No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
vinita
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO. 623 OF 2015
Ashish Deorao Chandekar aged 42 years,
resident of Building No.206/2/1 MPT Colony,
Headland Sada, Vasco, Goa
]
]
] ...Petitioner
Versus
1. Mormugao Port Authority through its
Chairman, Headland Sada, Vasco, Goa-
403804.
]
]
]
2. Chief Mechanical Engineer and
Disciplinary Authority, Mormugao Port
Trust, Headland Sada, Vasco, Goa,
403804.
]
]
]
]
3. The Estate Officer, Under the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1971, Mormugao Port
Trust, 3
rd
floor, Administrative
Building, Mormugao Port Trust,
Headland Sada, Vasco, Goa-403804
]
]
]
]
]
] ...Respondents
Mr V. A. Lawande, Mr Atul Sadre and Mr Shivam Gurav, Advocates
for the petitioner.
Mr Y. V. Nadkarni, Ms Simran Khadilkar and Mr Nilay Naik,
Advocates for the respondents.
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CORAM : A.S. CHANDURKAR & NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, JJ.
The date on which the arguments were heard : 19
TH
MARCH.,
2025.
The date on which the Judgment is pronounced : 17
TH
APRIL, 2025.
JUDGMENT ( PER Nivedita P. Mehta , J.)
1. The petitioner has filed the instant Writ Petition assailing the order
dated 30.4.2011 passed by the respondent no. 2 removing the petitioner
from the service and the orders dated 2.4.2012, 21.5.2013 and 27.1.2015
passed by the Appellate/Reviewing Authority.
2. Succinctly, the petitioner applied for the post of Hindi Translator
based on an advertisement issued by respondent no.1 in the year 1998.
After the due selection process was concluded, the petitioner was
appointed as a Hindi Translator vide order dated 7.5.1998. The petitioner
was also given a training course of three months conducted by the Central
Translation Bureau, Department of Official Language, Ministry of Home
Affairs, Government of India, at Bangalore as the same was made
compulsory to get appointment on a regular basis. After completion of the
aforesaid translation course, the petitioner was appointed to the post of
Hindi Translator on a regular basis with effect from 2.4.1999 and after
completion of the probation period the petitioner was confirmed on
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8.4.2003. The petitioner at the time of applying for the post of Hindi
Translator had submitted his certificates of educational qualification
which were duly verified by the respondent No.1.
3. On 29.7.2003, the respondent no. 1 issued a memo asking the
petitioner to submit documents of his educational qualification to
consider him for the post of Senior Hindi Translator. Accordingly, the
petitioner replied to the said memo vide his reply dated 26.8.2003. On
29.9.2003, the respondent no.1 again sought information from the
petitioner as regards the University from which the petitioner had
completed his graduation and post-graduation from.
4. The respondent no.1 issued a chargesheet dated 2.3.2004 to the
petitioner for disobeying the order of the Administration in violation of
Mormugao Port Employees (Classification, Control & Appeal),
Regulations 1964 (hereinafter referred to as “MPE Regulations, 1964”).
5. During the enquiry in pursuance of the aforesaid chargesheet, the
petitioner filed a written explanation on 29.5.2004 informing the
respondent No.1 of the University from which the petitioner obtained his
graduation and post-graduation degrees. The petitioner informed him
that he passed B.A. in 1995 and M.A. in 1997 from the University Bhartiya
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Shiksha Parishad, Bharat Bhavan, Matiyari Chinhat, Faizabad Road,
Lucknow.
6. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report to the respondent No.2
holding that the charges against the petitioner are proved. The petitioner
submitted his written submissions to the Disciplinary Authority, however
the same were not accepted and the respondent No.2 issued a
memorandum dated 4.5.2005 holding the petitioner guilty of the charges
and proposed to impose upon him the penalty of “withholding of two
increments of pay with cumulative effect".
7. The petitioner submitted his written submission in response to the
proposed penalty but the same was not considered. The penalty of
"withholding of two increments of pay with cumulative effect, with effect
from 1.2.2006" was passed vide order dated 18.11.2005. The petitioner
preferred an appeal against the same before the Appellate Authority as
per MPE Regulations, 1964. However, the said appeal was dismissed by
the Appellate Authority vide order dated 29.8.2006 and the matter was
closed.
8. On 27.5.2005, a second chargesheet was issued to the petitioner on
the same subject. The article of charge against the petitioner was that he
had submitted a statement dated 29.5.2004 to the Enquiry Officer who
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was appointed vide reference dated 25.3.2004, indicating that he
completed his graduation, B.A. in the year 1995 and post-graduation,
M.A. in the year 1997 at Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Bharat Bhavan,
Matiyari Chinhat, Faizabad Road, Lucknow whereas in the attestation
form duly filled and signed by the petitioner at the time of his
appointment, he had declared that B.A and M.A. degree were obtained by
him in the years 1995 and 1997 respectively from K.M.V Mahavidyalaya
Mul and S.B.O.M Institute, Madras. This was contrary to the statement
given to the Enquiry Officer in the earlier enquiry pursuant to the
chargesheet dated 2.3.2004. The petitioner filed Writ Petition
No.227/2005 challenging the chargesheet dated 27.5.2005 wherein this
Court had stayed the aforesaid chargesheet. After two years, the
respondent no.1 prayed for vacating the said stay order dated 23.8.2005
by filing Misc. Civil Application no. 642/2007. This Court vide order
dated 27.11.2007 directed the respondent no.1 to conduct an enquiry in
lieu of chargesheet dated 27.5.2005 within three months and directed that
no adverse orders may be passed against the petitioner without prior
permission of the Court.
