Instructions provided by Sri Prakhar Shukla, learned Advocate, holding brief of Sri Ramesh Kumar Shukla, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, be kept on record.
AFR
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:9933-DB
Court No. - 39
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 2228 of 2025
Petitioner :- Anil Pathak And Another
Respondent :- State Of U.P. And 4 Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- Brijesh Kumar Kesharwani,Mamta Singh
Counsel for Respondent :- A.S.G.I.,Anoop Tiwari,C.S.C.,Krishna
Mohan Asthana
Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma, J.
Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.
(Per: Dr Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J)
1.Instructions provided by Sri Prakhar Shukla, learned Advocate,
holding brief of Sri Ramesh Kumar Shukla, learned counsel for the
respondent-Bank, be kept on record.
2.Heard Sri Brijesh Kumar Kesharwani, learned counsel for the
petitioners, Sri Prakhar Shukla, holding brief of Sri Ramesh Kumar
Shukla, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank and learned Standing
Counsel for the State-respondents.
3.The facts as pleaded in the writ petition indicate that House No.24,
Awas Vikas Colony Betiyahata, Gorakhpur, owned by Ujjwal Banka and
Tushar Banka, was mortgaged against a loan amount of Rs.1 Crore plus
Rs.20 Lakhs over draft.
4.The above mentioned loan amount, having not been repaid,
respondent no.3-Bank issued a notice under Section 13 (2) of the
Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act, 2002
1
. Thereafter, a possession notice under Section
13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 was issued, and a newspaper
1SARFAESI Act, 2002
publication for auction of the above mentioned property was also made.
The auction date was fixed on 23.10.2024 and the petitioners, being the
only bidders were declared successful.
5.The petitioners deposited 25% of the auction money, amounting to
Rs.55,93,750/-, within the prescribed time period of 15 days. For
depositing the balance 75% of the auction money, the petitioners applied
for a loan from the respondent-Bank. The said application was rejected by
the respondent-Bank on 3.1.2025. It is stated that although the petitioners
have made a request for grant of three months’ further time for depositing
the balance 75% of the auction money, but the respondent-Bank is going
to auction the property on 22.1.2025.
6.The petitioners have, accordingly, preferred the present writ
petition, seeking a direction to respondent no.3-Bank for granting three
months’ further time for depositing the balance 75% of the auction money,
or to refund 25% amount deposited earlier, within a stipulated time
period.
7.Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the afore-stated
facts, to contend that the delay in depositing 75% of the auction money is
mainly due to rejection of the loan application of the petitioners by the
respondent-Bank, and accordingly, they have sought further three months’
time for the purpose. It is submitted that the Bank is seeking to re-auction
the property which would gravely prejudice their interests.
8.Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a
decision of this Court in Writ-C No.2196 of 2019 (Gaurav Garg vs.
Syndicate Bank and others), which was disposed of, following the
judgment in the case of GM, Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Ltd.
and another vs. Sri Ikbal and others
2
.
9.Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank has submitted
that as per his instructions, the petitioners, who were declared highest
2(2013) 10 SCC 83
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bidders in the online auction held on 23.10.2024, upon having deposited
25% of the bid amount, were advised to deposit the remaining 75% of the
bid amount by 7.11.2024. However, considering their request vide letter
dated 5.11.2024, the Bank granted extension of time till 6.12.2024.
Thereafter, by means of another representation dated 2.12.2024, the
petitioners sought further extension of time till 7.1.2025, stating their
difficulty in arranging the funds. Considering the said request, the Bank
further allowed extension of time for depositing of the remaining sale
amount till 27.12.2024. It is stated that instead of depositing the balance
sale amount within the extended time period, the petitioners submitted
another representation on 22.12.2024, seeking further extension of time
upto 7.2.2025.
10.It has been submitted that as per the request received from the
petitioners vide representation dated 22.12.2024, the competent authority
of the Bank had granted further extension of time till 23.1.2025, as final
opportunity for depositing the remaining balance. It has been pointed out
that the Bank has duly sent a communication dated 18.1.2025 to the
petitioners, with an advise to deposit the remaining sale amount of
Rs.1,67,81,250.00, not later than 23.1.2025 failing which, the initial
deposit of Rs.55,93,750.00 shall be forfeited to the Bank and the said
property shall be re-sold.
