As per case facts, Petitioners, owners of land in Laxmi Industrial Estate, had entered into Development-cum-Sale Agreements in 1985 (and one in 1996), paying consideration, taking possession, and executing Powers ...
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.9358 OF 2016
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.9360 OF 2016
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.9361 OF 2026
Atul Enterprises, through it’s
Partner Atul N. Patel … Petitioner
Vs.
1.State of Maharashtra
2.The Deputy Collector of Stamps … Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.9359 OF 2016
Montal Investment, through it’s
Partner Atul N. Patel … Petitioner
Vs.
1.State of Maharashtra
2.The Deputy Collector of Stamps … Respondents
Mr. Aspi Chinoy, Senior Advocate with Mr. Vibhav
Krishna i/by Juris Consillis for the Petitioner.
Mr. Vineet B. Naik, Special Senior Advocate with Mr.
Miheer S. Jayakar and Mr. S.H. Kankal, AGP with Mr.
Y.D. Patil, AGP for the Respondents-State.
CORAM :AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON :SEPTEMBER 28, 2026
PRONOUNCED ON:OCTOBER 5, 2026
1
ATUL
GANESH
KULKARNI
Digitally signed by
ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.10.05
11:26:46 +0530
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
JUDGMENT:
1.Since the facts and issues involved in all the four Writ
Petitions are similar, all the four Petitions are being considered and
decided by this common judgment. For convenience, the facts of
Writ Petition No. 9358 of 2016 are being referred to.
2.The present Writ Petitions have been filed under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India. By these Petitions, the
Petitioners have challenged the legality, validity, and propriety of
the impugned order dated 3 March 2016 passed by Respondent
No.2. According to the Petitioners, the facts which have resulted in
filing the present Writ Petitions are as follows. The Petitioners are
a partnership firm and are the owners of the land bearing Plot No.
D-40, Laxmi Industrial Estate, Village Pahadi, Goregaon, Taluka
Borivali. Respondent No.1 is the State of Maharashtra through the
Collector of Stamps, Borivali. Respondent No.2 is the Deputy
Controller of Stamps, Maharashtra State. The said property was
declared to be a slum under Section 4(1) of the Maharashtra Slum
Areas (Improvement, Clearance, and Redevelopment) Act, 1971,
by a notification published on 31 October 1977. The declaration
was made on the ground that the property had been encroached
upon and was occupied by hutments. The Petitioners had entered
into Development-cum-Sale Agreements dated 9 December 1985
with different members of the Kawa Family. Under these
Agreements, in consideration of an aggregate amount of
Rs.5,01,620/- paid and payable thereunder, the Petitioners were
given development-cum-sale rights in respect of five plots of land
situated at Village Pahadi, Goregaon, forming part of Laxmi
2
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
Industrial Estate, D-40. The total area of the said plots was about
8404.5 square metres. Clause 3 of the said Development-cum-Sale
Agreements recorded that the Agreements were entered into on an
"as is where is basis" and were subject to the occupation of
unauthorized occupants. At the relevant time, and until 1990,
although the aggregate value of the Development-cum-Sale
Agreements was Rs.5,01,620/-, the stamp duty payable on the said
Agreements was only Rs.40,000/-.
3.On 7 January 1986, the owners executed a Power of
Attorney in favour of the Petitioners. There are 280 tenants on the
said property. The property is affected by several development
restrictions, reservations and slum tenements. According to the
Petitioners, approximately 4632.5 square metres of the property
falls within CRZ-I and approximately 3771.98 square metres falls
within CRZ-II. Further, approximately 8254.75 square metres is
affected by RG reservation and approximately 149.73 square
metres is affected by road reservation. The property is stated to be
covered by forest area. The Petitioners claim that they have been
in possession of the property since 1985 and have regularly paid
the municipal taxes. On 18 May 1996, the Slum Rehabilitation
Authority issued a Letter of Intent in respect of the property. The
SRA approved the plans under No. SRS/DY/CE/257/P/S/PL/AP
dated 24 March 1998. An Intimation of Disapproval was issued on
24 March 1998 and a Commencement Certificate was issued on 2
April 1998. However, under the Coastal Zone Management Plan
published on 19 January 2000, about 50% of the property was
shown as falling in CRZ-I and the remaining 50% in CRZ-II.
3
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
According to the Petitioners, development of the property was not
permitted. This position was recorded by the Petitioners' Architect
in the letter dated 19 April 2010 addressed to the SRA. For these
reasons, according to the Petitioners, the development of the
property could not proceed, although the IOD and Commencement
Certificate were regularly revalidated. On 25 April 2012, one R. B.
Singh, who was the original Complainant, had been appointed by
the Petitioners as a Consultant for the development of the said
project. A Power of Attorney dated 24 May 2002 was stated to
have been executed in favour of the said Consultant. The
Petitioners subsequently lodged a Police Complaint dated 25 April
2012 against the said Ram Badan Singh. An M.E.C.R. was
registered on 4 February 2014 by the MIDC Police Station. In the
year 2012, the SRA required the Petitioners to establish and
complete their title in respect of the said lands. The Petitioners
state that they were required to do so only in respect of those
lands in which they had acquired Development-cum-Sale rights
under the Agreements of 1985 and of which they were in
possession. For this purpose, the Petitioners prepared four
engrossed Conveyances. The Development-cum-Sale Agreements
of 1985 and the Power of Attorney of 1986 were annexed to the
said Conveyances. The Petitioners, by two separate letters,
appointed Hemal Muni and Yunis J. Shroff as Consultants for
registration of the documents and for adjudication of the stamp
duty. The Petitioners executed two duly registered General Powers
of Attorney, both dated 7 May 2012, in their favour. The said
Consultants arranged for the Conveyances to be adjudicated by the
4
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
Collector of Stamps, Borivali. The Collector of Stamps certified
under Section 32 of the Stamp Act that the Conveyances required
payment of stamp duty of Rs.40,000/-, taking into account the
aggregate original value of Rs.8,00,000/-, under Article 25(b) of
the Stamp Act. The Petitioners paid stamp duty of Rs.40,000/-.
The Conveyances dated 10 July 2012 were executed and duly
registered. Subsequently, on 17 July 2012, the Maharashtra
Pollution Control Board published a Public Notice regarding an
environmental public hearing for development of the slum plot.
The said public hearing was held on 16 August 2012 and was
video recorded.
4.The Petitioners received a Show Cause Notice dated 4
September 2013 from the Chief Controlling Authority and
Inspector General of Registration, Pune, who is Respondent No.2.
It was alleged that proper stamp duty had not been paid on the
Conveyances. According to the said notice, the market value of the
property was Rs.56,20,76,500/- and the stamp duty payable was
Rs.2,01,03,825/-. It was alleged that there was a deficit or short
levy of stamp duty of Rs.2,00,63,825/-. By order dated 10
February 2014, the Inspector General of Registration, inter alia,
held that there was a deficit or short levy of stamp duty amounting
to Rs.2,00,63,825/-.
