2026:HHC:21234

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MP(M) No. 273 of 2026 and

Cr.MMO Nos. 823 & 1136 of 2025

Reserved on: 24.4.2026

Date of Decision: 3.6.2026.

Cr.MP(M) No. 273 of 2026

Sanjeev Kumar Sharma …. Petitioner

Versus

State of HP & ors. …. Respondents

Cr. MMO No. 823 of 2025

Abhay Bahadur Singh & anr. …. Petitioners

Versus

State of HP & anr. …. Respondents

Cr. MMO No. 1136 of 2025

Sangram Singh …. Petitioner

Versus

State of HP & ors. …. Respondents

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Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the Petitioners :Mr Sudhir Thakur, Senior

Advocate, with Mr Karun Negi,

Advocate, in Cr.MP(M) No. 273 of

2026, Ms Ashima Mandla,

Advocate (through video

conferencing) and Ms Parul Negi,

Advocate (present in the Court) in

Cr.MMO No. 823 of 2025 and Mr

Karan Singh Kanwar, Advocate, in

Cr.MMO No. 1136 of 2025

For the Respondents/

State.

:Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate

General, for respondent No. 1, State

in Cr.MP(M) No. 273 of 2026;

Cr.MMO No. 823 of 2025; and for

respondents No.1 to 3/State in

Cr.MMO No. 1136 of 2025

For the Respondents :Mr Sudhir Thakur, Senior

Advocate, with Mr Karun Negi,

Advocate, for respondent No.2 in

Cr.MMO No. 823 of 2025 and for

respondent No.4 in Cr.MMO No.

1136 of 2025.

Respondents No.3A, 4 and 6 proceeded against ex-parate.

[

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present petitions have been filed against the

order dated 10.6.2025, passed by the learned Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Trial Court) in

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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an application filed under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure (Cr.P.C.).

2. Since all the petitions have arisen out of the common

order, they are being taken up together for consideration.

3. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petitions are that the applicant, Sanjiv Kumar Sharma, filed an

application before the learned Trial Court seeking a direction to

the Police of Police Station Kala Amb to register an FIR against

the accused. It was asserted that accused Nos. 1 and 2, along with

their mother, late Smt. Leela Kumari were the owners in

possession of the land measuring 232-14 bighas, comprised in

Khata/Khatuni No. 1min/1min, Khasra No.181/86, 182/86 and

470/85, situated at Mohal Ogli, Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmour,

H.P., as per the Jamabandi for the year 2000-2001. Accused No.2

and 3 inherited the estate of Leela Kumari based on the Will

executed by her. Accused No. 2 was acting as a General Power

Attorney of Smt. Leela Kumari and he executed various

agreements, receipts and sale deeds on her behalf. The accused

entered into an agreement to sell the land to the applicant on

29.11.2004 in the presence of Arun Kumar Singla. This agreement

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was duly attested by Purshotam Singh Saini, Notary Public. The

accused handed over the possession of the entire land to the

applicant as per the agreement. The applicant also sold some

portion of the land to third parties who developed and set up the

industries. The applicant paid a total sale consideration of

₹1,49,66,250/- to the accused. The applicant also spent money

on the development of the land. He requested the accused to

execute the sale deed, and a sale deed of 126.16 bigha out of the

total land measuring 230-05 bigha was executed in favour of the

applicant. The accused promised to execute the sale deed of the

remaining portion of the land measuring 103-09 bigha. The

applicant asked the accused repeatedly to execute the sale deed,

but they put off the matter on one pretext or another. The

accused No.2 entered the land in February 2024 with many

persons and threatened the applicant and his labourers to leave

the land. The applicant thereafter requested accused Nos. 1 and 2

to execute the sale deed in his favour, but they put off the matter.

The applicant also filed a civil suit in the Court of Learned Civil

Judge, Nahan, which is pending. The accused belongs to the

ruling party. The applicant approached the Director General of

Police with the complaint, who forwarded it to Superintendent of

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Police, Sirmour, H.P., for investigation. An enquiry was

conducted but no case was registered. Hence, the applicant filed

an application before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Nahan, H.P. (learned Trial Court) for taking action against the

accused as per the law.

4. Learned Trial Court held that mere pendency of the

civil suit is no ground for not initiating criminal proceedings.

Mere failure to execute the sale deed does not amount to cheating

unless there is an intention to defraud the other party from the

beginning. There is no allegation that any document was forged.

The allegations in the application disclosed the commission of

offences punishable under Section 329(3), 115(2), 351(2) and 352

of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). Hence, the application

was forwarded to the SHO for the registration of the FIR and the

proper investigation.

5. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned

Trial Court and the registration of the FIR, three separate

petitions have been filed.

