal activity and, admittedly, was not an incident

where any person died or got seriously injured. Thus, in our

18

view, the incident was not such from which any inference could

be drawn about the propensity of the petitioners to repeat, or

indulge in, such activities. For the reasons stated above as also

keeping in mind that no co-accused similarly situated have

been preventively detained, we are of the considered view that

the order of detention has been passed by being influenced

with the criminal antecedents of petitioners' relative, which, in

our view was extraneous and not a relevant consideration,

particularly, in absence of further details as to how the

petitioners were linked with him in his criminal activity. We are

therefore of the considered view that on the basis of the solitary

incident dated 25.3.2019 the detention order against the

petitioners is not sustainable and as such the impugned

detention orders are liable to be quashed.

Consequently, both the habeas corpus petitions are

allowed. The detention orders dated 16th April, 2019, passed

by the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad in respect of Aashif

(petitioner in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 562 of 2019) and Adil

(petitioner in Habeas Corpus Petition No. 564 of 2019) are

hereby quashed. Both the petitioners shall be set at liberty

forthwith unless wanted in any other case. There is no order as

to costs.

Order Date :- 17.9.2019

Sunil Kr Tiwari