2025 INSC 118 1 | P a g e

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No. 441/2025

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8777/2022)

Ajay Malik …Appellant

versus

State of Uttarakhand and Anr. …Respondents

WITH

Criminal Appeal No. 442/2025

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 15131/2024)

State of Uttarakhand …Appellant

versus

Ashok Kumar and Anr. …Respondents

JUDGEMENT

SURYA KANT, J.

Leave granted.

2. The instant appeals arise out of the common First Information Report

No. 60/2017 (Case Crime No. 94/2017) (FIR), which inter alia contains

allegations of wrongful confinement and trafficking of a female domestic

worker—the Complainant.

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3. To further clarify, SLP (Crl.) No. 8777/2022, has been preferred by the

accused Ajay Malik in the FIR, as against the judgment dated

01.09.2022 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital (High Court),

whereby Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 96 of 2018 (CMA),

seeking the compounding and quashing of the criminal proceedings

initiated against him, was rejected (Ajay Malik’s case). SLP (Crl.) No.

15131/2024, on the other hand, has been filed by the State of

Uttarakhand, challenging the judgment dated 12.01.2021, in Criminal

Revision No. 173 of 2019, whereby the co-accused Ashok Kumar’s

Revision Application seeking discharge was allowed by the High Court

(Ashok Kumar’s case).

A. FACTS

4. Considering that these appeals arise from the same incident, their

factual matrices remain predominantly uniform, with differences largely

being restricted to the differing roles ascribed to Ajay Malik and Ashok

Kumar. It is thus necessary to briefly advert to the facts that lay the

foundation for these appeals.

A. 1 Background to the materialization of the criminal incident

4.1 The Complainant, a resident of Birhipani Nawatoli Bokhi, Birhipani,

District Jashpur, Chhattisgarh, belongs to a financially disadvantaged

family from a Scheduled Tribe. In her search for employment to support

her family, she was brought to Delhi in 2009 b y her neighbours,

Subhash and Mohan Ram, under the pretext of securing work.

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4.2 Upon her arrival in Delhi, the Complainant was handed over to one

Shambhu @ Sambhu Prasad, who reportedly operated an office at

Britannia Chowk, Shakurpur, Delhi. Shambhu claimed to run the Saint

Maryam Placement Services (Regd.), ostensibly showcased as a social

welfare society for Scheduled Tribes (Placement Agency). Shambhu

forcibly deployed the Complainant as a domestic help/housekeeper in

various households, requiring her to perform tasks such as washing

utensils and cleaning. As a result, she was reportedly sent to multiple

locations, including Karnal, Delhi, Gur gaon, and Kanpur. The

Complainant further alleged in the FIR that Shambhu through the

Placement Agency failed to compensate her for the labour extracted,

and instead misappropriated her earnings. In this regard, the

Complainant also alleged that she was routinely assaulted whenever

she requested remuneration or sought permission to return home.

4.3 Ajay Malik recruited the Complainant on 16.10.2016, having

purportedly entered into a written agreement with the Placement

Agency, for her to work as a domestic help at his official residence.

Subsequently, two individuals employed by Shambhu dropped off the

Complainant at Ajay Malik’s home in Dehradun, Uttarakhand. Ajay

Malik at the time was serving as a Scientist at the Defence Electronics

Application Laboratory, Defence Research and Development

Organization under the Ministry of Defence (DRDO), where he had been

employed since 1988. As a Class-I Officer, Ajay Malik had been allotted

a Type-V Government accommodation, where he resided with his wife

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and two children. The alleged incident is said to have occurred on these

premises.

4.4 Ajay Malik, on 22.03.2017, departed from his residence with his entire

family, for official duty concerning the SDR-AR Phase II L Band Trials

at Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Kanpur. During the absence of Ajay

Malik and his family, the Complainant was left behind on the premises,

the main entry to which had been locked. A spare key to the home had

been entrusted to his friend and neighbour, Ashok Kumar, who is

alleged to have visited Ajay Malik’s residence regularly to provide the

Complainant with drinking water and to keep watch on her. The

Complainant has further stated in the FIR that Ajay Malik had also left

a mobile phone with the Complainant to remain in regular touch with

her, using which she was able to contact the Police Authorities on

29.03.2017, to register a complaint of wrongful confinement.

A. 2 Registration of the FIR

4.5 Acting on the Complainant’s information, the Police arrived at Ajay

Malik’s residence, and with the assistance of Ashok Kumar, entered the

premises. The Complainant was subsequently recovered, and the Police

prepared a Recovery Memo dated 29.03.2017. Following this, an FIR

was lodged on 30.03.2017 against four individuals—Ajay Malik, Mohan

Ram, Subhash, and Shambhu —under Sections 343 and 370 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), at Police Station Rampur, District

Sadar, Dehradun. On the same day, the Complainant’s statement was

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recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(CrPC), before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dehradun.

4.6 The investigation commenced, during which the Investigating Officer

recorded witness statements, collected evidence, and subsequently filed

the first Chargesheet against Shambhu on 09.07.2017. A second

Chargesheet was filed on 31.12.2017 against the remaining three co-

accused, whereby Ajay Malik specifically was accused of having

committed offences under Sections 343 and 370 read with Section

120B of the IPC. Finally, the third Chargesheet came to be filed on

22.12.2017 against Ashok Kumar, who had not been named in the FIR

or the initial complaint, charging him under Sections 343 and 120B of

the IPC.

A. 3 Commencement of criminal proceedings

4.7 It is at this juncture that the criminal proceedings against Ajay Malik

and Ashok Kumar commenced separately and may be traversed as

such.

