AJAIB SINGH

v.

THE SIRHIND COOPERATIVE MARKETING CUM

PROCESSING SERVICE SOCIETY LTD. AND ANR.

APRIL 8, 1999

[S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.]

Labour Laws :

A

B

Termination of workman-Termination without complying with the C

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act-Demand of reinstatement by the

workman after

7 years-Matter referred by the appropriate government to

the Labour Court-Management did not take the plea of limitation in

reference

of dispute before the labour court-Held, not having raised such

plea, workmen could not

be deprived of the benefits of the Act-More so D

when the object of the Act was to create social welfare-Industrial Disputes

Act,

1947, history traced and object restated-Trade Disputes Act, 1929 (as

amended in 1938)-Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1945-

Defence of India Rules, Rule Bl-A-Limitation Act, 1963, Article 137.

Practice and Procedure-Plea-New plea-Cannot be taken at the E

appellate stage to deprive the benefits of the social welfare statutes-Findings

of facts returned by the High Court in writ proceedings, without pleading­

Unjustified-Constitution of India, 1950, Article 226, 227-Interference on

findings of fact by lower courts-Jurisdiction-Administrative Law.

Interpretation of Statues-Interpretation of Welfare Statutes-Statements F

of objects and reasons-Relevancy of-Constitution of India, 1950, Part IV­

Welfare State.

The services of the appellant were terminated without compliance of

the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the same was G

referred by the appropriate government to the Labour Court. The management

justified their action on the ground that the workman, being a salesman, had

embezzled thousands of rupees. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court to

entertain and adjudicate the reference was also disputed Labour Court

directed reinstatement of the workmen with full back wages. The management

did not press the issue of jurisdiction before the Labour Court. Management H

505

506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A filed a writ petition before the High Court for quashing the award mainly on

.·~ the ground that the workman had approached the labour court i.tfter a

prolonged delay.

It was not in dispute that the service of the workman was

terminated on 16.7.1974

and he had issued the notice of demand only on

8.12.1981. Single

Judge of the High Court held that the workman was not

entitled to any relief as he had slept over the matter for 7 years and confronted

B with the management at a belated stage when it might have been difficult for

o the employer to prove the guilt of the workman. Division Bench of the High

Court upheld the judgment of the Single Judge, Hence this appeal.

It was contended by the management-respondent that the principle

C incorporated under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act though

not specifically made applicable yet it would be deemed to be applicable

in a

case under the Industrial Dispute Act for the purpose

of making a reference

under Section

10 thereof. It was contended by the workman that the principles

--..

incorporated under Article 137 cannot be held to be applicable under the Act

for the purposes

of making a reference of the dispute to the labour court and

D that the provision of the Act was a social welfare legislation intended to

protect the interest

of the workmen employed in various industries.

Allowing

the appeal, this Court

HELD: 1.1. The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation

E Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes

Act and

that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workmen only on the

ground

of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to

be proved as a

matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a

merely hypothetical defence.

No reference to the labour court can be generally

F questioned on the ground of delay. The tribunal, labour court or board,

dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant

back wages to the workmen till the date he raised the demand regarding his

illegal retrenchment/termination

or dismissal. The Court may also in

appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead offull

back wages.

G

Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopa/ Bhiva &

Ors., [1964] 3 SCR 709; Town

Municipal Council Athani

v.

Presiding Officer, Labour Court & Ors., [1970)

1 SCR 51; Sha Mulchand & Co. Ltd, [1953] SCR 709; AIR (1953) SC 98;

Sakura v. Tanaji, Am (1958) SC; Nityanand M Joshi v. LIC of India, [1970)

1SCR396; Jai Bhagwan v. Management of the Ambala Central Cooperative

H Bank Ltd & Anr., AIR (1984) SC 286 and H.MT. Ltd v. Labour Court,

AJAIB SINGH v.S.C.M.C.P. SERVICE SOCIETY 507

Ernaku/am & Ors. (1994) LLR 720 (SC), relied on.

