Page 1 R E P O R T A B L E

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7600 OF 2014

ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS. ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

KRISHNA NARAYAN TEWARI …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, CJI.

1.In this appeal by special leave the appellant calls in

question the correctness of a judgment and order dated 28

th

October, 2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature at

Allahabad, Lucknow bench, whereby Writ Petition No.2867 of

2006 filed by the respondent has been allowed and an order

dated 29

th

July, 2005 passed by the Disciplinary Authority

and that dated 5

th

January, 2006 passed by the Appellate

Authority directing removal of the respondent from the

service of the appellant-bank quashed. The High Court has

as a result directed the appellant bank to provide all

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Page 2 service/retiral benefits to the petitioner within ninety days of

the order. The challenge mounted by the appellant arises in

the following circumstances:

2.The respondent was employed with the appellant-bank

and was during the relevant period posted as Officer

in-charge at the appellant-bank’s Sultanpur branch in District

Sultanpur in the State of Uttar Pradesh. He was, by an order

dated 10

th

December, 2004, placed under suspension in

contemplation of a disciplinary enquiry which was initiated

against him with the service of a charge-sheet dated 10

th

February, 2005. The respondent pleaded not guilty but the

Enquiry Officer concluded the enquiry proceedings rather

quickly within a span of just about forty-five days and

submitted a report dated 27

th

May, 2005 holding that the

respondent was guilty on all counts except two which were

held proved but only partially. The Disciplinary Authority

accepted the findings and passed an order imposing upon

the respondent the major penalty of removal from service.

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Page 3 3.Aggrieved, the respondent preferred a departmental

appeal which was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its

order dated 5

th

January, 2006. The respondent then

questioned the said two orders before the High Court in a

writ petition which as noticed earlier has been allowed by

the High Court in terms of the order impugned in this appeal.

4.The High Court came to the conclusion that neither the

Disciplinary Authority nor the Appellate Authority had

applied their mind or recorded reasons in support of their

conclusions. Relying upon the decisions of this court in Roop

Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 570,

Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors. (1999) 2 SCC

10, Nand Kishore v. State of Bihar (1978) 3 SCC 366,

Kailash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry Officer, Allahabad Bank & Ors.

(2003) 9 SCC 480, State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi

Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 and Mohd. Yunus Khan v.

State of U.P. & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 539, the High Court held

that the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the

appellate authority were unsustainable in law. The High

Court found that the findings recorded by the Disciplinary

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Page 4 Authority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority were

perverse and were based on no evidence whatsoever. The

High Court observed that the Appellate Authority had not

applied its mind independently and simply cut and pasted

the findings of the Disciplinary Authority while dismissing the

appeal.

5.On behalf of the appellant-bank it was contended

before us that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in

re-appreciating the evidence and holding the respondent not

guilty. It was argued that so long as there was some

evidence on which the Disciplinary Authority could rest its

findings, sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence could

not be gone into by a Writ Court. Alternatively, it was

submitted that even if there was any infirmity in the orders

passed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate

Authority, on account of absence or insufficiency of the

reasons in support of the findings recorded by them, the

proper course for the High Court was to remand the matter

back to the Appellate Authority or the Disciplinary Authority

as the case may be for doing the needful afresh. The High

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Page 5 Court could not, on account of absence of reasons or

unsatisfactory appraisal of the evidence by them, quash the

order of punishment and direct release of the service

benefits due to the respondent.

6.On behalf of the respondent it was on the other hand

contended that the enquiry conducted against the

respondent and the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry

Officer, Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority

suffered from fatal defects. Firstly, because the enquiry

conducted by the Enquiry Officer was unfair and had resulted

in gross miscarriage of justice on account of the failure of the

Enquiry Officer to provide a reasonable opportunity to the

respondent to lead evidence in his defense. In the second

place the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and so

also the Disciplinary Authority were unsupported by any

evidence whatsoever and were perverse to say the least. In

the third place, the orders were unsustainable also for the

reason that the same did not disclose due and proper

application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority and the

Appellate Authority. The order passed by the Appellate

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Page 6 Authority was, in particular, bad in law as the same did not

examine the material on record independently and had

simply relied upon the findings of the Disciplinary Authority

without adverting to the points which the respondent had

raised in support of his challenge. It was lastly submitted

that the respondent has since superannuated and was a

physical wreck having suffered a heart attack and a

debilitating stroke which had confined him to bed. Any

remand of the proceedings to the Appellate Authority to pass

a fresh order or the Disciplinary Authority for re-examination

and fresh determination of the respondent’s guilt would not

only be harsh but would tantamount to denial of justice to

him. The High Court was in that view justified in taking a

pragmatic view of the matter and in directing continuity of

service to the respondent and release of all service and

retiral benefits to him upto the date of his superannuation.

