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CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 202 of 2001

PETITIONER:

Alamgir

RESPONDENT:

State (NCT, Delhi)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/11/2002

BENCH:

Umesh C. Banerjee & B.N. Agrawal.

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

BANERJEE,J.

The matter under consideration presently before this Court

stands out to be singularly singular on the plea of fabrication by the

defence against the prosecutor. The High Court of Delhi negated

the same and dismissed the appeal against the conviction under

Section 302 IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life along

with fine.

It is at this juncture convenient to advert briefly to the

prosecution case as below :

Alamgir, the appellant herein being a resident of Pakistan

was married to Ms. Hazra (known by the name of Halima after

marriage). The factual score depicts that on 17th September, 1991,

the appellant came to Delhi along with his wife Hazra @ Halima

and they checked in in a hotel at Darya Ganj (Royal Inn Guest

House) on 18th September, 1991 at about 8.50 p.m. Upon

registration in the guest registration book, the appellant and his

wife, who was in Burqa, were allotted Room No.107 and the key

was handed over to Alamgir. On 19th September, 1991, Alamgir,

however, went out and brought some break-fast and at or about

10.15 in the morning, he reported at the counter informing

therewith that the wife being left alone in the hotel room ought not

to be disturbed and that he would be back soon. Alamgir,

however, the factual score depict, did not return till 20th and the

Manager of the hotel by reason of not being able to get any

response from the room after several attempts, opened the room

with the duplicate key in the presence of one Dinesh Chand and

found that the deceased was lying on the bed covered with a red

dupatta. Immediately thereafter, however, the police was

informed and Sub-inspector Rajbir Singh reached at the hotel and

recorded the statement of the Manager of the hotel. The Crime

Branch was called along with photographer and upon completion

of all necessary formalities, the dead body was sent for post-

mortem and the FIR being No.357/91 was registered around 12.25

in the afternoon.

Incidentally, the police found two slips near the dead body.

one of the papers indicated "7 A Jaitkar House Tandel Street Room

No.3, Mal Bazar, Bombay 3" and something was written in Urdu

thereon. The other paper slip was a photo of receipt A.V. 187318,

18.7.90 bearing photo and signatures of Alamgir. On its backside

50690, 235472, and Assistant Director, D.R.O. Karachi (West) was

printed and sealed respectively. Some injury marks were noticed

on the neck of the deceased.

The further factual score depicts that on 21st September, 1991

on receipt of some secret information at about 2.20 p.m. by the

CID, Bombay Unit, at 2.45 p.m. Inspector Naresh Talvalkar along

with Inspector Dhoble and other Constables reached in front of

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Caf Rahim Restaurant and found a person standing opposite Caf

Rahim Restaurant. They arrested that person, namely, the accused

Alamgir. On his personal search the accused was found holding a

brown colour rexine pouch in his hand containing a key ring with a

brass letter 'R' and No.107 written on it along with passport of the

accused. residential permit as well as Pakistani I card of the

accused and Pakistani passport of Ms. Halima Noor Jamal, her

residential permit and one copy of I. Card form of the Halima and

ticket from Delhi to Bombay along with 100 rupee notes in Indian

currency and Pakistani currency. Assistant Police Commissioner,

Darya Ganj, Delhi was contacted and it was confirmed that

accused Alamgir was wanted in the case under Section 302 IPC in

FIR No. 357 of 1991.

On 21st September, 1991 Delhi Police received the

information of arrest of accused Alamgir. SI Rajbir Singh was

deputed to leave for Bombay for investigation. The post mortem

examination was also conducted on 21st September, 1991.

However, the body was directed to be preserved. Necessary

formalities were completed by the Bombay Police. Accused was

produced on 22nd September, 1991 before the Additional CMM,

Bombay. On 24th September, 1991 Delhi Police arrived in

Bombay. All the articles which the Bombay Police had recovered

from the accused were handed over to Delhi Police. SI Rajbir

Singh met Inspector Talvalkar on 24th September, 1991, formally

arrested accused Alamgir, conducted his personal search,

produced before MM Mr. Shinde and obtained the remand. He

interrogated the accused, who made certain disclosure statements.