5.The Petitioners challenged the said order by filing Writ
Petition Nos. 2897 of 2014, 2898 of 2014, 2907 of 2014 and 2908
of 2014. By a common order dated 3 April 2014, this Court set
aside the order dated 10 February 2014 and directed the Collector
of Stamps, Borivali, to consider the representation of the
5
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
Petitioners in accordance with law. Pursuant to the said order
dated 3 April 2014, the Petitioners, on 22 May 2014, deposited an
amount of Rs.1,50,00,000/- with the Collector of Stamps, Borivali
and forwarded the receipt evidencing such deposit. Thereafter, by
their letter dated 9 June 2014 addressed to the Collector of
Stamps, Borivali, the Petitioners requested the authorities to obtain
confirmation from the City Survey Office, Borivali. According to
the Petitioners, the actual boundary of the plot was required to be
finally determined before the area falling under various
reservations and restrictions could be ascertained. The Petitioners
stated that only could the areas falling under RG reservation,
forest area, CRZ-I, CRZ-II, slum area and other restrictions be
determined for the purpose of calculating the market value. By
their letter dated 30 June 2014 addressed to the Collector of
Stamps, Borivali, the Petitioners submitted a tentative chart
showing the areas affected by RG reservation, CRZ-I, CRZ-II, road
reservation and other restrictions. They requested that the
reservations be actually verified. The Petitioners contended that no
FSI was available on the property and, therefore, according to
them, the value of the property was nil and no stamp duty was
payable. They stated that in the CRZ-II portion falling within the
residential zone, if the plot was vacant, FSI was required to be
taken at 1, whereas where there was encroachment, no FSI was
available for development after giving the basic FSI to the
encroacher. Thereafter, by a letter dated 9 July 2014 addressed to
the Collector of Stamps, Borivali, the Petitioners reiterated that the
earlier chart had been prepared on the basis of the tentative City
6
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
Survey boundary superimposed on the physical possession of the
site. According to them, actual verification could be carried out
only after the City Survey boundary was finally determined. The
Petitioners informed the authorities that Appeal No.6070 of 2014
concerning the survey of the property was pending before the
Ministry of Revenue, Government of Maharashtra.
6.On 23 July 2014, representatives of the City Survey Office
were scheduled to visit the property for a site inspection.
According to the Petitioners, the visit was cancelled because of
continuous heavy rain. Thereafter, on 8 August 2014, the City
Survey Officer along with his staff visited the property. The
Petitioners contend that no actual survey was carried out and no
survey report was prepared. They state that, even thereafter, they
were not supplied with any purported survey report prepared by
the City Survey Officer. In the meantime, on 9 October 2014, the
Collector of Stamps, Borivali, passed an order determining the
stamp duty at Rs.1,44,11,275/-. After giving credit for the stamp
duty of Rs.40,000/- paid, the Collector determined the balance
stamp duty payable at Rs.1,43,71,275/-.
7.The Petitioners, through their Advocates' letter dated 28
October 2014 addressed to the Collector of Stamps, Bombay,
requested, inter alia, for a copy of the survey report and for details
regarding demarcation of the property boundary and calculation of
the areas affected by slum reservation, mangroves, CRZ-I and CRZ-
II. On 1 December 2014, the Petitioners filed four Appeals before
the Deputy Controller of Stamps challenging the order dated 9
October 2014 insofar as it related to the respective plots. The
7
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
Deputy Controller of Stamps, by the impugned order dated 3
March 2016, upheld the order passed by the Collector of Stamps
and directed the Petitioners to pay the balance stamp duty of
Rs.1,43,71,275/-. It is this order which has been challenged by the
Petitioners in the present Writ Petitions.
8.Mr. Chinoy, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
Petitioners, submits that the four Petitions arise out of similar facts
and raise common questions relating to the applicability of Section
4 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, the determination of the
true market value of the properties and the manner in which the
Stamp Authorities have proceeded with such determination. He
makes the following common submissions, with the necessary
factual differences relating to the respective properties.
9.In Writ Petition No.9358 of 2016, the Petitioners had entered
into a Development-cum-Sale Agreement dated 9 December 1985
with the members of the Kawa Family, being the owners of Plot
No.D-40, Laxmi Industrial Estate, situated at Pahadi, Goregaon,
Taluka Borivali, admeasuring 8041.48 square metres, equivalent to
9619 square yards. Under the said Agreement, the owners had
irrevocably agreed to grant to the Petitioners the right of
development-cum-sale “of the land described in the Schedule”.
Possession of the property was handed over to the Petitioners. The
Petitioners were required to pay the taxes and other outgoings
relating to the property and a Power of Attorney was to be
executed in their favour for completing the transaction.
8
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
10.In Writ Petition No.9359 of 2016, the Petitioners had entered
into an Agreement for Sale dated 28 March 1996 in respect of Plot
No.D-34, Laxmi Industrial Estate, situated at Pahadi, Goregaon,
Taluka Borivali, admeasuring 4041 square metres, equivalent to
4833.5 square yards. Under the said Agreement, possession of the
property was handed over to the Petitioners. The Petitioners made
payments to the owner, including the payment evidenced by
receipt dated 5 February 1996. A Power of Attorney dated 28
March 1996 was executed in favour of the Petitioners or their
nominees. The Petitioners were brought on the municipal
assessment records and have been paying the municipal taxes.
11.In Writ Petition No.9360 of 2016, the Petitioners had entered
into Development-cum-Sale Agreements dated 9 December 1985
in respect of Plot Nos.37, 38, 39, 39A, 41, 44, 45 and 46, Laxmi
Industrial Estate, Pahadi, Goregaon, Taluka Borivali. The aggregate
area of the plots was stated to be 37084 square metres, equivalent
to 44338 square yards. Possession was handed over to the
Petitioners under the said Agreements. The Petitioners were
responsible for payment of taxes and other outgoings and Powers
of Attorney were executed in their favour for completing the
transactions.
12.In Writ Petition No.9361 of 2016, the Petitioners had entered
into a Development-cum-Sale Agreement dated 9 December 1985
in respect of Plot No.D-36 admeasuring 5481 square metres, stated
to be equivalent to 5612 square metres as per the property card,
and Plot No.D-42 admeasuring 5411 square metres, stated to be
equivalent to 5401 square metres as per the property card. The
9
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
properties form part of Laxmi Industrial Estate, Pahadi, Goregaon,
Taluka Borivali. Possession was handed over to the Petitioners
under the said Agreement and the Petitioners were liable to pay
the taxes and other outgoings.
13.The Petitioners submit that, in all four cases, substantial
amounts were paid pursuant to the original agreements. In the
cases arising from the Development-cum-Sale Agreements of 9
December 1985, payments were made against receipts dated 9
December 1985, 20 January 1987 and February 1988. Powers of
Attorney were executed by the owners in favour of the Petitioners
or their nominees on 7 January 1986. The Petitioners were
brought on the municipal assessment records and have been
paying the municipal taxes in respect of the properties.
