No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
h475
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Reserved on: 29.02.2024
Pronounced on: 07.03.2024
SWP No.1396/2003
Ashok Kumar S/o Sh. Gian Chand
R/o Nehalpur Simble Tehsil R.S.Pura,
Jammu, Age 35 years ...Petitioner(s)
Through:- Mr. Ajay Abrol, Advocate with
M/s Ayush Gupta & Manik Bhardwaj
Advocates
V/s
1. Union of India through Secretary to Govt.,
Industries Department, New Delhi.
2. Secretary to Govt. of India, Labour Departrment,
New Delhi.
3. Director, Small Industries Service Institute, 36-B/C,
Gandhi Nagar, Jammu.
4. Dy. Director, Small Industries Service Institute,
36-B/C, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu.
5. Central Government Industrtial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
Chandigarh.
...Respondent(s)
Through:- Mr. Vishal Sharma, DSGI
Coram: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR , JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. The petitioner is aggrieved and has called in question an
award dated 30
th
June, 2003 passed by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour 2023:JKLHC-JMU:2783
2 SWP No.1396/2003
Court, Chandigarh [“the Tribunal”], whereby the Tribunal has turned down
and returned the reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the
Central Government as “not maintainable”.
2. Briefly stated, the facts leading to the filing of this petition by
the petitioner invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction vested in this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are that, on an industrial
dispute having been raised by the petitioner with the management of Small
Industries Service Institute, the Central Government vide No.L-
42012/132/93-1R(DV) dated 29.11.1994 referred the dispute to the
Tribunal for adjudication in the following term:-
“whether the action of the management of Small Industries
Service Institute, Jammu in terminating the services of Shri
Ashok Kumar is legal and justified? If not, to what relief the
workman is entitled to?”
3. The claim of the petitioner claiming to be a workman with the
respondent-Institute, as was laid before the Tribunal, was that he was
working as peon on daily wage basis with the respondent-Institute for the
last about seven years and his services were terminated on 12.02.1993
arbitrarily and without passing any order. He was neither paid any
retrenchment compensation nor was any prior notice of termination given
to him. A UDC of the respondent-Institute, who had no authority or
competence, terminated his services. The claim of the petitioner was
refuted by the respondent-Institute, which, apart from meeting the case of 2023:JKLHC-JMU:2783
3 SWP No.1396/2003
the petitioner on merits, also took a preliminary objection with regard to
the maintainability of the reference. It was claimed that the respondent-
Institute was not an „industry‟, as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act
and, therefore, not amenable to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. It was pleaded that the respondent-Institute provides only
consultancy services to prospective units and also assists the State
Government in implementing Central Government Policies. It also
provides technical guidance to the entrepreneurs proposing to set up their
industries. On merits, it was submitted that the engagement of the
petitioner was on daily wage basis and without availability of Class-IV
post in the respondent-Institute in Jammu. It was submitted that a request
was made to the Central Government to sanction three posts of Class-IV to
respondent-Institute at Jammu but the request was declined by the
headquarter and, therefore, the respondent-Institute was left with no option
but to terminate the arrangement under which the petitioner was appointed.
4. The matter was considered by the Tribunal. Relying upon
definition of the „industry‟ given in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [“the
Act”] and the judgments referred to by the management of the respondent-
Institute, the Tribunal concluded that the respondent-Institute performing
consultancy services was not covered under the definition of „industry‟
and, therefore was not amenable to the provisions of the Act. It is in this
background, the reference was turned down and returned to the appropriate
government by the Tribunal vide its award dated 08.04.2003, which is
impugned in this petition. 2023:JKLHC-JMU:2783
4 SWP No.1396/2003
5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material on record, the following question seeks determination in this
petition:-
“whether the Small Industries Service Institute, Jammu
qualifies to be an „industry‟ under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 and, therefore, amenable to the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
6. The core question to be determined in this petition is the
nature of activities, which the respondent-Institute performs and whether
such activities bring the respondent-Institute within the purview of the
term “industry” used under the Act.
7. The issue as to what makes an organization, society or
authority an industry within the meaning of the term given in the Act was
subject matter of considerable debate and discussion in Banglore Water
Supply and Sewerage Board v. R.Rajappa and others, (1978) 2 SCC
213. The definition of industry given by the Supreme Court in D.N.
Banerji v. P.R.Mukherjee and others, AIR 1953 SC 58 was adopted
with approval by the majority opinion in the Banglore Water Supply’s
case (supra) and the triple test as enunciated in Banerjee’s case to find out
as to whether a particular organization is „industry‟ as defined in Section
2(j) of the Act was accepted i.e.;
(a) an organization where a systematic activity is carried out; 2023:JKLHC-JMU:2783
5 SWP No.1396/2003
(b) the activity is organized by cooperation between employer
and employee (the direct and substantial element is
chimerical); and
(c) the activity is for production and /or distribution of goods and
services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not
spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things or
services geared to celestial bliss i.e. making on a large scale
Prasad or food).
However, following were held irrelevant consideration:-
(A) Whether or not there is profit motive or gainful objective or
investment of capital in an industry.
