IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No. 153 of 2025

Reserved on: 17.12.2025

Date of Decision: 1.1.2026

Ashutosh Gupta ...Petitioner

Versus

State of H.P. & others ...Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the Petitioner :Mr. Ashok Kumar Tyagi,

Advocate.

For respondents No. 1 to 3:Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy

Advocate General.

For respondents No. 4 & 5 :Mr. Bimal Gupta, Senior

Advocate, with Ms. Simran,

Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

quashing of FIR No. 102/2024, dated 30.6.2024, registered at

Police Station Puruwala, District Sirmour, HP, for the

commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 447 and

506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that respondent No.5/informant Keshav Sharma

made a complaint to the police that he was posted as a Manager

in Himalayan International Food Company, Shubhkhera, Paonta

Sahib. Manmohan Malik, the owner of the factory, owns the

house and land in Khasra No.206/155/63, Mauja Ambwala

Singpura. A civil suit was pending before the High Court. The

High Court directed Manmohan Malik to vacate five rooms and

the kitchen in CWP No. 7719/2021 and CMP No. 8402 of 2024.

Manmohan Malik handed over the possession of 05 rooms and

the kitchen to Ashutosh Gupta (the present petitioner),

designated partner of Manverse Pharma. The Court directed

Manmohan Malik to vacate the building on or before 23.6.2024.

He complied with the orders of the Court and removed his

articles. He deputed Deep Chand and Sant Kumar to look after

the property. Ashutosh Gupta and Man Singh threatened the

workers on 30.6.2024 at 5.30 PM and threw them out of the

premises in possession of Manmohan Malik. The locks were put

on the main gate and the boundary wall to oust Manmohan

Malik. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter.

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3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and the

investigation, the petitioner has filed the present petition

asserting that Manmohan Malik was Director of APJ

Laboratories, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P., which had

availed a loan from Punjab National Bank (PNB). The loan was

subsequently transferred to HP State Cooperative Bank. The

company failed to repay the loan, and proceedings under the

SARFAESI Act were initiated. The bank took over the possession

of the company’s property comprised in Khata/Khatauni No.

68/89, Khasra No.205/155/63, 166/84, 164/84, 149/86, 167/151,

Kita-6, measuring 27-17 bigha, situated in Mauza Ambwala

Singhapura, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P.

Manmohan Malik filed a writ petition before this Court, which

was registered as CWP No. 7719 of 2021, titled M/s APJ

Laboratories Vs. HP State Cooperative Bank. The Court ordered

the auction of the property, but no bidder participated. The

Court permitted the Cooperative Bank to sell the property by

private negotiation. The petitioner filed an application before

this Court, which was registered as CMP No. 3179 of 2024. The

petitioner’s company purchased the property from HP State

Cooperative Bank in a private negotiation for ₹12.52 crores. The

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Court issued a direction to Manmohan Malik to hand over the

possession of the property to the petitioner. Manmohan Malik

hindered the delivery of the possession and ultimately delivered

the possession pursuant to the order passed by the Court. The

Court granted time to Manmohan Malik to remove his

belongings from the portion of the house which was purchased

by the petitioner. Manmohan Malik removed the fixtures from

the building, and the matter was reported to the police. When

Manmohan Malik came to know about this fact, he lodged a

false complaint against the petitioner. He has also filed a civil

suit, but could not get any interim order from the Court. He

approached the Court by filing CMP No. 11391 of 2024, but this

application was dismissed by the Court. He filed another Civil

Writ Petition, which was registered as CWP No. 13328 of 2024

and was dismissed as not being maintainable. The petitioner

never claimed any right over Khasra No. 206/155/63 leased to

Manmohan Malik by the informant. The FIR was registered to

pressurise the petitioner to surrender his claim. The matter is

civil in nature and is being given a criminal colour. The

ingredients of the commission of offences punishable under

Sections 451, 457 and 506 of the IPC are not satisfied. The Civil

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Court is seized of the matter and is to decide the rights of the

parties. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an

abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that

the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential

proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed.

4. The petition is opposed by respondents No.1 to 3 by

filing a reply making preliminary submissions regarding the

lack of maintainability and cause of action. It was asserted that

the police got the disputed land demarcated through the

revenue agency. Tehsildar issued a report stating that Keshav

Dutt is the owner-in-possession of Khasra No. 206/155/63,

measuring 1-03-00 bigha, which was leased out to Manmohan

Malik. A big and small gate abutted the path constructed upon

Khasra No.206/155/63. A residential house was constructed on

the spot, a portion of which falls in the land owned by Keshav

Dutt. The main door constructed on Khasra No. 206/155/63 was

found locked from the inside. Five rooms were constructed upon

Khasra No.205/155/63, which is in possession of the petitioner.

