2026 INSC 982 Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO…………………………..OF 2026

(@ SLP (CRL.) NO. 12871 OF 2026)

ABU SALEM ABDUL

QAYOOM ANSARI …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF

MAHARASHTRA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAM NATH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. We have heard Mr. Rishi Malhotra, learned senior

counsel appearing for the appellant.

3. The present appeal, preferred under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India, assails the final judgment and

order dated 15

th April, 2026, passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Bombay,

1 in Writ Petition No.

1586 of 2025, whereby the High Court dismissed the

writ petition instituted by the appellant seeking

issuance of writs of habeas corpus and mandamus

1

Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”.

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 2

directing the respondent-State to release him from

custody. The appellant’s case before the High Court

was that he had already undergone the maximum

sentence of 25 years upon taking into account the

period spent in custody as an undertrial, the period

of incarceration after conviction, as well as the

remissions earned by him during his imprisonment.

4. The facts, relevant for the disposal of the present

appeal, are as follows: –

4.1. The appellant was previously associated with a

criminal syndicate and had been accused of

involvement in several criminal activities. In this

backdrop, the Union Government sought his

extradition from Portugal, subject principally to two

conditions: first, that he would not be prosecuted for

offences other than those for which his extradition

was sought; and second, that he would not be

extradited to any third country. It is pertinent to note

that, on 17

th December, 2002, a solemn sovereign

assurance was conveyed to the Government of

Portugal through the then Deputy Prime Minister,

Shri L.K. Advani, that the Government of India would

exercise its powers under Indian law to ensure that,

upon extradition to India for trial, the appellant

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 3

would neither be subjected to the death penalty nor

imprisonment exceeding 25 years.

4.2. Pursuant to the aforesaid assurances, the Ministry of

Justice, Portugal, vide order dated 29

th March, 2003,

permitted the appellant’s extradition. His custody

was handed over to the Indian authorities on 10

th

November, 2005, and he was extradited to India on

11

th November, 2005.

4.3. Upon his extradition, the appellant was arrested on

11

th November, 2005, in connection with BBC Case

No. 1 of 1993. In TADA Case No. 1 of 2006, he was

arrested on 24

th November, 2005. Upon conclusion of

the trial, the Special Court under the TADA (P) Act at

Bombay,

2 vide order dated 25

th February, 2015,

convicted the appellant and sentenced him to

rigorous life imprisonment.

4.4. Subsequently, upon conclusion of the trial in BBC

Case No. 1 of 1993, the TADA Court, vide order dated

7

th September, 2017, convicted the appellant and

sentenced him to rigorous life imprisonment. The

TADA Court, however, directed that the said sentence

shall run concurrently with the sentence imposed in

TADA Case No. 1 of 2006.

2

Hereinafter referred to as “TADA Court”.

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 4

4.5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid convictions, the appellant

preferred appeals

3 before this Court under Section 19

of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)

Act, 1987

4.

4.6. This Court, vide judgment dated 11

th July, 2022,

disposed of the said appeals and held that the

appellant’s period of detention, for the purposes of

computation of his sentence, would commence from

12

th October, 2005. This Court rejected the

appellant’s claim for set-off under Section 428 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,

5 holding that the

period of incarceration undergone by him in another

country in connection with separate proceedings

could not be taken into account for computing the

sentence imposed in India. The Court further rejected

the appellant’s contention that his formal arrest

ought to be reckoned from 18

th September, 2002.

4.7. At the same time, this Court observed that upon

completion of twenty-five years of sentence, the

Central Government may either advise the President

of India to exercise the powers under Article 72 of the

Constitution or, in exercise of its powers under

Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC, consider

3

Criminal Appeal Nos. 679 of 2015 and 180 of 2018.

4

For short, “TAD Act”.

5

For short, “CrPC”.

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 5

remission or commutation of the sentence, having

regard to the principles of national commitment and

comity of courts.

4.8. Thereafter, the appellant approached the High Court

by way of a writ petition seeking issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus and a writ of mandamus directing the

respondent-State to release him from custody. His

case was that, upon computation of the period of

detention undergone by him, he had already

completed twenty-five years of sentence.