7.We have given our anxious consideration to the

submissions at the bar. It is true that a writ court is very

slow in interfering with the findings of facts recorded by a

Departmental Authority on the basis of evidence available on

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Page 7 record. But it is equally true that in a case where the

Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported

by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which no

reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ court

would be justified if not duty bound to examine the matter

and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ court will

certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant

orders passed by the competent authority on that basis if

the enquiry itself was vitiated on account of violation of

principles of natural justice, as is alleged to be the position in

the present case.Non-application of mind by the Enquiry

Officer or the Disciplinary Authority, non-recording of reasons

in support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also

grounds on which the writ courts are justified in interfering

with the orders of punishment. The High Court has, in the

case at hand, found all these infirmities in the order passed

by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority.

The respondent’s case that the enquiry was conducted

without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading

evidence in defense has not been effectively rebutted by the

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Page 8 appellant. More importantly the Disciplinary Authority does

not appear to have properly appreciated the evidence nor

recorded reasons in support of his conclusion. To add insult

to injury the Appellate Authority instead of recording its own

reasons and independently appreciating the material on

record, simply reproduced the findings of the Disciplinary

Authority. All told the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary

Authority and the Appellate Authority have faltered in the

discharge of their duties resulting in miscarriage of justice.

The High Court was in that view right in interfering with the

orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the

Appellate Authority.

8.There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases

where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient either

procedurally or otherwise the proper course always is to

remand the matter back to the concerned authority to redo

the same afresh. That course could have been followed

even in the present case. The matter could be remanded

back to the Disciplinary Authority or to the Enquiry Officer for

a proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that

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Page 9 course may not have been the only course open in a given

situation. There may be situations where because of a long

time lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ

court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to

direct a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent

authority. That is precisely what the High Court has done in

the case at hand. The High Court has taken note of the fact

that the respondent had been placed under suspension in

the year 2004 and dismissed in the year 2005. The

dismissal order was challenged in the High Court in the year

2006 but the writ petition remained pending in the High

Court for nearly seven years till 2013. During the

intervening period the respondent superannuated on 30

th

November, 2011. Not only that he had suffered a heart

attack and a stroke that has rendered him physically

disabled and confined to bed. The respondent may by now

have turned 65 years of age. Any remand either to the

Enquiry Officer for a fresh enquiry or to the Disciplinary

Authority for a fresh order or even to the Appellate Authority

would thus be very harsh and would practically deny to the

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Page 10 respondent any relief whatsoever. Superadded to all this is

the fact that the High Court has found, that there was no

allegation nor any evidence to show the extent of loss, if

any, suffered by the bank on account of the alleged

misconduct of the respondent. The discretion vested in the

High Court in not remanding the matter back was, therefore,

properly exercised.

9.The next question is whether the respondent would be

entitled to claim arrears of salary as part of service/retiral

benefits in full or part. The High Court has been rather

ambivalent in that regard. We say so because while the High

Court has directed release of service/retiral benefits, it is not

clear whether the same would include salary for the period

between the date of removal and the date of

superannuation. Taking a liberal view of the matter, we

assume that the High Court’s direction for release of service

benefits would include the release of his salaries also for the

period mentioned above. We are, however, of the opinion

that while proceedings need not be remanded for a fresh

start from the beginning, grant of full salary for the period

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Page 11 between the date of dismissal and the date of

superannuation would not also be justified. We, therefore,

allow this appeal but only in part and to the extent that while

orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the

Appellate Authority shall stand quashed, and the respondent

entitled to continuity of service till the date of his

superannuation with all service benefits on that basis, he

shall be entitled to only 50% of the salary for the period

between the date of his removal from service till the date of

superannuation. Retiral benefits shall also be released in his

favour. The order passed by the High Court shall, to the

extent indicated above, stand modified. The parties shall

bear their own costs.

…………………… .…..…CJI.

(T.S. THAKUR)

……………………… .…..…J.

(A.M. KHANWILKAR)

New Delhi

January 2, 2017

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