C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

Reserved On : 23/04/2026

Pronounced On : 02/07/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/PETN. UNDER ARBITRATION ACT NO. 145 of 2025

With

CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR AMENDMENT) NO. 1 of 2025

In R/PETN. UNDER ARBITRATION ACT NO. 145 of 2025

With

R/PETN. UNDER ARBITRATION ACT NO. 304 of 2025

With

R/MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 773 of 2026

In

R/PETN. UNDER ARBITRATION ACT NO. 39 of 2025

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIRAL R. MEHTA

==========================================================

Approved for Reporting Yes No



==========================================================

ABHISHEK SURESH MEHTA & ORS.

Versus

M/S PARTH DEVELOPERS & ORS.

==========================================================

Appearance:

MR RUTUL P DESAI(6498) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2,3

MAYANK K TRIVEDI(7906) for the Respondent(s) No. 6,7

MR KK TRIVEDI(934) for the Respondent(s) No. 6,7

MR MEHUL SHARAD SHAH(773) for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5

==========================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIRAL R. MEHTA

CAV JUDGMENT

1. By way of the present petitions filed

under Section 29A(4) and (5) of the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Rule 34.6 of

Page 1 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

the Arbitration Centre (Domestic and

International), High Court of Gujarat Rules,

2021, the petitioners have approached this Court

seeking extension of the mandate of the learned

Sole Arbitrator, Hon’ble Ms. Justice H.N. Devani

(Retd.), in Arbitration Case No. 6 of 2022. The

prayer is to extend the time for a further period

of six months from the expiry of the last

extended period, i.e. 20

th

December, 2025, and

thereafter for a further period of six months

from 20

th

June, 2026, in the interest of justice,

so as to enable the learned Sole Arbitrator to

pronounce and publish the arbitral award.

2. The brief facts necessary for deciding

the present petitions are as under:

2.1 The arbitration proceedings were

initiated pursuant to the order dated 07

th

January, 2022 passed by the High Court of Gujarat

appointing Hon’ble Ms.Justice H.N. Devani (Retd.)

as the learned Sole Arbitrator under the

Arbitration Centre (Domestic and International),

High Court of Gujarat Rules, 2021. The parties

were governed by the said Rules, and upon her

appointment, the learned Sole Arbitrator entered

upon the reference to adjudicate the disputes

between the parties.

Page 2 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

2.2 The claimant filed its Statement of

Claim on or about 28

th

February, 2022. Respondent

Nos.1, 2, 3 and 5 filed their Statement of

Defence along with Counter Claim on 12

th

May,

2022. Respondent No.4 filed its Statement of

Defence on 09

th

May, 2022, whereas respondent

Nos.6 and 7 filed their Statement of Defence and

Counter Claim on 13

th

May, 2022. The claimant

thereafter filed its rejoinder as well as its

Statement of Defence to the respective Counter

Claims on or about 20

th

June, 2022. Accordingly,

in terms of Rules 24 and 25 read with Rule 34.4

of the Rules, 2021, the pleadings stood completed

on 20

th

June, 2022, from which date the statutory

period of twelve months commenced.

2.3 Upon completion of pleadings and

settlement of the terms of reference, the parties

undertook the process of admission and denial of

documents and thereafter led oral evidence. In

all, nineteen witnesses were examined and cross-

examined before the learned Tribunal. The cross-

examination was extensive and ultimately

concluded on 22nd September, 2023. Since the

initial period of twelve months was due to

expire, the parties, by consent, filed a pursis

under Rule 34.5 of the Rules, 2021 extending the

mandate of the learned Tribunal by six months,

Page 3 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

and accordingly the period stood extended up to

20th December, 2023.

2.4 Thereafter, when the matter had reached

the stage of final hearing and the extended

period was due to expire on 20

th

December, 2023,

the applicants filed Arbitration Petition No.190

of 2023 seeking a further extension of six

months. By order dated 20th December, 2023, this

Court extended the mandate of the learned Sole

Arbitrator up to 20

th

June, 2024.

2.5 During the said extended period, the

learned Tribunal heard and concluded the oral

arguments of all the parties on 11

th

April, 2024.

Thereafter, the matter was reserved for

pronouncement of the arbitral award, while

granting one month’s time to the parties to file

their written submissions.

2.6 Having regard to the voluminous record

and the complex issues arising out of the

business transactions of the partnership firm and

the inter se disputes between the partners, the

learned Tribunal required additional time to

prepare and pronounce the arbitral award. Since

it was not likely that the award could be

pronounced before 20

th

June, 2024, the applicants

preferred IAP No.116 of 2024 seeking a further

Page 4 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

extension of six months.

2.7 As the extended period was thereafter to

expire on 20

th

December, 2024, the applicants

filed Arbitration Petition No.39 of 2025 seeking

a further extension of six months, i.e. upto 20

th

June, 2025. The said petition came to be allowed

by this Court by order dated 13

th

March, 2025.

2.8 Even as on the date of filing of the

present petitions, the arbitral award has not

been pronounced. It has been stated that the

learned Sole Arbitrator requires further time and

that the award is not likely to be pronounced

before 20

th

June, 2025. The applicants have,

therefore, filed the present petitions seeking

extension of the mandate for a further period of

six months from 20

th

June, 2025 to enable the

learned Sole Arbitrator to pronounce the arbitral

award.

3. Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr.Deven

Parikh with learned Advocate Mr.Rutul Desai for

the petitioners, Learned Advocate Mr.Mehul Sharad

Shah for respondent Nos.1 to 5 and Learned

Advocate Mr.K.K. Trivedi for respondent Nos.6 and

7.

4. At the outset, learned advocate Mr.

Page 5 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

Mehul Shah appearing for the respondent raised a

preliminary objection by placing reliance upon

the recent decision of the Apex Court in Jagdeep

Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule reported in 2026 INSC

92. It was contended that, in view of the said

decision, the jurisdiction to extend the mandate

of an arbitral tribunal under Section 29A(4) of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vests

only in the Court competent to entertain an

application under Section 34 challenging the

arbitral award.