4.9. The High Court, vide judgment dated 15

th April, 2026,

dismissed the writ petition, holding that the appellant

had failed to demonstrate that his continued

detention was unauthorised or illegal and that the

period of twenty-five years fixed by this Court by

judgment dated 11

th July, 2022 had not yet been

completed.

5. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant is before us.

6. On 27

th July, 2026, when the matter was listed as a

petition for special leave under Article 136 of the

Constitution, we were not persuaded that any

infirmity existed in the judgment passed by the High

Court so as to warrant issuance of notice. We had

indicated to learned counsel appearing for the

appellant that the petition was premature, as the

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 6

period of twenty-five years stipulated by this Court

had not yet been completed. Learned counsel,

however, insisted upon a reasoned order. We,

therefore, proceeded to hear the matter and reserved

the same for orders.

7. We have perused the material available on record and

the written submissions advanced on behalf of the

appellant.

8. There is no dispute that this Court, vide judgment

dated 11th July, 2022, disposed of the appellant's

appeals

6 after taking note of the national

commitment made by the Central Government to the

Government of Portugal. This Court observed that,

upon completion of 25 years, the Central

Government would be required to consider advising

the President under Article 72 of the Constitution or

exercising its powers under Sections 432 and 433 of

the CrPC for suspension or remission of the life

sentences imposed upon the appellant by the TADA

Courts.

9. It is equally undisputed that, for the purpose of

computing the aforesaid period of twenty-five years,

the date fixed by this Court was 12

th October, 2005,

6

Criminal Appeal Nos. 679 of 2015 and 180 of 2018.

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 7

being the date from which the appellant's detention

was to commence.

10. The principal submission of learned counsel for the

appellant is that, as on 30

th June, 2026, the

appellant had completed 26 years, 9 months and 22

days of incarceration. To arrive at this figure, learned

counsel has divided the period of custody into three

components.

11. First, it is contended that the appellant’s undertrial

custody commenced from 11

th November, 2005, the

date of his arrest upon extradition from Portugal, and

continued until 7

th September, 2017, when he was

convicted in BBC Case No. 1 of 1993. According to the

appellant, this amounts to 11 years, 9 months and

26 days.

12. Second, for the period of post-conviction custody,

learned counsel has taken 25

th February, 2015, the

date of conviction in TADA Case No. 1 of 2006, as the

starting point and 30

th June, 2026 as the terminal

date, thereby computing a further period of 11 years,

4 months and 4 days.

13. Third, reliance has been placed upon a total earned

remission of 3 years, 6 months and 2 days.

14. The difficulty with the aforesaid computation is that

the two periods have been selected on inconsistent

bases. For the purpose of calculating undertrial

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 8

custody, the appellant takes the date of his arrest

and carries the computation until the later of the two

convictions, namely, the conviction dated 7

th

September, 2017 in BBC Case No. 1 of 1993.

However, for calculating post-conviction custody, he

commences the computation from the earlier

conviction dated 25

th February, 2015 in TADA Case

No. 1 of 2006. This results in an overlapping

computation of the very same period of incarceration

25

th February, 2015 to 7

th September, 2017.

15. The fact that the sentences imposed in the two cases

were directed to run concurrently is of significance.

Sentences granted concurrently operate

simultaneously, hence the same period of

incarceration cannot, therefore, be notionally

counted twice for the purpose of determining

completion of the sentence. The appellant cannot

treat the period preceding the later conviction as

undertrial custody for one sentence while

simultaneously treating the same period, from the

date of the earlier conviction, as post-conviction

custody for the other sentence and thereby secure a

double benefit.

16. The distinction sought to be drawn between the

expressions “undertrial custody” and “post-

conviction custody” cannot justify such overlapping

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 9

computation. The period of incarceration has to be

calculated in accordance with the direction expressly

issued by this Court in its judgment dated 11

th July,

2022. The methodology adopted by the appellant,

apart from lacking legal foundation, artificially

enlarges the period of custody by counting

overlapping periods more than once.

