1

2025:CGHC:6842

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

ORDER RESERVED ON 16.01.2025

ORDER DELIVERED ON 06.02.2025

MCRC No. 7176 of 2024

1 - Amit Singh S/o Sh. Ravindra Singh Aged About 34 Years Residing

At- Shristi Palazo, Avanti Vihar Raipur, Chhattisgarh

... Applicant

versus

1 - State of Chhattisgarh through ACB/EOW, Raipur, Chhattisgarh,

... Respondent(s)

For Applicant :Shri Sunil Otwani, Advocate along with Shri

Shobit Koshta and Shri Shashank Mishra,

Advocate

For Respondent/State :Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pandey, Addl. AG

(Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma)

C A V Order

The applicant has filed the instant bail application before this

Court in terms of the provisions of Section 483 (1) of the Bharatiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 ('BNSS' for short) for grant of bail in

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connection with Crime No. 04/2024 registered with Anti Corruption

Bureau, District Raipur under Sections 420,467,468,471,120-B IPC and

7 & 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

FACTUAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE

2.Facts of the case in brief are that on 11.07.2023, after receiving

communication from the Enforcement Directorate and on due

verification and being satisfied that prima facie a cognizable offence was

committed, FIR No. 04/2024 came to be registered under Section 7 &

12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 420,467,471 and

120-B IPC against 71 accused persons. The said charge sheet reveals

that applicant Anil Tuteja along with Anwar Dhebar was the head of the

criminal syndicate comprising of high level State government officials,

private persons and political executives of the State Government who

were operating in the State of Chhattisgarh along with Trilok Singh

Dhillon, Arunpathi Tripathi and Niranjan Das. The syndicate used to

collect illegal money in three different ways from the sale of liquor which

is classified by the syndicate itself into three parts:

Part A- illegal commission charged from liquor

supplier for official sale of liquor in the State of

Chhattisgarh.

Part B – Sale of unaccounted illicit countrymade

liquor from State run shops done with the

involvement of distillers, hologram manufacturers,

bottle makers, transporters, man power

management and District Excise Officials.

Part C – Annual Commission from distillers for

allowing them to operate a syndicate and divide

the market share amongst themselves.

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3.In the investigation, it has ben revealed that massive corruption

took place in the State Excise Department and the accused/applicants

were involved in altering the liquor policy for personal gratification

through illegal means. It has been revealed in the investigation that the

liquor was divided into two categories namely Country Liquor and Indian

Manufactured Foreign liquor (IMFL). The country liquor is produced in

the State of Chhattisgarh through three distilleries ie. M/s. Chhatisgarh

Distilleries Ltd., M/s. Bhatia Wines and Merchants Pvt. Ltd. and M/s.

Welcome Distilleries Pvt. Ltd.

4.It has been further revealed that since it was difficult to extract

cash bribes for foreign liquor makers in recept of IMFL and FL and there

was strong demand for good quality foreign brands, in the month of April

2020, the syndicate introduced a fourth type of mechanism to extort

bribes from FL makers by introducing the concept of FL-10A licenses.

These licenses were given to three chosen associates of Anwar Dhebar

who used to buy and sell the foreign liquor as an intermediary to the

Chhattisgarh Government warehouses and generated commission of

around 10% on foreign liquor.

5.The licenses were given with a promise that 50-50% of the final

profit amount of the FL-10A licensees be paid to the syndicate. The

people who were given the FL-10A licenses were ready to hike the

prices and ensure payment of cash bribes ie. Sanjay Mishra (M/s.

Nexgen Power Engitech Private Ltd.), Atul Kumar Singh and Mukesh

Manchand (M/s. Om Sai Beverage pvt. Ltd) and Asheesh Saurabh

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Kedia (M/s. Dishita Ventures Private Ltd.) and thus total earning of Rs.

1660,41,00,056/- was made by the syndicate causing huge loss to the

State exchequer.

6.The case against the present applicant is that he is the nephew of

co-accused Arvind Singh who is one of the main player of the

syndicate. Said Arvind Singh chose the present applicant who is his

near relative for monitoring the production of B-Part liquor in the

distilleries, transportation of additional bottles, supplying of duplicate

holograms and collecting the sales amount of B-Part fro the shops and

sending it to Vikas Agarwal. It is alleged that the applicant has been

charged for the offences under Sections 420,467, 468,471, and 120-B

IPC and Sections 7 & 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT

7.Contention of Shri Otwani, learned counsel for the applicant is

that the subject FIR has been registered illegally and is untenable in law

because it is evident from the fact that the material collected by the

respondent has already been quashed and they are preceding with the

quashed material with the sole intent of frustrating the fundamental and

constitutional right of the applicant. He contended that the co-accused

has filed petitioner before the Apex Court for quashment of the Fir and

he had been granted interim relief. Further contention of the learned

counsel for the applicant is that the investigation carried out by the ED in

the liquor ECIR is null, void ab initio, without jurisdiction and illegal and

therefore the subject FIR which has been registered on the complaint of

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the ED is also without jurisdiction. Similarly, the letter under Section 66

of the PMLA and the material collected by the ED cannot form the basis

of any tenable action in law including the registration of FIR and

resultantly all proceedings arising therefrom including the arrest of the

applicant are illegal. He contented that the Apex Court was pleased to

quash Prosecution Complaint dated 4.07.2023 filed against the

applicant and categorically held that there was neither any scheduled

offence in the liquor ECIR nor were there any proceeds of crime

therefore the entire genesis of registration of the subject FIR including

the issuance of the letter under Section 66 of the PMLA, 2002 by the ED

which led to the registration of the subject FIR has been quashed and

held to be illegal by the Apex Court.

8.It has been contended that the Apex Court had quashed the

Prosecution Complaint dated 04.07.2023 filed against the applicant and

had categorically held that there was neither any scheduled offence in

the liquor ECIR nor was there any proceeds of crime therefore the entire

genesis of registration of the subject FIR including the issuance of the

letter Section 66 of the PMLA, 2002 by the ED which led to the

registration of the subject FIR has been quashed and held to be illegal

by the Apex Court.

9.He further contended that the Departmental Enquiry conducted by

the jurisdictional department ie. Commercial Tax (Excise) Department,

State of Chhattisgarh in relation to the same allegations did not find any

illegality in relation to the same transactions. However, the same has

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been suppressed while registering the subject FIR despite the settled

law that in case of exoneration on merits in a Departmental Enquiry,

criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot

be allowed to be continued. He has referred to the judgment in the

matter of Radheshyam Kejriwal Vs. State of West Bengal and

Another (2011) 3 SCC 581.

10.He submits that the subject FIR has been registered in a

completely malafide manner. The respondent and the investigating

agencies are acting at the behest of the political masters and are

making repeated attempts to arrest the applicant and other persons in

relation to the alleged offence. He contended that the very registration of

the liquor ECIR and the investigation carried thereunder are without

jurisdiction and the action of the ED including addressing letters under

Section 66 of the PMLA in the same ECIR causing the registration of the

subject FIR is without jurisdiction. Prima facie, the subject FIR is illegal

and tenable in law and there was absolutely no ground made out for

arresting and keeping the applicant in custody. Keeping the applicant

behind bars in relation to an illegal case is a serious violation of the

fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

11.Next contention of Shri Otwani, learned counsel for the applicant

is that no notice or summons were issued to the applicant prior to his

arrest. It is contended that the applicant has been arrested under the

garb of search operation and he had been summoned as part of

preliminary enquiry. He has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court

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in the matter of Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273, it

has been held that :

“5. Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and

cast scars forever. Law makers know it so also

the police. There is a battle between the law

makers and the police and it seems that police

has not learnt its lesson; the lesson implicit and

embodied in the Cr.PC. It has not come out of its

colonial image despite six decades of

independence, it is largely considered as a tool

of harassment, oppression and surely not

considered a friend of public. The need for

caution in exercising the drastic power of arrest

has been emphasized time and again by Courts

but has not yielded desired result. Power to

arrest greatly contributes to its arrogance so also

the failure of the Magistracy to check it. Not only

this, the power of arrest is one of the lucrative

sources of police corruption. The attitude to

arrest first and then proceed with the rest is

despicable. It has become a handy tool to the

police officers who lack sensitivity or act with

oblique motive.

6. Law Commissions, Police Commissions and

this Court in a large number of judgments

emphasized the need to maintain a balance

between individual liberty and societal order

while exercising the power of arrest. Police

officers make arrest as they believe that they

possess the power to do so. As the arrest curtails

freedom, brings humiliation and casts scars

forever, we feel differently. We believe that no

arrest should be made only because the offence

is non-bailable and cognizable and therefore,

lawful for the police officers to do so. The

existence of the power to arrest is one thing, the

justification for the exercise of it is quite another.

Apart from power to arrest, the police officers

must be able to justify the reasons thereof. No

arrest can be made in a routine manner on a

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mere allegation of commission of an offence

made against a person. It would be prudent and

wise for a police officer that no arrest is made

without a reasonable satisfaction reached after

some investigation as to the genuineness of the

allegation. Despite this legal position, the

Legislature did not find any improvement.

Numbers of arrest have not decreased.

Ultimately, the Parliament had to intervene and

on the recommendation of the 177th Report of

the Law Commission submitted in the year 2001,

Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(for short ‘Cr.PC), in the present form came to be

enacted. It is interesting to note that such a

recommendation was made by the Law

Commission in its 152nd and 154th Report

submitted as back in the year 1994. The value of

the proportionality permeates the amendment

relating to arrest.”

12.Similarly in the matter of Satedra Kumar Antil Vs. CBI (2022) 10

SCC 51, it has been held as under:

“7. The word ‘trial’ is not explained and defined

under the Code. An extended meaning has to be

given to this word for the purpose of enlargement

on bail to include, the stage of investigation and

thereafter. Primary considerations would

obviously be different between these two stages.

In the former stage, an arrest followed by a

police custody may be warranted for a thorough

investigation, while in the latter what matters

substantially is the proceedings before the Court

in the form of a trial. If we keep the above

distinction in mind, the consequence to be drawn

is for a more favourable consideration towards

enlargement when investigation is completed, of

course, among other factors.”

13.It has been further held that:

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ECONOMIC OFFENSES (CATEGORY D)

66.What is left for us now to discuss are the

economic offences. The question for consideration

is whether it should be treated as a class of its own

or otherwise. This issue has already been dealt with

by this Court in the case of P. Chidambaram v.

Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791,

after taking note of the earlier decisions governing

the field. The gravity of the offence, the object of the

Special Act, and the attending circumstances are a

few of the factors to be taken note of, along with the

period of sentence. After all, an economic offence

cannot be classified as such, as it may involve

various activities and may differ from one case to

another. Therefore, it is not advisable on the part of

the court to categorise all the offences into one

group and deny bail on that basis. Suffice it to state

that law, as laid down in the following judgements,

will govern the field:-

Precedents



P. Chidambaram v.

Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13

SCC 791:

23. Thus, from cumulative perusal of the

judgments cited on either side including the

one rendered by the Constitution Bench of this

Court, it could be deduced that the basic

jurisprudence relating to bail remains the same

inasmuch as the grant of bail is the rule and

refusal is the exception so as to ensure that

the accused has the opportunity of securing

fair trial. However, while considering the same

the gravity of the offence is an aspect which is

required to be kept in view by the Court. The

gravity for the said purpose will have to be

gathered from the facts and circumstances

arising in each case. Keeping in view the

consequences that would befall on the society

in cases of financial irregularities, it has been

held that even economic offences would fall

under the category of “grave offence” and in

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such circumstance while considering the

application for bail in such matters, the Court

will have to deal with the same, being sensitive

to the nature of allegation made against the

accused. One of the circumstances to

consider the gravity of the offence is also the

term of sentence that is prescribed for the

offence the accused is alleged to have

committed. Such consideration with regard to

the gravity of offence is a factor which is in

addition to the triple test or the tripod test that

would be normally applied. In that regard what

is also to be kept in perspective is that even if

the allegation is one of grave economic

offence, it is not a rule that bail should be

denied in every case since there is no such

bar created in the relevant enactment passed

by the legislature nor does the bail

jurisprudence provide so. Therefore, the

underlining conclusion is that irrespective of

the nature and gravity of charge, the

precedent of another case alone will not be the

basis for either grant or refusal of bail though it

may have a bearing on principle. But ultimately

the consideration will have to be on case-to-

case basis on the facts involved therein and

securing the presence of the accused to stand

trial.



Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40:

“39. Coming back to the facts of the present

case, both the courts have refused the request

for grant of bail on two grounds: the primary

ground is that the offence alleged against the

accused persons is very serious involving

deep-rooted planning in which, huge financial

loss is caused to the State exchequer; the

secondary ground is that of the possibility of

the accused persons tampering with the

witnesses. In the present case, the charge is

that of cheating and dishonestly inducing

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delivery of property and forgery for the

purpose of cheating using as genuine a forged

document. The punishment for the offence is

imprisonment for a term which may extend to

seven years. It is, no doubt, true that the

nature of the charge may be relevant, but at

the same time, the punishment to which the

party may be liable, if convicted, also bears

upon the issue. Therefore, in determining

whether to grant bail, both the seriousness of

the charge and the severity of the punishment

should be taken into consideration.

40. The grant or refusal to grant bail lies

within the discretion of the court.

The grant or denial is regulated, to a large

extent, by the facts and circumstances of each

particular case. But at the same time, right to bail is

not to be denied merely because of the sentiments

of the community against the accused. The primary

purposes of bail in a criminal case are to relieve the

accused of imprisonment, to relieve the State of the

burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the

same time, to keep the accused constructively in the

custody of the court, whether before or after

conviction, to assure that he will submit to the

jurisdiction of the court and be in attendance

thereon whenever his presence is required.

xxx xxx xxx

46. We are conscious of the fact that the accused

are charged with economic offences of huge

magnitude. We are also conscious of the fact that

the offences alleged, if proved, may jeopardize the

economy of the country. At the same time, we

cannot lose sight of the fact that the investigating

agency has already completed investigation and the

charge-sheet is already filed before the Special

Judge, CBI, New Delhi. Therefore, their presence in

the custody may not be necessary for further

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investigation. We are of the view that the appellants

are entitled to the grant of bail pending trial on

stringent conditions in order to ally the apprehension

expressed by CBI.”

ROLE OF THE COURT

67.The rate of conviction in criminal cases in India is

abysmally low. It appears to us that this factor

weighs on the mind of the Court while deciding the

bail applications in a negative sense. Courts tend to

think that the possibility of a conviction being nearer

to rarity, bail applications will have to be decided

strictly, contrary to legal principles. We cannot mix

up consideration of a bail application, which is not

punitive in nature with that of a possible adjudication

by way of trial. On the contrary, an ultimate acquittal

with continued custody would be a case of grave

injustice.

68.Criminal courts in general with the trial court in

particular are the guardian angels of liberty. Liberty,

as embedded in the Code, has to be preserved,

protected, and enforced by the Criminal Courts. Any

conscious failure by the Criminal Courts would

constitute an affront to liberty. It is the pious duty of

the Criminal Court to zealously guard and keep a

consistent vision in safeguarding the constitutional

values and ethos. A criminal court must 1uphold the

constitutional thrust with responsibility mandated on

them by acting akin to a high priest.”

14.It is therefore contended by the learned counsel for the applicant

that no useful purpose would be served by continuing the custody of the

applicant. The applicant is in judicial custody and he had duly

cooperated in the investigation and his statements were recorded

therefore no useful purpose would be served in keeping him in custody.

The search proceedings and the examination of the applicant has

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already been concluded and there is no material to be obtained from

him nor any recovery has been made from him. In plethora of

judgments, the Apex Court has held the basic rule of “….Bail, Not Jail”

(State of Rajasthan Vs. Balchand (1977) 4 SCC 308) and “….bail is

the ride and committal to jail an exception.” In Gurcharan Singh Vs.

State (Delhi Admn.) (1978) 1 SCC 118, that the object of bail is neither

punitive nor preventive.

15. He submits that the respondent/Agency has alleged that it s a huge

scam having wide implication in the society but in the light of the

judgment passed by the Apex Court in the matter of Jalaludin Khan Vs.

Union of India 2024 INSC 604 that the role of each accused has to be

seen while as an independent. There is no substantial admissible

evidence brought on record by the respondent which would establish

that the applicant was involved in the activity of manufacturing duplicate

holograms, illegal commission from the liquor suppliers for unaccounted

official sale of liquor of sale off the record unaccounted illicit country

liquor. He submits that there are no ingredients of the offence

punishable under Sections 420,467,468,471,120-B IPC and 7 &12 of

the PC Act.

16.Another Contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that

the applicant satisfies the triple test for grant of bail. It has been held in

catena of judgments that at the time of consideration fo the application

for bail, the Court should consider three factors:viz. (I) flight risk; (ii)

likelihood of tampering with evidence and (iii) likelihood of influencing

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witnesses. Pertinently all the three facts are satisfied by the applicant

and as such the applicant may be granted bail.

17.It is contended that the applicant is not a flight risk and that any

conditions may be imposed on him. He submits that the applicant has

cooperated with the investigation and his statements have been

recorded. It is contended that ground of arrest has not been supplied to

the applicant in terms of Article 22 of the Constitution of India read with

Section 50(1) of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973. IN the judgment

of the Apex Court dated 3.10.2023 passed in the matter of Pankaj

Bansal Vs. Union of India and Others (Cr.A. No. 3051-3052 of 2023)

and in the matter of Prabir Purkayatha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)

dated 15.05.2024.

“Article 22 of the Constitution of India reads as

under:

“22. Protection against arrest and detention in

certain cases.

No person who is arrested shall be detained in

custody without being informed as soon as many

be of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be

denied the right to consult and to be defended by

a legal practitioners of his choice.

…… ….. ….. …..

Section 50 Cr.P.C. reads as under:

“50. Person arrested to be informed of

grounds of arrest and or right to bail.

(a) Every police officer or other person arresting

any person without warrant shall forthwith

communicate to him full particulars of the offence

for which he is arrested or other grounds for such

arrest.

(b) where a police officer arrests without warrant

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any person other than a person accused of a non-

bailable offence, he shall inform the person

arrested that he is entitled to be released on bail

and that he may arrest for sureties on his behalf.”

18.It has also been contended by learned counsel for the applicant

that in the matter of Pankaj Bansal (supra) held that that the grounds

of arrest needs to be physically served to the accused and non-supply

of grounds of arrest would render an arrest as illegal and the person is

liable to released forthwith. Relevant portion has been reproduced as

under:

“26. The more important issue presently is as to

how the ED is required to ‘inform’ the arrested

person of the grounds for his/her arrest. Prayer

(iii) in the writ petitions filed by the appellants

pertained to this. Section 19 does not specify in

clear terms as to how the arrested person is to be

‘informed’ of the grounds of arrest and this aspect

has not been dealt with or delineated in Vijay

Madanlal Choudhary (supra). Similarly, in V.

Senthil Balaji (supra), this Court merely noted that

the information of the grounds of arrest should be

‘served’ on the arrestee, but did not elaborate on

that issue. Pertinent to note, the grounds of arrest

were furnished in writing to the arrested person in

that case. Surprisingly, no consistent and uniform

practice seems to be followed by the ED in this

regard, as written copies of the grounds of arrest

are furnished to arrested persons in certain parts

of the country but in other areas, that practice is

not followed and the grounds of arrest are either

read out to them or allowed to be read by them.

XXXX XXXX XXXX

29. In this regard, we may note that Article 22(1)

of the Constitution WP (Crl.) No. 2465 of 2017,

decided on 01.12.2017 = 2017 SCC OnLine Del

12108 2017 Cri LJ (NOC 301) 89 = 2017 (1) AIR

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Bom R (Cri) 929 provides, inter alia, that no

person who is arrested shall be detained in

custody without being informed, as soon as may

be, of the grounds for such arrest. This being the

fundamental right guaranteed to the arrested

person, the mode of conveying information of the

grounds of arrest must necessarily be meaningful

so as to serve the intended purpose. It may be

noted that Section 45 of the Act of 2002 enables

the person arrested under Section 19 thereof to

seek release on bail but it postulates that unless

the twin conditions prescribed thereunder are

satisfied, such a person would not be entitled to

grant of bail. The twin conditions set out in the

provision are that, firstly, the Court must be

satisfied, after giving an opportunity to the public

prosecutor to oppose the application for release,

that there are reasonable grounds to believe that

the arrested person is not guilty of the offence

and, secondly, that he is not likely to commit any

offence while on bail. To meet this requirement, it

would be essential for the arrested person to be

aware of the grounds on which the authorized

officer arrested him/her under Section 19 and the

basis for the officer’s ‘reason to believe’ that

he/she is guilty of an offence punishable under

the Act of 2002. It is only if the arrested person

has knowledge of these facts that he/she would

be in a position to plead and prove before the

Special Court that there are grounds to believe

that he/she is not guilty of such offence, so as to

avail the relief of bail. Therefore, communication

of the grounds of arrest, as mandated by Article

22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19 of the Act

of 2002, is meant to serve this higher purpose

and must be given due importance.”

