No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
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ASHOK KUMAR BHATIACHARYYA
v.
AJOY BISWAS AND ORS.
Nov1mber 15, 1984
(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND
SABYASACm MUKHARJI JJ.]
Constitution •I Inaia 1950, Artie/es 102(2) (a) and 191(/) (a).
'Office of profit under government'-Who is holder of such office-A holder
of the office of profit under an1 authority or local authority subject to the Control
· I of the "State or Central Government-Whether disqualified from becoming a
Member
of
Parliament.
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Word• and Phrases 'Office of profit under the government of India or the
Government
of
any State-Mellllint •/-Articles 58, 102(1) (a) and 191(1) (a)
Constitution of India, 1950.
Respondent No. 1 was employed in the Agartala Municipality and held
the post of an Assistant Accountant. The Commissioners of this Municipality
were superseded by an order or the State Government under Section 553 or the
Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 as extended to the State of Tripura in 1975. Respon·
dent No, 1 who was under suspension at the time of superscssion was dismissed
from service in the disciplinary proceedings against him by the Administrator of
the Municipality on 20th December, 1975. The State Government confirmed the
order of dismissal. Respondent No.-1 was however reinstated to the post
of Accountant-in·chargc on 6th May,
1978
With immediate effect by the
Administrator.
Respondent No.
I contested the mid.term Lok Sabha election held in 1980
from the West Tripura Parliamentary Constituency, and was declared elected on
8th January, 1980.
The appellant who was a voter filed an Election Petition in the High
Court contending that respondent No. 1 was disqualified for being elected as a J
member of the House of People aa he held an office of profit under the Govern· -
ment of Tripura within the meaning of Article 102(1){a) of the Constitution. The
Hiah Court dismissed the petition holding that Respondent No. I did not hold
an office of profit under the aovernment of Tripura.
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A. K. BHAlTACHARYYA V. AJOY BTSWAS SI
In the appeal to this Court on the question : whether respondent No. 1 A
hdd •n office of profit under sub-clause (a) of Clause (I) or Anicle 102 of the
Constitution.
Dismissing the Appeal.
HELD:
1.
\Vhether in a particular case a person holds an office or profit
under the government
or not must
depend upon the facts and circumstances of
the relevant provisions. To make in all cases employees of local authorities
subject to the control of Government, holders of office or profit under the
Government wouid be to obliterate the specific differentiation made under
Atticle 58(2) of the Constitution and to extend disqualification under Article t02
(l)(a) to an extent not warranted by the language of the Article. (62 E-F]
In the instant case, having regard to the provisions of_ the Bengal Munici
pal Act, 1932 as extended to Tripura, the Government does not control officers
like respondent No. 1 and he continues to ~e an employee of the Municipality
though bis appointment
is subject to the confirmation by the Government. He
does
not cease to be an employee of the Municipality. Local
authority as such
or any other authority does not cease to become independent entity separate
from Government. [62 D-C]
2. Respondent
No. 1 was not at the relevant time a holder of office or
profit under the Government.
Some amount of control is reco&nised even in a
local authority which is taken account of under Article SS. The High Court
rigbly held that respondent No. 1 did not hold office or profit under_ the Govern·
ment of Tripura on the date of filing of the nomination on an analysis or
relevant provisfons of the Act. [ 62 0-H)
3. The object of enacting provisions like Article 102(1)(a) and Article
191(1)(a)
is that a person who is elected to a Legislature or
Parliament should be
free
to carry on his duties fearlessly without being subjected to any kind of
government pressure.
·The term
0
office of profit under the Government" used
in clause
(a} is an expression of wider import than a post held under the
Govern
ment which is dealt with in Part XIV of the Constitution. The measure or
control by the Government over a local authority 1.hould be judged in order to
eliminate the possibility
of a conflict between duty and interest and to maintain
the purity
of the elected bodies. (61
G-HI,
.
4. It will be clear from reference to ItemrS in List Il of VII Schedule of
the Constitution that Municipality are separately mentioned in contra~distinction
of the State government. Therefore, a local authority as such is separate and
distinct. This becomes further clear from Article S8(2) of the Constitution.
