2025 INSC 1356 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 11160-11161 of 2024)

T. MANJUNATH ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

AND ANR. ….RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.

2. Leave granted.

3. These appeals, by special leave, call into

question the order dated 26

th July, 2024, passed by

the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru

1, whereby

the High Court decided two Criminal Revision

Petitions, being Criminal Revision Petition No. 422 of

1

Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”.

2

2018

2 and Criminal Revision Petition No. 599 of

2018

3, arising out of the order dated 23

rd August,

2017, passed by the LXXVI Additional City Civil and

Sessions Court & Special Court, Bengaluru

4. By the

impugned order, the High Court allowed the revision

petition filed by the State and dismissed the revision

petition preferred by T. Manjunath

5, consequently

setting aside and reversing the order of the trial

Court, whereby the application for discharge filed by

the accused-appellant had been allowed. The High

Court further granted liberty to the investigating

agency to proceed against the appellant in

accordance with law, including permission to file a

fresh chargesheet after obtaining the requisite

sanction from the competent authority.

2

Preferred by the State.

3

Preferred by T Manjunath (accused-appellant).

4

Hereinafter, referred to as the “trial Court”.

5

Hereinafter, referred to as the “accused-appellant”.

3

Factual Background

4. The factual matrix relevant and essential for the

disposal of the appeals may be noted hereinbelow.

5. The accused-appellant was working as a Senior

Inspector of Motor Vehicles at R.T.O. Office, K.R.

Puram, Bengaluru, when a trap was

attempted/arranged against him. The Lokayuktha

Inspector Sri Sanjeevarayappa secured two

independent witnesses who were Government

servants, and in their presence, conducted the pre-

trap proceedings.

6. During the pre-trap proceedings, an amount of

Rs. 15,000/- was entrusted to the complainant to be

handed over to the accused-appellant upon demand.

7. Thereafter, the Lokayuktha Inspector, along

with his trap team, two independent witnesses, and

the complainant, left for the RTO office, KR Puram,

Bengaluru, where the accused -appellant was

4

working. The accused-appellant was trapped while

demanding and accepting illegal gratification of

Rs.15,000/- from the complainant through co -

accused H. B. Mastigowda (accused No.2), a private

person who is alleged to have received the amount at

the instance of accused-appellant (accused No. 1).

8. The trap proceedings led to registration of Crime

No.48/2012 under the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988

6. During the investigation, exercising powers

under Section 19 of the PC Act, sanction was granted

by the Commissioner of Transport for prosecution of

the accused-appellant for the offences punishable

under Section 7, 8, 13(1)(d), read with 13(2) of the PC

Act. Chargesheet was filed against the accused -

appellant for the aforesaid offences.

9. Thereafter, the accused-appellant preferred an

application under Section 227 read with Section 239

6

For short, ‘PC Act’.

5

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

7, seeking

discharge.

10. Two primary grounds were raised by the

accused-appellant:

(a) That the accused-appellant, having been

appointed by the State Government, could

not have been prosecuted on the strength of

sanction issued by the Commissioner of

Transport, who was not competent to accord

sanction for prosecuting the appellant;

(b) That the accused-appellant stood exonerated

in the departmental proceedings instituted

on the same charges and allegations, as were

levelled in the criminal case, and hence, the

continued criminal prosecution against the

accused-appellant was unjustified.

7

For short, ‘CrPC’.

6

11. The trial Court vide order dated 23

rd August,

2017, allowed the application and discharged the

accused-appellant as well as the co-accused H.B.

Mastigowda on the ground that the sanction for

prosecution was not valid, as the authority that

exercised jurisdiction was not the competent

authority. However, liberty was given to the

investigating agency to file a fresh chargesheet after

obtaining sanction from the competent authority in

accordance with law. The relevant findings from the

trial Court’s order are reproduced hereinbelow for the

sake of ready reference:

“8. The issue regarding the validity of the Sanction

Order is taken up for consideration as a preliminary

issue.

9. As per Sec 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988, obtaining of valid sanction from the Competent

Authority to prosecute the public servant is

mandatory The accused No 1 is a Public servant,

working as Senior Inspector of Motor Vehicles He is a

Group-B Officer The service particulars of the

accused No 1 (page-50 of the charge sheet file) would

disclose that the Authority competent to remove the

accused No 1 from the said post is the Government of

7

Karnataka But the Sanction Order accorded in this

case is by the Commissioner of Transport which is

invalid and no sanction in the eye of law.

