Civil Revision, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, Coal Bearing Areas Acquisition and Development Act 1957, Jurisdiction, Limitation, Declaration of Title, Compensation, Tribunal, Madhya Pradesh High Court
 06 Jan, 2026
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Atul Kumar Pathak And Others Versus Ramsakhi Devi And Others

  Madhya Pradesh High Court CIVIL REVISION No. 788 of 2023
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Case Background

As per case facts, the petitioners (defendants) challenged a trial court order that partially rejected their application under Order 7 Rule 11, arguing the entire suit was not maintainable and ...

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Document Text Version

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT JABALPUR

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN

CIVIL REVISION No. 788 of 2023

ATUL KUMAR PATHAK AND OTHERS

Versus

RAMSAKHI DEVI AND OTHERS

Appearance:

Shri Rohit Sohgaura - Advocate for petitioners.

Shri Brahmendra Prasad Pathak - Advocate for respondent No.1.

Shri Arihant Tiwari - Advocate for respondents No.2, 4 to 7.

Shri Guru Prasanna Singh Parihar - Advocate for respondent No.12.

Shri Amit Mishra - Panel Lawyer for respondents No.11 and 13.

ORDER

(Reserved on :01.12.2025)

(Pronounced on :06.01.2026)

The present petition has been filed by the defendants being

aggrieved by the order passed by the trial Court dated 14.08.2023, whereby

the trial Court has rejected the application under Order 7 Rule 11 filed by

the present petitioners-defendants on all grounds, except on the ground of

valuation and Court fees and granted liberty to the plaintiffs to correct the

valuation and pay the Court fees accordingly.

2. The case of the petitioners is that the suit was not maintainable at

all and therefore, the trial Court ought to have rejected the plaint altogether

and on this ground the impugned order passed by the trial Court is put to

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challenge and prayer is made to reject the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11

CPC.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the suit was

not at all maintainable and it was the fit case to exercise jurisdiction vested

in the Court under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC so as to save the parties from

unnecessary trial of the suit.It is argued that in appropriate case the Court

should exercise the jurisdiction under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, rather than

forcing the parties into unnecessary trial of a suit which clearly is barred by

law.

4. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the suit has

been filed by the plaintiff - respondent No.1 seeking declaration of title and

challenging the sale deed executed in favour of the present petitioners-

defendants No.10 to 16. It is argued that the suit has been filed in the year

2022 and challenge is made to the sale deed executed in favour of

defendants No.10 to 16 by the defendants No.1 to 8. The plaintiff is the

sister of defendant Nos.1 and 2 and defendant Nos.3 to 8 are the children of

defendant Nos.1 and 2. In this manner, defendant Nos.1 to 8 are brothers

and nephews of the plaintiff and defendant No.9 is the sister's son of the

plaintiff.

5. It is argued that the sale deed(s)executed by defendants No.1 to 8

in favour of the petitioners being defendants No.10 to 16 have been

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challenged in the year 2022, but in the entire plaint, the date of the sale

deed is not mentioned and therefore, it cannot be inferred that the limitation

in the present case is a mixed question of law and fact so as to be decided

in trial after evidence.It would have been a mixed question of law and fact

if the date of sale deed had been disclosed and any explanation had been

put forth to challenge the sale deed at this point of time. It is argued that

the sale deed(s) in favour of the petitioners are of the year 2012 and the suit

has been filed after 10 years and just to get over limitation the dates of the

sale deed have not been disclosed in the plaint and therefore, the trial Court

could not have held that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact.

6. It is further argued that the suit is barred by law because the land

has been subject matter of acquisition under Coal Bearing Areas

Acquisition and Development Act, 1957 (for short referred to as ‘Act of

1957’). It is argued that under the Act of 1957, Notification under Section

7(1) was issued on 13.08.2020 and even the Notification under Section 10,

which relates to vesting of the land in the Government was issued on

06.08.2021, whereas the suit has been filed in the year 2022. It is argued

that the land having been vested in the Central Government, now the

plaintiff can only sue for share in compensation and the compensation is

determined as per Section 14 of Act of 1957 and any dispute as to the

person entitled to receive compensation has to be raised under Section

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17(2) before the Tribunal constituted under the Act of 1957.It is further

argued that as per Section 26 of Act of 1957, civil suit is barred and

therefore, the suit was clearly barred by law and the trial Court has gravely

erred in overlooking this important aspect of the case.

