As per case facts, the Petitioner, a Senior TNC/NH, was charged in 1994 for violating Railway Service Conduct Rules due to alleged fraudulent acts causing loss. An internal inquiry found ...
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present :-
The Hon’ble The Chief Justice SUJOY PAUL
&
The Hon’bleJusticePARTHA SARATHI SEN
WP.CT 75 OF 2010
ASIM KUMAR PAUL
-Vs-
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
For the Petitioners: Mr. Debottam Das, Adv.,
Mr. Tirupati Mukherjee, Adv.
For the Union of India: Ms. Amrita Pandey, Adv.,
Mr. Ghanshyam Pandey, Adv.
Hearing concluded on: 13.05.2026
Judgment on: 19 .05.2026
PARTHA SARATHI SEN, J. : –
1. In this writ petition as filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India
the order dated 24.07.2009 passed in OA no. 763 of 2004 by the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata Bench (Tribunal in short) is assailed. While
passing the impugned order the said Tribunal upheld the enhanced
punishment of the original applicant as imposed by the appellate authority that
is “removal from service” which has been affirmed by the revisional authority.
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2. For effective adjudication of the instant writ petition, the facts leading to
filing of the said OA are required to be dealt in a nutshell. In the year 1994 the
writ petitioner was posted as Senior TNC/NH and on 06.06.1994 he was served
with a memorandum containing article of charge for alleged contravention of
Rule 3(1)(i), (ii) and (iii) of Railway Service Conduct Rules, 1966 (‘Rules’ in
short) together with a statement of imputation of charge containing alleged
fraudulent act with an intention to defraud the railway administration.
3. On the basis of the aforementioned charge and statement of imputation of
charge, an in-house enquiry was held wherein the enquiry officer found that
the charge as framed against the writ petitioner/ original applicant has been
duly proved. The disciplinary authority after considering such enquiry report
vis-à-vis the representation of the delinquent imposed a punishment of 01(one)
grade below in the time scale for 02(two) years with cumulative effect which
would operate to postpone future increments on the expiry of the punishment
upon the writ petitioner.
4. Feeling aggrieved, the writ petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate
authority. Upon presentation of the said appeal the appellate authority found
that the punishment as imposed by the disciplinary authority is inadequate
and thus, under cover of a memo dated 15.07.2003 the appellate authority
asked the delinquent that is the writ petitioner/ original applicant to show
cause as to why the punishment would not be enhanced to “removal from
service”. The writ petitioner/ original applicant replied to such show cause. The
appellate authority was not satisfied with the cause shown by the writ
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petitioner under cover of his reply dated 06.08.2003 and accordingly, the
punishment of the writ petitioner/ original applicant was enhanced to “removal
from service”. The writ petitioner/ original applicant unsuccessfully challenged
the order of the appellate authority before the revisional authority as well as
before the said Tribunal.
5. In course of argument Mr. Das, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of
the writ petitioner/ original applicant at the very outset took us to the charge
as framed against the delinquent as well as the statement of imputation of
charge. It is submitted that on careful perusal of the article of charge together
with statement of imputation of charge it would reveal that the respondent
authorities in the said enquiry proceeding as initiated against the writ
petitioner/ original applicant proceeded on the basis that on account of alleged
mala fide and fraudulent act of the writ petitioner/ original applicant in
discharging his duty, fraudulent delivery of the consignment at Siwan to a
person took place who is not the consignee of the said consignment causing
huge loss to the railway administration. At this juncture, learned Advocate
appearing for the writ petitioner/ original applicant draws our attention to the
supplementary affidavit as affirmed on 20.08.2024. It is submitted that from
Annexure-‘A’ of the said supplementary affidavit being a copy of the judgment
dated 25.06.2019 as passed in Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 2007 by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge- V, Saran at Chapra, it would reveal that while
acquitting the writ petitioner/ original applicant from the charges under
Section 420/408/468/471/120B IPC the said appellate Court came to a
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finding upon appreciation of evidence of the PWs and DWs that the charges as
framed against the writ petitioner/ original applicant in the criminal trial were
not proved.
