Renuka WP 3505-2023 and WP(ST) 5298-2023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (ST) NO. 5298 OF 2023

Apras Polymer and Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd....Petitioner

V/s.

Rajendra Laxman Deore ...Respondent

WITH

WRIT PETITION NO. 3505 OF 2023

Rajendra Laxman Deore ...Petitioner

V/s.

1.

2.

Apras Polymer and Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd.

Learned Member, Industrial Court, Nashik ...Respondents

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO.7918 OF 2025

IN

WRIT PETITION NO. 3505 OF 2023

Rajendra Laxman Deore ...Applicant

V/s.

Apras Polymer and Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. and

Anr.

...Respondents

______________

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Mr. Avinash Jalisatgi with Mr. T. R. Yadav, Ms. Divya Wadekar and Mr.

Mulanshu Vora, for Petitioner in WP (ST) 5298/2023 and for Respondent in

3505/2023.

Mr. Rajendra Laxman Deore, Petitioner in person in WP 3505/2023 and

Respondent in person in WP (ST) 5298/2023.

______________

CORAM: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.

RESERVED ON: 24 JUNE 2026

PRONOUNCED ON: 6 JULY 2026

JUDGMENT:

1) These are cross Petitions �led by the Employer and by its

Employee challenging the judgment and order dated 12 May 2022 passed

by the learned Member, Industrial Court, Nashik in Revision Application

(ULP) No. 2 of 2020, by which the Industrial Court has modi�ed the

Order of the Labour Court. By its judgment and order dated 28 January

2020, the Labour Court had allowed Complaint (ULP) No. 25 of 2017 �led

by the Employee and had set aside termination order dated 27 April 2017

with direction for reinstatement of the Employee with continuity in

service and full backwages from 27 April 2017. The Industrial Court,

though has maintained the direction for reinstatement with continuity,

has denied him the backwages.

2) The Employer is aggrieved by setting aside of the

termination order dated 27 April 2017 and direction for reinstatement

and has accordingly �led Writ Petition (ST) No. 5298 of 2023 challenging

the orders passed by the Labour and Industrial Courts. On the other

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hand, the Employee is aggrieved by only the order passed by the

Industrial Court to the extent of denial of backwages and has accordingly

�led Writ Petition No. 3505 of 2023.

3) Apras Polymer and Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd.

(‘Employer’) is engaged in the business of manufacturing plastic

injection molding and has a factory at MIDC, Ambad, Nashik. Mr.

Rajendra Laxman Deore (who is referred to as the ‘Employee’ for the sake

of convenience and without any reference to his status as such) was

appointed on the post of Quality Assurance Supervisor since 7 March

2011. According to Employer, Employee does not �t within de�nition of

the term ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act,

1947 (ID Act). On the grounds of poor performance and other behavioral

issues, the Employer terminated the services of Employee by letter dated

27 April 2017 by offering to pay compensation in the form of two

months’ salary. The Employee �led Complaint (ULP) No.25 of 2017

before Labour Court, Nashik challenging the termination letter dated 27

April 2017 and seeking reinstatement with full backwages. The

Complaint was resisted by the Employer by �ling Written Statement.

Based on pleadings, the Labour Court framed issues. Employee led

evidence by examining himself as a witness in addition to �ling

documentary evidence. The Employer examined Mr. Mosim Mohammed

Ali Sayyed, Assistant Manager of HDFC and Rajendra Damodhar Wagh,

Senior Quality Executive working with it and also �led documents. After

considering the pleadings, documentary and oral evidence, the Labour

Court proceeded to allow Complaint (ULP) No. 25 of 2017 declaring that

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the Employer had committed unfair labour practice under items 1 (a), (b),

(f) and (g) of schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade

Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTU &

PULP Act). The Labour Court set aside the termination order dated 27

April 2017 and directed reinstatement of the Employee with continuity

of service and full backwages with effect from 27 April 2017.

4) The Employer �led Revision Application (ULP) No. 2 of

2020 before Industrial Court, Nashik challenging the judgment and order

of Labour Court. By judgment and order dated 12 May 2022, the

Industrial Court has partly allowed Revision Application �led by the

Employer and has modi�ed the judgment and order passed by the Labour

Court. The Industrial Court has partly allowed Complaint (ULP) No. 25 of

2017, upholding the �nding of Labour Court about commission of the

unfair labour practice under item 1 (a), (b), (f) and (g) of the Schedule IV

of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. The Industrial Court has also not

disturbed the direction for reinstatement in service with continuity.