The dispute between the parties is civil, but the complaint

discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Therefore, it

was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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5. A separate reply was filed by respondents No. 4 and 5

taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability

and the petitioner having no right, title or interest over Khasra

No. 206/155/63 owned by respondent No.5 and leased to

respondent No.4. It was asserted that the petitioner took

forcible possession of the building constructed on Khasra No.

206/155/63 in possession of respondent No.5 Manmohan Malik.

The petitioner locked the main door of the gate of the boundary

wall with the clear intention of getting a share of the residence.

The dispute is criminal, and mere pendency of the civil suit will

not make it civil. The petitioner twisted the facts to suit his

version. Respondent No. 4 has a right over the building

constructed over Khasra No.206/155/63. Abhay Malik, who was

a partner of the petitioner, sent a message to Mr B.K. Sharma,

which was forwarded to the respondents. This message shows

the manner in which the possession was taken. The petitioner

trespassed into the building in possession of respondent Nos.4

and 5. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be

dismissed.

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6. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply filed by

respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and affirming those of the petition was

filed.

7. I have heard Mr Ashok Kumar Tyagi, learned counsel

for the petitioner/accused, Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy

Advocate General for respondents no.1 to 3/State and Mr Bimal

Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms Simran, learned

counsel for respondents No.4 and 5.

8. Mr Ashok Kumar Tyagi, learned counsel for the

petitioner, submitted that the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. A civil

dispute is being converted into a criminal case, which is

impermissible. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be

allowed and the FIR are consequential proceedings arising out

of it be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Ankush Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025

SCC OnLine SC 2060 and Ganesh Dutt and another Vs. State of HP

and others 2025 HHC 10439 in support of his submission.

9. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General,

for respondents No.1 to 3/State submitted that the allegations in

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the FIR, prima facie, show the commission of a cognizable

offence. Mere pendency of the civil dispute is not sufficient to

quash the FIR. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be

dismissed.

10. Mr Bimal Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for

respondents No.4 and 5, adopted the submission of Mr Prashant

Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General and submitted that the

door was locked from inside, which shows the trespass. The

petitioner has nothing to do with the building in possession of

respondents No.4 and 5, and he had locked the gate to deprive

respondents No.4 and 5 of the use of the property. The learned

Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not

exercise its inherent jurisdiction in the present matter. Hence,

he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

12. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was

explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of

U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned,

it is now more or less well settled as regards the

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principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one

may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana

v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this

Court has summarised some of the principles under

which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed

in the following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the

various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter

XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this

Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of

the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which

we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the

following categories of cases by way of illustration

wherein such power could be exercised either to

prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise

to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be

possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and

sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or

rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad

kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if they

are taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence

or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first

information report and other materials, if any,

accompanying the FIR do not disclose a

cognizable offence, justifying an investigation

by police officers under Section 156(1) of the

Code except under an order of a Magistrate

within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made

in the FIR or complaint and the evidence

collected in support of the same do not disclose

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the commission of any offence and make out a

case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only

a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is

permitted by a police officer without an order of a

Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)

of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or

complaint are so absurd and inherently

improbable on the basis of which no prudent

person can ever reach a just conclusion that

there is sufficient ground for proceeding against

the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in

any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned

Act (under which a criminal proceeding is

instituted) to the institution and continuance of the

proceedings, and/or where there is a specific

provision in the Code or the concerned Act,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of

the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fide and/or where the

proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

accused and with a view to spite him due to a

private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)

would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the

allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute

any offence or make out a case against the accused, then

the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a

non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by

a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate

as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in

such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an

express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the

CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal

proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be

quashed.”

13. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising

its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,

may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes

or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers

are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory

provision. However, given the broad and profound nature

of this authority, the High Court must exercise it

sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are

embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing

the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of

process or where intervention is essential to uphold the

ends of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of

several decades, has laid down the principles and

guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing

criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-

empting the Prosecution from building its case before the

Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,

contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal

complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR

represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima

facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in

nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus

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allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and

compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v.

Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).