17. The gravity of these offences assumes particular

significance in the present case, especially when the

appellant’s extradition was secured upon a solemn

sovereign assurance given by the Government of

India to the Government of Portugal. The offences in

question were not merely directed against individual

victims; they formed part of acts calculated to

destabilise the country and undermine its economic

progress by targeting Mumbai, the financial capital of

India. The larger national and economic

consequences of such acts, therefore, cannot be lost

sight of while considering the appellant's claim.

18. The assurance so given was that the appellant would

not be subjected to the death penalty or

imprisonment beyond 25 years. This commitment

was expressly taken note of by this Court in its

judgment dated 11

th July, 2022. The commitment,

however, cannot be construed as conferring upon the

appellant a right to an artificial or accelerated

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 10

computation of the period of incarceration. The

assurance fixes the outer limit of imprisonment and

it does not permit periods of custody to be counted

twice or otherwise contrary to the manner directed by

this Court.

19. The question before us is consequently not whether

the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the sovereign

commitment made to the Government of Portugal, of

which he is as already adjudicated by this Court. The

question is whether he has, in law, completed the

period of 25 years prescribed for that purpose. On the

computation placed before us, we are unable to hold

that he has and affirm the view expressed by the High

Court on this aspect.

20. Next, it was submitted by senior counsel appearing

for the appellant that the appellant is entitled to the

benefit of jail-earned remission of 3 years, 6 months

and 2 days. In support of the submission, reliance

was placed upon Jail Register No. 6 maintained by

the jail authorities and the affidavit filed before the

High Court by the Additional Director General of

Police and Inspector General of Prisons and

Correctional Services of the respondent-State. It was

submitted that the said affidavit categorically records

that the appellant has already been granted jail-

earned remission for the aforesaid period.

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 11

21. He further placed reliance upon the Full Bench

judgment of the High Court in Yovehel v. State of

Maharashtra,

7 wherein reliance was placed upon

the decisions of this Court in Union of India v. V.

Sriharan @ Murugan ,

8 and Swamy

Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka

9. On the

strength of these decisions, it was contended that

jail-earned remission is liable to be reckoned and

added to the period of actual incarceration. It was,

therefore, submitted that the High Court erred in

holding that the benefit of jail-earned remission was

unavailable to the appellant on the ground that the

sentence imposed upon him was one of life

imprisonment and not a fixed-term sentence.

22. We are unable to accept this contention, primarily for

two reasons. First, this Court, vide judgment dated

11

th July, 2022,

10 did not alter the two life sentences

imposed upon the appellant vide judgments dated

25

th February, 2015 and 7

th September, 2017. The

said judgment merely reaffirmed the sovereign

assurance extended by the Union Government to the

Government of Portugal in connection with the

appellant’s extradition to India for the purpose of

7

2020 SCC OnLine Bom 1318.

8

(2016) 7 SCC 1.

9

(2008) 13 SCC 767.

10

2022 SCC OnLine SC 852.

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 12

trial. The assurance did not have the effect of

converting or modifying the sentences imposed by the

competent courts. The relevant portion of the

judgment reads: –

“42. We do believe that looking into the

grievousness of the offence in which the appellant

was involved, there is no question for this Court

exercising any special privileges to commute or

restrict the period of sentence of the appellant. In

fact, different States in India have followed different

patterns before even a case for remission is

considered. We, thus, do not accept that the plea of

the learned counsel for the appellant based on the

judgment of this Court in Sriharan case.

43. However, we are in agreement with the

submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant

and do not accept the contention of the learned ASG

that we should not opine on this aspect at present.