14.The Petitioners submit that, in the year 2012, the SRA
Authorities required them to complete and establish their title
before their proposals for redevelopment of the slum properties
could be considered. For that purpose, substituted Powers of
Attorney dated 1 February 2012 were executed, referring to the
original Development-cum-Sale Agreements and the properties
covered by them. In the case of Plot No.D-34, the original
Agreement for Sale dated 28 March 1996 and the Power of
Attorney dated 28 March 1996 formed the basis of the subsequent
transaction. It is submitted that the Conveyances dated 10 July
2012 were executed only for the purpose of completing and
perfecting the Petitioners' title under the earlier transactions. The
Conveyances did not represent a fresh sale of the properties in the
year 2012. They were executed in continuation of the earlier
10
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
transactions under which possession had been handed over and
consideration had been paid. The Petitioners submit that the
Conveyances dated 10 July 2012 annexed the relevant earlier
documents. These include the Development-cum-Sale Agreements
dated 9 December 1985, the Agreement for Sale dated 28 March
1996, the relevant payment receipts, the Powers of Attorney dated
7 January 1986 or 28 March 1996, as the case may be, the
substituted Powers of Attorney dated 1 February 2012 and the
municipal assessment records. The documents establish the
connection between the earlier transaction and the subsequent
Conveyances.
15.Before the Collector of Stamps, the Petitioners submitted that
the Conveyances dated 10 July 2012 were executed to complete
the earlier transactions and to perfect their title. Since possession
had been delivered under the earlier agreements and the
Petitioners had been paying the municipal taxes from that time,
the subsequent Conveyances could not be treated as fresh
transactions of sale taking place in 2012 and subjected to stamp
duty on the market value prevailing in 2012. The Collector of
Stamps, however, rejected the said contention on the ground that
the earlier agreements were not referred to in the body of the
Conveyances and were allegedly not annexed to them. In the case
of Writ Petition No.9358 of 2016, the Collector recorded at page
56 as follows:
“The said agreement is not annexed to the conveyance
and is
an unregistered document and there is no reference of this
Agreement in the Conveyance. As per clause 28 of Mah
11
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
Stamps Act the factors affecting the chargeability of stamp
duty are to be mentioned in the document. In this context
there is no relation between the Dev cum sale agreement and
Deed of Conveyance
and the benefit of date of execution of
the Development cum Sale Agreement cannot be provided
for deciding the market value of the property
”
16.Similar findings were recorded by the Collector in the other
Petitions. In Writ Petition No.9359 of 2016, the Collector recorded
at page 52 that the Agreement for Sale was not annexed to the
Conveyance and was an unregistered document, and that there
was no reference to the Agreement in the Conveyance. The
Collector held that there was no relation between the Agreement
for Sale and the Deed of Conveyance and that the date of the
earlier Agreement could not be taken into consideration for
determining the market value.
17.In Writ Petition No.9360 of 2016, a similar finding was
recorded at pages 62 and 63. In Writ Petition No.9361 of 2016, the
Collector recorded the same reasoning at page 57. The Petitioners
submit that these findings disclose an error apparent on the face of
the record because the earlier agreements and the other relevant
documents were in fact annexed to the respective Conveyances
and showed that the Conveyances related to the same properties
and the same transactions which had commenced under the earlier
agreements.
18.The Petitioners submit that the mere fact that the earlier
instruments were not referred to in the body of the subsequent
Conveyances cannot determine the applicability of Section 4 of the
Act. Section 4 is concerned with a transaction which has been
12
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
completed through more than one instrument. The question is
whether the different instruments were in fact used for completing
one transaction.
19.The Petitioners place reliance upon the judgment of this
Court dated 20 August 2026 in Writ Petition No.13655 of 2017,
Kumar Housing Corporation vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
According to the Petitioners, the said judgment settles the manner
in which Section 4 is required to be applied where more than one
instrument has been used for completing one transaction. It is
submitted that, as held in
Kumar Housing Corporation, for
applying Section 4, “what is required to be seen is whether several
instruments were in fact used for completing one transaction of
sale, development agreement, lease, mortgage, or settlement”. The
Petitioners submit that it is not necessary that the subsequent
Conveyance must refer in its body to every earlier instrument
forming part of the same transaction. What is necessary is to
examine the documents as a whole and determine whether the
earlier agreement and the subsequent Conveyance were
instruments used for completing the same transaction concerning
the same property.
20.In the present cases, the earlier agreements and the
subsequent Conveyances relate to the same parties, the same
properties and the same underlying transactions. Possession had
been delivered under the earlier agreements. Consideration had
been paid pursuant thereto. Powers of Attorney had been
executed. The Petitioners had been brought on the municipal
assessment records and had been paying municipal taxes. The
13
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
subsequent Conveyances were executed only when the SRA
Authorities required the Petitioners to complete their title before
considering the redevelopment proposals.
21.The Petitioners submit that these circumstances, when
considered together, establish that the Conveyances dated 10 July
2012 were part of the same transactions which had commenced
under the earlier agreements. The transactions must be considered
as a whole. The subsequent Conveyances cannot be treated as
independent and fresh sales merely because they were executed in
2012.
22.The Petitioners submit that the Respondents have relied
upon Section 28 of the Act and upon the judgment of this Court
dated 18 March 2025 in Writ Petition No.6537 of 2017,
Praman
Infrastructure P. Ltd. vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors
. The said
judgment is relied upon for the proposition that an annexure, “if
explicitly referenced in the sale deed”, may be treated as forming
part of the instrument for the purposes of stamp duty assessment.
According to the Petitioners, the reliance upon Section 28 and the
decision in
Praman Infrastructure is misplaced in the present case.
The question here is not merely whether an annexure can be
treated as part of an individual instrument for the purpose of
Section 28. The issue is whether several instruments formed part
of one transaction for the purpose of Section 4 of the Act.
23.The Petitioners submit that the two provisions operate in
different fields. The requirement under Section 28 concerning the
contents of an instrument cannot be applied in such a manner as
14
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
to defeat the separate statutory scheme under Section 4, where the
transaction has been completed through more than one
instrument. The Petitioners submit that the test laid down in
Kumar Housing Corporation is the appropriate test. The Court is
required to examine whether the earlier agreement and the
subsequent Conveyance were in fact instruments used for
completing one transaction. That question has to be answered by
considering the documents and the whole transaction together.
24.Applying that test to the present cases, the Petitioners submit
that the Development-cum-Sale Agreements dated 9 December
1985 and the Conveyances dated 10 July 2012 in Writ Petition
Nos.9358, 9360 and 9361 of 2016 relate to the same properties
and the same transactions. Similarly, the Agreement for Sale dated
28 March 1996 and the Conveyance dated 10 July 2012 in Writ
Petition No.9359 of 2016 relate to the same property and the same
transaction. The Petitioners submit that Section 4 of the Act
applies to all four cases. The stamp duty liability cannot be
determined by treating the Conveyances dated 10 July 2012 as
fresh transactions of sale and by applying the market value
prevailing in 2012.
25.The Petitioners raise a separate challenge to the manner in
which the market value of the properties has been determined. It is
submitted that the Stamp Authorities have proceeded on the basis
of the Ready Reckoner or Annual Statement of Rates, despite the
admitted physical, statutory and development restrictions affecting
the properties. The Petitioners submit that the properties are
affected, in varying degrees, by CRZ-I and CRZ-II restrictions,
15
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
mangroves, RG and road reservations, slum occupation and other
restrictions on development. These restrictions affect the actual
use and development potential of the properties and have a direct
bearing on their true market value. According to the Petitioners,
the Ready Reckoner is only a guideline. It cannot replace the
statutory duty of the Collector to determine the true market value
of the property on the basis of all relevant circumstances. Reliance
is placed upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in
Prasadnagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra,
2005 (2) Mh.L.J. 310. The Petitioners submit that
the said judgment makes it that Ready Reckoner rates are merely
guidelines and constitute only a prima facie indication of value.