However, the Industrial Court has set aside the direction of the Labour

Court for payment of full backwages. Thus, the Employer is directed to

reinstate the Employee with continuity of service but without backwages.

As observed above, the Employer is aggrieved by orders passed by Labour

as well as Industrial Courts and has accordingly �led Writ Petition (ST)

No. 5298 of 2023. On the other hand, Employee is aggrieved only by the

order of Industrial Court, to the limited extent of denial of backwages

and has �led Writ Petition No. 3505 of 2023.

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5) The Employer claims that during pendency of the Pet ition,

Employee was directed to join the services with effect from 28 May 2023.

It is claimed by the Employer that Employee indeed joined the services

and was paid wages. The Employer claims that Employee was required to

be kept in suspension vide letter dated 28 June 2024 and enquiry was

initiated against him vide chargesheet dated 29 July 2024. It is claimed

by the Employer that Employee was dismissed from service with effect

from 27 June 2025 after the charges were proved against him. Employee

has however denied reinstatement, payment of wages or dismissal from

services.

6) Writ Petition No. 3505 of 2023 was initially �led by

Employee through an Advocate. It appears that Employee has availed the

services of several Legal Aid advocates but has changed them from time

to time. Finally, Employee expressed desire to appear in person. However,

the Committee of this Court did not grant permission for personal

appearance to Employee after interacting with him. He however insisted

before the Court to present his case in person. On a condition of

extending due cooperation, this Court has heard submissions made by

the Employee in person.

7) Mr. Jalisatgi, the learned counsel appearing for the

Employer has submitted that the Labour as well as Industrial Courts have

grossly erred in holding that Employee is a ‘workman’ within the

meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID Act or an ‘employee’ within the

meaning of Section 3(5) of the MRTU & PULP Act. That he was employed

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with the company on the post of Quality Assurance Supervisor, receiving

salary of Rs. 20,368/- and therefore, he had independent supervisory and

managerial powers. That his engagement was in supervisory capacity.

That the Employer has established that the Employee was engaged in

supervisory activity. He was deployed to �nd defects in the products and

to direct its recti�cation through workmen under him. That he also used

to impart training to others. That he used to have interactions with the

customers of the Employer. That he used to prepare inspection reports.

That since he was overseeing the work of others, the engagement in

supervisory capacity was clearly established. That Labour Court and

Industrial Court have erroneously applied the yardsticks of absence of

disciplinary authority or absence of power of taking policy decisions for

determining status. That the said yardsticks are relevant for the purpose

of determining employment in managerial or administrative capacity.

That for proving employment in supervisory capacity, it is not necessary

to establish existence of power of taking disciplinary action or policy

decisions. In support of his contentions, Mr. Jalisatgi relies on the

judgments in Inthru Noronha V/s. Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. and

Ors.

1

, John Joseph Khokar V/s B. S. Bhadange and Ors.

2

and Standard

Chartered Bank V/s. Vandana Joshi and Anr.

3

Mr. Jalisatgi would

accordingly pray for setting aside the orders of the Labour and Industrial

Courts directing reinstatement.

8) Mr. Jalisatgi opposes the Petition �led by the Employee and

submits that even if order of reinstatement is upheld, denial of

1

2005 (2) Mh.L.J 884

2

1997 (3) Mh.L.J 907

3

2010 (2) Mh.L.J. 22

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backwages is clearly justi�ed in the present case since he was gainfully

employed after his termination. That he was in a position to pay EMIs of

HDFC Bank in respect of loan disbursed to him, showing steady source of

income and possible gainful employment.

9) Mr. Jalisatgi further submits that in any case, the liability to

pay backwages cannot exceed period after 28 May 2023 since the

Employee was reinstated on 28 May 2023. He submits that the Employer

has paid salary and subsistence allowance to Employee during the period

from 28 May 2023 to 27 June 2025. He submits that an amount of Rs.