6. I have heard Ms. Ashima Mandla, learned counsel for

the petitioners/accused Abhay Bahadur Singh and Ajay Bahadur

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Singh, Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the

petitioner/accused Sangram Singh, Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned

Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Karun Negi, learned counsel for

the applicant Sanjeev Kumar Sharma and Mr. Ajit Sharma,

learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

7. Ms Aashima Mandla, learned counsel for the

petitioners/accused Abhay Bahadur Singh and Ajay Bahadur

Singh, submitted that an FIR registered after 1.7.2024 would be

registered and investigated as per the provisions of BNSS. The

Magistrate must hear the police and conduct an enquiry before

passing an order as per Section 175(3) of Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). In the present case, no such

enquiry was conducted, and the learned Magistrate erred in

passing the order. An application under Section 156 (3) of the

CrPC is required to be accompanied by an affidavit that the

applicant had approached the police and the police had not taken

any action. The applicant has to approach the Station House

Officer of the area concerned, and approaching any other police

official is not a proper compliance. The application was filed after

an inordinate delay for which no explanation was provided. The

delay in reporting the matter to the police without a proper

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explanation makes the prosecution's case highly suspect. The

dispute between the parties is regarding the execution of the sale

deed based on the agreement to sell, which is purely a civil

dispute. The FIR is being lodged to compel the accused to meet

the unlawful demands of the complainant. Hence, she prayed

that the petitions filed by the accused/petitioners be allowed and

the FIR be quashed. She relied upon the following judgments in

support of her submission: -

(i)Om Prakash Ambadar Vs. State of Maharashtra 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 238;

(ii)Ranjit Singh Bath Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 2025

SCC OnLine 1479;

(iii)CBI Vs. R.R. Kishore (2023) 15 SCC 339;

(iv)Vijay Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine Raj

2897;

(v)State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. M. Madhusudhan Rao (2008) 15

SCC 582;

(vi)Preeti Gupta Vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667;

(vii)Munshi Ram and Ors. Vs. Delhi Administration, 1967 SCC

OnLine SC 80;

(viii)V.Y. Jose Vs. State of Gujarat (2009) 3 SCC 78; and

(ix)State of Harayana and ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal and ors. 1992 Supp

(1) SCC 335

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8. Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the

petitioner/accused Sangram Singh, adopted the submissions of

Ms. Aashima Mandala, and submitted that the FIR has been

lodged to compel the petitioners to execute the sale deed. The

Civil Court is seized of the matter, and recourse to criminal

proceedings is not justified. Hence, he prayed that the present

petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed against the

petitioners/accused.

9. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned additional Advocate General

for the respondent/State, submitted that the police have only

registered the FIR and the investigation is continuing. The police

would submit a cancellation report in case no cognizable offence

is made out. The Court should not interfere with the

investigations. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be

dismissed.

10. Mr Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Advocate for the

applicant/respondent No.2, submitted that the applicant had

made a specific allegation of cheating, forgery, criminal

intimidation, intentional insult, criminal trespass and causing

hurt. These allegations are to be taken as correct at this stage. An

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FIR cannot be quashed at the preliminary stage unless no case is

made out or some provision of law bars the registration of the

FIR. In the present case, no such circumstances have been

established. The Magistrate has passed a detailed order. The

Learned Magistrate had erred in holding that no offence of

cheating or forgery was made out. Mere pendency of the civil suit

is no bar to the continuation of the criminal proceedings.

Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. He

relied upon the following judgments in support of his

submission: -

(i)Vipasa Vs. State of H.P. MANU/HP/0346/2022;

(ii)Sakiri Vasu Vs. State of U.P. & ors. MANU/SC/8179/2007;

(iii)Suresh Chand Jain Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and ors.

MANU/SC/0014/2001;

(iv)Mohd. Yousuf Vs. Afaq Jahan & ors., MANU/SC/8888/2006;

(v)Varinder Singh Vs. Nirmala Devi & ors. MANU/HP/2891/2025;

(vi)Meenakshi Sharma Vs. State of H.P. & ors.

MANU/HP/1015/2021; and

11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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12. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was

explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of

U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it

is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to

be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the

decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised

some of the principles under which

FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the

following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the

various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter

XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this

Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of

the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which

we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the

following categories of cases by way of illustration

wherein such power could be exercised either to

prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise

to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be

possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and

sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or

rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad

kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if they are

taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or

make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information

report and other materials, if any, accompanying

the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,

justifying an investigation by police officers

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under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an

order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made

in the FIR or complaint and the evidence

collected in support of the same do not disclose

the commission of any offence and make out a

case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a

non-cognizable offence, no investigation is

permitted by a police officer without an order of a

Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of

the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or

complaint are so absurd and inherently

improbable based on which no prudent person

can ever reach a just conclusion that there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the

accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in

any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned

Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)

to the institution and continuance of the

proceedings, and/or where there is a specific

provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved

party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fide and/or where the

proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

accused and with a view to spite him due to a

private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)

would be of relevance to us in this case.