7. Per contra,learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the

judgment of the High Court of Bombay in Sandeep vs. Suchita and others

2019 SCC OnLine Bom 13281, to argue that the Tribunal under Act of

1957 cannot decide title disputes, which are complex issues and therefore,

in view of Section 9 of CPC, the suit cannot be held to be barred by law

unless specifically barred.It is further argued that the suit could not have

been held to be barred by limitation, because limitation is a mixed issue of

law and fact and the trial Court has rightly directed that limitation cannot

be decided without sending the parties to trial.On these assertions, it is

prayed to reject the petition.

8. Heard.

9. In the present case, the issue of limitation is taken up first. As per

Article 58 and 59 of Limitation Act, the following has been provided:-

Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which

period begins to run

58. To obtain any other

declaration.

Three years. When the right to sue

first accrues.

59. To cancel or set

aside an instrument or

Three years. When the facts entitling

the plaintiff to have the

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decree or for the

rescission of a contract.

instrument or decree

cancelled or set aside

or the contract

rescinded first become

known to him.

10. The limitation to set aside an instrument is 3 years and the

starting point of limitation would be the time when the facts entitling the

plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside first become known

to him. The issue would be a mixed question of law and fact, if anything

has been set up by the plaintiff that the relevant fact of execution of sale

deed was not known to the plaintiff. Though the date of sale deed which

the plaintiff seeks to get set aside, is disclosed in the entire plaint, but in

paragraph 11 of the plaint, it has been mentioned that up to one year prior

to filing of the suit the land was fallow and now a house has been started to

be constructed by the defendants No.10 to 16/present petitioners on the

land. It is also pleaded that when the plaintiff visited the spot on

27.02.2022 she came to know that there has been a sale deed in favour of

defendants No.10 to 16. Though the date of sale deed is not disclosed in the

plaint, but the date of knowledge of sale is mentioned in paragraph 11 of

the plaint as 27.02.2022 and therefore, in the opinion of this Court, this

issue would become amixed issue of law and fact,because there is pleading

of sale deed having come to knowledge of the plaintiff only in February,

2022.

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11. So far as the suit being barred by law and barred by Section 26 of

Act of 1957 is concerned, it is not in dispute that Notification under

Section 7(1), which is Notification of intention to acquire the land was

issued on 13.08.2020 and Notification under Section 10, which is the

declaration of acquisition and consequential vesting on the land in the

Central Government, has been issued on 06.08.2021. It is argued before

this Court that all the questions of title are now not real issues, but virtual

issues, because now the only question remains as to the entitled person to

receive compensation and the compensation is to be determined as per

Section 14 and the quantum of compensation has to be determined by the

Tribunal under Section 14.Even the dispute of the persons entitled to

receive the compensation has to be determined by the Tribunal under

Section 17. Therefore, the suit is barred under Section 26, because all these

issues are required to be determined by the Central Government or the

authority competent under the Act of 1957, which would lead to divesting

of jurisdiction from the Civil Court.

12. Relevant Sections 7, 10, 14, 17 and 26 of Act of 1957 are as

under:-

“7. Power to acquire land or rights in or over land

notified under section 4.—

(1) If the CentralGovernment is satisfied that coal is

obtainable in the whole or any part of the land notified

undersub-section (1) of section 4, it may, within a period of

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two years from the date of the said notification orwithin such

further period not exceeding one year in the aggregate as the

Central Government mayspecify in this behalf, by notification

in the Official Gazette, give notice of its intention to acquire

thewhole or any part of the land or of any rights in or over

such land, as the case may be.

10. Vesting of land or rights in Central

Government.—(1) On the publication in the OfficialGazette

of the declaration under section 9, the land or the rights in or

over the land, as the case may be,shall vest absolutely in the

Central Government 6[free from all encumbrances].