3,88,727/- is paid to the Employee during this period. That since

Employee did not work satisfactorily even after reinstatement and

exhibited behavioral issues, even the order for reinstatement passed by

the Labour Court and upheld by the Industrial Court deserves to be set

aside. He therefore prays for dismissal of the Petition �led by Employee.

10) The Employee, appearing in person, supports the orders

passed by the Labour and Industrial Courts to the extent of upholding

the status as ‘workman’ and ‘employee’ and to the extent of direction for

reinstatement with continuity of service. He submits that he was not

engaged in supervisory capacity and that he did not have any power of

taking any policy decisions. That he did not supervise any other

employees of the company. That his job was restricted to use technical

instruments to check the quality of products. That therefore the Labour

and Industrial Courts have rightly upheld his status as ‘workman’. That

since no inquiry was conducted before terminating his services, the order

for reinstatement does not warrant any interference.

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11) So far as Writ Petition No. 3505 of 2023 �led by him is

concerned, the Employee submits that the Industrial Court has grossly

erred in setting aside the direction for payment of full backwages. That

there is no cogent evidence of any gainful employment by him. That he

had borrowed money for repayment of loan. That several defaults were

committed by him in repayment of the loans. That in absence of direct

evidence of gainful employment, the Industrial Court has erroneously

recorded presumptive �ndings. He relies on the judgment of the Apex

Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak

Mahavidyalaya

4

in support of his contention that once termination is set

aside, payment of full backwages is a natural consequence and a normal

rule. He denies that the Employer actually reinstated him on 28 May

2023 or paid any wages. That since there is no reinstatement, there is no

question of dismissal on 27 June 2025. He prays for setting aside the

directions of the Industrial Court denying backwages.

12) Rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties now fall for

my consideration.

13) Since the Employer has challenged orders of Labour a nd

Industrial Courts holding termination as illegal and directing

reinstatement, it would be �rst necessary to consider the challenge

raised by the Employer in Writ Petition (ST) No. 5298 of 2023. Mr.

Jalisatgi has raised a singular point for challenging the �ndings of

Labour and Industrial Courts on the issue of legality of termination. He

has submitted that both Labour and Industrial Courts have erroneously

4

(2013) 10 SCC 324

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treated Employee as a ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the ID Act and as

‘employee’ under Section 3(5) the MRTU & PULP Act.

14) It must be observed at the outset that there are concurrent

�ndings of the Labour and Industrial Courts on the issue of status. The

�ndings are recorded on conduct of factual inquiry and this Court

execrcising only supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 would have

limited powers to interfere in the same. The Employee was employed as

‘Quality Assurance Supervisor’. Mere designation cannot decide his

status and what must be taken into consideration is the nature of work

and his duties and responsibilities. Use of the word ‘Supervisor’ in his

designation would not ipso facto elevate his engagement as in

supervisory capacity. Under Section 2(s) of the ID Act, even a supervisor

can be a workman. It is only when a person is employed in supervisory

capacity that he loses status as a ‘workman’ if he draws wages in excess

of Rs. 10,000/- per month. The de�nition of term ‘workman’ under

Section 2(s) the ID Act is as under:

(s) “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any

industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or

supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be

express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in

relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been

dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of,

that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that

dispute, but does not include any such person—

(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army

Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or

(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other

employee of a prison; or

(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity;

or

(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages

exceeding ten thousand rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the

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nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers

vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.

15) It is contended on behalf of the Employer that the

employment of the Employee was in supervisory capacity . This

contention is premised on the nature of tasks performed by him during

the course of his employment in �nding defects in the manufactured

products, directing recti�cation of defective products, getting the defects

recti�ed from other workmen, imparting training to the other workmen,

interacting directly with the consumers of the company, preparing

inspection report etc. In my view however, none of the above activities

would convert the employment into supervisory capacity. There is no

denial to the position that the Employee was working on technical

instruments for assessing the quality of the manufactured products.