11.Learned counsel for the Bank has submitted that the auction sale
has been conducted as per the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and
Rules made thereunder, and in terms thereof, it is to be a time bound
process and no extension can be granted to the auction purchaser beyond
the time period stipulated under the relevant statutory rules. Further, in
default of payment of entire sale amount within the stipulated time period,
the deposit made by the auction purchaser is to be forfeited to the secured
creditor-Bank.
12.In order to examine the rival contentions, the relevant statutory
provisions would be required to be referred.
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13.The SARFAESI Act, 2002 was enacted to regulate securitisation
and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest
and to provide for a central database of security interests created on
property rights, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
14.The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act reads as under:
“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
The financial sector has been one of the key drivers in India's efforts to
achieve success in rapidly developing its economy. While the banking
industry in India is progressively complying with the international
prudential norms and accounting practices there are certain areas in
which the banking and financial sector do not have a level playing field
as compared to other participants in the financial markets in the world.
There is no legal provision for facilitating securitisation of financial
assets of banks and financial institutions. Further, unlike international
banks, the banks and financial institutions in India do not have power to
take possession of securities and sell them. Our existing legal
framework relating to commercial transactions has not kept pace with
the changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms. This
has resulted in slow pace of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting
levels of non-performing assets of banks and financial institutions.
Narasimham Committee I and II and Andhyarujina Committee
constituted by the Central Government for the purpose of examining
banking sector reforms have considered the need for changes in the
legal system in respect of these areas. These Committees, inter alia,
have suggested enactment of a new legislation for securitisation and
empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of the
securities and to sell them without the intervention of the court. Acting
on these suggestions, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Ordinance, 2002 was
promulgated on the 21st June, 2002 to regulate securitisation and
reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The
provisions of the Ordinance would enable banks and financial
institutions to realise long-term assets, manage problem of liquidity,
asset liability mismatches and improve recovery by exercising powers
4 of 16
to take possession of securities, sell them and reduce non-performing
assets by adopting measures for recovery or reconstruction."
15.The history and the legislative backdrop that led to the enactment of
the SARFAESI Act was examined in the case of Mardia Chemical Ltd.
vs. Union of India
3
, and it was observed as follows:
“34.Some facts which need to be taken note of are that the banks and
the financial institutions have heavily financed the petitioners and other
industries. It is also a fact that a large sum of amount remains
unrecovered. Normal process of recovery of debts through courts is
lengthy and time taken is not suited for recovery of such dues. For
financial assistance rendered to the industries by the financial
institutions, financial liquidity is essential failing which there is a
blockade of large sums of amounts creating circumstances which retard
the economic progress followed by a large number of other
consequential ill effects. Considering all these circumstances, the
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act was
enacted in 1993 but as the figures show it also did not bring the desired
results. Though it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that it so
happened due to inaction on the part of the Governments in creating
Debts Recovery Tribunals and appointing presiding officers, for a long
time. Even after leaving that margin, it is to be noted that things in the
spheres concerned are desired to move faster. In the present-day global
economy it may be difficult to stick to old and conventional methods of
financing and recovery of dues. Hence, in our view, it cannot be said
that a step taken towards securitisation of the debts and to evolve means
for faster recovery of NPAs was not called for or that it was
superimposition of undesired law since one legislation was already
operating in the field, namely, the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act. It is also to be noted that the idea has not
erupted abruptly to resort to such a legislation. It appears that a thought
was given to the problems and the Narasimham Committee was
constituted which recommended for such a legislation keeping in view
the changing times and economic situation whereafter yet another
Expert Committee was constituted, then alone the impugned law was
enacted. Liquidity of finances and flow of money is essential for any
healthy and growth-oriented economy. But certainly, what must be kept
in mind is that the law should not be in derogation of the rights which
are guaranteed to the people under the Constitution. The procedure
should also be fair, reasonable and valid, though it may vary looking to
the different situations needed to be tackled and object sought to be
achieved.”