9. The respondent no.1 however sought to withdraw the chargesheet
dated 27.5.2005 during the pendency of Writ Petition No.227 of 2005. In
view of this development, the said writ petition was disposed of with
liberty to the respondent no.1 to issue a fresh chargesheet. After
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withdrawing the chargesheet dated 27.5.2005, the respondent no.1 again
issued a third chargesheet dated 12.5.2008 on similar charges. In the
aforesaid chargesheet, the Article of the charge against the petitioner was
that the petitioner had violated Regulations 3(1)(i) and 3(1)(iii) of the
MPE Regulations, 1964, alleging that the petitioner made false and
misleading statements by giving two different names of the Educational
Institutions through which he obtained the same qualifications i.e. B.A. in
1995 and M.A. in 1997 while in Annexure-I of the application form duly
signed by the petitioner and submitted while seeking appointment stating
that he had obtained his B.A in 1995 and M.A in 1997 through K.M.V
Mahavidyalaya Mul, S.B.O.M Institute, Madras. While filing his written
explanation before the Enquiry Officer during the earlier enquiry on
25.3.2004, the petitioner had stated that he had obtained his B.A in 1995
and M.A in 1997 through Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad Bharat Bhavan,
Matiyari, Chinhat, Faizabad Road, Lucknow. The petitioner on 15.7.2008
and 11.9.2008 requested the respondent No.2 to provide a copy of the
application form signed by him and attested by the Plantation Officer as
stated in the statement of Articles of Charge to effectively putforth his
defence. The respondent No.2 vide order dated 22.9.2008 replied that the
Authority was unable to furnish the said document as no such document
existed and that the charges were based on the petitioner’s Attestation
Form. The petitioner filed his reply dated 31.7.2008 denying the charges
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levelled against him and stated that in the absence of the aforesaid
document, he was not able to place his defence effectively.
10. The respondent no.2 appointed Enquiry Officer Shri S. R. Singbal
who conducted the departmental enquiry. During the enquiry process,
the Enquiry Officer issued a letter dated 13.1.2009 to the Chairman,
Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad Bharat Bhavan, Matiyari, Chinhat, Faizabad
Road, Lucknow for verifying the certificates which were issued by the said
Institution. The Assistant Director, Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad Bharat
Bhavan, Matiyari, Chinhat, Faizabad Road, Lucknow replied vide letter
dated 5.12.2009 stating therein that the petitioner has completed B.A and
M.A from the Institute in 1995 and 1997 respectively.
11. After the conclusion of the enquiry proceeding, the Enquiry Officer
submitted his report dated nil to the respondent no.2 who was the
Disciplinary Authority stating therein that charges levelled against the
petitioner were not proved. The Disciplinary Authority on 18.3.2011
passed an order stating that he was disagreeing with the findings of the
Enquiry Officer and that he had come to the conclusion that the petitioner
was guilty of the charge as framed. The petitioner submitted his reply
dated 7.4.2011 denying the contentions therein. The Disciplinary
Authority without considering the submissions of the petitioner passed an
order dated 30.4.2011 overruling the findings of the Enquiry Officer in
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referring to Clause 10 sub-clause (iv) of the MPE Regulations, 1964 and
awarded the penalty of “Removal from service which shall not be a
disqualification for future employment" with immediate effect, in terms of
Regulation 9(2)(viii) and 11 of MPE (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Regulations 1964.
12. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority
Deputy Chairman, Mormugao Port Trust (for short “MPT”) against the
order of termination. The said appeal came to be dismissed by the
Appellate Authority vide order dated 2.4.2012 without assigning any
reasons. Thereafter the petitioner filed a review before the Chairman,
MPT and the same was also dismissed vide order dated 21.5.2013.
Subsequently, another review application order was preferred by the
petitioner before the Ministry of Shipping Government of India and the
said review was dismissed as not maintainable. Hence, the present writ
petition.
13. The MPT in its affidavit-in-reply stated that the order dated
30.4.2011 awarding the penalty of removal from service was passed after
complying with all the necessary procedures and proper application of
mind. Hence it was stated that this Court should not interfere with the
order in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. It was further stated that the order dated 12.4.2012
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passed by the Deputy Chairman as Appellate Authority, and the order
dated 21.5.2013 passed by the Chairman as Reviewing Authority did not
suffer from any infirmities. Moreover, the disciplinary enquiry conducted
against the petitioner had culminated in the order dated 30.4.2011. It is
further stated that the MPE Regulations, 1964 annexed by the petitioner
to the petition was an unamended version of the said 1964 Regulations
which had been subsequently amended in the years 1995 and 1997. The
amended 1964 Regulations vide Clause 11(26)(i) did not mandate the
Disciplinary Authority to call upon the employee to make a representation
against the proposed penalty to be awarded. It is also submitted that it
was incorrect on the part of the petitioner to allege that the Disciplinary
Authority was vested with no power under Regulation 10(iv) to overrule
the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The MPT thus stated that the
impugned order did not call for any interference by this Court.