These were his predominant duties. Thus, predominant duties performed

by him included skilled work to be performed on instruments. Mere

performance of work of quality control does not mean engagement in

supervisory capacity. To prove supervisory capacity, it is necessary to

prove that the employee performs predominantly the job of only

supervising the other workmen by deciding their postings, duty timings,

leaves, etc. The supervision thus needs to be on the workmen and not

merely on quality of products. In the present case, there is nothing on

record to indicate that the Employee performed supervisory powers on

other workmen. His authority to assign work was thus restricted only in

the area of quality enhancement of the product. His authority to inspect

quality of product, to prepare inspection reports and to attend to the

complaints of customers was all aimed at ensuring the quality of the

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product. Performance of those tasks did not give any authority to the

Employee to exercise any control over the other workmen. Similarly, the

imparting of training was again aimed at preventing the workers from

repeating the mistakes. He had no authority to punish any workman or

to decide matters such as leave, pay �xation, transfer, etc. It has also

come in evidence that Employee had no authority to take any managerial

decisions. The Industrial Court has rightly appreciated the above

position and has held in para 8 of its Order as under:

8. As far as the point that complainant is not workman is concerned, I here

state that, complainant vide his evidence Exh. U-13 by witness viz. Rajendra

Deore has categorically submitted the nature of his duties. After appreciating

the said evidence, it is established that, complainant Rajendra Deore has only

authority to report the lacuna and de�ciencies, noticed in the products. He has

not authority to initial any disciplinary action against erring employees.

Although, it is true that complainant Rajendra Deore has authority to assign

the work to his colleagues, the said assignment of work is appeared for

�nishing of the products and for its quality enhancement. After perusal of the

evidence of respondent's witness viz. Rajendra Wagh, who examined below

Exh. C-70, it is established that, the complainant Deore has authority only to

inspect the quality of the product, prepared the inspection report and to attend

and to solve the complaints of the customers. In addition to that, from his

evidence it is established that, complainant Deore has authority to give

necessary training to the workers to avoid the repeated mistakes and thereby

to enhance the quality of the products. All these facts depicted in the evidence

of the respondent witness Rajendra Wagh examined below Exh. C-70

established that, complainant Deore has no authority to take any policy

decision about the end products and also to take managerial decision like to

initiate the action etc. regarding the same. The evidence of respondent's

witness Rajendra Wagh examined below Exh. C-70 establishe d that,

complainant Deore has no authority to punish the erring employee, who is

responsible for the defect in the products. Hence, it is established that,

complainant Deore is a employee/workman falling under Sec. 2(s) I. D. Act,

1047.

16) Mr. Jalisatgi has relied on the judgment of this Cou rt in

Inthru Noronha (supra). The judgment is an authority on the issue that

designation is not conclusive in deciding whether an employee is a

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workman or not and the Court must essentially be guided by the

dominant nature of duties performed by the employee. Mr. Jalisatgi has

highlighted the �ndings recorded by this Court in Inthru Noronha that

the test of existence of control over subordinate may apply only in

certain factual situations but cannot be a test to be uniformly applied in

every case. He has contended that absence of power to take action

against other workman may only prove lack of managerial powers. In

support of the same contention, reliance is also placed on the judgment

of this Court in Standard Chartered Bank v. Vandana Joshi (supra).

However, in the present case, the absence of power to take disciplinary

action against other workmen is not the only factor considered by the

Labour and Industrial Courts for upholding the status of Employee as a

workman. In Inthru Noronha, claim was raised by employee of

performance of clerical work, though the case involved promotion to the

executive cadre and application of pension scheme meant for executive

staff. In the facts of that case, this Court arrived at the conclusion that

the nature of work performed by the employee was anything but clerical,

and therefore the order of the Industrial Court holding him to be not a

workman was upheld. Similarly, in Standard Chartered Bank, the Court

has essentially discussed the scope of managerial job in the light of

changing nature of businesses. The employee therein was employed as

‘Personal Financial Consultant’ and it was held that she was not

performing work of clerical nature. In my view, both the judgments are of

little assistance in the facts of the present case where the Employee was

admittedly employed to perform work in the production line and

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discharge his duties by use of technical instruments for assessing quality

of the products.

17) Mr. Jalisatgi has relied on judgment of this Court in John

Joseph Khokar (supra) in support of his contention that Employee was

employed in supervisory capacity and that supervisory work can be

contradistinct from managerial or administrative work. It is held by this

Court that supervisor’s predominant function is to see what work is done

by workers under him but has no power to take any disciplinary action.