4.1 Learned Advocate also relied on the

following judgments to buttress his submissions:

(i) Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. M/s.Bharat

Textiles [SLP (C) No.13779 of 2025],

(ii) Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb [(1999)

4 SCC 396],

(iii) Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v.

Berger Paints India Ltd. [(2025) 10

SCC 802],

(iv) Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka

(Deceased) through Lrs. v. Jasjit

Singh [(1993) 2 SCC 507],

(v) Nimet Resources Inc. v. Essar Steels

Ltd. [(2009) 17 SCC 313],

(vi) Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v.

BSC & C and C JV [2024 SCC OnLine SC

1801],

Page 6 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

(vii) Petition under Arbitration Act

No.132 of 2024 decided by the High

Court of Gujarat vide order dated

22

nd

November, 2024,

(viii) Coimbatore Integrated Waste

Management Company Pvt. Ltd. v.

Coimbatore City Municipal

Corporation [2026 LawSuit (Mad) 83],

(ix) C B Ramkumar S/o. Late I B Menon:

Lalitha Ramkumar W/o C B Ramkumar v.

M/s.Himalaya Prime Assets Pvt. Ltd.

[2026 LawSuit (Kar) 223],

(x) Era International v. Aditya Birla

Global Trading India Pvt. Ltd. [2024

SCC OnLine Bom 835].

4.2 Learned Advocate Mr.Shah, on the basis

of the aforesaid, requested this Court not to

entertain the present petition.

5. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate

Mr.Deven Parikh appearing for the petitioner made

the following submissions:

5.1 Learned Senior Advocate submitted that

while appointing the learned Sole Arbitrator by

order dated 07

th

January, 2022 passed in

Arbitration Petition No.91 of 2020, this Court

specifically directed that the arbitration

proceedings shall be governed by the Arbitration

Centre (Domestic and International), High Court

of Gujarat Rules, 2021, and that both parties

Page 7 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

shall be bound by the said Rules. It was

submitted that the parties have all throughout

acted in accordance with the said Rules without

raising any objection. Therefore, it is no longer

open for the respondent to contend that the

petition for extension of the mandate under

Section 29A(4) cannot be entertained by this

Court by overlooking Rule 34.6 of the Rules,

2021. It was, therefore, urged that the

preliminary objection deserves to be rejected.

5.2 It was further submitted that all the

earlier applications seeking extension of the

mandate were filed before this Court under Rule

34.6 of the Rules, 2021 and no objection was ever

raised by the respondent. Having accepted the

applicability of Rule 34.6 on the earlier

occasions, the respondent cannot now contend that

the petitioners should approach the civil court

for extension of time.

5.3 Learned Senior Advocate submitted that

the Rules, 2021 continue to hold the field and

have not been challenged. The said Rules, having

statutory force, are binding on the parties. Rule

34.6 specifically empowers the High Court to

extend the mandate of the arbitral tribunal on an

application made by any party. Therefore, in

Page 8 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

terms of the statutory Rules, this Court alone

has the jurisdiction to extend the mandate and

the petitioners cannot be relegated to the civil

court under Section 29A(5) of the Act.

5.4 It was next submitted that party

autonomy is the cornerstone of arbitration law.

Parties are free to adopt, by agreement, the

rules that would govern the arbitral proceedings.

In the present case, having accepted the

applicability of the Rules, 2021 by their

conduct, the parties cannot now depart from the

said Rules.

5.5 It was submitted that by referring the

disputes to arbitration in accordance with the

Rules, 2021, this Court had referred the matter

to an institutional arbitration. In the absence

of any objection to such reference, the

respondents cannot now dispute the jurisdiction

of this Court to extend the mandate under Rule

34.6. It was further submitted that the decision

in Jagdeep Chowgule (supra) does not deal with

institutional arbitration where the governing

rules of the institution specifically confer such

power upon the High Court.

5.6 Learned Senior Advocate further

submitted that, in arbitration, parties are not

Page 9 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

only free to adopt the procedure governing the

proceedings but are also entitled to agree upon

the forum exercising supervisory jurisdiction.

Therefore, once the parties accepted the Rules,

2021, Rule 34.6 alone would govern the extension

of the mandate. It was contended that, in the

peculiar facts of the present case, where the

Hon’ble the Chief Justice referred the disputes

to the Arbitration Centre with a specific

direction that the Rules, 2021 would apply, any

extension of the mandate must necessarily be

sought under Rule 34.6 before this Court.

5.7 It was also submitted that the High

Court Arbitration Centre is entitled to provide,

under its Rules, that its proceedings shall be

supervised by the High Court alone and not by the

District Court. Consequently, Rule 34.6 confers

jurisdiction exclusively upon the High Court to

extend the mandate of the arbitral tribunal.

5.8 Lastly, it was submitted that the

Arbitration Centre has framed a complete set of

Rules governing institutional arbitration,

including Rule 34.6 relating to extension of the

mandate. Once the parties have chosen to be

governed by those Rules, the procedure prescribed

therein must be followed. According to the

Page 10 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

learned Senior Advocate, the parties having

agreed to the supervisory jurisdiction of the

High Court in matters relating to extension of

the mandate, such an arrangement is neither

inconsistent with nor contrary to the fundamental

policy of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996. It was, therefore, submitted that the

principle of party autonomy permits the parties

to adopt such procedural framework even in

matters concerning Section 29A of the Act.

5.9 By making above submissions, learned

Senior Advocate requested this Court to reject

the preliminary objection raised by the

respondents.

5.10 To substantiate the aforesaid

contentions, Learned Senior Advocate relied on

the following decisions:

(i) Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Union of

India [(2014) 7 SCC 603];

(ii) Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings

LLC v. Future Retail Ltd. [(2022) 1

SCC 209];

(iii) Hindustan Construction Company Ltd.