According to the prosecution, accused Alamgir from Delhi

had given a telephonic call to Shamim Bano, sister of the deceased

at Bombay and asked her to call his father who had come from

Pakistan. But his father was not available in the house. Alamgir

also told that Hazra had died in bus accident. Shamim Bano told

all these facts to the police after three-four days at Bombay.

Smt. Safiya Tazim Ali, mother of the deceased stated that

Hazra was married six-seven months prior to murder. Alamgir,

accused told her (mother-in-law) and other members of her family

that Hazra had died in a bus accident and she had been cremated at

the cremation ground in Nizamuddin. About 3 or 4 days prior to

the arrival of the police at the house of Smt. Safiya Tazim Ali, he

had come to her house in Bombay. He had kept two bags in her

house which were recovered by the police. Both the bags

contained clothes of her deceased daughter.

It is on these state of facts, the charge was framed and as

noticed above, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Delhi found

accused guilty and sentenced imprisonment for life which stands

confirmed by the High Court and hence the appeal by the grant of

special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Jaspal Singh, has been

able to state the proposition of law with due clarity. It has been

contended that in the event of there being only circumstantial

evidence, it is well settled that those circumstances must be proved

to be such as to be conclusive of the guilt of the accused and

incapable of explanation on any hypothesis consistent with the

innocence of the accused. It has been contended further that it is

on this score the law seems to be well settled as well, to wit that

the Courts will be well advised in case of circumstantial evidence

to be watchful and to ensure that conjectures and suspicions do not

take place of legal proof. It has been the appellant's contention

that the prosecution has utterly failed to link up the chain and as a

matter of fact the snap in the chain is not very far to seek, thus

warranting an order of acquittal and the High Court has fallen into

a manifest error in regard thereto. The evidence of PW.1 and

PW.23 being Madan Singh and Dinesh Chand was taken recourse

to. It is on this score, it has been contended that (a) None of them

has identified the appellant; (b) None of them has stated that it

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was the appellant who had checked in on 18.9.1991; (c) None of

them has stated that it was the appellant who had checked out on

19.9.1991 at 8.30 A.M.and (d) Rather both the witnesses have

stated that appellant was not the person who had checked in on

18.9.1991 or who had checked out on 19.9.1991 at 8.30 A.M. and

drawing inspiration therefrom, Mr. Singh in support of the appeal

contended that there is thus no direct evidence available to prove

that it was the appellant who had checked in on 18th September,

1991 or had left the hotel on 19th September, 1991. Admittedly,

there is no difficulty in appreciating the submissions of Mr. Singh.

Availability of direct evidence is not there but what about the

circumstances ? Before doing so, be it noted that the evidence of

PW.6, Sahmim Bano as to the date of departure of the accused

with his wife Hazra @ Halima from Bombay to Delhi and the

subsequent telephonic message that Halima died in a bus accident

and that cremation has taken place in Nizamuddin stand out to be a

rather significant component of the chain of evidence.

(a) The appellant came to visit Delhi along with his wife

Hazra @ Halima leaving Bombay on 17th September,

1991.

(b) On 18th September, 1991 at about 8.50 p.m. both of

them claimed to be husband and wife. Alamgir,

appellant entered his name and address in the guest

register and received key of Room No.107 and stayed

in Room No.107 in Royal Inn Guest House, Netaji

Subhash Marg, Daryaganj, Delhi.

(c) On 19th September, 1991 in the morning at 8.30 a.m.,

Alamgir left the guest house locking his wife in the

room and did not return thereafter.

(d) The appellant telephonically informed PW6, Shamim

Bano that the deceased died in a bus accident and was

buried in Nizamuddin and thereafter the appellant left

Delhi for Bombay.