14. Mr. V.A. Lawande, the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner
advanced his submissions as given hereunder:
(a) The order dated 30.11.2011 violates Regulation 11(26)
(i) of MPE Regulations, 1964. The Disciplinary
Authority disagreeing with the report of the enquiry
officer asked the petitioner to show cause within 15
days. It was incumbent upon the respondent no. 2 to
issue notice to the petitioner by specifically
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mentioning the proposed penalty as required under
the Regulations.
(b) The action of the Disciplinary Authority terminating
the services of the petitioner was based upon a
chargesheet dated 12.5.2008. However, on the same
issue, earlier charge-sheets dated 2.3.2004 and
27.5.2005 were issued to the petitioner. As far as the
matter of the chargesheet dated 2.3.2004 is
concerned, a full-fledged enquiry was conducted and
the petitioner was punished with withholding of two
increments of pay. Furthermore, the chargesheet
dated 27.5.2005 was withdrawn by the respondents
and therefore, the mode and the manner in which the
petitioner was on various occasions charged on the
same ground is untenable.
(c) The Disciplinary Authority in violation of principles of
natural justice passed the order dated 30.4.2011. The
charges framed against the petitioner in the
chargesheet dated 12.5.2008 were fully based upon the
application form which was submitted by the
petitioner to the General Administration Department,
MPT, at the time of his appointment and the copy of
the same was not furnished to the petitioner despite
numerous requests. Therefore, the petitioner was
denied a fair and proper hearing.
(d) This Court vide order dated 27.11.2007 had allowed
the respondent no.1 to hold an enquiry in pursuance of
the chargesheet dated 27.7.2005. The respondent no.1
failed to hold any such enquiry and withdrew the
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chargesheet and therefore, the respondents are
precluded from issuing a fresh chargesheet dated
12.5.2008 on the same grounds.
(e) The Enquiry Officer exonerated the petitioner and
submitted a report to the Disciplinary Authority. The
Disciplinary Authority, while disagreeing with the
findings of the Enquiry Officer, should have conveyed
its tentative findings on the grounds of disagreement
and allowed the petitioner to put forth his defence.
(f) The action of the Disciplinary Authority was
predetermined and biased. The findings of the Enquiry
Officer were overruled in a cryptic manner referring to
Clause 10 sub-clause (ii) MPE Regulations, 1964.
Moreover, removal from service was illegal as there is
no documentary evidence available with the
Disciplinary Authority on which the order dated
30.4.2011 had been issued. The Appellate Authority
while deciding the appeal of the petitioner was
required to pass a speaking order stating the reasons
for dismissing the appeal.
(g) The Appellate Authority was required to make sure
that the procedure laid down has been complied with
by the Disciplinary Authority and findings on record
were duly supported to warrant penalty of dismissal.
(h) With regards to the amended Regulation 11 (26) (i),
the provision dictates that if a major penalty is
imposed in terms of item no.(s) (vi) to (ix) of
Regulation 9 of the MPE Regulations, 1964, it is
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mandatory to furnish a copy of the record of the
Enquiry Officer and where the Disciplinary Authority
is different from the Enquiry Officer, a statement as to
its findings along with brief reasons for disagreement
has to be mentioned. In this case, no such reasons for
disagreement with the report of the Enquiry Authority
were given by the Disciplinary Authority thus vitiating
the entire proceedings.
15. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following
judgments: -
(i) Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. Kunj Behari
Misra, (1998) 7 SCC 84;
(ii) Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra and
Another, (1999) 7 SCC 739;
(iii) State of Assam Vs. Mohan Chandra Kanta, AIR 1972
SC 2535;
(iv) Aditya Kumar Mishra Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,
Road Transport Corporation through its Managing
Director, 2024 SCC OnLine ALL 4699;
(v) Krishna Kumar Rao Vs. Haryana Warehousing
Corporation, 1994 SCC OnLine P&H 1181;
(vi) Dr. M. S. Mudhol and another Vs. S. D. Halegkar and
others, (1993) 3 SCC 591;
(vii) Vikas Pratap Singh and others Vs. State of
Chhattisgarh and others, (2013) 10 S.C.R 1114;
(viii) Varindra Hans Vs. Union of India and others in Civil
Writ Petition No. 30737 of 2018 of High Court of
Punjab and Haryana decided on 31.07.2019;
(ix) United Bank of India Vs. Biswanath Bhattacharjee,
(2022) 13 SCC 329;
(x) Allahabad Bank and others Vs. Krishna Narayan
Tiwari, Civil Appeal No. 7600 of 2024 decided on
02.01.2017 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
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(xi) Jayantibhai Raojibhai Patel Vs. Municipal Council
Narkhed and others, (2019) 17 SCC 184.
16. Mr. Y. V. Nadkarni, learned counsel on behalf of the respondents
made the following submissions:
(a) After the charges were framed against the petitioner
under Clause 3(1)(i) and 3(1)(iii) of the MPE
Regulations, 1964, an Enquiry Officer was appointed as
the petitioner did not admit to the charges. The
Enquiry Officer submitted a report holding that the
charges levelled against the petitioner were not proved.
The report and findings of the Enquiry Officer who
disagreed with the report concluded that the charges
were proved and called the petitioner to file his
explanation within 15 days.
(b) It was only incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority
to give the petitioner an opportunity to be heard and
such opportunity was duly given.