Through its Authorised Signatory

Yogesh Dalal v. Bihar Rajya Pul

Nirman Nigam Ltd. [2025 LawSuit (SC)

1542] and

Page 11 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

(iv) P.R. Shah Shares and Stock Brokers

Pvt. Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities Pvt.

Ltd. [(2012) 1 SCC 594] .

6. Learned advocate Mr.Amit Thakkar adopted

the submissions advanced by learned Senior

Advocate Mr.Deven Parikh. However, in so far as

Miscellaneous Civil Application No.773 of 2026 in

Arbitration Petition No.39 of 2025 is concerned,

he questioned its maintainability by relying upon

the provisions of Order XLVII of the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908.

6.1 It was submitted that the Explanation to

Order XLVII makes it abundantly clear that a

judgment cannot be reviewed merely because the

legal position on which it was based has

subsequently been reversed or modified by a

superior court in another case. According to the

learned advocate, the present Miscellaneous Civil

Application is founded entirely on the decision

of the Apex Court in Jagdeep Chowgule (supra) ,

rendered on 29th January, 2026.

6.2 It was further submitted that the orders

sought to be reviewed and recalled were passed on

13th March, 2025 and 21st March, 2025, much prior

to the pronouncement of the judgment in Jagdeep

Chowgule (supra) . Therefore, a subsequent

Page 12 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

declaration of law by the Apex Court cannot

furnish a ground to seek review of orders passed

before such declaration. It was, therefore,

contended that the review application is

misconceived and deserves to be dismissed.

7. In rejoinder, learned advocate Mr. Shah

made the following submissions:

7.1 It was submitted that no distinction can

be drawn between an institutional arbitration and

an ad hoc arbitration so far as the applicability

of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is

concerned. According to the learned advocate, the

provisions of the Act apply uniformly to both

forms of arbitration.

7.2 Learned advocate further submitted that

when Rule 34.6 of the Arbitration Centre

(Domestic and International), High Court of

Gujarat Rules, 2021 was framed, the jurisdiction

to extend the mandate under Sections 29A(4) and

29A(5) vested in the High Court, and therefore

the expression “High Court” came to be

incorporated in the said Rule. It was contended

that, in any case, the Rules of the Arbitration

Centre cannot override the provisions of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. According

to the learned advocate, in view of the recent

Page 13 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

decision of the Apex Court interpreting Section

29A(4), it has now been authoritatively held that

the expression “Court” refers to the court having

jurisdiction to entertain an application under

Section 34 of the Act. Consequently, to the

extent Rule 34.6 is inconsistent with the said

interpretation of Section 29A(4), it cannot be

given effect to.

7.3 On the aforesaid submissions, learned

advocate for the respondents prayed that the

preliminary objection be upheld.

CONTROVERSY BEFORE THE COURT AS FOLLOWS:

8. Having considered the submissions

advanced by the learned advocates for the

respective parties and upon perusal of the

material placed on record, the following

questions arise for determination:

(i) Whether, in the facts of the present

case, the jurisdiction to extend the

mandate of the learned Sole Arbitrator

is to be determined in accordance with

Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, as interpreted

by the Apex Court in Jagdeep Chowgule

(supra), or in accordance with Rule 34.6

Page 14 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

of the Arbitration Centre (Domestic and

International), High Court of Gujarat

Rules, 2021, which the parties had

agreed to be governed by?

(ii) Whether the principle of party autonomy

permits the parties, either by agreement

or by adopting institutional arbitration

rules, to confer jurisdiction upon the

High Court to entertain an application

for extension of the arbitral tribunal’s

mandate, notwithstanding the scheme of

Section 29A of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996?

(iii) Whether Rule 34.6 of the Arbitration

Centre (Domestic and International),

High Court of Gujarat Rules, 2021 can

operate independently of, or prevail

over, the jurisdictional framework

contained in Section 29A of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

9. So as to decide the aforesaid question,

in my view, provisions of Section 29A(4) deserves

consideration. For the sake of brevity, the same

is hereby reproduced hereunder:

Page 15 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

“29A. Time Limit for arbitral

award.-

(1)… … …

(2)… … …

(3)… … …

(4) If the award is not made within

the period specified in sub-section

(1) or the extended period specified

under sub-section (3), the mandate of

the arbitrator(s) shall terminate

unless the Court has, either prior to

or after the expiry of the period so

specified, extended the period:

Provided that while extending the

period under this sub-section, if the

Court finds that the proceedings have

been delayed for the reasons

attributable to the arbitral tribunal,

then, it may order reduction of fees

of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five

per cent for each month of such delay:

Provided further that where an

application under sub-section (5) is

pending, the mandate of the arbitrator

shall continue till the disposal of

the said application:

Provided also that the arbitrator

shall be given an opportunity of being

heard before the fees is reduced.”

10. A plain reading of Section 29A of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 makes it

evident that, except in the case of an

international commercial arbitration, the

Page 16 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

arbitral tribunal is required to make the

arbitral award within a period of twelve months

from the date of completion of pleadings under

Section 23(4) of the Act. The time limit

prescribed by the legislature is mandatory in

nature and forms an integral part of the

statutory framework governing arbitral

proceedings.

Under Section 29A(3), the legislature

has consciously preserved the principle of party

autonomy by permitting the parties, by mutual

consent, to extend the mandate of the arbitral

tribunal for a further period not exceeding six

months. Thus, to that limited extent, the

continuation of the arbitral proceedings remains

within the control of the parties.

However, the statutory scheme undergoes

a marked change once the initial period of twelve

months and the consensual extension of six months

expire. Section 29A(4) expressly provides that,

upon expiry of the said period, the mandate of

the arbitral tribunal stands terminated unless

the Court extends the period. At that stage, the

legislature has consciously withdrawn the matter

from the domain of party autonomy and entrusted

it to judicial supervision. The continuation of

Page 17 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

the arbitral tribunal thereafter depends solely

upon an order of the Court passed on sufficient

cause being shown and on such terms and

conditions as it may deem fit. The Court is also

empowered, if the circumstances so warrant, to

substitute the arbitrator while granting such

extension.