The affidavit of the Union of India through the

Home Secretary is clear, at least, to the effect that

they will abide by the assurance given by the

Government of India to Portugal. Thus, on

completion of the period of 25 years of sentence,

in compliance of its commitment to the courts in

Portugal, it is required that the Government of

India advise the President of India to exercise its

powers under Article 72(1) of the Constitution to

commute the remaining sentence, or that the

Government of India exercise powers under

Sections 432 and 433 of the Cr.P.C. We do believe

that there is a necessity of making this time bound so

that it does not result in an unending exercise and,

thus, the Government of India must exercise the

aforesaid powers or render advice on which the

President of India is expected to act, within a month

of the period of completion of sentence. We say so also

to respect the very basis on which the Courts of

Portugal observed the principles of comity of courts

by recognising that there is a separation of powers in

India and, thus, the Courts cannot give any

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 13

assurance. The corresponding principle of comity

of courts, thus, has to be observed such that the

Government of India having given the solemn

assurance, and having accepted the same before

us, is bound to act in terms of the aforesaid. We

are, thus, taking a call on this issue now and do

not want to leave it to any uncertainty in future.

This is of course subject to any aggravating aspect

of the appellant.

…

Conclusion:

55. In view of the aforesaid facts and

circumstances, we conclude that the detention of

the appellant commence from 12.10.2005 in the

present case. On the appellant completing 25

years of sentence, the Central Government is

bound to advice the President of India for exercise

of his powers under Article 72 of the Constitution,

and to release the appellant in terms of the

national commitment as well as the principle

based on comity of courts. In view thereof, the

necessary papers be forwarded within a month of

the period of completion of 25 years sentence of

the appellant. In fact, the Government can itself

exercise this power in terms of Sections 432 and

433 of the Cr.P.C. and such an exercise should

also take place within the same time period of one

month.

56. The appeals are accordingly disposed of leaving

the parties to bear their own costs.”

(Emphasis supplied)

23. From the aforesaid, it is clear that this Court

expressly declined to interfere with the sentences

awarded by the TADA Court or to confer upon the

appellant any special dispensation by way of

commutation or restriction of the sentences so

imposed.

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 14

24. The approach adopted by this Court is firmly rooted

in the constitutional principle of separation of

powers. The sovereign assurance extended by the

Union Government to the Government of Portugal

was an act of the Executive in the context of the

appellant’s extradition, whereas the sentence

imposed by the TADA Court was an exercise of

judicial power, determining the punishment

commensurate with the offences of which the

appellant stood convicted. The prescription of the

nature and extent of punishment is governed by the

Legislature and its application to the facts of a

particular case falls within the domain of the

Judiciary. The Executive, in turn, exercises such

powers in relation to remission, commutation or

release as are conferred upon it by law.

25. It is in this context that the judgment dated 11

th July,

2022, is required to be understood. This Court did

not convert the appellant’s sentence of life

imprisonment into a sentence of 25 years. It merely

recognised the sovereign assurance given by the

Union Government and directed that, upon

completion of 25 years, the Executive would be

required to consider the exercise of its powers under

Article 72 of the Constitution or, as the case may be,

Sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC. Thus, the

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 15

judgment did not alter the sentence , it only

delineated the consequence of the sovereign

assurance upon the appellant completing the

stipulated period of incarceration.

26. We are, therefore, unable to appreciate how the

appellant can claim the benefit of “jail-earned

remission” when the sentence imposed upon him

continues to be one of life imprisonment. The

stipulation regarding consideration of his release

upon completion of 25 years cannot be construed to

mean that the appellant was sentenced to a term of

25 years. The said stipulation operates only as a

consequence of the sovereign assurance extended by

the Union Government and requires the Central

Government to consider the exercise of its powers in

accordance therewith. It does not alter the nature or

duration of the sentence imposed by the TADA Court

and affirmed by this Court. The High Court was,

therefore, justified in declining to extend the benefit

of “jail-earned remission” to the appellant on the

ground that no fixed-term sentence had been

imposed upon him.