(e) The appellant's wife was found dead due to

strangulation in Room No.107 on opening of the same

with duplicate key on 20th September, 1991.

(f) The appellant was arrested at Bombay on 21st

September, 1991 and key of the room was recovered

from him along with ticket from Delhi to Bombay dated

19th September, 1991 proving that he after killing his

wife instead of taking her care, had left for Bombay on

19th September, 1991. Only beyond the range of a

reasonable doubt, of course, the expression 'reasonable

doubt' is incapable of definition. Modern thinking is

in favour of the view that proof beyond a reasonable

doubt is the same as proof which affords moral

certainty to the judge.

The question for consideration is thus as to whether the

circumstances noticed above would form a complete chain of

events without any snap and pointedly point to the accused as the

guilty person and to no-one else. In the event there is an answer in

the affirmative, question of interference with the order of the High

Court would not arise. Incidentally, the High Court did emphasize

on the true and correct meaning of the phraseology 'reasonable

doubt' to be attributed thereon and it is on this score, the High

Court records :

"Modern thinking is in favour of the view that proof beyond

a reasonable doubt is the same as proof which affords moral

certainty to the judge."

We are, however, not expressing any opinion with regard

thereto. Suffice it to say that sufficiency of moral certainty itself

is a matter for deliberation and since the matter has not been

addressed to us on that score, expression of opinion on the same

would not arise.

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The circumstances noticed above, if read with the evidence

of PW.6, Shamim Bano as to the date of departure of the accused

with his wife Hazra @ Halima from Bombay to Delhi and the

telephonic message after two days that Halima had died in a bus

accident and that she had been cremated at a cremation ground in

Nizamuddin this piece of evidence, as noticed above, if read

along with the circumstances noticed above, would form a chain

without there being any snap. Strenuous submissions have been

made as regards the admissibility of the Handwriting Expert's

opinion as also a challenge thrown to the non-admissibility of the

entire evidence of Shamim Bano, PW.6. This evidence of

Shamim Bano has been challenged on two counts: on the first

Shamim Bano, being the sister of Halima, was an interested

witness and secondly, she did not say so in a statement before the

police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Interested witness by itself

cannot possibly be a ground to reject the evidence on record. The

test of creditworthiness or acceptability, in our view, ought to be

the guiding factor and if so, question of raising an eye-brow on the

reliability of witness being an interested witness would be futile

in the event the evidence is otherwise acceptable, there ought not

to be any hindrance in the matter of prosecutor's success. The

evidence must inspire confidence and in the event of unshaken

credibility, there is no justifiable reason to reject the same. It is on

this score the issue of interested witness thus stands negated, as

raised by the appellant. The second limb pertains to the statement

under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Admittedly, this piece of evidence was

not available in the statement of the witness under Section 161

Cr.P.C., but does it take away the nature and character of the

evidence in the event there is some omission on the part of the

police official. Would that be taken recourse to as amounting to

rejection of an otherwise creditworthy and acceptable evidence

the answer, in our view, cannot but be in the negative. In that

view of the matter, the evidence of PW.6 thus ought to be treated

as creditworthy and acceptable and it is to be seen the effect of

such an acceptability.

Coming back to Mr. Jaspal Singh's submissions as regards

prosecution's fabrication of evidence, two redeeming features

ought to be noticed, namely :

(a) PW.1 Madan Singh after several knocks at the door and

having failed to obtain any reply therefrom, opened the room with

a duplicate key and found a person lying on the double bed

covered with red cloth the room was locked and police was

informed. The arrival of the police people at the hotel led the

opening of the door and the dead body of a female was recovered

with two slips of paper noticed hereinbefore. The handwriting and

signatures stand to be proved by the Handwriting Expert as that of

the appellant herein. The High Court did not find any reason to

discard this piece of evidence, neither we find any justifiable

reason to discard the same either. It is on this score that Mr.

