2026 INSC 684 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal Nos. ...................... & ....................... of 2026

(@ SLP (C) Nos . 15817 & 15818 of 2025)

A.K. Ghosh & Company and others … Appellants

versus

Biman Bose and others … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KUMAR, J

1. Leave granted.

2. ‘Does the mandatory time frame prescribed by the proviso to Order

VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, apply to the filing of a

written statement by the plaintiff to a counter-claim raised by the

defendant in a suit governed by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015

1

?’

3. This is the question that presently beseeches decision.

4. By order dated 19.08.2024 in GA (COM) No. 4 of 2024 in CS (COM)

No. 440 of 2024, a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that the

appellants herein, viz., the plaintiffs in the suit, CS (COM) No. 440 of 2024,

1

For short, ‘the CC Act’

2

were not entitled to file their written statement to the counter-claim of the

respondents, viz., defendant Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 in the said suit, after

expiry of the period of 120 days and dismissed their application for leave

to do so. Assailing the said order, the appellants filed an appeal in

AO-COM/35/2024 before a Division Bench (Commercial Division) of the

Calcutta High Court. However, the appeal was dismissed on the ground

of maintainability as well as on its merits, vide order dated 26.02.2025.

In consequence, the appeals on hand.

5. On 23.05.2025, this Court stayed further proceedings in the suit on

the file of the Calcutta High Court.

6. Parties shall be referred to hereinafter as arrayed in the suit.

7. The plaintiffs supplied printing paper to the defendants from time to

time. Disputes having arisen as to payment therefor, the plaintiffs got

issued legal notice dated 16.06.2021, claiming that a sum of ₹74,65,527/-

was payable to them with interest thereon. The defendants denied the

claim by way of letter dated 28.06.2021. The plaintiffs, thereupon, filed a

recovery suit in CS No. 274 of 2022 , which was later renumbered as CS

(COM) No. 440 of 2024 on the file of the Calcutta High Court. D efendant

Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6, viz., the contesting defendants, filed their written

statement in the said suit and raised a counter-claim. Copies of the written

statement and counter-claim were served upon the Advocate-on-Record

for the plaintiffs, under letter dated 18.07.2023.

3

8. However, it was only on 15.03.2024, i.e., after the expiry of 238

days, that the plaintiffs filed an application before the learned Judge

seeking leave to file their written statement to the said counter-claim. The

learned Judge dismissed the application, vide order dated 19.08.2024.

Therein, the learned Judge not ed that, though Order VIII Rule 6A(3) of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), permitted a plaintiff to file a written

statement to a defendant’s counter-claim within such time as may be fixed

by the Court, no such time had been fixed in the case on hand. However,

as Order VIII Rule 6G CPC extended all the rules applicable to the filing

of a written statement by a defendant to the filing of a written statement in

answer to a counter-claim, the learned Judge held that the plaintiffs could

not wriggle out of the time frame fixed under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, as

applicable to a commercial suit. He also noted that Order VIII Rule 10 CPC

visited an embargo upon the Court from receiving a belated written

statement. Reference was also made to Rule 12A of the Original Side

Rules of the High Court, which requires a plaintiff to file a written statement

to a defendant’s counter-claim within 10 days from the date of receipt of

the notice of the filing thereof or such further time as may be allowed. The

learned Judge, accordingly, held that the plaintiffs’ written statement to the

counter-claim was beyond time and dismissed their application.