(c) Regulation 11(26) (i) of Regulation 1964 does not
mandate the Disciplinary Authority to call upon the
employee to make a representation against the
proposed penalty to be awarded. The petitioner has
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relied on the unamended Regulations. The Regulations
were amended in the years 1995 and 1997 and in so far
as the effect of amended Regulation was concerned, all
the requirements therein had been complied with. The
Disciplinary Authority was not under an obligation to
give detailed reasons as to its dissatisfaction with the
findings of the Enquiry Officer. Upon concluding that
the petitioner was guilty, the Disciplinary Authority,
cited reasons in brief and furnished a copy of the
enquiry report to the petitioner and therefore, all the
procedural requirements as given under Regulation
11(26) (i) had been complied with.
(d) An earlier charge sheet dated 2.3.2004 was issued to
the petitioner on the charge that he was asked by the
MPT to furnish his educational qualification certificates
to re-verify the same to consider him for the post of
Senior Hindi Translator on a regular basis but the
petitioner failed to submit the same despite repeated
requests made to him and therefore the charge sheet
culminated in issuing Order dated 18.11.2005 awarding
the penalty.
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(e) It is pertinent to note that the Petitioner herein has
accepted the said Order dated 18.11.2005 and had not
challenged the same.
(f) Subsequently, a charge sheet dated 27.5.2005 was
issued to the petitioner on the charge that the petitioner
had submitted a statement dated 29.5.2004 to the
Enquiry Officer indicating that he has done his
Graduation B.A. in 1995 and Post Graduation M.A in
the year 1997 at Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad Bharat
Bhavan, Matiyari, Chinhat, Faizabad Road, Lucknow
whereas in the Attestation Form duly filled and signed
by the petitioner and which was submitted to the
General Administration Department, MPT at the time
of his appointment, he had declared that B.A. and M.A
had been done by him in the year 1995 and 1997
respectively at K.M.V. Mahavidyalaya Mul, S.B.O.M.
Institute, Madras. This was contrary to the statement
given to the Enquiry Officer at the time of enquiry. The
Petitioner challenged the said charge sheet dated
27.05.2005 by filing Writ Petition No.227/2005 and
this Court vide order dated 23.8.2005 issued a rule and
directed that until further orders, proceedings shall
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remain stayed of the aforesaid charge sheet. This Court
on an application filed by the respondent no.1 vide
order dated 23.08.2005 allowed the respondents to
proceed with the enquiry but the final order was not be
given effect to, if it was adverse to the Petitioner,
without prior permission of the Court. The respondent
no.1 filed a Misc. Civil Application No.131/2008 in Writ
Petition No.227/2005 submitting that they desired to
withdraw the charge sheet dated 27.05.2005 with
liberty to issue a fresh charge sheet and this Court was
pleased to dispose of the Writ Petition No.227/2005
with such liberty.
(g) The respondent no.1 thereafter issued a charge sheet
dated 12.5.2008 which ultimately culminated in the
passing of the removal Order dated 30.04.2011.
(h) While conducting the whole process of enquiry there
was no violation of principles of natural justice. The
petitioner was informed that in the list of documents
mentioned in Annexure III of the charge sheet dated
12.5.2008 what was indicated was only the attestation
form dated 12.11.1997 signed by the petitioner and
attested by the Plantation Officer, Forestry Sangli.
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According to the respondents, the petitioner was
informed that no such document exists and charges
were framed on the basis of the attestation form listed
in the list of documents. The enquiry was held against
the petitioner by the Competent Authority as per the
procedure prescribed in law.
(i) The scope of judicial interference in writ jurisdiction
against the order of the Disciplinary Authority was
limited and the Court cannot act as an appellate forum
and look into the findings of the Authority that have
been arrived at after a full-fledged enquiry. The case of
the petitioner did not warrant interference by the Court
under any of the circumstances where such interference
has been deemed necessary and proper as per the law
as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
(j) The petitioner made false undertakings at the time of
appointment and therefore the punishment of dismissal
was warranted.
(k) With regard to back wages, the petitioner had failed to
plead that he was not gainfully employed and was
therefore not eligible for back wages under any of the
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circumstances that had been culled out by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, where the grant of back wages may be
justified.
17. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on the following
judgments :
(i) S. N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC
594;
(ii) State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur and others Vs.
Prabhu Dayal Grover, (1995) 6 SCC 279;
(iii) State Bank of Karnataka and another Vs. N.
Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423;
(iv) State Bank of Karnataka and another Vs. Umesh,
(2022) 6 SCC 563;
(v) Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. ED) and others,
(2013) 10 SCC 324;
(vi) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs.
Mahadev Krishna Naik, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 325.
18. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
materials available on record, the rival contentions now fall for our
consideration.
19. The enquiry report recorded the charges made against the
petitioner for violation of Regulation 3(1)(i) and 3(1)(iii) of the MPE
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Regulations, 1964 by giving two different names of the Educational
Institute from where he received his qualification in B.A. and M.A in two
separate communications. In the course of the proceedings four witnesses
were examined, however, their statements do not disclose anything of
great evidentiary value due to the passage of time since the appointment
of the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer concluded that the documents
submitted by the petitioner, i.e. the marksheets of his B.A. & M.A had
been confirmed with Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, UP and were deemed to
be conclusively authentic. Further, the enquiry report records that the
issue raised pertaining to the Bharatiya Shiksha Parishad, UP not being a
recognised University was a sub judice issue and, therefore, was beyond
the scope of this enquiry. It was further stated that, in view of the facts
and evidence placed, the petitioner had rightly mentioned the names of
the study centres and that there was no contradiction to the information
produced by the petitioner in the attestation form with regards to the
name of the study centre as well as the name of the university. Hence, the
charges levelled against him for giving false, misleading and contradictory
statements were not proved.