They cannot be treated as conclusive for determining the true
market value. The Petitioners submit that, at paragraph 8 of
Prasadnagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., the Division Bench
considered the judgment of the Supreme Court in
R. Sai Bharathi
v. J. Jayalalitha,
(2004) 2 SCC 9, and reiterated that a guideline
value is not final but is only a prima facie rate. At paragraphs 10
and 11, the Division Bench directed that the Ready Reckoner
should be treated only as a guideline and as a declaration of prima
facie market value, and “nothing more”.
26.The Petitioners submit that the above principle has direct
application to the present cases. The record discloses that the
properties are subject to substantial restrictions on their
development and use. In such circumstances, the Collector was
required to examine the actual effect of those restrictions before
determining the true market value.
16
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
27.In Writ Petition No.9358 of 2016, the Petitioners point out
that the Collector's order records that approximately 2300 square
metres were affected by mangroves and records that “no
construction or use is permissible in the Mangrove area”. Despite
this finding, the said portion was valued at 50% of the Ready
Reckoner rate. The Petitioners submit that such an approach does
not amount to a determination of the true market value of the
affected land.
28.In Writ Petition No.9359 of 2016, the Petitioners submit that
the property is affected by CRZ-I and other restrictions. According
to the Petitioners, the entire area falls under CRZ-I. Despite the
restriction on development, the Collector proceeded to value the
property at 85% of the Ready Reckoner rate, resulting in a
valuation of approximately Rs.15.44 crore.
29.In Writ Petition No.9360 of 2016, the Collector's order
records that approximately 3600 square metres in Plot No.D-44
and approximately 2400 square metres in Plot No.D-45 were
affected by mangroves. The Collector recorded that “no
construction or use is permissible in the Mangrove area”.
Nevertheless, the affected portions were valued at 50% of the
Ready Reckoner rate, resulting in a valuation of approximately
Rs.8.59 crore for Plot No.D-44 and Rs.13.11 crore for Plot No.D-
45.
30.In Writ Petition No.9361 of 2016, the Collector's order
records that approximately 2000 square metres in Plot No.D-42
were affected by mangroves and that “no construction or use is
17
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
permissible in the Mangrove area”. The said portion was
nevertheless valued at 50% of the Ready Reckoner rate, resulting
in a valuation of approximately Rs.5.62 crore. Similarly,
approximately 1200 square metres in Plot No.D-36 were stated to
be affected by mangroves and the same was valued at 50% of the
Ready Reckoner rate, resulting in a valuation of approximately
Rs.3.37 crore.
31.The Petitioners submit that the Maharashtra Stamp
(Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules require
the Collector to consider the nature of the land, the construction,
the location and the situational advantages or disadvantages of the
property while determining its true market value. It is submitted
that Rule 6 requires the Collector, after giving an opportunity of
hearing, to consider the objections raised by the parties and the
relevant factors and evidence before determining the true market
value. The Ready Reckoner may provide a starting point for the
exercise, but it cannot take the place of the statutory adjudication
required to be undertaken by the Collector. The Petitioners submit
that the mechanical application of a fixed percentage of the Ready
Reckoner rate to land which is incapable of development or use is
contrary to the statutory requirement of determining the true
market value. Where the Collector records that no construction or
use is permissible on a portion of the property, the same cannot be
valued merely by applying a fixed percentage of the Ready
Reckoner rate without examining the actual value of such
restricted land. The Petitioners submit that land affected by
mangroves or CRZ-I, where the applicable restrictions prevent
18
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
construction or use, requires a separate and proper assessment. It
cannot be assigned a substantial value by applying a percentage of
the Ready Reckoner rate.
32.The Petitioners challenge the impugned orders on the
ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. It is
submitted that the earlier order of this Court dated 3 April 2014
required a fresh adjudication by the Collector of Stamps. According
to the Petitioners, where a quasi-judicial authority relies upon a
site inspection report, survey report, technical material or
valuation material which is adverse to the affected party, the
affected party must be given the material relied upon and a
meaningful opportunity to deal with it. A mere opportunity to
remain present before the authority is not sufficient if material
adverse to the party is relied upon without disclosing the same.
The Petitioners submit that they requested the authorities to
furnish the survey material, demarcation of the property, details of
the areas affected by CRZ restrictions, reservations, mangroves and
other restrictions, and the basis on which the developable area had
been determined. It is submitted that, where the valuation
depends upon the physical boundaries of the plots and the extent
of land affected by various restrictions, the survey, and
demarcation material is relevant to the determination of market
value. The Petitioners ought to have been given an effective
opportunity to examine and contest such material before it was
relied upon for determining their stamp duty liability. The
Petitioners submit that to the extent the impugned orders rely
upon survey reports, site inspection material, technical calculations
19
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
or other valuation material which was not furnished to the
Petitioners, the procedure adopted by the authorities did not
provide a fair and effective opportunity of hearing.
33.The Petitioners submit that the impugned orders suffer from
two fundamental errors. First, the authorities have failed to
consider the earlier agreements and the subsequent Conveyances
as instruments forming part of the same transaction for the
purpose of Section 4 of the Act. Second, while determining the
market value, the authorities have proceeded mechanically on the
basis of the Ready Reckoner without determining the effect of the
admitted restrictions on the actual use and development potential
of the properties. The Petitioners submit that the impugned orders,
insofar as they determine the stamp duty on the basis of the 2012
market value and the valuation methodology adopted by the
authorities, cannot be sustained and require interference in
exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India.
34.Mr. Vineet Naik, learned Senior Advocate appearing for
Respondent No.2, submits that the present Petitions challenge the
orders dated 3 March 2016 passed by Respondent No.2, whereby
the Appeals filed by the Petitioners under Section 32B of the
Maharashtra Stamp Act were rejected. By the impugned orders,
the orders dated 9 October 2014 passed by the Collector of
Stamps, District Borivali, under Section 31 read with Sections
32A(4) and (5) and Section 53A of the Maharashtra Stamp Act,
were upheld. The Petitioners were held liable to pay the stamp
duty determined on the respective registered deeds. The relevant
20
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
details of the properties, documents, consideration and stamp duty
are set out below for convenience.
35.Description of the properties and impounded documents
Petition
No.
Subject Plot
Registered
Document
No.
Consideration
shown /
Stamp Duty
paid
Market Value /
Stamp Duty
leviable
9358/2
016
D-40,
admeasuring
8,404.5 sq.
mtrs.
Document
No. 5379
dated 10
July 2012
Consideration:
Rs.8 Lakhs;
Stamp Duty
paid:
Rs.40,000/-
Market Value:
Rs.56,20,76,50
0/-; Stamp
Duty leviable:
Rs.2,81,03,825
/-
9359/2
016
D-34,
admeasuring
4,141.39 sq.
mtrs.
Document
No. 5377
dated 10
July 2012
Consideration:
Rs.35 Lakhs;
Stamp Duty
paid:
Rs.1,75,000/-
Market Value:
Rs.27,02,80,00
0/-; Stamp
Duty leviable:
Rs.1,35,14,000
/-
9360/2
016
D-37, D-38, D-
39, D-39/A, D-
41, D-44, D-45
and D-46, total
approximately
37,086 sq.
mtrs.
