Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

RESERVED ON : 30.09.2026

PRONOUNCED ON: .10.2026

CORAM

THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S.KARTHIKEYAN

CRL A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

CNR:{HCMD011313972026}

Alagar @ Alagesan @ Kedi

..Appellant/Petitioner/4th accused

Vs

1.The State of Tamil Nadu rep by

The Deputy Superintendent of Police,

Othakadai Zone,

Madurai District.

(Crime No.123/2026)

2.The State of Tamil Nadu,

Rep by The Inspector of Police,

Othakkadai Zone,

Madurai District.

3.P.Stalin

..Respondent(s)

PRAYER:This Criminal Appeal has been filed under Section 14-A(2) of

SC/ST (PoA) Act, 2015, to call for the records in Crl.M.P.No.418 of 2016 on

the file of the learned III Additional District Judge for PCR Cases, Madurai and

set aside the order dated 09.09.2026 and release the appellant on bail.

For Appellant : Thiruvadi Kumar.A

For Respondent : Mr.A.Robinson

Government Advocate (Criminal Side)

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

JUDGMENT

This Criminal Appeal has been filed against the order of declining bail by

the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Madurai in

Crl.M.P.No.418 of 2026 in Crime No.123 of 2026 by order dated 09.09.2026.

2. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was

arrested and remanded to judicial custody on 14.04.2026 in connection with

Crime No.123 of 2026, pending on the file of the second respondent, for the

alleged offences punishable under Sections 103, 109, 126(2), 191(2), 191(3),

296(b) of BNS @ Sections 103, 109, 126(2), 191(2), 191(3), 296(b) of BNS and

Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act. Even after the completion of 90

days from the date of remand, the respondent police had not filed the charge

sheet and therefore, the appellant had filed an application seeking statutory bail

under Section 187(3) of the BNSS. The co-accused had also filed a similar

petition. Though the petition filed by the appellant was returned on certain

grounds, the petition filed by the co-accused was considered and they were

granted statutory bail. Subsequently, the appellant filed a petition seeking

regular bail before the Trial Court in Crl.M.P.No.329 of 2026, which came to be

dismissed by the trial Court by order dated 05.08.2026. Aggrieved by the same,

the appellant has preferred an appeal before this Court in Crl.A(MD) No.969 of

2026, in which, the appellant stated that he wants to pursue the remedy before

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

the Trial Court seeking for mandatory bail in the light of the decision of the

Hon'ble Apex Court in Sanjay Dutt Vs. State through C.B.I, Bombay, reported

in (1995) 5 SCC 410. Thereafter, the appellant has re-presented the petition for

statutory bail which was came to be dismissed by the Trial Court by the

impugned order, dated 09.09.2026 on the ground that after filing of the charge

sheet, the mandatory bail application is not maintainable.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the said course of

action adopted by the Trial Court is directly against the dictum laid down by the

Hon’ble Apex Court. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the

right to claim the mandatory bail accrues on 60

th

or 90

th

day when the

investigation agency failed to file the final report. The said right of the accused

is an indefeasible right which cannot be taken away subsequently by filing the

final report. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the

Hon'ble Apex Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs. State of Assam reported in

(2017) 15 SCC 67. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that

the date relevant for computation is the date of filing of application and not the

date of taking cognizance by the Court. He relied on the judgment of Hon'ble

Apex Court in Sarah Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio-Vascular Diseases by its

Director Dr.K.M.Cherian and others, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 62.

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

4. He further contended that no written application is necessary for

seeking statutory bail and that even an oral application is sufficient. In support

of the said contention, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the

decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bikramjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab,

reported in (2020) 10 SCC 616.

5. He also relied upon the decision of this Court in K.Muthirul Vs.

Inspector of Police, Samayapuram Police Station, Madurai District, reported

in 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 17811 to say the indefeasible right to default bail

under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is an integral part of the right to personal liberty

guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that the said right

to bail cannot be suspended even during a pandemic situation.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant further relied upon the decision

of this Court in Rahim Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, represented by the Inspector

of Police, Thalamuthunagar Police Station, Thoothukudi District, in Crl.O.P.