10. The accused No. 2 is a private person. According

to the prosecution, the accused No. 2 received the

tainted currency notes from the complainant at the

instance of the accused No. 1. Obtaining of valid

sanction from the Competent Authority to prosecute

the accused No 1 is mandatory It is well settled that

cognizance can be taken in respect of the offences

alleged against the accused only once and if there are

several accused, against some of whom sanction for

prosecution may be necessary, it is mandatory that

sanction be awaited till such time cognizance is

awaited or otherwise, it would lead to confused state

of affairs which is impermissible Since the Sanction

Order accorded to prosecute the accused No 1 in

this case is by the Commissioner of Transport,

which is invalid and non-est, it is just and proper

to return the entire charge sheet papers to the

Investigating Agency with liberty to the State to

proceed further in accordance with law and to file

a charge-sheet afresh after obtaining necessary

sanction from the Competent Authority as far as

the accused No 1 is concerned who is a public

servant along with the accused No 2 Till such

time, it is just and proper to discharge the accused

No 1 & 2 Hence, I answer the above point

accordingly.”

[Emphasis supplied]

12. The above order was assailed by both the State

and the accused-appellant by way of separate

revision petitions before the High Court.

8

13. The High Court allowed the revision petition

filed by the State and dismissed the revision petition

preferred by the accused-appellant, setting aside the

order passed by the trial Court.

14. In doing so, the High Court held that the

sanction had been accorded by the competent

authority observing that no liberty could be granted

to the accused to contest the proceedings on the

ground of the validity of sanction because the order

of sanction was accorded by the competent authority

in terms of the notification dated 11

th February,

2010, which confers jurisdiction upon the Transport

Commissioner to accord the sanction.

15. The impugned order was set aside, and the trial

Court was directed to proceed against both the

accused in accordance with law. The aforesaid order

of the High Court is in challenge before us at the

9

instance of the accused-appellant T. Manjunath in

these appeals by special leave.

Submissions on behalf of the accused-appellant

16. Learned senior counsel, Shri Devadatt Kamat,

representing the accused-appellant, vehemently and

fervently contended that the departmental

proceedings were instituted against the accused-

appellant on identical charges and same set of facts

and evidence and have culminated in the exoneration

of the accused-appellant, and therefore, his

prosecution in the criminal case is totally unjustified.

He urged that the witnesses examined in the

departmental disciplinary proceedings were the same

as those who were cited by the prosecution in the

criminal case. The disciplinary authority, upon a

comprehensive appreciation of the evidence, recorded

a categorical finding that Shri K.R. Manjunath

(complainant), Shri Nagesh (shadow witness), and

10

Shri Maruthiraj (witness) did not support the case of

the department, and that the testimony of the

Investigating Officer remained uncorroborated .

Based on these findings, the disciplinary authority

proceeded to exonerate the accused-appellant of the

charges.

17. It was the contention of learned senior counsel

that the standard of proof required to bring home the

charges in the disciplinary proceedings is of

significantly lower degree than the standard of proof

required to establish the guilt of the accused in a

criminal trial. While in departmental proceedings,

charges can be established merely on basis of

preponderance of possibilities, in a criminal trial, the

prosecution would be required to establish the

charges by proving its case beyond all manner of

doubt.

11

18. Thus, once the delinquent employee stands

exonerated in the departmental proceedings, where

the burden of proof is much lesser, the continuance

of criminal proceedings founded on the very same set

of allegations and evidence would not be justified.

19. To buttress his contentions, learned senior

counsel placed reliance on Ashoo Surendranath

Tewari v. Dept Superintend ent

8

, and urged that

the criminal proceedings sought to be pursued

against the accused-appellant deserve to be quashed.

20. Further, during the course of hearing, learned

senior counsel Shri Kamat handed over to the Court

the office memorandum dated 3

rd December, 1991,

evidencing the appointment of the accused-appellant

T. Manjunath, to the post of Inspector of Motor

Vehicles. He referred to this document and contended

that the appointment of the accused-appellant had

8

(2020) 9 SCC 636.