9. In appeal, the Division Bench noted that the provisions of the CC

Act were stringent with regard to filing of pleadings and, more particularly,

4

a written statement. It was observed that the plaint along with a writ of

summons is served upon a defendant in a suit and, upon such service,

the obligation of that defendant to file a written statement arises and,

similarly, for a reply to a counter-claim which, in effect, partakes the

character of a written statement, upon service of an authenticated copy of

a written statement raising a counter-claim. Per the Bench, the period of

120 days is to be calculated from the date of service of such authenticated

copy of the written statement along with the counter-claim. The Bench

noted that the existing Original Side Rules of the High Court were silent

on the issue of filing of a written statement to a counter-claim and issued

practice directions till appropriate rules were framed. In terms thereof,

after the scrutiny of a counter-claim filed by a defendant in a suit, the

Registry is required to serve notice of such counter -claim along with a

copy thereof on the plaintiff in the said suit or his Advocate-on -Record

within 7 days. Time for filing a written statement by the plaintiff to the

counter-claim was directed to be reckoned from the date on which the

notice along with a copy of the counter-claim is served by the Registry on

the plaintiff or his Advocate, as the case may be. Applying these

standards, the Bench found no merit in the plaintiffs’ appeal. On the

maintainability of the appeal, the Bench noted that an appeal is a creature

of a statute and the CC Act, being a special statute, was a self-contained

code dealing with the specified kinds of commercial disputes. Opining that

5

the right of appeal, when it is provided, is a substantive right, the Bench

referred to case law and held that the appeal by the plaintiffs was not

maintainable. The appeal was, accordingly, dismissed on both grounds.

10. Learned senior counsel, appearing for the plaintiffs, strenuously

contended before us that the stipulated period of 120 days for filing of a

written statement by a defendant cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to

the filing of a written statement by the plaintiff to a counter-claim by the

defendant in a commercial suit. He pointed out that, in the case on hand,

no time frame was fixed by the learned Judge for the filing of the written

statement when the contesting defendants raised their counter-claim and,

in the absence of such a time frame being fixed under Order VIII Rule

6A(3) CPC, he argued that the plaintiffs could not be penalised by denying

them an opportunity to respond to the said counter-claim. He asserted that

the legal position is well settled that a penal provision must be

interpretated strictly against the interest of the party seeking to take

advantage of it and if an alternative interpretation is permissible, a penal

provision must be construed so as to give benefit rather than take it away.

11. On the issue of maintainability of the appeal under Section 13(1A)

of the CC Act, the learned senior counsel contended that the language of

Section 13(2) thereof, which restricts the scope of the remedy of appeal,

could not be interpreted in such a way as to hold that no other order would

be appealable other than those provided for in the CC Act itself. Section

6

13(2), per the learned senior counsel, has to be construed to mean that

all appeals must be in accordance with the provisions of the Act,

notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary in any other law for the

time being in force or in the Letters Patent of the High Court. In effect, his

submission is that the provision only regulates the procedure in relation to

appeals and does not take away the substantive right of appeal. Reliance

was placed upon Nasima Naqi vs. Todi Tea Company Limited and

others

2

to contend that whatever has not been included in a legislation

must be treated as having been excluded by implication and it was argued

that the intention is clear that the statutory prescription of 120 days for

filing a written statement applies only to a defendant in a commercial suit

while the filing of a written statement by a plaintiff in such a suit to a

defendant’s counter-claim is covered by Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC.

12. Per contra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the contesting

defendants asserted that it is not open to the plaintiffs to get over the

statutory mandate in relation to completion of pleadings in a commercial

suit. He contended that the amended Order VIII CPC put it beyond the

pale of doubt that a written statement in response to a counter-claim in a

suit governed by the CC Act also has to abide by the time frame fixed

therein. He pointed out that Order VIII Rule 6G CPC plainly states that the

2

(2019) 1 Cal LT 305 = (2019) 2 Cal LJ 232

7

rules relating to a written statement by a defendant shall apply to a written

statement filed in answer to a counter-claim. In effect, per the learned

senior counsel, the time frame fixed under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC for the

filing of a written statement by the defendant in such a suit would squarely

apply to the filing of a written statement by the plaintiff to a counter -claim

raised by the defendant in that suit.

