Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.408 OF 2007

Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy & Ors. ..Appellants

Versus

State of Andhra Pradesh ..Respondent

J U D G E M E N T

R.M. LODHA, J.

This criminal appeal by special leave unfolds a

woeful tale of a village political rivalry leading to double

murder; prior thereto also there were attacks by rival factions

that led to two murders.

2. Fifteen persons were arraigned before the trial

court for the offences under Section 302, 307, 307 read with

149, 148 and 341, IPC. The trial court convicted only eleven

among them and acquitted two accused. The other two

accused died during the trial. The convicted persons were

sentenced under Section 302, IPC, to life imprisonment and

varying periods of imprisonment under other offences; fine

with default stipulation was also imposed. All the eleven

convicted persons filed appeal before the High Court. The

High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence passed by the

trial court. All these eleven convicted persons preferred

special leave petition in which leave has been granted.

During the pendency of the appeal, one more convicted

person has died.

3. Chinthalajuturu in Vemula Mandal of Cuddapah

District (Andhra Pradesh) is a faction-ridden village. One of

these factions is led by Kakarla Gangi Reddy (victim group)

that supports Congress Party. The leader of the other faction

is Annareddysamba Siva Reddy (accused group) which

supports Telugu Desam Party. There were instances of attack

between these groups earlier also. One year prior to the

present incident, one Yeddula Gangi Reddy of the Congress

Party and belonging to victim group was murdered. About a

fortnight prior to the incident, one Sirigireddy Prathapa Reddy

of accused group was murdered. For the murder of

2

Sirigireddy Prathapa Reddy, the members of victim group

figured as accused. It is for this reason that A.M. Annareddy

Siva Reddy started residing at Pulivendula.

4. On May 16, 1996 at about 9.00 A.M. Annareddy

Siva Reddy (deceased hereinafter referred to as D-1), Yerram

Reddy Pulla Reddy (deceased and hereinafter referred to as

D-2), Annareddy Bala Gangi Reddy (PW-1) - brother of D-1,

Annareddy Jagan Mohan Reddy (PW-3) - nephew of D-1 and

one Ramiredy Narayana Reddy left Pulivendula in a jeep

driven by Ala Krishnaiah (PW-2). D-1 sat in the front seat by

the side of driver (PW-2). PW-1 and D-2 occupied the

second row seat behind D-1 and PW-2.

PW-3 and Ramireddy Narayana Reddy occupied the rear seat

of the jeep.

5. When the said jeep reached near Gollalaguduru

Harijanawada village, D-1 saw a jeep with the members of

accused group seated therein, coming from the opposite

direction. Seeing this, D-1 asked PW-2 to reverse the jeep.

PW-2 had hardly reversed the jeep that Annareddi Sambasiva

Reddy (A-1), Annareddi Ramakrishna Reddy (A-2), Annareddi

Ramasura Reddy (A-3), Yeddula Eswara Reddy (A-4),

3

Yeddula Gangi Reddy (A-5), Annareddi Gangi Reddy (A-6),

Palle Venkatarami Reddy (A-7), Annareddi Srinivasul Reddy

(A-8), Dasareddigari Chalama Reddy (A-9), Dasareddigari

Lakshmi Reddy (A-10), Singam Pedda Pulla Reddy (A-11),

Singam Chinna Gangi Reddy (A-12), Kakarla Subbi Reddy

(A-13), Annareddi Lakshmi Reddy (A-14) and Annareddi

Ramana Reddy (A-15) came out of their vehicle and

surrounded the jeep of D-1. A-1, A-2, A-10 and A-13 were

armed with axes while the others were armed with Eathapululu

(sickle). A-1 to A-9 hacked D-1. A-3, A-6, A-7 and A-10 to

A-13 hacked D-2. D-1 and D-2 died on the spot. A-1, A-3,

A-6, A-7 and A-10 to A-13 inflicted grievous injuries on PW-1

whereas A-7, A-9, A-10 and A-14 inflicted injuries on

Annareddy Jagan Mohan Reddy (PW-3) and Ramireddy

Narayana Reddy. A-14 attacked PW-3 and A-15 attacked

PW-2.

6. PW-1 was taken to Pulivendula Government

Hospital by few residents of Chinthalajuturu village. Dr. T.V.

Raghavendra Reddy (PW-10), Civil Assistant Surgeon

attended on him and gave PW-1 the necessary medical aid.

K. Danam (PW-11) - Assistant Sub Inspector of Police,

4

Vemula Police Station while he was at Pulivendula came to

know of the incident at about 1.50 P.M. He went to the

Pulivendula Government Hospital and found that PW-1 was

undergoing treatment. After being satisfied that PW-1 was

conscious and able to give his statement, in the presence of

the doctor (PW-10), he recorded statement (Ex.P-1) of PW-

1. PW-11 then went to Vemula Police Station and registered

the case (Crime No.26/1996) and forwarded a copy of the first

information report to the concerned magistrate immediately

thereafter.

7. A. Venkateswara Reddy (PW-12) - Inspector of

Police, took up investigation and conducted further

investigation on May 17, 1996. He conducted inquest of the

dead bodies and sent them to Government Hospital,

Pulivendula for post-mortem examination. PW-10 conducted

autopsy of the dead bodies and issued post-mortem reports

Ex.P.18 and Ex.P.19. PW-10 also examined the injured PW-

2 and PW-3 and issued injury certificates Ex.P.13 and Ex.P.16.