(MD) No.1517 of 2026, dated 30.03.2026, wherein it was held that even if the

bail application and the charge sheet were filed on the same day, the

indefeasible right of the accused to seek statutory bail will not get lost.

Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the Trial Court

erred in holding that the application for statutory bail is not maintainable.

Hence, he prayed for setting aside the impugned order and for enlarging the

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

appellant on bail, with or without conditions.

7. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) submitted that it is

a case of double murder. The appellant has five previous cases. The appellant

has already approached this Hon'ble Court in Crl.O.P(MD) No.12570 of 2026,

wherein this Court has declined to grant bail to the appellant. Further, though

the appellant has claimed that he filed an application under Section 183 of the

BNSS seeking statutory bail, the said application was returned and he has not

pursued the said application thereafter. Subsequent to the return of the said

application, the prosecution has filed the final report and therefore, the

indefeasible right, whatever accrued, is lost. Apart from that, the petitioner has

again filed a regular bail application. It was declined by the trial court.

Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the appellant has approached this Court by

way of appeal in Crl.A(MD) No.969 of 2026 and he withdrew the said

application on 24.08.2026.

8. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) further submitted

that though the co-accused were granted bail, they were granted statutory bail

due to the non filing of the final report before the court. Now, the right of the

appellant to file a statutory bail application is lost. Therefore, according to the

learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side), the trial court rightly rejected

the application as not maintainable. Therefore, he prays for dismissal of the

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

present appeal.

9. This Court has given its thoughtful consideration to the rival

submissions put forth by either side. On careful perusal of the records, it is

found that the appellant herein was arrested on 14.04.2026 in connection with

Crime No.123 of 2026, pending on the file of the second respondent, for the

offences punishable under Sections 103, 109, 126(2), 191(2), 191(3), 296(b) of

BNS @ Sections 103, 109, 126(2), 191(2), 191(3), 296(b) of BNS and Sections

3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act. From the submission of the learned

counsel for the appellant, it is found that the appellant herein has filed an

application before the trial court seeking mandatory bail under Section 187(3)(i)

of the BNSS and on 17.07.2026, the said application was returned for certain

defects. The said defect was not rectified and represented immediately.

However, the co-accused were granted mandatory bail by the trial court.

10. Thereafter, this appellant has moved for regular bail, it was declined

by the trial court. Challenging the said order, the appellant has preferred the

appeal in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.969 of 2026, and the same was

subsequently withdrawn on 24.08.2026. Only thereafter, the appellant had re-

presented the mandatory bail application on 25.08.2026, which was originally

filed on 17.07.2026,. In the meantime, the final report was filed on the 92

nd

day

from 17.07.2026. Therefore, the trial court has held that the application is not

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

maintainable.

11. However, the learned counsel for the appellant contended before this

Court that insofar as mandatory bail is concerned, no written application is

necessary; even an oral application is sufficient. In this connection, he relied on

the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs. State of

Assam reported in (2017) 15 SCC 67. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the said

decision has held as follows:

“Procedure for obtaining default bail

40. In the present case, it was also argued by learned counsel for the State

(1996) 1 SCC 722 that the petitioner did not apply for ‘default bail’ on or

after 4

th

January, 2017 till 24

th

January, 2017 on which date his indefeasible

right got extinguished on the filing of the charge sheet. Strictly speaking this

is correct since the petitioner applied for regular bail on 11

th

January, 2017

in the Gauhati High Court – he made no specific application for grant of

‘default bail’. However, the application for regular bail filed by the accused

on 11

th

January, 2017 did advert to the statutory period for filing a charge

sheet having expired and that perhaps no charge sheet had in fact being

filed. In any event, this issue was argued by learned counsel for the

petitioner in the High Court and it was considered but not accepted by the

High Court. The High Court did not reject the submission on the ground of

maintainability but on merits. Therefore it is not as if the petitioner did not

make any application for default bail – such an application was definitely

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

made (if not in writing) then at least orally before the High Court. In our

opinion, in matters of personal liberty, we cannot and should not be too

technical and must lean in favour of personal liberty. Consequently, whether

the accused makes a written application for ‘default bail’ or an oral

application for ‘default bail’ is of no consequence. The concerned court must

deal with such an application by considering the statutory requirements

namely, whether the statutory period for filing a charge sheet or challan has

expired, whether the charge sheet or challan has been filed and whether the

accused is prepared to and does furnish bail.”