A. 3. 1 Ajay Malik’s case

4.8 Having been Chargesheeted in Case Crime No. 94/2017, Ajay Malik

filed CMA No. 96/2018 under Section 482 of the CrPC before the High

Court in January, 2018, seeking the quashing and setting aside of the:

(i) criminal proceedings initiated against him through the FIR; (ii) the

Chargesheet dated 31.10.2017; and (iii) the summoning order, passed

in Criminal Case No. 5282/2017, pending before the Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Dehradun. The High Court initially vide order dated

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25.01.2018, stayed the trial proceedings in the above-mentioned

Criminal Application.

4.9 Subsequently, Ajay Malik on 01.08.2022 moved Compounding

Application No. 532/2022 before the High Court seeking compounding

of the alleged offences under Section 320 of the CrPC. The application

was supported by an affidavit affirmed by the Complainant herself,

wherein she provided that the parties had amicably settled the dispute.

She further deposed that she had no objection, should the offences

against Ajay Malik be compounded and the criminal proceedings

against him be quashed.

4.10 That being so, the High Court vide the Impugned Judgment dated

01.09.2022, firstly rejected Ajay Malik’s compounding application—

observing that a prima facie case under Section 370 of the IPC was

made out against him, which is a non-compoundable offence under the

aegis of Section 320 of the CrPC. Secondly, the High Court also deemed

it fit to turn down Ajay Malik's main application under Section 482 of

the CrPC on merits, holding that the Chargesheet and witness

testimonies combined made out prima facie allegations of wrongful

confinement against him.

4.11 As a sequel thereto, Ajay Malik has approached this Court. While

issuing notice in Ajay Malik’s case on 26.09.2022, this Court passed an

ex-parte interim order staying his arrest in connection with the

captioned FIR, which operates till date.

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A. 3. 2 Ashok Kumar’s case

4.12 Having elucidated the contextual backdrop amid which Ajay Malik’s

appeal arose, we now advert to the facts in Ashok Kumar’s case. We

note, at the cost of repetition, that the State of Uttarakhand has

preferred this appeal against the order of the High Court discharging

him from the criminal proceedings in Sessions Trial No. 124/2018.

4.13 In this scenario, the Police Authorities, having conducted further

investigation in connection with the captioned FIR and accompanying

complaint, filed Third Charge Sheet No. 93B/2017 against Ashok

Kumar under Sections 343 and 120B of the IPC on 22.12.2017. The

Magistrate, Dehradun, took cognizance of the same on 31.01.2018.

Aggrieved, Ashok Kumar preferred a Discharge Application before the

Court of First Additional Sessions Judge, Dehradun, under Section 227

of the CrPC on 06.08.2018. However, the said Court, vide order dated

02.03.2019, rejected his Discharge Application, having found prima

facie evidence that he had held the keys to the residence wherein the

Complainant was wrongfully confined.

4.14 Discontented with the order of the Sessions Court, Ashok Kumar

moved the High Court through Criminal Revision No. 173/2019, which

has been allowed vide the Impugned Judgment dated 12.01.2021,

quashing the criminal proceedings emanating from the FIR qua him.

While doing so, the High Court stressed on the absence of any specific

allegations against him in the FIR and subsequent recorded

statements. More pertinently, the High Court has also found that Ajay

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Malik’s residence had two entry/exit points, with only one being

locked—thereby establishing that the Complainant had the option of

egress available to her at all relevant times.

4.15 Consequently, the Second Additional District Judge, Dehradun, vide

order dated 06.02.2021, dropped the criminal proceedings against

Ashok Kumar in Sessions Trial No. 124/2018. It is in this factual

backdrop that the aggrieved State is before us in appeal.

B. CONTENTIONS

5. Before we formulate the issues that arise for consideration in these

appeals, we may briefly note the contentions forwarded by the parties:

5.1 Mr R. Basant, Learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of Ajay

Malik, while praying that the Impugned Judgment be set aside and the

criminal proceedings pending against him be quashed, submitted as

follows:

a) The Complainant’s statement under Section 164 of the CrPC

indicates that she merely requested Ajay Malik if she could leave

his residence, and he responded by requesting her to remain until

alternative arrangements could be made. No evidence of active

wrongful restraint, as is contemplated under Section 343 of the

IPC, is thus presented.

b) A no-objection affidavit filed by the Complainant explicitly denies

any confinement or mistreatment by Ajay Malik, indicating a lack

of grievance against him. This affidavit should hold significant

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weight, allowing the Court to quash proceedings, following the

principles evolved in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab

1

and

Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab.

2

c) The interim relief granted by the High Court demonstrates judicial

recognition of Ajay Malik’s case. In fact, decisions such as State of

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ,

3

and Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal

Kapoor,

4

emphasise the quashing of frivolous or baseless

prosecution.

d) The Complainant’s allegations are linked to prior disputes with the

Placement Agency, and not Ajay Malik, further diminishing the

relevance of the charges registered against him.

5.2 Mr Prashant Bhushan, Learned Counsel, appearing for Ashok Kumar,

adopted the relevant part of the contentions put forth on Ajay Malik’s

behalf and fervently advocated to the correctness of the Impugned

Judgment in discharging Ashok Kumar. Additionally, he canvassed the

following submissions:

a) Ashok Kumar is not only a DRDO Officer with decades of

unblemished service; he also does not have any criminal

antecedents. The only role attributable to Ashok Kumar in this

entire factual scenario is the key he possessed to Ajay Malik’s

1 Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012 (10) SCC 303.

