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IN

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2026:CGHC:3541

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

[Arising out of a common impugned judgment of conviction and

order of sentence dated 23.09.2017, passed in Sessions Trial No.69

of 2017 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Arjun Patle and others) by the 7

th

Addl. Sessions Judge, Raipur (CG)]

Criminal Appeal No. 1578 of 2017

Harish Kumar Navrangye @ Bablu, S/o Lt Bhikham Lal Navrangye,

Wrongly Mention As Harish Kumar Naurangye @ Bablu, S/o Lt Shri

Bhukhan Lal Naurangye, aged about 22 years, R/o Kondapa, Police

Station Kurud, District Dhamtari (Chhattisgarh)

--- Appellant

(On Bail)

Versus

State of Chhattisgarh, through District Magistrate, Raipur, District

Raipur, (Chhattisgarh)

--- Respondent

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

For Appellant : Mr. Maneesh Sharma, Advocate

For Respondent-State : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Govt. Advocate

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

WITH

Criminal Appeal No. 1637 of 2017

Komal Banjare @ Mukesh @ Raj, S/o Santram Banjare, aged about

24 years R/o Village Manikchouri, P.S. Abhanpur, District Raipur

(Chhattisgarh)

---Appellant

(On Bail)

Versus

State of Chhattisgarh, through P.S.- G.R.P. Raipur, District Raipur

(Chhattisgarh)

Page No.2 of 17

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--- Respondent

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

For Appellant : Mr. CR Sahu, Advocate

For Respondent-State : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Govt. Advocate

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

WITH

Criminal Appeal No. 1866 of 2017

Arjun Patle, S/o Late Anjan Patle, aged about 20 years, R/o Indira

Awas, Aspatal Para, Manikchouri, Post Office and Police Station

Abhanpur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh)

---Appellant

(On Bail)

Versus

State of Chhattisgarh, through The District Magistrate, Raipur,

District Raipur (Chhattisgarh)

--- Respondent

[Cause-title taken from Case Information System (CIS)]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

For Appellant : Mr. Shrivendu Pandey, Advocate

For Respondent-State : Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Govt. Advocate

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Division Bench

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and

Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma

Judgment on Board

(21.01.2026)

Sanjay K. Agrawal, J

(1)Regard being had to the similitude of the questions of fact and

law involved and being arising out of a common impugned judgment

dated 23.09.2017, all these criminal appeals are clubbed together,

heard together and being disposed of by this common order.

(2)Invoking criminal appellate jurisdiction of this Court, total 03

accused/appellants, namely, Arjun Patle (A-1), Komal Banjare @

Mukesh @ Raj (A-2) and Harish Kumar Navrangye @ Bablu (A-3),

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have preferred these 03 appeals being CRA-1866-2017, CRA-1578-

2017 & CRA-1637-2017 respectively, under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C.,

calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of common

impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated

23.09.2017, passed in Sessions Trial No.69 of 2017 (State of

Chhattisgarh v. Arjun Patle and others) by the 7

th

Addl. Sessions

Judge, Raipur (CG), whereby they have been convicted and

sentenced as under:

As regards accused/appellant- Arjun Patle (A-1):

Conviction Sentence

U/s. 302 of IPC Imprisonment for life with fine of

Rs.500/- and, in default of payment of

fine amount, additional rigorous

imprisonment for 01 year.

U/s. 392/398 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 07 years

with fine of Rs.500/- and, in default of

payment of fine amount, additional

rigorous imprisonment for 01 year.

As regards accused/appellant- Komal Banjare @ Mukesh @ Raj (A-

2):

Conviction Sentence

U/s. 414 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 03 years

with fine of Rs.500/- and, in default of

payment of fine amount, additional

rigorous imprisonment for 03 months.

As regards accused/appellant- Harish Kumar Navrangye @ Bablu

(A-3):

Conviction Sentence

U/s. 411 of IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 03 years

with fine of Rs.500/- and, in default of

payment of fine amount, additional

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rigorous imprisonment for 03 months.