Jaspal Singh has been rather emphatic that Handwriting Expert's

opinion being a weak piece of evidence ought not to be relied upon

and placed reliance in support thereof the decision of this Court in

Magan Bihari Lal v. The State of Punjab (1977 (2) SCC 210).

Since detailed submissions have been made on this score, we think

it fit and proper to detail out the observations of this Court in

Magan (supra). This Court in para 7 of the Report stated as

below :

"7. In the first place, it may be noted that the

appellant was at the material time a Guard in the

employment of the Railway Administration with his

headquarters at Agra and he had nothing to do with the

train by which Wagon No. SEKG 40765 was

despatched from Munda to Bikaner, nor with the train

which carried that wagon from Agra to Ludhiana. He

was not a Guard on either of these two trains. There

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was also no evidence to connect the appellant with the

theft of the blank Railway Receipt at Banmore Station.

It is indeed difficult to see how the appellant, who was

a small employee in the Railway Administration, could

have possibly come into possession of the blank

Railway Receipt from Banmore Station which was not

within his jurisdiction at any time. It is true that B.

Lal, the handwriting expert, deposed that the

handwriting on the forged Railway Receipt Ex.PW10/A

was that of the same person who wrote the specimen

handwritings, Ex. PW 27/37 to 27/57, that is the

appellant, but we think it would be extremely hazardous

to condemn the appellant merely on the strength of

opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now

well settled that expert opinion must always be received

with great caution and perhaps none so with more

caution than the opinion of a handwriting expert.

There is a profusion of precedential authority which

holds that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on

expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This

rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost

become a rule of law. It was held by this Court in Ram

Chandra v. State of U.P. (AIR 1957 SC 381) that it is

unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient

basis for conviction, but it may be relied upon when

supported by other items of internal and external

evidence. This Court again pointed out in Ishwari

Prasad Mishra v. Md. Isa (AIR 1963 SC 1728) that

expert evidence of handwriting can never be conclusive

because it is, after all, opinion evidence, and this view

was reiterated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh

Kumar Banerjee (AIR 1964 SC 529) where it was

pointed out by this court that expert evidence as to

handwriting being opinion evidence can rarely, if ever,

take the place of substantive evidence and before acting

on such evidence, it would be desirable to consider

whether it is corroborated either by clear direct

evidence or by circumstantial evidence. This Court

had again occasion to consider the evidentiary value of

expert opinion in regard to handwriting in Fakhruddin

v. State of M.P. (AIR 1967 SC 1326) and it uttered a

note of caution pointing out that it would be risky to

found a conviction solely on the evidence of a

handwriting expert and before acting upon such

evidence, the court must always try to see whether it is

corroborated by other evidence, direct or circumstantial.

It is interesting to note that the same view is also

echoed in the judgments of English and American

courts. Vide Gurney v. Langlands (1822, 5 B and Ald

330) and Matter of Alfred Foster's Will (34 Mich 21).

The Supreme Court of Michigan pointed out in the last

mentioned case :

Every one knows how very unsafe it is to

rely upon any one's opinion considering the

niceties of penmanship Opinions are necessarily

received, and may be valuable, but at best this

kind of evidence is a necessary evil.

We need not subscribe to the extreme view expressed

by the Supreme Court of Michigan, but there can be no

doubt that this type of evidence, being opinion evidence

is by its very nature, weak and infirm and cannot of

itself form the basis for a conviction. We must,

therefore, try to see whether, in the present case, there

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is, apart from the evidence of the handwriting expert B.

Lal, any other evidence connecting the appellant with

the offence."

In our view, however, reliance in Magan (supra) is rather

misplaced in the contextual facts since no conviction is based on

the opinion of the handwriting expert but admittedly it can be

relied upon when supported by other items of internal and external

evidence. The handwriting expert's opinion simply corroborates

the circumstantial evidence and as such we are unable to record

our concurrence with the submissions of Mr. Singh on this score.

