1

2026:CGHC:2526

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

Order Reserved on : 04.12.2025

Order Delivered on : 15.01.2026

WPS No. 3033 of 2023

Amit Shandilya S/o Shri Mannu Lal Shandilya Aged About 41 Years

Occupation Service, Working As Jail Superintendent, Central Jail,

Jagdalpur, R/o Superintendent House, Jail Line, Jagdalpur, District

Bastar Chhattisgarh.

... Petitioner

versus

1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Principal Secretary, Department of

Home (Jail), Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar,

District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

2 - Director General Jail Chhattisgarh, Sector-19, Nava Raipur, Atal

Nagar, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

3 - Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission through its Secretary,

CGPSC, North Block, Sector-19, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District

Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

4 - S.S. Tigga presently working as Deputy Inspector General Jail,

Posted at Headquarters, Jail and Correctional Services Chhattisgarh,

Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

--- Respondents

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioner :Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate

assisted by Ms. Sunita Jain, Advocate

For State/Respondents

No.1 and 2

:Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Government

Advocate

For Respondent No.3:Mr. Gary Mukhopadhyay, Advocate

For Respondent No.4:Mr. Siddhant Tiwari, Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge

C A V Order

1.Heard Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, learned Senior Advocate assisted by

Ms. Sunita Jain, Advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Sangharsh

Pandey, Government Advocate appearing for the

State/respondents No.1 and 2, Mr. Gary Mukhopadhyay,

Advocate for respondent No.3 as well as Mr. Siddhant Tiwari,

Advocate for respondent No.4.

2.By filing the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the

impugned order dated 09.03.2023 (Annexure P-1), whereby

respondent No.4 has allegedly been illegally promoted to the post

of Deputy Inspector General (DIG), Jail, despite being less

meritorious than the petitioner and in complete violation of the

“Merit-cum-Seniority” criteria prescribed under Rule 7(9) of the

Chhattisgarh Public Services (Promotion) Rules, 2003; the

petitioner has further assailed the communication dated

26.04.2023 (Annexure P-2), by which his representation dated

22.03.2023 was erroneously rejected by the Under Secretary,

Department of Jail; and has also questioned the proceedings of

the Departmental Promotion Committee (for short, ‘DPC’) held on

08.02.2023 on the ground that the same were conducted in

contravention of Rule 7 of the Chhattisgarh Public Services

(Promotion) Rules, 2003, particularly Clauses 7 and 9 thereof.

The petitioner has prayed for following reliefs :-

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“10.1 Call for the entire records from the

possession of respondents, for kind perusal

of this Hon'ble Court.

10.2 This Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash

the impugned order dated 09/03/2023

(Annexure P-1) and letter dated 26/04/2023

(Annexure P-2) issuing a writ in the nature of

certiorari and direct the respondent

authorities to promote the petitioner with all

due seniority and other consequential

benefits in place of respondent No.4.

10.3 This Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct

the Respondents to reconsider the case of

petitioner for promotion on the post of DIG

Jail from the date of promotion of respondent

No.4 and grant all consequential benefits.

10.4 This Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass

such other orders as it may deem fit under

the facts and circumstances of the case, in

favour of the petitioner against the

respondents. Cost of this litigation may also

be awarded.

10.5 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be

pleased to issue an appropriate

writ/order/direction and quash the DPC

conducted on 08.02.2023 (Annexure P/4).”

3.Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell are that, the petitioner was

initially appointed in the year 2009 as Superintendent, District

Jail, and has since been discharging his duties with utmost

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sincerity; he was promoted in 2015 to the post of Superintendent,

Central Jail, and is presently posted at Central Jail, Jagdalpur,

District Bastar. Upon the superannuation of Dr. K.K. Gupta, the

post of Deputy Inspector General (‘DIG’) Jail fell vacant, which is

to be filled by promotion under the Chhattisgarh Jail (Gazetted)

Service Recruitment Rules, 2008 (for short, ‘Rules of 2008’) and

the Chhattisgarh Public Service (Promotion) Rules, 2003 (for

short, ‘Rules of 2003’). The DPC in its meeting dated 08.02.2023,

applied the “Merit-cum-Seniority” criteria, requiring “Very Good”

ACR grading for the preceding five years, and considered the

petitioner along with respondent No.4 and one Yogesh Singh

Kshatriya; however, only respondent No.4 was recommended.

On obtaining the DPC minutes and the ACR tabulation chart

under the RTI Act, the petitioner discovered that he possessed

superior ACR gradings (“क+” signifying “Outstanding” and “”

क

signifying “Very Good”) as compared to respondent No.4, thereby

making him more meritorious. The petitioner has also placed on

record his ACRs, including the modified upgraded gradings for

the years 2018 and 2020. He submitted a detailed representation

dated 22.03.2023 seeking reconsideration of his case, which was

forwarded but ultimately rejected vide letter dated 26.04.2023

without proper consideration, on the erroneous ground that no

vacancy was available despite the fact that respondent No.4 had

already been promoted vide order dated 09.03.2023. As the

promotion of respondent No.4 is contrary to Rules of 2003 and

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Rules of 2008, and the petitioner, though more meritorious and

eligible, has been illegally denied promotion, the present writ

petition has been filed seeking appropriate reliefs.