(3)The case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 04.10.2016, in

the afternoon between 12:00 to 17:00 hours, in the middle of

passenger waiting room of railway station, Manikchouri, which

comes within the ambit of Police Station- CRPF, Raipur (CG), the

accused-appellant- Arjun Patle (A-1) firstly assaulted Abhay Kumar

on his neck time and again by means of axe, due to which, Abhay

Kumar (hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”) suffered grievance

injuries and died and, thereafter, committed loot of deceased’s

mobile phone and wallet and ultimately sold the said mobile phone

of the deceased to accused-appellant Komal (A-2), who later on

again sold the said mobile phone to accused-appellant Harish (A-3)

and, thereby, the appellants herein are said to have committed the

aforesaid offences in question.

(4)It is further case of the prosecution that initially dehati merg

and dehati nalisi were registered vide Ex.P/01 and Ex.P/02

respectively and, thereafter, merg intimation (Ex.P/23) and FIR

(Ex.P/24) were registered and wheels of investigation started

running, in which, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P/22. Summons

under Section 175 of CrPC were sent vide Ex.P/03 and inquest

proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/04. The dead-body of the

deceased was sent for postmortem examination, which was

conducted by Dr. S.K. Bagh (PW-18) and, as per PM report

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(Ex.P/46), it has been opined that cause of death of the deceased is

shock and hemorrhage as a result of cut throat and nature of death

is homicidal. The accused/appellants were arrested and their

memorandum statements were recorded vide Ex.P/8 to P/14 & P/12

respectively. Thereafter, pursuant to the memorandum statement of

accused-appellant- Arjun Patle weapon of the offence i.e. axe and

wallet (purse) was seized vide Ex.P/09 & Ex.P/10, whereas pursuant

to the memorandum statement of appellant- Harish (A-3) mobile

phone, alleged to be that of the deceased, was seized vide Ex.P/13.

Blood stained clothes of the deceased were also seized vide Ex.P/25.

Further, one micromax mobile, one box of samsung galaxy grand

prime and one purchase receipt were also seized from Pawan

Sharma (PW-05) vide Ex.P/07. The seized articles were sent for

chemical examination and, as per FSL report (Ex.P/39), it has been

opined that stains of blood were found on the axe seized pursuant to

the memorandums statement of appellant- Arjun (A-1). After

statements of witnesses were recorded and due investigation, the

police filed charge-sheet against the appellants/accused persons in

the competent criminal court having jurisdiction and, thereafter, the

case was committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in

accordance with law, in which the appellants/accused abjured their

guilt and entered into defence by stating that they are innocent and

have been falsely implicated.

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(5)The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many

as 18 witnesses and exhibited 47 documents, whereas the

appellants-accused in support of their defence, though not examined

any witness, but exhibited 04 documents.

(6)The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and

documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to convict

appellant- Arjun (A-1) for offence under Section 302 & 392/398 of

IPC, whereas convicted appellants- Komal (A-2) and Harish (A-3)

for offence under Section 414 & 411 of IPC respectively, and

sentenced them as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this

judgment, against which these appeals have been preferred by the

appellants-accused questioning the impugned judgment of

conviction and order of sentence.

(7)Mr. Shivendu Pandya, Mr. C.R. Sahu and Mr. Maneesh

Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the accused/appellants in

CRA-1866-2017, CRA-1637-2017 & CRA-1578-2017 respectively

submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in

convicting the appellants for the aforesaid offences, as the

prosecution has failed to prove the same beyond reasonable doubt.

They vehemently argued that the ownership of the mobile phone

seized from appellant- Harish (A-2) vide Ex.P/13, alleged to be that

of the deceased, has not been established at all. There is no evidence

available on record to prove that the appellant- Arjun (A-1)

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assaulted the deceased on the date of offence. Even otherwise, on

the basis of memorandum statements of Komal (A-2) and Harish (A-

3) the appellants cannot be convicted. As such, all the appeals

deserves to be allowed and the appellants are liable to be acquitted

of the said charges on the basis of benefit of doubt.

(8)Per-contra, Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, learned State counsel

supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of

sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence

beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. In

view of the statements of prosecution witnesses coupled with other

material available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly

convicted all the appellants for the offences in question. Thus, all

the appeals deserve to be dismissed.

(9)We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered

their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the

records with utmost circumspection.