Significantly, this Court in Murari Lal v. State of Madhya

Pradesh (1980 (1) SCC 704) in no uncertain terms observed that

the hazard in acceptance of opinion of an expert is not because it is

unreliable evidence, but because human judgment is fallible.

Needless to record that the signs of identification of handwriting

have attained more or less a state of perfection and the risk of an

incorrect opinion is practically non-existent. This Court went on

further to record that doubting the opinion of a handwriting expert

ought to be a far cry and insistence upon further corroboration as

an invariable rule does not seem to be a justifiable conclusion. In

continuation of the above noted principle, this Court went on to

further examine as regards judicial precedence and in that vein

stated in paragraph 7 of the Report as below :

"7. Apart from principle, let us examine if

precedents justify invariable insistence on

corroboration. We have referred to Phipson on

Evidence, Cross on Evidence, Roscoe on Criminal

Evidence, Archibald on Criminal Pleadings, Evidence

and Practice and Halsbury's Laws of England but we

were unable to find a single sentence hinting at such a

rule. We may now refer to some of the decisions of

this Court. In Ram Chandra v. U.P. State (AIR 1957

SC 381), Jagannadhadas, J. observed : "It may be that

normally it is not safe to treat expert evidence as to

handwriting as sufficient basis for conviction"

(emphasis ours). "May" and "normally" make our

point about the absence of an inflexible rule. In

Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohammad Isa (AIR 1963 SC

1728) Gajendragadkar, J. observed : "Evidence given

by experts can never be conclusive, because after all it

is opinion-evidence", a statement which caries us

nowhere on the question now under consideration.

Nor, can the statement be disputed because it is not so

provided by the Evidence Act and, on the contrary,

Section 46 expressly makes opinion-evidence

challengeable by facts, otherwise irrelevant. And as

Lord President Cooper observed in Davis v. Edinburgh

Magistrate (1953 SC 34) : "The parties have invoked

the decision of a judicial tribunal and not an oracular

pronouncement by an expert."

As regards the decision of Magan (supra) this Court in

paragraph stated as below :

"10. Finally, we come to Magan Bihari Lal v.

State of Punjab (1977 (2) SCC 210), upon which Sri

R.C. Kohli, learned counsel, placed great reliance. It

was said by this Court :

. . . . but we think it would be extremely

hazardous to condemn the appellant merely on the

strength of opinion evidence of a handwriting

expert. It is now well settled that expert opinion

must always be received with great caution and

perhaps none so with more caution than the

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opinion of a handwriting expert. There is a

profusion of precedential authority which holds

that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on

expert opinion without substantial corroboration.

This rule has been universally acted upon and it

has almost become a rule of law. It was held by

this Court in Ram Chandra v. State of U.P. (AIR

1957 SC 381) that it is unsafe to treat expert

handwriting opinion as sufficient basis for

conviction, but it may be relied upon when

supported by other items of internal and external

evidence. This Court again pointed out in

Ishwari Prasad Mishra v. Md. Isa (AIR 1963 SC

1728) that expert evidence of handwriting can

never be conclusive because it is, after all, opinion

evidence, and this view was reiterated in Shashi

Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee (AIR

1964 SC 529) where it was pointed out by this

court that expert evidence as to handwriting being

opinion evidence can rarely, if ever, take the place

of substantive evidence and before acting on such

evidence, it would be desirable to consider

whether it is corroborated either by clear direct

evidence or by circumstantial evidence. This

Court had again occasion to consider the

evidentiary value of expert opinion in regard to

handwriting in Fakhruddin v. State of M.P. (AIR

1967 SC 1326) and it uttered a note of caution

pointing out that it would be risky to found a

conviction solely on the evidence of a handwriting

expert and before acting upon such evidence, the

court must always try to see whether it is

corroborated by other evidence, direct or

circumstantial.