12. In view of the above decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is found

that in the matter of personal liberty, the Court should not adopt hyper

technicality and it should lean in favour of personal liberty. Therefore, even

though the application for default bail was returned, the trial court ought to have

considered that the appellant had applied for statutory bail on the expiry of the

statutory period, that is, the 92

nd

day from the date of his arrest. Only thereafter,

the final report was filed before the trial court. Since the appellant had applied

for statutory bail even before the filing of the final report, this Court is of the

considered view that the indefeasible right accrued to the appellant on his filing

of the petition.

13. Once the indefeasible right is accrued, as submitted by the learned

counsel for the appellant, the subsequent filing of the final report will not take

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away the said indefeasible right already accrued to the appellant. The Hon'ble

Apex Court in Bikramjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2020) 10 SCC

616 has held as follows:

“29. The question as to whether default bail can be granted once a

charge sheet is filed was authoritatively dealt with in a decision of a

Three Judge Bench of this Court in Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State

of Maharashtra (2001) 5 SCC 453. The majority judgment of G.B.

Pattanaik, J. reviewed the decisions of this Court and in particular the

enigmatic expression “if already not availed of” in Sanjay Dutt

(supra). The Court then held:

“13.…The crucial question that arises for consideration,

therefore, is what is the true meaning of the expression “if

already not availed of”? Does it mean that an accused files

an application for bail and offers his willingness for being

released on bail or does it mean that a bail order must be

passed, the accused must furnish the bail and get him

released on bail? In our considered opinion it would be

more in consonance with the legislative mandate to hold

that an accused must be held to have availed of his

indefeasible right, the moment he files an application for

being released on bail and offers to abide by the terms and

conditions of bail. To interpret the expression “availed of”

to mean actually being released on bail after furnishing the

necessary bail required would cause great injustice to the

accused and would defeat the very purpose of the proviso to

Section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and further

would make an illegal custody to be legal, inasmuch as after

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the expiry of the stipulated period the Magistrate had no

further jurisdiction to remand and such custody of the

accused is without any valid order of remand. That apart,

when an accused files an application for bail indicating his

right to be released as no challan had been filed within the

specified period, there is no discretion left in the Magistrate

and the only thing he is required to find out is whether the

specified period under the statute has elapsed or not, and

whether a challan has been filed or not. If the expression

“availed of” is interpreted to mean that the accused must

factually be released on bail, then in a given case where the

Magistrate illegally refuses to pass an order

notwithstanding the maximum period stipulated in Section

167 had expired, and yet no challan had been filed then the

accused could only move to the higher forum and while the

matter remains pending in the higher forum for

consideration, if the prosecution files a charge-sheet then

also the so-called right accruing to the accused because of

inaction on the part of the investigating agency would get

frustrated. Since the legislature has given its mandate it

would be the bounden duty of the court to enforce the same

and it would not be in the interest of justice to negate the

same by interpreting the expression “if not availed of” in a

manner which is capable of being abused by the

prosecution. A two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in

State of M.P. v. Rustam [1995 Supp (3) SCC 221 : 1995

SCC (Cri) 830] setting aside the order of grant of bail by

the High Court on a conclusion that on the date of the order

the prosecution had already submitted a police report and,

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therefore, the right stood extinguished, in our considered

opinion, does not express the correct position in law of the

expression “if already not availed of”, used by the

Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt [(1994) 5 SCC 410 :

1994 SCC (Cri) 1433]…In the aforesaid premises, we are of

the considered opinion that an accused must be held to have

availed of his right flowing from the legislative mandate

engrafted in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of

the Code if he has filed an application after the expiry of the

stipulated period alleging that no challan has been filed and

he is prepared to offer the bail that is ordered, and it is

found as a fact that no challan has been filed within the

period prescribed from the date of the arrest of the accused.