8. In order to complete the narration of facts, it may

be noticed here that during the course of investigation, A-14

and A-15 pleaded alibi. The Investigating Officer took all

5

necessary steps towards investigation and after collecting the

necessary evidence and on completion of investigation, he

filed chargesheet against A-1 to A-13 before the Court of

Judicial Magistrate 1

st

Class, Pulivendula who committed them

to court of sessions for trial. The accused were charged for

the following offences:

“(i) A-1 to A-13 for rioting under Section 148 IPC;

(ii)A-1 to A-13 for wrongful restraint under Section 341 IPC;

(iii)A-1 to A-13 for voluntarily causing grievous hurt to PW-1 and

PW-3 under Section 326 IPC;

(iv)A-1 to A-5 and A-6 to A-9 under Section 302 IPC for the murder of

D-1;

(v)A-3, A-6 to A-8 and A-10 to A-13 under Section 302 IPC for the

murder of D-2;

(vi)A-1, A-3, A-6 to A-8, A-10, A-12 and A-13 under Section 307 IPC

for attempt to murder PW-1;

(vii)A-7, A-9 and A-10 under Section 307 IPC for attempt to murder

Ramireddi Narayana Reddy;

(viii)A-2, A-4, A-5 and A-11 under Section 307 read with Section 149

IPC for attempt to murder PW-1.”

9. Since A-14 and A-15 were deleted from the

chargesheet by the Investigating Officer, a private complaint

came to be filed by PW-1 before the Judicial Magistrate 1

st

6

Class, Pulivendula. The concerned magistrate also

committed A-14 and A-15 to the court of sessions for trial.

10. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses including

three eye-witnesses (PW-1 to PW-3) and marked

documents Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-28 and exhibited M.O. 1 to

M.O.14.

11. In their statement under Section 313, Cr.P.C., the

accused denied their role in the crime.

12. The III Additional Sessions Judge, Cuddapah, on

consideration of both oral and documentary evidence vide his

judgment dated April 5, 2004, found A-1, A-2, A-4 to A-8 guilty

of the offence under section 302 IPC; they were sentenced to

undergo imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.1,000/- with

default stipulation. A-6, A-7, A-10 to A-13 were found guilty

of the offence under section 302 IPC and sentenced to

undergo imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.1,000/- with

default stipulation. A-6, A-7, A-10 to A-13 were found guilty

of the offence under section 307 IPC as well and sentenced to

undergo imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs.1,000/-

with default stipulation. A-2, A-4 and A-5 were found guilty

of the offence under section 307 read with section 149 IPC

7

and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five

years and a fine f Rs.1,000/- with default stipulation. A-1, A-

2, A-4 to A-8, A-10 to A-13 were found guilty of the offence

under section 148 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment

for one year and a fine of Rs.500/- with default stipulation.

The sentence passed against each of the accused was

ordered to run concurrently. The trial court acquitted A-14

and A-15 of all the charges. A-3 and A-9 died during the trial

and, thus, the case abated as against them.

13. Aggrieved against their conviction and sentence, A-1,

A-2, A-4 to A-8 and A-10 to A-13 filed appeal before the High

Court. The State preferred separate appeal against that very

judgment in so far as acquittal of A-14 and A-15 was

concerned.

14. These two appeals were heard together by the

Division Bench of the High Court and were dismissed on

March 9, 2006.

15. The present appeal now subsists on behalf of

A-1, A-2, A-4, A-6 to A-8 and A-10 to A-13 since A-5 has died

during the pendency of appeal.

8

16. Dr.T.V. Raghavendra Reddy (PW-10), Civil

Surgeon, Government Hospital, Pulivendla conducted post-

mortem examination on the body of Annareddy Siva Reddy

(D-1) on May 17, 1996. In the post-mortem report (Ex.P-18), he

recorded the following external injuries on the body of D-1:

“1.An incised wound in the middle of right upper arm

measuring about 7 cm x 3 cm x 4 cm deep. Muscles cut

and fracture of bone present.

2. An incised wound 5 cm above wound No.1 measuring

about 7 cm x 3 cm x 2 cm deep. Muscles cut.

3. An incised wound from the lateral part of the left eye

below the ear to the root of neck measuring about 20

cm x 3 cm x 5 cm deep. Muscles cut and fracture of

mandible and spinal process.

4. An incised wound 1½ cm above wound No.3

measuring about 15 cm x 1½ cm x 4 cm deep.

5. An incised wound 7 cm x 1 cm x bone deep 1 cm

above wound No.4.

6.An incised wound 2 cm above wound No.5 measuring

about 5 cm x 1½ cm x bone deep fracture of occipital

bone present.

7.An incised wound in the left occipital area measuring

about 8 cm x 5 cm x bone deep. Flap is hanging with

bit of skin .

8.An incised wound on the left parietal area measuring

about 6 cm x 1½ cm x bone deep and fracture of

parietal bone present.

9.An incised wound in the centre of the scalp measuring

about 6 cm x 1½ cm x bone deep. Fracture of the left

and right parietal bones seen.

9

10.An incised wound on the right parietal area measuring

about 5 cms x 1 cm x bone deep and fracture of right

parietal bone seen.

Head and neck : Brain injured and neck vessels cut.”

The aforesaid injuries on the body of D-1 were found ante-

mortem in nature. In the opinion of PW-10, D-1 died due to

haemorrhage, shock and injury to neck vessels.

17. On the same day (May 17, 1996) at 1.30 P.M.,

PW-10 conducted post-mortem examination on the body of

D-2. In the post-mortem report (Ex.P-19), he recorded the

following injuries on the body of D-2:

“1.Incised wound on the left leg at the knee joint

measuring about 15 cms x 8 cm x 8 cm deep. Fracture

of patella bone seen.

2. Incised wound 6 cms below wound No.1. measuring

about 10 cm x 3 cm x 4 cms deep. Fracture of

Tibia seen.

3. Incised wound in centre of chest lower part of

sternum measuring about 6 cm x 2 cm x fracture of

sternum and plura is injured.

4. An incised wound between left thumb and the index

finger measuring about 3½ cm x 1½ cm x 1½ cm deep.

5. An incised wound on the nape of the neck measuring

about 5 cm x 1½ cm x 1½ cm deep.

