2026 INSC 475 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 25076 of 2024)

ANN SAURABH DUTT ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

LIEUTENANT COLONEL

SAURABH IQBAL

BAHADUR DUTT ….RESPONDENT (S)

WITH

SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 28451 OF 2024

J U D G M E N T

Mehta, J.

Civil Appeal @ SLP(Civil) No. 25076 of 2024

1. Heard.

2. Leave granted.

3. We are well into the 21

st Century, and yet an

attempt by a qualified woman to pursue her

professional career and to secure a safe and stable

2

environment for the upbringing of her child has been

treated as an act of cruelty and desertion by the

Courts below. We are constrained to observe that the

approach adopted by the learned Family Court, as

affirmed by the High Court, is not only legally

unsustainable but also deeply disquieting. The

endeavour of the appellant to establish her own

dental clinic at Ahmedabad, rather than allowing the

professional qualification she had earned through

years of effort to lie dormant and go waste, has been

viewed with disapproval, merely because her stance

did not conform to the expectation of the husband

and the in-laws that she must abandon her

aspirations and reside with her husband at a remote

location on account of his posting as an Army Officer.

4. The reasoning which permeates the impugned

judgments appears to be founded upon deeply

entrenched archaic societal assumptions that a wife’s

professional identity is subject to an implied spousal

veto; that her autonomy must yield to the

geographical and occupational demands of her

husband; and that her decision to secure a safer and

more conducive environment for the upbringing of

her child, even at the cost of living separately for

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certain periods, would construe as a matrimonial

default. Such assumptions, rooted in a conservative

patriarchal understanding of marital roles, are wholly

incompatible with the progressive evolution of

society, where dignity, autonomy , and equal

participation of women in all spheres are increasingly

recognised as fundamental to social advancement.

5. It must be emphasised that a well-educated and

professionally qualified woman cannot be expected to

be confined within the rigid boundaries of

matrimonial obligations alone. Marriage does not

eclipse her individuality, nor does it subjugate her

identity under that of her spouse. It is for both the

husband and the wife to balance their marital ties in

a manner that respects mutual aspirations, and not

for one to unilaterally dictate the life choices of the

other. As has been recognised in the evolving

discourse on matrimonial jurisprudence, a woman

can no longer be treated as a mere appendage to the

household of the husband, and her independent

intellectual and professional identity and aspirations

must receive due credence and respect.

6. What is portrayed as defiance in the impugned

judgments is, in truth, an assertion of independence;

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what is labelled as desertion is, on a closer scrutiny,

a consequence of circumstances shaped by

professional commitments, the welfare of the minor

child, and the realities of life. To characterise such

conduct as cruelty or desertion is to effectively

penalise the appellant for exercising choices that are

integral to her dignity and personhood. The

expectation that a woman must invariably sacrifice

her career and conform to traditional notions of an

obedient wife meant for cohabitation, irrespective of

her own aspirations or the welfare of the child,

reflects a line of reasoning that is archaic, ultra-

conservative, and cannot be countenanced in the

present day scenario when women are leading

various professional fields from the forefront.

7. The factual matrix, as it unfolds from the

record, would demonstrate that the conduct

attributed to the appellant as cruelty or desertion

was, in reality, a manifestation of legitimate choices

made in pursuit of professional fulfilment and

responsible parenthood. It is in this backdrop and

keeping in view the need to harmonise matrimonial

obligations with the constitutional guarantee of

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individual autonomy, that the present lis warrants

adjudication with a fine balance.

Background: -

8. The appellant and the respondent were married

on 3

rd September, 2009. The appellant is a qualified

dentist, and the respondent was serving in the Indian

Army and was posted at Pune.

9. The appellant started her own private dental

clinic at Pune in the month of June, 2010. A year

later, the respondent came to be posted at Kargil.

The appellant sacrificed her dental practice to be

besides her husband (respondent) and shifted to

Kargil. Both stayed together at Kargil for over four

months. During this period, the appellant conceived.

Finding the circumstances not conducive to her

pregnancy, particularly in view of the limited medical

facilities at Kargil, the place of posting of the

respondent, the appellant returned to Ahmedabad

and started living with her in-laws.