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S. A person who iS holding an office of profit either under the Govern ...
ment of India or the Government of the State or any other local or other
authority subject to the control of the said Governments is disqualified from
becoming a President but if a person bolds an office of profit under the Govero ...
meat of India or the Government of any State, he only is disqualified from
bcin~ a member or, Parliament. A holder of the of!ico of profit under an1 ff
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authority or local authority subject to the control of the State or Centt-1. .
Government is as such not disqualified from becoming a Member of Partian)u,l: · ·
en c:-Ql
D. R, Gurushantappa v. Abdul Khuddus Anwar & Ors. (1969] 3 S.C.R, 22S,
G11rugobinda Basu v. Sankari Prasad Ghosal & Ors. [1964) 4 S.C.R. 311, Maulona
Abdul Shakur v. Rikhab Chand, (1958) S.C.R. 387, Surya !Cant Roy v. Immamul
'Hai KhOn, (1975] 3 S.C.R., 909; and Mad!mker G.E, Pankakar v. Jaswant Choir
bi/da~ Rajani & Ors, (1975) 3 S.C.R, p. 832 at page 851, referred to.
Bihari/a/ Dobray v, Roshan Lal Dobray, (1984) I S.C.C, 551, explained.
CIVIL APPELLATB JUl\1SDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1724 of 1982,
From the Judgment and Order dated the 15th March, 1982 of'
the Gauhati High Court (Agartala Bench) in E.P. No. 2 of 1980 .
. ,
·'
· G.L. Sanghi, SK, Nandy and S, Parekh, for the ~ppellant,
· · R.K. Ga;g and S.C, Blrla for the Respondent .
..
D . The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
. SABYASACHI Mu~HArui. J, This appeal arises out of the judg
ment and an order of the Gauhati High Court in an election petition,
The petitioner appellant was a voter in the West Tripura Parliamentary
Constituency from No, 7 Ramnagar Assembly Segment, He contested
'E the mid-term Lok
Sabha election held in 1980 from the West Tripura
Padiamentary,Constituency as a nominee
of Congress (I},
There were
six candidates including the petitioner contesting the said election,
The respondent
No. 1 was a
C.P.I.(M} candidate, 8th December,
1979 was the date of filing of the nominations, Nominations were
scrutinised on 11th December, · 1979 and the withdrawal ·date was
F 13th December, 1979. On 6th January, 1980 the polling was held
and the result
of the election was declared on 8th January,
1980. The
main. contest
was between the petitioner/appellant and the respondent
No, I, Ajoy Biswas
.. The respondent No, 1 had secured 1,98,335
votes as against the appellant who had secured 1,42,990 votes. The
respondent No. 1 was declared elected. ·
Ji
.. The only point on which the election petition by the appellant/
petitioner was pressed before the High Court arid the only point
urged before
us in this appeal, is whether
'the respondent No. 1 was
disqualified for. being elected as a member
of the House of
People as
he held
an office of profit under the Government ofTripura within
the meaning
of Article 102(l}(a) of the Constitution,
On the relevant
date, respondent No. 1 wa.s the' Accountant-in-charge of the Agartala
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A. K. BHATTACHARYYA v. AJOY BISWAS (Mukharji, i.) 53
Municipality. Therefore, the question involved in this appeal, is,
whether an Accountant-in-charge of the Agartala Municipality holds
an office of profit within the meaning of Article
102(1)(a) of the
Constitution.
In order to determine this question, it will be necessary
to refer to certain facts.
Respondent No. 1
was employed in Agartala Municipality and
held the post carrying the scale of pay of Rs.
80-180 per month.
The Commissioners of the Agartala Municipality were superseded by
an order of the State Government under Section 553 of the Bengal
Municipal Act,
1932 as extended to the
State of Tripura in 1975. The
effect of Section 554 of the s~id Act is that during the period of
supersession the powers and duties of the Commissioners and Chair·
man shall be exercised and performed by the Administrator appointed
by the State Government under that section. The respondent No. 1
who
was under suspension at the time of supersession was dismissed
from service
in the disciplinary proceedings against him
by the Ad·
ministrator of the Agartala Municipality on 20th December, 1975.