The above extracted passage, undoubtedly, contains some

sweeping general observations. But we do not think that the

observations were meant to be observations of general

application or as laying down any legal principle. It was

plainly intended to be a rule of caution and not a rule of law

as is clear from the statement "it has almost become a rule

of law'. "Almost", we presume, means "not quite". It was

said by the Court there was a "profusion of precedential

authority" which insisted upon corroboration and reference

was made to Ram Chandra v. State of U.P., Ishwari Prasad

v. Mohammad Isa, Shashi Kumar v. Subodh Kumar and

Fakhruddin v. State of M.P. We have already discussed

these cases and observed that none of them supports the

proposition that corroboration must invariably be sought

before opinion-evidence can be accepted. There appears to

be some mistake in the last sentence of the above extracted

passage because we are unable to find in Fakhruddin v. State

of M.P. any statement such as the one attributed. In fact, in

that case, the learned Judges acted upon the sole testimony

of the expert after satisfying themselves about the

correctness of the opinion by comparing the writings

themselves. We do think that the observations in Magan

Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, must be understood as

referring to the facts of the particular case."

In fine in Murari Lal (supra) this court stated that there is no

rule of law, nor any rule of prudence which has crystallised into a

rule of law that opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert must

never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated. We feel it

expedient to record our concurrence therewith, though, however,

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we hasten to add that since human judgment cannot be said to be

totally infallible, due caution shall have to be exercised and the

approach ought to be that of care and caution and it is only upon

probe and examination the acceptability or creditworthy of the

same depends. The learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court

did place, upon consideration of all relevant facts and material on

record, reliance on the opinion of the handwriting expert and we do

not see any reason to record a contra finding.

(b) Misleading telephonic information about the death of the

deceased to sister and mother of the deceased and the evidence on

this score seems to be rather categoric and creditworthy. It is on

this score, the High Court also placed reliance and did not think it

fit to discard the testimony of PW.6, Shamim Bano on this score.

The two counts mentioned above have in fact cemented the

fate of this appeal. Identity of the accused person stands

challenged by Mr. Jaspal Singh and while recording acceptance of

a factum of murder, it has been the definite contention that it is a

blind murder if that be so then why the misleading information to

the family members of the deceased is it to obviate a detection so

as to enable him to escape the rigors of law or a genuine and

innocent statement of the accused : if the death had been caused,

as reported to the family members of the deceased or the burial

there would have been some documentary evidence in support

thereof : the street accident must have been rather fatal and burial

also cannot take place without proper documentation

unfortunately, there is no documentary support. This is, however,

on the opposition that the evidence of PW.6 stands accepted. At

this juncture we, however, feel it expedient to record that in fact on

a plain look at the evidence one would take to conclude its

acceptability in creditworthiness rather than its rejection. It is on

this score, the High Court was pleased to record its opinion upon

detailing out the circumstances and we do also feel it inclined to

record that the circumstances noticed above cannot but lend

concurrence to the observations of the High Court that the matter

in issue cannot but be termed to be a brutal and gruesome murder

of Hazra by the accused person.

Before proceeding with the matter further, it would be

convenient to note the well established rule in criminal

jurisprudence as regards the acceptability of the circumstantial

evidence and the rule of the law courts in regard thereto.

The word of caution introduced in the judgment of this Court

about five decades ago in that direction however still stands as an

acceptable guide. This Court in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar &

Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1952 SC 343) stated:

"It is well to remember that in cases where the

evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the

circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to

be drawn should in the first instance be fully

established, and all the facts so established should be

consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the

accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a

conclusive nature and tendency and they should be

such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one

proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a

chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any

reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the

innocence of the accused and it must be such as to

show that within all human probability the act must

have been done by the accused."