16.In this context, certain observations made in the decision in the case
of United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tandon
4
, may also be referred to.
The said observations are as follows:
3(2004) 4 SCC 311
4(2010) 8 SCC 110
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“1. … With a view to give impetus to the industrial
development of the country, the Central and State Governments
encouraged the banks and other financial institutions to formulate
liberal policies for grant of loans and other financial facilities to those
who wanted to set up new industrial units or expand the existing units.
Many hundred thousand took advantage of easy financing by the banks
and other financial institutions but a large number of them did not repay
the amount of loan, etc. Not only this, they instituted frivolous cases
and succeeded in persuading the civil courts to pass orders of injunction
against the steps taken by banks and financial institutions to recover
their dues. Due to lack of adequate infrastructure and non-availability of
manpower, the regular courts could not accomplish the task of
expeditiously adjudicating the cases instituted by banks and other
financial institutions for recovery of their dues. As a result, several
hundred crores of public money got blocked in unproductive ventures.”
17.Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act contains the provisions relating to
the enforcement of the security interest and the manner in which the same
may be done by the secured creditor without the intervention of the court
or tribunal in accordance with its provisions.
18.The procedural formalities to be followed for the sale of immovable
secured assets as per Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act is provided under
Rules 8 and 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002
5
.
19.The controversy involved in the present case would relate to sub-
rule (4) of Rule 9 which provides for a time period within which, the
balance amount of the purchase price payable by the auction purchaser is
to be paid. For ease of reference, Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002 is extracted
below:
“9.Time of sale, issue of Sale Certificate and delivery of
possession, etc. – (1) No sale of immovable property under these rules,
in first instance shall take place before the expiry of thirty days from the
date on which the public notice of sale is published in newspapers as
referred to in the proviso to sub-rule (6) of rule 8 or notice of sale has
been served to the borrower:
Provided further that if sale of immovable property by any one
of the methods specified by sub rule (5) of rule 8 fails and sale is
required to be conducted again, the authorised officer shall serve, affix
and publish notice of sale of not less than fifteen days to the borrower,
for any subsequent sale.
5Rules, 2002
6 of 16
(2)The sale shall be confirmed in favour of the purchaser who has
offered the highest sale price in his bid or tender or quotation or offer to
the authorized officer and shall be subject to confirmation by the
secured creditor:
Provided that no sale under this rule shall be confirmed, if the
amount offered by sale price is less than the reserve price, specified
under sub-rule (5) of rule 8:
Provided further that if the authorized officer fails to obtain a
price higher than the reserve price, he may, with the consent of the
borrower and the secured creditor effect the sale at such price.
(3)On every sale of immovable property, the purchaser shall
immediately, i.e. on the same day or not later than next working day, as
the case may be, pay a deposit of twenty five per cent. of the amount of
the sale price, which is inclusive of earnest money deposited, if any, to
the authorized officer conducting the sale and in default of such deposit,
the property shall be sold again.
(4) The balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid by
the purchaser to the authorized officer on or before the fifteenth day of
confirmation of sale of the immovable property or such extended period
as may be agreed upon in writing between the purchaser and the
secured creditor, in any case not exceeding three months.
(5)In default of payment within the period mentioned in sub-rule
(4), the deposit shall be forfeited to the secured creditor and the
property shall be resold and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all
claim to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may be
subsequently sold.
(6)On confirmation of sale by the secured creditor and if the terms
of payment have been complied with, the authorized officer exercising
the power of sale shall issue a certificate of sale of the immovable
property in favour of the purchaser in the Form given in Appendix V to
these rules.
(7)Where the immovable property sold is subject to any
encumbrances, the authorized officer may, if he thinks fit, allow the
purchaser to deposit with him the money required to discharge the
encumbrances and any interest due thereon together with such
additional amount that may be sufficient to meet the contingencies or
further cost, expenses and interest as may be determined by him:
Provided that if after meeting the cost of removing
encumbrances and contingencies there is any surplus available out of
the money deposited by the purchaser such surplus shall be paid to the
purchaser within fifteen days from the date of finalisation of the sale.