20. The Enquiry Officer in his inquiry report observed in conclusion as
under :-
“Therefore in conspectus of above facts and evidence
placed before me, it is proved that CO has rightly
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mentioned the names of study centres i.e. K.M.V.
Mahavidyalaya Mul for BA in 1995 and S.B.O.M.
Institute, Madras for MA (Hindi) in 1997 in the
Sr.No.10 of attestation form (C-34 & 35) and whist
mentioning in the explanation dt. 25.3.2004 (C-33)
before Inquiry Officer Shri Silvester Correia the name of
the University i.e. Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Bharat
Bhavan, Matlyari, Chinhat, Faizabad Road, Lucknow –
227105 as appearing in the certificates (C-69 & C-70)
and marksheets (C-76, C-77, C-78, C-79, C-80). Also
there is no contradiction between the information given
by CO in the attestation form (C34 & C35) i.e. names of
the study centres and the name of university in the
explanation (C33) before the Inquiry Officer Shri
Silvester Correia, through which the CO acquired his BA
& MA (Hindi) qualification, as the information provided
by CO as above are independent of each other and true
in all respect as regards to names of study centres in
attestation form and name of university mentioned in
the explanation before Inquiry Officer Shri Silvester
Correia. Hence the charges levelled against the CO vide
abovementioned Chargesheet of giving false, misleading
and contradictory information, as regards the
Institution through which he has obtained his
educational qualifications i.e. BA & MA (Hindi) are not
proved.”
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21. It is pertinent, at this juncture, to look at the contents of Regulation
11(25) of the MPE Regulations, 1964 which reads as under :
“The disciplinary authority shall, if it is not the
inquiring authority, consider the record of the
inquiry and record its findings on each charge.”
In the present case, the Disciplinary Authority was not the
inquiring authority. After considering the enquiry report, the Disciplinary
Authority passed an order dated 18.3.2011 which commences as under :
“Whereas an inquiry was conducted against Shri Ashish D.
Chandekar, Hindi Translator, EDP No.154416 of MM
Division to inquire into the charge levelled against him
vide chargesheet of even reference
no.MM/GEN/125/2008/419 dtd. 12.05.2008.
And, whereas the undersigned as Disciplinary Authority
having carefully gone through the Inquiry Report (copy
attached) disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer,
and has come to the conclusion that Shri Ashish D.
Chandekar is guilty of the charge against him for the
following reasons :
1. ……………………………………….………..
2. ……………………………………….………..
Shri Ashish D. Chandekar is hereby given an opportunity
for making a representation on the above. Any such
representation which he may wish to make should be
submitted in writing to the undersigned, so as to reach not
later than 15 days from the date of receipt of order.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. Regulation 11(26) of MPE reads thus:
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“26.(i) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its
findings on the charge is of the opinion that any of
the penalties specified in terms of items (iv) to (ix)
of regulation 9 should be imposed, it shall make
an order imposing such penalty and shall furnish
to the employee a copy of the report of the Inquiry
Authority and where the Disciplinary Authority is
not the Inquiry Authority, a statement of its
findings together with brief reasons for
disagreement, if any, with the findings of Inquiry
Authority. (emphasis supplied)
(ii) In every case in which it is necessary to consult
the Board the record of Inquiry shall be
forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority along
with its recommendations to the Board of passing
such orders.
Note :
Any disciplinary action which had been taken or
is pending or an appeal/review in respect of any
disciplinary action has been preferred prior to
inclusion of above clause. The same shall be
deemed to have been taken or pending or
preferred as the case may be under these
amended regulations and shall be disposed off in
accordance with the provisions of these amended
regulations.”
23. The requirement under Regulation 11(25) has not been complied
with and therefore it is per se apparent that the Disciplinary Authority has
not applied its mind. The Disciplinary Authority while disagreeing with
the views of the Enquiry Officer, has breached the principles of natural
justice as contrary to Regulation 11(26), the Disciplinary Authority has
straightway held that the charges levelled against the petitioner as proved.
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The Disciplinary Authority, if it intended to disagree with the findings
recorded by the Enquiry Officer ought to have recorded his tentative
reasons for disagreement and thereafter should have provided an
opportunity to the delinquent employee to represent against the tentative
reasons, before recording any findings on the charges. The pre-
determined stand of the Disciplinary Authority in concluding that the
petitioner was guilty of the charge framed and thereafter calling for
further representation on the dissenting note is nothing but an empty
formality.
24. In Kunj Behari Misra (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India mandates the Disciplinary
Authority to give an opportunity of representation to the charged
employee on his findings. While explaining the principles laid down in
Managing Director, ECIL Vs. B Karunakar reported in (1993)4 SCC 727,
on the aspect of complying with the principles of natural justice by
furnishing a copy of the enquiry officer’s report with an opportunity to the
delinquent officer to submit his further representation on the report and
in the case of disagreement with the enquiry officers’ report, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, at paragraphs 18 and 19 held as follows:
“18. Under Regulation 6, the enquiry proceedings can be
conducted either e by an enquiry officer or by the
disciplinary authority itself. When the enquiry is
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conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final
or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not
stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand
concluded with the decision of the disciplinary
authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can
impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where
the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an
opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When
the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the
enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different
conclusion, there is no reason as to why an
opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be
most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged
officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are
deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority
before that authority differs with the enquiry officer's
report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes
punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such
situation, the charged officer must have an
opportunity to represent before the disciplinary
authority before final findings on the charges are
recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to
be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as
explained in Karunakar case.