4.Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms.

Sunita Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the

impugned orders dated 09.03.2023 (Annexure P-1) and

26.04.2023 (Annexure P-2) are arbitrary, erroneous,

unconstitutional and bad in the eyes of law, having been issued in

complete derogation of the procedure established by law and

being violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of

India. He submits that the petitioner, being demonstrably more

meritorious than respondent No.4 as reflected from the certified

ACR records, ought to have been promoted in accordance with

the “Merit-cum-Seniority” criteria, but the respondents have

vitiated the entire promotion process by relying solely on seniority,

in complete violation of Rule 4(2) and Rule 7(9) of the

Chhattisgarh Public Services (Promotion) Rules, 2003.

5.It is contended that the impugned promotion suffers from patent

illegality and non-application of mind, as the DPC failed to

undertake the mandatory comparative assessment of merit as

required under Rule 7(9), which explicitly provides that public

servants graded as “Outstanding” must be placed at the top of

the select list, followed by those graded as “Very Good”, with

inter-se seniority maintained only within the same grading

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category. The respondents, in their reply, have themselves

admitted that respondent No.4 was promoted merely because his

name stood at the top of the seniority list, which clearly

establishes that the DPC did not conduct any comparative merit

assessment. This admission alone is sufficient to vitiate the

promotion.

6.Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the petitioner has

secured three Outstanding gradings in the relevant five-year

period, whereas Respondent No.4 has secured only two

Outstanding gradings, making the petitioner objectively more

meritorious. The false and contradictory statements made by the

State in its reply that the petitioner was not awarded

“Outstanding” stand demolished by the certified ACR chart

(Annexure P-6) and the modified ACRs of 2018 and 2020

7.Reliance is placed upon the judgments rendered by the the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajit Singh and others (II) v. State of

Punjab and others, (1999) 7 SCC 209 and Ravikumar

Dhansukhlal Maheta and another v. High Court of Gujarat,

AIR 2024 SC 3256, wherein it has been categorically held that

under the “Merit-cum-Seniority” principle, merit is the primary

consideration and seniority becomes relevant only when two

candidates are of substantially equal merit; juniors with superior

merit must be preferred over seniors. It is further submitted that

the DPC acted contrary to Clause 7 of Rule 7 of the Rules of

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2003, as it neither considered the ACRs of preceding years when

certain ACRs were unavailable nor undertook the mandatory

evaluation exercise. The petitioner, having 3 Outstanding entries

as against only 2 of respondent No.4, was entitled to be placed

above respondent No.4 in the select list.

8.Learned Senior Counsel therefore submits that the entire

decision-making process is vitiated, arbitrary, mechanical, and

reflective of an attempt to favour respondent No.4, the “blue-eyed

boy” of the authorities. The impugned orders are in clear violation

of Rules of 2003 and Rules of 2008, the principles of natural

justice, and the settled principles of service jurisprudence. It is

urged that the petitioner, being more meritorious and eligible, is

entitled to be promoted in place of Respondent No.4, and

accordingly, the impugned promotion order as well as DPC

proceedings deserve to be quashed.

9.On the other hand, Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned State counsel

appearing for respondents No.1 and 2, opposed the submissions

advanced by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and

submits that all the allegations levelled by the petitioner against

the answering State authorities are categorically, unequivocally

and specifically denied. He submits that the sole grievance of the

petitioner that he is more meritorious than respondent No.4, is

wholly misconceived and baseless, as the DPC, in its meeting

held on 08.02.2023, duly considered the cases of all eligible

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officers in accordance with the prevailing rules. It is contended

that for promotion to the post of DIG Jail, the prescribed criteria

was “Suitability-cum-Seniority”, and the seniority list as on

01.04.2021, along with the requirement of obtaining “Very Good”

entries in the preceding five years’ ACRs, formed the basis for

consideration.

10.Learned State counsel submits that respondent No.4, being the

seniormost eligible officer in the zone of consideration, and

having the requisite benchmark of “Very Good” ACR gradings,

was rightly recommended by the DPC. The petitioner, whose

name stood at third position in the seniority list, could not be

considered ahead of Respondent No.4 in view of the applicable

criteria. It is further submitted that Rule 7(9) of the Rules of 2003,

though providing for comparative assessment of merit, applies

only after an officer secures the prescribed benchmark. The

petitioner was not awarded “Outstanding” in the preceding five

years’ ACRs as claimed, and therefore, the DPC, while

maintaining the seniority position amongeligible officers, rightly

recommended respondent No.4. He submits that the promotion

order dated 09.03.2023 has been passed strictly in accordance

with law and on the basis of the DPC recommendation. There is

no arbitrariness, illegality or infirmity in the decision-making

process, and the petitioner's contentions are devoid of substance

and liable to be rejected. Accordingly, learned State counsel

prays for dismissal of the writ petition.