Document
No. 5380
dated 10
July 2012
Consideration:
Rs.30 Lakhs;
Stamp Duty
paid:
Rs.1,70,000/-
Market Value:
approximately
Rs.248.5
Crores; Stamp
Duty leviable:
Rs.12,42,97,25
0/-
9361/2
016
D-36,
admeasuring
5,481.65 sq.
mtrs., and D-
42,
admeasuring
5,411.59 sq.
mtrs., total
10,893.24 sq.
mtrs.
Document
No. 5378
dated 10
July 2012
Consideration:
Rs.12 Lakhs;
Stamp Duty
paid:
Rs.60,000/-
Market Value:
Rs.73,72,82,50
0/-; Stamp
Duty leviable:
Rs.3,68,64,125
/-
21
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
36.According to the Petitioners, although the respective Deeds
of Conveyance were executed in the year 2012, they were only
consequential documents executed pursuant to the earlier
Development-cum-Sale Agreements entered into in the year 1985.
Those earlier agreements were unregistered and unstamped. It is
submitted that the 2012 Conveyances were executed only for
completing and perfecting the Petitioners' title to the subject lands
and, therefore, the transaction would fall within Section 4 of the
Act. The Petitioners contend that the Development Agreements
and the Powers of Attorney executed in 1985 were annexed to the
respective registered documents and, therefore, the complete
transaction was disclosed to the Authority. On this basis, it is
submitted that the stamp duty ought to have been determined
with reference to the market value of the lands in the year 1985
and not their market value in the year 2012.
37.The Petitioners contend that substantial portions of several
of the subject plots were affected by existing slums, R.G.
reservations, C.R.Z. reservations, D.P. Road reservations and other
restrictions under the Development Control and Promotion
Regulations. According to the Petitioners, these restrictions
reduced the value and development potential of the affected
portions of the lands, but the same were not considered by the
Authority. It is submitted that, since the transaction had in
substance taken place in the year 1985, the market value
prevailing in 1985 ought to have been considered for determining
the stamp duty and not the market value prevailing in 2012. The
Petitioners have raised certain other grounds of challenge, which,
22
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
according to the Respondents, do not require separate
consideration for deciding the present Petitions.
38.Mr. Naik submits that a plain reading of the Deeds of
Conveyance executed in 2012 shows that there is no recital, clause
or reference to any earlier document executed between the parties,
including the alleged agreements or Powers of Attorney of 1985.
There is no recital stating that the Conveyances were being
executed for completing or perfecting the title of the Petitioners to
the subject lands. Even the receipts relating to the consideration
paid to the vendors, which are appended to the respective deeds,
do not state that any balance consideration was being paid in 2012
pursuant to or in continuation of amounts paid in 1985. Similarly,
there is no recital, clause or reference in the Conveyances
regarding any portion of the subject plots being affected by
existing slums, R.G. reservations, C.R.Z. reservations, D.P. Road
reservations or any other such restrictions. It is submitted that,
having regard to Section 28 read with Section 4 of the Act, the
Petitioners were required to state fully and the facts and
circumstances which affected the chargeability of the instruments.
In the absence of such disclosure, the Authority was justified in
considering the document as it stood and in not looking beyond its
contents, unless the annexures were and unambiguously referred
to and incorporated into the document. According to the learned
Senior Advocate, any fact which has a direct bearing on the market
value, a fact which is relied upon to reduce the development
potential of the property, must either be stated in the main
document or be incorporated through an annexure which is and
23
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
unambiguously referred to in the document.
39.Reliance is placed upon the judgment dated 18 March 2025
passed by this Court in
Praman Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. It is
submitted that, while considering a similar issue and relying upon
the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Himalaya House Co. Ltd.
Bombay v. The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority,
this Court,
from paragraph 12 onwards, held as follows:
"12. A foundational question arises as to whether a recital
indicating the applicability of CRZ restrictions on a part of
the land - thereby potentially reducing the effective
development potential and hence impacting the sale
consideration-must mandatorily find place in the body of the
sale deed, or whether reference to an annexure would be
sufficient.
……………..
14. It is necessary to include in the main body of the
document all critical facts and recitals that go to the essence
of the sale consideration or that bear upon the market value.
Courts and authorities administering the stamp laws cannot
look beyond the four corners of the main text unless the
references to annexures are unambiguous. A recital affecting
market valuation, one that diminishes development
potential, must be set forth in the document or be
unambiguously incorporated through a referenced annexure.
15. The statutory framework If the principal instrument is
silent on CRZ restrictions and they appear solely in an
annexure that is vaguely referenced or not explicitly
incorporated, the stamp authorities are justified in
disregarding such vague recitals.
16. Therefore, in my opinion, a suitably incorporated
24
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
annexure that is referenced within the sale deed is to be
treated as part of the instrument and is necessary to place
the CRZ limitations on record for the purpose of assessing
market value. The omission of such an express reference
could lead to the authorities disregarding material
limitations and assessing stamp duty based on an inflated
market value.
17. ......…
18. The Supreme Court, while interpreting Section 27 of the
Indian Stamp Act, held that parties to a document are
required to set forth in the document fully and truly the
consideration (if any) and all other facts and circumstances
affecting the chargeability of the document with duty or the
amount of duty payable. The Court observed that no
provision in the Indian Stamp Act empowers the revenue
authorities to conduct an independent inquiry into the value
of the property conveyed. Additionally, the Court held that a
reference to an earlier transaction in a deed of assignment
does not amount to an incorporation of its terms unless the
document demonstrates the intention of the parties to adopt
such incorporation.
19. Therefore, in my opinion, while an annexure, if explicitly
referenced in the sale deed, may be deemed part of the
instrument for the purpose of stamp duty assessment, facts
and circumstances that bear upon the Floor Space Index
(FSI) and development potential of the property must
necessarily be stated on the face of the main deed. Any
ambiguity in referencing such limitations could lead to
incorrect assessments and disputes regarding valuation.”
40.Learned Senior Advocate submits that, when the Petitioners'
case is examined in the light of the above judgment, their
submissions cannot be accepted. According to him, none of the
25
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
impounded Conveyances refers to the alleged transaction of 1985.
There is no specific reference in the Conveyances to any portion of
the subject plots being affected by reservations or restrictions
which reduced their development potential.
41.It is submitted that the only conclusion possible is that the
transactions completed by the respective Deeds of Conveyance
dated 10 July 2012 were transactions completed in the year 2012
and not in the year 1985, as contended by the Petitioners. Reliance
is placed upon Section 2(na) of the Act, which defines "market
value" in relation to property which is the subject matter of an
instrument as the price which such property would have fetched if
sold in the open market on the date of execution of the instrument,
[or the consideration stated in the instrument whichever is
higher]. Reliance is placed upon Rule 2(1)(f), relating to
"valuation guidelines", and Rule 4, relating to the "Annual
Statement of rates of immovable property", of the Bombay Stamp
(Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules, 1995.
42.Without prejudice to the above submissions, Mr. Naik
submits that the compilations filed in each of the Petitions disclose
another important aspect. The compilations contain copies of the
registered documents. On a first reading, it may appear that the
entire document of 1985 formed part of the registered deed as an
annexure. However, according to the learned Senior Advocate, a
closer examination of the compilations shows otherwise.