6. It is further submitted by the learned Advocate for the writ petitioner/
original applicant that on careful perusal of the charges as framed against the
writ petitioner/ original applicant in the criminal trial it would reveal that the
charges as framed against the writ petitioner were of cheating, criminal breach
of trust, forgery etc. together with the charge of criminal conspiracy on account
of alleged fraudulent act of the delinquent. Placing reliance upon the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of MaharanaPratap Singh vs.
State of Bihar reported in 2025 INSC 554:2025 SCC OnLine SC 890 it is
submitted that since the charges, evidences, witnesses and circumstances in
the departmental enquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or
substantially similar, the findings of the enquiry authority, disciplinary
authority, the revisional authority and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal
on account of acquittal of the writ petitioner/ original applicant in the criminal
trial may be set asideand thus, appropriate relief/ reliefs may be granted to the
writ petitioner as prayed for in this writ petition.
7. Per contra, Ms. Pandey, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the
respondent/ Union of India and its instrumentalities submits before this Court
that there cannot be any occasion to disturb the finding of the appellate
authority as well as the revisional authority vis-à-vis the impugned order of the
Tribunal in view of the fact that the writ petitioner was acquitted from the
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criminal trial. It is further submitted that the two proceedings that is; the
criminal trial and domestic enquiry are distinct from each other and the degree
of proof in a domestic proceeding is different from that of a criminal trial since
in the former, the enquiry officer weighs the evidence based on preponderance
of probabilities while in criminal trial the same is beyond reasonable doubt. It
is further submitted that in course of the said domestic enquiry as well as
before the appellate authority and the revisional authority principle of natural
justice has been duly followed. It is further submitted that in absence of any
material irregularity in such proceedings and/or for consideration of any
extraneous materials which are relevant there cannot be any justification to
allow the instant writ petition by granting reliefs to the writ petitioner. In
support of her contention, Ms. Pandey placed her reliance upon the judgment
as passed in Airports Authority of India vs. Pradip Kumar Banerjee
reported in (2025) 4 SCC 111.
8. We have meticulously perused the entire materials as placed before us. We
have given our due consideration over the submissions of the learned
Advocates for the contending parties. In order to reach at a logical conclusion
of the lis, we at the very outset propose to look to Rule 3 of Railway Services
(Conduct) Rules, 1966 (“Rules” in short) and the same is reproduced
hereinbelow in verbatim:
“3. General. -- (1) Every railway servant shall at all times-
(i) maintain absolute integrity;
(ii) maintain devotion to duty;
(iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a railway
servant;
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(iv)…………
(v)…………..
(vi)………….
(vii)…………
(viii)………..
(ix)………….
(x)……………
(xi)…………..
(xii)………….
(xiii)…………
(xiv)…………
(xv)………….
(xvi)…………
(xvii)………..
(xviii)……….
(xix)…………
(xx)………….
(xxi)…………”
9. Since the writ petitioner was charged for violation of Rule 3(1) (i), (ii) and (iii) of
the said Rules, we also propose to look to the charge and statement of
imputation of charge as framed against the writ petitioner/ original applicant
as available at page no. 64 of the instant writ petition and those are also
reproduced hereinbelow in verbatim:
“Annexure- I
Article of charges for framed against Sri A.K. Paul, Sr.
TNC/NH.
Sri A.K. Paul, Sr. TNC/NH while on duty on 09.2.91
misdespatched and diverted Wagon No. WR/BKC-72124
loaded with 18 bdls. CR sheet by false recording false entry
……. illegible…… the O/A E/L handbook “B” as Ex. Nh to
SIWAN on line No. 11/OR against its original booked
destination Ex. NH to GRP with mala fide and fraudulent
intention which left Railway Admn. To face a fraudulent
delivery on forged RR.