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11.Mr. Gary Mukhopadhyay, learned counsel appearing for

respondent No.3, submits that the writ petition is wholly frivolous,

bereft of substance, and constitutes a gross abuse of the process

of judicial review, as no legal or fundamental right of the petitioner

has been infringed so as to warrant interference by this Court. He

further submits that the Departmental Promotion Committee held

its meeting on 08.02.2023 for considering promotion from the

post of Assistant Inspector General of Prisons/Superintendent,

Central Jail to the post of Deputy Inspector General of Prisons,

wherein the names of three officers, including the petitioner, were

taken up for consideration against one solitary vacant post. He

submits that the applicable criteria for the said promotion was

“Merit-cum-Seniority”, with an eligibility requirement that the

officer must have secured “Very Good” remarks in the preceding

five years’ Annual Confidential Reports.

12.Mr. Mukhopadhyay submits that the DPC undertook an

assessment of the ACR gradings for the years 2017 to 2021 and

found that all three candidates had secured the minimum

benchmark of “Very Good” (15 marks), making them eligible for

consideration. Their immovable property returns for the

corresponding years were also duly examined. However, upon

comparative scrutiny of ACR gradings, the DPC noted that none

of the candidates possessed any “A+” (Outstanding) remark in

the five-year period under consideration, leaving no discernible

basis for determining inter se merit. In such circumstances, he

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that the DPC, in accordance with established procedure, applied

the seniority criterion to identify the most suitable candidate.

respondent No.4, Shri S.S. Tigga, being the seniormost officer,

his name appearing at Serial No.1 of the seniority list was found

eligible and suitable, and therefore recommended for promotion.

The petitioner, whose name stands at Serial No.3 in the seniority

list, could not be recommended, particularly when there was only

one post available. Accordingly, learned counsel for respondent

No.3 submits that the DPC proceedings were conducted strictly in

accordance with rules, without any arbitrariness or mala fides,

and prays for dismissal of the writ petition.

13.Mr. Siddhant Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for respondent

No. 4, submits that the grievance raised by the petitioner is wholly

misconceived and unfounded. He submits that the petitioner has

sought to contend that he is allegedly more meritorious than

respondent No. 4, and therefore the DPC ought to have

considered and recommended his name for promotion to the post

of DIG, Jail. It is urged that the petitioner has claimed to have

secured better ACR gradings than respondent No. 4; however,

such assertions are misleading and contrary to the record. He

further submits that the contentions so advanced by the petitioner

are devoid of any substance and deserve outright rejection. He

submits that the DPC meeting was duly convened on 08.02.2023

for considering promotions from the post of Assistant Inspector

General of Prison/Superintendent, Central Jail to the post of DIG,

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Jail. The criteria prescribed for such promotion was “Suitability-

cum-Seniority”, and the seniority position as reflected in the list

dated 01.04.2021 formed the basis of consideration. The

prescribed benchmark was that the candidate must have secured

“Very Good” remarks in the ACRs of the preceding five years. In

the seniority list, respondent No. 4 stood at Serial No. 1, whereas

the petitioner was placed at Serial No. 3. Accordingly, the DPC,

upon due evaluation, recommended respondent No. 4 for

promotion, and on the basis of such recommendation, the

competent authority issued the promotion order dated 09.03.2023

in his favour.

14.It is next submitted that Rule 7(9) of the Rules of 2003 mandates

that the DPC shall undertake a comparative assessment of

eligible officers within the zone of consideration and shall classify

them under categories such as “Outstanding”, “Very Good”,

“Average”, or “Poor”, based on their service records. Only officers

graded “Very Good” and above are eligible to be included in the

select list, with those graded “Outstanding” being placed above

those graded “Very Good”, while maintaining inter se seniority

within the same grade. He further submits that the petitioner did

not possess any “Outstanding” grading in ACRs of the relevant

five-year period, and therefore, the DPC rightly proceeded on the

basis of seniority, all candidates having only “Very Good”

gradings. Since respondent No. 4 was the senior-most eligible

officer, he was correctly recommended and subsequently

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promoted. There is no illegality, arbitrariness, or infirmity in the

process, and the petition is wholly meritless and liable to be

dismissed.

15.I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length,

carefully considered their respective submissions, and perused

the entire material placed on record with due circumspection. The

arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner as well as the

respondents have been examined in the light of the statutory

provisions governing the field, the applicable service rules, and

the documents forming part of the pleadings.