The State Government thereafter had confirmed the order of dis
missal. When the Left Front Government came in power in the
State of Tripura, the respondent No. 1 was reinstated to the post of
Accountant-in-charge of Agartala Municipality on 6th May,
1978
with immediate effect by the Administrator.
So at the relevant time
he was an Assistant Accountant and was Accountant-in-charge under
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the Agartala Municipality drawing a monthly salary of Rs.
200. E
It is necessary to briefly note some of the relevant provisions of
the said Act
in view of the contentions urged in this appeal. Proviso
(ii) to
Section 66(2) of the said Municipal Act provides that no
appointment carrying a monthly salary of more than two hundred
rupees or a salary rising by periodical increments to more than two
hundred rupees shall
be created without the sanction of the
State
Government, and every nomination to, and dismissal from, any such
nomination shall
be subject to confirmation by the
State Government.
It appears
that the Deputy Secretary to. the
Govsrnment of Tripura
by his letter dated 6th May
1978 had conveyed to the Administrator,
Agartala Municipality, decision
of the Government for cancellation
of the order of confirmation of the dismissal communicated to him
on 19th December,
1975. As a result, the cancellation order ceased
to
be effective and respondent No.
I was reinstated and it was further
provided that the period between the date of dismissal and the date
of reinstatement would be treated as period spent on duty for all
purposes.
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S4 StlPREME COURT REPORTS {198Sj i S.C.R.
The Act further provides that there shall be established for each
Municipality a body
of Commissioners consisting of such members
or
Comll\issioners not being more than twenty nor less than six as
the State Government may specify in the notification constituting the
municipality. Such Commissioners shall be a body corporate by the
name
of the Municipal Commissioners of the place by reference to
which the Municipality is known,
having, perpetual succession and
a common seal, and by
that name shall sue and be sued. The
Mnnicipality consists
of the elected Commissioners. A Chairman is
elected by the Commissioners from amongst the Commissioners
within
30 days from the date of publication of the result of the
general election
of the Commissioners in the Municipality failing
which the
State Government has the power to appoint one of the
Commissioners
to be Chairman. A Vice-Chairman is also to be
elected from amongst themselves. The Chairman
is
empo.,,.ered "ithin
certain !imitations to transact the business connected with the Act
and exercise all the powers vested in the Commissioners under the
Act, except as otherwise provided. The Commissioners are to hold
office for four years commencing from the date
of the first meeting of
the newly formed body of Commissioners after a general election of
Commissioners in the Municipality at which a quornm is present. An
elected Chairman or Vice-Chairman may at any time be removed
from his office by a resolution
of the Commissioners as laid down in
section
61(2) or (3) of the said Act. The Act also empowered the
State Government to remove an elected Commissioner on certain
grounds set
out in section 62 of the said Act.
Jn view of the contentions raised in this appeal, it would be
relevant
to refer and set out section 66 of the said Act which is as
follows : "66. APPOINTMENT OF SUBORDINATE OFFICERS,-
(I) The Commissioners at a meeting may, subject to
the provisions
of this Act and the rules made thereunder
from time to time, determine what officers and what servants
of the Commissioners are necessary for the municipality and
may
fix the salaries and allowances to be paid and granted
to such officers and servants.