In our view, such interpretation would subserve the purpose

and the object for which the provision in question was

brought on to the statute-book. In such a case, therefore,

even if the application for consideration of an order of being

released on bail is posted before the court after some length

of time, or even if the Magistrate refuses the application

erroneously and the accused moves the higher forum for

getting a formal order of being released on bail in

enforcement of his indefeasible right, then filing of challan

at that stage will not take away the right of the accused.

Personal liberty is one of the cherished objects of the Indian

Constitution and deprivation of the same can only be in

accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions

thereof, as stipulated under Article 21 of the Constitution.

When the law provides that the Magistrate could authorise

the detention of the accused in custody up to a maximum

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period as indicated in the proviso to sub-section (2) of

Section 167, any further detention beyond the period

without filing of a challan by the investigating agency would

be a subterfuge and would not be in accordance with law

and in conformity with the provisions of the Criminal

Procedure Code, and as such, could be violative of Article

21 of the Constitution. There is no provision in the Criminal

Procedure Code authorising detention of an accused in

custody after the expiry of the period indicated in proviso to

sub-section (2) of Section 167 excepting the contingency

indicated in Explanation I, namely, if the accused does not

furnish the bail…But so long as the accused files an

application and indicates in the application to offer bail on

being released by appropriate orders of the court then the

right of the accused on being released on bail cannot be

frustrated on the off chance of the Magistrate not being

available and the matter not being moved, or that the

Magistrate erroneously refuses to pass an order and the

matter is moved to the higher forum and a challan is filed in

interregnum. This is the only way how a balance can be

struck between the so-called indefeasible right of the

accused on failure on the part of the prosecution to file a

challan within the specified period and the interest of the

society, at large, in lawfully preventing an accused from

being released on bail on account of inaction on the part of

the prosecuting agency. On the aforesaid premises, we

would record our conclusions as follows:

3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days,

as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

of the accused for being released on bail on account of

default by the investigating agency in the completion of the

investigation within the period prescribed and the accused

is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and

furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate.

6. The expression “if not already availed of” used by this

Court in Sanjay Dutt case [(1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC

(Cri) 1433] must be understood to mean when the accused

files an application and is prepared to offer bail on being

directed. In other words, on expiry of the period specified

in para (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167

if the accused files an application for bail and offers also

to furnish the bail on being directed, then it has to be held

that the accused has availed of his indefeasible right even

though the court has not considered the said application

and has not indicated the terms and conditions of bail, and

the accused has not furnished the same.”

32. Also, in Syed Mohd. Ahmad Kazmi v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

(2012) 12 SCC 1, Section 43-D of the UAPA came up for

consideration before the Court, in particular the proviso which

extends the period for investigation beyond 90 days up to a period of

180 days. An application for default bail had been made on

17.07.2012, as no charge sheet was filed within a period of 90 days of

the appellant’s custody. The charge sheet in the aforesaid case was

filed thereafter on 31.07.2012. Despite the fact that this application

was not taken up for hearing before the filing of the charge sheet, this

Court held that this since an application for default bail had been filed

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prior to the filing of the charge sheet the “indefeasible right” spoken

of earlier had sprung into action, as a result of which default bail had

to be granted. The Court held:

“25. Having carefully considered the submissions made on

behalf of the respective parties, the relevant provisions of

law and the decision cited, we are unable to accept the

submissions advanced on behalf of the State by the learned

Additional Solicitor General Mr Raval. There is no denying

the fact that on 17-7-2012, when CR No. 86 of 2012 was

allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge and the custody of

the appellant was held to be illegal and an application

under Section 167(2) CrPC was made on behalf of the

appellant for grant of statutory bail which was listed for

hearing. Instead of hearing the application, the Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate adjourned the same till the next

day when the Public Prosecutor filed an application for

extension of the period of custody and investigation and on

20-7-2012 extended the time of investigation and the

custody of the appellant for a further period of 90 days with

retrospective effect from 2-6-2012. Not only is the

retrospectivity of the order of the Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate untenable, it could not also defeat the statutory

right which had accrued to the appellant on the expiry of 90

days from the date when the appellant was taken into

custody. Such right, as has been commented upon by this

Court in Sanjay Dutt [(1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri)

1433] and the other cases cited by the learned Additional

Solicitor General, could only be distinguished (sic

extinguished) once the charge-sheet had been filed in the

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

case and no application has been made prior thereto for

grant of statutory bail. It is well-established that if an

accused does not exercise his right to grant of statutory bail

before the charge-sheet is filed, he loses his right to such

benefit once such charge-sheet is filed and can, thereafter,

only apply for regular bail.

26. The circumstances in this case, however, are different in

that the appellant had exercised his right to statutory bail on

the very same day on which his custody was held to be

illegal and such an application was left undecided by the

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate till after the application filed

by the prosecution for extension of time to complete

investigation was taken up and orders were passed

thereupon.

27. We are unable to appreciate the procedure adopted by

the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, which has been

endorsed by the High Court and we are of the view that the

appellant acquired the right for grant of statutory bail on 17

7-2012, when his custody was held to be illegal by the

Additional Sessions Judge since his application for statutory

bail was pending at the time when the application for

extension of time for continuing the investigation was filed

by the prosecution. In our view, the right of the appellant to

grant of statutory bail remained unaffected by the

subsequent application and both the Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate and the High Court erred in holding otherwise.”

33. In a fairly recent judgment reported as Rakesh Kumar Paul v.

State of Assam (2017) 15 SCC 67, a Three-Judge Bench of this Court

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referred to the earlier decisions of this Court and went one step

further. It was held by the majority judgment of Madan B. Lokur, J.

and Deepak Gupta, J. that even an oral application for grant of

default bail would suffice, and so long as such application is made

before the charge sheet is filed by the police, default bail must be

granted. This was stated in Lokur, J.’s judgment as follows:

“37. This Court had occasion to review the entire case law

on the subject in Union of India v. Nirala Yadav [Union of

India v. Nirala Yadav, (2014) 9 SCC 457 : (2014) 5 SCC

(Cri) 212] . In that decision, reference was made to Uday

Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra [Uday Mohanlal

Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 5 SCC 453 : 2001

SCC (Cri) 760] and the conclusions arrived at in that

decision. We are concerned with Conclusion (3) which reads

as follows: (Nirala Yadav case [Union of India v. Nirala

Yadav, (2014) 9 SCC 457 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 212] , SCC

p. 472, para 24)

“13. (3) On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or

60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right

accrues in favour of the accused for being released

on bail on account of default by the investigating

agency in the completion of the investigation within

the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to be

released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the

bail as directed by the Magistrate.’ (Uday Mohanlal

case [Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of

Maharashtra, (2001) 5 SCC 453 : 2001 SCC (Cri)

760] , SCC p. 473, para 13)”

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38. This Court also dealt with the decision

rendered in Sanjay Dutt [Sanjay Dutt v. State, (1994)

5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] and noted that the

principle laid down by the Constitution Bench is to

the effect that if the charge-sheet is not filed and the

right for “default bail” has ripened into the status of

indefeasibility, it cannot be frustrated by the

prosecution on any pretext. The accused can avail his

liberty by filing an application stating that the

statutory period for filing the charge-sheet or challan

has expired and the same has not yet been filed and

therefore the indefeasible right has accrued in his or

her favour and further the accused is prepared to

furnish the bail bond.