16.Firstly, this Court deems it appropriate to advert to the

Chhattisgarh Public Services (Promotion) Rules, 2003, and in

particular Rule 7, which governs promotion on the basis of merit-

cum-seniority. For proper appreciation of the controversy, sub-

rule (6), (7) and (9) of Rule 7, which lays down the manner in

which the Departmental Promotion Committee is required to

assess the comparative merit of candidates, is reproduced

hereunder:—

“7. Promotion on the basis of merit-cum-

seniority-

(6) The Departmental Promotion/screening

committee shall assess the suitability of the

public servants for promotion on the bases of

their service record and with particular

reference to the Annual Confidential Reports

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(ACRs) for 5 preceding years, However, in

cases where the required qualifying service is

more than 5 years, the Departmental

promotion/screening committee shall see the

record with particular reference to the ACRs

for the years equal to the require qualifying

service.

(7) When one or more ACRs are not available

for any reason for the relevant period, the

Departmental promotion/screening committee

shall consider the ACRs of the years

preceding the period in question.

***

(9) The Departmental promotion/screening

committee shall make a relative/comparative

assessment of the merits of public servants

who are within the zone of consideration and

make an overall grading of the public

servants merit on the basis of their service

records and place them in the categories as "

Outstanding", Very-Good", "Average" and

"Poor" as the case may be However, only

those public servants who are graded as

"Very-Good" and above will be included in the

select list, by placing the public servants

graded as "Outstanding" on top followed by

those graded as "Very-Good", subject to

availability of vacancies, with the public

servants with the same grading maintaining

their inter-se-seniority in the feeder cadre/part

of the service/pay scales of the post.”

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17.From perusal of the order dated 09.03.2023 (Annexure P-1), it

transpires that the State Government has promoted Shri S.S.

Tigga, Assistant Inspector General of Jails, Headquarters, Jail

and Correctional Services, Chhattisgarh, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar

(presently posted as Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Durg) to

the post of Deputy Inspector General of Jails in the pay scale of

₹79,900–2,11,700 (Pay Matrix Level-14), with effect from the date

he assumes charge. By the said order, he has been posted at the

Headquarters, Jail and Correctional Services, Chhattisgarh, Naya

Raipur, Atal Nagar.

18.It transpires from the record that a DPC was convened on

08.02.2023, wherein it was noted that the promotion from the

post of Assistant Inspector General of Prisons/Superintendent,

Central Jail to the post of Deputy Inspector General of Prisons

was to be made on the principle of “suitability-cum-seniority” in

accordance with the Rules of 2008 read with the Rules of 2003.

The DPC adopted the final seniority list as on 01.04.2021 and

fixed “Very Good” grading in the preceding five years’ ACRs as

the minimum benchmark. Upon assessment of ACRs, integrity,

qualifying service, and other parameters, it was found that only

one vacancy was available for the relevant year. Since all eligible

officers possessed “Very Good” entries but none had an

“Outstanding/A+” grading to enable comparative merit

assessment, the Committee, applying the principle of seniority,

recommended the name of Shri S.S. Tigga, who stood at Serial

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No. 1 in the seniority list, as suitable for promotion. The names of

the remaining two officers, including the petitioner, were not

recommended as the post was already filled.

19.In Ajit Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while

examining an analogous issue relating to the interpretation and

application of the principle of “merit-cum-seniority”, has

comprehensively clarified the methodology for assessing

comparative merit. The Court observed that when the applicable

service rule places merit as the dominant or governing criterion

for promotion, the role of seniority becomes only secondary or

residual. Seniority, in such a situation, operates merely as a

tiebreaker where candidates are otherwise found to be

approximately equal in merit. The Supreme Court further

emphasized that seniority cannot be permitted to eclipse,

override, or dilute the statutory requirement of evaluating relative

merit. If the rule mandates selection on merit, the competent

authority must undertake a meaningful comparative assessment

of the qualifications, performance, service record, achievements,

and overall suitability of the eligible candidates. A mere

mechanical reliance on length of service would defeat the very

object of the rule. The Hon’ble Apex Court underscored that the

principle of merit-cum-seniority contemplates a two-step

approach: (i) First, determine and rank candidates strictly on their

merit, assessed through objective and relevant parameters; and

(ii) Only thereafter, if two or more candidates are found to be of

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equal or nearly equal merit, their seniority may be considered to

decide inter se placement. Thus, the ruling makes it clear that

whenever merit is prescribed as the primary yardstick, it must

receive predominant consideration, and seniority cannot assume

importance at the cost of the rule’s foundational requirement of

merit-based evaluation. The decision therefore fortifies the

principle that promotional advancement in such cases cannot be

treated as a matter of seniority alone but must be rooted in an

honest appraisal of comparative merit.

20.Likewise, in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta (supra), the

Hon’ble Supreme Court once again examined the contours of the

principle of “merit-cum-seniority” and held that merit must always

have predominance over seniority when the rule so mandates.