Reliance on the judgment is again for highlighting the position that

mere absence of power to take disciplinary action does not exclude an

employee from being employed in supervisory capacity. However, as

observed above, absence of power to take action against other workmen

is not the only factor considered by the Labour and Industrial Courts for

upholding status of the Employee as a workman. Here the predominant

work performed by him was in production line using instruments. He

himself was putting labour in checking the quality of manufactured

products and giving directions/training to other workmen for quality

improvement was not his predominant work. The judgment, therefore,

has no application to the facts of the present case.

18) In view of the above discussion, no case is made out for

interference in concurrent �ndings recorded by the Labour and Industrial

Courts about status as ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the ID Act and as

‘employee’ under Section 3(5) of the MRTU & PULP Act.

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19) The Employer did not conduct any inquiry before

terminating the services of the Employee. Mr. Jalisatgi has not canvassed

any other point for challenging the direction of reinstatement.

Therefore, once challenge to the status as a ‘workman’ fails, the order of

reinstatement will have to be necessarily upheld.

20) Coming to the issue of backwages, Labour Court had

granted full back wages in addition to continuity in service while setting

aside the termination order and while passing the order for

reinstatement. However, the Industrial Court has set aside the direction

for payment of backwages and has upheld only the direction for

reinstatement and continuity of service. The Industrial Court has taken

into consideration the evidence of Manager of HDFC Bank, who produced

documents in respect of loan account of the Employee. The Industrial

Court has held that the Employee paid all EMIs in respect of loan

account and there was no default after termination. On this basis, the

Industrial Court has arrived at a �nding that he must have had enough

source of funds even after his termination and that therefore, there must

be some gainful employment for him. The relevant �ndings by the

Industrial Court in this regard are recorded in para 11 which read thus:

11. The issue about the back wages is concerned, I have gone through the

evidence of respondent's witness viz. Mohsin Sayyed examined below Cxh. C-

58 and the documents �led below Exh. C-60 to C-62. After appreciating the

evidence of respondent's witness vide Mohsin Sayyed, it is established that, he

is working as a Manager in the HDFC bank where-from complainant Deore has

availed the home loan facility in the year 2015. Respondent witness Mohsin

has submitted the extract of loan account for the period 01.04.2015 to

29.11.2018 vide Exh. C-60 to C-62. After appreciating the evidence of

respondent's witness Mohsin Sayyed as well as the documents at Exh. C-60 to

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C-62, it is established that, although complainant Deore has terminated from

service w.e.f. 27.04.2017 he has paid all the EMI towards the loan account and

there is no default. This fact clearly established that, complainant Deore has

enough source of fund after termination of his service and thereby he is in

position to pay the EMI regularly. Unless one has enough source of fund, apart

from the expenses required for the livelihood, no-one is able to pay the EMI of

the loan. As complainant Deore has no defaulter towards his loan account after

termination of his service, it is established that, he is gainfully employed and

thereby he is in a position to pay the EMI regularly. The Ld. Labour Court vide

para No. 26 in the judgment opined that, mere fact that one is paying EMI

regularly is not a incidence which constitute that, he is gainfully employed. It

is mentioned here that, if one has no source of fund, he is not in a position to

pay the EMI of the loan. It is general behaviour that, after making provision

towards the daily livelihood person will save from the earnings and from that

he will pay the EMI towards the loan. It is obvious that, �rst priority is always

given to the livelihood and not towards the repayment of loan. As complainant

Deore has no defaulter towards the loan opt by him, it is established that, he

has a enough source of fund, which could only available to him by gainful

employment. Thus, the observation to that context given by the Ld. Labour

Court is appeared to be perverse and modi�cation of the order to that effect is

necessary.

21) In my view, the Industrial Court has committed an error in

presuming gainful employment through inferential process. There is no

direct evidence of Employee’s gainful employment. The presumption of

gainful employment is raised only on account of ability to repay EMIs

after termination of service. In my view, �nding of gainful employment

cannot be recorded in absence of some proof. Mere ability to pay EMIs

cannot be a ground for presuming that the workman must have been

employed after termination. There may be variety of source from which

payment of EMIs can be arranged by a terminated workman. He may

have suf�cient savings or he may borrow funds from friends and relatives

in order to save the residential house from being auctioned. He may

liquidate other assets to repay the EMIs. In my view therefore, an

inevitable presumption of gainful employment cannot be drawn in every

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case where a terminated workman is in position to pay the EMIs. I am

therefore not in agreement with the �ndings recorded by the Industrial

Court about the Employee being gainfully employed after termination of

services.