The scheme of Section 29A, therefore,

reflects a careful legislative balance between

party autonomy and judicial oversight. While the

parties enjoy complete freedom to grant a one-

time extension of six months by mutual consent,

any further continuation of the arbitral tribunal

is placed exclusively under the control of the

Court. The provision is not merely procedural;

rather, it constitutes a self-contained statutory

mechanism regulating the time within which an

arbitral award is to be made and prescribing the

manner in which the mandate of the arbitral

tribunal may continue beyond the prescribed

period.

10.1 Section 29A thus imposes a statutory

obligation upon the arbitral tribunal to render

its award within a maximum period of eighteen

months, comprising the original period of twelve

months and the additional six months that may be

Page 18 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

granted by consent of the parties. Beyond this

period, the mandate can continue only upon an

order of the Court under Section 29A(4).

Viewed from this perspective, neither

the parties nor an arbitral institution can, by

agreement or by institutional rules, provide for

any mechanism permitting extension of the

tribunal’s mandate beyond the statutory period

without recourse to the Court. Significantly, the

Act does not carve out any exception excluding

institutional arbitrations seated in India from

the operation of Section 29A. Consequently,

irrespective of whether the arbitration is ad hoc

or institutional, any extension of the arbitral

tribunal’s mandate beyond the statutory period

must necessarily be sought from the “Court” as

understood under Section 29A read with the

definition contained in Section 2(1)(e) of the

Act.

11. At this stage, this Court cannot be

under any oblivion with regard to the recent

pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of

Jagdeep Chowgule (supra) . It would be apt to

consider the relevant portion of the said

decision. The same is quoted as under:

“5. As we begin to examine the very

Page 19 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

same questions, ably canvassed before us by

Mr. Abhay Anil Anturkar and Mr. Amit Pai,

learned counsels for the appellant and the

respondents respectively, we would prefer to

reframe the question, which is as simple and

straight forward as follows:-

If an arbitral tribunal - appointed by

the High Court or by the parties

concerned – does not complete proceedings

within the required or extended time

limit, can an application to extend time

under Section 29A of the Act can be filed

before the High Court or the Civil Court?

6. We are of the opinion that there

was no need to split the questions into two,

one for a situation when the High Court

constitutes the arbitral tribunal under

Section 11(6) and the other, when the parties

themselves constitute it under Section 11(2).

Perhaps by asking the wrong questions, the

Division Bench arrived at wrong answers. It

is not just this Division Bench, in fact this

perceived duality in the appointment process

has given rise to divergent views of

different High Courts. Before we deal with

the divergent views of the High Court,

followed by our analysis, short and necessary

facts are as follows.

IV. Divergence in the opinion of the High

Courts on interpretation of “Court” under

Section 2(1)(e) of the Act

8. A large number of decisions of the High

Courts on interpretation of Section 29A of

the Act can be categorized into following two

streams.

A. Judgments taking the view that ‘Court’ in

Section 29A is Court as defined in Section

2(1)(e).

9. The first stream of High Court decisions

in Mormugao Port Trust v. Ganesh Benzoplast

Ltd. [WP No. 3 of 2020 (High Court of Bombay

at Goa)], M/s A'Xykno Capital Services

Private Ltd. V State of UP [2023 SCC OnLine

Page 20 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

AII 2991], and Dr. VV Subbarao v. Dr. Appa

Rao Mukkamala & Ors. [2024 SCC OnLine AP

1668], hold that the expression ‘Court’ in

Section 29A is the Court as defined under

Section 2(1)(e), irrespective of the event

that the arbitral tribunal was constituted by

the Supreme or High Courts under Section

11(6) or by consent of parties under Section

11(2) of the Act. They hold that, once an

arbitrator has been appointed through the

judicial process, the Courts become functus

officio and applications seeking extension of

mandate under Section 29A are to be filed

before Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e).

9.1 Further, as per this stream of decisions,

the text of the legislation is unambiguous.

Neither a High Court not having original

ordinary civil jurisdiction has been included

with regard to entertainability of an

application under Section 29A, nor a

Principal Civil Court has been excluded from

Section 2(1)(e) for purpose of Section 29A.

Some of these decisions clarify that, when

the legislature intended to delineate

jurisdictions, requisite provisions have duly

been made, as exemplified through Sections 47

and 57, whereby jurisdiction of Civil Courts

is expressly excluded. Further, Section 29A

stipulates no distinction between arbitrators

appointed with the consent of parties or by

Constitutional Courts under Section 11.

B. Other stream of judgments interpreting

Court in Section 29A in the ‘context’ to

disapply Section 2(1)(e).

10.The second stream of High Court

decisions in Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel v.

Bhanubhai Ramanbhai Patel [2018 SCC OnLine

Guj 5017], Cabra Instalaciones Y. Servicios

v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution

Co. Ltd. [2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1437], DDA v.

Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co. [2020 SCC

OnLine Del 2501], Amit Kumar Gupta v. Dipak

Prasad [2021 SCC OnLine Cal 2174], Magnus

Opus IT Consulting Pvt Ltd v. Artcad Systems

[2022 SCC OnLine Bom 2861], Indian Farmers

Fertilizers Cooperative Limited v. Manish

Page 21 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

Engineering Enterprises [2022 SCC OnLine All

150], Best Eastern Business House Pvt. Ltd.

v. Mina Pradhan [2025 SCC OnLine Cal 7997],

Ovington Finance Pvt Ltd. v. Bindiya Naga

[2023 SCC OnLine Del 8765], K.I.P.L.

Vistacore Infra Projects J.V. v. Municipal

Corporation of the city of Ichalkarnj [2024

SCC Online Bom 327], M/S Geo Miller Company

Private Limited v. UP Jal Nigam and Ors.