Subsequently, the Constitution Bench of this Court in MG

Agarwal and Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1963 SC 200) in

the similar vein and without any contra note stated the law with

utmost lucidity in the manner noted below:

"It is a well established rule in criminal

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jurisprudence that circumstantial evidence can be

reasonably made the basis of an accused person's

conviction if it is of such a character that it is wholly

inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and is

consistent only with his guilt. If the circumstances

proved in the case are consistent either with the

innocence of the accused or with his guilt, then the

accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. There is no

doubt or dispute about this position. But in applying

this principle, it is necessary to distinguish between

facts which may be called primary or basic on the one

hand and inference of facts to be drawn from them on

the other. In regard to the proof of basic or primary

facts, the Court has to judge the evidence in the

ordinary way, and in the appreciation of evidence in

respect of the proof of these basic or primary facts there

is no scope for the application of the doctrine of benefit

of doubt. The court considers the evidence and decides

whether that evidence proves a particular fact or not.

When it is held that a certain fact is proved, the

question arises whether that fact leads to the inference

of guilt of the accused person or not, and in dealing

with this aspect of the problem the doctrine of benefit

of doubt would apply and an inference of guilt can be

drawn only if the proved fact is wholly inconsistent

with the innocence of the accused and is consistent only

with his guilt."

Similar however is the opinion of this Court in Pawan Kumar

v. State of Haryana [2001 (3) SCC 628] in which one of us (U.C.

Banerjee, J) was a party. The opinion of the Court runs as under:

"Incidentally, success of the prosecution on the basis of

circumstantial evidence will however depend on the

availability of a complete chain of events so as not to

leave any doubt for the conclusion that the act must

have been done by the accused person. While.

however, it is true that there should be no missing links,

in the chain of events so far as the prosecution is

concerned, but it is not that every one of the links must

appear on the surface of the evidence, since some of

these links may only be inferred from the proven

facts. Circumstances of strong suspicion without,

however. any conclusive evidence are not sufficient to

justify the conviction and it is on this score that great

care must be taken in evaluating the circumstantial

evidence. In any event, on the availability of two

inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be

accepted and the law is well settled on this score, as

such we need not dilate much in that regard excepting,

however, noting the observations of this Court in the

case of State of U.P. Vs. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (AIR

1992 SC 840) wherein this Court in paragraph 9 of the

report observed:-

"This Court has, time out of number,

observed that while appreciating circumstantial

evidence the Court must adopt a very cautious

approach and should record a conviction only if

all the links in the chain are complete pointing to

the guilt of the accused and every hypothesis of

innocence is capable of being negatived on

evidence. Great care must be taken in evaluating

circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied

on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the

one in favour of the accused must be accepted.

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The circumstance relied upon must be found to

have been fully established and the cumulative

effect of all the facts so established must be

consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. But

this is not to say that the prosecution must meet

any and every hypothesis put forward by the

accused however far-fetched and fanciful it might

be. Nor does it mean that prosecution evidence

must be rejected on the slightest doubt because

the law permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable

and not otherwise."

The other aspect of the issue is that the evidence

on record, ascribed to be circumstantial, ought to justify

the inferences of the guilt from the incriminating facts

and circumstances which are incompatible with the

innocence of the accused or guilt of any other person.

The observations of this Court in the case of Balwinder

Singh Vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1987 SC 350) lends

concurrence to the above."

In a more recent decision of this Court in Sudama Pandey &

Ors. vs. State of Bihar [2002 (1) SCC 679] the law as noticed

above and to the same effect stands very felicitously expressed.

On the basis of the law and the factual score as above, in

particular the circumstances tabulated hereinbefore, the issue thus

arises as to whether involvement of the accused can be doubted in

any way or the events pointedly point out the guilt of the accused

person. The High Court answered it in the second alternative and

upon consideration of the entire matter we do feel it expedient to

record our concurrence with the reasons and conclusions as put

forth in the judgment impugned.

In that view of the matter, this appeal fails and is dismissed.