12

been made under the authority of the Governor of

Karnataka and, therefore, the appointing authority of

the accused-appellant was the State Government. On

this premise, it was urged that the sanction for

prosecution could have been validly accorded only by

the State Government and not by the Commissioner.

21. Shri Kamat further argued that the expression

“competence” occurring in Section 19(4) of the PC

Act, has to be treated at par with “jurisdiction”.

According to him, by virtue of Section 19(1) of the Act,

the authority competent to grant sanction for

prosecution of the accused-appellant was the State

Government alone, and sanction accorded by an

officer not authorised to remove the accused from the

post was without the authority of law and suffered

from patent lack of jurisdiction. He thus urged that

the view taken by the High Court in reversing the

13

order passed by the trial Court is absolutely

unjustified and deserves to be set aside.

Submissions on behalf of the respondent-State

22. Per contra, Shri Aman Panwar, learned AAG

representing the State of Karnataka, vehemently and

fervently opposed the submissions advanced on

behalf of the accused-appellant. He contended that

the mere exoneration of the accused-appellant in the

disciplinary proceedings cannot, by itself, furnish a

ground to quash the criminal proceedings even if

both proceedings are founded on the same set of

facts. He submitted that the exoneration of the

accused-appellant in the disciplinary proceedings

was occasioned solely because the complainant, the

shadow witness, and the accompanying witness did

not support the case of the department. The

exoneration was totally unjustified because the trap-

14

laying Officer had, in his deposition, fully supported

the case of department.

23. He urged that the law is well settled by a catena

of judgments rendered by this Court that in cases

where the accused is apprehended for accepting

illegal gratification, the mere fact of the complainant,

the shadow witness and the accompanying witness

turning hostile, would have no bearing on the

outcome of the case, and that the conviction in the

criminal case can be based/sustained even on the

sole testimony of the trap laying officer, if found

credible and trustworthy. He further submitted that

the accused himself admitted having demanded the

bribe when the trap memo was prepared and thus,

the prosecution case is founded on unimpeachable

material, the worth whereof would have to be

assessed at the trial.

15

24. Learned counsel placed reliance on State v. T.

Murthy

9, State of MP v. Virender Kumar

Tripathi

10, and State of Bihar v. Rajmangal

Ram

11 to urge that the controversy regarding the

competence of the sanctioning authority and its effect

on the trial has been settled by this Court in these

precedents expressly holding that a sanction order

cannot be struck down on the ground of lack of

competence of the authority issuing it.

25. Learned AAG has vehemently and fervently

controverted the claim made by Shri Kamat based on

documents handed over during the course of hearing

that the appointing authority of the appellant is the

State Government. He urged that no such plea was

taken by the appellant before the High Court and that

the unverified documents handed over by the

9

(2004) 7 SCC 763.

10

(2009) 15 SCC 533.

11

(2014) 11 SCC 388.

16

appellant across the board cannot be considered to

decide the issue of appointing authority. He further

contended that the office memorandum relied upon

by the accused-appellant is not the appointment

order at all; it is merely a posting order issued under

the authority of the Governor of Karnataka. As a

matter of fact, the appointing authority of the

accused-appellant is none other than the

Commissioner. To substantiate this contention,

learned counsel handed over an order dated 11

th

February, 2010, which, according to him,

conclusively establishes that the Commissioner was

the appointing authority competent to remove the

accused-appellant from service and, as a necessary

corollary, to grant sanction for prosecution. He thus

urged that on both facets, namely, the question of

competence as well as the aspect of the appointing

authority, the accused-appellant has failed to make

17

out any case warranting interference in the impugned

order.

Discussion and Analysis

26. We have given our thoughtful consideration to

the submissions advanced at the Bar and have

carefully gone through the impugned order dated 26

th

July, 2024 passed by the High Court, as well as the

order dated 23

rd August, 2017 passed by the trial

Court. We have also minutely perused the findings

recorded by the disciplinary authority while

exonerating the accused-appellant in the

departmental proceedings.

A. Effect of Departmental Clean

Chit/Exoneration on Criminal Proceedings

27. First, we will consider the plea of the accused-

appellant that, as the departmental proceedings have

resulted in his exoneration, the criminal proceedings

cannot be continued.

18

28. For this purpose, we have perused the findings

as recorded in the Enquiry report dated 23

rd

September, 2021. Relevant excerpts of the report are

reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready

reference: -

“13) The points that arise for my consideration are

Point No 1: Whether the Disciplinary Authority

has proved the charges?