30. We may also note that the language of

Section 19 of the Act of 2002 puts it beyond doubt

that the authorized officer has to record in writing

the reasons for forming the belief that the person

proposed to be arrested is guilty of an offence

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punishable under the Act of 2002. Section 19(2)

requires the authorized officer to forward a copy

of the arrest order along with the material in his

possession, referred to in Section 19(1), to the

Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope.

Though it is not necessary for the arrested person

to be supplied with all the material that is

forwarded to the Adjudicating Authority under

Section 19(2), he/she has a constitutional and

statutory right to be ‘informed’ of the grounds of

arrest, which are compulsorily recorded in writing

by the authorized officer in keeping with the

mandate of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002. As

already noted hereinbefore, It seems that the

mode of informing this to the persons arrested is

left to the option of the ED’s authorized officers in

different parts of the country, i.e., to either furnish

such grounds of arrest in writing or to allow such

grounds to be read by the arrested person or be

read over and explained to such person.

32. That being so, there is no valid reason as to

why a copy of such written grounds of arrest

should not be furnished to the arrested person as

a matter of course and without exception. There

are two primary reasons as to why this would be

the advisable course of action to be followed as a

matter of principle. Firstly, in the event such

grounds of arrest are orally read out to the

arrested person or read by such person with

nothing further and this fact is disputed in a given

case, it may boil down to the word of the arrested

person against the word of the authorized officer

as to whether or not there is due and proper

compliance in this regard. In the case on hand,

that is the situation insofar as Basant Bansal is

concerned. Though the ED claims that witnesses

were present and certified that the grounds of

arrest were read out and explained to him in

Hindi, that is neither here nor there as he did not

sign the document. Non-compliance in this regard

would entail release of the arrested person

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straightaway, as held in V. Senthil Balaji (supra).

Such a precarious situation is easily avoided and

the consequence thereof can be obviated very

simply by furnishing the written grounds of arrest,

as recorded by the authorized officer in terms of

Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002, to the arrested

person under due acknowledgment, instead of

leaving it to the debatable ipse dixit of the

authorized officer.

33. The second reason as to why this would be

the proper course to adopt is the constitutional

objective underlying such information being given

to the arrested person. Conveyance of this

information is not only to apprise the arrested

person of why he/she is being arrested but also to

enable such

person to seek legal counsel and, thereafter,

present a case before the Court under Section 45

to seek release on bail, if he/she so chooses. In

this regard, the grounds of arrest in V. Senthil

Balaji (supra) are placed on record and we find

that the same run into as many as six pages. The

grounds of arrest recorded in the case on hand in

relation to Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal

have not been produced before this Court, but it

was contended that they were produced at the

time of remand. However, as already noted

earlier, this did not serve the intended purpose.

Further, in the event their grounds of arrest were

equally voluminous, it would be well-nigh

impossible for either Pankaj Bansal or Basant

Bansal to record and remember all that they had

read or heard being read out for future recall so

as to avail legal remedies. More so, as a person

who has just been arrested would not be in a

calm and collected frame of mind and may be

utterly incapable of remembering the contents of

the grounds of arrest read by or read out to

him/her. The very purpose of this constitutional

and statutory protection would be rendered

nugatory by permitting the authorities concerned

19

to merely read out or permit reading of the

grounds of arrest, irrespective of their length and

detail, and claim due compliance with the

constitutional requirement under Article 22(1) and

the statutory mandate under Section 19(1) of the

Act of 2002.

XXXX XXXX

35. On the above analysis, to give true meaning

and purpose to the constitutional and the

statutory mandate of Section 19(1) of the Act of

2002 of informing the arrested person of the

grounds of arrest, we hold that it would be

necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such written

grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested

person as a matter of course and without

exception. The decisions of the Delhi High Court

in Moin Akhtar Qureshi (supra) and the Bombay

High Court in Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal

(supra), which hold to the contrary, do not lay

down the correct law. In the case on hand, the

admitted position is that the ED’s Investigating

Officer merely read out or permitted reading of

the grounds of arrest of the appellants and left it

at that, which is also disputed by the appellants.

As this form of communication is not found to be

adequate to fulfil compliance with the mandate of

Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19(1)

of the Act of 2002, we have no hesitation in

holding that their arrest was not in keeping with

the provisions of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002.

Further, as already noted supra, the clandestine

conduct of the ED in proceeding against the

appellants, by recording the second ECIR

immediately after they secured interim protection

in relation to the first ECIR, does not commend

acceptance as it reeks of arbitrary exercise of

power. In effect, the arrest of the appellants and,

in consequence, their remand to the custody of

the ED and, thereafter, to judicial custody, cannot

be sustained.

20

36. The appeals are accordingly allowed, setting

aside the impugned orders passed by the Division

Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court as

well as the impugned arrest orders and arrest

memos along with the orders of remand passed

by the learned Vacation Judge/Additional

Sessions Judge, Panchkula, and all orders

consequential thereto.”

19.In the aforesaid settled proposition, in the matter of Prabir

Purkayastha (supra) the Apex Court has held as under:

30. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating

that the requirement to communicate the

grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in

writing to a person arrested in connection with

an offence or a person placed under preventive

detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and

22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct

and cannot be breached under any situation.

Non-compliance of this constitutional

requirement and statutory mandate would lead

to the custody or the detention being rendered

illegal, as the case may be.

31. Furthermore, the provisions of Article 22(1)

have already been interpreted by this Court in

Pankaj Bansal(supra) laying down beyond the

pale of doubt that the grounds of arrest must be

communicated in writing to the person arrested

of an offence at the earliest. Hence, the fervent

plea of learned ASG that there was no

requirement under law to communicate the

grounds of arrest in writing to the accused

appellant is noted to be rejected.

XXXX XXXX XXXX

49.49. It may be reiterated at the cost of

repetition that there is a significant difference in

the phrase ‘reasons for arrest’ and ‘grounds of

arrest’. The ‘reasons for arrest’ as indicated in

the arrest memo are purely formal parameters,

21

viz., to prevent the accused person from

committing any further offence; for proper

investigation of the offence; to prevent the

accused person from causing the evidence of

the offence to disappear or tempering with such

evidence in any manner; to prevent the

arrested person for making inducement, threat

or promise to any person acquainted with the

facts of the case so as to dissuade him from

disclosing such facts to the Court or to the

Investigating Officer. These reasons would

commonly apply to any person arrested on

charge of a crime whereas the ‘grounds of

arrest’ would be required to contain all such

details in hand of the Investigating Officer

which necessitated the arrest of the accused.

Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed

in writing must convey to the arrested accused

all basic facts on which he was being arrested

so as to provide him an opportunity of

defending himself against custodial remand

and to seek bail. Thus, the ‘grounds of arrest’

would invariably be personal to the accused

and cannot be equated with the ‘reasons of

arrest’ which are general in nature.”

20.It is contended by learned counsel for the applicant that the said

judgment is squarely applicable to the present case and as has been

provided in the matter of Prabir Purkayastha (supra) wherein it was

stated as under:

“20. Resultantly, there is no doubt in the mind

of the Court that any person arrested for

allegation of commission of offences under the

provisions of UAPA or for that matter any other

offences has a fundamental and statutory right

to be informed about the grounds of arrest in

writing and a copy of such written grounds of

arrest have to be furnished to the arrested

22

person as a matter of course and without

exception at the earliest. The purpose of

informing to the arrested person the grounds of

arrest is salutary and sacrosanct inasmuch as,

this information would be the only effective

means for the arrested person to consult his

Advocate; oppose the police custody remand

and to seek bail. Any other interpretation would

tantamount to diluting the sanctity of the

fundamental right guaranteed under Article

22(1) of the Constitution of India.”

21.He has further relied upon the matter of Ram Kishor Arora Vs.

Directorate of Enforcement wherein it has been held that reasonably

convenient or reasonably requisite time to inform the arrestee about the

grounds of his arrest would be 24 hours of the arrest wherein it was

stated as under:

“21. In view of the above, the expression “as soon

as may be” contained in Section 19 of PMLA is

required to be construed as- “as early as possible

without avoidable delay” or “within reasonably

convenient” or “reasonably requisite” period of

time. Since by way of safeguard a duty is cast

upon the concerned officer to forward a copy of

the order along with the material in his possession

to the Adjudicating Authority immediately after the

arrest of the person, and to take the person

arrested to the concerned court within 24 hours of

the arrest, in our opinion, the reasonably

convenient or reasonably requisite time to inform

the arrestee about the grounds of his arrest would

be twenty-four hours of the arrest.”

22.It has been held in Prabir Purkayastha (supra) that if the charge

sheet is filed it cannot mean that the rights of the accused is not violated

by the judgment and has held as under:

23

“22. The right to be informed about the

grounds of arrest flows from Article 22(1) of

the Constitution of India and any

infringement of this fundamental right would

vitiate the process of arrest and remand.

Mere fact that a charge sheet has been filed

in the matter, would not validate the illegality

and the unconstitutionality 3 (2000) 8 SCC

590 committed at the time of arresting the

accused and the grant of initial police

custody remand to the accused.”

23.In the matter of Gautam Navlakha Vs. National Investigation

Agency, Cr.A.No. 510 of 2021, it has been held as under:

101. Now, as far as the non-fulfillment of the

conditions under Article 22(1) and the duty of

a Magistrate exercising power to remand, we

notice the judgment of this Court rendered by

a Bench of three learned Judges in The

matter of: Madhu Limaye and Others;16.

Therein, the petitioners were arrested

apparently for offence under Section 188 of

the IPC which was non-cognizable. The

officer did not give the arrested persons the

reasons for their arrest or information about

the offences for which they had been taken

into custody. this was a case where the

Magistrate offered to release the petitioners

on bail but on the petitioners refusing to

furnish bail, the Magistrate remanded them

to custody. The proceeding before this Court

was under Article 32. It was in fact, initiated

on a letter complaining that the arrest and

detention were illegal. It was 16(1969)1 SCC

292 contended that the arrests were illegal

as they were arrested for offences which

were non-cognizable. In fact, it was found

that the arrest were effected without specific

order of Magistrate. It was also contended

that Article 22(1) was violated. What is

relevant is the following discussion:-

24

“12. Once it is shown that the arrests made

by the police officers were illegal, it was

necessary for the State to establish that at

the stage of remand the Magistrate directed

detention in jail custody after applying his

mind to all relevant matters. This the State

has failed to do. The remand orders are

patently routine and appear to have been

made mechanically. All that Mr Chagla has

said is that if the arrested persons wanted to

challenge their legality the High Court should

have been moved under appropriate

provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.