6. An incised wound on the left parietal area measuring

about 5 cm x 1½ cm x scalp deep.

10

7. An incised wound on the posterior part of left

parietal area measuring about 5 cm x 1½ cm x scalp

deep.”

The aforesaid injuries were found ante-mortem in nature.

According to PW-10, D-2 died of haemorrhage, shock and

injury to vital organs.

18. The evidence of PW-10 and post-mortem reports

(Ex.P-18 and Ex.P-19) leave no manner of doubt that the

death of D-1 and D-2 was homicidal.

19. PW-1 is the injured witness. The following injuries

were inflicted on him:

“1.An incised wound in front of left parietal area and

front bone measuring about 7 cm x 1½ cm x bone deep.

(Depressed fracture of the frontal bone as per the specialist

opinion).

2. An incised wound on the left hand above the wrist

measuring about 4 cm x 1 cm x muscles deep. Fracture of

Ulna bone (As per the specialist opinion).

3. An incised wound on the posterior part of the left

parietal area measuring about 6 cm x 1 cm x bone deep,

and cut of the bone.

4. An incised wound by the side of wound No.3, 2 cm

apart measuring about 3 cm x ½ cm x scalp deep.

5. An incised wound on the left hand above wound No.2

measuring about 3 cm x 1 cm x muscle deep.

6. An incised wound on the right wrist measuring about

1½ cm x ½ cm skin deep.

11

7.An incised wound on the anterior part of Right parietal

bone measuring about 2 cm x ¼ cm x skin deep.

8. An incised wound on the anterior part of the left

parietal bone measuring about 3½ cm x ¼ cm x Skin

deep.”

20. K. Danam (PW-11), was posted as Assistant Sub

Inspector of Police at Vemula Police Station at the relevant

time. Having come to know of the incident that two persons

belonging to the Congress Party were done to death at

Gollalaguduru Harijanwada by the Telugu Desam Party

faction, PW-11 immediately rushed to the Government

Hospital, Pulivendula. He found that PW-1 was undergoing

treatment in the emergency ward. As PW-1 was in a fit

condition to give statement, PW-11 recorded his statement

marked Ex.P-1. PW-10 also made an endorsement on Ex.P-

1 that PW-1 was in a fit and proper condition to give a

statement. Based on Ex.P-1, first information report came to

be registered.

21. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing

for the appellants vehemently contended that first information

report was a concocted document and that makes the entire

prosecution case doubtful. He would submit that PW-1 was

12

seriously injured and not in a position to give any statement.

In this regard, he referred to the evidence of Dr. A. Sudhakar

Reddy (PW-7), Assistant Professor of Neuro Surgery at

S.V.R.R.G.G. Hospital, Tirupati who treated PW-1. The

learned senior counsel also submitted that at the time of the

recording of statement (Ex.P-1), the group leader Kakarla

Gangj Reddy had already arrived and he was in the room

where PW-1 was being treated. It is the contention of Mr.

P.P. Rao that Kakarla Gangi Reddy was instrumental in

implicating the accused falsely who belonged to rival group.

It was also contended that in the first information report except

naming all the accused and making omnibus allegations, no

specific overt acts of the accused were mentioned.

22. We are unable to accept the submission of the

learned senior counsel that F.I.R. is a concocted document.

It is true that injury no.1 received by PW-1 in front of left

parietal area and the depressed fracture of frontal bone was

extremely grave and serious but on the face of clear,

categorical and unambiguous endorsement made by Dr.T.V.

Raghavendra Reddy (PW-10) that PW-1 was in a fit and proper

condition to give a statement at that time and the fact that

13

PW-11 recorded the statement of PW-1 in the presence of

PW-10, there cannot be even slightest doubt about the

authenticity of Ex.P-1 and we find no justifiable reason to even

remotely conclude that Ex.P-1 is not the statement given

by PW-1. The contention that PW-11 is a chance witness, is

noted to be rejected. Pertinently, the F.I.R. was forwarded to

the Magistrate without any delay. As a matter of fact, F.I.R.

reached the Magistrate at 10.45 P.M. on May 16, 1996 itself.

As to whether PW-1 was in a fit and proper condition to give

statement or not, could have been assessed by PW-10 under

whose treatment PW-1 was at that time and none else. The

evidence of PW-7 referred to by the learned senior counsel in

no way creates any doubt about the correctness of

statement of PW-10 as PW-7 has not stated in definite terms

that PW-1 was not in a fit state of condition to give statement

at that time. The trial court as well as the High Court did not

accept the contention made on behalf of the accused that

Ex.P-1 was fabricated. We agree with this view of the trial

court and the High Court.

23. PW-1 in his testimony before the court has given

account of the incident. He testified that A-1, A-2, A-10 and

14

A-12 were armed with axes and remaining eleven accused

were armed with eathapululu (sickle). A-1 to A-9 hacked D-1

with their weapons. A-3, A-6, A-7, A-10 to A-13 hacked D-2

with their respective weapons. A-1, A-3, A-6, A-7 and A-10 to

A-13 hacked him with their respective weapons. A-7, A-9, A-10

and A-14 hacked PW-3 and R. Narayanareddy with their

respective weapons. D-1 and D-2 died on the spot. In his

cross-examination, he admitted that he did not state in Ex.P-1

that they (PW-1 and D-1) obtained loan of Rs.6,000/- from the

bank. He also admitted in Ex.P-1 that he did not state that

A-1, A-2, A-10 and A-12 were armed with axes and the

remaining accused with eathapululu (sickle). He also admitted

that he did not state in Ex.P-1 that A-1 to A-9 hacked D-1; A-

3, A-6, A-10 to A-13 hacked D-2 and that he was attacked by

A-1, A-3, A-6, A-7, A-10 to A-13 and that A-7, A-9, A-10 and

A-14 attacked PW-3 and R. Narayanareddy. These

omissions do not affect the credibility of his evidence since at

the time of recording of Ex.P-1, PW-1 was in injured condition.