Point No 2: What order?

14) Above points are answered as under

Point No 1: In the Negative

Point No 2: As per final order for the following,

REASONS

15) The Disciplinary Authority has examined the

shadow witness as PW -1, complainant as PW-2,

colleague of the complainant as PW -3, and the

Investigation Officer came to be examined as PW-4

and got marked documents Ex P -1 to P-26 The

shadow witness, complainant and his colleague i.e.,

PW-1 to 3 have not supported the version of the

Disciplinary Authority Even though, the Disciplinary

Authority cross-examined PW-1 to 3 and suggested

the version of the Disciplinary Authority that, DGO

has demanded bribe of Rs 24,0 00/- for twelve

tippers, but after negotiation with the complainant

PW-2, the bribe amount was reduced to Rs 18,000/-

and at last PW-1 gave Rs 15,000/- to Paramesh @

Mastigouda on the say of the DGO but, the said

19

version of the disciplinary authority has been denied

by PW-1 to 3.

16) No doubt, the Disciplinary Authority succeeded

in proving about the lodging of the complaint Ex P-

10, basing on it, PW-4 registered crime No 48/2012

and sent FIR vide Ex P-12 to court and his superiors

The pre-trap malazar was drawn on 13/06/2012

vide Ex P-2 PW-1 has produced Rs 18,000/- (500x

36) currency notes and their numbers were noted in

the sheet Ex P-1 by the panch witness i.e., PW-1 and

Vishwas Investigation Officer has deposed about

drawing of Ex P-4 panchanama on 13/06/2012,

wherein the trap was unsuccessful as the DGO was

not in the office at about 5:15 pm on 13/06/2012.

17) PW-4 has further deposed about trap

panchanama Ex P -5, which was conducted on

14/06/2012, wherein the trap was conducted at

2nd floor of the RTO office, KR Puram at 12:30 pm

PW-4 deposed about the recovery of Rs 15,000/ -

from Mastigouda and his hand wash was made in

the sodium carbonate solution, the solution turned

to pink colour The said mahazar Ex P -5 was

concluded at Lokayukta police, MS Building,

Bengaluru at 4:50 pm.

18) The prime witnesses for establishing the charges

leveled against the DGO are the complainant, PW-2

and his colleague PW-3 and shadow witness PW-1

But, the said prime witnesses have not supported

the version of the Disciplinary Authority The

complainant is working as a Supervisor in

Prashanth Crushers, which has twelve tippers

plying within jurisdiction of KR Puram RTO, wherein

DGO was serving as Motor Vehicle Inspector The

20

allegation of PW-1 is that, the DGO was stopping the

said tippers near Hoskote often and insisted the

drivers to telephone to their owner asking him to

look after the DGO otherwise DGO threatened to

book case against the said tippers The owner of the

sad Prashanth Crushers has asked PW -2 to lodge

the complaint to the Lokayukta police Accordingly,

PW-2 approached PW -4 on 12/06/2012 and

disclosed about the demand of bribe amount by the

DGO to PW-4, PW-4 directed PW-1 to record the

conversations held between the DGO in respect of

demand of bribe amount by giving the voice-recorder

PW-1 met the DGO and made negotiation of bribe

amount i.e. , DGO alleged to have demanded Rs

2,000/- per tipper in total Rs 24,000/-, but after

negotiation, amount was reduced to Rs 1 8,000/-

PW-1 has again approached PW-4 on 13/06/2012

and lodged the complaint, Ex P-10 and basing on it,

Cr No 48/2012 was registered and FIR, Ex P-12 was

sent to court and his superiors

19) PW-2, complainant has deposed before the court

that, he has affixed his signature on the complaint

at Ex P-10, on the say of his owner, but shown his

ignorance about its content PW-2 further deposed

that, DGO has never demanded bribe amount and

also not asked the complainant to give the amount

in the hands of said Paramesh @ Mastigouda He has

given Rs 15,000/- to said Paramesh (@ Mastigouda

No doubt, PW-4 has recovered Rs 15,000/- from said

Paramesh under the trap and hands of the said

Paramesh were washed in the sodium carbonate

solution, which turned to pink colour

20) PW-3, the colleague of PW-2 has shown his

ignorance about demand of bribe amount by the

21

DGO from PW-2 and he has not accompanied PW-2

to the RTO, KR Puram office, he has not gone inside

the said RTO office and he is unaware of the incident

that has taken place in the RTO office Even though,

the Presenting Officer cross-examined PW-3, but

nothing is elicited during the cross-examination to

establish the charge levelled against DGO.