43.In Writ Petition No.9358 of 2016, concerning Registered
Document No.5379/12. The "Seal of the Registrar" appears on
26
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
these pages. Only a part of the 1985 document is annexed and
bears the Seal of the Registrar. The 1985 document is annexed in
its entirety, but these pages do not bear the Seal of the Registrar.
The document contains the receipts bearing the Seal of the
Registrar.
44.In Writ Petition No.9359 of 2016, concerning Registered
Document No.5377/12 with the "Seal of the Registrar" appearing
on the relevant pages. The 1985 document is annexed in its
entirety. However, these pages do not bear the Seal of the
Registrar.
45.In Writ Petition No.9360 of 2016, concerning Registered
Document No.5380/12, with the "Seal of the Registrar" appearing
on the relevant pages. Only a part of the 1985 documents relating
to the respective plots is annexed with the Seal of the Registrar.
The 1985 document relating to Plot Nos.37 to 41 is annexed in its
entirety. However, these pages do not bear the Seal of the
Registrar. The document contains receipts bearing the Seal of the
Registrar.
46.In Writ Petition No.9361 of 2016, concerning Registered
Document No.5378/12, with the "Seal of the Registrar" appearing
on the relevant pages. Only a part of the 1985 document is
annexed with the Seal of the Registrar. The 1985 document is
annexed in its entirety, but these pages do not bear the Seal of the
Registrar. The document contains the receipts bearing the Seal of
the Registrar.
27
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
47.It may be contended by the Petitioners that, even if the
relevant portions of the 1985 documents were annexed to the
respective deeds, there was sufficient disclosure of the earlier
transaction. However, Mr. Naik submits that the 1985 documents
were neither referred to in the Conveyances nor annexed to them
in the manner contemplated by law. He submits that the judgment
of this Court referred to above squarely applies to the present case.
It is submitted that the recitals in the 1985 documents record that
the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act were applicable and
that the owners had made applications under Sections 20 and 21
of that Act, which were then pending. The Urban Land Ceiling Act
was subsequently repealed, and the repeal became applicable to
the State of Maharashtra with effect from 29 November 2007.
According to Mr. Naik, the subject lands were thereby freed from
the restrictions imposed by the ceiling law. The registered
Conveyances were executed in 2012, by which time the lands had
regained their value in the open market. It is submitted that this
circumstance supports the stand of the State that the 2012
documents were undervalued and that properties having a value
running into hundreds of crores of rupees were sought to be
transferred on payment of only nominal stamp duty.
48.Mr. Naik submits that, as recorded by the Authorities in the
impugned orders, the Petitioners had admitted that forged and
fabricated rent receipts had been produced in the proceedings to
support their case for reducing the market value of the properties.
It is submitted that, in view of such conduct, the Petitioners are not
entitled to seek any relief from this Court in the present Petitions.
28
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
As regards the determination of the market value, it is submitted
that the Authorities have correctly applied the yearly valuation
guidelines applicable to the year 2012. These guidelines prescribe
the method for valuation of different categories and uses of land
and different categories of constructed premises. They were issued
by the Revenue Department of the State under Rule 2(1)(f),
relating to "valuation guidelines", and Rule 4, relating to the
"Annual Statement of rates of immovable property", of the Bombay
Stamp (Determination of True Market Value of Property) Rules,
1995. The guidelines for the year 2012 were handed over across
the Bar, and reliance was placed upon Rules 17 and 22 thereof. It
is submitted that, while determining the market value of the
respective lands, the Authority has taken into account the relevant
factors relating to the market value prevailing in the year 2012
and has determined the stamp duty payable. The impugned orders,
according to the learned Senior Advocate, cannot be said to be
perverse, arbitrary or contrary to law so as to warrant interference
by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India. The Petitioners' challenge,
according to the Respondents, is without merit and the Petitions
are liable to be dismissed.
REASONS AND FINDINGS:
49.I have considered the submissions made by the Petitioners
and the State. Since the main questions in all the four Writ
Petitions are mostly common, they are being considered together.
29
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
50.The first question is what is the real nature of the
transaction. According to the Petitioners, the Conveyances made in
2012 were only the final documents by which the transactions
made in 1985, and in one case in 1996, were completed and the
title was formally transferred. According to the State, the
Conveyances of 2012 were independent instruments. Therefore,
according to the State, the market value of the properties in 2012
had to be taken.
51.The documents have to be seen together. A stamp duty
matter cannot be decided only by looking at the last document and
forgetting why and in what circumstances that document came to
be made. At the same time, it is not enough for a party to say that
all documents are one transaction. There must be some material
on record showing how the different documents are connected.
52.In the present case, such material is available. In Writ
Petition No.9358 of 2016, the transaction goes back to the
Development-cum-Sale Agreement dated 9 December 1985
concerning Plot D/40. The Petitioners rely upon the possession
given, payments made, the Power of Attorney and the substituted
Power of Attorney, followed by the Conveyance dated 10 July
2012. In Writ Petition No.9359 of 2016, the earlier Agreement for
Sale is dated 28 March 1996 concerning Plot D-34 and the later
Conveyance is again dated 10 July 2012. In Writ Petition No.9360
of 2016, the earlier Development-cum-Sale Agreements concern
several plots, namely D-37, D-38, D-39, D-39A, D-41, D-44, D-45
and D-46. In Writ Petition No.9361 of 2016, the earlier
Development-cum-Sale Agreement concerns D-36 and D-42.
30
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
Therefore, the earlier agreements, possession documents, Powers
of Attorney, receipts and final Conveyances cannot be seen as
papers having no connection with each other.
53.The Respondents are correct to some limited extent. Merely
because different documents relate to the same property, Section 4
does not apply. There must be one transaction and the several
instruments must have been used for completing that transaction.
But where the documents show that the later document was only
completing the transfer which had been agreed and acted upon
earlier, this requirement is satisfied. Section 4 is important. The
relevant provision reads:
“Section 4. Several instruments used in single transaction
of development agreement, sale, lease, mortgage or
settlement.—
(1) Where, in the case of any development agreement,
sale, lease, mortgage or settlement, several instruments are
employed for completing the transaction, the principal
instrument only shall be chargeable with the duty prescribed
in Schedule I for the conveyance, development agreement,
lease, mortgage or settlement, and each of the other
instruments shall be chargeable with a duty of five hundred
rupees instead of the duty (if any) prescribed for it in that
Schedule.”
54.This provision does not say that all documents must have the
same name. It does not say that all documents must be made on
the same date. What has to be seen is whether several instruments
were used for completing one transaction.
31
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
55.The same approach is found in Kumar Housing Corporation
Private Limited
. In paragraph 21 of that judgment, it was
observed:
“The Section 4 applies where “several instruments are
employed for completing the transaction”. Therefore, the
enquiry is not limited only to finding whether all documents
have the same title or whether they were executed on the
same date. What is required to be seen is whether several
instruments were in fact used for completing one transaction
of sale, development agreement, lease, mortgage, or
settlement.”56.The same judgment further records in paragraph 27:
“I am unable to accept this submission in the manner in
which it is made. Section 4 applies where several
instruments are employed for completing a single transaction
of, amongst other things, “development agreement” or
“sale”. Therefore, merely because one document may have
the character of a development agreement and the final
document is a conveyance, that fact by cannot take the
matter outside the scope of Section 4. The entire transaction
is required to be examined.”