[2024 SCC OnLine All 1676], Best Eastern

Business House Pvt. Ltd. v. Mina Pradhan

[2025 SCC OnLine Cal 7997], and M/s. Premco

Rail Engineering Ltd. v. Indian Institute of

Technology, Indore [Arbitration Case No.88 of

2025 (High Court of Madhya Pradesh)] hold

that in cases where the appointment of

arbitrator is by the High Court under Section

11(6), applications for extension of time

under Section 29A cannot be made before Civil

Courts. The primary concern in these

decisions is, if the expression “Court” in

Section 2(1)(e) is interpreted to mean only

the Court as defined there, it will create a

jurisdictional anomaly, that is, the High

Court would be appointing the arbitrator and

the Civil Court, a Court inferior to it,

could be asked to extend the arbitrator’s

mandate and would also have the jurisdiction

to substitute the arbitrator appointed by the

High Court.

10.1 It is reasoned that as the

exclusive power of appointment of arbitrator

under Section 11 is of the Supreme Court or

the High Courts, the ancillary power of

extension or substitution can only be of

these Courts, or else a situation of

“conflict of power” between the Civil Court

and the High Court would arise in cases of

domestic arbitration and a similar conflict

would arise between the High Court and the

Supreme Court in cases of international

commercial arbitration.

10.2 To obviate the situation, these

lines of decisions adopt the interpretative

principle of giving “contextual” meaning to

the expression ‘Court’ in Section 29A by

Page 22 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

referring and relying on the phrase “in this

Part, unless the context otherwise requires”

in Section 2(1) of the Act. The High Courts,

for instance the High Court of Gujarat in

Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel (Supra) followed by

the Delhi High Court in DDA v. Tara Chand

(Supra) [2020 SCC OnLine Del 2501] were

troubled by the power of principal Civil

Court to substitute arbitrators appointed by

the High Court. To resolve this complexity,

they have taken the view that “Court” under

Section 29A for extension of the mandate of

the arbitral tribunal in the context of the

arbitral tribunal being constituted by the

High Court or the Supreme Court under Section

11(6), shall not be the “Court” as defined in

Section 2(1)(e), but the High Court or the

Supreme Court under Section 11(6).

12. The Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996 is a complete code. While Chapter I

of the Act relates to definitions, limits of

judicial intervention and waiver. Chapter II

defines the scope of an arbitration

agreement, the obligation of a judicial

authority to refer the parties to the

agreement to arbitration and power of the

Court to provide interim measures. Chapter

III relates to the initiation and composition

of arbitral tribunal, as also the procedure

and remedies for challenging the

appointments. Chapter IV relates to

jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, its

powers to examine its own competence and also

to provide interim measures. Chapter V deals

with the conduct of arbitral proceedings. The

process of making of award and termination of

arbitral proceedings is dealt with in Chapter

VI. Finally, Chapters VII, VIII and IX relate

to judicial remedies for challenging the

award, appeal, finality and enforcement.

True Text and Context of Section 29A

16. As we move away from the process of

“Appointment of Arbitrators” under Section 11

and arrive at the “Conduct of Arbitral

Proceedings” and “Making of Arbitral Award

Page 23 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

and Termination”, which procedures are

articulated in Chapters V and VI, we notice

the Parliament’s endeavour to introduce

principles of integrity and efficiency in

working of the alternative remedy by

prescribing time limits. This is an important

feature, introduced through Section 29A,

w.e.f. 23.10.2015. The Section in its

entirety has already been extracted for ready

reference, but a holistic reading of the

provision with other parts of the Act

mandates as follows;

(i) Sub-Section (1) of Section 29A mandates

that the award shall be made within 12

months of the completion of pleadings

before the Arbitral Tribunal. While sub-

Section (2) incentivises expeditious making

of the Award, proviso to sub-Section (4)

and sub-Section (8) authorises the Court to

impose penalty for delay in making the

award.

(ii) Sub-Section (3) enables parties, by

consent, to extend the period of 12 months

for making the award by a further period

not exceeding 6 months.

(iii) If the award is not made within the

stipulated period of 12 months or the

extended period of 6 months, the mandate of

the arbitrator(s) shall terminate.

(iv) This termination is subject to the

power of the Court to extend the period.

(v) The ‘Court’ under Section 29A shall be

the Civil Court of ordinary original

jurisdiction in a district and includes the

High Court in exercise of its original

civil jurisdiction under Section 2(1)(e),

and shall not be the High Court or the

Supreme Court under Section 11(6) of the

Act. Equally, Section 42 of the Act

relating to jurisdiction for application

will not apply to Section 11 of the Act.

(vi) There is no statutorily prescribed

time limit for the Court to exercise its

power under Section 29A(4) for extending

the period, except for its own restraint.

Page 24 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

The Court can exercise the power before or

after the expiry of the period under sub-

Sections 29A(1) or (3). Further, there is

no prescription of outer limit for

extending time for conclusion of arbitral

proceedings. Given this power, the Court

will exercise it with circumspection,

balancing the remedy with rights of other

stake holders.

(vii) The power of the Court to extend the

time under sub-Section (4) may be exercised

on an application by any of the parties.

Once such an application for extension of

time is pending, the mandate of the

arbitrator shall continue till the disposal

of such application under sub-Section (9).

The Court shall also endeavour to dispose

of such an application within 60 days.

(viii) Under Section 29A(6), while

exercising the power of extension, it shall

be open to the Court to substitute one or

all the arbitrators. This is a

discretionary power that the Court would

exercise in the facts and circumstances of

the case. Upon substitution, the

reconstituted tribunal shall be deemed to

be in continuation of the previously

appointed tribunal as per Section 29A(7)

and shall continue from the stage already

reached and on the basis of evidence

already on record. The newly appointed

arbitrators shall be deemed to have

received the evidence and materials.

(ix) Vesting of the power of substitution,

under Section 29A(6), is on the Court and

this Court is the Court as defined in

Section 2(1)(e). The text as well as the

context for identifying the Court in

Section 29A(6), as well as in 29A(4), is

the Court in Section 2(1)(e). The

expression ‘Court’ in other provisions must

be guided by the meaning given in Section

2(1)(e).