10. However, as per the appellant, owing to the

difference in religious background from which the

parties hail (the appellant is a Christian and the

respondent is a Hindu), the relationship between

them started going southwards. The appellant

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thereafter moved to her parental home at

Ahmedabad. She gave birth to a female child on 12

th

April, 2012, who continues to be in her care and

custody.

11. After the birth of the daughter, the appellant

went to Kargil to stay with the respondent, where the

child developed certain medical complications, to be

specific, seizure episodes, and was required to be

admitted to the military hospital. As the condition of

the child did not show improvement and in view of

the limited specialized medical facilities available at

Kargil, the parties returned to Ahmedabad with the

child so that she could be provided proper further

treatment.

12. The aforesaid sequence of events precipitated

severe discord between the spouses. The appellant

thereupon approached the competent Army

authorities seeking maintenance for herself and the

minor child. The Army authorities, vide order dated

12

th May, 2014, allowed the application and directed

the respondent to pay 22% of his salary to the

appellant and 5.5% to the minor daughter. It appears

that the said order was passed in terms of the

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applicable Army instructions governing maintenance

to dependents.

13. The order granting maintenance was challenged

by the respondent before the Armed Forces Tribunal,

Lucknow. The matrimonial strife between the parties

escalated, leading to initiation of multiple

proceedings before different fora, including the

learned Family Court No.2 of Ahmedabad City at

Ahmedabad

1. During the pendency of such

proceedings, efforts were made to bring about a

reconciliation between the parties; however, the same

did not fructify. Thereafter, by order dated 11

th

February, 2022, the learned Family Court granted

interim maintenance to the tune of Rs.55,000/- per

month (Rs.35,000/- to the appellant and

Rs.20,000/- to the minor daughter).

14. In revision preferred by the respondent before

the High Court for assailing the said order, the

quantum of interim maintenance was modified and

the amount payable to the appellant was scaled down

to Rs.25,000/- per month, while the amount of

Rs.20,000/- per month awarded to the minor

1 Hereinafter, referred to as the “Family Court”.

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daughter as maintenance was maintained. The same

terms of maintenance were finalized by the learned

Family Court vide final order dated 30

th September,

2022.

15. In the intervening period, the respondent had

also filed Family Suit No. 2361 of 2017 seeking

dissolution of marriage. During the course of the said

proceedings, he also moved an application under

Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

2, 1973

read with Section 340 CrPC (Exh. 54), alleging that

the appellant had made false statements on oath in

proceedings relating to interim maintenance, and

sought her prosecution for perjury. The learned

Family Court, vide judgment and decree dated 30

th

September, 2022, decreed the suit for divorce on the

grounds of cruelty and desertion attributed to the

appellant and simultaneously, by the same

judgment, rejected the aforesaid application of the

respondent (Exh.54).

16. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred a First

Appeal to the High Court at Gujarat at Ahmedabad

3

challenging the decree of divorce, whereas the

2 For short, ‘CrPC’.

3 Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”.

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respondent preferred a separate First Appeal

challenging the rejection of his application filed under

Section 195 of the CrPC read with Section 340 CrPC.

17. While pressing the appeal, the appellant simply

urged for expunging of the observations and findings

pertaining to desertion and cruelty while not

contesting the grant of divorce, whereas the

respondent pressed hard for acceptance of his appeal

and prosecution of the appellant for perjury.

18. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed

both the appeals by judgment dated 12

th August,

2024 which is assailed by both the parties in this

appeal by special leave.

19. We have heard the learned counsel for the

appellant and the respondent, who appeared in-

person, and have considered the submissions

advanced. The appellant Ms. Ann has just prayed for

expungement of the findings of desertion and cruelty

which prayer was hotly contested by the respondent

Saurabh Dutt. Thus, we have perused and gone

through the findings of the Family Court on these

issues and find the same to be appalling and totally

unacceptable.