2 Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014 INSC 217.

3 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1990 SCR Supl. (3) 259.

4 Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, 2013 (3) SCC 330.

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residence, which had been provided to him so that he could keep

an eye on the premises in the absence of the latter.

b) Ashok Kumar is being needlessly harassed for innocently and

innocuously agreeing to keep the aforementioned keys with him .

He was completely unaware of any alleged wrongful confinement

being perpetrated by Ajay Malik. He, moreover, never went to Ajay

Malik’s residence before the police arrived.

c) Ashok Kumar is also not named in the FIR or the Complainant’s

statement under Section 164 of the CrPC. The Police have

mechanically filed a Supplementary Chargesheet, roping him in as

an accused. In any case, the ingredients for the offences alleged

against him have not been fulfilled.

5.3 Per contra, Ms Anubha Dhulia, Learned Standing Counsel for the State

of Uttarakhand, sought to not only defend the correctness of the High

Court in disallowing Ajay Malik’s quashing application but also

vehemently opposed the discharge of Ashok Kumar. She, accordingly,

advanced the following contentions:

i. Ajay Malik’s case

a) The Complainant’s FIR details allegations of being locked in a

house for a week, with the key handed over to Ajay Malik’s

associate. Moreover, her statements under Sections 161 and 164

of the CrPC corroborate these claims, describing the

Complainant's inability to leave the premises and her limited

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access to communication. Additionally, the Recovery Memo

records the discovery of the Complainant confined in a locked flat

by Police Authorities and a video documenting her release. Taken

together, these facts clearly make out the charge of wrongful

confinement against Ajay Malik.

b) The victim belongs to a Below Poverty Line-Scheduled Tribe family,

which highlights the power imbalance between the Complainant

and Ajay Malik. This disparity raises serious concerns about

systemic exploitation, with legislative intent ensuring these

offences remain non-compoundable under Section 370 of the IPC.

c) The no-objection affidavit relied upon by Ajay Malik and allegedly

affirmed by the Complainant is a mere reproduction of the former’s

Special Leave Petition before this Court. It thereby lacks

credibility, given the Complainant’s vulnerable status; and

potential coercion or manipulation cannot be ruled out at this

stage.

d) Lastly, upholding these charges aligns with social and moral

principles, ensuring accountability for exploitation and addressing

broader societal inequalities. Domestic workers, who often start

working when they are underage, are particularly vulnerable to

exploitation by the elite classes—and most such cases are never

reported.

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ii. Ashok Kumar’s case

a) The Complainant’s FIR mentioned Ashok Kumar by name —

credited as Ajay Malik’s friend—who was responsible for looking

after the Complainant and the premises in Ajay Malik’s absence.

Similarly, her statement under Section 164 of the CrPC also

details the allegations against Ashok Kumar. The High Court was

thus incorrect in holding that no case was made out against him

since he was not named in these two documents.

b) The Recovery Memo further sheds light as to how when the

Complainant was statedly freed from Ajay Malik’s residence by

Police Authorities, Ashok Kumar was called to the said premises,

having been in possession of the keys thereof. This fact speaks to

the reality that the Complainant was wrongfully confined in the

house, with the sole key resting with Ashok Kumar, who while

being aware of the Complainant's confinement, nonetheless elected

to let her remain in that position.

C. ISSUES

6. We have duly considered the rival submissions of the parties, as

elucidated hereinabove, and carefully perused the material on record.

We find that the following issues need to be analysed:

i. Whether the High Court acted well within the contours of its

powers under Section 482 of the CrPC in rejecting Ajay Malik’s

quashing petition?

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ii. Whether the High Court fell in error in rejecting the Compounding

Application moved by Ajay Malik and supported by the

Complainant?

iii. Whether the High Court was legally correct in accepting Ashok

Kumar’s Criminal Revision, thereby discharging him from the

captioned criminal proceedings?

iv. Whether the existing legal framework in India sufficiently protects

the rights of domestic workers?

D. ANALYSIS

7. It may be noted at the outset that while evaluating the issue s

formulated above, we have taken into consideration the credentials of

both, Ajay Malik and Ashok Kumar; the contents of the FIR; the

Complainant’s statements; and her affidavits filed before the High

Court and this Court.

D. 1 Issue No. 1: The correctness of rejecting Ajay Malik’s quashing

application

8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary

powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the

abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These

inherent powers are neither controlled nor limi ted by any other

statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of

this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The

conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482

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of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear

abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends

of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several

decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts

must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold;

thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the

Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the

following situations: (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala

fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima

facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v) the

complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties

are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably.

5

10. Turning to the facts of the present case, it is thus necessary to examine

each of the offences alleged against Ajay Malik to determine whether a

prima facie case has been established and if there is any justification

for quashing the criminal proceedings against him.

D. 1. 1 The offences alleged against Ajay Malik

11. The analysis in this regard will address each of the offences

enumerated against Ajay Malik, namely: (i) wrongful confinement under

Section 343 of the IPC; (ii) human trafficking under Section 370 of the

IPC; and (iii) criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC.

5 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335.

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D.1.1.1 Wrongful confinement under Section 343 of the IPC

12. The IPC defines ‘wrongful confinement’ as ‘wrongfully restraining any

person in such a manner so as to prevent that person from proceeding

beyond certain circumscribing limits’. Put more simply, this offence

requires the satisfaction of two prongs: (i) the voluntary restraint of any

person; and (ii) the act being done in a manner such that it prevents

the said person from proceeding beyond circumscribing limits.