19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the
principles of natural justice have to be read into
Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the
disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry
authority on any article of charge, then before it
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records its own findings on such charge, it must record
its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to
the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent
before it records its findings. The report
of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have
to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an
opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to
accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer.
The principles of natural justice, as we have already
observed, require the authority which has to take a
final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an
opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file
a representation before the disciplinary authority
records its findings on the charges framed against the
officer.”
25. In Yoginath D. Bagde (supra), it has been observed that the right of
hearing of an employee who is subjected to proceedings conducted by a
Disciplinary Authority has to be granted at two stages, first when, the
charges are levelled against him, second, when the findings of the enquiry
officer are being considered by the Disciplinary Authority. The relevant
portion of paragraph 31 has been extracted hereunder for convenience :
“31.…A delinquent employee has the right of hearing not
only during the enquiry proceedings conducted by the
enquiry officer into the charges levelled against him
but also at the stage at which those findings are
considered by the disciplinary authority and the latter,
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namely, the disciplinary authority forms a tentative
opinion that it does not agree with the findings
recorded by the enquiry officer. If the findings
recorded by the enquiry officer are in favour of the
delinquent and it has been held that the charges are
not proved, it is all the more necessary to give an
opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee
before reversing those findings. The formation of
opinion should be tentative and not final. It is at this
stage that the delinquent employee should be given an
opportunity of hearing after he is informed of the
reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary
authority has proposed to disagree with the findings of
the enquiry officer. This is in consonance with the
requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution as it
provides that a person shall not be dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in
which he has been informed of the charges against him
and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in
respect of those charges. So long as a final decision is
not taken in the matter, the enquiry d shall be deemed
to be pending. Mere submission of findings to the
disciplinary authority does not bring about the closure
of the enquiry proceedings. The enquiry proceedings
would come to an end only when the findings have
been considered by the disciplinary authority and the
charges are either held to be not proved or found to be
proved and in that event punishment is inflicted upon
the delinquent. That being so, the "right to be heard"
would be available to the delinquent up to the final
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stage. This right being a constitutional right of the
employee cannot be taken away by any legislative
enactment or service rule including rules made under
Article 309 of the Constitution.”
26. The aforementioned extract delineates the two-fold right to be
heard of an employee who is subject to proceedings before a Disciplinary
Authority. The position adopted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court herein
assails any defence that may be sought under the argument that upon the
filing of a conclusive report by the enquiry committee, the case of an
employee may be laid to rest. It is clear that before the Disciplinary
Authority rules on the findings of the enquiry committee, it is mandatory
to afford an opportunity to the employee.
27. In the present case, the Disciplinary Authority does not rule on the
defence advanced by the petitioner or even record it in its order imposing
punishment. The order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 18.03.2011
first records disagreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and
then concludes that the petitioner is guilty of the charge as framed. It
therefore seeks the petitioner’s response to the same. This course as
followed is contrary to the settled law in this regard.
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28. In Aditya Kumar Mishra (supra), the High Court of Allahabad has
summarised the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena
of pronouncements as extracted hereunder:
“The law regarding judicial review of disciplinary
proceedings is well settled. Disciplinary proceedings are
quasi-judicial proceedings, and the Inquiry Officer
performs a quasi-judicial function. Under Article 226 of
the Constitution, the High Court is not a court of appeal
over the decision of the disciplinary authority and does
not either re-appreciate the evidence submitted against
the employee, nor does the High Court record an
independent finding on evidence. However, under Article
226 the High Court can interfere where the findings of the
disciplinary authority are wholly arbitrary and
capricious or are based on no evidence or where the
findings are such which no reasonable man can ever
arrive at. The findings in the disciplinary proceedings as
well as the punishment awarded to the delinquent should
also not be influenced by irrelevant considerations. The
Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority cannot
record findings or pass orders of punishment on mere
suspicion. The Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary
authority can also not travel beyond the charges and any
punishment imposed on the basis of a charge which was
not the subject matter of the charge sheet would be
illegal.”
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29. In light of this crystalised position, it is clear that a Court under writ
jurisdiction may interfere where the conclusion of the Disciplinary
Authority is capricious or wholly arbitrary. In the instant case, the
Disciplinary Authority took a divergent position from the one that was
recorded by the Enquiry Officer without seeking the petitioner’s response
on the view proposed to be taken by it. It is our view that such a scenario
presents itself as a fit case for the exercise of writ jurisdiction.
30. The learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner has submitted
numerous judgments, which in effect are derived from the views
pronounced in Yoginath D. Bagde (supra) and reiterate the same
principle as condensed in Aditya Kumar Mishra (supra). Therefore, we
find that the case of the petitioner is covered by the ratio of the aforesaid
pronouncements.