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The above activities of Sri A.K. Paul, Sr. TNC/Nh exposes
his malicious policy and fraudulent intention to defraud the
administration which tantamounts to gross negligence to
duty and as such Sri Paul acted in a manner of unbecoming
a Railway servant which contravened Rule 3/1 (i), (ii) & (iii)
of Railway Service (Conduct) Rules, 1966.
Annexure-II
Statement of imputation of charges framed against Sri A.K.
Paul Sr. TNC/Nh.
Wagon No. WR/BKC- 72124 loaded with 18 Bdls. CR
sheets booked under Inv. No. 7/RR 737470 dt. 17.1.91
Ex.NH to GKP despatched from NH/Goods on 05.2.91 by
Dn CP/PJ at 19/30 hrs. under correct entry NH to GKP
which arrived at NH/Yard on 06.2.91 at 0.25 hrs. This has
been correctly recorded in Rail Inward “B” handbook
maintained by Sri A.B. Harijan TNC on L/No. 6/NR.
On 09.2.91 the said loaded Wagon No. ERBKC 72124 was
misdespatched/ diverted by E3403/NA under or false
recorded entry in O/W handbook “B” cum guidance
prepared by Sri A.K. Paul, Sr. TNC/Nh on Line No. 11/OR
as Ex.Nh to SIWAN resulting to allow fraudulent delivery on
forged RR at SIWAN. A misdespatched Wire No. TI/7/91 dt.
11.2.91 after two days of the wagon passed.”
10. On careful perusal of the aforementioned charge vis-à-vis the statement
of imputation of charge as framed against the writ petitioner/ original
applicant, it would reveal that it is the specific case of the respondents
authorities that the delinquent while on duty on 09.02.1991 with mala fide and
fraudulent intention, misdirected and diverted the wagon no. WR/BKC 72124
Ex.Naihati to Siwan by changing its original destination Ex.Naihati to
Gorakhpur (GRP). It further appears from the said charge and the statement of
imputation of charge that it is also the case of the respondents authorities that
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the delinquent with the fraudulent intention to defraud the respondents
authorities falsely recorded entry in OW handbook thereby allowed fraudulent
delivery on forged RR at Siwan.According to the respondents authorities, such
malicious and fraudulent act on the part of the delinquent tantamount to gross
negligence to duty and thus, violation of Rule 3(1) (i), (ii) and (iii) has/have been
caused resulting initiation of the enquiry proceeding.
11. At this juncture, if we look to the judgment as passed in Criminal Appeal
No. 108 of 2007 as has been annexed with the supplementary affidavit as filed
by the writ petitioner and as has been affirmed on 20.08.2024, it would reveal
that in the criminal appeal arising out of Siwan Railways P.S. Case no. 16 of
1991 dated 19.04.1991 under Section 419/420/471/467/468 IPC, the said
appellate Court while setting aside the conviction of the appellant (writ
petitioner/ original applicant herein) from the charges under Section
420/408/468/471/120B, IPC noticed that in the criminal trial the allegation
against the writ petitioner/ original applicant was that in outgoing register he
made entry ‘Siwan’ in place of ‘Gorakhpur’ and thus diverted the wagon no.