1.2.

It is not the function of the court to prescribe the limitation where

the Legislature in its wisdom had though it fit not to prescribe any period.

The courts admittedly interpret law

and do not make laws. Personal view of

A

the Judges presiding the court cannot be stretched to authorise them to

interpret law in such a manner which would amount to legislation B

intentionally left over by the Legislature. [516-D]

Ram Chander Morya v.

State of Haryana, (1999) 1 SCT 141, overruled.

1.3. In the instant case, the respondent-management

is not shown to

have taken

any plea regarding delay as is evident from the issues framed by C

the labour court. The only plea raised in defence was that the labour court

had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the reference and the termination of the

services of the workmen was justified. Had this plea been raised, the workmen

would have been

in a position to show the circumstances preventing him in

approaching the Court at an earlier stage or even to satisfy the court the D

such a plea was not sustainable after the reference was made by the

government. The High Court was not justified in holding that the workmen

had not given any explanation as to why the demand notice had been issued

after a long period. The findings of facts returned by the High Court in writ

proceedings, even without pleadings were

not justified in holding that the

courts were bound to render an even handed justice by keeping balance E

between the two different parties. Such an approach totally ignores the aims

and objects especially the social object sought to be achieved by the Act. Even

after noticing that

"it is true that a fight between the workmen and

management is not a just fight between equals", the High Court was not

justified to make them equals while returning the findings, which if allowed

to prevail, would result in frustration

of the purpose of the enactment.

The F

workman appears to be justified in complaining that in the absence of any

plea on behalf

of the management and any evidence, regarding delay, he could

not be deprived

of the benefits under the Act merely on technicalities oflaw.

The High

Court appears to have substituted its opinion for the opinion of the

labour court which was not permissible in proceedings under Article 226/ G

227 of the Constitution. However, on account of admitted delay, the labour

court ought to have appropriately moulded the relief by denying the appellant­

workmen some

part of the back wages.

2.1.

It cannot be disputed that the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 was

brought on the statute book with the object to ensure social justice to both H

508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 2 S.C.R.

A the employers and employees and advance the progress of industry by bringing

about the existence of harmony and cordial relationship between the parties.

It is a piece of legislation providing and regulating the service condition of

the workers. The object of the Act is to improve the service conditions of

industrial labour so as to provide them the ordinary amenities of life by the

B process, to bring about industrial peace which would in its turn accelerate

productive acti".ity of the country resulting in its prosperity. The prosperity

of the country in turn, helps to improve the conditions of labour. The Act is

intended not only to make provision for investigation and settlement of

industrial disputes but also to serve the industrial peace so that it may result

in

more production and improve the national economy in the present social

C political system, it is intended to achieve cooperation between the capital and

labour which has been deemed to be essential for maintenance of increased

production and industrial peace. The Act provides to ensure higher terms

to workmen and to prevent disputes between the employers and employees so

that the large interests of public may not suffer. The provisions of the Act

have to be interpreted in a manner which advance the object of the Legislature

D contemplated in the statement of objects and reasons. While interpreting

different provision of the Act, attempt should be made to avoid industrial

unrest, secure industrial peace and to provide machinery to secure the end.

Conciliation is a most

important and desirable way to secure that end. In

dealing with industrial disputes, course have always emphasized doctrine of

E social justice which is founded on basic ideal of socio-economic equality as

enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution. While construing the

provisions of the Act, the Courts have to give them a construction which

should help in achieving

the object of the Act.

Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. v. The Workmen, AIR (1967)

SC 948,

F referred to.

2.2. The history

of the legislation with respect to the industrial disputes

would show

that for the first time in the year

1920 the Trade Disputes Act

was enacted which provided for Courts of Inquiry and Conciliation Boards

G and forbade strikes in public utility service without a statutory notice in

writing.