(2)
Subject to the scale of establishment approved by
the Commissioners under sub-section(!), the Chairman shall
have power
to appoint such persons as
he may think fit;)nd
A. K. BHATTACHARYYA v. AJOY BISWAS (Mukharji, J.) SS
from time to time to remove such persons and appoint
others in their places :
Provided
as follows :
(i) a person shall not be appointed to an office carrying a
monthly salary of more than
fifty rupees or a salary
rising
by periodical increments to more than fifty
rupees without the sanction of the
Commissioners at a
meeting, and an
officer or servant whose post carries a
monthly salary of more than twenty rupees shall not be
dismissed
\'iithout such sanction ;
(ii) no appointment carrying a monthly salary of more than
two hundred rupees or a salary rising
by periodical
increments to more than two hundred rupees shall be
created without the sanction of the
State Government,
and every nomination to, and dismissal from, any such
appointment shall be subject to confirmation
by the
State Government ;
(iii) no person holding an
office carrying a monthly salary
of one hundred rupees or more shall
be dismissed unless
such dismissal
is sanctioned by a resolution of the
Commissioners passed at a special meeting called for
the purpose and, except with the consent of the State
Government unless such resolution has been supported
by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total
number
of
Commissioners holding office for the time
being.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(2), the creation of and nomination to or suspension, removal ·
or dismissal from, the post of Executive
Officer shall; irres-·
pective of the salary assigned to the post, be subject to
confirmation
by the
State Government."
The Act further provides that besides the officers and the
servants mentioned above, all or any
of the officers mentioned in
section
67 may be appointed by the
Commissioners. In certain
circumstances, the Act provides, that the State Government may have
an Executive Officer for such periog as may be specified in the Notifi
cation. Section 93 provides that as soon as may be after the first
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day of April in every year not later than such date as may be fixed
by the State Government, the Commissioners shall submit to the
State Government a report on the administration of the Municipality
during the preceding year in such form and with such details as the
State Government may direct, and a copy of the report shall also be
submitted by the Commissioners to the District Magistrate. The
Commissioners
of a Municipality may acquire and hold property
within or without the limits of the Municipality, and all property
within the Municipality of the nature specified in section
95, other
than property maintained
by the Central Government or any other
Local Authority, are vested in and belong to the Commissioners, and
are under their direct management and control.
By Section
102 of
the said Act, the Commissioners are empowered to purchase, take on
lease or otherwise acquire any land for the purposes
of the said Act,
and may
se!J, lease, exchange or otherwise dispose of any land not
required for such purposes. They are also empowered to enter into
and perform any contract necessary for the purpose
of the Act. A
fund called the Municipal fund
is constituted for each Municipality
and all sums received by or on behalf of the Commissioners under the
said Act or otherwise, and the balance,
if any, standing at the credit
of the Municipal fund of the Municipality at the commencement of
the said Act, are credited to the said fund. The purposes to which
the Municipal Fund
is applicable are enumerated in section
108 of
the Act. If any work is estimated to cost above ten thousand rupees,
the State Government may require the plans and estimates
of such
works to be submitted for its approval, or for the approval of any
servant
of the Government before such work, in such form as it
might prescribe.
There are provisions for imposing taxes, tolls and
foes under
section
123 of the said Act and to make assessment of the rate on the
annual value
of the holdings under section 128 of the said Act.
Powers
are conferred to impose taxes. There are other provisions for raising
fund for the Municipality by
way of charging fee for registration etc.
The Act empowers raising of funds for the Municipality for carrying
out the purposes of the said Act.
In this connection it may be relevant to refer to clause
(31) of
section 3
of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and in view of the
pro
.. visions of the Act it was held b¥ the High Court that Agartala
Mnnic1pality
is a 'Local authority' within the meaning of that
expres
sion as defined in clause (31) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act,
1897. We are of the opinion that the High Coutt was right.
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A. k. illlATtACHARYYA V. AJOY BISWAS (Mukharji, J.) S1
In view of the facts narrated before, it was found by the High
Court and
in our opinion rightly that the respondent No. l was at the
relevant time holding an
office of profit under a local municipality.
Section 66 which we have set out hereinbefore indicates that the
appointment of persons to the category of post held
by respondent
No. 1
was to be made by the Commissioners of Municipality, but the
appointment
was subject to the confirmation by the
State Govern
ment. The High Court held and we are of the opinion rightly that
the respondent No. I
was an
ofllcer of the Commissioners. Section 63
of the said Act provides that such ofllcers and servants of the Com
missioners shall be subordinates to the Executive Officer appointed
by the Commissioners. The respondent No. 1 was appointed by Com
missioners, though sanction of the Government was obtained. He
could
be removed by the Commissioners again subject to the sanction
of the Government. He was paid out of the municipal funds which
the Municipality
was and is competent to raise. From the analysis
of the provisions of the Act it is clear that though the Government
exercises certain amount of control and supervision, the respondent
No. 1 was not
an employee of the Government nor was he required
to perform governmental functions for the Government.