(B) A private individual shall be employer of the industry. This
Act equally applies when the Government or the local
authority is the employer. The nature could be public, joint or
otherwise, the true focus is functional and the decisive test is
nature of activity with special emphasis on the employer and
employee relation.
8. The Supreme Court also enunciated “Dominant Nature Test”, which
is a test where there is complex of activities, the test would be predominant
nature of services and integrated nature of departments. All departments
integrated with industry will also be industry. Following are the exeptions
carved out to the „industry‟:-
i) Casual activities (because they are not systematic);
ii) Small clubs, co-operatives, research labs, gurukuls which
have essentially non-employee character; 2023:JKLHC-JMU:2783
6 SWP No.1396/2003
iii) Single door lawyer taking help from clerk (because there is no
organized labour) as contradiction to Solicitors Firm having
employed served people each one contributing directly or
indirectly to outcomes.
iv) Selfless charitable activities carried though volunteers e.g.
free legal or medical service;
v) Sovereign functions-strictly understood are maintenance of
law and order, legislative and judicial functions.
9. The discussion made in the Seven Judge Bench judgment in
Banglore Water Supply’s case (supra) in paras 140 to 144 highlights the
legal position churned out after considerable debate and discussion. The
majority did not find favour with the law laid down in Management of
Safdarjung Hospitals v. Kuldip Singh Sethi, (1970) 1 SCC 735 and
University of Delhi v. Ram Nath, AIR 1963 SC 1873 and reinstated the
view taken by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay
v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610. This majority view is
still the law on the point, though there was suggestion made in the
judgment itself to the Union Government to come up with legislation to
clear the confusion created by the loosely and inadequately worded
definition of the term „industry‟ made in Section 2(j) of the Act. The
amendment was enacted but the same was not enforced by the Government
of India for the reasons best known to it.
10. At one point of time there was also an attempt made by a two Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court to seek reconsideration of the Banglore 2023:JKLHC-JMU:2783
7 SWP No.1396/2003
Water Supply case’s judgment but the same was declined by a three
Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Coir Board Ernakulam
Kerala State and another v. Indira Devi P.S. and others, (2000) 1 SCC
224. It is in the light of this judgment and the principles laid down therein,
the issue raised before this Court in the instant petition is required to be
examined.
11. From the material on record, it is seen that in the reply
affidavit/objections filed by the respondent-Institute before the Tribunal it
has been pleaded that the main functions of the respondent-Institute are as
under:-
a) to provide consultancy to the prospective entrepreneurs in
establishing their industrial units in the State of J&K;
b) to assist the State Government in implementing the Central
Government Policies; and
c) to provide technical guidance to the entrepreneurs for starting their
ventures.
12. The Branch office of Small Industries Service Institute headed by its
Director is functioning at Jammu since 1967. This position explained by
the respondent-Institute before the Tribunal has not been rebutted. From a
reading of the objects and functions of the Institute, it is clearly discernible
that the respondent-Institute is predominantly involved in providing of
consultancy services to the entrepreneurs for starting their business 2023:JKLHC-JMU:2783
8 SWP No.1396/2003
ventures or to the State Government for implementing the Central
Government policies. The activities, which are carried out by the
respondent-Institute are obviously carried through the experts in the field,
who are capable of providing technical guidance and consultancy in the
matter of starting industrial ventures by the entrepreneurs in the State. It
has also a duty to provide assistance to the State Government in
implementing the Central Government policies. The aforesaid activities
cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be such activities as are
required to be performed by the experts involving the cooperation of
persons performing menial jobs in the office. The duties of the
organization are performed predominantly by the experts and the
consultants and in the performance of their duties they are not directly or
indirectly assisted by the workmen like the petitioner.
13. The petitioner was admittedly engaged as Class-IV on daily wage
basis and was, thus, providing services in the office. Undoubtedly, the
activity carried out by the respondent-organization/Institute is a systematic
activity providing services calculated to satisfy the human wants but the
question is whether this systematic activity is organized by cooperation
between the employer and the employee. The answer to this question, in
my humble opinion, is not in the affirmative. The cooperation between the
employer and the employee must have direct or indirect nexus with the
performance of duties and rendering of services by the Institute so as to
qualify the Institute to be an „industry‟ within the meaning of Section 2(j)
of the Act. 2023:JKLHC-JMU:2783
9 SWP No.1396/2003
14. Not only the predominant object but also the only object of the
respondent-Institute is to provide services in the form of consultancy to the
State Government in implementation of the Central Government policies
and to the entrepreneurs in establishing their ventures. The duties
performed by a person in the office as Class-IV do not directly or even
remotely contribute towards the performance of duties of consultancy and
the experts providing the intended services to the beneficiaries. The nexus,
direct or indirect between the services provided by an employee and the
services rendered by the Institute is sine qua non to bring an organization
within the scope of the term „industry‟ as defined in Section 2(j) of the
Act.
15. For the reasons given above, I find no legal infirmity in the award
passed by the Tribunal. The petition is, without merit and, therefore,
dismissed. The petitioner shall, however, be free to avail of any other
remedy/remedies available to him under law.
(Sanjeev Kumar)
Judge
JAMMU
07.03.2024
Vinod, PS Whether the order is speaking : Yes
Whether the order is reportable: Yes 2023:JKLHC-JMU:2783
Legal Notes
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