72124 carrying the relevant consignment to Siwan to facilitate the delivery of
the consignment in question to the co-accused persons. While appreciating the
evidence as recorded by the trial Court, the said appellate Court in the said
criminal appeal however noticed that the prosecution has miserably failed to
prove the charge of criminal conspiracy as punishable under Section 120B,
IPC. The said appellate Court also found that the accused Asim Kumar Paul is
not guilty of the offence under Section 420/468/471/408 IPC since while
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appreciating the evidence of the PWs and the DWs as recorded in the criminal
trial, it was found by the said appellate Court that outgoing and incoming
entries in the relevant register was made on the basis of card label fixed in the
pocket of the wagon. The said appellate Court also found in the evidence of
prosecution that as to who had changed the label and/or when such label was
changed could not be detected and thus, the said appellate Court came to a
finding that the accused Asim Kumar Paul cannot be made scapegoat only
because he made entry in the outgoing register. This Court in the foregoing
paragraphs of the judgment has already recorded that Section 420 IPC is the
penal provision of the offence of cheating within the meaning of Section 417
IPC. Section 468 IPC deals with the penal provision for forgery for the purpose
of cheating while Section 471 IPC deals with the penal provision of using as
genuine a forged document and Section 408 deals with criminal breach of trust
by clerk or servant and in all such sections elements of fraud are there. We
have also noticed that the charges under the aforementioned Sections were
framed in the said criminal trial on account of alleged fraudulent acts of the
accused/writ petitioner/ original applicant who according to the respondents
authorities misdirected the relevant wagon containing the relevant
consignment to Siwan instead of Gorakhpur.
12. It thus appears to us that the charges, the evidence, the witnesses and
the circumstances in both the departmental enquiry and the criminal
proceeding are identical or substantially similar. At his juncture, the moot
question arises for our consideration is as to whether on account of such
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similarity, the finding of the enquiry authority, appellate authority, revisional
authority as well as of the Tribunal in the impugned judgment can be allowed
to be sustained following the acquittal of the writ petitioner/ original applicant
in criminal appeal. At this juncture, if we look to the reported decision of
MaharanaPratap Singh (Supra) , we find that the Hon’ble Supreme Court
while deciding the said Civil Appeal framed four numbers of issues as reveals
from paragraph no. 25 of the said reported decision. For better understanding
we propose to quote paragraph 25 of the reported decision of
MaharanaPratap Singh (Supra) in verbatim and the same is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“25. The issues for determination that emerge for decision
are:
(i) Whether due process was followed in dismissing
theappellant from service and whether his dismissal from
serviceis justified, on facts and in the circumstances, that
haveunfolded before us?
(ii) Whether, in light of the facts, evidence, witnesses,
andcircumstances of the case, the charges in the
criminalproceedings are substantially identical to those in
thedepartmental proceedings, such that an acquittal in
thecriminal case would render the findings in the
disciplinaryproceedings vulnerable?
(iii) Whether the impugned judgment, which allowed
the appealof the respondents and dismissed the writ
petition of theappellant, deserves to be upheld?
(iv) Whether the appellant is entitled to any relief,
should theaforesaid questions be answered in his favour?”
13. While deciding the issue no. (ii) the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
MaharanaPratap Singh (Supra) expressed the following view:
“46. The aforesaid discussion on the first issue seals the
fate of therespondents. However, since arguments were
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advanced in respect of thisissue too, we propose to briefly
answer the same.
47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not
automatically entitle theaccused to have an order of setting
aside of his dismissal from publicservice following
disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that when
the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in
both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings
are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes
a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in
the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and
oppressive. This is a position settled by the decisionin G. M.
Tank (supra)[AIR 2006 SC 2129], since reinforced by a
decision of recent origin inRam Lal v. State of Rajasthan
[(2024) 1 SCC 175].
48. To assess the degree of similarity between the
charges, evidence,witnesses, and circumstances in the
disciplinary and criminalproceedings, it is indeed crucial to
review the materials placed before the Court where such an
issue arises. However, we regret, absence ofthe
departmental file has disabled us from looking into the
same.
49. Notwithstanding the above, a plain reading of the
materials available onrecord only reveals that charge no.1
in the disciplinary closely resembledthe allegations in the
criminal proceedings. In fact, the disciplinaryproceedings
were initiated based on the written complaint of
theinformant.
50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals that
the prosecution"miserably failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt" as both theinformant and PW-2 refused
to identify the appellant in court. Thisdiscussion confirms
that the appellant's acquittal was based not on
meretechnicalities. In Ram Lal (supra), this Court held that
terms like"benefit of doubt" or "honourably acquitted" should
not be treated asformalities. The Court's duty is to focus on
the substance of thejudgment, rather than the terminology
used.