13. The State of Uttarakhand in this regard has vehemently contended that

there are several factors militating against Ajay Malik, including the FIR

detailing that he allegedly wrongfully confined the Complainant at his

residence, and the Recovery Memo which enumerates that the

Complainant was locked inside Ajay Malik’s residence, with the main

gate being doubly locked. The specific allegation thus seems to be that

Ajay Malik restricted the Complainant’s movements from the

circumscribed limit of his residence.

14. While this assertion appears plausible, what raises concern for this

Court is the claim that an alternative exit was available to the

Complainant, allowing her to freely enter and exit the premises. This

fact is fortified by the High Court's findings in the Impugned Judgment

in Ashok Kumar's case, which held that:

“7. The learned Magistrate did not consider the aspect

of the matter that where the complainant was resided

in the house of Ajay Malik which has two entries, one

entry the lock was put and another entry was free.

Upon consideration of the case record and the document

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submitted therewith there is no sufficient ground for

proceeding against the accused. The revisionist was liable to

be discharged under Section 227 of Cr.P.C., which is quoted

hereunder:-

“227. Discharge- If, upon consideration of the record of the

case and the documents submitted therewith, and after

hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution

on this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient

ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall

discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

15. This factual finding aligns with Ajay Malik's consistent assertion that,

although the main entry to his residence was locked, an alternative exit

remained accessible for the Complainant to use, which has also been

illustrated in the site plan of the subject premises. Furthermore, even

as far as the Recovery Memo is concerned, it seems that the Police did

not inspect or document the existence of this alternate exit, leaving its

availability unverified.

16. Be that as it may, certain additional factual circumstances lend further

support to this conclusion. First, the mobile phone allegedly left by Ajay

Malik with the Complainant, and subsequently recovered by the police,

raises questions about the plausibility of wrongful confinement. It

remains unexplained why Ajay Malik would provide the Complainant

with a means of communication, allowing her to contact others at will,

had he intended to confine her or restrict her within circumscribed

limits. Second, the Complainant had been issued a temporary pass

issued by the DRDO Colony, where Ajay Malik’s residence is located.

The existence of this pass bolsters Ajay Malik's claim that the

Complainant frequently left the residence and the colony for errands.

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Third, the Complainant’s own no-objection affidavits, explicitly state

that she was never wrongfully confined and that an alternative exit was

always accessible to her.

17. On an objective consideration of this uncontroverted material on

record, there can be no other conclusion except to hold that the

allegations, even if accepted to be true, do not disclose the commission

of an offence by Ajay Malik under Section 343 of the IPC.

D.1.1.2 Trafficking and exploitation under Section 370 of the IPC

18. We now turn to the allegations against Ajay Malik under Section 370 of

the IPC, pertaining to the trafficking and exploitation of the

Complainant. In this regard, taking into consideration the extenuating

circumstances surrounding this case, this allegation seems to lack any

substantial merit. We say so for the following reasons:

i. The FIR includes allegations of assault and exploitation against

Ajay Malik and the other co -accused. However, a closer

examination reveals that the bulk of the FIR primarily focuses on

two neighbours, Subhash and Mohan Ram, who allegedly brought

the Complainant to Delhi, and Shambhu, who is accused of

persistently harassing the Complainant and exploiting her

vulnerable situation.

ii. In the Complainant's statement recorded under Section 164 of the

CrPC, the allegations against Ajay Malik seemingly diminish. She

instead provides a detailed account of how her neighbours brought

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her to Delhi and handed her over to Shambhu, who subsequently

sent her to work in various cities, withheld her rightful earnings,

and consistently denied her requests to return home. In contrast,

the only mention of Ajay Malik in her statement pertains to his

alleged refusal to send her home until alternative arrangements

were made and his having allegedly locked her in a room. The

Complainant also notes that Ajay Malik had left a mobile phone

with her before leaving for Delhi and maintained regular contact

with her during that time.

iii. The no-objection affidavit submitted by the Complainant before the

High Court as part of Ajay Malik’s Compounding Application,

elucidates that the Complainant has no grievances against Ajay

Malik and unequivocally asserts that she was neither trafficked

nor wrongfully confined by him. She further expresses her

willingness to have all pending criminal proceedings against Ajay

Malik quashed. At the High Court's request, the Complainant

appeared virtually and reiterated her categorical stance,

confirming that she holds no complaints against Ajay Malik. The

relevant paragraph from the Impugned Judgment in this case

reads as follows:

“10. After having interacted with the

complainant/respondent No. 2 herein through

video conferencing, she had submitted that the

present applicant is not responsible for the act ,

which was complained of by her and which finds

reference in her statement too, which was recorded

under Section 164 of Cr.PC.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

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19. Furthermore, during the pendency of these proceedings, the

Complainant filed an additional affidavit before this Court as well,

which carries significant weight and warrants our undivided attention.

In this affidavit, she reiterates that she was never wrongfully confined

or trafficked by Ajay Malik and affirms that she was always treated with

dignity and respect. She further states that she is now happily married

with a daughter and has no desire to prolong the embarrassment

caused to Ajay Malik and his family due to the allegations. It is thus

abundantly clear that the Complainant has sought to recant the

entirety of her allegations against Ajay Malik.

20. In this vein, having duly and holistically considered all of these aspects

in toto, we are of the opinion that no prima facie offence under Section

370 of the IPC qua Ajay Malik has been made out as well. Not only is

there no evidence of neglect or exploitation of the Complainant by Ajay

Malik on record, but her own sworn statements in denying any abuse

must also be given due credence.