17. Before we examine the

interpretative choices of the Court to

decipher the true meaning of a word on the

basis of the context, it is necessary for us

to consider if perceptions such as “inferior

Page 25 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

Court”, “conflict of power”, “hierarchy” or

even a “jurisdictional anomaly”, can supply

“context” for deviating from a definition

supplied by the Parliament to an expression.

We have no hesitation in holding that

interpretation based on a perception of

status or hierarchy of Courts is opposed to

the fundamental conception of rule of law. It

is apt to refer to the famous statement of

Dicey that, ‘however high you may be, the law

is above you.’ Law, and law alone is the

source of power.

20. For the reasons stated above, we

are of the opinion that the conclusion on the

ground that there will be hierarchical

difficulties, conflict of power or

jurisdictional anomaly if a Civil Court

entertains application under Section 29A for

extension of time of an arbitral tribunal if

the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act

has appointed the arbitrator(s) is untenable.

This approach is hereby rejected.

VIII. Interpretation of the expression

“Court” in Section 2(1)(e)

21. It is a settled principle of

statutory interpretation that a defined term

must ordinarily bear the meaning assigned to

it “unless the context otherwise requires”.

Further, in State of West Bengal v.

Associated Contractors [(2015) 1 SCC 32], a

three-judge bench held that no Court other

than the one defined in Section 2(1)(e) gets

qualified as ‘Court’ under Part I of the Act,

1996. It observed that,

“25. …. (a) Section 2(1)(e) contains an

exhaustive definition marking out only the

Principal Civil Court of Original

Jurisdiction in a district or a High Court

having original civil jurisdiction in the

State, and no other court as “court” for

the purpose of Part I of the Arbitration

Act, 1996.”

22. Similarly, in Nimet Resources Inc.

& Anr. v. Essar Steels Ltd. [(2009) 17 SCC

Page 26 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

313] where this Court considered Section 2(1)

(e) in the context of Section 14 observed as

under:

“8. Application in terms of sub-section (2) of

Section 14, thus, lies before a “court” within

the meaning of the 1996 Act.

9. It is only thus the “court”, within the

meaning of the provisions of the said Act which

can entertain such an application raised by the

parties herein and determine the dispute therein

on merit.

10. Unlike the 1940 Act, “court” has been defined

in Section 2(1)(e) to mean:

“2. (1)(e) ‘Court’ means the Principal

Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a

district, and includes the High Court in

exercise of its ordinary original civil

jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide

the questions forming the subjectmatter of

the arbitration if the same had been the

subjectmatter of a suit, but does not

include any civil court of a grade inferior

to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court

of Small Causes;”

11. As a “court” has been defined in the 1996 Act

itself, an application under Section 14(2) would

be maintainable only before the Principal Civil

Court which may include a High Court having

jurisdiction but not this Court .

12. This Court in passing its order dated 27-9-

2000, as noticed hereinbefore, did not and could

not retain any jurisdiction in itself as could be

done in suitable cases under the 1940 Act. It

even did not determine the validity or otherwise

of the arbitration agreement. It allowed the

parties to take recourse to their remedies before

the learned arbitrator. When the said order was

passed, this Court was considered to have only an

administrative power, but the same has since been

held to be a judicial power in SBP & Co. v. Patel

Engg. Ltd. [(2005) 8 SCC 618] The said

jurisdiction, however, does not extend to Section

14 of the Act.

13. The definition of “court” indisputably would

be subject to the context in which it is used. It

Page 27 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

may also include the appellate courts. Once the

legislature has defined a term in the

interpretation clause, it is not necessary for it

to use the same expression in other provisions of

the Act. It is well settled that meaning assigned

to a term as defined in the interpretation clause

unless the context otherwise requires should be

given the same meaning .

14. It is also well settled that in the absence

of any context indicating a contrary intention,

the same meaning would be attached to the word

used in the later as is given to them in the

earlier statute. It is trite that the words or

expression used in a statute before and after

amendment should be given the same meaning. It is

a settled law that when the legislature uses the

same words in a similar connection, it is to be

presumed that in the absence of any context

indicating a contrary intention, the same meaning

should attach to the words.

18. Jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the 1996

Act is used for a different purpose. The Chief

Justice or his designate exercises a limited

jurisdiction. It is not as broad as sub-section

(4) of Section 20 of the 1940 Act. When an

arbitrator is nominated under the 1996 Act, the

court does not retain any jurisdiction with it.

It becomes functus officio subject of course to

exercise of jurisdiction in terms of

constitutional provisions or the Supreme Court

Rules.”

(emphasis supplied)

23. Nimet Resources (Supra) clarifies

two propositions of enduring relevance.

First, that applications concerning conduct,

continuation, termination or substitution of

an arbitral mandate, whether under Section 14

or otherwise, are matters of curial

supervision and must be instituted before the

“Court” as statutorily defined. Second, that

the jurisdiction exercised under Section 11

is limited and exhausted upon the

constitution of the arbitral tribunal,

leading to the appointing Court becoming

functus officio thereafter. These principles

apply with equal force to Section 29A. The

extension of mandate or substitution of an

arbitrator under Section 29A does not partake

Page 28 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

the character of “appointment” under Section

11, but is a measure designed to ensure

timely conclusion of arbitration. Absence of

any contextual indicia to the contrary, the

expression “Court” in Section 29A must,

therefore, be accorded the meaning assigned

to it under Section 2(1)(e).

X Conclusion

27. In view of the above, we allow the

appeals, set aside the reference of the

Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 88 of

2024 dated 07.08.2024 and the subsequent

judgment and order of the Single Judge of the

High Court in Writ Petition No. 88 of 2024

dated 21.08.2024 and restore the judgment of

the Commercial Court in Civil Miscellaneous

Application No. 20/2023/A dated 02.01.2024.

Parties are at liberty to move the Commercial

Court for further extension under Section

29A(5) for exercising Court’s power under

Section 29A(4). The Court shall consider the

application, hear the parties and pass

appropriate orders.”