(10)The first and foremost question is as to whether the death of

the deceased was homicidal in nature or not, which the learned trial

Court has recorded in affirmative by taking into consideration the

postmortem report (Ex.P/46), wherein it has been opined that cause

of death of the deceased is shock and hemorrhage as a result of cut

throat and nature of death is homicidal, which is duly proved by the

statement of Dr. SK Bagh (PW-18). Accordingly, t aking into

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consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/46) and the statement of

Dr. SK Bagh (PW-18), who has conducted the postmortem of the

dead-body of the deceased, we are of the considered opinion that the

death of the deceased is homicidal in nature, as the same is correct

finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor

contrary to the record. We hereby affirm the said finding.

(11)Now, the next question would be whether the accused-

appellants herein are the author of the crime in question or not

which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by relying

upon following incriminating circumstances, as projected by the

prosecution:

“1. Mobile Phone having IMEI

No.351714/07/187412/8351715/07/187412/5 was

purchased by the deceased from one Pawan Mobile

Reparing Shop on 17.10.2015, which was allegedly looted

by appellant- Arjun (A-1) and, thereafter, sold to

appellant- Komal (A-2), who in turn further sold the

same to appellant- Harish (A-3) and said mobile phone

was seized pursuant to the memorandum statement of

appellant- Harish (A-3) vide Ex.P/13;

2.Recovery of wallet and axe pursuant to the

memorandum statement of appellant- Arjun (A-1) and,

as per FSL report (Ex.P/37) stains of blood were found on

the said axe;

3.Appellant- Arjun (A-1) has previous criminal

antecedents”

(12)Since, the present case is based on above-stated circumstantial

evidence, therefore, it is profitable here to note following five golden

principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the

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matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra

1

which constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on

circumstantial evidence and same read as under:

“153.…. (1) the circumstances from which the

conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully

established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the

circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may

be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a

legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be

or should be proved' as was held by this Court in

Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of

Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following

observations were made:

"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused

must be and not merely may be guilty before a court

can convict and the mental distance between 'may be'

and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures

from sure conclusions."

(2) The facts so established should be consistent only

with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is

to say. they should not be explainable on any other

hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature

and tendency.

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis

except the one to be proved, and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not

to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion

consistent with the innocence of the accused and must

show that in all human probability the act must have

been done by the accused.”

1(1984) 4 SCC 116

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(13)We shall now consider the above-mentioned incriminating

circumstances in light of the above-quoted principles of law laid

down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as also in light of the

evidence available on record, in order to ascertain whether the

appellant herein has rightly be held guilty for offence in question by

the learned trial Court or not.

As regards incriminating circumstance No.1:

(14)So far as the first incriminating circumstance is concerned, it

is the case of the prosecution that Mobile Phone having IMEI

No.351714/07/187412/8351715/07/187412/5 was purchased by the

deceased from one Pawan Mobile Repairing Shop on 17.10.2015,

which was allegedly looted by appellant- Arjun (A-1) and, thereafter,

sold to appellant- Komal (A-2), who in turn further sold the same to

appellant- Harish (A-3) and said mobile phone was seized pursuant

to the memorandum statement of appellant- Harish (A-3) vide

Ex.P/13. Therefore, the question is as to whether the ownership of

the said mobile phone has been proved or not? In order to prove the

same, one Pawan Sharma (PW-05), worker in railways, has been

examined and he has proved seizure of mobile receipt and mobile

box vide Ex.P/7. However, he did not say that the said mobile receipt

and mobile box was having IMEI

No.351714/07/187412/8351715/07/187412/5, which belongs to the

deceased. Even otherwise, the mobile receipt has neither been

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marked as exhibit nor brought to the record. Therefore, merely on

the statement of Pawan (PW-05), who is friend of the deceased, it

could not be proved that the said Mobile Phone having IMEI

No.351714/07/187412/8351715/07/187412/5 was owned by the

deceased. Further, it is also an evidence on record that said mobile

phone, which was seized vide Ex.P/13, was having SIM bearing

No.7692824789, which was in the name of Khumeshwar Sahu (PW-

08) and not in the name of the deceased or the appellant herein. The

prosecution was duty bound to examine the shopkeeper from whom

the deceased is said to have purchased the said mobile having IMEI

No.351714/07/187412/8351715/07/187412/5, but the same has not

been done in the present case and, in absence of which, it could not

be established that the said mobile phone having IMEI

No.351714/07/187412/8351715/07/187412/5 was owned by the

deceased only and nobody else.