31. The respondent has relied on the ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in S.N. Mukherjee (supra) inter alia, which opines that the findings
of an administrative authority such as a Disciplinary Authority, are not
required to be supported by reasons to the same standard as that of the
reasoning offered to support the judgment of a court. It is further,
considered that the need to record reasons is greatest when it is passed at
an original stage and as a sequitur, when an order is passed affirming the
findings validated in a previous order, the requirement to elaborate upon
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previously affirmed findings is less pressing and a mere statement that
the appellate or revisional authority is in consonance of the original order
suffices. However, from a reading of the relied-upon portion (paragraph
36 as reported by SCC), the use of the term “separate reason” is pivotal.
In our view, while it is true that the same reasons for the original order
may not be re-stated, in the instant case, the order of termination records
insufficiently substantiated reasons. Therefore, in our view, to be
exempted from reproducing the reasoning adopted by the authority that
passed the original order is not the same as an exemption from recording
a valid set of reasons. It is a well-settled principle of law that orders,
regardless of whether passed under quasi-judicial authority or judicial
authority, have to be supported by a cogent statement of reasons.
32. In Prabhu Dayal Grover (supra), such exemption from a legal
mandate to record reasons is provided for, expressly, by the regulations
that the Disciplinary Committee is proceeding under. In this light, the
reliance placed on this judgment is misconceived as it does not consider
the rider placed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The relevant portion is
extracted here for convenience:
“13. ..It can, therefore, be legitimately inferred that when
express provisions have been made in the Regulations
for recording reasons in only the first two of three fact
situations - and not the other there is no implied
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obligation also to record the reasons in case of
concurrence with the findings of the inquiry officer.”
33. A bare reading of the extract makes it clear that such exemption
from recording reasons has to be in light of a provision in the body of the
regulations, and does not, by any means, dictate that as a general
principle, a revisional/appellate authority may be exempt for having to
record reasons. In the absence of such a provision in the instant factual
matrix, we find that the case in hand is distinguishable from the ruling in
Prabhu Dayal Grover (supra).
34. In N. Gangaraj (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has opined
that the scope of judicial intervention under writ jurisdiction is not the
same as an appellate court sitting in re-appreciation of evidence adduced
in proceedings of the Disciplinary Authority. In our opinion, considering
that a non-speaking order was passed in the present case, the question of
re-appreciation of evidence does not arise. The order dated 30.4.2011 was
passed without any consideration as to the consequence of any evidence
that was adduced during the proceedings of the Disciplinary Authority,
therefore this case is distinguishable on facts.
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35. In Umesh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court opined upon the
scope of judicial intervention over the findings of the Disciplinary
Authority as thus:
“22. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not
act as an appellate forum over the findings of the
disciplinary authority. The court does not re-
appreciate the evidence on the basis of which the
finding of misconduct has been arrived at in the
course of a disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the
exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to
determine whether:
(i) the rules of natural justice have been
complied with;
(ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some
evidence;
(iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of
the disciplinary enquiry have been observed;
and
(iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary
authority suffer from perversity; and
(v) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven
misconduct.”
36. The instant case is squarely covered under clause (iii) of the
extracted paragraph, therefore reliance placed on this ruling by the
respondents is not apposite.
37. Therefore, in case of disagreement with the Enquiry Officer’s
report, the substantial compliance of the principles of natural justice
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requires that the Disciplinary Authority in case of any disagreement can
record only its tentative opinion on the charges with reasons and then
issue notice to the delinquent to show cause. The Disciplinary Authority
cannot hold him guilty at that stage and thereafter call upon him to make
a further representation, which would offend the well-cherished
principles of natural justice.
38. The services of the petitioner were terminated by the decision of the
Disciplinary Authority after taking a divergent view from the one that had
been taken by the Enquiry Officer. We are of the opinion that when a
divergent view is taken from the body vested with the task of fact-finding,
there is a greater burden placed upon the authority with whom the final
decision of imposition of punishment rests to substantiate its premise
based upon which such a divergent view may be taken.
39. In the present case, the Disciplinary Authority clearly failed to
discharge this burden by not apprising the petitioner of the proposed
punishment vide order dated 18.03.2011 which was mandatory in view of
Regulation 11(26)(i), by not considering the submissions of the petitioner
in the body of the order dated 30.4.2011 and by not furnishing a copy to
the petitioner of the application form which was submitted by the
petitioner to the General Administration Department, MPT, at the time of
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his appointment. On these counts, the order of punishment is liable to be
interfered with as it has been passed in a manner contrary to law.
40. As far as the submission pertaining to remit the matter for fresh
consideration by the Disciplinary Authority is concerned, we are not
inclined to do so due to the length of time that has passed since the
conclusion of the enquiry. Prejudice to the rights of the petitioner caused
due to the disciplinary proceedings is apparent on the face of the record.
In the facts and circumstances of this case, by remitting the matter to the
Disciplinary Authority, his agony will be only prolonged. The petitioner
was first issued a memorandum in the same matter on 29.7.2003. Despite
grant of liberty to proceed with the enquiry afresh, the same has been
conducted in breach of principles of justice. The facts of the present case
do not call for an order of remand again. Justice should not only be done
but should manifestly seem to be done.
41. In light of the aforementioned discussion, it can be culled out
clearly that the basis for imposing such punishment upon the petitioner is
both in violation of the procedural mandate of the MPE Regulations, 1964
and of the principles of natural justice. Furthermore, prior to the
chargesheet that culminated in an order of termination being issued, two
chargesheets had been issued against the petitioner on two separate
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occasions for the same purported misconduct; it is clear that the
petitioner has been victimised by the respondents.