Municipalities are separately mentioned
in contradistinction of
the State Government
as it will be clear from reference to Item 5 in
List II of the VII Schedule of the Constitution. Therefore, a local
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authority as such is a separate and distinct entity. This will become E
further clear from Article
58(2) of the Constitution.
The question involved in this appeal
is whether respondent No.
1 held an
office of profit under sub-clause (a) of Clause
(I) of Article
102 of the Constitution. Sub-clause (a) of Article 102 (I) provides as
follows:-
"Art. 102-Disqualification for membership.-
(I) A person shall
be disqualified for being chosen as,
and for being, a member of either House of
Parliament-
( a) If he
holds any office of profit under the Government
of India or the Government of any State, other than an
office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify
its
holder;"
Jn contra-distinction, clause (2) of Article 58 which mentions
disqualifications for election as President provides as follows
:-
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SS SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 s.c.R.
"58 Disqualifications for election as President:
(1)
(2) A person shall not be eligible for election as Presi
dent if he holds any office of profit under the
Government ofindia or the Government of any
State or under any local or other authority subject
to the control
of any of the said
Governments."
In fact a person who is holding an office of profit either under
the Government of India or the Government
of any
State or under
any local or other authority subject to the control
of any of the said
Governments
is disqualified from becoming the
President but if a
person holds an
office of profit under the Government of India or the
Government of any
State he only is disqualified from being a mem·
ber of Parliman!. A holder of the office of profit under any local or
other authority subject to the control
of the
State or Central Govern
ment is as snch not disqualified from becoming a Member of
Parliament. Keeping in view these provisions, it is necessary to
consider the question whether the respondent No. 1
was holding an
office of profit under the
State Government.
In the case of
D. R. Gurushantappa v. Abdul Khuddus Anwar
&
Ors., w this Court had to consider whether a candidate employed in
a company owned
by the Government
was disqualified under Article
102(1) (a) and 191 (!)(a) of the Constitution and in this connection
considered the relevant provisions
of Articles
102(1) (a) and 191(1)
(a) of the Constitution. After discussing the case of Gurugobinda
Basu
v. Sankari Prasad Ghosal &
Ors."
1
and the decision in the case
of Maulana Abdul Shakur v. Rikhab Chand,"
1
this Court come to the
conclusion that the
mere fact that the Government had control over
the Managing Director and other Directors
as well as the power of
issuing directions relating to the working
of the company could not
lead to the inference that
every employee of the company was under
the control
of the Government.
The true principle behind this provision in Article
102 (I) (a)
is that there should not be any conflict between the duties and the
interest
of an elected member. Government controls
varioui activities
(I) [1969) 3 S.C.R. 425
(2) [1964) 4 S.C.R. 311
)3) (1958) 3 S.C.R. 387 .
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A. I::. llHAtTACHARYYA v. AJOY BISWAS (Mukherji, J.) )9
in various spheres and in various measures. But to judge whether
employees of any authority or local authorities under the control
of
Government become Government employees or not or holders of
office of profit under the Government the measure and nature of
control exercised by the Government over the employee must be
judged in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case so as to
avoid any possible conflict between his personal interests and duties
and of the Government. This position
was further examined in the
case
of
Surya Kant Royv.Imamul Hai Khan.W There under Bihar and
Orissa Mining Settlement Act, 1920, a Board called the Mines Board
of Health may
be established to provide for the control and sanita
tion of any area within
which the persons employed in a mine reside
and for the prevention therein of the out-break
an~ spread of epide
mic diseases. After analysing the facts of that case, this Court held
that the mere fact that the candidate
was appointed
Chairman of the
Board by State Government would not make him a person holding
an
office of profit under the State Government. There the Supreme Court referred to the decision in the case of Shivamurthy Swami v.