(15)Furthermore, the learned trial Court has relied upon the

memorandum statement of appellant- Arjun (A-1) recorded vide

Ex.P/8 to hold that he looted the said mobile phone from the

deceased. However, it is well settled that confessional statement

made by the accused is inadmissible in evidence in light of Section

27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In this regard, in the matter of

State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya

2

, the Constitution Bench of the

Supreme Court has held that confessional part of the statement is

2AIR 1960 SC 1125

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inadmissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and only part

which leads to discovery of facts is admissible in evidence.

(16)The aforesaid decision of Deoman Upadhyaya (supra) has been

followed with approval by the Supreme Court in the matter of Babu

Sahebagouda Rudragoudar & Others v. State of Karnataka

3

and

observed in paragraph 60 & 61 held as under :

“60. We would now discuss about the requirement under

law so as to prove a disclosure statement recorded

under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the

discoveries made in furtherance thereof.

61. The statement of an accused recorded by a police

officer under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is basically

a memorandum of confession of the accused recorded by

the investigating officer during interrogation which has

been taken down in writing. The confessional part of

such statement is inadmissible in evidence as laid down

by this Court in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya

(supra).”

(17)Coming to the facts of this case in light of the decisions

rendered by the Supreme Court in Deoman Upadhyaya (supra)

followed in Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar (supra), it is quite vivid

that the part of the appellant’s confessional statement that he looted

the mobile phone of the deceased is inadmissible in evidence, as

only the information given by the accused/appellant leads to

recovery of incriminating material from a place solely and

exclusively within the knowledge of the maker thereof would be

3(2024) 8 SCC 149

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admissible in evidence. Therefore, the reliance placed by the trial

Court on the confessional part of the statement of

accused/appellant, admitting his guilt, is inadmissible in evidence

and cannot form basis for his conviction.

(18)Moreover, the learned trial Court relied upon the confessional

statements of appellant- Komal (A-2) and Harish (A-3) recorded vide

Ex.P/14 & Ex.P/12 respectively, whereby they have stated that

firstly Komal (A-2) has purchased the mobile phone from appellant-

Arjun (A-1) and, thereafter, Harish (A-3) has purchased the said

mobile phone from appellant- Komal (A-2) and, on the basis of

which, the learned trial Court held that since Arjun (A-1) looted the

said mobile phone, which was firstly purchased by Komal (A-2) and,

thereafter, by Harish (A-3), the said article comes within the

meaning of looted property and, therefore, Sections 414 & 411 of

IPC would be attracted.

(19) The Supreme Court in the matter of Haricharan Kurmi and

another v. State of Bihar

4

has held confession of a co-accused person

cannot be treated as substantive evidence and can be pressed into

service only when the Court is inclined to accept other evidence and

feels the necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of its

conclusion deducible from the said evidence and observed in Para-16

as under:

“16.It is true that the confession made by Ram Surat is

4AIR 1964 SC 1184

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a detailed statement and it attributes to the two

appellants a major part in the commission of the offence.

It is also true that the said confession has been found to

be voluntary, and true so far as the part played by Ram

Surat himself is concerned, and so, it is not unlikely that

the confessional statement in regard to the part played by

the two appellants may also be true; and in that sense,

the reading of the said confession may raise a serious

suspicion against the accused. But it is precisely in such

cases that the true legal approach must be adopted and

suspicion. however grave, must not be allowed to take the

place of proof. As we have already indicated, it, has been a

recognised principle of the administration of criminal law

in this country for over half a century that the confession

of a co-accused person cannot be treated as substantive

evidence and can be pressed into service only when the

court is inclined to' accept other evidence and feels the

necessity of seeking for an assurance in support of its

conclusion deducible, from the said evidence. In criminal

trials, there is no scope for applying the principle of moral

conviction or grave suspicion. In criminal cases where the

other evidence adduced against an accused person is

wholly unsatisfactory and the prosecution seeks to rely on

the confession of a co-accused person, the presumption of

innocence which is the basis of criminal jurisprudence

assists the accused person and compels the Court to

render the verdict that the charge is not proved against

him, and so, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. That is

precisely what has happened in these appeals.”