The Court observed that the selection committee is required to

assign due weightage to the comparative merit of candidates

based on their service profile, ACR gradings, achievements,

vigilance clearance, and other relevant service parameters.

Seniority is to be considered only when officers are found to be of

broadly equal merit. The Court categorically held that where the

rule prescribes merit-cum-seniority, the most meritorious officer

has to be placed above others irrespective of their position in the

seniority list; only when two or more officers are found to have

equal merit, seniority may then tilt the balance. Any deviation

from this principle would vitiate the promotion process by

observing as follows :-

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“91. In Bhagwandas Tiwari & Ors. v. Dewas

Shajapur Kshetriya Gramin Bank & Ors.

reported in (2006) 12 SCC 574, this Court

observed that although the requirement of

minimum marks for assessing merit can be

prescribed for the purpose of promotion on

the basis of 'Seniority-cum-Merit', yet where a

very high requirement of minimum marks has

been prescribed, the same would amount to

laying greater emphasis on merit and thereby

departing from the principle of 'Seniority-cum-

Merit' and shifting towards to the principle of

'Merit-cum- Seniority' where merit and ability

play a predominant role. The relevant

observations read as under:-

"11. The principle of "merit-cum-seniority"

lays greater emphasis on merit and ability

and seniority plays a less significant role.

Seniority is to be given weight only when

merit and ability are approximately equal.

***

20. There is no basis, in the instant case, for

the stand that for assessing merit a minimum

number of marks has been prescribed. The

contention that minimum marks were 45 out

of 60, means that an employee is to secure

75% of marks. Such a high percentage

cannot be a measure for prescribing

minimum marks to assess merit. It obviously

would be a case of shifting the focus to merit-

cum-seniority principle. In para 37 of Sivaiah

case this Court noted that minimum marks

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prescribed for assessing merit do not depart

from the seniority-cum-merit principle. But the

factual position is different here. There is no

mention that 45 marks out of 60 relate to the

prescription of minimum marks for assessing

the merit. In Jalal Uddin case it was noted

that in seniority-cum-merit greater emphasis

is on seniority though it is not the

determinative factor. In the case of merit-

cum-seniority, merit becomes a determinative

factor. In fact, the position noted by this Court

in paras 19, 20, 24 and 25 of Sivaiah case

dealt with almost identical fact situation, apart

from para 16 of the judgment."

(Emphasis supplied)

***

93.1 This Court held that the principle of

‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ postulates only one

requirement i.e., once the minimum required

merit is assessed, thereafter the promotion

must be strictly in accordance with the

seniority of the candidates having the

requisite merit. How the minimum merit ought

to be assessed is immaterial.

93.2 As such, prescribing of an additional

requirement of minimum marks in any one

component of assessment such as interview

in addition to the requirement of aggregate

minimum marks in the overall assessment

process was permissible under the principle

of ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ provided that the

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ultimate promotion is taking place as per

seniority. The relevant observations read as

under: -

“13. [...] As the promotion to the post of Junior

Management Scale II shall be made on the

basis of seniority-cum-merit, the only

requirement would be that after it is found

that the candidates have possessed the

minimum necessary merit, namely, minimum

40% qualifying marks in the written test and

minimum 12 marks each out of 20 marks

each in interview and the performance

appraisal reports respectively, thereafter the

candidates are required to be promoted in the

order of seniority, irrespective of anyone

among them having obtained more marks.”

(Emphasis supplied)”

94. What can be discerned from the

aforenoted decisions is that this Court over

the years has consistently held that where

promotion is on the basis of the principle of

‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ a greater emphasis is

placed on merit, whereas, when the

promotion is on the basis of the principle of

‘Seniority-cum-Merit’, a greater emphasis is

laid on seniority.

95. One must be mindful that the terms

‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ or ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’

are not statutorily defined by the legislature.

96. These principles are judicial connotations

that have been evolved over a period of years

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through various decisions of this Court and

the High Courts whilst dealing with matters of

promotion pertaining to different statutes and

service conditions.

97. This Court in B.V. Sivaiah (supra),

Rajendra Kumar Srivastava (supra), Shriram

Tomar (supra), Sujata Kohli (supra) and a

catena of other decisions has held that the

principles of ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ and

‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ are conceptually

different. Whilst explaining the difference

between these two principles, this Court has

only gone to the extent of laying down what

these principles postulate for the purpose of

promotion. In other words, this Court has only

gone so far as to lay down what is

permissible within the four corners of these

principles and by no stretch of imagination

has this Court in any manner held that such

postulations are stricto-sensu required to be

complied with.

98. The various decisions of this Court have

only developed upon the principles of ‘Merit-

cum-Seniority’ and ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ by

explaining the criterions that may be

postulated within the framework of these

principles for the purpose of promotion. The

scope of the aforesaid principles is

summarized below: -

I) The principle of ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’

postulates that: -

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i. Minimum requirement of merit and

suitability which is necessary for the higher

post can be prescribed for the purpose of

promotion.

ii. Comparative Assessment amongst the

candidates is not required.

iii. Seniority of a candidate is not a

determinative factor for promotion but has

a predominant role.

iv. Upon fulfilling the minimum

qualifications, promotions must be based

on inter-se seniority.