Agadi Sanganna Andanappaa.c
21
This Court in Surya Kant Roy v.
fmamul Hai Khan (supra) observed at page 911 as follows:-
"Here again it is to be pointed out that the Government
does not pay the remuneration nor does the holder perfrom
his fuctions for the Government. To hold otherwise would
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be to hold that local bodies like Municipal
Councils per- E
form their functions for the Government though in one sense
the functions they perform are governmental functions."
In the case of D.R. Gurushantappa v. Abdul Khuddus Anwar
& Ors. (supra) mentioned hereinbefore, at page 434 this Court
observed as follows :-
"Thus, in the case of election as President or Vice
Pretident, the disqualification arises even if the candidate is
holding an office of profit under a local or any other autho
rity under the control of the Central Government or the
State Government, whereas, in the case
of a candidate for
election as a Member
of any of the Legislatures, no such
disqualification is laid down
by the Constitution if the office
of profit is held under a local or any other authority under
(!) [1975) 3 S.C.R.
909
(2) [1971) 3 s.c.c. 870
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the control of the Governments and not directly under any
of the Governments. This clearly indicates that in the case of
~ligibility for election as a member of a Legislature, the
holding of an
office of profit under a corporate body like a
local authority
does not bring about disqualification even if
that local authority be under the control of the Government.
The
mere control of the Government over the authority
having the power to
appoirit, dismiss, or control the work
ing of the officer employed by such authority does not
disqualify that
officer from being candidate for election as
a member of the Legislature in the manner in which such
disqualification
comes into existence for being elected as the
President or the Vice-President. The Company, in the
present case, no doubt did come under the control
of the
Government and respondent No.
1 was holding an office of
profit under the Company; but, in view of the distinction
indicated above, it
is clear that the disqualification laid down
under Art.
191
(I) (a) of the Constitution was not intended
to apply to the holder of such an
office of
profit."
This view was again reiterated by this Court in the case of
Madhuker G.E. Panakakar v. Jaswant Chabbildas Rajani & Ors.'
11
where this Court observed as follows:-
"The core question that comes to the fore from the
survey
of the panorma of case law is as to when we can
designate a person gainfully engaged in some work having
a nexus with Government
as the holder of an
'office of
profit' under Government in the setting of disqualification
for candidature for municipal or like elections. The holding
of an office denotes au office and connotes its holder and
this duality implies the existence of the
office as an
indepen
dent continuity and an incumbent there of for the nonce.
Certain aspects appear to
be elementary. For holding an
office of profit under Government one need not be in the
· service of Government and there need be no relationship of
master and servant
(Gurugobinda supra). Similarly, we
have to look at the substance, not the form. Thirdly, all the
several factors
str;115ed by this Court as determinative of the
holding of an 'office' under Government,· need not be con-
ft (1) (1976] 3 S,C.R. l32 at 8S1
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(
A. II:. BHATTACHARYYA v. AJOY BISWAS (Mukhar}i, J.) "
jointly present, the critical circumstances, not the total A
factors, prove decisive. A practical
view not pedantic basket
of
tests, should guide in arriving at a sensible conclusion."
In a recent decision of this Court in the case of Bihari/al
Dobray v. Roshan Lal Dobray,1 this Court was concerned with the
question whether an
office profit
~as held directly under the Govern
ment in the facts of that case. There was an assistant teacher of a
Basic Primary School run by U.P. Board of Basic Education under
U.P. Basic Education Act, and it was held that it was an office of
profit under the State Government within the meaning of Article 191
(!)(a) of the Constitution and therefore he was disqualified from
election. There the respondent
was originally employed as an assistant
teacher
in a Basic
Primary School which was being run and managed
by the Zila Parishad. On coming into force of the U.P. Basic
Education Act,
1972, he became an employee of the Board of Basic
Education under Section 9
(I) of the Act. While holding the post of
an assistant teacher as such he filed his nomination for his election to
the State Legislative Assembly. But the Returing
Officer rejected his
nomination paper on the ground that he
was holding an office of
profit under the State Government and hence he was disqualified
under Article
191
(I) (a) for being elected as an MLA. Article 191 (!)