The said Act did not make any provision for any machinery for

settling of

Industrial disputes. The said Act was repealed and repliced by the

Trade Disputes Act, 1929 which started the State intervention in the settl~ment

of industrial disputes and armed the Government with the power which could

be used whenever considered fj.t to intervene in industrial disputes. This Act

H was amended in the year 1938 authorising the Central and Provincial

II

AJAIB SINGH v.S.C.M.C.P. SERVICE SOCIETY 509

Government to appoint conciliation officers for mediating in or promoting A

the settlement of industrial disputes Shortly thereafter the Government of

India promulgated the Defence of .India Rules to meet the exigency created

by the Second World War. Rule 81-A gave powers to the Government to

intervene

in industrial disputes and was intended to provide speedy remedies

for industrial disputes by referring them compulsorily to conciliation

or B

adjudication by making the awards legally binding on the parties and by

prohibiting strike

or lock-outs during the pendency of the conciliation or

adjudication proceedings. Industrial Employment (Standing Orders ) Act,

1945 was enacted which made provision for framing and certifying of standing

orders covering various aspects of service conditions in the industry. The

Industrial Disputes

Bill was introduced in the Central Legislative Assembly C

on

8.10.1945 which embodied the essential provisions of Rule 81-. A of the

Defence

of India Rules and also certain provisions of Trade Disputes Act,

1929 concerning industrial disputes. The Bill was passed by the Assembly

in March 1947

and became

tht: law w.e.f. 1.4.1947. The present Act was

enacted the said objects and provided machinery and forum for the investigation

of industrial disputes, their settlement for purpose analogous and incidental

thereto. The emergence

of the concept of welfare State implies an end to

exploitation

of workmen and as a corollary to that collective bargaining came

into its own. The Legislature had intended to protect workmen against

victimisation and exploitation by the employer and to ensure termination

of

industrial disputes in a peaceful manner.

D

E

2.3. The object of the Act, therefore, is to give succour to weaker

sections

of the society which is a pre-requisite for a welfare Sate. To ensure

industrial peace

and pre-empt industrial tension, the Act further aims at

enhancing the industrial production which is acknowledged to be the life­

blood

of a developing society. The Act provides a machinery for investigation F

and settlement of industrial disputes ignoring the legal technicalities with

a view to avoid delays,

by specially authorised courts which are not supposed

to deny and relief

on account of the procedural wrangles. The Act contemplates

realistic and effective negotiations, conciliation

and adjudication as per the

need

of the society keeping in view the fast changing social norms of the G

developing country like India.

CIVIL APPELLATE

JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2157of1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.2.98 of the Punjab & Haryana

High Court

in L.P.A. No. 798of1991. H

510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A B.L. Yadav, P.K. Chakravarty and K. Mishra for the Appellant.

R.K. Talwar (D.M. Sinha) for Y.P. Dhingra for the Respondents.

The Judgment

of the Court was delivered by

B

SETHI, J. Leave granted.

"

__...,,...,..

The services of the appellant-workman were terminated by the

respondent-management allegedly without compliance

of the mandatory

provisions

of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the

Act'). The dispute regarding his termination of services was referred to the

-

c Labour Court by the appropriate government on 19 .3 .1982. The management

justified their action on the ground that as the workman, being a salesman,

had embezzled thousands

of rupees, the termination of his services was

...

justified. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain and adjudicate the