12. Having considered the rival submissions,

this Court now proceeds to examine the

contentions advanced on behalf of the

petitioners.

12.1 The principal contention of the

petitioners is founded upon Rule 34.6 of the

Arbitration Centre (Domestic and International),

High Court of Gujarat Rules, 2021, which provides

that an application for extension of the mandate

of the arbitral tribunal shall lie before the

High Court. It is true that the reference to

Page 29 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

arbitration in the present case was made in

accordance with the said Rules and the parties

had agreed to be governed by them. However, that

by itself cannot conclude the issue.

Rule 34.6 was framed in the year 2021

when the legal position regarding Section 29A of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 had

not been authoritatively settled. Subsequently,

the Apex Court, in Jagdeep Chowgule (supra) , has

interpreted Section 29A in conjunction with

Section 2(1)(e) of the Act and has categorically

held that an application for extension of the

mandate must be presented before the Court

competent to entertain a challenge under Section

34 of the Act. Once the statutory provision has

been authoritatively interpreted by the Apex

Court, Rule 34.6 must necessarily yield to such

interpretation. The Rule, therefore, cannot be

applied in disregard of Section 29A as

interpreted by the Apex Court.

12.2 Equally untenable is the contention

that, since earlier applications for extension

were entertained by this Court under Rule 34.6

without objection, the respondents are now

precluded from raising the issue of jurisdiction.

All the earlier orders extending the mandate were

Page 30 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

passed prior to the pronouncement of the decision

in Jagdeep Chowgule (supra) . Once the Apex Court

has declared the law, the same becomes binding on

all courts by virtue of Article 141 of the

Constitution. Article 144 further obliges all

civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of

the Supreme Court. Consequently, the

jurisdictional issue must now be examined in the

light of the law declared by the Apex Court,

irrespective of the course adopted in the earlier

proceedings.

12.3 The further submission that Rule 34.6

continues to operate as it has not been

challenged also does not merit acceptance. It is

well settled that subordinate legislation must

conform to the parent statute. If a rule is found

to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act

or with the law declared by the Apex Court while

interpreting the Act, such inconsistency cannot

be ignored merely because the rule has not been

specifically challenged. The duty of the Court is

to harmoniously construe the Rules with the Act.

Therefore, Rule 34.6 must operate subject to

Section 29A and cannot be construed in a manner

inconsistent with the statutory scheme.

12.4 Much emphasis was placed on the

Page 31 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

principle of party autonomy, which undoubtedly

constitutes one of the foundational principles of

arbitration law. The Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996 accords considerable freedom to parties

in matters relating to the arbitration agreement,

the number and appointment of arbitrators, the

procedure to be followed, the place and language

of arbitration and several other procedural

aspects. The legislative intent is to minimise

judicial intervention and facilitate efficient

resolution of disputes through arbitration.

However, party autonomy under the Act is

not absolute. It operates only in those areas

where the statute expressly permits the parties

to exercise their choice. Wherever the Act

prescribes a mandatory statutory procedure, party

autonomy necessarily gives way to the legislative

mandate.

Section 29A is one such provision. While

Section 29A(3) permits the parties, by mutual

consent, to extend the mandate of the arbitral

tribunal for a further period of six months,

Section 29A(4) mandates that any extension beyond

that period can be granted only by the Court.

Thus, the statute itself draws a clear

distinction between the sphere reserved for party

Page 32 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

autonomy and the sphere reserved for judicial

supervision. Once the statutory period together

with the consensual extension expires, the

continuation of the arbitral tribunal ceases to

be a matter of agreement between the parties and

becomes subject exclusively to the jurisdiction

of the Court.

In that view of the matter, party

autonomy cannot be stretched to permit the

parties, either by agreement or by adopting

institutional rules, to confer jurisdiction upon

a Court which the statute does not recognise.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by

consent. Once the expression “Court” occurring in

Section 29A has been interpreted by the Apex

Court with reference to Section 2(1)(e) of the

Act, the parties cannot, by agreement, substitute

another forum for the one contemplated by the

statute.

12.5 Thus, principle of party autonomy in the

arbitration law, in my considered opinion, there

cannot be any cavil with regard to the said

proposition. Arbitration law and its object is to

minimize the supervisory role of courts,

providing speedy disposal of the dispute with

amicable, swift and co-efficient settlement with

Page 33 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

a formal award while ensuring that arbitration

proceedings are just, fair and effective. While

making arbitration proceedings speedy and

effective, legislature has also added pinch of

friendliness by extending certain flexibilities

to the parties to the agreement/ arbitration. The

parties to the arbitration are free to adopt the

procedure. At the same time, such autonomy is not

absolute in nature. The party autonomy operates

in area where the statute is permissive, but at

the same time, it is excluded where the

provisions are mandatory such as court’s

supervision under certain provisions of the Act.

On overall consideration of the Arbitration Act,

1996, party autonomy is permissive under Section

7 where party decides whether to arbitrate, scope

of dispute, etc. Meaning thereby, parties are

left open to have an agreement to submit to

themselves to arbitration proceedings. So far as

Sections 10 and 11 are concerned, parties are

left to their autonomy to choose number of

Arbitrators and procedure for appointment

thereof. Section 19 of the Arbitration Act would

allow the parties to have their own procedure

precisely, parties can decide their own mode of

recording of evidence, procedure for conducting

the proceedings etc. In view of provisions of

Section 20, parties are also left to decide seat

Page 34 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

and venue of arbitration. Once the seat of

arbitration is decided, applicability of curial

law of court’s jurisdiction would be determined.

Accordingly, once the place of arbitration is

decided under Section 20 and if place of

arbitration is situated in India, Indian law

shall be applicable being a mandatory position.