It was not expected of him to give a detailed version in that

condition, more so when so many accused were involved. But

despite that, in Ex.P-1, he has given names of all the accused

15

persons. 24. The testimony of PW-1 is corroborated

by medical evidence. The factum of PW-1 and D-1 having

gone to the Bank at Pulivendula and that they obtained a loan

of Rs.6,000/- from Alavalapadu Grameena Bank is also

established by the evidence of R.B.S.K. Satyamurthy (PW-5)

and M. Venkata Subbareddy (PW-6). PW-5 and PW-6 were

Branch Manager and Clerk-cum-Cashier respectively in the

Bank at the relevant time. The evidence of driver of the jeep

A. Krishnaiah (PW-2), although declared hostile as he refused

to recognize the assailants, corroborates the evidence of PW-

1 to the extent that they had gone to the Bank at Pulivendula

and that they were returning from that place on May 16, 1996

at 11.00 A.M.

25. A. Jaganmohan Reddy (PW-3) is yet another eye-

witness. He also got injured in the incident. He has given

detailed version of the incident. He has testified that A-1 to

A-9 hacked D-1 and A-3, A-6, A-7, and A-10 to A-13 hacked

D-2 with their weapons. He also testified that A-3, A-6, A-7

and A-10 to A-13 hacked PW-1 causing various injuries to him

and A-7 and A-10 hacked him on his left forearm and left

thigh. PW-10 examined PW-3 at about 3.45 P.M. on May 16,

16

1996 and found two incised injuries on the left hand and left

thigh. The injury report pertaining to him is Ex.P-16.

26. PW-1 and PW-3 are injured witnesses. As a

matter of fact, PW-1 suffered a grave injury on his head. Two

of their family members died. Why should he and PW-3 let

real culprits go scot-free ? It is most unlikely that they would

have spared the actual assailants and falsely implicated

these appellants merely because there is political rivalry

between them. The omissions and discrepancies pointed out

in the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 are only minor and do not

shake their trustworthiness. It is true that neither PW-1 nor

PW-3 assigned specific injuries or specific overt acts attributed

to the accused individually but looking to the nature of the

incident where large number of persons attacked D-1, D-2

PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, it would not have been possible

for PW-1 or PW-3 to attribute specific injury individually to

each accused. How could it be possible for any person to

recount with meticulous exactitude the various individual

acts done by each assailant ? Had they stated so, their

testimony would have been criticized as highly improbable

and unnatural. The testimony of eye-witnesses carries with it

17

the criticism of being tutored if they give graphic details of

the incident and their evidence would be assailed as

unspecific, vague and general if they fail to speak with

precision. The golden principle is not to weigh such testimony

in golden scales but to view it from the cogent standards that

lend assurance about its trustfulness. In our view, the

testimony of PW-1 and PW-3 is of credence and does not

deserve to be discarded on the ground of non-mentioning of

specific overt acts. The trial court and the High Court have

given cogent and convincing reasons for accepting the

evidence of PW-1 and PW-3. We concur. Merely because

A-14 and A-15 got acquittal, in our view, credibility of deposition

of PW-1 and PW-3 is not affected.

27. Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel submitted

that the conviction and sentence passed against the accused-

appellants for the offence under Section 302, IPC, simpliciter is

not legally sustainable in the absence of any specific overt

acts attributed to each of the accused. The learned senior

counsel would submit that the accused who inflicted fatal

injury/injuries resulting in the death with the requisite

intention or knowledge alone are liable for the offence under

18

Section 302, IPC simpliciter. The learned senior counsel

contended that as there is no conviction for the offence

under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC, the question

whether such conviction is maintainable or not without such

charge does not arise in the present case. Placing reliance

upon a decision of this Court in Pandurang,Tukia and Bhillia

vs. The State of Hyderabad

1

, learned senior counsel would

submit that in absence of specific charge under Section 149,

the accused persons cannot be convicted under Section 302

read with Section 149 as Section 149 creates a distinct and

separate offence. The learned senior counsel also relied

upon Suraj Pal vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh

2

, Nayan Ullah

and Ors. Vs. Emperor

3

, Tahsildar Singh vs. State

4

and

Nanak Chand vs. The State of Punjab

5

.

28. Learned senior counsel for the appellants also

contended that in the instant case there is no charge under

Section 149, IPC at all nor any finding of the courts below that

the accused had the common object to commit the offence

under Section 302, IPC. He submitted that barring one injury

1

(1955) 1 SCR 1083

2

(1955) 1 SCR 1332

3

A.I.R. 1925 Calcutta 903

4

A.I.R. 1958 Allahabad 255

5

(1955) 1 SCR 1201

19

in the case of D-1 and two injuries in the case of D-2, none of

the other injuries was found to be fatal and, therefore, the

common object at the most could be only to cause some

injury but not to cause the fatal injuries. In support of this

contention of his, the learned senior counsel relied upon

Shambhu Nath Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar

6

; Bhajan

Singh And Ors. Vs. The State of Punjab

7

and Ram Anjore And

Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

8

.

29. Mr.D. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned counsel for

the State in his reply submitted that in the complaint (Ex.P-1),

the names of all the accused persons, weapons wielded by

them and their participation have been clearly mentioned. In

their deposition, PW-1 and PW-3 have also stated which of

the accused attacked D-1, D-2 and injured PW-1, PW-2 and

PW-3 and, therefore, non-attributing the injuries specifically

to the individual accused does not materially affect the

prosecution case. He would urge that the accused-

appellants have been convicted for the offences under Sections

148 and 307 read with Section 149 and Section 302 IPC

6

AIR 1960 SC 725

7

(1978) 4 SCC 77

8

(1975) 3 SCC 379

20

simpliciter which would show that the accused formed unlawful

assembly. The learned counsel invited our attention to

Section 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and submitted

that in the present case, neither in the grounds of appeal

before this Court nor before the courts below the accused

have pleaded prejudice or failure of justice due to non-

mentioning of Section 149 IPC with Section 302 IPC. He

relied upon: Willie (William) Slaney Vs. The State of M.P

9

. ;

Bhoor Singh And Anr. Vs. State of Punjab

10

; Karnam Ram

Narsaiah & Ors. Vs. State of A.P.