reference was also disputed. However, after the evidence

of the parties, the

D

labour court vi de its award dated I G.4.1986 directed reinstatement of the

workman with full back wages from 8.12.1981. it may be worth noticing that

the issue regarding jurisdiction

of the labour court to entertain the reference

was not pressed

by the management. Not satisfied with the award of the

labour court, the management filed a writ petition

in the High Court praying

for quashing the award

of the labour court mainly on the ground of the

'E workman having approached the court for the grant of the relief after a

prolonged delay. The learned single Judge

of the High Court held that the

workman was not entitled to any relief as he was allegedly shown to have

slept over the matter for 7 years and confronted

wjth the management at a

belated stage when it might have been difficult for the employer to prove the

F

guilt of the workman. The judgment of the learned Single

Judge was upheld

by the Division Bench vide the judgment impugned

in this appeal. -

Supporting the impugned judgment, 'the learned counsel appearing for

the management-respondent has contended that the principle incorporated

under Article

137 of the Limitation Act though not specifically made applicable

G

yet would be deemed to be applicable in a case under the Act for the purpose

of making a reference in terms of

Section IO thereof. In support of his

/

contentions, he has referred to different judgments under various enactments.

'

The learned counsel appearing for the workman has, however, submitted that --

the principles incorporated under article 13 7 of the Limitation Act cannot be

held to be applicable under the Act for t'1e purposes of making a reference

H of the dispute to the labour court and that the reliance of the learned counsel

_,

•

AJAIB SINGH v.S.C.M.C.P. SERVICE SOCIETY [SETHI, J.] 511

on different judgments was misconceived for reasons of not taking note of A

the special provision of the Act admittedly is a social welfare legislation

intended

to protect the interests of the workmen employed in various industries.

It is not in dispute that the services of the workman were terminated on

16.7.1974 and he had

issu~d the notice of demand only on 8.12.1981. It is also B

not disputed that no plea regarding delay appears to have been taken by the

management before the labour court, it

is also acknowledged that Article 137

of the Limitation Act has not been specifically made applicable to the

proceedings under the Act seeking reference

of industrial disputes to the

labour court. This Court,

in no case, has so far held that either Article 137

of the Limitation Act or the principle incorporated therein is applicable to the C

proceedings under the Act.

Before appreciating the rival contentions urged on behalf

of the parties,

it has to be noticed as to under what circumstances the act was enacted and

what was the objectives sought to be achieved by its legislation.

If cannot

be disputed that the act was brought on the statute book with the object to

D

ensure social justice to both the employers and employees and advance the

progress

of industry by bringing about the existence of harmony and cordial

relationship between the parties.

It is a piece of legislation providing and

regulating the service conditions

of the workers. The object of the Act is to

improve the service conditions

of industrial labour so as to provide for them E

the ordinary amenities of life and by the process, to bring about industrial

peace which would

in its tum accelerate productive activity of the country

resulting in its prosperity. The prosperity

of the country in its tum, helps to

improve the conditions

of labour Hindustan Antibiotics ltd. v. The Workman,

AIR (1967) SC 948. The Act is intended not only to make provision for

investigation and settlement

of industrial disputes but also to serve industrial F

peace so that it may result in more production and improve the national

economy. In the present sociopolitical economic system, it

is intended to

achieve co-operation between the capital and Jabour which has been deemed

to be essential for maintenance

of increased production and industrial peace.

The Act provides

to ensure fair terms to workman and to prevent disputes G

between the employer and the employees so that the large interests of the

public may not suffer. The provisions

of the Act have to be interpreted in a

manner which advances the object

of the Legislature contemplated in the

statement

of objects and reasons. While interpreting different provisions of

the Act, attempt should be made to avoid industrial un-rest, secure industrial

peace and to provide machinery to secure the end. Conciliation

is most H

512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l 999] 2 S.C.R.

A important and desirable way to secure that end. In dealing with industrial

disputes, the courts have always, emphasized doctrine

of social justice, which

is founded on basic ideal of socio-economic equality as enshrined in the .

Preamble

of our Constitution. While construing the provisions of the Act, the

Courts have

to give them a construction which should help in achieving the

B object of the Act.