But it must be remembered that Madhu

Limaye and others have, by moving this

Court under Article 32 of the Constitution,

complained of detention or confinement in jail

without compliance with the constitutional

and legal provisions. If their detention in

custody could not continue after their arrest

because of the violation of Article 22(1) of the

Constitution they were entitled to be released

forthwith. The orders of remand are not such

as would cure the constitutional infirmities.

This disposes of the third contention of

Madhu Limaye.”

102. We may further notice that in In Arnesh Kumar vs. State of

Bihar and Another; this Court taking note of indiscriminate

arrests issued certain directions. We may notice: -

“8.2. Before a Magistrate authorizes detention under Section

167 CrPC, he has to be first satisfied that the arrest made is

legal and in accordance with law and all the constitutional rights

of the person arrested are satisfied. If the arrest effected by the

police officer does not satisfy the requirements of Section 41 of

the Code, Magistrate is duty-bound not to authorize his further

detention and release the accused.

In other words, when an accused is 17 (2014) 8 SCC 273

produced before the Magistrate, the police officer effecting the

arrest is required to furnish to the Magistrate, the facts, reasons

and its conclusions for arrest and the Magistrate in turn is to be

satisfied that the condition precedent for arrest under Section

41 CrPC has been satisfied and it is only thereafter that he will

25

authorize the detention of an accused.

8.3. The Magistrate before authorizing detention will record his

own satisfaction, may be in brief but the said satisfaction must

reflect from his order. It shall never be based upon the ipse dixit

of the police officer, for example, in case the police officer

considers the arrest necessary to prevent such person from

committing any further offence or for proper investigation of the

case or for preventing an accused from tampering with

evidence or making inducement, etc. the police officer shall

furnish to the Magistrate the facts, the reasons and materials on

the basis of which the police officer had reached its conclusion.

Those shall be perused by the Magistrate while authorizing the

detention and only after recording his satisfaction in writing that

the Magistrate will authorize the detention of the accused.”

24.He further contended that the prosecution agency has placed

heavy reliance on certain statements of the co-accused persons. To this,

he has placed his reliance upon the decision of Haricharan Kurmi Vs.

State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1184, wherein it has been held as under:

“13. As we have already indicated. this question

has been considered on several occasions by

judicial decisions and it has been consistently

held that a confession cannot be treated as

evidence which is substantive evidence against a

co-accused person. in dealing with a criminal

case where the prosecution relies upon the

confession of one accused person against

another accused person, the proper approach to

adopt is to consider the other evidence against

such an accused person, and if the said evidence

appears to be satisfactory and the court is

inclined to hold that the said evidence may

sustain the charge framed against the said

accused person, the court turns to the confession

with a view to assure itself that the conclusion

which it is inclined to draw from the other

evidence is right. As was observed by Sir

Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan

Chuckerbuttv(1) a confession can only be used to

26

"lend assurance to other evidence against a co-

accused". In In re. Peryaswami Noopan,(2) Reilly

J. observed that the provision of s. 30 goes not

further than this : "where there is evidence

against the co-accused sufficient, if,. believed, to

support his conviction, then the kind of confession

described in s. 30 may be thrown into the scale

as an additional reason for believing that

evidence." In Bhuboni Sahu v. King(1) the Privy

Council has expressed the same view. Sir. John

Beaumont who spoke for the Board observed that

a confession of a co-accused is obviously

evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed

come within the definition of "evidence" contained

in s. 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be

given on oath, nor in the presence of the

accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-

examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence

than the evidence of an approver, which is not

subject to any of those infirmities.

25.The statement of a co-accused is generic piece of evidence under

Section 30 of the Evidence Act but not evidence as defined under

Section 3 of the Evidence Act. Solely on the basis of statement of a co-

accused, there cannot be conviction it has to be corroborated with other

evidences as well. Int he entire final report there is no documentary

evidence to establish that the applicant has been collecting money from

the hawala operators and circulated the same among various

bureaucrat and politicians as protection money. He has further relied

upon the judgment of Surinder Kumar Khanna Vs. Intelligence

Officer (2018) 8 SCC 271. The proposition of law has been further

reiterated by the Apex Court in Deepak Bhai Patel Vs. State (2019) 16

27

SCC 547. Relevant paras in the matter of Surinder Kumar (supra) are

reproduced herein below:

11. In Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya

Pradesh, this Court relied upon the decision of

the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King8

and laid down as under:

“Gurubachan's confession has played

an important part in implicating the

appellant, and the question at once

arises, how far and in what way the

confession of an accused person can

be used against a co-accused? It is

evident that it is not evidence in the

ordinary sense of the term because,

as the Privy Council say in Bhuboni

Sahu v. The King "It does not indeed

come within the definition of"

'evidence' contained in section 3 of

the Evidence Act., It is not required to

be given on oath, nor in the presence

of the accused, and it cannot be

tested by cross- examination." Their

Lordships also point out that it is

"obviously evidence of a very weak

type......... It is a much weaker type of

evidence than the evidence of an

approver, which is not subject to any

of those infirmities."

They stated in addition that such a

confession cannot be made tile

foundation of a conviction and can

only be used in "support of other

evidence." In view of these remarks it

would be pointless to cover the same

ground, but we feel it is necessary to

expound this further as

misapprehension still exists. The

question is, in what way can it be

used in support of other evidence?

28

Can it be used to fill in missing gaps?

Can it be used to corroborate an

accomplice or, as in the present case,

a witness who, though not an

accomplice, is placed in the same

category regarding credibility

because the judge refuses to believe

him except in so far as he is

corroborated ?

(1952) SCR 526 (1949) 76 Indian

Appeal 147 at 155 In our opinion, the

matter was put succinctly by Sir

'Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit

Mohan Chuckerbutty9 where he said

that such a confession can only be

used to "lend assurance to other

evidence against a co-accused "or, to

put it in another way, as Reilly J. did

in In re Periyaswami Moopan10 "the

provision goes no further than this--

where there is evidence against the

co-accused sufficient, if believed, to

support his conviction, then the kind

of confession de- scribed in section

30 may be thrown into the scale as

an additional reason for believing that

evidence."

Translating these observations into concrete

terms they come to this. The proper way to

approach a case of this kind is, first, to marshal

the evidence against the accused excluding the

confession altogether from consideration and

see whether, if it is believed, a conviction could

safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief

independently of the confession, then of course

it is not necessary to call the confession in aid.

But cases may arise where the judge is not

prepared to act on the other evidence as it

stands even though, if believed, it would be

sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an

29

event the judge may call in aid the confession

and use it to lend assurance to the other

evidence and thus fortify himself in believing

what without the aid of the confession he would

not be prepared to accept.”

12. The law laid down in Kashmira Singh

(supra) was approved by a Constitution Bench

of this Court in Hari Charan Kurmi and Jogia

Hajam v. State of Bihar11 wherein it was

observed:

“As we have already indicated, this

question has been considered on

several occasions by judicial

decisions and it has been

consistently held that a confession

cannot be treated as evidence which

is substantive evidence against a co-

accused person. In dealing with a

criminal case where the prosecution

relies upon the confession of one

accused person against another

accused person, the proper approach

to adopt is to consider the other

evidence against such an accused

person, and if the said evidence

appears to be satisfactory and the

court is inclined to hold that the said

evidence may sustain the charge

framed against the said accused

person, the court turns to the

confession with a view to assure itself

that the conclusion which it is inclined

to draw from the other evidence is

right. As was observed by Sir

Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit

Mohan Chuckerburty a confession

can only be used to “lend assurance

to other evidence against a co-

accused”. In re Periyaswami Moopan

Reilly. J., observed that the provision

of Section 30 goes not further than

30

this: “where there is evidence against

the co-accused sufficient, if believed,

to support his conviction, then the

kind of confession described in

Section 30 may be thrown into the

scale as an additional reason for

believing that evidence”. In Bhuboni

Sahu v. King the Privy Council has

expressed the same view. Sir John

Beaumont who spoke for the Board,

observed that “a confession of a co-

accused is obviously evidence of a

very weak type. It does not indeed

come within the definition of

“evidence” contained in Section 3 of

the Evidence Act.

It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the

presence of the accused, and it cannot be

tested by cross-examination. It is a much

weaker type of evidence than the evidence of

an approver, which is not subject to any of

those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides

that the court may take the confession into

consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it

evidence on which the court may act; but the

section does not say that the confession is to

amount to proof. Clearly there must be other

evidence. The confession is only one element

in the consideration of all the facts proved the

case; it can be put into the scale and weighed

with the other evidence”. It would be noticed

that as a result of the provisions contained in

Section 30, the confession has no doubt to be

regarded as amounting to evidence in a

general way, because whatever is considered

by the court is evidence; circumstances which

are considered by the court as well as

probabilities do amount to evidence in that

generic sense. Thus, though confession may

be regarded as evidence in that generic sense

because of the provisions of Section 30, the

31

fact remains that it is not evidence as defined

by Section 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is

that in dealing with a case against an accused

person, the court cannot start with the

confession of a co-accused person; it must

begin with other evidence adduced by the

prosecution and after it has formed its opinion

with regard to the quality and effect of the said

evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the

confession in order to receive assurance to the

conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is

about to reach on the said other evidence.

That, briefly stated, is the effect of the

provisions contained in Section 30. The same

view has been expressed by this Court in

Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh

where the decision of the Privy Council in

Bhuboni Sahu case has been cited with

approval.”

14. In the present case it is accepted that

apart from the aforesaid statements of co-

accused there is no material suggesting

involvement of the appellant in the crime in

question. We are thus left with only one piece

of material that is the confessional statements

of the co-accused as stated above. On the

touchstone of law laid down by this Court such

a confessional statement of a co-accused

cannot by itself be taken as a substantive piece

of evidence against another co-accused and

can at best be used or utilized in order to lend

assurance to the Court. In the absence of any

substantive evidence it would be inappropriate

to base the conviction of the appellant purely

on the statements of co-accused. The appellant

is therefore entitled to be acquitted of the

charges leveled against him. We, therefore,

accept this appeal, set aside the orders of

conviction and sentence For example: State vs.

Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253, paras 424 and 704

and acquit the appellant. The appellant shall be

32

released forthwith unless his custody is

required in connection with any other offence.”

26.It is a well settled law that the statement of co-accused person is

an extremely weak piece of evidence and cannot be treated as

substantive evidence as against the other co-accused persons.

27.Next contention of learned counsel for the applicant is that the

applicant has already suffered long period of pre-trial custody and the

trial has not yet commenced. It has been time and again reiterated it

has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court that right to speedy trial

is a facet of the Fundamental Right to life of an accused under Article 21

of the Constitution of India. He has referred to the decision of the Apex

Court in the matter of Manish Sisodia Vs. CBI and ED (2023) SCC

OnLine SC1393 in para 27 as under:

“27. However, we are also concerned about the

prolonged period of incarceration suffered by the

appellant – Manish Sisodia. In P. Chidambaram v.

Directorate of Enforcement48, the appellant

therein was granted bail after being kept in

custody for around 49 days, relying on the

Constitution Bench in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia

and Others v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565.

and Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of

Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40 that even if the

allegation is one of grave economic offence, it is

not a rule that bail should be denied in every

case. Ultimately, the consideration has to be

made on a case to case basis, on the facts. The

primary object is to secure the presence of the

33

accused to stand trial. The argument that the

appellant therein was a flight risk or that there

was a possibility of tampering with the evidence

or influencing the witnesses, was rejected by the

Court. Again, in Satender Kumar Antil v. Central

Bureau of Investigation and Another, (2022) 10

SCC 51 this Court referred to Surinder Singh

Alias Shingara Singh v. State of Punjab (2005) 7

SCC 387 and Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab,

(1977) 4 SCC 291 to emphasize that the right to

speedy trial is a fundamental right within the

broad scope of Article 21 of the Constitution. In

Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), this Court

while highlighting the evil of economic offences

like money laundering, and its adverse impact on

the society and citizens, observed that arrest

infringes the fundamental right to life.

49 In P. Chidambaram v. Central Bureau of

Investigation, (2020) 13 SCC 337, the appellant

therein was granted bail after being kept in

custody for around 62 days.

This Court referred to Section 19 of the

PML Act, for the in-built safeguards to be adhered

to by the authorized officers to ensure fairness,

objectivity and accountability. Vijay Madanlal

Choudhary (supra), also held that Section 436A of

the Code can apply to offences under the PML

Act, as it effectuates the right to speedy trial, a

facet of the right to life, except for a valid ground

such as where the trial is delayed at the instance

of the accused himself.

In our opinion, Section 436A should not be

34

construed as a mandate that an accused should

not be granted bail under the PML Act till he has

suffered incarceration for the specified period.

This Court, in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v.

State of Maharashtra and Others (2021) 2 SCC

427, held that while ensuring proper enforcement

of criminal law on one hand, the court must be

conscious that liberty across human eras is as

tenacious as tenacious can be.

29. Detention or jail before being pronounced

guilty of an offence should not become

punishment without trial. If the trial gets protracted

despite assurances of the prosecution, and it is

clear that case will not be decided within a

foreseeable time, the prayer for bail may be

meritorious. While the prosecution may pertain to

an economic offence, yet it may not be proper to

equate these cases with those punishable with

death, imprisonment for life, ten years or more

like offences under the Narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, murder,

cases of rape, dacoity, kidnapping for ransom,

mass violence, etc. Neither is this a case where

100/1000s of depositors have been defrauded.

The allegations have to be established and

proven. The right to bail in cases of delay,

coupled with incarceration for a long period,

depending on the nature of the allegations,

should be read into Section 439 of the Code and

Section 45 of the PML Act. The reason is that the

constitutional mandate is the higher law, and it is

the basic right of the person charged of an

35

offence and not convicted, that he be ensured

and given a speedy trial. When the trial is not

proceeding for reasons not attributable to the

accused, the court, unless there are good

reasons, may well be guided to exercise the

power to grant bail. This would be truer where the

trial would take years.”

28.In the matter of Manish Sisodia Vs. ED and CBI (2024) SCC

OnLine SC920, it has been held as under:

49. We find that, on account of a long period of

incarceration running for around 17 months and

the trial even not having been commenced, the

appellant has been deprived of his right to speedy

trial.

50. As observed by this Court, the right to speedy

trial and the right to liberty are sacrosanct rights.

On denial of these rights, the trial court as well as

the High Court ought to have given due weightage

to this factor.

51. Recently, this Court had an occasion to

consider an application for bail in the case of

Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra

and Another6 wherein the accused was

prosecuted under the provisions of the Unlawful

Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. This Court

surveyed the entire law right from the judgment of

this Court in the cases of Gudikanti Narasimhulu

and Others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of

Andhra Pradesh, Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and

Others v. State of Punjab, Hussainara Khatoon

and Others (I) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar9,

Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb and Satender Kumar

Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation and

Another. The Court observed thus:

“19. If the State or any prosecuting

agency including the court concerned

36

has no wherewithal to provide or protect

the fundamental right of an accused to

have a speedy trial as enshrined under

Article 21 of the Constitution then the

State or any other prosecuting agency

should not oppose the plea for bail on

the ground that the crime committed is

serious. Article 21 of the Constitution

applies irrespective of the nature of the

crime.”

29.In cases where the fundamental right to speedy trial of the

accused is violated, the State or the prosecuting agency should not

oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is

serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature

of the crime. He has referred to the decision of Javed Gulam Nabi

Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693,

wherein it has been held as under:

“19. If the State or any prosecuting agency including

the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or

protect the fundamental right of an accused to have

a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the

Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting

agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the

ground that the crime committed is serious. Article

21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the

nature of the crime.”

30.He contended that the applicant shall be severely prejudiced and

prejudged if he is continuously remanded to custody. It is imperative for

the proper and effective defence of the applicant and as a step to

ensure the fair trial fo the applicant he may be granted bail unless there

are overwhelming considerations otherwise. It is submitted that even

37

otherwise in terms of settled law, since further investigation is going on

in the instant case, no charges have been framed and the trial cannot

commence or likely to commence in the near future, the applicant may

be released on bail.

31.Another contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is the

presumption of innocence. He has referred to the judgment of Satendra

Kumar Antil Vs. CBI (2022) 10 SCC 51, relevant paragraphs are

mentioned herein below:

3. Innocence of a person accused of an offense

is presumed through a legal fiction, placing the

onus on the prosecution to prove the guilt

before the Court. Thus, it is for that agency to

satisfy the Court that the arrest made was

warranted and enlargement on bail is to be

denied.

14.Presumption of innocence has been

acknowledged throughout the world. Article 14

(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights, 1966 and Article 11 of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

acknowledge the presumption of innocence, as

a cardinal principle of law, until the individual is

proven guilty.

15.Both in Australia and Canada, a prima facie

right to a reasonable bail is recognized based

on the gravity of offence. In the United States, it

is a common practice for bail to be a cash

deposit. In the United Kingdom, bail is more

likely to consist of a set of restrictions.

16.The Supreme Court of Canada in Corey Lee

James Myers v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2019

SCC 18, has held that bail has to be

considered on acceptable legal parameters. It

thus confers adequate discretion on the Court

38

to consider the enlargement on bail of which

unreasonable delay is one of the grounds. Her

Majesty the Queen v. Kevin Antic and Ors.,

2017 SCC 27:

“The right not to be denied reasonable bail

without just cause is an essential element of an

enlightened criminal justice system. It

entrenches the effect of the presumption of

innocence at the pre-trial stage of the criminal

trial process and safeguards the liberty of

accused persons. This right has two aspects: a

person charged with an offence has the right

not to be denied bail without just cause and the

right to reasonable bail. Under the first aspect,

a provision may not deny bail without “just

cause” there is just cause to deny bail only if

the denial occurs in a narrow set of

circumstances, and the denial is necessary to

promote the proper functioning of the bail

system and is not undertaken for any purpose

extraneous to that system. The second aspect,

the right to reasonable bail, relates to the terms

of bail, including the quantum of any monetary

component and other restrictions that are

imposed on the accused for the release period.

It protects accused persons from conditions

and forms of release that are unreasonable.

While a bail hearing is an expedited

procedure, the bail provisions are federal law

and must be applied consistently and fairly in

all provinces and territories. A central part of

the Canadian law of bail consists of the ladder

principle and the authorized forms of release,

which are found in s. 515(1) to (3) of the

Criminal Code. Save for exceptions, an

unconditional release on an undertaking is the

default position when granting release.

Alternative forms of release are to be imposed

in accordance with the ladder principle, which

must be adhered to strictly: release is favoured

at the earliest reasonable opportunity and on

39

the least onerous grounds. If the Crown

proposes an alternate form of release, it must

show why this form is necessary for a more

restrictive form of release to be imposed. Each

rung of the ladder must be considered

individually and must be rejected before

moving to a more restrictive form of release.

Where the parties disagree on the form of

release, it is an error of law for a judge to order

a more restrictive form without justifying the

decision to reject the less onerous forms. A

recognizance with sureties is one of the most

onerous forms of release, and should not be

imposed unless all the less onerous forms have

been considered and rejected as inappropriate.

It is not necessary to impose cash bail on

accused persons if they or their sureties have

reasonably recoverable assets and are able to

pledge those assets to the satisfaction of the

court. A recognizance is functionally equivalent

to cash bail and has the same coercive effect.

Cash bail should be relied on only in

exceptional circumstances in which release on

a recognizance with sureties is unavailable.

When cash bail is ordered, the amount must

not be set so high that it effectively amounts to

a detention order, which means that the

amount should be no higher than necessary to

satisfy the concern that would otherwise

warrant detention and proportionate to the

means of the accused and the circumstances

of the case. The judge is under a positive

obligation to inquire into the ability of the

accused to pay. Terms of release under s.

515(4) should only be imposed to the extent

that they are necessary to address concerns

related to the statutory criteria for detention and

to ensure that the accused is released. They

must not be imposed to change an accused

person’s behaviour or to punish an accused

person. Where a bail review is requested,

courts must follow the bail review process set

40

out in R. v. St-Cloud, 2015 SCC 27, [2015] 2

S.C.R. 328.”

17.We may only state that notwithstanding the

special provisions in many of the countries

world-over governing the consideration for

enlargement on bail, courts have always

interpreted them on the accepted principle of

presumption of innocence and held in favour of

the accused.