22) The next issue for consideration is the nature of relief that

needs to be granted in the facts and circumstances of present case. The

Employee was terminated from service on 27 April 2017. The Labour

Court set aside his termination and directed reinstatement from 28

January 2020. The Industrial Court upheld the direction for

reinstatement but set aside the direction for backwages on 12 May 2022.

During pendency of the Petition and in deference to the observations

made by this Court, it appears that the Employer called upon Employee

to join the services with effect from 28 May 2023. It is the case of the

Employer that the Employee was reinstated on 28 May 2023, but he

declined to perform the allocated work and behaved in arrogant manner.

The Employer claims to have suspended him on 28 June 2024 and after

issuance of chargesheet dated 29 July 2024, he was dismissed from

service by order dated 27 June 2025. The Employer claims to have paid

wages and subsistence allowance to the Employee during the period from

28 May 2023 to 27 June 2025. It is claimed that a total amount of Rs.

3,88,727/- is paid to him from 7 July 2023 to 7 July 2025.

23) The Employee however stoutly denies the allegation s of

reinstatement, suspension and dismissal. He has submitted that he was

never reinstated in service, nor was he paid any wages or subsistence

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allowance during June 2023 to July 2025. At the time of closure of

hearing, this Court repeatedly enquired with the Employee as to whether

he had received any amounts from the Employer during June 2023 to July

2025 and he insisted that he did not receive a single farthing from the

Employer. Therefore, the Petitions were directed to be listed for

directions in order to enable the Employer to produce bank statements

for demonstrating transmission of amounts to the account of the

Employee. Accordingly, a compilation is placed on record on behalf of the

Employer on 24 June 2026. The compilation contains statement of

account of the Employer’s bank which indicates that various amounts are

transmitted in the bank account of the Employee with Union Bank of

India bearing No. 513002010002247. However, despite the Employer

demonstrating before this Court, through bank statements, transmission

of various amounts on June 2023 to July 2025, the Employee again

maintained before this Court during the course of hearing on 24 June

2026 that he did not receive a single farthing from the Employer. To

disprove the Employer’s contention, he has placed on record copies of

statements of his account with Union Bank of India and maintained that

no amount was paid by the Employer to him during the concerned

period.

24) I �nd both the denials of Employee about reinstatement /

rejoining the services and payment of various amounts to be totally

false. So far as the issue of rejoining the services is concerned, the

Employee has himself admitted in his Af�davit dated 29 July 2024 that

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he had rejoined the services and had started working. In this regard,

paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of af�davit dated 29 July 2024 read thus:

10. I says that this Hon'ble Court passed an order dated 18th April 2023, where

it was clari�ed that no interim order was granted in the cross petition �led by

the Respondent-company. Therefore by letter dated 02.05.2023 addressed to

the Respondent-company requesting them to take me back in to the service.

The said letter was refused with mark "Refused" by postman on 04/05/2023 to

my address. After that I received the letter dated 22/05/2023 from Respondent-

company to reinstate me as per order dated 18th April 2023 which was received

on 26/05/2023.

11. I say that, on the day of reinstatement (28th May 2023) I have joined and

reported to HR. Prachi Chincholikar madam to give my work. She told me to

make entry in the register and to start my work under Mr. R.D. Wagh in Quality

Department I started my work to check product quality on machines but at

11:00am, Mr. Prakash Dhanokar Sir (Director) of the Respondent-company

came, stopped my work and told me for go home and come at 5:30pm. I

immediately informed HR. Prachi Madam on call. Also informed my Advocate

Sushan Mhatre on Message about the said incident. I was instructed by my

Advocate, not to go home and if they deny giving work then sit near watch

cabin till 5:30pm. Therefore, the Director restricted my entry in the

Respondent-company.