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20. At this stage, we would like to extract the

findings recorded by the learned Family Court, while

granting divorce and dissolving the marriage of the

parties, which are as below:-

(i) That the appellant was not inclined to

continue with the marriage, as she gave

precedence to her career by operating a

dental clinic at Ahmedabad;

(ii) That the appellant got invitation cards

printed for the opening of her dental clinic

and circulated the same without the

knowledge of the respondent and his family,

which, according to the learned Family

Court, amounted to cruelty, as it was

expected of a wife or daughter-in-law that any

such step be taken with the knowledge of the

husband or his family;

(iii) That the setting up of the dental clinic

without informing the family was not

reflective of healthy family relations and,

according to the learned Family Court, such

conduct, amounted to disregard for the

emotions and feelings of the family;

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(iv) That the request made by the appellant that,

during visits to Ahmedabad, she be permitted

to stay at her parental home was also treated

as an act of cruelty, as, according to the

learned Family Court, a married woman is

expected to reside with her husband at the

matrimonial home;

(v) That whenever the parties came to

Ahmedabad, they resided separately, as the

appellant stayed at her parental home while

the respondent stayed at his own residence;

(vi) That the allegation of the respondent that, on

one occasion, the appellant did not permit his

mother to take the minor daughter in her lap

or to touch her, allegedly on account of fear

of infection, was also treated to be indicative

of cruelty;

(vii) It was observed by the learned Family Court,

in paragraph 26 of the judgment, that it was

the bounden duty of a wife to reside with her

husband wherever he may choose to reside,

and that the husband could not be deprived

of his conjugal rights except under special

circumstances which absolved the wife of

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such duty. The appellant’s attempt to run her

own dental clinic was held to be indicative of

an intent not to reside with the respondent at

his place of posting and was accordingly

treated as desertion;

(viii) In paragraph 27 of the judgment, the learned

Family Court observed that the marriage

between the parties had irretrievably broken

down and that a decree of divorce was

warranted on account of such breakdown,

resulting from acts of cruelty and desertion

on the part of the appellant.

21. Having gone through the above findings

recorded by the learned Family Judge, we find the

approach of the Presiding Judge to be pedantic and

regressive, to say the least. The endeavour on the part

of the appellant to choose a more secure place for

bringing up her minor daughter, who suffered from a

concerning medical condition, could not have been

construed as an act of desertion under any

circumstances.

22. True it is that, in ideal conditions, an army

officer’s wife would be expected to accompany her

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husband even if the posting is at difficult locations.

However, merely because the wife decided to reside at

Ahmedabad with the primary intention to provide a

safer environment and better health care to her

daughter, where she could also pursue her

professional career, branding such conduct as

constituting cruelty or desertion was atrocious to say

the least.

23. It reflects an ultra-conservative and myopic

approach of the Presiding Officer. To brandish the

effort of the wife to pursue her own career goals as

acts of cruelty, as the same may have hurt the

sentiments of the husband or the in-laws, is highly

objectionable and deplorable in the era where the

society proudly talks of women empowerment.

24. The learned Family Judge laid much emphasis

on the incident wherein the appellant inaugurated

her dental clinic without informing the respondent or

her in-laws. The said act was held to be an act of

cruelty. Looking to the approach that the respondent

has displayed all throughout the proceedings, it is

apparent that his attitude was of male chauvinism

claiming an exalted status on account of Army service

and never to promote or support the career of his own

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wife, herself a qualified Dentist. Under such

circumstances, if at all, the appellant opened the

dental clinic without disclosing the same to the

respondent, it must have been a decision taken out

of sheer compulsion and to deter her husband from

obstructing her rightful pursuit of a professional

career.

25. Needless to state that the appellant must have

put in great efforts and expenditure for acquiring the

degree in Dentistry. Thus, the approach of the Family

Court was clearly meant to convey that the wife even

though having a degree in Dentistry, should have

sacrificed her own career to go and stay with her

husband at his place of posting and failure to do so,

tantamounted to committing cruelty by deserting her

husband. This approach can never be countenanced

and deserves to be deprecated.

26. In the present world, where women are making

strides in leaps and bounds, merely because the

husband was an Army Officer posted in a remote

location, the expectation that the wife could not even

think of pursuing her career in Dentistry, is

indicative of regressive and feudalistic mindset. We

are afraid that the learned Family Court would never

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have taken the same view if there was a role reversal

and the wife was serving in the Army while the

husband was a medical professional . In such

circumstances the husband would never be expected

to sacrifice his career merely to remain by the side of

his wife; his failure to do so would certainly not be

branded as cruelty and desertion.

27. We are of the firm view that in such a situation,

striking a balance is necessary. If, at all, the wife

intended to pursue her medical career, then the same

should have been supported rather than deterring

her efforts. The husband should have taken pride in

the fact that his wife was in pursuit of her career

goals rather than holding her responsible for

breakdown of the marriage on the ground that she

did not join him at Kargil by sacrificing her career. If

the lady, having acquired the degree in Dentistry, did

not utilise the same, that, in our opinion, would be a

sinful wastage of talent and resources because the

seat against which she had acquired the degree,

would go abegging.