11

and Dumpala Chandra

Reddy Vs. Nimakayala Balireddy And Ors.

12

and Malhu Yadav

And Ors. Vs. State of Bihar

13

and Umesh Singh And Anr. Vs.

State of Bihar,

14

30. In Suraj Pal, this Court held:

“…Whether or not Section 149 IPC creates a distinct

offence (as regards which there has been conflict of views

in the High Courts), there can be no doubt that it creates a

distinct head of criminal liability which has come to be known

as “constructive liability”—a convenient phrase not used in

the Indian Penal Code. There can, therefore, be no doubt

that the direct individual liability of a person can only be fixed

upon him with reference to a specific charge in respect of

the particular offence. Such a case is not covered by

9

(1955) 2 SCR 1140

10

(1974) 4 SCC 754

11

(2005)10 SCC 629

12

(2008) 8 SCC 339

13

(2002) 5 SCC 724

14

(2000) 6 SCC 89

21

Sections 236 and 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The

framing of a specific and distinct charge in respect of

every distinct head of criminal liability constituting an

offence, is the foundation for a conviction and sentence

therefore. The absence, therefore, of specific charges

against the appellant under Sections 307 and 302 IPC in

respect of which he has been sentenced to transportation

for life and to death respectively, is a very serious lacuna in

the proceedings insofar as it concerns him. The question

then which arises for consideration is whether or not this

lacuna has prejudiced him his trial.”

31. In Pandurang, it was observed:

“……Several persons can simultaneously attack a man

and each can have the same intention, namely the intention

to kill, and each can individually inflict a separate fatal blow

and yet none would have the common intention required by

the section because there was no prior meeting of minds to

form a pre-arranged plan. In a case like that, each would

be individually liable for whatever injury he caused but none

could be vicariously convicted for the act of any of the

others; and if the prosecution cannot prove that his

separate blow was a fatal one he cannot be convicted of the

murder….”

32. In the case of Nanak Chand, this Court stated:

“…There is a clear distinction between the provisions of

sections 34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code and the two

sections are not to be confused . The principal element in

section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is the common intention

to commit a crime. In furtherance of the common intention

several acts may be done by several persons resulting in

the commission of that crime. In such a situation section

34 provides that each one of them would be liable for that

crime in the same manner as if all the acts resulting in that

crime had been done by him alone. There is no question

of common intention in section 149 of the Indian Penal

Code. An offence may be committed by a member of an

unlawful assembly and the other members will be liable for

22

that offence although there was no common intention

between that person and other members of the unlawful

assembly to commit that offence provided the conditions

laid down in the section are fulfilled. Thus if the offence

committed by that person is in prosecution of the common

object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of

that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in

prosecution of the common object, every member of the

unlawful assembly would be guilty of that offence,

although there may have been no common intention and no

participation by the other members in the actual

commission of that offence……………………………………

………………………..

After an examination of the case referred to on behalf of

the appellant and the prosecution we are of the opinion that

the view taken by the Calcutta High Court is the correct

view namely, that a person charged with an offence read

with section 149 cannot be convicted of the substantive

offence without a specific charge being framed as required

by section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

33. In Umesh Singh while dealing with Section 149

IPC, this Court held:

“ Vicarious liability, we may state, as rightly contended for

the State by Shri B.B. Singh relying upon the decisions of

this Court in Shamshul Kanwar v. State of U.P.,(1995) 4

SCC 430, and Bhajan Singh v. State of U.P., (1974) 4 SCC

568, extends to members of the unlawful assembly only in

respect of acts done in pursuance of the common object of

the unlawful assembly or such offences as the members of

the unlawful assembly are likely to commit in the execution

of that common object. An accused whose case falls within

the terms of Section 149 IPC as aforesaid cannot put

forward the defence that he did not with his own hand

commit the offence committed in prosecution of the common

object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of

the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in

prosecution of that object. Everyone must be taken to have

intended the probable and natural results of the combination

of the acts in which he had joined. It is not necessary in all

cases that all the persons forming an unlawful assembly

must do some overt act. Where the accused had assembled

23

together, armed with guns and lathis, and were parties to the

assault on the deceased and others, the prosecution is not

obliged to prove which specific overt act was done by which

of the accused. Indeed the provisions of Section 149 IPC, if

properly analysed will make it clear that it takes an accused

out of the region of abetment and makes him responsible as

a principal for the acts of each and all merely because he is

a member of an unlawful assembly. We may also notice that

under this provision, the liability of the other members for the

offence committed during the continuance of the occurrence

rests upon the fact whether the other members knew

beforehand that the offence actually committed was likely to

be committed in prosecution of the common object. Such

knowledge can reasonably be intended from the nature of

the assembly, arms or behaviour, at or before the scene of

action. If such knowledge may not reasonably be attributed

to the other members of the assembly then their liability for

the offence committed during the occurrence does not arise.

Tested on this touchstone, we may safely say that in the

present case when the appellants were members of an

unlawful assembly which was armed with lathis and guns

and a declaration had been made that in the event there is

any resistance to the taking away of the paddy which is

stated to have been the original object, they were willing to

take the life of the deceased and take away the paddy. If

that is the position, it is futile to contend for the appellants

that their conviction is in any way bad.”

34. Section 464 of Code of Criminal Procedure

reads:

“464. Effect of omission to frame, or absence of, or

error in, charge.—(1) No finding sentence or order by a

Court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid

merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the

ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge

including any misjoinder of charge, unless, in the opinion of

the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of

justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.