13. The issue, therefore, turns squarely upon interpretation of the

provisions of Order VIII CPC. Notably, the very concept of a counter-claim

being raised by a defendant in a suit was introduced by the Code of Civil

Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976), with effect from

01.02.1977, by inserting Rule 6A in Order VIII CPC. This reduced

multiplicity of proceedings by allowing a defendant in the suit, if he had an

independent claim of his own against the plaintiff, to raise the same in the

plaintiff’s suit itself, instead of requiring such defendant to institute a

separate suit against such plaintiff. Order VIII Rule 6A(1) CPC states that

a defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under

Order VIII Rule 6 CPC, set up against the plaintiff’s claim, by way of a

counter-claim, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing

to that defendant against the plaintiff, either before or after the filing of the

suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time

limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counter-claim

is in the nature of a claim for damages or not. The proviso thereto

8

stipulates that such a counter-claim should not exceed the pecuniary limits

of the jurisdiction of the Court trying the plaintiff’s suit. Order VIII Rule

6A(2) CPC states that such a counter-claim shall have the same effect as

a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce the final judgment in

the same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim. Order

VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC provides that the plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a

written statement in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within

such period as may be fixed by the Court. Order VIII Rule 6A(4) CPC

states that the counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by

the rules applicable to plaints.

14. Thus, a counter-claim filed by a defendant in a suit is on par with a

plaint, insofar as such defendant’s claim is concerned, and the reply

thereto filed by the plaintiff is nothing other than his written statement in

response thereto. Order VIII Rule 6E CPC is relevant in this regard . It

deals with default of a plaintiff in replying to a counter-claim and states

that, if the plaintiff makes a default in putting in a reply to the counter-claim

made by the defendant, the Court may pronounce judgment against the

plaintiff in relation to the counter-claim made against him or make such

order in relation to the counter-claim as it thinks fit. Order VIII Rule 6G

CPC is also of relevance. Titled ‘Rules relating to written statement to

apply’, it states that the rules relating to a written statement by a defendant

shall apply to a written statement filed in answer to a counter-claim.

9

15. The time for the filing of a written statement by a defendant in a suit

is prescribed by Order VIII Rule 1 CPC. Though Order VIII Rule 1 CPC

was amended by Act 104 of 1976 to an extent, the essence of it remained

the same. It stated that the defendant in a suit shall, at or before the first

hearing or within such time as the Court may permit, present a written

statement of his defence. It was, thus, entirely within the discretion of the

Court to fix the time for filing of a written statement by a defendant.

Thereafter, on amendment of the provision by Act 46 of 1999, it was

envisaged that the defendant shall , at or before the first hearing or within

such time as the Court may permit, which shall not be beyond 30 days

from the service of summons, present a written statement of his defence.

The time frame was, therefore, sought to be severely curtailed by allowing

a maximum of 30 days from the service of summons to file a written

statement. However, the provision was not given effect to and was

substituted by Act 22 of 2002. The Statement of Objects and R easons of

Act 22 of 2002 reflects that , after Act 46 of 1999 was brought out, a large

number of representations were received for and against its enforcement.

The Bar Council of India and other B ar Associations asked for a relook to

be taken at certain provisions thereof, which caused hardship to litigants.

16. The lawmakers, thereupon, made amendments to the Code of Civil

Procedure,1908, by way of Act 22 of 2002 with effect from 01.07.2002.

One such amendment was in relation to the time frame for a defendant to

10

file a written statement. Pursuant thereto, Order VIII Rule 1 CP C required

a defendant in a suit to file a written statement ordinarily within 30 days

from the date of service of summons but the proviso thereto stated that,

where the defendant failed to file a written statement within 30 days, he

shall be allowed to file the same on such other day as may be specified

by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be

later than 90 days from the date of service of summons. In effect, a

defendant normally had to file a written statement with in 30 days from the

service of summons but the Court’s discretion to extend the time to do so,

recording reasons therefor, increased to 90 days from 30 days.

17. While so, Order VIII Rule 1 CPC was made more stringent in suits

relating to commercial disputes of specified value governed by the CC Act.