51. That apart, it is noteworthy that in course of the
inquiry PW-2 had alsodeclined to identify the appellant
during cross-examination, and theinformant was not called
as a witness in the disciplinary proceedings.This sort of
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creates a parallel between the circumstances in both
thecriminal and disciplinary proceedings.
52. Besides, the appellant's case is strengthened by the
principle of adverseinference. It can be reasonably inferred
that the respondentsdeliberately withheld the scanned copy
of the departmental file, whichwas essential for us to
assess whether the charges, witnesses, evidence, and
circumstances in both the criminal and departmental
proceedingswere substantially similar or identical, likely
due to concerns over thepotential adverse consequences.
53. In light of the preceding discussion and the adverse
presumption that isavailable to be drawn, we hold that the
finding of the appellant beingguilty of charge no.1 cannot be
sustained following his acquittal in thecriminal proceedings,
which seem to have involved substantially similaror
identical charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances.”
[Emphasis supplied]
14. Keeping in mind the proposition of law as decided in the case of
MaharanaPratap Singh (Supra) , if we look to the factual aspects as involved
in the instant writ petition, it appears to us that the charges as framed against
the delinquent in the enquiry proceeding are almost similar to the charges as
framed in the criminal proceeding and the evidence and the witnesses and the
circumstances of both the enquiry proceeding and criminal proceeding are
either identical or substantially similar. We have also noticed that apart from
the charge of mala fide and fraudulent act of the delinquent thereby attracting
contravention of the Rule 3(1) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the said Rule, no other
independent charge was framed in the said disciplinary proceeding alleging
culpable negligence on the part of the writ petitioner in discharging his duty. It
thus appears to us that on account of passing of the judgment of acquittal in
the aforementioned criminal appeal the findings of the enquiry authority,
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appellate authority as well as the revisional authority cannot be allowed to
stand.
15. We have also noticed that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal was
passed on 24.07.2009 while the learned Additional Sessions Judge- V Sarat at
Chapra allowed the Criminal Appeal no. 108 of 2007 as filed by the writ
petitioner/ original applicant by its judgment dated 25.06.2019 and thus, there
was no scope on the part of the said Tribunal to assess the impact of passing of
the judgment of acquittal in Criminal Appeal no. 108 of 2007 in favour of the
writ petitioner/ original applicantbefore it.
16. It is pertinent to mention herein that the reported decision of Airports
Authority of India (Supra) is distinguishable from the facts and
circumstances of the instant writ petition inasmuch as in the said reported
decision there was no occasion on the part of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to
consider the impact of passing of a judgment of acquittal in a criminal trial
where charges, witnesses, evidence and circumstances are substantially
similar.
17. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we thus find sufficient merit
in the instant writ petition. Consequently the punishment dated 20.08.2002 as
has been imposed by the disciplinary authority, the finding of the appellate
authority dated 15.07.2003 and the punishment dated 30.09.2003 awarded by
it, the finding of the revisional authority dated 19.03.2004 and the impugned
order dated 24.07.2009 as passed by the said Tribunal are hereby quashed
and set aside.
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18. Admittedly, the writ petitioner has crossed his age of superannuation in
the year of 2014. At this juncture, it is required to be determined as to what
benefits the writ petitioner is entitled to on account of allowing of this writ
petition. Admittedly, after passing of the order of removal from service on
30.09.2003 by the appellate authority the writ petitioner was out of service. In
that event, a question arises as to whether on account of allowing the instant
writ petition, the writ petitioner is at all entitled to the back wages that is on
and from 30.09.2003 till the date of his actual retirement in the year 2014.