21)The shadow witness, PW -1 has deposed half-

heartedly before the Inquiry Officer and he does not

remember how much amount was given by the

complainant to the Police Inspector He further

deposed that, PW-1 was standing near the door of

the chamber of DGO and the door was closed, hence

he could not hear the conversations and also witness

anything which transpired between the complainant

and the DGO PW-1, could not hear the conversation

that took place inside the chamber, but PW-1 has

witnessed complainant giving the tainted money of

Rs 15,000/- to one Sri Mastigouda and the said

amount was kept in his trouser pocket and he could

not hear as to who instructed Sri Mastigouda to

receive the said money During the cross-

examination made by the Presenting Officer, PW-1

admitted that, he was standing near the door, when

the complainant went inside the chamber and door

was slightly opened at that time, he could not hear,

but denied the suggestions made by the Presenting

Officer that, he heard the conversations of DGO that

he demanded bribe amount from the complainant

and further heard that, the complainant negotiated

with DGO for reducing the bribe amount and DGO

asked the complainant to give the said money to Sri

Mastigouda.

22

22) According to the theory of the Disciplinary

Authority, the complainant and DGO negotiated the

bribe amount from Rs 24000/- to Rs 18,000/- in

order to permit twelve tippers belonging to

Prashanth Crushers to ply on road i.e., within the

jurisdiction of RTO, KR Puram, the complainant

approached PW-4 as per the directions of his owner

to lodge complaint Ex P-10, but the complainant has

not supported the said version that, DGO demanded

bribe amount of Rs 24,000/- and after negotiation,

it was reduced to Rs 18,000/- The said amount of

Rs 18,000/- (500x36) was given to PW -4 on

13/06/2012 and the value and number of the said

currency notes were written on a sheet Ex P-1 by the

panch witnesses PW-3 was present at the time of

drawing pre-panchanama, Ex P-3 and also trap

panchanama Ex P -5 on 14/06/2012 But, PW -3,

who is the colleague of PW -2 i.e., employee of

Prashanth Crushers has completely turned hostile

and there is no corroboration in the evidence of PW-

2 and 3 with respect to demand of bribe amount by

the DGO from PW-2 and he has given bribe amount

of Rs 15,000/- to the said Paramesh @ Mastigouda

on the say of the DGO.

23) According to Disciplinary Authority, the shadow

witness, PW-1, accompanied PW-2 and 3 to the RTO

office, KR Puram i.e, 2nd floor and was standing

near the door of the DGOs chamber and heard the

conversations between PW-2 and DGO regarding

negotiation of reducing the bribe amount and he

witnessed the receipt of Rs 15,000/- by the said

Paramesh from PW-2 on the say of the DGO But,

PW-1 categorically deposed that, he has not heard

the conversations held between PW-2 and DGO and

he had witnessed the incident of giving amount of Rs

23

15,000/- by PW-2 to the said Paramesh Evidence of

PW-1 to 3 is not linking the chain of events i.e., DGO

has demanded bribe amount from PW -2 and PW-2

has given the said amount to said Paramesh as per

the say of the DGO The said fact of demand of bribe

amount from DGO and receipt of said bribe amount

by the said Paramesh as per the say of the DGO from

PW-2 is totally missing from the evidence of PW-1 to

3.