12. I say that on Reinstatement day. When I called H.R. Prachi Chincholikar

madam and told her about Mr. Prakash Dhanokar Sir (Director) has stopped me

from doing my quality work. She accepted and told me If Prakash Sir (Director)

told you to go at home and come only to put out time, then you can go and

come only to put out-time. She also said, Sir is the director and she also had

same directions from the Director. I crave leave and rely upon the said call

details. Hereto annexed and marked as Exhibit-F is the Copy of call log, call

recording (transcription), messages, along with 65B Certi�cate of my

Telephonic conversation with H.R. Prachi Chincholikar Madam on dated

28/05/2023 11:46 AM of my reinstatement day and several messages on several

days for permissions.

13. Once I joined company and started working I was treated extremely badly

and unfairly. I was made to sit in front of the watchman and was not allotted

work for which I was appointed. I was not allowed to sign the register, So I had

to use my cell phone to click the sel�e-photos to show I was present and my

own safety purpose as they misbehaved with me. I have saved the metadata

sent to my advocate (details of photo). I crave leave to refer and rely upon

every sel�es captured from my mobile. Some days I fell extremely unwell due

to the extreme heat. I experienced severe dehydration as I was made to sit next

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Renuka WP 3505-2023 and WP(ST) 5298-2023

to the watchman without any shade on my head and no cooling system in place

at the peak of the summer when the temperature easily soared above 40

degrees Celsius. I gave Proper Application, Gate Pass, on 7th June, 8th June to

go at hospital and submitted Medical Certi�cates to watchman as madam not

allowed me to submit it in of�ce. Hereto annexed and marked Exhibit-G, is the

copy of the Gate Pass given to me by madam when I suffered giddiness and

was admitted in hospital. Details of medical certi�cate also given by me. I sent

a letter to HR. Madam on 02/06/2023 after submitting medical certi�cate as

they did not allowed me in company and sat me near gate in front of

watchman.

14. I say that, the Respondent-company did not allow me to work for a long

period. When rainy season started, I was only allowed to sit in the company

near quality Department to save myself from rains, but the Respondent-

company did not allow me to enter the company and kept on harassing me.

They harassed me through watchman to remove me from my quality

department and erased my in-out time in register through the watchman.

Hereto annexed and marked Exhibit-H is the copy of the said video and In-Out

time erased by the watchman as per the H.R. and Director's direction.

25) The Employee himself has placed on record WhatsApp

conversation and the message of 28 May 2023 states “Mi Rajendra Deore.

Aaj kamavar join zalo ahe”. The message of 24 July 2023 by him was,

“mala ushir honar as aaj thoda”. The message of 31 July 2023 was “Sir

mala udyachi leave pahije ahe highcourtat tarikh ahe”.

26) The af�davit as well as WhatsApp messages sent by the

Employee leave no manner of doubt that he had actually rejoined the

service with the Employer on 28 May 2023. During the course of oral

submissions, he has falsely denied reinstatement or rejoining of work.

27) Coming to the issue of payment of amounts by the

Employer during 28 May 2023 to 27 June 2025, the bank statements

clearly re�ect transmission of various amounts every month in the bank

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account of Employee. It appears that following amounts are transmitted

in the bank account of the Employee during June 2023 to July 2025:

Sr. No. Date Amount (After deductions)

1. 7th June 2023 2,743/-

2. 11th July 2023 18,313/-

3. 8th August 18,313/-

4. 12th September 2023 18,313/-

5. 9th October 2023 18,313/-

6. 6th November 2023 18,313/-

7. 7th December 2023 18,313/-

8. 5th January 2024 18,301/-

9. 7th February 2024 15,913/-

10. 6th March 2024 17,102/-

11. 5th April 2024 15,109/-

12. 7th May 2024 16,177/-

13. 7th June 2024 17,284/-

14. 8th July 2024 16,807/-

15. 6th August 2024 9,399/-

16. 5th September 2024 9,057/-

17. 7th October 2024 9,057/-

18. 25th October 2024 (Bonus) 9,965/-

19. 6th November 2024 13,684/-

20. 6th December 2024 13,684/-

21. 6th January 2025 13,659/-

22. 6th February 2025 13,684/-

23. 6th March 2025 13,684/-

24. 7th April 2025 13,684/-

25. 7th May 2025 13,684/-

26. 6th June 2025 13,684/-

27. 7th July 2025 12,591/-

Total 3,88,727/-

28) The Employee has, however, placed on record some stray

statements of his bank account. He has deliberately not placed on record

bank statement of those dates on which the transmission of amounts has

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occurred. To illustrate, the �rst transmission of amount of Rs. 2,743/-