39. This Court also noted that apart from the

possibility of the prosecution frustrating the

indefeasible right, there are occasions when even the

court frustrates the indefeasible right. Reference was

made to Mohd. Iqbal Madar Sheikh v. State of

Maharashtra [Mohd. Iqbal Madar Sheikh v. State of

Maharashtra, (1996) 1 SCC 722 : 1996 SCC (Cri)

202] wherein it was observed that some courts keep

the application for “default bail” pending for some

days so that in the meantime a charge-sheet is

submitted. While such a practice both on the part of

the prosecution as well as some courts must be very

strongly and vehemently discouraged, we reiterate

that no subterfuge should be resorted to, to defeat the

indefeasible right of the accused for “default bail”

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during the interregnum when the statutory period for

filing the charge-sheet or challan expires and the

submission of the charge-sheet or challan in court.

Procedure for obtaining default bail

40. In the present case, it was also argued by the

learned counsel for the State that the petitioner did

not apply for “default bail” on or after 4-1-2017 till

24-1-2017 on which date his indefeasible right got

extinguished on the filing of the charge-sheet. Strictly

speaking, this is correct since the petitioner applied

for regular bail on 11-1-2017 in the Gauhati High

Court — he made no specific application for grant of

“default bail”. However, the application for regular

bail filed by the accused on 11-1-2017 did advert to

the statutory period for filing a charge-sheet having

expired and that perhaps no charge-sheet had in fact

being filed. In any event, this issue was argued by the

learned counsel for the petitioner in the High Court

and it was considered but not accepted by the High

Court. The High Court did not reject the submission

on the ground of maintainability but on merits.

Therefore it is not as if the petitioner did not make

any application for default bail — such an

application was definitely made (if not in writing)

then at least orally before the High Court. In our

opinion, in matters of personal liberty, we cannot and

should not be too technical and must lean in favour of

personal liberty. Consequently, whether the accused

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makes a written application for “default bail” or an

oral application for “default bail” is of no

consequence. The court concerned must deal with

such an application by considering the statutory

requirements, namely, whether the statutory period

for filing a charge sheet or challan has expired,

whether the charge-sheet or challan has been filed

and whether the accused is prepared to and does

furnish bail.

41. We take this view keeping in mind that in

matters of personal liberty and Article 21 of the

Constitution, it is not always advisable to be

formalistic or technical. The history of the personal

liberty jurisprudence of this Court and other

constitutional courts includes petitions for a writ of

habeas corpus and for other writs being entertained

even on the basis of a letter addressed to the Chief

Justice or the Court.

Application of the law to the petitioner

45. On 11-1-2017 [Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of

Assam, 2017 SCC OnLine Gau 573] when the High

Court dismissed the application for bail filed by the

petitioner, he had an indefeasible right to the grant of

“default bail” since the statutory period of 60 days

for filing a charge-sheet had expired, no charge-sheet

or challan had been filed against him (it was filed

only on 24-1-2017) and the petitioner had orally

applied for “default bail”. Under these

circumstances, the only course open to the High

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

Court on 11-1-2017 was to enquire from the

petitioner whether he was prepared to furnish bail

and if so then to grant him “default bail” on

reasonable conditions. Unfortunately, this was

completely overlooked by the High Court.

46. It was submitted that as of today, a charge-sheet

having been filed against the petitioner, he is not

entitled to “default bail” but must apply for regular

bail — the “default bail” chapter being now closed.

We cannot agree for the simple reason that we are

concerned with the interregnum between 4-1-2017

and 24-1-2017 when no charge-sheet had been filed,

during which period he had availed of his

indefeasible right of “default bail”. It would have

been another matter altogether if the petitioner had

not applied for “default bail” for whatever reason

during this interregnum. There could be a situation

(however rare) where an accused is not prepared to

be bailed out perhaps for his personal security since

he or she might be facing some threat outside the

correction home or for any other reason. But then in

such an event, the accused voluntarily gives up the

indefeasible right for default bail and having forfeited

that right the accused cannot, after the charge sheet

or challan has been filed, claim a resuscitation of the

indefeasible right. But that is not the case insofar as

the petitioner is concerned, since he did not give up

his indefeasible right for “default bail” during the

interregnum between 4-1-2017 and 24-1-2017 as is

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

evident from the decision of the High Court rendered

on 11-1-2017 [Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam,

2017 SCC OnLine Gau 573] . On the contrary, he

had availed of his right to “default bail” which could

not have been defeated on 11-1-2017 and which we

are today compelled to acknowledge and enforce.

47. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the

petitioner had satisfied all the requirements of

obtaining “default bail” which is that on 11-1-2017

he had put in more than 60 days in custody pending

investigations into an alleged offence not punishable

with imprisonment for a minimum period of 10 years,

no charge-sheet had been filed against him and he

was prepared to furnish bail for his release, as such,

he ought to have been released by the High Court on

reasonable terms and conditions of bail.

Conclusion

49. The petitioner is held entitled to the grant of

“default bail” on the facts and in the circumstances

of this case. The trial Judge should release the

petitioner on “default bail” on such terms and

conditions as may be reasonable. However, we make

it clear that this does not prohibit or otherwise

prevent the arrest or re-arrest of the petitioner on

cogent grounds in respect of the subject charge and

upon arrest or re-arrest, the petitioner is entitled to

petition for grant of regular bail which application

should be considered on its own merit. We also make

it clear that this will not impact on the arrest of the

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

petitioner in any other case.”

14. In the light of the above decisions, it is clear that once the indefeasible

right accrues in favour of the appellant on filing an application for default bail,

the subsequent filing of the charge sheet will not take away that indefeasible

right.

15. This issue can be looked into from another aspect also. The

application which was returned on 17.07.2026, was re-presented on 25.08.2026.

Once the application is accepted and numbered, then it will be dated back to the

date of its original presentation. Therefore, for all practical purposes, despite the

application was taken on file only on 25.08.2026, it should be construed that the

application was filed on 17.07.2026 itself. Therefore, the subsequent filing of

the final report after the filing of the application cannot take away the right of

the appellant. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on

the decision of this Court in K.Muthirul Vs. Inspector of Police, Samayapuram

Police Station, Madurai District, reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 17811 ,

and the decision of this Court in Rahim Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, represented

by the Inspector of Police, Thalamuthunagar Police Station, Thoothukudi

District, in Crl.O.P.(MD) No.1517 of 2026.

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

16. In the light of the above decisions, this Court is of the considered

view that the appellant had applied for mandatory bail within the statutory limit,

even before the filing of the final report and therefore, the indefeasible right

accrued on 17.07.2026 itself. That will not get lost by the subsequent filing of

the charge sheet. Therefore, the finding of the trial court that the application is

not maintainable is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the impugned order dated

09.09.2026 is set aside and the appellant is granted statutory bail on following

conditions:

i) The appellant shall execute a bond for a sum of

Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand only) with two sureties

each for a like sum to the satisfaction of the learned III

Additional District and Sessions Judge for PCR Cases, Madurai.

ii) The appellant and the sureties shall submit a copy of

their Aadhaar Card or any other identity card issued by the

Government in proof of their residence address;

iii) The appellant and the sureties shall file an affidavit of

undertaking before the respondent police that the appellant will

not involve in any offence in future.

iv) The appellant shall report before the trial Court daily at

10.30 a.m., until further orders, except the days, on which their

appearance is required before the trial Court.

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

v) On violation of any of the above conditions by the

appellant, the respondent police is at liberty to move an

application for cancellation of the bail.

-10-2026

Index: Yes/No

Speaking/Non-speaking order

Neutral Citation: Yes/No

Indu

To

1.The Deputy Superintendent of Police,

Othakadai Zone,

Madurai District.

2.The Inspector of Police,

Othakkadai Zone,

Madurai District.

3.The Additional Public Prosecutor,

Madurai Bench of Madras High Court,

Madurai.

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Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

S.KARTHIKEYAN, J.

Indu

Crl.A(MD) No.1131 of 2026

-10-2026

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