Section 16 of the CC Act, read with the Schedule thereto, substituted the

proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC in the context of such suits. It states that

where the defendant fails to file a written statement within 30 days from

the service of summons, he may be allowed, for reasons to be recorded

in writing and on payment of such costs as the Court deems fit, to file a

written statement on such other day as may be specified by the Court, but

which shall not be later than 120 day s from the date of service of summons

and on the expiry of 120 days from the date of service of summons, the

defendant shall forfeit the right to file a written statement and the Court

shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record.

11

18. In the light of the aforestated proviso , if a defendant in a commercial

suit fails to file a written statement within 120 days, it is not open to such

defendant to put forth a plea, even if genuine, and seek to file a written

statement beyond the said period. This was made clear by this Court in

SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited vs. K.S. Chamankar

Infrastructure Private Limited and others

3

, wherein it was held that

failure to file a written statement within the extended period of 120 days

from the date of service of the summons on the defendant would entail

forfeiture of the right to file a written statement and the Court cannot allow

a written statement to be taken on record after the said date, even if the

defendant was engaged in pursuing an application under Order VII Rule

11 CPC for rejection of the plaint.

19. The question, presently, is whether such a strict time frame would

apply to the filing of a written statement by a plaintiff to the counter-claim

of the defendant in a commercial suit. We may also take note of Order VIII

Rule 9 CPC, which is titled ‘Subsequent pleadings’. It states that no

pleading subsequent to the written statement of a defendant other than by

way of defence to a set-off or counter-claim shall be presented except by

the leave of the Court and upon such terms as the Court thinks fit, but the

Court may at any time require a written statement or additional written

statement from any of the parties and fix a time for presenting the same.

3

(2019) 12 SCC 210

12

It may be noted that the words ‘or counter-claim’ were inserted in the

above provision by Act 104 of 1976 with effect from 01.02.1977.

Thereafter, by way of Act 46 of 1999, it was proposed to altogether omit

Order VIII Rule 9 CPC. However, in the light of the representations

received, Act 22 of 2002 was brought in, with effect from 01.07.2002,

whereby the earlier provision remained but for the addition that the Court’s

power and discretion to require a written statement or additional written

statement from any of the parties was restricted, by limiting the fixing of

time therefor to not more than 30 days. Therefore, even prior to the

enactment of the CC Act, the endeavour of the lawmakers was to cut down

on delays to the extent possible.

20. Significantly, Order VIII Rule 10 CPC categorically states that if a

party, from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9

of Order VIII CPC, fails to present the same within the time permitted or

fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court is entitled to pronounce

judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks

fit and on the pronouncement of such judgment, a decree shall be drawn

up. The proviso thereto has application to commercial suits governed by

the CC Act and mandates that no Court shall extend time for filing a written

statement, beyond the permissible limit under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC.

21. We find that some of the High Courts have taken a rather liberal

view on the issue of delayed filing of a written statement to a defendant’s

13

counter-claim. In Nirottam Sharma vs. Ramkishore and another

4

, a

learned Judge of the Rajasthan High Court held that the Trial Court was

duty bound to fix the time under Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC for a plaintiff

to file a written statement to a counter-claim and if, within that time, the

plaintiff failed to file his reply, Order VIII Rule 6E would come into

operation. As the Trial Court had not fixed such time in that case, the

learned Judge directed it to grant further time to the plaintiff to file his reply

to the counter-claim within such time as it may fix.

22. In CSCO LLC and an other vs. Lakshmi Saraswathi Spintex

Limited and others

5

, a learned Judge of the Madras High Court had

occasion to consider delay of 563 days in the filing of a written statement

to a counter-claim. In that case, the written statement of the defendants

was itself filed with a delay of 113 days along with a counter-claim. The

application for condonation of that delay was allowed by the Trial Court

and stood confirmed in appeal. The matter was then carried to this Court

and was pending consideration. At that stage, the plaintiffs in the suit filed

a written statement to the counter-claim with a delay of 563 days. The

learned Judge referred to Nirottam Sharma (supra) and observed that,

even in the case before him, no time had been fixed for the plaintiffs to file

a written statement to the counter -claim and, therefore, it could not be said

4

SB Civil WP No. 18024 of 2016, decided on 07.02.2018

5

Appl No. 4791 of 2021 in CS No. 697 of 2017, decided on 28.01.2022

14

that the default lay with them. The learned Judge opined that the law laid

down in SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited (supra) would not apply