24) The solitary evidence of Investigation Officer,

PW-4 alone will not establish the charge leveled

against DGO PW -4 deposed that, PW -2 had

approached PW-4 on 12/06/2012 disclosed about

the demand of bribe amount by DGO PW -4 directed

PW-2 to record the conversations of DGO in the

voice-recorder PW-4 registered crime No 48/2012 on

the basis of the complaint lodged by PW -2 on

13/06/2012 PW-4 has secured PW-1 and another

panch witness namely, Sri Vishwas and introduced

them to PW-2 and disclose about the complaint, Ex

P-10 PW-4 has further deposed that, PW2 has

produced Rs 18,000/- (500 x36) currency notes and

the value of the said notes and numbers were noted

in the sheet Ex P1 One of the police staff had

smeared the phenolphthalein powder on the said

currency notes and as per the directions of PW-4,

Panch witness namely, Vishwas kept the said

tainted notes in the pant pocket of PW-2 and the

hand wash of the said Vishwas was made in the

sodium carbonate solution, which turned to pink

PW4 directed the complainant to give the said

tainted notes to the DGO, only after demand and

PW-1 had to accompany PW-2 along with PW-3 to

the RTO office, KR Puram for trap Trap was not

successful on 13/06/2012 as DGO left the office at

24

5:00 pm itself In that respect mahazar Ex P-4 was

drawn PW-1 to 4 along with Vishwas and staff have

returned back to PW 4’s office and returned the

tainted notes and also voice-recorder and also the

pen camera and asked the said raiding party to come

on 14/06/2012 at 10:00 am

25) PW-4 was successful in getting the trap on

14/06/2012 at 12:30 pm at 2nd floor of the RTO

office, KR Puram by accompanying PW -1 to 3 and

Vishwas along with his staff and the trap mahazar

was drawn vide Ex P-5 at PW-4’s office PW-4 has

followed PW-1 to 3 along with Vishwas and the staff

to RTO office He was standing at the 2nd floor

amidst public PW-4 has directed PW-2 to give signal

after giving the said tainted notes after demand PW-

2 made signal and the said raiding party went to the

chamber of DGO and PW-2 stated that, he had given

the amount to the said Paramesh and hand wash of

the said Paramesh was made m the sodium

carbonate solution, which turned into pink colour

and the amount was seized from said Paramesh at

the RTO office itself.

26) There is no corroboration in the evidence of PW-

4 and PW-1 to 3 The important aspect of demand of

bribe amount by the DGO is not forthcoming from

the evidence of PW-1 to 3, though it is finding place

in the complaint, Ex P-10, Ex P-2 and Ex P-5 trap

panchanama The acceptance of bribe amount by the

said Paramesh as per say of DGO is also missing

from the evidence of PW-1 to 3 The charge levelled

against DGO is that, he has demanded bribe amount

from PW-2 The main ingredients of illegal demand of

bribe amount from the complainant and receipt of

the bribe amount by said Paramesh on the say of the

25

DGO are missing in the instant case on hand The

evidence of the PW-1 to 4 in other aspect may

corroborate, but it is no way helpful to the

Disciplinary Authority in proving the charge levelled

against the DGO.

…..

32) On appreciation of entire oral and documentary

evidence, I hold that the charge leveled against the

DGO is not established and preponderance of

probabilities also do not point at his misconduct

Point No 1: Hence, Point No 1 is answered in the

Negative

Point No 2: For the reasons stated above, I

proceed to record the following findings –

FINDINGS

The Disciplinary Authority has not

proved the charges framed against DGO Sri T

Manjunath, Senior Inspector of Motor

Vehicles, Office of RegionalTransport Officer

KR Puram, Bengaluru DGO will retire from

service on 31/05/2028.

This report is submitted to the Hon’ble

Upalokayukta in a sealed cover,

Dated this the 23 September, 2021

Sd/-”

29. Upon perusal of the above report, it is evident

that the disciplinary authority’s discretion was

swayed by the fact that the Sri K.R. Manjunath

(complainant), Sri Nagesh (shadow witness), and Sri

26

Maruthiraj (colleague of the complainant) did not

support the department’s case and feigned ignorance

about the transaction of bribe. However, the order of

the disciplinary authority also takes note of the fact

that Sri Sanjeevarappa (Investigating Officer) fully

supported the case of the department and proved the

trap panchnama, as per which the tainted currency

notes were recovered from the hands of Paramesh @

Mastigowda (accused No. 2), and the allegation of

demand of a bribe was proved against the accused-

appellant. We feel that the conclusion drawn by the

disciplinary authority that guilt of the delinquent

employee could not be proved merely on the

testimony of the trap laying officer, is premature and

unfounded.

27

30. This Court has, in a catena of decisions

12, held

that the mere fact that a decoy/complainant in a trap

case turns hostile would not adversely affect the case

of prosecution and that conviction can be based even

on the evidence of the trap laying officer, if found

reliable and trustworthy.