21. We deem it important to note that while there may have been instances

suggesting some degree of labour-based exploitation of the

Complainant by Ajay Malik and his family, this is not evident from the

face of the record, and we are not inclined to initiate an inquiry into

this aspect. In any event, such allegations do not constitute an offense

under Section 370 of the IPC, and we cannot conclusively find Ajay

Malik guilty of trafficking and exploitation as defined therein. However,

that being said, this case has prompted us to frame Issue No. IV,

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whereby we have elaborately addressed the pressing need to establish

guidelines to safeguard the rights of domestic workers employed in

households across the country.

D.1.1.3 Criminal conspiracy under Section 120B of the IPC

22. Finally, we turn to the allegations against Ajay Malik under Section

120B of the IPC, which deals with punishment for criminal conspiracy.

It is trite law that the principal ingredient of this offence is the

agreement to commit an offence.

6

The charge of conspiracy must be

explicitly evidenced, and should be easily discernable in the acts of the

conspiring parties. This Court has also previously held, in no uncertain

terms, that conspiracy cannot be made out without some kind of

physical manifestation of the alleged agreement being established.

7

23. As previously noted, Ajay Malik employed the Complainant through the

Placement Agency established by Shambhu for domestic work at his

residence in Dehradun, which she joined on 16.10.2016. She continued

to work there for over five months without any untoward incident. As

per the purported agreement between the Placement Agency and Ajay

Malik, the Complainant’s wages were regularly paid to her through the

Agency. It therefore appears that the only agreement between Ajay

Malik and co-accused Shambhu was the employment of the

Complainant as domestic help at the former’s residence.

6 State of Kerala v. P. Sugathan and Anr., (2000) 8 SCC 203.

7 Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641.

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24. Furthermore, a thorough review of the material on record does not

indicate any orchestrated arrangement by Ajay Malik with the co-

accused to exploit or confine the Complainant. On the contrary, the

case appears to involve minimal interaction or communication between

Ajay Malik and the co-accused. Any correspondence between them

seems limited strictly to hiring of the Complainant as a domest ic

worker at Ajay Malik’s residence. Against this backdrop, the charge

under Section 120B of the IPC qua Ajay Malik is highly speculative and

warrants rejection at the very threshold.

D. 1. 2 Whether quashing would be justified?

25. In light of the conclusions reached regarding each of the offences

alleged against Ajay Malik, it becomes clear that the Investigating

Agency has failed to establish any prima facie case. Since the FIR has

been investigated and a Chargesheet has been filed, the FIR alone

cannot serve as the basis for dismissing Ajay Malik’s claims.

26. Even assuming the FIR is accurate, it does not substantiate the

charges, which appear to have been mechanically transcribed into the

Chargesheet, despite the Investigating Agency having had sufficient

opportunity to gather material evidence. Notably, no element of illegal

confinement, trafficking, or criminal conspiracy has been established

against Ajay Malik. Additionally, the Complainant has, under oath,

stated that she was not illegally confined. If this remains her position in

Court, the purpose of proceeding to trial becomes questionable ,

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amounting to an exercise in futility and a sheer wastage of judicial

resources.

27. Based on the foregoing facts, it appears that the Complainant’s primary

grievance lies in the unfair treatment she received from Subhash,

Mohan Ram, and Shambhu. At this juncture, it is important to note

that the allegations against these three co-accused are significantly

more serious and grave, considering that charges have been filed

against them under Sections 370, 373 and 376 of the IPC. The

Placement Agency run by Shambhu could be described as a deceptive

front, supposedly aimed at the welfare of tribal girls, but in reality, it

perpetuates their abuse and exploitation. This dubious operation seems

to be the root cause of the Complainant’s suffering, with Ajay Malik

having been included in the FIR without substantial justification.

28. In this backdrop, it appears to us that the Complainant's actions were

driven by a fear that should she leave Ajay Malik's employment, as she

had done in previous jobs in different cities, she would once again fall

under the control of the Placement Agency, which would subject her to

further exploitation and abuse. This fear likely led her to lodge the

complaint as a means of escaping her situation. This sequence of

events aligns with the Complainant's subsequent and consistent stance

thereafter, in which she asserts that Ajay Malik and his family did not

wrongfully confine or exploit her. Furthermore, she has expressed a

desire for the proceedings against Ajay Malik, who is a retired senior

citizen now, to be quashed.

23 | P a g e

29. In light of the absence of any prima facie evidence of wrongdoing by

Ajay Malik; the vague and omnibus claims made in the FIR and

subsequently the Chargesheet; and the Complainant's consistent

stance to compound and settle the dispute, we are unable to concur

with the High Court's conclusion in the Impugned Judgement, which

otherwise constitutes a fit case for quashing.

D.2 Issue No. 2: The correctness of rejecting Ajay Malik’s

Compounding Application

30. We now turn to the second issue in Ajay Malik’s case concerning the

rejection of his compounding application. As stated previously, Ajay

Malik had moved a Compounding Application in his pending petition,

based on the strength of the Complainant’s no-objection affidavit.

31. Section 320 of the CrPC provides for the compounding of offences, and

its appended Schedule lists the various criminal offences that may be

compounded or settled by and between the parties under the Court's

supervision. In the facts of the instant case, the FIR against Ajay Malik

was registered under Sections 343 and 370 of the IPC. Incontrovertibly,

Section 370 IPC, being a serious offence, does not find a place on the

Schedule attached to Section 320 of the CrPC and is thus classified as

a non-compoundable offence.