(20)As such, since the ownership of mobile phone having IMEI

No.351714/07/187412/8351715/07/187412/5 has not been established

by the prosecution to be that of the deceased, the learned trial Court

is committed grave legal error in relying upon the confessional

statement of appellants- Komal (A-2) and Harish (A-3) to hold that

the said mobile phone was firstly looted by appellant- Arjun (A-1)

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from the deceased, which was purchased by Komal (A-2) and

thereafter by Harish (A-3). The finding in this regard is perverse

and liable to be and is hereby quashed. It is held accordingly.

As regards incriminating circumstance No.2:

(21)So far as recovery of wallet (purse) and axe vide Ex.P/9 & P/10

respectively pursuant to the memorandum statement of appellant-

Arjun (A-1) is concerned, Pawan Sharma (PW-05) has specifically

stated that no Test Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted by the

police with regard to the purse/wallet. From perusal of the

statement of IO- RK Borjha (PW-16) it is further clear that no TIP

with regard to the said purse seized vide Ex.P/10 was conducted to

prove that the same belongs to the deceased only. Even otherwise, it

is also not the case of the prosecution that said purse is of such a

unique design or quality or workmanship, which belongs to the

deceased or same is not easily available in the market (See:

Digamber Vaishnav and another v. State of Chhattisgarh

5

[Para-

37]). As such, the recovery of aforesaid purse from appellant- Arjun

(A-1) vide Ex.P/10 is of no help to the prosecution and same cannot

be relied upon to hold the appellant guilty for the offences in

question. It is held accordingly.

(22)With regard to seizure of axe vide Ex.P/9 pursuant to the

memorandum statement of appellant- Arjun (A-1), in which, as per

FSL report (Ex.P/37) stains of blood were found. The Supreme Court

5(2019) 4 SCC 522

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in the matter of Raja Nayka v. State of Chhattisgarh

6

by relying

upon its earlier decision rendered in the matter of Mustkeen @

Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan

7

has held that sole circumstance of

recovery of blood-stained article cannot form the basis of conviction

unless the same is corroborated with other piece of incriminating

circumstances. As such, the recovery of axe vide Ex.P/09 is also of no

help to the prosecution and same cannot be relied upon to hold the

appellant guilty for the offences in question. It is held accordingly.

As regards incriminating circumstance No.3:

(23)The last circumstance that has been relied upon by the

prosecution is that appellant- Arjun (A-1) has previous criminal

antecedents. However, there is nothing available on record to show

that appellant- Arjun (A-1) has previous criminal antecedents,

accept letter Ex.P/40, whereby information with regard to previous

criminal antecedents of appellant- Arjun was sought by the police.

Even otherwise, merely on the basis of criminal antecedents, the

appellant cannot be held guilty for an offence that too under Section

302 of IPC. It is held accordingly.

(24)In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are unable to hold that

the prosecution has been able to prove the five golden principles to

constitute the ‘panchsheel’ of proof of a case based on circumstantial

evidence, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of

62024 SCC Online SC 67

7(2011) 11 SCC 724

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Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) and, in absence of which, the

appellants are entitled to get benefit of doubt. Since offence under

Section 392 of IPC has not been found established against

appellant- Arjun (A-1), consequently, offence under Section 414 &

411 of IPC are also not established against appellants- Komal (A-2)

and Harish (A-3). As such, the learned trial Court is unjustified in

convicting all the appellants for offences under Section 302, 392/398,

414 & 411 of IPC respectively in light of the above-mentioned

incriminating circumstances. Accordingly, the conviction and their

respective sentences of all the appellants for the aforesaid offences,

as imposed upon them by the learned trial Court, are hereby set

aside. They are acquitted of the said charge on the basis of benefit of

doubt. Since the appellants are already on bail, they need not to

surrender. However, their bail bonds shall remain in force for a

period of six months in view of the provision contained in Section

437A of the CrPC.

(25)Consequently, all the criminal appeals are allowed to the

extent indicated herein-above.

(26)Let a certified copy of this order alongwith original record be

transmitted to the trial Court for necessary information and action,

if any.

sd/- sd/-

(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Arvind Kumar Verma)

Judge Judge

s@if