to a written statement to be filed by a plaintiff to the counter-claim made

by a defendant and such cases would be governed only by the time fixed

by the Court under Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC. H e, however, hastened to

add that, while fixing such a time frame, the outer limit of 120 days fixed

for a defendant must be kept in mind. On facts, the learned Judge

observed that as the matter was pending before this Court in relation to

condonation of the delay in the filing of the written statement along with a

counter-claim, reasonable cause had been shown by the plaintiffs for filing

a written statement to the counter-claim with delay. The learned Judge,

accordingly, condoned the delay.

23. In Dattaram Krishnanath Pednekar and others vs. Pandurang

K. Pednekar and o thers

6

, a learned Judge of the Bombay High Court

followed the earlier decision of that Court in Mrs. S halini Nunes

Mascarenhas vs. Mr. Trevor Nunes

7

, wherein it was held that filing of a

written statement to a counter-claim is not covered by Order VIII Rule 1

CPC but is governed by Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC. The learned Judge

held that, in terms of the said provision, the Trial Court is expected to fix a

time frame for the filing of a written statement to the counter-claim. He

6

2010 (7) Mh.L.J.386

7

2009 (2) Goa LR 222

15

opined that Order VIII Rule 6G CPC had no bearing on Order VIII Rule

6A(3) CPC as it only refers to the contents of a written statement and had

nothing to do with the time for filing of a written statement in answer to a

counter-claim under Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC.

24. In Indcon Boiler Ltd. vs. Maeda Corporation India and o thers

8

,

a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court dealt with delay in the filing of a

written statement to a counter-claim. The learned Juge observed that, in

the case of a counter-claim, the plaintiff may accept the summons in the

Court itself when it is presented but the order has to specifically record

that the counter-claim has been registered and the service of summons is

affected and it is only then that the time for the plaintiff to file a written

statement to the counter-claim begins to run. However, on facts, the

learned Judge found that the suit had originally been instituted in the High

Court and was then transferred to the District Court, but the counter-claim

was never registered. At that stage, the CC Act was notified and the

plaintiff failed to file a written statement to the counter-claim owing to the

prevailing confusion. The learned Judge, accordingly, permitted the

plaintiff to file a written statement to the counter-claim of the defendants,

subject to payment of costs. This case, therefore, turned on its own

individual facts.

8

CM (M) 767/2019 & CM APPL. 23274/2019, d ecided on 17.09.2019

16

25. In Nasima Naqi (supra), a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court

was dealing with interpretation of the provisions of a rent control

legislation. In that context, the learned Judge observed that when a statute

mentions only one out of more than one, it necessarily implies that the

others are excluded for that purpose. This observation was made in the

context of a spouse of an original tenant being included in the substantive

provision but being excluded from the second proviso thereto, whereupon,

the learned Judge held that the interpretation has perforce to be that the

spouse has not been conferred the right recognised in the second proviso .

This decision was affirmed by this Court in Nasima Naqi vs. Todi Tea

Company Limited and others

9

and this Court observed that the High

Court was correct in observing that this was a case of ‘casus omissus’ on

the part of the legislature.

26. It would be useful, at this stage, to refer to the Statement of Objects

and Reasons of the CC Act to understand why the proviso to Order VIII

Rule 1 CPC reads as it does in the context of a commercial suit. The

Statement records that the proposal to provide for speedy disposal of high

value commercial disputes had been under consideration of the

Government for some time and that there was a need to provide for an

independent mechanism for such early resolution. It was opined that early

resolution of commercial disputes would create a positive image to the

9

(2023) 17 SCC 641

17

investor world about an independent and responsive Indian legal system.