(2)If the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision is of

opinion that a failure of justice has in fact been

occasioned, it may –

(a)in the case of an omission to frame a charge,

order that a charge be framed and that the

24

trial be recommended from the point

immediately after the framing of the charge.

(b)in the case of an error, omission or irregularity

in the charge, direct a new trial to be had upon

a charge framed in whatever manner it thinks

fit.

Provided that if the Court is of opinion that the facts of

the case are such that no valid charge could be preferred

against the accused in respect of the facts proved, it shall

quash the conviction.”

35. We deem it appropriate at this stage to

refer to the charges framed against the accused

by the trial court:

“Charge No.1. That you A-1 to A-13 on or about 16-5-1996

in the morning near Gollalaguduru Harijanawada were

members of an unlawful assembly and did, in prosecution of

the common object of such assembly viz., in murdering the

deceased, 1 and 2 commit the offence of rioting with a

deadly weapon to wit axes and Eethapululu and that that

you thereby committed an offence punishable under

Section 148 I.P.C. and within my cognizance.

Charge No.2. That you A-1 to A-13 on or about the same

day, time, place and during the course of the same

transaction as mentioned in charge No.1 above, wrongfully

restraint LWs-1 to 4 Annareddi Bala Gangireddi, Annareddi

Jagan Mohanreddi, Ramireddi Narayanareddi and Ala

Krishnaiah and later the deceased 1 and 2 thereby

committed an offence punishable under Section 341 I.P.C.

and within my cognizance.

Charge No.3. That you A-1 to A-13 on or about the same

day, time, place and during the course of the same

transaction as mentioned in charge No.1 above, voluntarily

caused grievous hurt to LWs-1 to 4 Annareddi Bala

Gangireddi, Annareddi Jagan Mohanreddi, Ramireddi

Narayanareddi and Ali Krishnaiah by means of axes and

Eethapululu and that you thereby committed an offence

punishable under Section 326 I.P.C. and within my

cognizance.

25

Charge No.4. That you A-1 to A-5 and A-6 to A-9, on or

about the same day, time, place and during the course of

the same transaction as mentioned in charge No.1 above,

did commit murder by intentionally causing the death of

Annareddi Sivaraeddi (deceased No.1) and that you

thereby committed an offence punishable under Section

302 I.P.C. and within my cognizance.

Charge No.5. That you A-3, A-6 to A-8, A-10 to A-13 on or

about the same day, time, place and during the course of

the same transaction as mentioned in the charge No.1

above, did commit murder by intentionally causing the death

of Yerramireddi Pullareddi (deceased No.2) and that you

thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302

I.P.C. and within my cognizance.

Charge No.6. That you A-1, A-3, A-6 to A-8, A-10, A-12

and A-13 on or about the same day, time, place and during

the course of the same transaction as mentioned in charge

No.1 above, did an act to wit to murder with such intention

and under such circumstances, that if by that act you had

caused the death of Annareddi Bala Gangi Reddi (LW-1)

you would have been guilty of murder and that you caused

hurt to the said Annareddi Bala Gangireddi (LW-1) by the

said act and that you thereby committed an offence

punishable under Section 307 I.P.C. and within my

cognizance.

Charge No.7. That you A-7, A-9 and A-10 on or about the

same day time and place during the course of the same

transaction as mentioned in charge No.1 above, did an act

to wit attempt to murder with such intention and under such

circumstances, that if by that act you had caused the death

of Ramireddi Narayana Reddi, you would have been guilt of

murder and that you caused hurt to the said Ramireddi

Narayanareddi LW-3 by the said act, and that you thereby

committed an offence punishable under Section 307 I.P.C.

and within my cognizance.

Charge No.8. That you A-2, A-4, A-5 and A-11 on or

about the same day, time, place and during the course of

the same transaction as mentioned in charge No.1 above,

were members of an unlawful assembly and in prosecution

of the common object of which viz., in attacking the

prosecution witnesses some of the members i.e., A-1, A-3,

A-6 to A-10 and A-12 and A-13 caused the death of the

deceased attempt to murder the witnesses and that you are

thereby under section 149 I.P.C. guilty of causing the said

offence, an offence punishable under Section 307 I.P.C.

and within my cognizance.”

26

36. Section 149, IPC creates constructive liability i.e. a

person who is a member of an unlawful assembly is made

guilty of the offence committed by another member of the

same assembly in the circumstances mentioned in the Section,

although he may have had no intention to commit that offence

and had done no overt act except his presence in the assembly

and sharing the common object of that assembly.

37. Some divergence between two decisions of this

Court in Nanak Chand and Suraj Pal seems to have been

noticed and matter was referred to the Constitution Bench in

Willie (William) Slaney. Although Willie (William) Slaney was

not a case under Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and

the charge against the accused therein was under Section 302

read with Section 34 IPC but the Constitution Bench

considered the question whether the omission to frame an

alternative charge under Section 302 IPC is an illegality that

cuts at the root of conviction. Vivian Bose, J. considered

Sections 221 to 223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 232, 233, 234, 235,

27

236, 237, 238, 535 and 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1898 and observed:

“29. We do not agree with either view. In our opinion, the

cases contemplated by Section 237 are just as much a

departure from Section 233 as are those envisaged in

Sections 225, 226, 227, 228, 535 and 537. Sections 236,

237 and 238 deal with joinder of charges and so does

Section 233. The first condition is that there shall be a

separate charge for each offence and the second is that

each charge must be tried separately except in the cases

mentioned in Sections 234, 235 and 236. It is to be

observed that the exceptions are confined to the rule about

joinder of charges and that no exception is made to that part

of the rule that requires separate charges for each offence.