18.The position in India is no different. It has

been the consistent stand of the courts,

including this Court, that presumption of

innocence, being a facet of Article 21, shall

inure to the benefit of the accused. Resultantly

burden is placed on the prosecution to prove

the charges to the court of law. The weightage

of the evidence has to be assessed on the

principle of beyond reasonable doubt.”

SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

32.In reply to the submission of learned counsel for the applicant, it

has been argued by Shri Saurabh Pandey, learned counsel for the

respondent that on receiving communication from the Enforcement

Directorate dated 11.07.2023, after due verification, prima facie a

cognizable offence for commission of the offence under Section 7 & 12

of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 420, 467,471 and 120-

B IPC was registered against the applicant in Crime No. 04/2024. As

per the said FIR, a criminal syndicate comprising of high level State

Government officials, private persons, political executives of the State

government working in the State were making illegal bribe collections by

41

controlling the high level management of important State departments

and State Public Sector undertakings.

33.The sale of liquor in the State of Chhattisgarh was one of the

major sources of illegal earning of the syndicate and Anil Tuteja, Anwar

Dhebar and his associates Vikas Agarwal @ Subbu, Arvind Singh and

Sanjay Arunpati Tripathi, MD, CSMCL and others were the members of

the syndicate who collected illegal money in three different ways ie.

Part-A, Part B and Part-C. After analyzing the information and the data

shared by the Income Tax Department, on the basis of these

documents and records, it is established that a well planned conspiracy

was executed by the syndicate to ear illegal commission in the sale and

licensing of liquor in the State of Chhattisgarh. It has also been

revealed by the EOW that these unaccounted liquor was produced

through three distilleries in the State ie. M/s. Chhattisgarh Distilleries

Ltd., M/s. Bhatia Wines and Merchants Pvt. Ltd and M/s. Welcome

Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. and thus massive corruption had taken place in the

Excise Department since 2019. It is contended by Shri Pandey, learned

counsel for the respondent that to regular the supply of liquor, and

ensure quality liquor to users and to prevent hooch tragedies and to

earn revenue for the State, excise departments were set up but the

criminal syndicate led by Anwar Dhebar and Anil Tuteja turned all these

objectives upside down. They have altered the liquor policy as per their

whims and fancies and extorted maximum personal benefit for

themselves.

42

34.It is submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that though

with a noble objective, the State Government had established thee retail

liquor shops in the State by changing the management of CSMCL but it

became the tool in the hands of the syndicate and they used to enforce

a parallel excise department. It has also been revealed that as part of

the conspiracy, co-accused Arun Pati Tripathi was assigned with the

task of maximizing the bribe commission collected on liquor procured by

M/s. CSMCL and to make necessary arrangement for sale of no-duty

paid liquor in the CSMCL run shops. He was assisted by Anwar Dhebar

and Anil Tuteja, a Senior IAS Officer. In furtherance of the plans, the

task of cash collection was given to one Vikas Agarwal @ Subbu and

the logistics were set to be responsibility of another accused Arvind

Singh.

35.He contended that since it was difficult to extract cash from

foreign liquor makers in respect of IMFL and FL, as there was strong

demand for good quality foreign brands, hence in the month of April

2020, the syndicate introduced fourth type of mechanism to extort bribe

from FL makers with the concept of FL-10A licensees. These licensees

were given the task of collection through mediator and buy the foreign

liquor and sell it to the Chhattigarh Government Warehouses and

generated commission of around 10% on foreign liquor. The licenses

were given with a condition that 50-60% of the final profit amount of the

FL-10A Licensee shall be paid to the syndicate. The FL-10A licensee

holders were - Sanjay Mishra (M/s. Nexgen Power Engitech Private

43

Ltd.), Atul Kumar Singh and Mukesh Manchanda (M/s. Om Sai

Beverages Pvt. Ltd.) and Asheesh Saurabh Kedia (M/s. Dishita

Ventures Private Ltd.).

36.Thus, a total earning of Rs. 1660,41,00,056/- was made by the

syndicate from the financial year 2019-2020 to 2022-2023 by causing

huge loss to the State exchequer. Thereafter, on 26.09.2024, a

supplementary charge sheet was filed against 4 persons namely Anurag

Dwivedi, Deepak Duary, Dilip Pandey and the present applicant.

37.Shri Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the

main ground raised by the counsel for the applicant is that the subject

FIR has been registered illegally and is untenable in law because the

Apex Court has already quashed the complaint filed by the ED and the

present FIR has been registered by the State which is a second FIR and

on the set of facts the UP police has also registered the FIR. However,

the registration of FIR has been challenged by the co-accused in Cr.M.P.

No. 721/2024 before the Division Bench of this Court which was

dismissed vide order dated 20.08.2024 holding that there is a prima

facie cognizable offence which required thorough investigation by the

ACB/EOW and in the present crime 70 named persons including

bureaucrats, politicians, businessman and others are involved and

therefore the investigation in contravention of the order of the Apex

Court is not tenable at this stage.

38.Next contention of learned counsel for the respondent is that the

role of the applicant in the present liquor scam is that he is the nephew

44

of co-accused Arvind Singh who is the main player of the syndicate.

Said Arvind Singh had emerged as a very important person in the

criminal syndicate and was responsible for providing necessary

resources to run the the syndicate whether it is for supplying duplicate

holograms to the distillery or providing additional bottles to the distillery

for the production of B-part liquor or transporting B-part from the

distillery to the government liquor shops or collecting sales amount of B-

part liquor from the shops and sending it to Vikas Agarwal and to

monitor the production and manage the work, he needed trustworthy

person. He chose his nephew Amit Singh ie. the present applicant to

manage all these operations. Arvind Singh had involved other members

of his family ie. Brother-in-law, Chitranjan Singh, Niranjan Singh,

another nephew Abhishek Singh, son of his elder brother in law Vivek

Singh @ Monu for different needs and activities of the syndicate.

39.Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the applicant

assisted in collection of sales amount of B-Part liquor with the help of his

uncle Arvind singh. The work of transport was opened by firm named

Adeep Empire in the name of Pinky Singh, wife of Arvind Singh from

where the liquor was transported from the warehouse to government

liquor shops after getting tender from CSMCL. The applicant along with

the transporting of liquor under CSMCL, used to bring the sale amount

of B-Part liquor from the districts determined by the Excise Department

to Raipur.

45

40.Shri Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent further

contended that the applicant used to collect B-part of money from the

officers of the Excise department and further handed over to one Sohan

Verma at Golchha Apartment. It is contended that during this period, the

maternal uncle of the present applicant Niranjan Singh, Chitranjan Singh

and his elder maternal uncle’s son Vivek Singh @ Monu besides Piyush

Bijlani, Deepak Duari, Rahul Soni, Sohan Verma, Nitin Yadav, Yatiraj,

Shiva, Prashant Kumar Das used to collect the B-Part money from the

districts and bring it to Raipur.

41.Next contention of learned counsel for the respondent is that the

present applicant on the instructions of the Excise Officer Janardhan

Singh Kaurav, used to send duplicate holograms from Noida office to

Raipur, contacted Prism Holograms, Raipur Unit In charge Dilip Pandey

and supplied duplicate holograms to the distilleries. It is contended that

the applicant in coordination with other accused persons Dilip Pandey

and Prakash Sharma @ Chhotu used to handover the duplicate

holograms to the distilleries.

42.Another contention of learned counsel for the respondent is that

the work of transportation of B-part liquor from the distilleries to the shop

was done by the present applicant. It is alleged that the applicant was

transporting B-part liquor from Bhatia wines distillery to the shops to the

districts through Adeep Empire Transporting firm. It is further contended

that the additional empty bottles requirement of the distillery for filling B-

part liquor which was purchased from Anurag Dwivedi from the

46

premises situated at Dhaneli Warehouse. The applicant along with his

uncle Arvind Singh supplied empty bottles to Bhatia Wines Distillery,

Welcome Distillery, Bilaspur. One Satyendra Gard was given the

responsibility of supplying empty bottles to Chhattisgarh distillery. It is

Anurag Dwivedi who used to buy empty sheeri bottles from the market

but the purchase and sale was shown through the firm Adeep Empire of

Amit Singh so that the illegal money received from the syndicate can be

adjusted. It is contended that over invoicing was done in the empty

bottles supplied through Adeep Empire and 20 percent breakage was

shown. The extra bottles obtained in this way were used by the

Welcome Distillery in filling B-part liquor. Another allegation against the

applicant is he had played a role in monitoring and coordinating the

production of B-part liquor in the distillery. After loading the liquor crates

in the trucks and sending thee trucks, the applicant used to inform one

Janardhan Kaurav and Vikas Agarwal and the same was sent to the

designated districts and the account of sale amount was prepared in

advance.

43.It is contended that the applicant registered a transport firm

Jagdamba Enterprises, in the name of his father-in-law Shambhu lal

Soni in 10.06.2020 which was formed to launder the illegal money

earned by his family members by joining the illegal excise syndicate.

The main work of this transport firm was to transport country liquor from

the distillery to the districts. However in reality, the firm did not have any

transport vehicle of its own but the vehicles of other transporters were

47

used. In the year 2020-21 to 2022023, CG Distillery Pvt. Ltd. and Bhatia

Wines Merchants pvt. Ltd. paid the prescribed rate of Rs. 23/- ( Rs.

20.54 +12%GST) per case to Jagdamba enterprises but the firm paid

different rates every year to the attached transport vehicle. The

transportation work of the firm was done by 12-13 different transporters

and among them were Dilip Pillai, Harjeet Singh, Trilochan Pal,

Surendra Kumar Khatuwa, Rakesh Singh Thakur and others and they

were paid Rs. 18.96 including loading, unloading and other expenses

per box. Thereafter in the year 2022-23, were paid on an average per

box rate of Rs. 15.05 and thus, the distillery paid Rs. 20.54 after

deducting GST per box to Jagdamba Enterprises firm in al these years.

But the firm showed payment of Rs. 20.15 (1.90%, 769% and 26.73%

repectively profit to the firm). Thus, the gross profit of Jagdamba

Enterprises firm earned Rs. 1,97,25,020/- in the three years which was

created by the applicant to legalize the illegal money earned by him

from the liquor scam by showing it as a transport business.

44.On 20.09.2022, Rs. 50,00,000/- was transferred from the account

number of Canara Bank of Jagdamba Enterprises firm to Anwar Dhebar.

Thus, financial transactions continued and it is clear that the accused

has adjusted the illegal money obtained in the illegal money obtained in

the liquor scam through the firm Jagdamba enterprises formed in the

name of his father-in-law.