Upon the Law Commission ’s recommendations, the Commercial Courts,

Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division in High Courts

Ordinance, 2015, was promulgated on 23.10.2015. Replacing the said

Ordinance, the CC Act provided for constitution of Commercial Courts as

well as Commercial Divisions and Commercial Appellate Divisions in the

High Courts. The CC Act also amended the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908, in its application to Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions

and the amended provisions were to prevail over the existing High Courts’

Rules and other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, so as to

improve efficiency and reduce delays in disposal of commercial cases.

27. This being the objective of the entire exercise, it would be

counterproductive to construe the provisions of Order VIII CPC in a

manner which would contribute to further delays instead of cutting them

down. We may note that Order VIII Rule 1 CPC in its application to a

regular suit ordinarily requires the filing of the written statement within 30

days from the date of service of summons and it is only by way of

exception that a defendant who fails to do so, is allowed by the proviso

thereto to file a written statement within a further period, if sufficient cause

is shown for the delay and the Court, upon recording reasons in writing,

extends the time to do so, but within 90 days from the date of service of

summons. The proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC was amended in its

18

application to a commercial suit, so as to provide more time to a defendant

therein, when compared to a regular suit, but with the caveat that in the

event such defendant did not file a written statement within the extended

period of 120 days, on payment of the costs imposed, the very right to file

a written statement would stand forfeited with no possibility of turning the

clock back. The proviso to Order VIII Rule 10 CPC emphasizes this by

affirming that no Court shall make an order to extend the time provided

under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC for filing of the written statement. Logically,

similar time constraints have to be applied to filing of a written statement

by a plaintiff in such a suit to a counter-claim raised by a defendant therein

so as to maintain a strict time schedule to facilitate prompt disposal of

such suit. Order VIII Rule 6G CPC achieves that purpose.

28. We, therefore, do not agree with the view taken by the Bombay High

Court that the ‘rules’ referred to in Order VIII Rule 6G CPC only relate to

the contents of a written statement to a counter-claim and have nothing to

do with the time limit for filing of such written statement. The phrasing of

Order VIII Rule 6G does not allow for any such restriction being read into

the provision. It unequivocally speaks of application of the rules relating to

a written statement by a defendant to a written statement that is to be filed

in answer to a counter-claim also. In the context of a commercial suit

governed by the CC Act, designed for quicker resolution of commercial

disputes, extending the strict temporal requirement relating to the filing of

19

a written statement by a defendant to the filing of a written statement to a

counter-claim is rational, as it achieves the same purpose, viz., speedy

and timely completion of the pleadings in the suit so as to enable its faster

disposal. Therefore, the distinction that was drawn between the filing of a

written statement by a defendant in a commercial suit, in terms of the

proviso under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, and a written statement that is to be

filed by a plaintiff to such a defendant’s counter-claim, by subjecting it only

to Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC would defeat the very aim of amending the

proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC in its application to commercial suits.

29. On the same lines, the Madras High Court had held that Order VIII

Rule 6A(3) CPC mandates that the Court must specifically pass an order,

while taking a counter-claim on file, for summons to be served on the

plaintiff or if the plaintiff is represented by counsel, directing such counsel

to accept summons on behalf of the plaintiff and fix the time for filing a

written statement to the counter-claim. According to the High Court, the

clock would start ticking only when the Court fixes the time for filing such

a written statement. However, this view of the High Court would mean that,

in the event the Court fails to fix such time, the plaintiff is left free to devise

his own time schedule to file such a written statement. This, obviously,

could not have been the intendment of the statute. As we have noted

earlier, amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, even prior to

the enactment of the CC Act, were directed at truncating the delays in civil

20

proceedings so as to cut short the time taken for resolution of civil

disputes. Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC, no doubt, enables the Court to fix

the time for the plaintiff to file a written statement to a counter-claim, but

in the absence of time being fixed thereunder, Rule 6G of Order VIII kicks

in and applies the proviso to Rule 1 thereof so as to set the temporal outer

limit, beyond which such a written statement cannot be filed. To interpret

the provisions otherwise would render one or the other unworkable apart

from doing violence to the aims of the CC Act.