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In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the

allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute

any offence or make out a case against the accused, then

the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-

cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a

police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in

such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an

express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the

CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal

proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be

quashed.”

13. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising

its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,

may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes

or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are

neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory

provision. However, given the broad and profound nature

of this authority, the High Court must exercise it

sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are

embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing

the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of

process or where intervention is essential to uphold the

ends of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of

several decades, has laid down the principles and

guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing

criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-

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empting the Prosecution from building its case before the

Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,

contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal

complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR

represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie

offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.)

the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;

and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the

dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp

(1) SCC 335).

14. A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State

of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:

“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear

that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of

any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the

ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only

empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its

inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new

power on the High Court but rather saves the power which

the High Court already possesses, from before the

enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very

existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate

for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the

High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it

may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the

proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”

15. The present petitions are to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

16. The informant/applicant/respondent No.2 specifically

asserted in para-7 of the application that the accused person

belongs to the ruling party of the State, and the applicant had an

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apprehension that the accused persons would manage things in

their favour; hence, he approached the Director General of Police

and emailed the complaint to the Director General of Police. In

Ranjit Singh Bath (supra), the applicant had approached the

Inspector General of Police, Chandigarh, who marked his

complaint to the Economic Offences Wing of Chandigarh Police.

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Section

154(1) requires that the information regarding the commission of

a cognizable offence has to be furnished to an officer in charge of

the Police Station. When the complaint was not made to the

officer in charge of the Police Station but to some other officer,

there is no compliance with Section 154(1), and it is not

permissible for him to approach the learned Magistrate under

Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC. It was observed:

7. The requirement of sub-Section (1) of Section 154 is that

information regarding the commission of a cognizable

offence has to be furnished to an officer Incharge of a

Police Station. In this case, obviously, the said compliance

was not made. It is stated that the Inspector General of

Police forwarded a complaint to the Economic Offences

Wing. Sub-Section (3) of Section 154 comes into picture

only when, after a complaint is submitted to the Officer

In-Charge of Police Station or information is provided to

the Officer In-Charge of Police Station regarding the

commission of a cognizable offence, the Officer In-Charge

refuses or neglects to register a First Information Report.

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8. Sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CrPC are

the two remedies available for setting the criminal law in

motion. Therefore, this Court held that before a

complainant chooses to adopt a remedy under Section

156(3) of the CrPC, he must exhaust his remedies under

sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 154 of the CrPC, and he

must make those averments in the complaint and produce

the documents in support. However, in this case, the

second respondent did not exhaust the remedies. In this

view of the matter, we find that both the learned

Magistrate and the High Court have completely ignored

the binding decision of this Court in the case of Priyanka

Srivastava (2015) 6 SCC 287.

9. We, therefore, quash and set aside both the impugned

orders and quash and set aside all the further steps taken

on the basis of the order dated 14

th

June, 2017, passed by

the learned Judicial Magistrate.

17. This judgment is binding upon this Court; therefore,

the order passed by the learned Magistrate and the FIR registered

based on the order passed by the learned Magistrate are liable to

be quashed on this short ground alone.

18. Since the order passed by the learned Magistrate and

the FIR are being quashed on the technical ground of non-

compliance with Section 154 of the Cr.PC and the applicant would

have an option of approaching the learned Magistrate again after

complying with the requirement of Section 154 of the Cr.PC as

per the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ranjeet Singh Bath

(supra), therefore, it is not necessary to adjudge the other pleas

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taken by the petitioners and urged by Ms Aashima Mandala,

learned counsel for the petitioners.

19. This Court is quashing the FIR and the order passed

by the learned Magistrate because of non-compliance with

Section 154 of the Cr.PC, therefore, the petition filed by the

applicant along with an application for condonation of delay

against the same order would become infructuous.

20. In view of the above, the Cr.MMO Nos. 823 of 2025

and 1136 of 2025 are allowed, and the order dated 10.6.2025,

passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, District

Sirmour, H.P., in Cr.MA No. 136 of 2025 and FIR No. 97 of 2025,

dated 13.6.2025 for the commission of offences punishable under

Sections 447, 323, 504 and 506 of IPC, registered at Police

Station, Kala Amb, District Sirmour, H.P., are ordered to be

quashed. Cr.MP(M) No. 273 of 2026 filed by the applicant/

petitioner against this order has become infructuous and is

dismissed as such. The pending application(s), if any, also stand

disposed.

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21. The observation made herein before shall remain

confined to the disposal of the instant petitions and will have no

bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

3

rd

June, 2026

(Chander)