57.The above principle concerns the main approach taken by
the Authorities in the present cases. The Authorities have given
much importance to the fact that the earlier documents were
called Development-cum-Sale Agreements or Agreement for Sale,
whereas the later documents were Conveyances. But the name
given to a document is not the complete test. What was the
transaction? What rights were created by the earlier documents?
Was possession given? Was consideration paid? Was authority to
develop, deal with and ultimately transfer the property given? Was
32
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
the final Conveyance only the document by which the earlier
arrangement was completed? These are the questions which have
to be seen.
58.On these questions, the material before the Court supports
the Petitioners. The earlier documents created rights in favour of
the Petitioners. The Petitioners rely upon possession, payment of
consideration, Powers of Attorney and receipts. The later
Conveyances were made in favour of the same Petitioners for the
same plots and according to the earlier arrangements. The
documents relied upon by the Petitioners do not show that a new
agreement was made for the first time in 2012. The long gap
between the earlier agreements and the final Conveyances does
not end the earlier transaction. Delay in making the final
Conveyance may have some other legal consequences, but such
delay alone does not make one transaction into two separate
transactions. The question still is whether the final document was
made for completing the earlier agreement.
59.The State has relied upon Section 28 and the judgment in
Praman Infrastructure Private Limited. That judgment does lay
down an important principle. The Authority cannot be expected to
reconstruct a transaction from vague or incomplete material.
Paragraph 13 states:
“The authorities cannot disregard material recitals found in
an annexure, provided the main deed unambiguously
incorporat es it.”
60.Paragraph 14 further states:
33
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
“It is necessary to include in the main body of the document
all critical facts and recitals that go to the essence of the sale
consideration or that bear upon the market value. Courts
and authorities administering the stamp laws cannot look
beyond the four corners of the main text unless the
references to annexures are unambiguous.”
61.Paragraph 15 of Praman Infrastructure states:
“If the principal instrument is silent on CRZ restrictions and
they appear solely in an annexure that is vaguely referenced
or not explicitly incorporated, the stamp authorities are
justified in disregarding such vague recitals.”
62.And paragraph 16 states:
“Therefore, in my opinion, a suitably incorporated annexure
that is referenced within the sale deed is to be treated as part
of the instrument and is necessary to place the CRZ
limitations on record for the purpose of assessing market
value.”
63.The above principle has to be applied, but it has to be
applied to the particular issue for which it was stated.
Praman
Infrastructure
was concerned with facts which were relied upon
for reducing market value, such as CRZ restrictions, FSI, leasehold
limitations and tenant occupation. The position in the present four
petitions is somewhat different. The Petitioners are not asking the
Court to bring some outside fact into the Conveyances only for
reducing their value. They rely upon the earlier instruments for
showing that the Conveyances of 2012 were part of the same
transaction. There is a difference between the two matters. One is
a fact relating to the property which may reduce its market value,
such as CRZ restriction, reservation or restricted development
34
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
potential. Such fact has to be stated in the instrument or made part
of it. The other question is whether the instrument under
consideration is one of several instruments used for completing the
same transaction. For deciding this second question, the complete
chain of documents has to be seen. Section 4 requires such
consideration.
64.The Respondents say that the Conveyances of 2012 did not
contain any recital that they were only completing the transactions
of 1985 or 1996. They say there was no recital about the balance
consideration and that the earlier documents were only annexed.
This submission cannot be ignored. An express recital would have
been better and could have avoided later disputes. But absence of
one particular sentence in the final Conveyance cannot wipe out
the earlier instruments, possession documents, Powers of Attorney
and receipts, when all these documents are on record and were
considered by the Respondents while deciding the stamp duty
issue.
65.The objection based on Section 28 cannot be applied in such
a way that Section 4 becomes without meaning. Section 4 speaks
of a situation where “several instruments” are used for completing
a transaction. Therefore, the Authority has to identify the different
instruments and decide whether, taken together, they form one
transaction. This exercise cannot be avoided only because the final
document does not repeat every fact which was contained in the
earlier documents.
35
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
66.The judgment in Kumar Housing is relevant on this point. In
paragraph 37, this Court observed:
“The impugned orders have proceeded on the basis that
because the earlier documents and the final Conveyance
were described differently, Section 4 could not apply. This
approach does not consider the statutory requirement
whether the several instruments were “employed for
completing the transaction”. The Authorities have
concentrated on the separate names and descriptions of the
documents.”
67.The judgment further observed:
“The continuous nature of the transaction and the fact that
the final Conveyance completed the transfer contemplated
under the earlier arrangements has not been given proper
effect.”
68.The same reasoning applies in the present cases. If the
earlier agreements are read along with the possession documents,
Powers of Attorney and receipts, and the final Conveyances are
seen in that background, it would not be proper to divide the
transaction into one earlier transaction which had ended and
another new transaction starting in 2012. The final Conveyances
were made for completing the transfer which had been
contemplated under the earlier arrangements.
69.I have considered the submission of the Respondents that in
some cases the copies of the earlier documents produced by the
Petitioners were not sealed copies or were not complete copies of
the registered documents. This objection may have some relevance
when the Authority has to decide whether a particular document is
36
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
proved or whether a particular fact can be accepted. But here the
identity of the earlier transactions is not being shown from one
loose document only. There is a chain of documents consisting of
the agreements, possession-related documents, Powers of Attorney,
receipts and final Conveyances. The Respondents examined the
compilations and relied upon the earlier documents while putting
forward their case. Therefore, this objection does not destroy the
connection between the different instruments.
70.The Respondents next submit that some of the earlier
documents referred to restrictions under the Urban Land Ceiling
Act and that the ULC regime was repealed in Maharashtra with
effect from 29 November 2007. According to the Respondents,
after such repeal the properties got greater open-market value and
the State was justified in taking the later value. This submission
does not answer the main question. The repeal of the ULC law may
have relevance when the actual market value on a particular date
is considered. But the first question before the Court is whether the
Conveyances of 2012 were independent transactions or whether
they were instruments used for completing the earlier transactions.
If Section 4 applies, the State cannot avoid Section 4 merely by
saying that the value of the property had increased later. Increase
in value of a property does not make a new sale.
71.The Respondents say that the transactions under the earlier
documents were separate and the Conveyances of 2012 must be
valued independently. I am unable to accept this submission. The
material shows continuity in the parties, continuity in the
properties and continuity in the rights which were being
37
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
transferred. The later Conveyances do not show that the properties
were purchased for the first time in 2012. There is no material
showing that a fresh agreement was entered into in 2012 at the
market value then prevailing. The consideration mentioned in the
2012 documents is not shown to be the price of a new transaction
entered into in 2012.
72.The Petitioners rely upon Section 2(na), which provides:
“Section 2 (na) “market value” in relation to any property
which is the subject matter of an instrument, means the price
which such property would have fetched if sold in open
market on the date of execution of such instrument or the
consideration stated in the instrument, whichever is higher;”
73.This definition makes the date of execution relevant where
the instrument is independently liable to ad valorem duty. But
Section 2(na) cannot be read separately from Section 4. First, it
has to be decided whether the instrument is an independent
taxable transaction or whether it is one of several instruments used
for completing the same transaction. The same reasoning is found
in
Kumar Housing, paragraphs 33 and 34. Paragraph 33 holds that
the date of execution of “such instrument” becomes relevant where
the instrument is independently liable to ad valorem duty.