30. Further, the Madras High Court h ad also noted that the proviso to

Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, in its application to a commercial suit under the

CC Act, only referred to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC but not Order VIII Rule 9

CPC, though both find mention in Order VIII Rule 10 . The High Court

opined that, as the proviso mentioned Rule 1 and not Rule 9 of Order VIII

CPC, the time frame fixed under Rule 9 thereof can be extended by a

Court for filing a written statement in appropriate cases and the total bar

imposed under Rule 1 would not be applicable to a written statement to a

set-off/counter-claim or the written statement/additional written statement,

called for by the Court. This construction of the provision is also incorrect.

Be it noted that a written statement to a set-off/counter claim does not

come within the ambit of the ‘subsequent pleadings’ covered by Order VIII

Rule 9 CPC, as it explicitly excepts the filing of a defence to a set-off or

counter-claim which, in consequence, would not need the leave of the

21

Court, and states to the effect that no ‘other’ pleading shall be filed without

the leave of the Court. This, obviously, refers to filing of a rejoinder and

sur-rejoinder by the parties, which requires prior leave of the Court .

31. Rule 9 of Order VIII CPC also empowers the Court to independently

require a written statement from a defendant, who has not filed one, or an

additional written statement from a defendant, who has filed one, if the

Court deems it necessary. However, this power also came to be controlled

when Order VIII Rule 9 CPC was substituted by Act 22 of 2002,

specifically adding the maximum time frame of not more than 30 days

when the Court itself calls for a written statement or additional written

statement. The scheme and structure of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908, as is evident from the many amendments that it has undergone, is

aimed at simplifying processes by fixing time frames for necessary steps

to be taken. Such time frames have been made tighter in the context of

commercial suits governed by the CC Act and any interpretation to the

contrary would defeat the very purpose of that enactment.

32. Read together, the scheme of the provisions is that the Court may,

in the first instance, fix a time frame for filing of a written statement to a

counter-claim, under Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC. Such time may be

extended, by way of an application at the behest of the plaintiff under the

proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC read with Rule 6G thereof, or by the

Court itself under Order VIII Rule 9 CPC. However, in the former case, the

22

discretion of the Court to grant more time, subject to recording of reasons

and payment of costs, would extend to a maximum of 120 days from the

date of service of the summons/receipt of the counter-claim, but in the

latter case, when the Court itself calls for a written statement without the

party seeking to do so, the time to be fixed by the Court therefor is shorter,

i.e., just 30 days, within the permissible outer limit of 120 days from the

date of service of the summons. Order VIII Rule 10 CPC speaks of the

consequences that would follow if these time lines are not abided by and

honoured, in terms of pronouncement of a judgment followed by a decree.

The proviso thereto merely puts emphasis on the point that the Court

cannot extend the time under Rule 1 of Order VIII CPC beyond the

permissible limit in a commercial suit governed by the CC Act. This,

however, does not mean that the time frame fixed under Order VIII Rule 9

CPC stands diluted, as the adverse consequences that are to follow upon

breach thereof still remain intact in Order VIII Rule 10 CPC.

33. Viewed thus, we answer the question posed in the affirmative. A

plaintiff in a commercial suit, governed by the CC Act, is bound by the

mandate of the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, as applicable to a

commercial suit, and must file a written statement to a counter-claim by a

defendant therein, ordinarily within 30 days from the date of service of

summons or receipt of the counter-claim, and in the event a plaintiff fails

to file such a written statement within that time but offers sufficient cause

23

for the delay, the Court may extend the time to do so, for reasons to be

recorded in writing and upon payment of appropriate costs, but not beyond

120 days from the date of service of summons upon the plaintiff/receipt of

the counter-claim by the plaintiff.