14. This position was reiterated in Rajendra Bihari Lal v.

State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:

“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear

that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of

any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the

ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only

empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise

its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any

new power on the High Court but rather saves the power

which the High Court already possesses, from before the

enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very

existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate

for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if

the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of

it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of

the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”

15. The present petition is to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

16. The police registered the FIR for the commission of

the offence punishable under Sections 451, 447 and 506 of the

IPC. Section 506 of the IPC punishes a person for criminal

intimidation, which is defined in Section 503 of the IPC as

under: -

503. Criminal intimidation

Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person,

reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of

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anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to

cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do

any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to

do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as

the means of avoiding the execution of such threat,

commits criminal intimidation.

Explanation- A threat to injure the reputation of any

deceased person in whom the person threatened is

interested is within this section.

17. Section 503 requires that the threat of injury should

have been made with an intent to cause alarm to a person, to do

an act, which a person is not legally bound to do or omit to do

any act which he is legally entitled to do. It was laid down by this

Court in Inder Pratap Singh Versus State of Himachal Pradesh 2003

(1) Crimes 345 (HC) that the complainant should have been

alarmed by the threat advanced by the accused to attract section

506 of IPC. It was observed:

“21. Similarly, before an offence of criminal intimidation

can be made out, it must be established prima facie that

the accused persons (like petitioners in the present case)

intended to cause an alarm to the complainant party, i. e.,

Jasbeer Singh. Mere threats, as alleged by him, extended

by the petitioners, with a view to deter the complainant

from interfering with what the petitioner believed to be

his exclusive property, would not constitute an offence of

criminal intimidation.”

18. Similar is the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Vikram Johar v. State of U.P., (2019) 14 SCC 207: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri)

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795: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609 wherein it was held at page 209: -

“25. Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is an

offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down

by Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC

44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715 have also to be applied when the

question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of

the offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is

that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving

an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the

ingredients that have to be proved by the prosecution?

Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn., with

regard to proof of offence, states the following:

“… The prosecution must prove:

(i) That the accused threatened some person.

(ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his

person, reputation or property; or to the person,

reputation or property of someone in whom he was

interested;

(iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that

person; or to cause that person to do any act which he

was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act

which he was legally entitled to do as a means of

avoiding the execution of such threat.” (emphasis

supplied)

A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does

not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.

19. In the present case, the FIR does not mention that

any alarm was caused in the mind of any person or that any

person was compelled to do something which he would not have

done but for the intimidation. Therefore, the essential

requirements of Section 506 of IPC are not satisfied in the

present case.

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20. Section 441 of the IPC defines criminal trespass as an

entry upon the property in possession of another with intent to

commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person

in possession of such property. It was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Mathri v. State of Punjab, 1963 SCC OnLine SC

180: AIR 1964 SC 986 that the prosecution has to prove that the

aim of the accused was to insult, intimidate or annoy and

merely because the entry caused the insult, intimidation, or

annoyance is not sufficient. It was observed:

18. We think, with respect, that this statement of law, as

also the similar statements in Laxaman Raghunath case

[26 Bombay 558] and in Sellamuthu Servaigaran case [ILR

35 Mad 186], is not quite accurate. The correct position in

law may, in our opinion, be stated thus: In order to

establish that the entry on the property was with the

intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for

the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance,

intimidation or insult was the aim of the entry; that it is

not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the

natural consequence of the entry was likely to be

annoyance, intimidation or insult, and that this likely

consequence was known to the persons entering; that in

deciding whether the aim of the entry was the causing of

such annoyance, intimidation or insult, the Court has to

consider all the relevant circumstances including the

presence of knowledge that its natural consequences

would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and

including also the probability of something else than the

causing of such intimidation, insult or annoyance, being

the dominant intention which prompted the entry.

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21. This position was reiterated in Rajinder v. State of

Haryana, (1995) 5 SCC 187: 1995 SCC (Cri) 852, wherein it was

observed at page 198:

“21. It is evident from the above provision that

unauthorised entry into or upon property in the

possession of another or unlawfully remaining there

after lawful entry can answer the definition of criminal

trespass if, and only if, such entry or unlawful remaining

is with the intent to commit an offence or to intimidate,

insult or annoy the person in possession of the property.

In other words, unless any of the intentions referred to in

Section 441 is proved, no offence of criminal trespass can

be said to have been committed. Needless to say, such an

intention has to be gathered from the facts and

circumstances of a given case…”

22. In the present case, the FIR does not mention that

the informant had trespassed into the property of respondents

No. 4 and 5 with an intent to commit an offence or to intimidate,

insult or annoy any person in possession of the property. The

FIR is regarding the dispossession of respondents No. 4 and 5

from the property, and does not satisfy the definition of

trespass.