(a) is in terms pari materia with Article 102 (I) (a) of the Constitution
regarding the election to the State Assembly. The respondent therein
filed an election petition and the High
Court allowed the same
declaring that the election of the appellant
by rejecting the
nomina
tion of the respondent was void. The appellant therefore preferred the
appeal to this Court. This Court allowed the appeal and it was held
that the respondent
was holding an office of profit under the State
Government.
As we have mentioned before, the object of enacting provisions
like Article
102 (I) (a) and Article 191(1) (a) is that a person who is
elected to Parliament or a Legislature should be free to carry on his
duties fearlessly without being subjected to any kind of governmental
pressure. The term "office of profit under the Government" used in
clause (a)
of Article
102(1) is an expression of wider import thl!n a
post in connection with the union or of any State which is dealt
with in part
XIV of the Constitution. The measure of control by the
Government over a local authority should
be judged in order to
elimin;1te the possibility of conflict between duty and interest and to
(I) [1984] I S.C.C. 155
B
c
D
E
F
G
A
B
c
D
E
F
62 SUPREMll COURT REPORTS (1985) 2 S.C.R.
maintain the purity of the elected bodies. After reviewing various
cases, and the provisions of the various sections
of the
U.P. Basic
Education Act,
l972 especially in view of section 13 of the Act, this
Court held
in the last mentioned case that the measure of control was
such
that U.P. Education Board was an authority which v.as not
truly independent
of the Government and every employee of the
Board
was in fact holding an office of profit under the
State Govern·
ment. The statement of Objects and Reasons of the U.P. Basic
Education Act, 1972 and sections 4, 6, 7, 13 and 19 all of which
have been
set out in extenso in that decision make that conclusion
irresistible.
For determination
of the question whether a person holds an
office of profit under the Government each case must be measured
and judged in the light
of the relevant provisions of the Act. Having
regard
to the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 as
exten·
ded to Tripura, the provisions of which have been set out herein
before, we are of the opinion that the State Government does not
exercise any control over
officers like respondent No. 1 and that he
continues to be an employee
of the Muncipality though his
appointment
is subject to the confirmation by the Government.
Ju1t
by reason of this condition an employee of a local authority does
not cease to be an employee of the Muncipality. Local authority as
such or any other authority does not cease to become independent
entity separate from Government. Whether in a particular case it
is so
or not mnst depend upon the facts and circumstances of the relevant
provisions. To make in
all cases employees of local authorities subject
to the control of Government and to treat them
as holders of office of
profit under the Government would be to obliterate the specific
differentiation made under Article
58(2) and Article
102 (1) (a) of the
Constitution and to extend the disquaiification under Article
58 (2)
to one under Article
102 (I) (a) to an extent not warranted by the
language
of the Article.
Having noted the relevant provisions,
we are of the
opinion that
the respondent"No. 1 was not at the relevant time a holder of office
of profit under the Government. Some amount of control is recognised
oven in a local authority which is taken account of under Article 58.
The High Court held that re1pondent No. I did not hold office of
profit under the Government
of Tripura on the date of filing of the
nomination on an analysis of relevant provision$
of the Act which
we
•
•
)I
•
A. I:. BHATTACHAllYA '· AJOY BISWAS (Mukharji, J.) 63
have set out herein before. We arc in aggrecment with this view of the
Hi&h Court.
1 In the premises, respondent No. I was not disqualified from
filing his nomination. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly
--• dismissed with co1ts.
N.V.K • Appia/ dismissed
-l
. ...
A
B
In the landmark judgment of Ashok Kumar Bhattacharyya v. Ajoy Biswas & Ors., now prominently featured on CaseOn, the Supreme Court of India delivered a crucial interpretation on the disqualification of a Member of Parliament (MP) under the Office of Profit doctrine. This case meticulously examines the boundaries between being an employee of a government-controlled local body and holding an office directly 'under the Government', a distinction that remains fundamental to India's election jurisprudence and the principle of separation of powers. It addresses whether an employee of a municipality, which is subject to state supervision, is disqualified from being elected to the Lok Sabha under Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution.