27. The reliance placed by the appellant upon the

affidavit dated 5

th May, 2025, filed by the Additional

Director General of Police and Inspector General of

Prisons and Correctional Services of the respondent-

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 16

State before the High Court is equally misplaced. The

very same affidavit categorically records the stand of

the respondent-State that the computation sought to

be made by the appellant would confer a two -fold

benefit, which is impermissible in law. Further, the

respondent-State, in paragraph 8 of the said affidavit,

has furnished a calculation chart indicating 31

st

January, 2046 as the probable date of release of the

appellant. The relevant portion thereof is reproduced

hereinbelow: -

“Calculation Chart of Probable Date of Release as per

recommended category of 50 years

Date Month Year

Date of Sentence 25 02 2015

Recommended Category + 50

= 24 02 2065

Set Off Period - 14 04 09

= 10 10 2055

Remission Earned (From

March 2015 to December

2045)

- 10 08 09

The probable date of release of

the prisoner after remission

earned, set off period and after

payment of fine

= 31 01 2046

”

28. The calculation chart reproduced above makes it

clear that the sentence imposed upon the appellant

continues to be one of life imprisonment. When his

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 17

case was considered for premature release under

Rule 25(iii) of Chapter XXXIX of the Maharashtra

Prison Manual, 1979, it was placed in the category of

prisoners sentenced to 50 years. It is in the context

of this sentence that the respondent -State has

calculated the jail-earned remission accruing to the

appellant. Such remission cannot, however, be

treated as a benefit proportionately available for the

purpose of advancing the appellant’s release in the

peculiar circumstances of the present case.

29. The appellant continues to stand convicted for life

imprisonment, as imposed by the competent courts

and affirmed by this Court. The stipulation that he

cannot be detained beyond twenty-five years is a

consequence of the sovereign assurance extended by

the Union Government to the Government of

Portugal. It does not convert the sentence of life

imprisonment into a fixed-term sentence of twenty-

five years. Consequently, the jail-earned remission

cannot be notionally added to the period of

incarceration so as to further advance the appellant’s

release. To permit such a course would, in effect,

confer a benefit over and above the consequence

already flowing from the sovereign assurance,

notwithstanding that the sentence itself remains one

of life imprisonment.

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 18

30. The reliance placed by learned senior counsel on

Yovehel (supra), Swamy Shraddananda (supra)

and V. Sriharan (supra) is, in our considered view,

misplaced. The factual and legal context in those

cases was materially different. None of those cases

involved a sovereign assurance pursuant to which

the Executive had undertaken, in the context of

extradition, that the prisoner would not be detained

beyond a stipulated period. The principle governing

the computation of remission in those cases cannot,

therefore, be mechanically applied to the present

case, where the appellant’s sentence remains one of

life imprisonment and the twenty-five-year

stipulation operates by virtue of the sovereign

assurance.

31. The law of precedent operates upon the ratio

decidendi of a decision read in the context of its

material facts and the legal issue arising therein. A

precedent cannot be applied divorced from the

factual and statutory setting in which it was

rendered. The decisions relied upon by the appellant,

therefore, do not advance his case.

32. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the judgment dated

15

th April, 2026, passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 1586 of

2025. The impugned judgment is accordingly upheld.

Crl. A. … of 2026 @ SLP(Crl.) No.12871 of 2026 19

33. Consequently, the present appeal stands dismissed

in limine.

34. Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.

…………………………………J.

[VIKRAM NATH ]

…………………………………J.

[SANDEEP MEHTA ]

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 10, 2026

ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.2 SECTION II-A

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 12871/2026

[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 15-04-2026

in WP No. 1586/2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at

Bombay]

ABU SALEM ABDUL QAYOOM ANSARI Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. Respondent(s)

IA No. 205003/2026 - APPROPRIATE ORDERS/DIRECTIONS

IA No. 204122/2026 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED

JUDGMENT

IA No. 204125/2026 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.

Date : 10-09-2026 This matter was called on for

pronouncement of judgment today.

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Prem Malhotra, AOR

For Respondent(s) :

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vikram Nath pronounced the

reportable judgment of the Bench comprising His

Lordship and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Mehta.

Leave granted.

The present appeal stands dismissed in limine,

in terms of the signed order.

Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.

(NEETU KHAJURIA)

ASSISTANT REGISTRAR-CUM-PS

(RANJANA SHAILEY)

ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file.)