It will be seen that though Sections 234, 235 and 236 are

expressly mentioned, Section 237 is not referred to, nor is

Section 238. Therefore, so far as Section 233 is concerned,

there can be no doubt that it requires a separate charge for

each offence and does not envisage a situation in which

there is either no charge at all or where, there being a

charge for some other offence of which the accused is

acquitted, he can be convicted instead of something else for

which he was not charged. We are unable to hold that the

Code regards Sections 237 and 238 as part of the normal

procedure.”

38. Vivian Bose, J. went on to observe :

“44. In adjudging the question of prejudice the fact that the

absence of a charge, or a substantial mistake in it, is a

serious lacuna will naturally operate to the benefit of the

accused and if there is any reasonable and substantial

doubt about whether he was, or was reasonably likely to

have been, misled in the circumstances of any particular

case, he is as much entitled to the benefit of it here as

elsewhere; but if, on a careful consideration of all the facts,

prejudice, or a reasonable and substantial likelihood of it,

is not disclosed the conviction must stand; also it will

always be material to consider whether objection to the

nature of the charge, or a total want of one, was taken at

an early stage. If it was not, and particularly where the

accused is defended by counsel (Atta Mohammad v. King-

Emperor) {(1929) LR 57 IA 71,74} it may in a given case

be proper to conclude that the accused was satisfied and

knew just what he was being tried for and knew what was

being alleged against him and wanted no further

particulars, provided it is always borne in mind that “no

28

serious defect in the mode of conducting a criminal trial

can be justified or cured by the consent of the advocate of

the accused” (Abdul Rahman v. King-Emperor) {(1926) LR

54 IA 96,104,110}. But these are matters of fact which will

be special to each different case and no conclusion on

these questions of fact in any one case can ever be

regarded as a precedent or a guide for a conclusion of fact

in another, because the facts can never be alike in any two

cases “however” alike they may seem. There is no such

thing as a judicial precedent on facts though counsel, and

even Judges, are sometimes prone to argue and to act as

if there were.”

39. In his concurring judgment, Chandrasekhara Aiyar,

J. also surveyed the relevant provisions of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1898 and held:

“76. A case of complete absence of a charge is covered

by Section 535, whereas an error or omission in a charge

is dealt with by Section 537. The consequences seem to

be slightly different. Where there is no charge, it is for the

court to determine whether there is any failure of justice.

But in the latter, where there is mere error or omission in

the charge, the court is also bound to have regard to the

fact whether the objection could and should have been

raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.

77. The sections referred to indicate that in the generality

of cases the omission to frame a charge is not per se fatal.

We are unable, therefore, to accept as sound the very

broad proposition advanced for the appellants by Mr

Umrigar that where there is no charge, the conviction

would be illegal, prejudice or no prejudice. On the other

hand, it is suggested that the wording of Section 535 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure is sufficiently wide to cover

every case of no charge. It is said that it applies also to the

case of a trial in which there has been no charge of any

kind even from the very outset. We are unable to agree

that Section 535 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to

be construed in such an unlimited sense. It may be noticed

that this group of sections relating to absence of a charge,

namely, Sections 225, 226 and 232 and the powers

exercisable thereunder, are with reference to a trial which

has already commenced or taken place. They would,

therefore, normally relate to errors of omissions which

occur in a trial that has validly commenced. There is no

29

reason to think that Section 535 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure is not also to be understood with reference to

the same context. There may be cases where, a trial which

proceeds without any kind of charge at the outset can be

said to be a trial wholly contrary to what is prescribed by

the Code. In such cases, the trial would be illegal without

the necessity of a positive finding of prejudice. By way of

illustration the following classes of cases may be

mentioned: (a) Where there is no charge at all as required

by the Code from start to finish — from the Committing

Magistrate’s court to the end of the Sessions trial; the

Code contemplates in Section 226 the possibility of a

committal without any charge and it is not impossible to

conceive of an extreme case where the Sessions trial also

proceeds without any formal charge which has to be in

writing and read out and explained to the accused (Section

210(2) and Section 251(A)(4) and Section 227). The Code

requires that there should be a charge and it should be in

writing. A deliberate breach of this basic requirement

cannot be cured by the assertion that everything was orally

explained to the accused and the assessors or jurors, and

there was no possible or probable prejudice, (b) Where the

conviction is for a totally different offence from the one

charged and not covered by Sections 236 and 237 of the

Code. On a charge for a minor offence, there can be no

conviction for a major offence, e.g., grievous hurt or rioting

and murder. The omission to frame a separate and

specific charge in such cases will be an incurable

irregularity amounting to an illegality.

78. Sections 34, 114 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code

provide for criminal liability viewed from different angles as

regards actual participants, accessories and men actuated

by a common object or a common intention; and the

charge is a rolled-up one involving the direct liability and

the constructive liability without specifying who are directly

liable and who are sought to be made constructively liable.

In such a situation, the absence of a charge under one or

other of the various heads of criminal liability for the

offence cannot be said to be fatal by itself, and before a

conviction for the substantive offence, without a charge

can be set aside, prejudice will have to be made out. In

most of the cases of this kind, evidence is normally given

from the outset as to who was primarily responsible for the

act which brought about the offence and such evidence is

of course relevant.

79. After all, in our considering whether the defect is illegal

or merely irregular, we shall have to take into account

30

several factors, such as the form and the language of the

mandatory provisions, the scheme and the object to be

achieved, the nature of the violation, etc. Dealing with the

question whether a provision in a statute is mandatory or

directory, Lord Penzance observed in Howard v.

Bodington. {(1877) 2 PD 203} “There may be many

provisions in Acts of Parliament which, although they are

not strictly obeyed, yet do not appear to the court to be of

that material importance to the subject-matter to which

they refer, as that the legislature could have intended that

the non-observance of them should be followed by a total

failure of the whole proceedings. On the other hand, there

are some provisions in respect of which the court would

take an opposite view, and would feel that they are matters

which must be strictly obeyed, otherwise the whole

proceedings that subsequently follow must come to an

end.” These words can be applied mutatis mutandis to

cases where there is no charge at all. The gravity of the

defect will have to be considered to determine if it falls

within one class or the other. Is it a mere unimportant

mistake in procedure or is it substantial and vital? The

answer will depend largely on the facts and circumstances

of each case. If it is so grave that prejudice will necessarily

be implied or imported, it may be described as an illegality.