II) The principle of ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’

postulates that: -

i. Merit plays a predominant role in and

seniority alone cannot be given primacy.

ii. Comparative Assessment of Merit is a

crucial, though not a mandatory, factor.

iii. Only where merit is equal in all respects

can inter-se seniority be considered.

Meaning that a junior candidate can be

promoted over the senior if the junior is

more meritorious.

99. The underlying reason why the afore-

stated postulations ought not be understood

as mandatory stems from the very fact that

they are not a result of a legislative creation,

but rather one of judicial interpretation whilst

dealing with different promotion policies,

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different service conditions, the varied nature

and requirement of posts and more

importantly different sets of rules. Since,

these postulations have been laid down in

different context and varied facts, it would be

preposterous to say that such postulations

will apply uniformly to all services and matters

of promotion including the judicial services.

100. The principles of ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’

and ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ should by no means

be regarded as rigid or inflexible in nature,

otherwise, these judicial connotations would

effectively assume the character of statutory

stipulation laid down through various judicial

pronouncements and would become

applicable to all types of services, posts and

promotions. This would lead to the

transgression by the judiciary into the realms

of policy making.

101. This Court in Lt. Gen. Rajendra Singh

Kadyan (supra) whilst explaining the

intricacies between the principles of ‘Merit-

cum-Seniority’ and ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’

made a pertinent observation that selection

for promotion is based on different criteria

depending upon the nature of the post and

requirements of service, and that such criteria

could be said to fall into three categories

which include ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ and

‘Seniority-cum-Merit’.

102. In Palure Bhaskar Rao (supra) and

Kavita Kamboj (supra) this Court equated the

23

principle of ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ and

‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ as modes or methods of

promotion. However, modes of promotion

should not be conflated with modalities of

promotion. The expressions ‘Merit-cum-

Seniority’ and ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ in service

jurisprudence are nothing but principles which

are used to broadly categorize policies

pertaining to promotions. They only lay down

the broad framework within which specific

policies of promotion can be elaborately laid

down.

103. In Bhagwandas Tiwari (supra) this Court

held that where for the purpose of promotion

a high threshold of minimum required marks

has been prescribed, the same would be an

instance of ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’, even in the

absence of a comparative assessment of

merit, thus clearly indicating that these

postulations are not mandatory. As even

without an element of comparative merit, the

promotion could be based on ‘Merit-cum-

Seniority’, provided that merit is given

prominence over seniority in the promotion

process. Therefore, the only factor that sets

apart ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ from ‘Seniority-

cum-Merit’ is whether emphasis is laid on

merit or seniority. All other ancillary factors or

postulations such as comparative merit or a

minimum specified benchmark may or may

not be material to these principles.

104. The fluid nature of the principles of

24

‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ and ‘Seniority-cum-

Merit’ is further evinced by the decision of this

Court in K. Samantaray (supra) wherein

although the policy stipulated that promotion

would be on the basis of ‘Seniority-cum-

Merit’, yet this Court after going through the

elaborate promotion policy held that a third

mode of promotion known as the “Hybrid

Mode of Promotion” has come to be

recognized by this Court, wherein it is open

for the employer to specify the area and

parameter of weight required to be given to

merit and seniority for the purpose of

promotion. It was further held that it is always

open for the employer or the selection body

to decide and stipulate their own criteria for

adjudging the claims on the principles of

‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ or ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’

depending upon the class, category and

nature of post and the requirements of

efficiency.

105. What can be discerned from the

aforesaid is that, wherever the expression

‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ or ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’

has been supplemented by an elaborate

promotion policy or statutory rules clearly

indicating the parameters on which

promotions are to be made, the mode of

promotion assumes the character of a Hybrid

or Dynamic Mode of Promotion as held in K.

Samantaray (supra).

106. In such scenario, these principles serve

25

as a beacon for the selection body which, in

exercise of its delegated legislative powers,

can formulate policies and lay down different

criteria and conditions of assessment for the

purposes of promotion. It does so by

providing the selection body with the tools for

formulating the promotion policy in the form of

the aforementioned postulations or criteria

which are permissible under these principles.

Thereafter, the selection body can, as a

conscious choice, decide the criteria it deems

necessary or most suitable for the purpose of

promotion keeping in mind the nature of the

post, the requirements of service, etc.

107. For instance, where the promotion is

based on ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’, the selection

body may opt for a comparative assessment

of merit, more particularly, in cases where the

promotions are competitive in nature or it may

say that seniority should only be considered

where merit is equal in all respect if the post

is of such nature that it requires significant

knowledge and ability.