23. It was submitted that the lock was put from inside,

which shows that the petitioner had trespassed into the

property owned and possessed by respondents No.4 and 5. This

submission will not help the respondents. Even if there was an

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entry, the intent mentioned in Section 441 is not specified in the

FIR and putting locks from inside will not make it a criminal

trespass.

24. The record shows that APJ laboratory was a defaulter.

The action was taken against it under the SARFAESI Act.

Respondent No.4, Manmohan Malik, was directed to hand over

the possession in Civil Writ Petition No. 7719 of 2021 vide order

dated 31.5.2024. However, the possession was not delivered, and

the Court passed an order on 11.6.2024 directing Manmohan

Malik and Sangeeta Malik to personally appear before the Court

in case of failure to deliver the possession of the 5

th

room. The

possession of the 5

th

room was delivered after this order, and

this fact was noticed by the Court in its order dated 13.6.2024.

Subsequently, Manmohan Malik filed CMP No. 11391 of 2024

stating that the house was built on Khasra No.205/155/63

inadvertently, as it was located adjacent to Khasra

No.206/155/63. The electricity connection was in the name of

Manmohan Malik. The purchaser (present petitioner) had

threatened Manmohan Malik that the latter would not be

permitted to use the part of the land/house, the entrance and

the area in his possession. This fact was brought to the notice of

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the police, but no action was taken. A civil suit was filed before

the Court of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Paonta Sahib. The

purchaser (present petitioner) and his officials locked the doors

and the main entrance gate of the building, which was not part

of the land mortgaged to H.P. State Cooperative Bank. An FIR

was registered regarding this incident. Hence, a prayer was

made to clarify the order dated 31.5.2024 and 13.6.2024 to the

extent that the purchaser was only entitled to the possession of

the mortgaged property and not the property leased to

Manmohan Malik.

25. This record shows that Manmohan Malik had

complained about the petitioner’s act before this Court, but the

Court declined to look into the matter. This is also the subject

matter of the civil suit. Thus, the petitioner’s acts were the

subject matter of the application filed before this Court, the civil

suit and the FIR. The police also concluded that, as per the

demarcation, some portion was found in possession of

Manmohan Malik, existing on Khasra No.206/155/63, with

which the petitioner has no concern. Therefore, it is apparent

that FIR. is in essence for the enforcement of the rights claimed

in the civil suit and the application filed before this Court.

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26. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Anukul Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060, that

criminal proceedings cannot be used for enforcing civil rights. It

was observed: -

17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated

the tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal

proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.

(2006) 6 SCC 736, it was held that criminal law cannot be

used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or

contractual matters, and that such misuse amounts to

abuse of process. The following paragraphs from the

decision are apposite:

“9. The principles relevant to our purpose are:

(i) A complaint can be quashed where the

allegations made in the complaint, even if

they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out the case

alleged against the accused. For this purpose,

the complaint has to be examined as a whole,

but without examining the merits of the

allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a

meticulous analysis of the material nor an

assessment of the reliability or genuineness

of the allegations in the complaint is

warranted while examining a prayer for

quashing of a complaint.

(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it

is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as

when the criminal proceeding is found to

have been initiated with malafides/malice for

wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or

where the allegations are absurd and

inherently improbable.

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(iii) The power to quash shall not, however,

be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate

prosecution. The power should be used

sparingly and with abundant caution.

(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim

reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence

alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is

laid in the complaint, merely on the ground

that a few ingredients have not been stated in

detail, the proceedings should not be

quashed. Quashing of the complaint is

warranted only where the complaint is so

bereft of even the basic facts that are

absolutely necessary for making out the

offence.

(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a)

purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal

offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal

offence. A commercial transaction or a

contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a

cause of action for seeking a remedy in civil

law, may also involve a criminal offence. As

the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are

different from a criminal proceeding, the

mere fact that the complaint relates to a

commercial transaction or breach of

contract, for which a civil remedy is available

or has been availed, is not by itself a ground

to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is

whether the allegations in the complaint

disclose a criminal offence or not.

10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice

of a growing tendency in business circles to convert

purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is

obviously on account of a prevalent impression that

civil law remedies are time-consuming and do not

adequately protect the interests of

lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in

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several family disputes, also leading to an

irretrievable breakdown of marriages/families.

There is also an impression that if a person could

somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution,

there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any

effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do

not involve any criminal offence, by applying

pressure through criminal prosecution should be

deprecated and discouraged.”