(8)On such deposit of money for discharge of the encumbrances,
the authorised officer shall issue or cause the purchaser to issue notices
to the persons interested in or entitled to the money deposited with him
and take steps to make the payment accordingly.
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(9)The authorised officer shall deliver the property to the purchaser
free from encumbrances known to the secured creditor on deposit of
money as specified in sub-rule (7) above.
(10)The certificate of sale issued under sub-rule (6) shall specifically
mention that whether the purchaser has purchased the immovable
secured asset free from any encumbrances known to the secured
creditor or not.”
20.Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002 relates to the time of sale, issue of sale
certificate and delivery of possession etc. Public notice of sale is to be
published in the newspaper and only after thirty days thereafter, the sale
of immovable property can take place. Under Rule 9 (2) of the 2002
Rules, the sale is required to be confirmed in favour of the purchaser who
has offered the highest sale price to the authorised officer and shall be
subject to confirmation by the secured creditor. The proviso makes it clear
that sale under the said Rule would be confirmed if the amount offered
and the whole price is not less than the reserved price as specified in Rule
9 (5).
21.Rule 9 (3) makes it clear that on every sale of immovable property,
the purchaser on the same day or not later than next working day, has to
make a deposit of twenty-five per cent of the amount of the sale price,
which is inclusive of earnest money deposited if any. Rule 9 (4) makes it
clear that balance amount of the purchase price payable shall be paid by
the purchaser to the authorised officer on or before the fifteenth day of
“confirmation of sale of the immovable property” or such extended period
as may be agreed upon in writing between the purchaser and the secured
creditor.
22.The liability of a successful auction purchaser to deposit the
requisite amount begins from the date when the sale is confirmed by the
secured creditor and communicated to the auction purchaser and as per
sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002, twenty five per cent amount of
auction price has to be deposited, as earnest money, no later than next
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working day from the date of confirmation of sale and the balance amount
within 15 days from the said date.
23.As per terms of sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002, as it
originally existed, 15 days time period for depositing of the balance 75%
of the purchase price was extendable for a period, as may be agreed upon
in writing between the parties. For ease of reference, sub-rule (4) of Rule
9 of the Rules, 2002, as it originally existed, is reproduced below:
“(4)The balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid by
the purchaser to the authorised officer on or before the fifteenth day of
confirmation of sale of the immovable property or such extended period
as may be agreed upon in writing between the parties.”
24.Sub-rule (4) of Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002 was subsequently
amended vide GOI Notification No.GSR 1046 (E) dated 3.11.2026 and
clause (iv) of Rule 7 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) (Amendment)
Rules, 2002 reads as under:
“(iv) in sub-rule (4), for the words “as may be agreed upon in writing
between the parties”, the words, “as may be agreed upon in writing
between the purchaser and the secured creditor, in any case not
exceeding three months” shall be substituted.”
25.Subsequent to the aforesaid amendment, sub-rule (4) of Rule 9 of
the Rules, 2002, now reads as under:
“(4) The balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid by
the purchaser to the authorized officer on or before the fifteenth day of
confirmation of sale of the immovable property or such extended
period as may be agreed upon in writing between the purchaser
and the secured creditor, in any case not exceeding three months.”
(emphasis supplied)
26.The effect of the amendment to sub-rule (4) of Rule 9 of the Rules,
2002 is that the fifteen days time period for depositing of the balance
amount of the purchase price by the purchaser would be extendable upon
agreement in writing between the purchaser and the secured creditor, for a
period not exceeding three months in any case.
9 of 16
27.Rule 9 (4) of the Rules, 2002 was examined in the decision in
Union Bank of India vs. Rajat Infrastructure (P) Ltd.