32. Although we are inclined to agree with the High Court’s rejection of

Ajay Malik’s Compounding Application owing to the non-compoundable

nature of alleged offences, this issue is nonetheless rendered academic

given our conclusion in the previous issue, where we have rejected the

24 | P a g e

High Court’s view regarding Ajay Malik’s quashing application.

Therefore, while we may not need to delve into this issue, it must be

underscored that a delicate balance ought to be struck in cases

wherein the parties seek compounding of the offences. Though well -

intentioned, an excessively moralistic order may unnecessarily prolong

criminal proceedings, which have no logical conclusion and only serve

to further distress the parties. Accordingly, the correctness of the High

Court’s decision to disallow Ajay Malik’s Compounding Application does

not require our consideration on merits.

D. 3 Issue No. 3: The State’s challenge to Ashok Kumar’s discharge

33. Adverting to Ashok Kumar’s case, we shall now consider the merit of

the State's challenge to the Impugned Judgment therein. At the cost of

repetition, the proceedings herein concern Ashok Kumar, a neighbor

and friend of Ajay Malik. Although Ashok Kumar was not initially

named in the FIR, he was later Chargesheeted by the Investigating

Officer and included as a co-accused. The State is aggrieved by the

High Court’s decision to allow Ashok Kumar’s Criminal Revision

Petition, thereby discharging him from the criminal proceedings arising

from the captioned FIR.

34. It is trite law that the discharge stage acts as a critical filter to eliminate

cases lacking legal merit, sparing the accused from unnecessary

proceedings, while ensuring that credible cases proceed to trial. Thus,

discharge under Section 227 of the CrPC is justified when the material

on record fails to disclose a prima facie case against the accused to

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proceed for trial. The legislative spirit behind this provision envisions

the rights of the accused being balanced with public interest, so as to

ultimately prevent abuse of the legal process.

35. The sum of the allegations against Ashok Kumar is that he held the key

to the residence where the Complainant was allegedly wrongfully

confined. While we have already negated the claims of wrongful

confinement against Ajay Malik based on the High Court's finding

regarding the alternative exit available to the Complainant, certain

additional mitigating circumstances may be observed in the case of

Ashok Kumar. Firstly, there is no direct allegation against him made by

the Complainant herself. Neither the FIR nor the Complainant's

statements disclose any explicit, illegal act on Ashok Kumar's part.

Secondly, Ashok Kumar was not named in the original FIR, and was

only added by way of a Supplementary Chargesheet by the Investigating

Officer, seemingly as an after-thought. This hasty inclusion lacks any

substantive justification. Thirdly, while Ashok Kumar was delivered the

keys by Ajay Malik and held them as a favor to him, there is no

evidence to suggest that he ever visited the premises or was aware and

acting in furtherance of any wrongful confinement of the Complainant.

36. For these reasons, we have no hesitation in upholding the correctness

of the reasoned order of the High Court, in allowing the discharge of

Ashok Kumar from the criminal proceedings. Given the demonstrable

lack of any mens rea or intent on the part of Ashok Kumar, apart from

26 | P a g e

the lack of any direct involvement, his discharge is well-founded and

warrants no interference by this Court.

D. 4 Issue No. 4: Domestic workers’ lacking legal protection in India

37. We lastly address the final issue framed by us in these appeals, which

pertains to the rights, protections, and privileges (or lack thereof)

accorded to domestic workers in the Indian milieu. While this broader

issue may only be tangential to the present appeals, we have taken it

upon ourselves to deal with the same in light of the gravity and nature

of the systemic issues we have been presented with.

D. 4. 1 Background

38. It is an incontrovertible fact that the demand for domestic workers has

been mounting in India, in consonance with rapid urbanization and

development. According to reports by the International Labor

Organization (ILO)—which is a United Nations agency devoted to

promoting internationally recognized labour and human rights —

domestic workers currently constitute a significant portion of the

unorganised workforce in India,

8

with millions of individuals, primarily

women,

9

engaged in this sector. Their contributions are indispensable

to urban households, performing tasks such as cooking, cleaning,

caregiving, and other essential services.

8 ILO Report, “Indispensable yet unprotected: Working conditions of Indian Domestic Workers

at Home and Abroad”, 2015.

9 ILO Report, “Employer practices and perceptions on paid domestic work: Recruitment,

employment relationships, and social protection”, 2023.

27 | P a g e

39. While any avenues for employment being opened to marginalised

women merit celebration, we are at pains to note that despite their

growing demand, this indispensable workforce has also been the most

vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Domestic workers often belong to

marginalised communities, such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled

Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and Economically Weaker Sections.

They are compelled to undertake domestic work due to financial

hardship or displacement, further reinforcing their vulnerability. That

is not to say, however, that we are declaiming this source of gainful

employment that is readily available to women across all social sub-

stratas. On the contrary, we seek to affirm this important livelihood

that is available to so many women, which brings them one step closer

to financial security and the accompanying independence.

40. Our concerns instead lie with the non-regulation of this crucial labour

sector, which often leads to the aforementioned malignant results. The

same is abundantly evident from the factual circumstances of the

present appeals, wherein the Complainant was tortured and exploited

for several years at the hands of individuals who forcibly transported

her to differing cities, in the promise of a better life which never

materialised. The purported Placement Agency which employed the

Complainant continually leeched her salaries, leaving her utterly

destitute and helpless.

41. The simple reason for this harassment and rampant abuse, which

seems to be prevalent throughout the country, is the legal vacuum

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which exists vis-à-vis the rights and protection of domestic workers.

Indeed, domestic workers in India remain largely unprotected and

without any comprehensive legal recognition. As a result, they

frequently endure low wages, unsafe environments, and extended hours

without effective recourse.