The-history of the legislation with respect to the industrial disputes

would show that for the first time in the year I 920 the Trade Disputes Act

was enacted which provided for Courts

of Inquiry and Conciliation Boards

and forbade strikes

in public utility service without a statutory notice in

C writing. The Act did not make provision for any machinery for setting of

industrial disputes. The said Act was repealed and replaced by the trade

Disputes Act, 1962 which started the state intervention in the settlement

of

industrial disputes and armed the Government with the power which could be

used whenever considered fit to intervene in industrial disputes. This Act

was amended in the year 1938 authorising the Central and Provincial

D Governments

to appoint conciliation officers for mediating in or promoting the

Settlement

of industrial disputes.

Shortly thereafter the Government of India

promulgated the Defence

oflndia Rules to meet the exigency created by the

Second World War. Rule 81-A gave powers to the Government to intervene

in industrial disputes and was intended to provide speedy remedies for

E industrial disputes by referring them co·mpulsorily to conciliation or adjudication

by making the

awarcis legally binding on the parties and by prohibiting

strikes or lock-outs uuring the pendency

of the conciliation or adjudication

proceedings. Industrial Employment

(Standing Orders) Act, 1945 was enacted

which made provision for framing and certifying

of standing orders covering

various aspects

of service conditions in the industry. The Industrial Disputes

F . Bill was introduced in the Central Legislative Assembly on 8.10.1945 which

embodied the essential principles

of Rule 81-A of the Defence of India Rules

and also certain provisions

of Trade Disputes Act, 1929 concerning industrial

disputes. The Bill was passed by the Assembly

in March 1947 and became

the law w.e.f. 1.4.1947. The present Act was enacted with the objects as

G referred to hereinabove and provided machinery and forum for the investigation

of industrial disputes, their settlement for purposes of analogous and incidental

thereto. The emergence

of the concept of welfare state implies an end to

exploitation

of workman and as a corollary to that collective bargaining came

into its own. The Legislature had intended to protect workmen against

victimisation and exploitation by the employer and to ensure termination

of

H industrial disputes in peaceful manner.

-

-

·,

.... -

AJAIB SINGH v.S.C.M.C.P. SERVICE SOCIETY [SETHI, J.] 513

The object of the Act, therefore, is to give succour to weaker sections A

of the society which is a pre-requisite for a welfare State. To ensure industrial

peace and pre-empt industrial tension, the Act further aims at enhancing the

industrial production which

is acknowledged to be life-blood of a developing

society. The Act provides a machinery for investigation and settlement

of

industrial disputes ignoring the legal techinicalities with a view to avoid B

delays, by specially authorised courts which are not supposed to deny the

relief on account

of the procedural wrangles. The Act contemplates realistic

and effective negotiations, conciliation and adjudication

as per the need of

the society keeping in view the fast changing social norms of the developing

country like India.

It appears to us that the High Court has adopted a casual

approach

in deciding the matter apparently ignoring the purpose, aim and C

,object of the Act.

1

/ This Court in Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva and Ors., [1964] 3

! SCR 709 held that the provisions of Article 181 (now Article 137) of the

' Limitation Act apply only to applications which were made under the Code

of Civil Procedure and its extension to applications under Section 33-C(2) of D

the Act was,not~stified. This position was further reiterated and explained

by this Court

in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour

Court, Hubili

and Ors., [

1970] l SCR 51 :-

"It appears to us that the view expressed by this Court in those cases

must be held to be applicable, even when considering the scope and

E

applicability of Article 137 in the new Limitation Act of 1963.

The

language of Article 137 is only slightly different from that of the earlier ;

Article 181 inasmuch as, when prescribing the three years' period of

limitation, the first column giving the description of the application

reads

as

"any other application for which no period of limitation is

provided elsewhere in this division." In fact, the addition of the word F

"other" between the words "any" and "application" would indicate

that the legislature wanted to make it clear that the principle

of

interpretation of Article 181 on

the basis of eiusdem generis should

be applied when interpreting the new Article 137. This word "other"