45.Another company Adeep Agrotech Pvt. Ltd. in the name of Pinky

Singh, wife of co-accused Arvind Singh was registered at Nawagarh

48

Road, Bemetara and the total net profit was shown as 94,55,664/-, Rs.

2,43,28,783/- and in this way property worth Rs. 10 crores has been

created in the name of Adeep Agrotech.

46.It has been submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that

during investigation, the agency has prepared panchnama regarding the

seizure of duplicate hologram and recorded the explanation

memorandum of the applicant. Shri Pandey, learned counsel for the

respondent contended that the legal ground for rejecting the bail to the

applicant is that the findings of the Apex Court in State of UP Vs.

Amarmani Tripathi (2005) 8 SCC 21 are applicable in the present

case. Relevant portion has been reproduced as under:

Reliance is next placed on Dolat Ram and

others vs. State of Haryana 1995 (1) SCC 349,

wherein the distinction between the factors

relevant for rejecting bail in a non-bailable

case and cancellation of bail already granted,

was brought out :

"Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case

at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail

so granted, have to be considered and dealt

with on different basis. Very cogent and

overwhelming circumstances are necessary

for an order directing the cancellation of the

bail, already granted. Generally speaking, the

grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly

(illustrative and not exhaustive) are:

interference or attempt to interfere with the

due course of administration of justice or

evasion or attempt to evade the due course of

justice or abuse of the concession granted to

the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of

the court, on the basis of material placed on

the record of the possibility of the accused

49

absconding is yet another reason justifying the

cancellation of bail. However, bail once

granted should not be cancelled in a

mechanical manner without considering

whether any supervening circumstances have

rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to

allow the accused to retain his freedom by

enjoying the concession of bail during the

trial."

17.They also relied on the decision in S.N.

Bhattacharjee vs. State of West Bengal 2004

(11) SCC 165 where the above principle is

reiterated. The decisions in Dolat Ram and

Bhattacharjee cases (supra) relate to

applications for cancellation of bail and not

appeals against orders granting bail. In an

application for cancellation, conduct

subsequent to release on bail and the

supervening circumstances alone are relevant.

But in an appeal against grant of bail, all

aspects that were relevant under Section 439

read with Section 437, continue to be relevant.

We, however, agree that while considering and

deciding appeals against grant of bail, where

the accused has been at large for a

considerable time, the post bail conduct and

supervening circumstances will also have to

be taken note of. But they are not the only

factors to be considered as in the case of

applications for cancellation of bail.

18.It is well settled that the matters to be

considered in an application for bail are (i)

whether there is any prima facie or reasonable

ground to believe that the accused had

committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity

of the charge;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of

conviction; (iv) danger of accused absconding

or fleeing if released on bail; (v) character,

behaviour, means, position and standing of the

50

accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being

repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the

witnesses being tampered with; and (viii)

danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by

grant of bail (see Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT,

Delhi 2001 (4) SCC 280 and Gurcharan Singh

vs. State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1978 SC

179). While a vague allegation that accused

may tamper with the evidence or witnesses

may not be a ground to refuse bail, if the

accused is of such character that his mere

presence at large would intimidate the

witnesses or if there is material to show that

he will use his liberty to subvert justice or

tamper with the evidence, then bail will be

refused. We may also refer to the following

principles relating to grant or refusal of bail

stated in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh

Ranjan, 2004 (7) SCC 528:

"11.The law in regard to grant or refusal

of bail is very well settled. The court granting

bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious

manner and not as a matter of course. Though

at the stage of granting bail a detailed

examination of evidence and elaborate

documentation of the merit of the case need

not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate

in such orders reasons for prima facie

concluding why bail was being granted

particularly where the accused is charged of

having committed a serious offence. Any order

devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-

application of mind. It is also necessary for the

court granting bail to consider among other

circumstances, the following factors also

before granting bail; they are:

a. The nature of accusation and the severity

of punishment in case of conviction and the

nature of supporting evidence.

b. Reasonable apprehension of tampering with

51

the witness or apprehension of threat to the

complainant.

c. Prima facie satisfaction of the court in

support of the charge. (see Ram Govind

Upadhyay vs. Sudarshan Singh, 2002 (3) SCC

598 and Puran vs. Ram Bilas 2001 (6) SCC

338."

This Court also in specific terms held

that:

"the condition laid down under section

437(1)(i) is sine qua non for granting bail even

under section 439 of the Code. In the

impugned order it is noticed that the High

Court has given the period of incarceration

already undergone by the accused and the

unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near

future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the

accused on bail, in spite of the fact that the

accused stands charged of offences

punishable with life imprisonment or even

death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion,

the mere fact that the accused has undergone

certain period of incarceration (three years in

this case) by itself would not entitle the

accused to being enlarged on bail, nor the fact

that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the

near future either by itself or coupled with the

period of incarceration would be sufficient for

enlarging the appellant on bail when the

gravity of the offence alleged is severe and

there are allegations of tampering with the

witnesses by the accused during the period he

was on bail."

47.It enunciates the factors to be considered while granting bail. The

Apex Court inter alia held that the relevant factors for considering bail

are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe

that the accused had committed the offence (ii) nature and gravity of the

52

charge (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction (iv)

danger of accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail (v)

character, behaviour, means position and standing of the accused; (vi)

likelihood of the offence being repeated (vii) reasonable apprehension of

the witnesses being tampered with and (viii) danger, of course, of

justice being thwarted by grant of bail. It has also been held that mere

fact that the accused had been incarcerated for a certain period of time

is also not a factor for granting bail.

Therefore the general rule that this Court will not ordinarily

interfere in matters relating to bail, is subject to exceptions where there

are special circumstances and when the basic requirements for grant of

bail are completely ignored by the High Court….”

48.In the matter of Gulabrao Babukar Deokar Vs. State of

Maharasthra (2013) 16 SCC 190, has observed that :

In the instant case, the attempts made by the

appellant to pressurize the witnesses and even

the investigating officer are clearly placed on

record through the affidavit of the Deputy S.P.

Mr. Pawar. On that ground also it could be said

that the appellant will be pressurizing the

witnesses if he is not restrained. This being the

position, we cannot find any fault with the order

of the High Court cancelling the bail on that

ground also. The order does record the cogent

and overwhelming circumstances justifying

cancellation of bail. The nature and

seriousness of an economic offence and its

impact on the society are always important

considerations in such a case, and they must

squarely be dealt with by the Court while

53

passing an order on bail applications.”

49.Similarly, in the matter of Mahipal Vs. Rajesh Kumar (2020) 2

SCC 118, Apex Court has held that held that it is necessary to consider

relevant factors while granting bail and if those relevant facts (as

enumerated in Amarmani Tripathi (supra) have not been taken into

consideration while considering the application for bail, the bail is found

on irrelevant considerations, indisputably the superior court can set

aside the order of such a grant of bail. Lastly, it is submitted that at the

stage of bail, the statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C, can be looked

into and has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of

Indresh Kumar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No.

938 of 2022. Lastly, it is submitted that on the basis of the above

mentioned submissions, it is apparent that the applicant was involved in

the same and therefore, the bail application is liable to be dismissed.

CONSIDERATION OF BAIL APPLICATION

50. Heard learned counsel for the parties, their rival submissions and

the documents on record.

51.To decide the case in hand, the factors enumerating in the case

should be taken in consideration while granting or refusing bail in a non-

bailable case. The apex court in the matter of State of UP Vs

Amarmani Tripathi, reported in 2005 (8) SCC 21, vide paragraph- 18

and in Criminal Appeal no. 448 OF 2021 (@ Special Leave Petition

(Crl.) No. 3577 0F 2020) (Sudha Singh Versus The State of Uttar

54

Pradesh & Anr, judgment delivered on 24-04-2021] has decided

certain factors to be taken in consideration while deciding bail

application in non-bailable offences as under:-

"It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an

application for the bail are:-

(i) whether there is any prima-facie or reasonable ground to

believe that the accused has committed the offence;

(ii) nature and gravity of charge;

(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv)

danger of the accused absconding or fleeing if released on

bail; (v) character, behavior, means, position and standing of

the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;

(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with;

and (viii) danger, of-course the justice being thwarted by grant of

bail.

52.Indeed, these guidelines are not exhaustive, nonetheless, these

have to be considered while passing an order in a bail application in a

non-bailable offence. The aforementioned factors for grant or refusal of

bail in non- bailable offences as the case in hand are discussed under

the following headings:

7. Prima-facie or reasonable ground to believe that the

applicant/accused has committed the offence:-

It is profitable to reiterate here, that case FIR No.

RC0042023A0003 dated 08.02.2023 has been registered by

the CBI, Jammu u/s 120-B of IPC r/w Section 7 of the

55

Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 against the petitioner on the

basis of complaint dated 07.02.2023 lodged by one Pankaj

Kumar Verma S/o Sh. Sarvan Kumar R/o Lotus Villa, 232

Sector-1 Jalpura Greater Noida UP alleging demand of bribe

of Rs.2.30 lacs by accused Sajad Ahmed Chief Accounts

Officer JKTDC through Shokat Ali for processing of payment in

respect of bills submitted by the complainant, on receipt of the

complaint the verification thereof was carried out by Sh.

Sanjay Kumar PSI wherein demand of bribe by the accused

Sajjad Ahmed from the complainant through Shokat was

confirmed, pursuant to which a trap was laid and both the

accused persons namely, Sajjad Ahmed Chief Accounts

Officer JKTDC and Shokat Ali Lecturer Govt. Polytechnic

College Jammu were caught red-handed while demanding

and accepting bribe of Rs.2.30 lacs from the complainant in

presence of independent witnesses and both the accused

were arrested and taken into custody on 08.02.2023 after

following all the legal procedure. From the allegations it clearly

transpires, that there is a prima-facie case against the

applicant. The disputed point for determination before this

court is, even when there is a prima-facie case against the

accused, what should be the approach of court in the matter of

grant or refusal of bail ?

56

53.From the allegations, it clearly transpires, that there is a prima-

facie case against the applicant. The disputed point for determination

before this court is, even when there is a prima-facie case against the

accused, what should be the approach of court in the matter of grant or

refusal of bail ?