If the seriousness of the omission is of a lesser degree, it

will be an irregularity and prejudice by way of failure of

justice will have to be established.”

40. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. however, put a note of

caution to subordinate Courts:

“80. This judgment should not be understood by the

subordinate courts as sanctioning a deliberate

disobedience to the mandatory requirements of the Code,

or as giving any licence to proceed with trials without an

appropriate charge. The omission to frame a charge is a

grave defect and should be vigilantly guarded against. In

some cases, it may be so serious that by itself it would

vitiate a trial and render it illegal, prejudice to the accused

being taken for granted. In the main, the provisions of

Section 535 would apply to cases of inadvertence to frame

a charge induced by the belief that the matter on record is

sufficient to warrant the conviction for a particular offence

without express specification, and where the facts proved

by the prosecution constitute separate and distinct offence

but closely relevant to and springing out of the same set of

facts connected with the one charged.”

31

41. Willie (William) Slaney thus holds: that where the

charge is rolled-up one involving the direct liability and the

constructive liability without specifying who are directly liable

and who are sought to be made constructively liable, in such

a situation, the absence of a charge under one or other or the

various heads of criminal liability for the offence cannot be

said to be fatal by itself, and before a conviction for the

substantive offence, without a charge can be set aside,

prejudice will have to be made out.

42. The aforesaid legal position holds good after

enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as well

in the light of Sections 215, 216, 218, 221 and 464 contained

therein. In unmistakable terms, Section 464 specifies that

a finding or sentence of a court shall not be set aside merely

on the ground that a charge was not framed or that charge

was defective unless it has occasioned in prejudice.

Because of a mere defect in language or in the narration or

in form of the charge, the conviction would not be rendered

bad if accused has not been adversely affected thereby. If

the ingredients of the section are obvious or implicit,

conviction in regard thereto can be sustained irrespective of

32

the fact that the said section has not been mentioned. A

fair trial to the accused is a sine quo non in our criminal

justice system but at the same time procedural law contained

in the Code of Criminal Procedure is designed to further the

ends of justice and not to frustrate them by introduction of

hyper-technicalities. Every case must depend on its own

merits and no straightjacket formula can be applied; the

essential and important aspect to be kept in mind is: has

omission to frame a specific charge resulted in prejudice to

the accused.

43. Coming now to the facts of the present case; all

the accused were put to notice under charge no. 1 that on

May 16, 1996 in the morning near Gollalaguduru

Harijanawada, they were members of an unlawful assembly

armed with deadly weapons and in prosecution of common

object of such assembly, namely, in murdering deceased 1

and 2, they committed offence of rioting, punishable under

section 148 IPC. A-1 to A-5 and A-6 to A-9 were noticed

of the particulars under charge no.4 that during the course

of same transaction as mentioned in charge no. 1, they

committed murder by intentional causing death of D-1 and

33

thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302

IPC. A-3, A-6 to A-8, A-10 to A-13 were put to notice under

charge no.5 that during the course of the same transaction

as mentioned in charge no. 1 they committed murder by

intentional causing death of D-2 and thereby committed an

offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.

44. A careful reading of charge no. 4 and charge no.

5 leaves no manner of doubt, since the transaction

mentioned in charge no.1 has been made integral part thereof,

that all the necessary ingredients of Section 149 IPC are

implicit therein except mentioning of Section 149 IPC

specifically. The particulars stated in charge no. 4 and 5 are

reasonably sufficient to give the appellants adequate notice of

Section 149 IPC although not specifically mentioned. Is non-

mentioning of Section 149 in charge no. 4 and charge no. 5 a

fundamental defect of an incurable illegality that may warrant

setting aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants ?

We do not think so. Non-framing of a charge under section

149 IPC, on the face of the charges framed against the

appellants would not vitiate their conviction; more so when the

accused have failed to show any prejudice in this regard. The

34

present case is a case where there is mere omission to

mention Section 149 in charge no. 4 and 5 which at the highest

may be considered as an irregularity and since the appellants

have failed to show any prejudice, their conviction and

sentence is not at all affected. Tenor of cross-examination of

PW-1 and PW-3 by the defence also rules out any prejudice to

them. The offence, in the established facts and circumstances

of the case, under Section 302 read with section 149 IPC is

implicit and applying the dictum laid down by the Constitution

Bench of this Court in Willie (William) Slaney, the omission to

mention Section 149 IPC specifically in the charge no. 4 and 5

cannot affect their conviction. In no way their conviction is

rendered bad as the appellants had assembled together

armed with axes and eathapululu(sickle) and were parties to

the assault on D-1 and D-2 and others. In a situation such as

this it was not obligatory upon the prosecution to prove which

specific overt act was done by which of the accused.

45. The submission of the learned senior counsel for

the appellants that since D-1 and D-2 received only one and

two fatal injuries respectively, the common object at the most

could be to cause injuries and not fatal injuries hardly merits

35

acceptance. The deadly weapons with which appellants

were armed, the number of injuries inflicted on D-1 and D-2,

and the murderous assault lead to a certain inference that the

appellants shared common object of committing murder with

other accused. That they were more than five and formed

unlawful assembly is beyond doubt. D-1 and D-2 died on the

spot. PW-1 fortunately survived after surgery and

hospitalization for more than month.

46. For the above reasons, the appeal must fail and is

dismissed.

………………….J

(D.K. Jain)

………………….J

(R.M. Lodha)

New Delhi,

April 21, 2009

36