implies a reference to earlier articles, and, consequently, in interpreting G

this article, regard must be had to the provisions contained in all the

earlier articles. The other articles

in the third division to the schedule

refer to applications under the Code

of Civil

Procedure, with the

exception

of applications under the Arbitration Act and also in two

cases applications under the Code

of Criminal

Procedure. the effect of

introduction in the third division of the schedule of reference to H

514

A

B

c

D

E

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

applications under the Arbitration Act in the old Limitation Act has

already been considered by this Court

in the case of

Sha Mulchand

& Co. Ltd., [1953] SCR 709 =AIR (1953) SC 98 (supra). We think that,

on the same principle,

it must be held that even the further alteration

~

made in the articles contained in the third division of the schedule to

the new Limitation Act containing references to applications under

the Code

of Criminal

Procedure cannot be held to have materially

altered the scope

of the residuary. Article 137 which deals with other

applications.

It is not possible to hold that the intention of the

Legislature was to drastically alter the scope

of this article so as to

include within it all applications, irrespective

of the fact whether they

had any reference to the Code

of Civil

Procedure.

This Point, in our opinion, may be looked at from another angle

also. When this Court earlier held that all the articles in the third

division to the schedule, including Article

181 of the Limitation Act

of 1908 governed applications under the Code of Civil Procedure only,

it clearly implied that the applications must be presented to a Court

governed by the Code

of Civil procedure. Even the applications under

the Arbitration Act that were included within the third division by

amendment

of Articles 158 and 178 were to be presented to Courts

whose proceedings were governed by the Code

of Civil Procedure. At

best the further amendment now made enlarges the scope

of the third

division

of the schedule so as also to include some applications

presented to courts governed by the Code

of Criminal Procedure.

One

factor at least remains constant and that is that the applications must

be to courts to be governed by the Articles

in this division. The

scope

of the various articles in

"this division cannot be held to have

F been so enlarged as to include within them applications to bodies

other than Courts, such

as a quasi-judicial tribunal, or even an executive

authority. An industrial tribunal or a Labour Court dealing with

applications or references under the Act are not courts

an they are

in no way governed either by the Code

of Civil Procedure or the code

G

H

of Criminal Procedure. We cannot, therefore, accept the submission

made that this article will apply even to applications made to an

Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court. The alterations made

in the

Article and in the new Act cannot,

in our opinion, justify the

interpretation that even applications presented to bodies, other than

courts, are now to

be governed for purposes of limitation by Art.

137."

-

AJAIB SINGH v.S.C.M.C.P. SERVICE SOCIETY [SETHI, J.] 515

In Sakura v. Tanaji AIR., (1985) SC 1279 it was held that the provisions A

of the Limitation Act applied only to proceedings in courts and not to appeals

. or applications before the bodies other than courts such as quasi-judicial

tribunal or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or

authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on courts

under the Codes

of Civil or Criminal

Procedure. The view taken by this Court B

in case Municipal Council Athani (supra) and Nityanand M Joshi v. LIC of

India, [1970] 1 SCR 396 was reiterated with approval.

In Jai Bhagwan v. Management of the Ambala Central Co-operative

Bank

Ltd. And Anr. AIR, (1984)

SC 286 this Court declined to set aside the

order

of reinstatement of the workman who was shown to have approached C

the court after a prolonged delay. However, in the circumstances of the case,

the court directed the workman to

be reinstated in service with continuity

from the date on which his services were terminated but having regard to the

fact that he had raised the industrial dispute after considerable delay without

doing anything

in the meanwhile, he was not awarded the back wages. The

grant

of half back wages from

the date of termination of service until the date D

of order and full back wages from that date till his reinstatement was found

in the circumstances to meet the ends of justice. In H.M T. Ltd. v. Labour

Court, Ernakulam

and Ors., (1994) LLR

720 SC where there was a delay of

14 years in invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, this Court found that

instead

of full back wages, the grand of

60 percent of the back wages upon E

the reinstatement of the workman would meet the ends of justice.