28. It also appears that the Courts below gave much

credence to the assertion of the respondent to the

effect that the appellant sought to coerce him to

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convert to Christianity and that such conduct

amounted to cruelty. In this regard, it may be noted

that the material on record does not indicate any

clear or credible evidence substantiating such

allegations, which seem to arise in the backdrop of

competing claims made by the parties during the

course of intense matrimonial discord. The only

circumstance that emerges with some degree of

consistency is that the respondent had accompanied

the appellant to the Velankanni Church in Tamil

Nadu, which, by itself, would not constitute coercion

or cruelty. This aspect may also be viewed in the

context of the fact that the marriage between the

parties was a love marriage, solemnised in

accordance with the customs and rites of both Hindu

and Christian faiths, and was subsequently

registered under the Special Marriage Act.

29. Having observed the approach of the

respondent during the course of hearings and the

thrust of his submissions seeking prosecution of the

appellant, we are convinced that he has an attitude

of domineering and control, which must have been

the probable cause for the appellant taking the steps

for gaining independence and pursuing her career

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goals. The steps so taken by the appellant Ms. Ann

were absolutely justified in view of the prevailing facts

and circumstances.

30. Furthermore, the learned Family Court also

attributed the irretrievable breakdown of the

marriage to the so-called acts of cruelty and desertion

on the part of the appellant. In view of the findings

recorded supra, the said observations are absolutely

baseless and unsustainable.

31. The judgment of the learned Family Court has

been affirmed by the High Court vide judgment dated

12

th August, 2024. Suffice it to say that having found

the observations made by the learned Family Court

regarding cruelty and desertion attributed to the

appellant to be unjustified and untenable in the eyes

of law, we are convinced that the same deserved to be

expunged and scored off the record.

32. As the learned counsel for the appellant has, on

instructions, stated that the appellant is no longer

hopeful of a patch-up or resumption of matrimony

with the respondent, and as the respondent has

reportedly remarried, we are not inclined to disturb

the decree of divorce passed by the learned Family

Court and affirmed by the High Court. The same is

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accordingly upheld, with the observations regarding

cruelty and desertion being expressly expunged and

set aside. The decree shall be deemed to have been

passed on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of

marriage.

33. The appeal is thus partly allowed.

34. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

SLP(Civil) No. 28451 of 2024

35. We have heard the petitioner, who appeared in-

person, in support of his special leave petition

assailing the rejection of his application filed under

Section 195 of CrPC read with Section 340 CrPC,

seeking prosecution of the respondent for perjury.

36. Having given our thoughtful consideration to

the submissions of Shri Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur

Dutt, the petitioner appearing in-person and after

going through the impugned orders and the other

material placed on record, we are of the firm opinion

that the allegations made by the petitioner seeking

prosecution of his ex-wife, the respondent herein,

appear to be instigated by personal vendetta and

spiteful approach. The same also seems to be fuelled

by anger and pent-up frustration owing to multiple

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cases and complaints filed by the respondent against

him and his family members.

37. In view of the order passed by us in Civil Appeal

arising out of SLP (Civil) No.25076 of 2024, and upon

thoughtful consideration of the submissions

advanced by the petitioner appearing in-person, as

also upon perusal of the impugned orders and the

material placed on record, we are of the firm opinion

that the allegations made by him do not disclose the

necessary ingredients of the offence of perjury or

giving false evidence so as to direct prosecution of the

respondent. The grievances sought to be projected

appear to stem from a hyper-technical dissection of

the material on record, in the backdrop of multiple

disputes between the parties arising from escalated

matrimonial acrimony. Concurrent findings have

been recorded by the Courts below in rejecting the

application and the appeal of the petitioner and thus,

we do not find any justifiable reason to entertain the

prayer made in this petition seeking prosecution of

the respondent, by taking recourse to the procedure

provided under Section 195 CrPC read with Section

340 CrPC.

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38. The special leave petition lacks merit and is

dismissed as such.

39. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

….……………………J.

(VIKRAM NATH )

...…………………….J.

(SANDEEP MEHTA)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 12, 2026.