19. On careful perusal of the copy of the application as filed before the
Tribunal as well as in the instant writ petition, we found that no prayer has
been made by the writ petitioner for grant of back wages. In course of his
argument learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner did not
make any such submission. The law relating to grant of back wages where
termination is found to be illegal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court time and again.In doing so it has been held that in absence of any
evidence to prove that the appellant was unemployed during the period in
question, back wages cannot be granted to him since he had not worked for
that period. In the case of Mulin Sharma vs. State of Assam reported in
(2016) 14 SCC 208the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the principle
of grant of back wages expressed the following view:
“14. We are fully satisfied that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, back wages should not have
been awarded to the appellant herein. In several cases,
this Court has held that payment of back wages is a
discretionary power which has to be exercised by a court
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keeping in view the facts in their entirety and neither
straitjacket formula can be evolved nor a rule of universal
application can be laid down in such cases. Thus,
reinstatement does not necessarily result in payment of
back wages which would be independent of reinstatement.
While dealing with the prayer of back wages, factual
scenario and the principles of justice, equity and good
conscience have to be kept in view by an appropriate court.
15. In C.N. Malla v. State of J&K [C.N.
Malla v. State of J&K, (2009) 9 SCC 597 : (2009) 2 SCC
(L&S) 715] , this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 600,
para 11)
“11. The legal position is fairly settled by a catena of
decisions that direction to pay back wages in its entirety is
not automatic consequent upon declaration of dismissal
order bad in law. The concept of discretion is inbuilt in
such exercise. The court is required to exercise discretion
reasonably and judiciously keeping in view the facts and
circumstances of the case. Each case, of course, would
depend on its own facts.”
16. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the
considered opinion that the concurrent finding of the courts
below that the appellant herein is not entitled to back
wages in the absence of any material on record that he
remained unemployed during the entire period from 23-5-
1998 to 16-8-1999 is correct. Even the learned counsel for
the appellant herein has admitted before this Court that he
was not allowed to perform his duties after obtaining his
signature on 22-5-1998.”
20. Similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
DeepaliGunduSurwase vs. Kranti Junior AdhyapakMahavidyalaya (D.Ed.)
& Ors.reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 wherein following has been held:
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“38.1. In cases of wrongful termination of service,
reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is
the normal rule.
38.2. The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that
while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating
authority or the court may take into consideration the
length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of
misconduct, if any, found proved against the
employee/workman, the financial condition of the
employer and similar other factors.
38.3. Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose
services are terminated and who is desirous of getting
back wages is required to either plead or at least make a
statement before the adjudicating authority or the court of
first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or
was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to
avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and
also lead cogent evidence to prove that the
employee/workman was gainfully employed and was
getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing
prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is
settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a
particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive
averment about its existence. It is always easier to prove a
positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once
the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus
lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that
the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the
same or substantially similar emoluments.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
21. Similar such view was taken by a Division Bench of the High Court of
Telengana at Hyderabad in its judgment dated 10.09.2024 in WP no. 7517 of
2018 [P.V. Suryanarayana vs. The High Court of Judicature for the State
of Telengana&Ors.] presided over by one of us (Sujoy Paul, J.).
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22. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we thus findno reason to
pass an order for payment of back wages to the writ petitioner in absence of
any pleading to the effect he was not gainfully employed after removal and in
absence of any proof that during the period from 30.09.2003 till the date of his
actual retirement in the year 2014 he remained unemployed. However, on
account of allowing the instant writ petition we direct the respondents
authorities to disburse all retiraldues to the writ petitioner on notional basis as
if he retired on his actual day of superannuation and such disbursement shall
have to be made positively within sixty working days from the date of
communication of the server copy of this judgement.
23. Before parting with the matter, we record our appreciation for the able
assistance provided by both the sides in general and by Mr. Debottam Das,
learned counsel of legal aid in particular.
24. With the aforementioned observation the instant writ petition is allowed
to the extent indicated hereinabove.
25. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, be given
to the parties on completion of usual formalities.
I agree.
(SUJOY PAUL, C.J.)
(PARTHA SARATHI SEN, J.)
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