6
, wherein in was
clarified that the balance amount of the purchase price has to be paid by
the auction purchaser to the Authorized Officer on or before the fifteenth
day of confirmation of sale or such extended period as may be agreed
upon in writing between the purchaser and the secured creditor, in any
case not exceeding three months. It was observed that even the plenary
powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution could
not be invoked to supplant the substantive law, ignoring the express
statutory provisions dealing with the subject and thereby to achieve
something indirectly, which could not be achieved directly. It was
observed as follows:
27.As discernible from the aforestated sub-rule (4) of Rule 9, the
balance amount of purchase price payable by the purchaser to the
authorised officer has to be paid on or before the fifteenth day of
confirmation of sale of the immovable property or such extended period
as may be agreed upon in writing between the purchaser and the
secured creditor, in any case not exceeding three months. Sub-rule (5)
thereof states that in default of payment within the period mentioned in
sub-rule (4), the deposit shall be forfeited to the secured creditor and the
property shall be resold, and that defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all
claim to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may be
subsequently sold. As per sub-rule (6) thereof, on the confirmation of
sale by the secured creditor and if the terms of payment have been
complied with, the authorised officer exercising the power of sale
would issue a certificate of sale of the immovable property in favour of
the purchaser in the form prescribed under the Rules.
28.The provisions contained in sub-rules (4) and (5) of Rule 9 of the
Rules, 2002, came up for consideration in the decision in the case of
Authorized Officer, State Bank of India vs. C. Natarajan
7
, wherein it
was observed that a discretion is available to the Authorized Officer of the
secured creditor for extension of time for depositing the balance
consideration, but not exceeding the prescribed limit of ninety days. The
objective and necessity of enactment of the powers of forfeiture of
deposited amount of the secured creditor under sub-rule (5) was also
6(2023) 10 SCC 232
7(2024) 2 SCC 637
10 of 16
explained by pointing out that the legislature had visualized that there was
a need to arrest cases of deceptive manipulation of prices at the instance
of unscrupulous borrowers by thwarting sale processes. It was observed
that the purpose of the provision was aimed at instilling a sense of
discipline in the intending purchasers while they proceed to participate in
the auction-sale process. Relevant observations made in the judgment in
this regard are as follows:
27.In the current era of globalisation, the entire philosophy of
society, mainly on the economic front is making rapid strides towards
changes. Unscrupulous people have been inventing newer modes and
mechanisms for defrauding and looting the nation. It is in such a
scenario that provisions of enactments, particularly those provisions
which have a direct bearing on the economy of the nation, must receive
such interpretation so that it not only fosters economic growth but is
also in tune with the intention of the law-makers in introducing a
provision such as sub-rule (5) of Rule 9, which though harsh in its
operation, is intended to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
If indeed Section 73 and Section 74, which are part of the general law
of contract, were sufficient to cater to the remedy, the need to make
sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 as part of the Rules might not have arisen.
Additionally, insertion of sub-rule (5) with such specificity regarding
forfeiture must not have been thought of only for reiterating what is
already there. It was visualised by the law-makers that there was a need
to arrest cases of deceptive manipulation of prices at the instance of
unscrupulous borrowers by thwarting sale processes and this was the
trigger for insertion of such a provision with wide words conferring
extensive powers of forfeiture. The purpose of such insertion must have
also been aimed at instilling a sense of discipline in the intending
purchasers while they proceed to participate in the auction-sale process.
28.At the cost of repetition, it must not be forgotten that the
SARFAESI Act was enacted because the general laws were not found to
be workable and efficient enough to ensure liquidity of finances and
flow of money essential for any healthy and growth-oriented economy.
The decision of this Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India
[Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311] , while
outlawing only a part of the SARFAESI Act and upholding the rest, has
traced the history of this legislation and the objects that Parliament had
in mind in sufficient detail. Apart from the law laid down in such
decision, these are the other relevant considerations which ought to be
borne in mind while examining a challenge to a forfeiture order.