34. As regards the issue of maintainability of the appeal filed before the

Division Bench of the High Court, we may note that Section 13 in Chapter

IV of the CC Act deals with appeals. Section 13(1) states that any person

aggrieved by the judgment or order of a Commercial Court below the level

of a District Judge may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Court within

a period of 60 days from the date of the judgment or order. Section 13(1A)

provides that any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a

Commercial Court at the level of the District Judge, exercising original civil

jurisdiction or, as the case may be, a Commercial Division of a High Court,

may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of that High Court within

a similar time frame. However, the proviso to Section 13(1A) stipulates

that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed by a Commercial Division

or a Commercial Court that are specifically enumerated under Order XLIII

of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as amended by the CC Act, and

Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 13(2),

starting with a non -obstante clause, emphasises this point. It states that,

notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in

force or the Letters Patent of a High Court, no appeal shall lie from any

24

order or decree of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court otherwise

than in accordance with the provisions of the CC Act.

35. Dealing with the scheme of Section 13 in BGS SGS SOMA JV vs.

NHPC Limited

10

, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that Section

13(1) of the CC Act must be construed in accordance with the object

sought to be achieved by the said Act and construction of Section 13

which would lead to further delay, instead of an expeditious enforcement

of a foreign arbitral award must, therefore, be eschewed. It was further

observed that there is no independent right of appeal created under

Section 13(1) of the CC Act, which merely provides the forum for filing the

appeal and parameters of Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, 1996, alone had to be looked at in order to determine whether the

appeal in that case was maintainable. The Bench held that an appeal is a

creature of statute and must be found within the four corners of the statute.

36. In Kandla Export Corporation and another vs. OCI Corporation

and another

11

, this Court considered the question as to whether an

appeal which is not maintainable under Section 50 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, would nonetheless be maintainable under Section

13(1) of the CC Act. Answering this question in the negative, this Court

held that Section 13(1) of the CC Act is in two parts - the main provision,

10

(2020) 4 SCC 234

11

(2018) 14 SCC 715

25

which provides for an appeal from a judgment, order and decree of the

Commercial Division of the High Court and, to this main provision, an

exception that has been carved out by the proviso. We may note that, in

this case, the unamended Section 13 of the CC Act, which was then titled

‘The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate

Division of High Courts Act, 2015’ , was under consideration. Section 13 ,

as it then stood, read as under:-

“(1) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Commercial Court or

Commercial Division of a High Court may appeal to the Commercial

Appellate Division of that High Court within a period of sixty days from

the date of judgment or order, as the case may be:

Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed by a

Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are specifically

enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of

1908) as amended by this Act and section 37 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996).”

As the proviso, which remains unchanged, restricted the appellate

jurisdiction under Section 13 of the CC Act to only those orders that are

specifically enumerated under Order XLIII CPC and Section 37 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this Court held that orders that were

not specifically enumerated thereunder would not be amenable to appeal.

This Court opined that where a special Act sets out a self-contained code,

applicability of the general law would be impliedly excluded.

37. In the light of the above statutory scheme and the decisions of this

Court referred to hereinabove, it is clear that an appeal would lie under

Section 13(1A) only if the order sought to be appealed against finds

26

mention either in Order XLIII CPC or Section 37 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996. As an order passed under Order VIII CPC is not

appealable under Order XLIII CPC, the question of the plaintiffs

maintaining an appeal against the order of the learned Judge denying

them leave to file a belated written statement to the counter-claim raised

by the contesting defendants does not arise. Thus, the Division Bench

committed no error in holding that the appeal, apart from being devoid of

merit, was not even maintainable.

38. We, therefore, find that the learned Judge and the Division Bench of

the High Court were fully justified in rejecting the plea of the plaintiffs to

grant them leave to file their written statement to the counter-claim raised

by the contesting defendants, notwithstanding the long delay on their part.

The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

Interim order dated 23.05.2025 shall stand vacated.

Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand dismissed .

Parties shall bear their own costs.

..............................., J.

SANJAY KUMAR

..............................., J.

K. VINOD CHANDRAN

July 13, 2026

New Delhi.