At this stage, it is required to be noted that in

the present case, seat of arbitration is within

the territory of India and thereby curial law of

procedure shall be applicable. As per Section 22,

parties are also free to agree upon the language

to be used in arbitration proceedings. Likewise,

Sections 29B and 31A are also reflects eminence

to party autonomy. Now, if the provision of

Section 29A is concerned, the same being

statutorily mandated, although limited autonomy

for extension of time of six months is granted to

the party, but the moment the mandate is expired;

Section 29A(4) becomes eminent and in that event,

only court can grant further extension and not

the party as per their claimed autonomy. When the

party autonomy is restricted for extension of

mandate, it is not digestible that a party can

choose a court who can extend the mandate. Party

autonomy does not give any leverage to any of the

parties to the arbitration to have their own

choice of court upon which, by way of agreement,

Page 35 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

they can invest powers for extension of mandate

de hors the provisions of Section 29A(4) of the

Arbitration Act, 1996. Under the circumstances,

party autonomy recognized under the provisions of

the Arbitration Act, 1996 is not absolute in all

the provisions, but limited to the area which is

statutorily prescribed within the Act itself.

12.6 The contention that the Arbitration

Centre is entitled to provide, under its Rules,

that the High Court alone shall supervise

proceedings conducted under its aegis also cannot

be accepted. An arbitral institution is

undoubtedly competent to frame rules governing

the conduct of proceedings before it and to

regulate procedural matters for the convenience

of the parties. Nevertheless, such rules cannot

override or dilute the mandatory provisions of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Institutional rules supplement the statute; they

cannot supplant it.

Acceptance of the petitioners’

contention would, in effect, permit every

arbitral institution to determine for itself the

forum having jurisdiction under Section 29A,

thereby defeating the uniform statutory framework

enacted by Parliament. Such a consequence is

plainly impermissible.

Page 36 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

12.7 The submission that, once the parties

have adopted the Rules, 2021, every provision

thereof must necessarily be enforced also

deserves to be rejected. Ordinarily, parties are

bound by the procedural rules governing the

arbitration they have chosen. However, such

adherence is subject to one fundamental

limitation, namely that the institutional rules

must remain consistent with the provisions of the

Act. To the extent any provision of the Rules is

inconsistent with the Act, or with the law

declared by the Apex Court while interpreting the

Act, the statutory mandate must prevail.

Accordingly, after the decision in

Jagdeep Chowgule (supra) , Rule 34.6 cannot be

applied in a manner inconsistent with Section 29A

read with Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996.

13. So far as the authorities relied upon by

the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner

are concerned, this Court is of the view that

they turn on their own facts and the legal issues

arising therein are materially different from

those involved in the present case. The principal

submission of the petitioner is that Rule 34.6 of

the Arbitration Centre (Domestic and

Page 37 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

International), High Court of Gujarat Rules,

2021, being part of the curial law chosen by the

parties, must continue to govern the issue of

extension of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate.

There can be no dispute with the

proposition that parties are free to adopt the

curial law governing the conduct of the arbitral

proceedings. However, the issue that arises in

the present case is altogether different. The

question is whether a provision of the curial

law, which has subsequently become inconsistent

with the statutory scheme of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 as interpreted by the Apex

Court, can still be enforced merely because it

was adopted by the parties.

None of the decisions relied upon by the

learned Senior Advocate lays down that an

institutional rule or curial provision, once

adopted by the parties, would continue to prevail

even if it becomes inconsistent with the

provisions of the parent statute. In that view of

the matter, the authorities relied upon by the

petitioner are clearly distinguishable on facts

as well as on the legal issue involved and,

therefore, do not advance the petitioner’s case.

14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the

Page 38 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

preliminary objection raised on behalf of the

respondents deserves to be accepted and is

accordingly upheld.

15. Consequently, in view of the law

declared by the Apex Court in Jagdeep Chowgule v.

Sheela Chowgule, reported in 2026 INSC 92, this

Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the

present petitions under Section 29A(4) of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The

petitions are, therefore, dismissed as not

maintainable, with liberty to the petitioners to

approach the competent Court having jurisdiction

under Section 29A(4) of the Act for appropriate

relief.

It is clarified that the period spent by

the petitioners in bona fide prosecuting the

present proceedings before this Court shall stand

excluded while computing limitation, if any, in

accordance with law.

16. In view of the dismissal of Arbitration

Petition No.145 of 2025, Civil Application No.1

of 2025 filed therein for amendment does not

survive for consideration and is accordingly

disposed of as having become infructuous.

17. In so far as Miscellaneous Civil

Page 39 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

Application No.773 of 2026 seeking review is

concerned, the same is founded upon the

subsequent decision of the Apex Court in Jagdeep

Chowgule (supra) . The orders sought to be

reviewed were admittedly passed prior to the

pronouncement of the said decision.

The Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 expressly

provides that a subsequent reversal or

modification of the legal position by a superior

Court in another case does not constitute a

ground for review of a judgment rendered earlier.

In view thereof, a subsequent declaration of law

by the Apex Court cannot furnish a ground to

review an order passed prior to such declaration.

Accordingly, Miscellaneous Civil

Application No.773 of 2026 is rejected. It is,

however, clarified that all the rights and

contentions of the respective parties are kept

open to be urged before the competent Court, if

so advised.

18. Before parting, this Court considers it

appropriate to direct the Registry to place a

copy of this judgment before the appropriate

Committee constituted for the Arbitration Centre

(Domestic and International), High Court of

Page 40 of 41

C/ARBI.P/145/2025 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026

Gujarat, so that the Arbitration Centre (Domestic

and International), High Court of Gujarat Rules,

2021, particularly Rule 34.6, may be examined for

suitable modification or amendment to bring the

same in conformity with the law declared by the

Apex Court in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule

reported in 2026 INSC 92.

(NIRAL R. MEHTA,J)

FURTHER ORDER

After pronouncement of the judgment,

Learned Advocate Mr.Rutul Desai requested this

Court to stay the judgment so as to enable them

to approach the higher forum.

In view of the discussion, request

deserves no consideration. The same is rejected.

(NIRAL R. MEHTA,J)

ANUP

Page 41 of 41