31. We may further observe that when a witness

deposing on oath in a criminal trial resiles from the

original version and does not support the prosecution

case, he would be liable to face prosecution for

perjury. Under this pressure, the witness may

choose to speak the truth. Thus, the mere fact that

some of the witnesses did not support the

department’s case in the disciplinary proceedings

would, by itself, not give any assurance that they

would behave in the same manner at the criminal

12

N. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691; Neeraj Datta v.

State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731.

28

trial. In the present case, as is evident, the

exoneration of the accused-appellant in the

departmental proceedings is merely on the ground

that the decoy and associating witnesses did not

support the case of department.

32. The possibility of the criminal case still resulting

into conviction, irrespective of the factum of the

witnesses turning hostile being a realistic possibility,

we feel that there is no merit behind the argument of

Shri Kamat that exoneration in the departmental

proceeding should lead to automatic discharge in the

criminal case. Hence, the said argument advanced

on behalf of the accused-appellant, placing reliance

on Ashoo Surendranath Tewari (supra), has no

merit and is rejected.

33. Though the core facts in both proceedings may

bear resemblance, the viewpoint, scope, and

standards for adjudication are entirely different, and

29

each is governed by a distinct forum and procedure.

Hence, exoneration in the departmental proceedings

does not, ipso facto, furnish a ground for dropping

the criminal charges more particularly in Trap Cases.

B. Sanction Under Section 19 PC Act:

Competence and Jurisdictional Validity

34. The second fold of the argument advanced by

learned counsel for the accused-appellant was based

on the alleged illegality vitiating the sanction order.

35. The question of competence of the sanctioning

authority – being the bone of contention between the

parties, the same requires to be considered. The

controversy essentially turns around whether the

expression “competence” is to be understood as

synonymous with “authority” or “jurisdiction” to

remove the employee from service for the purposes of

Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988.

30

36. For appreciating this submission, the language

of the enabling provision, i.e., Section 19 needs to be

reproduced hereunder: -

“19. Previous sanction necessary for

prosecution.—

(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence

punishable under [sections 7, 11, 13 and 15]

alleged to have been committed by a public

servant, except with the previous sanction [save

as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and

Lokayuktas Act, 2013]—

(a) in the case of a person who is employed, or as

the case may be, was at the time of commission

of the alleged offence employed in connection

with the affairs of the Union and is not removable

from his office save by or with the sanction of the

Central Government, of that Government;

(b) in the case of a person [who is employed, or

as the case may be, was at the time of

commission of the alleged offence employed] in

connection with the affairs of a State and is not

removable from his office save by or with the

sanction of the State Gov ernment, of that

Government;

(c) in the case of any other person, of the

authority competent to remove him from his

office:

[Provided that no request can be made, by a

person other than a police officer or an officer of an

investigation agency or other law enforcement

authority, to the appropriate Government or

31

competent authority, as the case may be, for the

previous sanction of such Government or authority

for taking cognizance by the court of any of the

offences specified in this sub-section, unless—

(i) such a person has filed a complaint in a

competent court about the alleged offences for

which the public servant is sought to be

prosecuted; and

(ii) the court has not dismissed the complaint

under section 203 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and directed the

complainant to obtain the sanction for

prosecution against the public servant for

further proceeding:

Provided further that in the case of request from

the person other than a police officer or an officer of

an investigation agency or other law enforcement

authority, the appropriate Government or competent

authority shall not accord sanction to prosecute a

public servant without providing an opportunity of

being heard to the concerned public servant:

Provided also that the appropriate Government or

any competent authority shall, after the receipt of the

proposal requiring sanction for prosecution of a

public servant under this sub-section, endeavour to

convey the decision on such proposal within a period

of three months from the date of its receipt:

Provided also that in case where, for the purpose

of grant of sanction for prosecution, legal consultation

is required, such period may, for the reasons to be

recorded in writing, be extended by a further period

of one month:

Provided also that the Central Government may,

for the purpose of sanction for prosecution of a public

servant, prescribe such guidelines as it considers

necessary.

32

Explanation. —For the purposes of sub-section (1),

the expression “public servant” includes such

person—

(a) who has ceased to hold the office during

which the offence is alleged to have been

committed; or

(b) who has ceased to hold the office during

which the offence is alleged to have been

committed and is holding an office other than the

office during which the offence is alleged to have

been committed.]