108. However, at the same time, this flexibility

should not be understood as a complete

autonomy. While the statutory rules or, in the

absence of the same, the promotion policy

formulated must be followed, they must at the

same time have some nexus or bearing with

the nature of the post and the requirements of

service. For instance, where the promotion is

based on ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ and the nature

26

of promotion allows for superseding a senior,

the selection body whilst formulating the

promotion policy cannot simpliciter as a

matter of choice refuse to provide for

assessment of comparative merit, as the

promotion herein is by its nature an

accelerated form of promotion and as such

comparative assessment becomes crucial.

109. The principle of ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’

and ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ are a flexible and a

fluid concept akin to broad principles within

which the actual promotion policy may be

formulated. They are not strict rules or

requirements and by no means can supplant

or take the place of statutory rules or policies

that have been formulated, if any. These

principles are dynamic in nature very much

like a spectrum and their application and

ambit depends upon the rules, the policy, the

nature of the post and the requirements of

service.

110. Thus, the principles applicable to

promotion such as the principle of ‘Merit-cum-

Seniority’ and ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’ can best

be described as two ends of a spectrum.

They are broad categories or frameworks for

promotion and do represent the actual

modalities by which promotions are to take

place. It is the rules and the promotion policy,

along with the intention of the legislature or

the selection board, as the case may be, that

supplements these principles and delineates

27

the actual modality of how promotion is to

take place. Through these rules and

promotion policy, the legislature or the

selection body specifies the area and the

parameters or the weightage which is to be

given to the aspect of “Merit” and “Seniority”

on the said spectrum.

***

***

130. We have discussed in detail in the

foregoing paragraphs that the concepts of

‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ or ‘Seniority-cum-Merit’

are flexible in nature and do not prescribe any

fixed or strait-jacket definitions. These

definitions take character and substance from

the context in which they are employed. Their

full import and nuances only become visible

when they are exposed to the guiding light of

the overall promotional policy of the

organisation. The concept of promotions in

the District Judiciary is a peculiar one, and

one that must be analysed in its own unique

context. Unlike most cases on promotions

decided by this Court where the interpretation

or incorrect implementation of the promotion

policy contained in a statute have been in

question, the present case of promotions to

the Higher Judicial Service is one in which

the statutory framework itself was created

after the decision in All India Judges’

Association (3) (supra). Thus, any dispute

arising out of the respective rules of

28

promotions of different States/Union

Territories as devised by their respective High

Courts must be construed in the context of

various decisions which have ultimately

shaped such rules.

131. How ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ will apply to

promotions within an organization will

ultimately depend on the statutory rules, if

any, or the promotional policy of such an

organisation. We have discussed in detail in

the preceding paragraphs that the objective

of this Court in All India Judges’ Association

(3) (supra) was to create a new category for

accelerated promotions and to introduce a

test to ascertain the suitability of candidates

in the regular promotional category. While the

newly created category was strictly based on

merit, the due weightage on seniority in the

regular promotional category was not diluted

in any manner except for the introduction of

the suitability test. We are aware that in a

number of decisions of this Court, the term

‘merit’ has been infused with a competitive

and comparative character, however, we are

of the opinion that whether the term ‘merit’

includes a comparative element can only be

ascertained from the context in which it is

employed and not in isolation from it. Merit

only indicates an assessment of qualities

which are relevant for the post. It is not

synonymous to scores in the competitive

examination. Competitive examinations are

merely one of the many ways in which the

29

merit of the candidate is determined. This

Court in All India Judges’ Association (3)

(supra) notes that merit must be determined

based on a limited competitive examination

with respect to the 25% (now 10%) of the

seats which are to be filled by merit. Thus,

this Court clarifies that merit in the context of

the 25% (now 10%) of the seats must be

determined through the competitive

examination while for the 50% (now 65%) of

the seats must be determined based on an

assessment of specific suitability parameters.

Whether the idea of a ‘minimum threshold

merit’ would be antithetical to the concept of

‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ would again depend on

the context and the manner in which the

minimum threshold is applied.

132. The term ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ in context

of 2005 Rules implies that both merit and

seniority would be considered in the

promotion of a candidate, with merit being

determined on the basis of a suitability test.

The exact modalities of how merit and

seniority are to be apportioned is a legislative

function and is to be performed keeping in

mind the unique requirements and

circumstances of the organization. In the

present case, the merit of a candidate is

assessed by means of a suitability test, as

prescribed under paragraph 27 of the

decision in All India Judges’ Association (3)

(supra).

30

133. The contours of the words ‘Merit-cum-

Seniority’ are drawn by this Court in the lines

immediately following these words. The

phrase “for this purpose”, as it appears in

paragraph 27 of the aforesaid decision, acts

as a bridge between the words – “Merit-cum-

Seniority” – their substance. For the purpose

of 65% promotional quota, this Court, in the

said paragraph, has defined “merit” as the

possession of a minimum standard, or

suitability. This Court deliberately did not

impart any competitive or comparative

character to the term and such intention

should be kept in mind while interpreting the

term ‘Merit-cum-Seniority’ for the purpose of

the 65% promotional quota.