occurred on 7 June 2023 and Employee has placed on record copy of his

bank his statement from 28 May 2023 to 6 June 2023. T he bank

Statement pertaining to the date 7 June 2023 is deliberately not placed

before the Court. Similarly, the next transmission occurred on 11 July

2023 of amount of Rs. 18,313/-. The Employee has, however, placed on

record statement of his bank for the period 1 July 2023 to 8 July 2023.

The last transmission occurred in respect of amount of Rs. 12,591/- on 7

July 2025, but the Employee has not placed on record copies of his bank

statement during August 2023 to July 2025 and has conveniently

produced bank statement for the period from 1 August 2025 to 18

September 2025. The Employee has thus attempted to mislead this Court

and has taken a false plea that he has not received a farthing from

employee in respect of the period 28 May 2023 to 27 June 2025. Thus,

both the denials by the Employee in respect of reinstatement as well as

in respect of receipt of amounts is dishonest.

29) From various af�davits placed on record by the rival sides,

it appears that the relationship between the duo has soured. It is not in

the interest of either of the parties that the Employee is made to work

with the Employer. The interaction between the two sides during the

period from 28 May 2023 to 27 June 2025 was not healthy. In my view

therefore, the direction for reinstatement or backwages needs to be

modi�ed and lump sum compensation needs to be awarded to the

Employee for his wrongful termination on 27 April 2017. Such course of

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action would also obviate further litigation between the parties relating

to challenge to the second dismissal of 27 June 2025.

30) Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, where

the last drawn wages of the Employee were Rs. 20,368/-, and the fact that

he has already received an amount of Rs.3,88,727/- in respect of the

period from 28 May 2023 to 27 June 2025, in my view, the ends of justice

would meet if a lump sum compensation of Rs. 20 lakhs is awarded to the

Employee towards full and �nal settlement. It must be clari�ed that the

Employee has not displayed honest conduct before the Court as observed

above and this Court would have been justi�ed in denying him any relief

in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. However, the relief of lump sum

compensation is being granted to him purely by way of indulgence

despite him making false oral statements before the Court while

appearing in person. Considering the amount already paid of Rs.

3,88,727/-, the total compensation for the Employee would be to the tune

of Rs. 23,88,727/-.

31) I accordingly proceed to pass the following order:

i) The judgment and order dated 28 January 2020

passed by Labour Court, Nashik in Complaint (ULP)

No. 25 of 2017 and judgment and order dated 12 May

2022 passed by Industrial Court in Revision

Application (ULP) No. 2 of 2020 are modi�ed.

ii) The Employer-Apras Polymers & Engineering

Company Private Limited, shall pay to the Employee-

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Renuka WP 3505-2023 and WP(ST) 5298-2023

Shri. Rajendra Laxman Deore a lump sum

compensation of Rs. 20,00,000/- in lieu of re-

instatement and back wages.

iii) Over and above the lump sum compensation so

awarded, the Employee shall not be entitled to any

other bene�ts from the employer qua the services

performed by him.

iv) The awarded compensation shall be paid by the

Employer to the Employee within a period of 4 weeks,

failing which there shall be interest at the rate of 8 %

per annum on the awarded sum of compensation.

32) With the above directions, both the Writ Petitions are

disposed of. With the disposal of the Writ Petitions, nothing survives to

be adjudicated in the Interim Application and is accordingly disposed

of. There shall be no order as to costs.

[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]

33) After the judgment is pronounced, the learned counse l

appearing for the Employer prays for stay of the operative part of the

judgment for a period of 8 weeks. However, considering the nature of

�ndings recorded in the judgment, I am not inclined to stay the

directions. The request is accordingly rejected.

[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]

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6 JULY 2026

NEETA

SHAILESH

SAWANT

Digitally

signed by

NEETA

SHAILESH

SAWANT

Date:

2026.07.06

17:07:31

+0530