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises

as to whether the previous sanction as required under

sub-section (1) should be given by the Central

Government or the State Government or any other

authority, such sanction shall be given by that

Government or authority which would have been

competent to remove the public servant from his office

at the time when the offence was alleged to have been

committed.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—

(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a

special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a

Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the

ground of the absence of, or any error, omission

or irregularity in, the sanction required under

sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that

court, a failure of justice has in fact been

occasioned thereby;

(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this

Act on the ground of any error, omission or

irregularity in the sanction granted by the

authority, unless it is satisfied that such error,

omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure

of justice;

33

(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this

Act on any other ground and no court shall

exercise the powers of revision in relation to any

interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial,

appeal, or other proceedings.

(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether

the absence of, or any error, omission or

irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or

resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have

regard to the fact whether the objection could and

should have been raised at any earlier stage in the

proceedings.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—

(a) error includes competency of the

authority to grant sanction;

(b) a sanction required for prosecution

includes reference to any requirement that

the prosecution shall be at the instance of a

specified authority or with the sanction of a

specified person or any requirement of a

similar nature.”

[Emphasis supplied]

37. Section 19(1) clearly stipulates that where the

appointing authority of the accused is the State

Government, the sanction for prosecution must be

accorded by the State Government and by none

other. The judgments in T. Murthy (supra), Virender

Kumar Tripathi (supra), and Rajmangal Ram

34

(supra) relied upon by the learned standing counsel

for the State, advert to the Explanation appended

under Section 19(4). In our view, the Explanation to

Section 19(4) would become relevant and come into

play only when the question of validity or otherwise

of the sanction is under scrutiny before the appellate

or the revisional forum

13 as provided in sub-Section

(3) of Section 19. In the present case, such a

determination was made by the learned Special

Judge in the original jurisdiction, who held that the

sanction was invalid as it had been issued by an

authority lacking jurisdiction to do so, and that no

authority other than the State Government could

have granted a sanction in respect of the accused-

appellant, his appointment having been made by the

State Government itself.

13

Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186.

35

38. In this factual background, the Explanation

below Section 19(4) is not germane to the

controversy, for it operates only in situations where

the finding, sentence, or order of the Special Judge

on the aspect of sanction is under scanner before the

appellate or revisional Court on the grounds specified

therein. Thus, these decisions are of no assistance to

the State and are distinguishable on facts.

C. Divergent claims regarding the Appointing

Authority

39. Having held so, we now proceed to advert to the

situation that has arisen owing to the inconsistency

in the diverse claims regarding the authority who

actually appointed the accused-appellant. As noted

hereinabove, competing assertions have been

advanced regarding the actual appointing authority

of the accused-appellant, based on the documents

handed over to the Court during the course of the

hearing of the appeals. While learned counsel for the

36

State maintains that the Commissioner is the

appointing authority of the accused-appellant, the

learned senior counsel representing the accused-

appellant, on the other hand, asserts that the

appointing authority is the State Government.

40. In view of this disputed factual scenario, we are

of the considered opinion that, for a proper and

effective resolution of the controversy, it would be

expedient in the interest of justice to remit the matter

to the trial Court for fresh adjudication on the limited

issue regarding the actual appointing authority of the

accused-appellant and the consequential bearing

thereof on the validity of the sanction order.

41. The contention advanced on behalf of the

accused-appellant that he is entitled to be discharged

on account of his exoneration in the departmental

proceedings does not merit acceptance and is,

accordingly, rejected.

37

42. The finding recorded by the High Court on the

aspect of the validity of the sanction is set aside, and

the matter is remitted to the trial Court for fresh

determination of the issue of sanction in accordance

with law, keeping in view the above observations.

43. For this purpose, the trial Court shall be at

liberty to summon the original

records/contemporaneous documents pertaining to

appointment of the accused-appellant, and thereafter

to take an appropriate decision regarding the validity

or otherwise of the sanction, in accordance with law.

In case the trial Court finds that the sanction has

been issued by a competent authority, the trial shall

proceed. However, in case the conclusion is

otherwise, the trial Court shall return the

chargesheet to the investigating agency for procuring

fresh sanction from the appropriate authority.

44. The appeals are disposed of in these terms.

38

45. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

….……………………J.

(VIKRAM NATH )

...…………………….J.

(SANDEEP MEHTA)

NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 10, 2025.