54.To appreciate this fact, it has to be taken note of that while

granting bail to the applicant it is necessary for the court to examine the

nature and gravity of the circumstances under which the offence is

committed. It is a trite law that personal liberty is a very precious

fundamental right enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and

deprivation of liberty is a matter of grave concern. It should be curtailed

only when it becomes imperative to the peculiar facts and

circumstances of the case. When a person is arrested on the allegations

of commission of non-bailable offence, two conflicting interests are

pitted against each other, that is, liberty of individual involved and

interest of society so as to prevent crime and punish criminal. It

becomes responsibility of the courts to weigh the contrary factors. The

object of detaining a person in judicial custody is to direct him to join the

investigation, secure his presence at trial, he may not interfere with

investigation, intimidate witnesses, tamper with evidence, flee from

justice, chances of repeating the offence etc., and if this purpose can be

fulfilled by putting certain conditions and securing bail bonds, it would be

an ideal blending of two apparently conflicting claims.

57

55.A fundamental postulate of Criminal Jurisprudence is the

presumption of innocence, which means a person is believed to be

innocent until found guilty. Another facet of our Criminal Jurisprudence is

that grant of bail is the general rule and putting a person in jail is an

exception (Bail but not jail). Grant or denial of bail is entirely the

discretion of a Judge considering a case, but such discretion should be

exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. After referring to the observation

in Emperor v. Hutchinson, reported in AIR 1931 All. 356, where the

Court held that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, this

Court added:

“6. However, we should not be understood to

mean that bail should be granted in every case.

The grant or refusal of bail is entirely within the

discretion of the judge hearing the matter and

though that discretion is unfettered, it must be

exercised judiciously and in a humane manner

and compassionately. Also, conditions for the

grant of bail ought not to be so strict as to be

incapable of compliance, thereby making the

grant of bail illusory”. The observations and

directions in Dataram Singh (supra) were in the

context of arrest and long custodial detention in a

crime case under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881 for issuing cheques and

then stopping payment of the cheque. Bail

application had been rejected, first by the Trial

Court and then by the High Court even after

about five months of detention of the accused in

custody.

56.Ex facie, the allegations are grave, the punishment is severe and

it cannot be said that there are no materials on record at all.

P.Chidambaram Vs. Directorate of Enforcement” reported in (2020)

58

13 SCC 791, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held as hereunder:

“Thus from cumulative perusal of the judgments

cited on either side including the one rendered

by the Constitution Bench of this Court, it could

be deduced that the basic jurisprudence relating

to bail remains the same inasmuch as the grant

of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception so

as to ensure that the accused has the

opportunity of securing fair trial.

However, while considering the same the gravity

of the offence is an aspect which is required to

be kept in view by the Court. The gravity for the

said purpose will have to be gathered from the

facts and circumstances arising in each case.

Keeping in view the consequences that would

befall on the society in cases of financial

irregularities, it has been held that even

economic offences would fall under the category

of “grave offence” and in such circumstance

while considering the application for bail in such

matters, the Court will have to deal with the

same, being sensitive to the nature of allegation

made against the accused. One of the

circumstances to consider the gravity of the

offence is also the term of sentence that is

prescribed for the offence the accused is alleged

to have committed. Such consideration with

regard to the gravity of offence is a factor which

is in addition to the triple test or the tripod test

that would be normally applied. In that regard

what is also to be kept in perspective is that even

if the allegation is one of grave economic

offence, it is not a rule that bail should be denied

in every case since there is no such bar created

in the relevant enactment passed by the

legislature nor does the bail jurisprudence

provides so. Therefore, the underlining

conclusion is that irrespective of the nature and

gravity of charge, the precedent of another case

alone will not be the basis for either grant or

refusal of bail though it may have a bearing on

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principle. But ultimately the consideration will

have to be on case to case basis on the facts

involved therein and securing the presence of

the accused to stand trial.”

57.Specifically, heed must be paid to the stringent view taken in this

regard for grant of bail with respect to economic offences. In this regard,

it is pertinent to refer to the following observations of this Court in Y.S.

Jagan Mohan Reddy:

“34. Economic offences constitute a class apart

and need to be visited with a different approach

in the matter of bail. The economic offences

having deeprooted conspiracies and involving

huge loss of public funds need to be viewed

seriously and considered as grave offences

affecting the economy of the country as a whole

and thereby posing serious threat to the financial

health of the country.

35. While granting bail, the court has to keep in

mind the nature of accusations, the nature of

evidence in support thereof, the severity of the

punishment which conviction will entail, the

character of the accused, circumstances which

are peculiar to the accused, reasonable

possibility of securing the presence of the

accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of

the witnesses being tampered with, the larger

interests of the public/State and other similar

considerations.”

This Court has adopted this position in several

decisions, including Gautam Kundu v.

Directorate of Enforcement and State of Bihar v.

Amit Kumar. Thus, it is evident that the above

factors must be taken into account while

determining whether bail should be granted in

cases involving grave economic offences.”

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58.In the present case, the applicant has been charged for the

offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120-B IPC

and Sections 7 & 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is the case of

the prosecution that from the charge sheet, it is alleged that the present

applicant was involved in the criminal syndicate and was helping in the

liquor scam through his transport firm Adeep Empire and Adeep

Agrotech Pvt. Ltd. He was also involved in the collection of sales

amount of B-Part liquor and sending duplicate holograms to the

distilleries. As per the allegation, the applicant used to monitor and

coordinated in the production of B-part liquor in the distilleries and

adjusted the illegal money obtained through the syndicate in Jagdamba

Enterprises and had earned huge profit. During investigation, it was

found that massive corruption had taken place in the Excise Department

since the year 2019. Instead of earning revenue for the State, the

present applicant in association with the syndicate had caused huge

financial loss to the State exchequer and the estimated proceeds of

crime is around Rs. 16,000 + crores.

59.In the matter of Nimmagadda Prasad v. Central Bureau of

Investigation,(2013) 7 SCC 466 their Lordships of the Supreme Court

have held that economic offence is a grave offence affecting the

economy of the country as a whole and observed as under:-

“23. Unfortunately, in the last few years, the country

has been seeing an alarming rise in white-collar

crimes, which has affected the fibre of the country’s

economic structure. Incontrovertibly,economic

offences have serious repercussions on the

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development of the country as a whole.

25. Economic offences constitute a class apart and

need to be visited with a different approach in the

matter of bail. The economic offence having deep-

rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of

public funds needs to be viewed seriously and

considered as a grave offence affecting the

economy of the country as a whole and thereby

posing serious threat to the financial health of the

country.”

60. It is the case of prosecution that on receiving communication from

the Enforcement Directorate and after due verification and on being

satisfied, the EOW registered FIR No. 04/2024 under Sections 7 & 12

of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 420, 467, 468, 471,

and 120-B IPC against the applicant. It has been revealed that a

criminal syndicate has been operating in the State of Chhattisgarh which

was extorting illegal commission in the sale of liquor and was also

involved in unauthorized sale of unaccounted liquor through government

liquor shops. During the course of investigation, plethora of evidence

regarding criminal involvement and illegal gratification of number of

government officers including the applicant has been unearthed and

their role in the crime has been established.

61.It is apparent that the applicant was one of the main accused in

the liquor scam. Having regard to the nature of allegations made against

the applicant and the manner in which the present applicant is alleged to

have involved in the commission of the offence and that the

investigation is still going on and also taking note of the fact that the

applicant along with the co-accused persons has caused huge financial

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loss to the State exchequer and the estimated proceeds of crime is

around Rs. 16000 + crores.

602This huge unexplained money and the disproportionate wealth

earned through the syndicate and causing loss to the State Exchequer

and for which the proceeding under Sections 7 & 12 of the Prevention of

Corruption Act is said to have been registered against the present

applicant. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled.

The general principles regarding granting or refusing bail are

enumerated in several judgments of the Apex Court. Generally, the

following matters are to be considered in granting or refusing bail to a

person accused of a non-bailable offence (1) The nature of the offence

(2) The severity of the punishment which conviction will entail (3) The

character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused (4) The

circumstances which are peculiar to the accused (5) The status and

position of the accused in relation to the victim or the complainant (6)

Reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused during

the trial (7) Reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered

with (8) The larger interests of the public or the State or the society (9)

Likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice (10) Absence or presence

of materials in support of the accusation (11) Likelihood of the offence

being repeated (12) Frivolity in prosecution.

63.The court must also keep in view that a criminal offence is not just

an offence against an individual, rather the larger societal interest is at

stake. Therefore, a delicate balance is required to be established

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between the two rights - safeguarding the personal liberty of an

individual and the societal interest. It cannot be said that refusal to grant

anticipatory bail would amount to denial of the rights conferred upon the

appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

64.Economic offences, having deep-rooted conspiracies and

involving huge loss of public funds, need to be viewed seriously and

considered as grave offences (See Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI :

(2013) 7 SCC 439 : AIR 2013 SC 1933 ). An economic offence is

committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on

personal profit regardless of the consequence to the community (See

State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal : (1987) 2 SCC 364 :

AIR 1987 SC 1321). Economic offences have serious repercussions on

the development of the society as a whole. The entire community would

be aggrieved if the economic offenders, who ruin the economy of the

State, are not brought to book in a proper manner.

65. ‘Bail is the rule and jail is the exception’ is the well established

principle but competing forces present in the facts and circumstances of

each case have to be measured before enlarging a person on bail.

Socio-economic offences have deep impact affecting the moral fiber of

the society and it is a matter needs to be considered seriously (See

State of Bihar v. Amit Kumar @ Bachcha Rai : AIR 2017 SC 2487).

64.In the present case, the applicant was involved in the criminal acts

of the syndicate and that he received commission from the liquor

suppliers. However, no recovery of unaccounted money has been made

64

in this regard and as per the investigating agency, the investigation is

pending, hence, a conclusive determination of their role is yet to be

made. However, it should be noted that there is no straight jacket

formula for consideration of grant of bail to an accused. It all depends

upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

CONCLUSION

66.Thus, keeping in mind the binding observations of their Lordships

of the Supreme Court in cases of Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar &

Nimmagadda Prasad (supra) that economic offences are grave

offence affecting the economy of the country as a whole and serious

repercussions on the development of the country and in view of the fact

that corruption is a really a human rights violation specially right to life

liberty, equality and non discrimination, and it is an enormous obstacle

to the realization of all human rights and the charges alleged against the

applicant are extremely serious and have been committed in the State

of Chhattisgarh, further taking into consideration the fact that charge-

sheet has been filed against the applicant this Court is not inclined to

grant regular bail to the applicant.

67. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the prayer for grant of bail

to the applicant is liable to be rejected and it is hereby rejected.

Sd/-

(Arvind Kumar Verma)

Judge