42. Coming to the aspect of consequential relief, it is clear that on the
order of punishment being set aside, the petitioner is entitled to be
reinstated on his former post with continuity. As regards the grant of
back-wages is concerned, the petitioner in paragraph 40 of the Writ
Petition has pleaded that after his services were illegally terminated, he
was rendered jobless. He has stated that he was the only bread earner in
his family. These averments of the petitioner have not been countered by
the respondents. There is no denial on the part of the respondents.
In our view, in the absence of any denial of the petitioner’s stand
that he was jobless after the termination of his services, the petitioner is
entitled to relief in that regard. In the case of Mahaedeo Krishna Naik
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring to the decision in
Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra) has opined that:
“There is one other aspect that would fall for
consideration of the court. In certain decisions, noticed
in Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), it has been opined
that whether or not an employee has been gainfully
employed is within his special knowledge and having
regard to Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the
burden of proof is on him. What's required of an
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employee in such a case? He has to plead in his
statement of claim or any subsequent pleading before
the industrial tribunal/labour court that he has not
been gainfully employed and that the award of
reinstatement may also grant him back wages. If the
employee pleads that he was not gainfully employed,
he cannot possibly prove such negative fact by
adducing positive evidence. In the absence of any
contra-material on record, his version has to be
accepted. Reference in this connection may be made to
Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which
confers a right on an employee to seek "full wages last
drawn" from the employer while the challenge of the
employer to an award directing reinstatement in a
higher court remains pending. There too, what is
required is a statement on affidavit regarding non-
employment and with such a statement on record, the
ball is in the court of the employer to satisfy the court
why relief under such section ought not to be granted
by invoking the proviso to the section. We see no
reason why a similar approach may not be adopted.
After the employee pleads his non-employment and if
the employer asserts that the employee was gainfully
employed between the dates of termination and
proposed reinstatement, the onus of proof would shift
to the employer to prove such assertion having regard
to the cardinal principle that 'he who asserts must
prove'. Law, though, seems to be well settled that if the
employer by reason of its illegal act deprives any of its
employees from discharging his work and the
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termination is ultimately held to be bad in law, such
employee has a legitimate and valid claim to be
restored with all that he would have received but for
being illegally kept away from work. This is based on
the principle that although the employee was willing to
perform work, it was the employer who did not accept
work from him and, therefore, if the employer's action
is held to be illegal and bad, such employer cannot
escape from suffering the consequences. However, it is
elementary but requires to be restated that while grant
of full back wages is the normal rule, an exceptional
case with sufficient proof has to be set up by the
employer to escape the burden of bearing back wages.”
(emphasis placed)
The clear upshot of the aforesaid extract is that the onus of proving
whether the terminated employee is presently employed is incumbent
upon the employer since it is observed that it would be a fallacious
endeavor to seek positive evidence of a negative fact. Therefore, this
ruling ultimately supports the claim of the petitioner to back wages and
the reliance placed by the respondent in this regard is unacceptable.
43. Thus, taking an overall view of the matter including the fact that the
order of termination has been set aside on the ground of breach of
principles of justice, we are inclined to award 50% back-wages to the
petitioner from 1.5.2011 till his reinstatement.
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It is to be noted that after the services of the petitioner were
terminated on 30.4.2011, proceedings for his eviction under Section 4 of
the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 were
initiated. On 20.3.2015 the Estate Officer issued a show cause notice to
the petitioner calling upon him to pay damages for unauthorised
occupation of the premises owned by MPT. By the order dated 30.9.2015
passed in the Writ Petition, the undertaking furnished by the petitioner
was accepted and he was permitted to vacate the premises on or before
31.12.2015. The recovery of the amount of damages was deferred till the
final hearing of the Writ Petition. Since the order of termination of the
petitioner’s service has been found to be illegal, the petitioner’s
occupation of the premises owned by the MPT cannot be treated to be
illegal. Hence, there would be no question of recovering the amount of
damages from the petitioner. The show cause notice dated 20.3.2015
stands clarified accordingly.
44. Hence, for the aforesaid reasons, the following order is passed :-
(a) The Order dated 30.04.2011 is untenable in the eyes
of the law and therefore liable to be quashed and set
aside. As a natural consequence, the orders dated
2.4.2012, 21.5.2013 and 27.1.2015 passed by the
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Appellate/Reviewing Authorities are also hereby
quashed and set aside. The petitioner shall be
reinstated on his former post with continuity in
service.
(b) The petitioner is held entitled to 50% back-wages
from 1.5.2011 till his reinstatement.
(c) No further steps shall be taken pursuant to show
cause notice dated 20.3.2015 against the petitioner.
(d) The writ petition is allowed with no order as to costs.
Rule is made absolute.
(NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, J.) (A. S. CHANDURKAR, J.)
45. At this stage, Mr N. Naik, learned counsel for the respondents
seeks stay of the order for a period of twelve weeks in order to challenge
the same.
46. Mr Lawande, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
opposes the request on the ground that the petitioner is suffering for last
many years.
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47. In the facts of the present case, the judgment shall operate after a
period of four weeks from today.
(NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, J.) (A. S. CHANDURKAR, J.)
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