It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule

to Lmitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the act

and that the relief under

it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the

ground

of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to F

be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a

merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the labour court can be generally

questioned on the ground

of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay in

shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board, dealing with the case

can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the

G

workman till the date he

raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/

termination or dismissal. The Court may also

in appropriate cases direct the

payment

of part of the back wages instead of full back wages. Reliance of

the learned counsel for the respondent-management on the full bench

judgment

of the

Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander Morya v.

State of Haryana, (1999) 1 SCT 141 is also of no help to him. fn that case H

516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

I

A the High Court nowhere held that the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation

Act were applicable in the proceedings under the Act. The Court specifically

held "neither any limitation has been provided nor any guidelines to determine

as to what shall be the period

of limitation in such

cases." However, it went

on further to say that "reasonable time in the cases of labour for demand of

B reference or dispute_ by appropriate government to labour tribunals will be

five years after which the government can refuse to make a reference on the

ground

of delay and latches if there is no explanation to the

delay." We are

of the opinion that the Punjab and Haryana High Court was not justified in

prescribing the limitation for getting the reference made ~r an application

under Section 37-C

of the Act to be adjudicated. It is not the function of the

C court to prescribe the limitation where the Legislature in its wisdom had

though

if fit not to prescribe any period. The courts admittedly interpret law

and do not make laws. Personal views

of the Judges presiding the court

cannot be stretched to authorise them to interpret law

in such a manner

whic~

would amount to legislation intentionally left over by the Legislature. The

judgment

of the Full Bench of the

Punjab and Haryana High Court has

D completely ignored the object of the Act and various pronouncements of this

Court as noted hereinabove and thus

is not a good law on the point of the

applicability

of the period of limitation for the purposes of invoking the

jurisdiction

of the courts/boards and tribunal under the Act.

E In the instant case, the respondent-management is not shown to have

taken any plea regarding delay

as is evident from the issues framed by the

labour court. The only plea raised

in defence was that the labour court had

not jurisdiction to adjudicate the reference and the termination

of the services

of the workman was justified. Had this plea been raised, the workman would

have been in a position to show the circumstances preventing him in

F approaching the Court at an earlier stage or

1;wen to satisfy the court that

such a plea was not sustainable after the reference was made by: the

government. The learned Judges

of the High Court, therefore, were not justified

in holding that the workman had not given any explanation

as to why the

demand notice had been issued after a long period. The findings

of facts

G returned by High Court in writ proceedings, even without pleadings were,

therefore, unjustified. The high Court was also not justified in holding that

the courts were

bound to render an even handed justice by keeping bal~ce

between the two different parties. Such an approach totally ignores the ~ims

and object and the social object sought to be achieved by the Act. Even a~er

noticing that "It is true that a fight between the workman and the management

H is not a just fight between equals," the court was not justified to make them

AJAIB SINGH v.S.C.M.C.P. SERVICE SOCIETY [SETHI, J.] 517

equals while returning the findings, which if allowed to prevail, would result A

in frustration· of the purpose of the. enactment. The workman appears to be

justified in complaining that in the absence

of any plea on behalf of the

management and any evidence, regarding delay, he could

not be deprived of

the benefits under the Act merely on technicalities of

law. The High Court

appears to have substituted its opinion for the opinion

of the labour court B

which was not pennissible in proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution.

We are, however,

of the opinion that on account of the admitted delay,

the labour court ought to have appropriately moulded the relief by denying

the appellant-workman some part

of the back wages. In the circumstances, the

C

appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside by upholding the award

of the labour court with modification that upon his reinstatement the appellant

would be entitled to continuity

of service, but back wages to the extent of 60 per cent with effect from 8.12.1981 when he raised the demand for Justice

till the date

of award of the labour court i.e 16.4.1986 and full back wages

thereafter till his reinstatement would be payable to him. The appellant

is also D

held entitled to the costs of litigation assessed

at Rs. 5.000 to be paid by the

respondent-management.

R.K.S. Appeal allowed.