42. Before we discuss the Indian legal experience with domestic workers, it

is perhaps fitting to advert to the prevailing international standards.

D. 4. 2 International norms and standards

43. In the international spectrum, over the course of many decades, the

ILO has provided various guidelines and conventions for the betterment

of labour laws across the world. It is noteworthy that it has also

extensively sought to protect the rights of domestic workers, which it

recognises as a uniquely disadvantaged and marginalised class. I t

proactively advocates for the inclusion of domestic workers in pre-

existing labour treaties. For instance, during discussions on the

Protection of Workers’ Claims (Employer’s Insolvency) Convention, 1992

(No. 173), the definition of ‘insolvency’ was revised to refer to as

‘employer’s assets’ instead of the narrower term ‘enterprise’s assets,’

ensuring domestic workers were covered. Moreover, Article 2 of the

Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise

Convention, 1948 (No. 87), applies to all ‘workers and employers’

without any exception.

44. Reference may also be made to the principles of non-discrimination and

equal opportunity in the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)

29 | P a g e

Convention, 1958 (No. 111), and the Equal Remuneration Convention,

1951 (No. 100), which also cover domestic workers. In fact, the ILO

Committee of Experts has repeatedly emphasised that laws or policies

promoting equality in jobs must include domestic workers and that

excluding them would violate these Conventions.

10

45. However, the most significant international development in the realm of

the rights of domestic workers was in 2011, with the adoption of the

Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189). This Convention offers

specific protection to domestic workers while laying down the basic

rights that such workers are entitled to, and the measures that States

must take to ensure decent work conditions. These protections include

regulating work settings and providing domestic workers with social

security benefits that are at par with other workers. This Convention is

supplemented by the ILO Recommendation No. 201, which further

addresses the need for facilities like proper accommodation, food, and

the medical health of domestic workers.

46. Apart from the illustrative treaties reproduced hereinabove, the plight

of domestic workers is also addressed in several other Conventions. For

instance, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights

of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990, in its

General Comment No. 1, provides for and acknowledges the

particularly vulnerable position of migrant domestic workers. Similarly,

General Comment No. 26 to the landmark Convention on the

10 ILO Guide, “Effective Protection for Domestic Workers: A Guide to Designing Labour Laws”,

2012; ILO Manual, “Achieving decent work for domestic works”, 2012.

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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979

addresses female migrant workers and extends to those undertaking

domestic work as well.

47. Thus, contemporary international standards not only acknowledge the

vulnerability of domestic workers but also strive to provide them

extensive protection and parity with other labourers.

D. 4. 3 Domestic laws and guidelines

48. Coming to the legal standing of domestic workers within India, there

seems to be a degree of lacunae in legislative frameworks, safeguarding

and protecting their rights.

49. At this juncture, we must fairly note that there have already been

several attempts to bring domestic workers under legal protection.

However, for a plethora of reasons that are beyond the scope of the

present discussion, these Bills have never materialized into tangible

laws or policies. In this regard, we may briefly note the following:

i. The Domestic Workers (Conditions of Employment) Bill of

1959 was among the earliest legislative attempts to regulate the

working conditions of domestic workers. It aimed to establish

minimum standards for wages, work hours, and employment

terms for domestic workers. However, the Bill received little

support and was ultimately not enacted into law.

ii. The House Workers (Conditions of Service) Bill of 1989 sought

to address similar issues, focusing on formalising employment

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practices and providing essential safeguards for domestic workers.

Despite being introduced, this Bill neither formed the subject of

significant Parliamentary discussions nor advanced towards

enactment.

iii. The Housemaids and Domestic Workers (Conditions of Service

and Welfare) Bill, 2004 was introduced in the Rajya Sabha as a

private member’s Bill. This Bill proposed mandatory registration of

domestic workers and required the government to ensure sufficient

employment opportunities, medical benefits, and other welfare

measures. It also included penalties for employers hiring

unregistered workers. However, the Bill was not passed by

Parliament.

iv. The Domestic Workers (Registration, Social Security and

Welfare) Bill, 2008, introduced by the National Commission for

Women, aimed to establish a registration process for domestic

workers and to provide them with social security benefits. The Bill

did not progress beyond its drafting stage and was not enacted

into law.

v. The Domestic Workers (Decent Working Conditions) Bill of

2015 sought to include domestic workers under existing labour

laws, such as the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. The Bill

proposed ensuring fair wages and regulated working conditions for

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domestic workers. However, it remained pending and was not

enacted into law.

vi. The Domestic Workers Welfare Bill 2016 proposed including

migrant and minor domestic workers within its ambit. The Bill

prescribed working conditions, terms of employment, and the

collection of a cess from employers to maintain a social security

fund. It also mandated the registration of workers by employers

and placement agencies. This Bill was, however, not enacted.

vii. The Domestic Workers (Regulation of Work and Social

Security) Bill, 2017 sought to regulate the work of domestic

workers, prescribe duties for employers and placement agencies,

establish Boards for their registration, address issues related to

the marginalisation caused by migration, and provide for the

inclusion of domestic workers in significant labour laws. However,

the Bill was never enacted.

50. It, thus, seems to us that no effective legislative or executive action in

furtherance of enacting a statute, which could prove to be a boon to

millions of vulnerable domestic workers across the country, has been

undertaken as of now. Over and above the absence of any legislation

protecting their interests, domestic labourers also find themselves

excluded from existing labour laws as well. These, inter alia, include

statutes such as the Payment of Wages Act 1936, Equal Remuneration

Act 1976, Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,

33 | P a g e

Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, Juvenile Justice (Care and

Protection of Children) Act, 2015, etc.