134. The suitability test assesses multiple

aspects of a candidate’s merit like knowledge

of law, quality of judgments, ACRs, etc. along

with the efficiency of the candidate exhibited

during the tenure already served. The

suitability test is devised in such a manner

that all candidates who clear the test can be

said to possess more or less the same level

of merit. Once a list of all similarly meritorious

candidates is prepared, seniority is applied to

select the candidates for promotion. Although

seniority is applied at the last stage of the

selection process, yet merit still plays the pre-

dominant role as a candidate who does not

possess the necessary suitability becomes

ineligible for promotion irrespective of their

seniority.”

31

21.Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the

aforementioned judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Ajit Singh (supra) and Ravikumar Dhansukhlal

Maheta (supra), it is quite vivid that the promotion to the post of

Deputy Inspector General of Prisons was required to be made

strictly in accordance with the principle of “merit-cum-seniority” as

embodied under Rule 7 of the Rules of 2003. The said Rule,

particularly sub-rule (9), not only obligates the Departmental

Promotion Committee to conduct a relative and comparative

assessment of the merit of all officers falling within the zone of

consideration, but further mandates the categorisation of officers

into “Outstanding”, “Very Good”, “Average” and “Poor” on the

basis of their service records, annual confidential reports, integrity

and overall performance.

22.However, upon meticulous examination of the proceedings of the

DPC dated 08.02.2023, it becomes manifest that the Committee,

instead of performing the comparative evaluation envisaged

under the Rules, adopted an erroneous approach in treating all

eligible candidates as indistinguishably equal merely because

their ACR gradings fell within the “Very Good” category. The

Committee thereafter straightaway proceeded to apply the

criterion of seniority alone for determining suitability, thereby

completely eclipsing the primacy of merit which lies at the heart of

the principle of merit-cum-seniority.

32

23.This Court is constrained to observe that the DPC’s reasoning

that merit could not be assessed merely because none of the

candidates possessed an “A+” or “Outstanding” grading is

fundamentally flawed and contrary to the law declared by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court.

24.As held in Ajit Singh (supra), the requirement of assessing

relative merit does not vanish merely because two or more

officers have similar gradings; even in such cases, the Committee

must evaluate qualitative differences, overall performance

indicators, consistency of service, noteworthy achievements,

integrity inputs and any distinguishing material in the service

dossiers.

25.Similarly, Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta (supra) reiterates

that seniority can be pressed into service only when candidates

are found to be of equal merit after a complete and objective

comparative assessment. Seniority cannot be made the sole or

primary basis when the governing rule prescribes merit as the

dominant factor.

26.In the instant case, the petitioner has specifically contended that

he possesses better ACR gradings and superior overall service

record as compared to respondent No.4, which assertion is not

shown to be incorrect on record. Yet, the DPC neither evaluated

such merit nor recorded any reason to indicate that the

comparative merit of the candidates was incapable of

33

assessment. This omission, coupled with the mechanical

application of seniority alone, renders the entire promotion

process arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Rule 7(9) of the

Rules of 2003.

27.In view of the aforesaid legal and factual position, this Court is of

the considered opinion that the impugned promotion order dated

09.03.2023 (Annexure P-1), promoting respondent No.4 to the

post of Deputy Inspector General of Prisons, cannot be sustained

in law. Likewise, the communication dated 26.04.2023 (Annexure

P-2), whereby the petitioner’s representation was mechanically

rejected, also deserves to be and is hereby quashed. The

recommendations of the DPC dated 08.02.2023, to the extent

they pertain to the promotion under challenge, are declared

illegal, arbitrary and in clear contravention of the governing

statutory rules.

28.Consequently, the respondents are directed to reconvene the

Departmental Promotion Committee afresh, and to undertake a

comprehensive, comparative and merit-based assessment of all

eligible officers falling within the zone of consideration, strictly in

accordance with Rule 7 of the Rules of 2003 and the law laid

down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

29.The aforesaid exercise shall be completed expeditiously

preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt

of certified copy of this order. The petitioner, if found more

34

meritorious in accordance with law, shall be accorded appropriate

consequential benefits.

30.With the above observations, findings and directions, the writ

petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. There shall be no

order as to costs.

Sd/-

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

Judge

Yogesh

The date when the

judgment is

reserved

The date when the

judgment is

pronounced

The date when the judgment is

uploaded on the website

Operative Full

04.12.2025 15.01.2026 ------ 15.01.2026

35

Head-Note

Under the “merit-cum-seniority” principle, merit and ability are the

dominant factors in promotion, while seniority is given consideration

only when candidates are nearly equal in merit. The selection primarily

depends on competence and performance rather than length of service.