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether Respondent No. 1, Mr. Ajoy Biswas, who served as the Accountant-in-charge of the Agartala Municipality, held an “office of profit under the Government of Tripura” at the time of his election. If so, would this disqualify him from being a member of the House of People (Lok Sabha) under Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution of India?
The core legal provision under scrutiny was Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution, which states that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament if they hold any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State, other than an office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its holder.
The Court drew a vital distinction by comparing Article 102(1)(a) with Article 58(2), which outlines the disqualifications for the office of the President. Article 58(2) has a much wider scope, disqualifying anyone who holds an office of profit under the Government of India, a State Government, or “under any local or other authority subject to the control of any of the said Governments.” The absence of this latter phrase in Article 102(1)(a) was interpreted by the Court as a deliberate choice by the framers of the Constitution to set a different, narrower standard for Members of Parliament.
The Supreme Court conducted a detailed analysis of the facts and the governing statutes to determine the true nature of Mr. Biswas's employment.
The Court delved into the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 (as extended to Tripura). It acknowledged that the State Government exercised a degree of control over the Agartala Municipality. For instance, the government had the power to supersede the Municipal Commissioners and appoint an Administrator. Furthermore, the appointment and dismissal of employees holding a certain salary grade required government confirmation. However, the Court observed that the Municipality was established as a distinct legal entity—a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal. Its employees were appointed by the Municipal Commissioners, and their salaries were paid from the Municipal fund, not the state exchequer.
The judgment firmly established that mere government control over a local authority is not sufficient to classify its employees as holders of an office of profit *under the Government*. The Court reasoned that to apply the broader disqualification standard of Article 58(2) to an MP election under Article 102(1)(a) would be to “obliterate the specific differentiation” intentionally made in the Constitution. The object of Article 102(1)(a) is to prevent a conflict of interest and ensure that an MP can perform their duties without being under government pressure. This objective, the Court held, was not compromised simply because the employee worked for a local authority that was subject to some governmental supervision.
Navigating the nuances of such landmark rulings can be time-consuming. This is where services like CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs become invaluable for legal professionals, offering a quick yet comprehensive understanding of specific rulings like this one.
The Court also distinguished this case from others like Biharilal Dobray v. Roshan Lal Dobray, where an employee of the U.P. Board of Basic Education was held to be disqualified. In that case, the degree of government control over the Board was found to be so pervasive and deep that the Board was not truly independent, making its employees de facto holders of an office under the government. In contrast, the Agartala Municipality retained its character as a separate local authority.
The Supreme Court concluded that Mr. Ajoy Biswas did not hold an office of profit under the Government of Tripura. His employment was with the Agartala Municipality, a local authority, which is a separate and distinct entity from the State Government. The control exercised by the government was supervisory in nature and did not transform his position into one 'under the Government'. Consequently, he was not disqualified under Article 102(1)(a) of the Constitution. The appeal was dismissed, and the High Court's judgment was upheld.
The case involved an election petition challenging the victory of Ajoy Biswas in the 1980 Lok Sabha election on the grounds that his employment as an Accountant-in-charge of the Agartala Municipality constituted an 'office of profit under the government'. The Supreme Court held that despite government supervision over the municipality, the institution remained a distinct local authority. Citing the difference in language between Article 102(1)(a) (for MPs) and Article 58(2) (for President), the Court ruled that an employee of a local authority does not hold an office 'under the Government' and is therefore not disqualified from being a Member of Parliament.
For Lawyers: This judgment is a cornerstone of election law in India. It provides a clear framework for distinguishing between government bodies and autonomous local authorities. It is essential reading for any lawyer handling election petitions or cases involving the interpretation of administrative control and service law.
For Law Students: The case is an excellent lesson in constitutional interpretation. It masterfully demonstrates the importance of comparing and contrasting different articles of the Constitution to understand the framers' intent. It also illustrates how the analysis of a specific statute (the Municipal Act) can be pivotal in deciding a major constitutional question, reinforcing the interplay between constitutional and administrative law.
The information provided in this article is for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice. For specific legal issues, please consult with a qualified legal professional.
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