Paragraph 34 then makes the important point that the 2012
market value cannot be applied by treating the final document as a
new independent transaction when the documents in fact form
part of one transaction under Section 4. Therefore, the submission
of the State that Section 2(na) requires the market value of 2012
in every case cannot be accepted. Section 2(na) does not permit
the Revenue to ignore Section 4. Both provisions have to be read
38
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
and applied together.
74.The Petitioners have challenged the manner in which the
Ready Reckoner rates were applied. They say that the properties
were affected by various restrictions, including slum conditions,
CRZ or environmental restrictions, mangroves, reservations, road
reservations and other development restrictions. The Respondents,
on the other hand, rely upon the Annual Statement of Rates and
the applicable 2012 guidelines and say that the valuation was
made according to the prescribed rates.
75.On this issue, the submission of the Petitioners that a Ready
Reckoner rate is not conclusive is well founded as a matter of
principle. The material relied upon by the Petitioners from
Prasadnagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. refers to the
observation of the Supreme Court that:
“The guideline value has relevance only in the context of
section 47-A ... Thus, the guideline value fixed is not final
but only a prima facie rate prevailing in an area. ... The
authorities cannot regard the guideline valuation as the last
word on the subject of market value.”
76.Therefore, the Ready Reckoner rate can be used as a starting
point for valuation. But it does not prove the actual market value
in every case. The Respondents were required to consider the
circumstances of the particular properties which had a real effect
on their value. At the same time, in the present cases, I do not find
it necessary to separately decide the exact market value of each of
the four properties for the year 2012. This is because that question
becomes unnecessary once it is held that the Conveyances of 2012
39
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
were not independent fresh transactions for the purpose of the
disputed levy. The same approach was adopted in
Kumar Housing,
where it was observed that the question whether the 2012 market
value was otherwise correct “loses its importance” once Section 4
is applied.
77.Therefore, the submissions relating to CRZ, mangroves,
reservations, slums and other restrictions do not require separate
decision for deciding whether the impugned demands can
continue. This is not because such factors can never affect market
value. They may have such effect. But the impugned demand was
based on the assumption that the Conveyances of 2012 were
independent transactions liable to stamp duty on the 2012 market
value. That basic assumption cannot be sustained.
78.I have considered the submission that the Petitioners had
taken different stands at different stages and that some documents
were earlier described as Development Agreements whereas later
they were referred to as Agreements for Sale. There is some
substance in the criticism of the Respondents. A party cannot be
allowed to change the description of a document only for getting
some financial benefit. But that does not finish the matter. The
legal character of an instrument cannot be decided only from the
label given to it by a party. The Court has to see the substance and
legal effect of the document.
Kumar Housing, paragraphs 29 and
30, considered this aspect and held that inconsistency in
description does not permit the Revenue to impose stamp duty
contrary to the statute. The relevant principle was stated in these
words:
40
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
“Stamp duty is required to be determined according to the
real nature and legal effect of the instrument. The liability
cannot be decided only on the basis of estoppel when the
document and the provisions of law require examination of
its real substance.”
79.I apply the same principle here. The Petitioners cannot claim
any benefit merely by changing the name of a document. But at
the same time, the State cannot impose a fresh levy merely
because the Petitioners used a different description at a different
stage. The documents have to be examined. On such examination,
the earlier agreements created substantive rights, possession and
authority in favour of the Petitioners, and the later Conveyances
completed those earlier arrangements.
80.The allegation regarding forged or fabricated rent receipts
requires consideration. The Respondents say that the Authorities
recorded that forged or fabricated receipts had been produced for
reducing the market value. Such allegation is serious. Even if there
was some irregularity concerning any particular receipt, that
cannot change the legal nature of the Conveyances of 2012. The
question before the Court is the statutory liability of those
instruments. An allegation concerning one supporting document
cannot be used to create a new taxable transaction contrary to
Section 4.
81.I have considered the submission regarding failure to register
or regularise some of the earlier documents within the prescribed
time and the reliance placed by the Authorities on the delay. Delay
may have some consequences under the Registration Act or other
provisions of law. But delay does not answer the question arising
41
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
under Section 4. The question remains whether several
instruments were used for completing one transaction.
Kumar
Housing
, paragraph 38, reaches the same conclusion and holds
that delay in registration cannot convert an otherwise continuous
transaction into several independent transactions.
82.The Respondents rely upon the fact that the Conveyances of
2012 do not say, in words, that they are only “completion” or
“perfection” documents. This submission has some force from the
drafting point of view, but it cannot be treated as a complete
answer in law. The Court is not deciding the matter only on the
basis of one sentence or one omission. The transaction has to be
seen as a whole. Section 4 requires the several instruments used
for completing the transaction to be identified. I hold that the
earlier Development-cum-Sale Agreements and Agreement for
Sale, the connected possession documents, Powers of Attorney,
receipts and the Conveyances dated 10 July 2012 constitute
several instruments employed for completing the same underlying
transactions within the meaning of Section 4 of the Maharashtra
Stamp Act, 1958.
83.This conclusion does not mean that no stamp duty can ever
be charged. Section 4 does not give exemption from stamp duty. It
only provides the manner in which stamp duty is to be charged
where several instruments are used for completing one
transaction. The principal instrument has to be dealt with
according to the duty prescribed for the principal transaction and
the other instruments have to be dealt with in the manner
provided under Section 4. The basic error in the impugned orders
42
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
is more fundamental. The Authorities treated the Conveyances of
2012 as if an entirely new sale had taken place in 2012 and
thereafter applied the market value of 2012 to that fresh
transaction. The material on record does not support this basic
factual assumption. The Authorities were first required to consider
the legal relationship between the earlier instruments and the final
Conveyances. Instead, the impugned orders proceeded on the
different names of the documents, the long passage of time and
the later increase in market value. Such approach does not give
proper effect to Section 4.
84.Consequently, the findings recorded by the Collector of
Stamps and affirmed in appeal, to the extent they proceed on the
basis that the Conveyances of 2012 were independent transactions
liable to fresh stamp duty on the market value of 2012, cannot be
sustained. The consequential demand for deficit stamp duty and
the penalty based upon such alleged deficit must fail.
85.The petitions deserve to be allowed on merits.
86.In view of the foregoing discussion and for the reasons
recorded hereinabove, the following order is passed:
(i) Writ Petition Nos.9358 of 2016, 9359 of 2016, 9360 of
2016 and 9361 of 2016 are allowed;
(ii) The impugned orders dated 3 March 2016 passed by
the Appellate Authority under Section 32B of the
Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, and the orders dated 9
October 2014 passed by the concerned Collector of Stamps
under the provisions of the said Act, are quashed and set
43
wp9358-2016 & connected-J.doc
aside;
(iii) The consequential penalty, interest and recovery
proceedings founded upon the impugned alleged deficit
stamp duty are quashed and set aside;
(iv) Rule is made absolute in the above terms.
(v) There shall be no order as to costs.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
44
Legal Notes
Add a Note....