29.There is one other aspect which is, more often than not, glossed
over. In terms of sub-rule (5) of Rule 9, generally, forfeiture would be
followed by an exercise to resell the immovable property. On the date
an order of forfeiture is in contemplation of the authorised officer of the
secured creditor for breach committed by the bidder, factually, the
position is quite uncertain for the former in that there is neither any
11 of 16
guarantee of his receiving bids pursuant to a future sale, much to the
satisfaction of the secured creditor, nor is there any gauge to measure
the likely loss to be suffered by it (secured creditor) if no bidders were
interested to purchase the immovable property. Since the extent of loss
cannot be immediately foreseen or calculated, such officers may not
have any option but to order forfeiture of the amount deposited by the
defaulting bidder in an attempt to recover as much money as possible so
as to reduce the secured debt. That the immovable property is later sold
at the same price or at a price higher than the one which was offered by
the party suffering the forfeiture is not an eventuality that occurs in each
and every case. Sections 73 and 74 of the Contract Act would not,
therefore, be sufficient to take care of the interest of the secured creditor
in such a case and that also seems to be another reason for bringing in
the provision for forfeiture in Rule 9. Ordinarily, therefore, validity of
an order of forfeiture must be judged considering the circumstances that
were prevailing on the date it was made and not based on supervening
events.
33.The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that whenever a
challenge is laid to an order of forfeiture made by an authorised officer
under sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 of the Rules by a bidder, who has failed to
deposit the entire sale price within ninety days, the tribunals/courts
ought to be extremely reluctant to interfere unless, of course, a very
exceptional case for interference is set up. What would constitute a very
exceptional case, however, must be determined by the tribunals/courts
on the facts of each case and by recording cogent reasons for the
conclusion reached.
34.Insofar as challenge to an order of forfeiture that is made upon
rejection of an application for extension of time prior to expiry of
ninety days and within the stipulated period is concerned, the scrutiny
could be a bit more intrusive for ascertaining whether any patent
arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the decision-making process has
had the effect of vitiating the order under challenge. However, in course
of such scrutiny, the tribunals/courts must be careful and cautious and
direct their attention to examine each case in some depth to locate
whether there is likelihood of any hidden interest of the bidder to stall
the sale to benefit the defaulting borrower and must, as of necessity,
weed out claims of bidders who instead of genuine interest to
participate in the auctions do so to rig prices with an agenda to
withdraw from the fray post conclusion of the bidding process. In
course of such determination, the tribunals/courts ought not to be
swayed only by supervening events like a subsequent sale at a higher
price or at the same price offered by the defaulting bidder or that the
secured creditor has not in the bargain suffered any loss or by
sentiments and should stay at a distance since extending sympathy,
grace or compassion are outside the scope of the relevant legislation.
35.In any event, the underlying principle of least intervention by
tribunals/courts and the overarching objective of the SARFAESI Act duly
complemented by the Rules, which are geared towards efficient and
speedy recovery of debts, together with the interpretation of the relevant
laws by this Court should not be lost sight of. Losing sight thereof may
not be in the larger interest of the nation and susceptible to interference.
12 of 16
29.The objective and the background under which stringent
consequences for default have been provided were taken note of in the
decision in the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of India (supra),
and it was observed as follows:
“24.…Drawing from our experience on the Bench, it can safely be
observed that in many a case the borrowers themselves, seeking to
frustrate auction sales, use their own henchmen as intending purchasers
to participate in the auction but thereafter they do not choose to carry
forward the transactions citing issues which are hardly tenable. This
leads to auctions being aborted and issuance of fresh notices. Repetition
of such a process of participation-withdrawal for a couple of times or
more has the undesirable effect of rigging of the valuation of the
immovable property. In such cases, the only perceivable loss suffered
by a secured creditor would seem to be the extent of expenses incurred
by it in putting up the immovable property for sale. However, what does
generally escape notice in the process is that it is the mischievous
borrower who steals a march over the secured creditor by managing to
have a highly valuable property purchased by one of its henchmen for a
song, thus getting such property freed from the clutches of mortgage
and by diluting the security cover which the secured creditor had for its
loan exposure. Bearing in mind such stark reality, sub-rule (5) of rule 9
cannot but be interpreted pragmatically to serve twin purposes - first, to
facilitate due enforcement of security interest by the secured creditor
(one of the objects of the SARFAESI Act); and second, to prohibit
wrong doers from being benefitted by a liberal construction thereof.”