51. Be that as it may, we must also acknowledge that recent years have

witnessed certain positive developments aimed at improving the legal

and social status of domestic workers in India. These developments,

while still in their initial stages of implementation, signal recognition of

the need to address the systemic neglect faced by this workforce. In this

regard, reference may be made to the Code on Wages, 2019, which

introduces provisions to address the issue of minimum wages for

domestic workers. Moreover, statutes such as the Social Security Code

of 2020 replace earlier legislation, including the Unorganized Workers’

Social Security Act of 2008, bringing domestic workers within the ambit

of ‘unorganised workers’. This inclusion makes them eligible for various

benefits such as social security, health insurance, provident fund, and

maternity benefits. Further, the introduction of the e-Shram portal in

2021 has facilitated the creation of a centralised database to identify

and register migrant/domestic/unorganised workers, enabling their

access to welfare schemes.

52. It is equally noteworthy that despite the absence of comprehensive

protections for domestic workers through a Central Law, several States

have taken initiatives to safeguard their rights and welfare. Tamil Nadu

established the Tamil Nadu Domestic Workers Welfare Board in 2007

under the Tamil Nadu Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and

Conditions of Work) Act, 1982. The Board administers various social

34 | P a g e

security benefits, including education assistance, marriage assistance,

delivery assistance, accidental death compensation, and pensions.

These benefits are provided through monetary compe nsation at fixed

rates. Maharashtra has enacted the Maharashtra Domestic Workers

Welfare Board Act, 2008, creating District Domestic Labour Welfare

Boards with tripartite representation from employers, employees, and

the government. This Act allows domestic workers to voluntarily

register to access social security benefits, including maternity and child

care, education assistance, and medical expense reimbursement.

Similarly, Kerala introduced the Kerala Domestic Workers (Regulation

and Welfare) Bill, 2021 to protect, regulate, and improve the welfare of

domestic workers. The Bill aims to ensure minimum wages, fair

treatment, and lawful payment for workers, many of whom are

employed through third-party agencies.

53. Amidst this backdrop, which motions the lack of specific protections

covering domestic workers in India, it becomes this Court's solemn

duty and responsibility to intervene, exercise the doctrine of parens

patriae and forge the path leading to their proper welfare. In a catena of

decisions,

11

this Court has repeatedly stepped in and laid down interim

guidelines to protect vulnerable groups who were utterly unprotected

due to legal gaps. That being said, we do not presently deem it

appropriate to lay down an interim legal code which would govern the

11 Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141; M.C. Mehta (2) v. Union of India, (1988) 1

SCC 471; Nilabati Bahera v. State of Orissa, (1993) Cri. LJ 2899; Vishwa Jagriti Mission v.

Central Govt., (2001) 6 SCC 577; Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India, (2011) 4

SCC 454; Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan,

AIR 1997 SC 3011.

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working conditions of domestic workers. We say so, being cognizant of

the factum that ordinarily, the judiciary should not stray too far out of

bounds, and expressly interfere in the legislative domain. The

democratic setup of this country may be likened to a tripartite machine,

fueled by the doctrine of separation of powers, without which it’s

functioning shall surely come to a grinding halt.

54. It is in this vein, that we once again repose our faith in the Legislature,

and the elected representatives of the Indian people, to take the

imperative steps towards ensuring an equitable and dignified life for

domestic workers. In light of the same, we seek to dispose of these

appeals with certain pointed directions to the Government of India.

E. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS

55. In view of the foregoing analysis and conclusions arrived at

hereinabove, we deem it appropriate to invoke this Court’s

extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and

issue the following directions:

i. Ajay Malik’s appeal (SLP (Crl.) No. 8777/2022) is thus allowed and

the Impugned Judgement dated 01.09.2022 passed by High Court

in Criminal Misc. Application No. 96/2018 is accordingly set aside.

Additionally, the FIR No. 60/2017 (Case Crime No. 94/2017),

Chargesheet and all other proceedings therefore arising qua him

are hereby quashed.

36 | P a g e

ii. There is no merit in the appeal preferred by the State against

Ashok Kumar (SLP (Crl.) No. 15131/2024), and it is thus

dismissed. Therefore, the High Court’s order dated 12.01.2021 in

Criminal Revision No. 173/2019 is upheld.

iii. The conclusions drawn in favour of Ajay Malik and Ashok Kumar

shall have no bearing on the criminal proceedings pending against

the other accused, including those who are alleged to have

exploited the Complainant on the pretext of securing her

employment. Those proceedings shall be decided as per their own

merits.

iv. As regard to the larger issue of the protection of rights of domestic

workers, we direct the Ministry of Labour and Employment in

tandem with the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, the

Ministry of Women and Child Development , and the Ministry of

Law and Justice, to jointly constitute a Committee comprising

subject experts to consider the desirability of recommending a

legal framework for the benefit, protection and regulation of the

rights of domestic workers.

v. The composition of the Expert Committee is left to the wisdom of

the Government of India and its concerned Ministries. It will be

appreciated if the Committee submits a Report within a period of 6

months, whereupon the Government of India may consider the

37 | P a g e

necessity of introducing a legal framework which may effectively

address the cause and concern of domestic workers.

56. The present appeals are disposed of in the above terms. Consequently,

pending interlocutory applications, if any, are also disposed of.

57. Ordered accordingly.

…….……………….J.

(SURYA KANT)

..…....……………..J.

(UJJAL BHUYAN)

NEW DELHI

DATED: 29.01.2025