18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of

Uttaranchal (2007) 12 SCC 1: AIR 2008 SC 251 , it was

emphasised that criminal prosecution must not be

permitted as an instrument of harassment or private

vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam (2015) 9

SCC 647, this Court again reiterated that criminal

complaints in respect of property disputes of a civil

nature, filed solely to harass the accused or to exert

pressure in civil litigation, constitute an abuse of process.

19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R.

Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2025 INSC 869, this Court

disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as

a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money

recovery cannot be enforced through criminal

prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The

Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in

such matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan

Lal. The following paragraphs are relevant in this

context:

“9. What we have been able to understand is that

there is an oral agreement between the parties. The

Respondent No. 4 might have parted with some

money in accordance with the oral agreement, and

it may be that the appellant, herein, owes a

particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No.

4. However, the question is whether, prima facie,

any offence of cheating could be said to have been

committed by the appellant.

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10. How many times are the High Courts to be

reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating,

there has to be something more than prima facie on

record to indicate that the intention of the accused

was to cheat the complainant right from the

inception. The plain reading of the FIR does not

disclose any element of criminality.

11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent

pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi

Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh”,

(2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire

law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal

breach of trust, respectively, has been exhaustively

explained. It appears that this very decision was

relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for

the petitioner before the High Court. However,

instead of looking into the matter on its own

merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the

petitioner to go for mediation and that too by

making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4

th

respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to

understand why the High Court should undertake

such an exercise. The High Court may either allow

the petition, saying that no offence is disclosed or

may reject the petition, saying that no case for

quashing is made out. Why should the High Court

attempt to help the complainant to recover the

amount due and payable by the accused? It is for

the Civil Court or Commercial Court, as the case

may be, to look into a suit that may be filed for

recovery of money or in any other proceedings, be

it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the

provisions of the IB Code, 2016.

12. Why the High Court was not able to understand

that the entire dispute between the parties is of a

civil nature.

13. We also enquired with the learned counsel

appearing for the Respondent No. 4 whether his

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client has filed any civil suit or has initiated any

other proceedings for recovery of the money. It

appears that no civil suit has been filed for the

recovery of money to date. Money cannot be

recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute

between the parties by filing a First Information

Report and seeking the help of the Police. This

amounts to abuse of the process of law.

14. We could have said many things, but we refrain

from observing anything further. If the Respondent

No. 4 has to recover a particular amount, he may

file a civil suit or seek any other appropriate

remedy available to him in law. He cannot be

permitted to take recourse to criminal proceedings.

15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which

the High Court has passed the impugned order. The

High Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs.

25,00,000/- to the Respondent No. 4 and thereafter

directed him to appear before the Mediation and

Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement.

That's not what is expected of a High Court to do in

a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed

under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code,

1973, for quashing of FIR or any other criminal

proceedings. What is expected of the High Court is

to look into the averments and the allegations

levelled in the FIR, along with the other material on

record, if any. The High Court seems to have

forgotten the well-settled principles as enunciated

in the decision of this Court in the “State of Haryana

v. Bhajan Lal”, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.

27. In the present case, an attempt is being made to

convert the civil dispute into a criminal dispute by claiming that

the door was locked from inside, which prima facie does not

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constitute the offence of trespass. Therefore, the continuation

of the criminal proceedings is impermissible

28. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Kapil Agarwal vs.

Sanjay Sharma, (2021) 5 SCC 524: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 154 that

criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to become a weapon

of harassment. It was observed:

“18.1. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of

decisions, inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC

and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution is designed to

achieve a salutary purpose that criminal proceedings ought

not to be permitted to degenerate into weapons of

harassment. When the Court is satisfied that criminal

proceedings amount to an abuse of process of law or that it

amounts to bringing pressure upon the accused, in the

exercise of inherent powers, such proceedings can be

quashed.”

29. No other point was urged.

30. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,

and the FIR No. 102/2024, dated 30.6.2024, registered at Police

Station Puruwala, District Sirmour, HP, for the commission of

offences punishable under Sections 451, 447 and 506 of the

Indian Penal Code and the consequential proceedings arising

out of it are ordered to be quashed.

31. Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so

also pending applications, if any.

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32. Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this

judgment, downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of

Himachal Pradesh, before the authorities concerned, and the

said authorities shall not insist on the production of a certified

copy, but if required, may verify passing of the order from the

Website of the High Court.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

1

st

January, 2026

(Chander)