30.In the case, at hand, the petitioners having participated in the
auction held on 23.10.2024, and having deposited 25% of the bid amount
on the said date, were required to deposit the remaining 75% of the
purchase price before the fifteenth day of the sale confirmation, i.e. by
7.11.2024. However, upon request being made by the petitioners on
5.11.2024, the Bank granted extension of time till 6.12.2024. Another
representation dated 2.12.2024 was submitted by the petitioners, seeking
extension of time till 7.1.2025, stating their difficulty in arrangement of
funds. The said request was also acceded to by the Bank and further
extension of time was allowed to deposit the balance sale price till
27.12.2024. The petitioner made yet another representation dated
22.12.2024, seeking further extension of time upto 7.2.2025, which was
turned down by the Bank on the ground that no extension could be
13 of 16
granted to the auction purchaser beyond the time period stipulated under
the statutory rules.
31.There is no material on record, which may persuade this Court to
come to a conclusion that there has been any manifest arbitrariness or
unreasonableness on the part of the respondent-Bank in not acceding the
repeated requests of the petitioners for depositing of the balance 75%
amount of the bid amount beyond the time period stipulated under sub-
rule (4) of Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002. The maximum permissible limit of
three months, as provided under the relevant statutory rules, having
already been granted by the secured creditor, there is no plausible reason
which may warrant issuance of any direction for further extension of time
period, as sought by the petitioners.
32.It may be reiterated as a settled principle of law that when a statute
requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be
done in that manner or not at all, and other methods of performance are
necessarily forbidden. (See: Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426;
Nazir Ahmad vs. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 (2); Rao Shiv
Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, (1954) 1 SCC 296; State of
UP v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358; Babu Verghese v. Bar Council
of Kerala, (1990) 3 SCC 422; Municipal Corporation of Greater
Mumbai vs. Abhilash Lal (2020) 13 SCC 234 and Nareshbhai
Bhagubhai vs. Union of India, (2019) 15 SCC 1.
33.Rule 9 (4) of the Rules, 2002, as amended with effect from
4.11.2016, contains an ordainment that on mutual agreement, the time for
making deposit of the balance amount of sale price can be extended for a
period not exceeding ninety days; however, extension beyond ninety days
would not be permissible in any case.
34.The decision in the case of GM, Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative
Bank Ltd. (supra), followed in the subsequent decision of Gaurav Garg
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(supra), which are sought to be relied on behalf of the petitioners, were
rendered in the context of the unamended Rule 9 (4) of the Rules, 2002,
wherein there was no outer limit provided for extension of the time period
for depositing of the balance amount of 75% of the purchase price. The
said authorities cannot be relied upon by the petitioners to claim further
extension of time beyond the outer limit prescribed under sub-rule (4) of
Rule 9 of the Rules, 2002, as it now exists.
35.The secured creditor is entitled in law to enforce the security
interest and in the process, to initiate all such steps and take all such
measures for the protection of public interest by recovering public money
lent to a borrower, who has defaulted in its repayment. The petitioners
(auction purchasers), having participated in the auction, would be
presumed to be fully aware of the requirements under the law with regard
to deposit of the purchase price and also that in case of any default or
failure on their part to make the payment of the sale price within the
permissible time period under the relevant statutory rules, would entail
forfeiture of the deposit already made by them.
36.Looking to the objectives for which, the SARFAESI Act, 2002 has
been enacted, Courts have taken a consistent view that in such a situation,
where a bidder has failed to deposit the entire sale price within the
stipulated period of ninety days, the tribunal/court would be extremely
reluctant to interfere, unless of course, a very exceptional case for
interference is made out. The underlying principle of least intervention by
the tribunal/courts and the overriding objective of the SARFAESI Act and
the Rules made thereunder, which are for speedy recovery of debt, cannot
be lost sight of.
37.We do not see any patent arbitrariness or unreasonableness on the
part of the respondent-Bank, which may persuade us to entertain the writ
petition in respect of the reliefs sought.
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38.The writ petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
Order Date :- 21.1.2025
Arun K. Singh/RKK/-
(Dr Y K Srivastava, J) (Siddhartha Varma, J)
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