(2) Where the rights under any mining lease 1[granted or

deemed to have been granted by a StateGovernment] to any

person are acquired under this Act, the Central Government

shall, on and from thedate of such vesting, be deemed to have

become the lessee of the State Government as if a mining

leaseunder the Mineral Concession Rules had been granted by

the State Government to the CentralGovernment, the period

thereof being the entire period for which such a lease could

have been granted bythe State Government under those rules.

14. Method of determining compensation.—

(1) Where the amount of any compensation

payableunder this Act can be fixed by agreement, it shall be

paid in accordance with such agreement.

(2) Where no such agreement can be reached, the

Central Government shall constitute a Tribunalconsisting of a

person who is or has been or is qualified to be a Judge of a

High Court for the purpose ofdetermining the amount.

(3) The Central Government may in any particular case

nominate a person having expert knowledgein mining to assist

the Tribunal, and where such nomination is made, the person

or persons interested mayalso nominate any other person for

the same purpose.

(4) At the commencement of the proceedings before the

Tribunal the Central Government and theperson interested

shall state what in their respective opinions is a fair amount of

compensation.

(5) The Tribunal shall after hearing the dispute, make

an award determining the amount ofcompensation which

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appears to it to be just, and specify the person or persons to

whom the compensationshall be paid; and in making the

award the Tribunal shall have regard to the circumstances of

each caseand to the foregoing provisions of this Act with

respect to the manner in which the amount ofcompensation

shall be determined in so far as the said provisions or any of

them may be applicable.

(6) Where there is a dispute as to the person or persons

entitled to compensation and the Tribunalfinds that more

persons than one are entitled to compensation, it shall

apportion the amount thereofamong such persons and in such

manner as it thinks fit.

(7) Nothing in the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940),

shall apply to any proceedings under thissection.

(8) The Tribunal, in the proceedings before it, shall

have all the powers which a civil court haswhile trying a suit

under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in

respect of the followingmatters, namely:—

(i) summoning and enforcing the attendance of

any person and examining him on oath;

(ii) requiring the discovery and production of any

document;

(iii) reception of evidence on affidavits;

(iv) requisitioning any public record from any

court or office; and

(v) issuing commissions for examination of

witnesses.]

17. Payment of compensation.—(1) Any compensation

payable under this Act may be tendered orpaid to the persons

interested entitled thereto, and the Central Government shall

pay it to them unlessprevented by some one or more of the

contingencies mentioned in sub-section (2).

(2) If the persons interested entitled thereto shall not

consent to receive it or if there be any dispute asto the

sufficiency of the amount of compensation or the title to

receive it or the apportionment thereof, the Central

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Government shall deposit the amount of compensation with

the Tribunal:

Provided that any person admitted to be interested may

receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the

amount:

[Provided further that every person who claims to be an

interested person (whether such person hasbeen admitted to

be interested or not) including the person referred to in the

preceding proviso shall beentitled to prefer a claim for

compensation before the Tribunal:

Provided also that no person who has received the

amount otherwise than under protest shall beentitled to prefer

any such claim before the Tribunal.]

(3) When the amount of compensation is not paid or

deposited as required by this section, the CentralGovernment

shall be liable to pay interest thereon at the rate of five per

centum per annum from the timethe compensation became due

until it shall have been so paid or deposited.

26. Jurisdiction of civil courts.—Save as otherwise

expressly provided in this Act, no civil courtshall have

jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Central

Government or the competent authorityor any other person is

empowered by or under this Act to determine.”

13. As per Section 10 Notification has already been issued by the

Central Government on 06.10.2021 and the land has been vested in the

Central Government. As per Section 14(1), compensation has to be

determined by agreement and where no agreement can be reached,

compensation would be determined by a Tribunal under Section 14(2),

which shall consist of a person who is or has been or is qualified to be a

Judge of the High Court.

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14. As per Section 14 (5), the Tribunal shall make an award and

have all the powers of the Civil Court in terms of Section 14 (8). It is

further provided in Section 17 (2) that if the persons interested do not

consent to receive the compensation or there is any dispute as to the

sufficiency of the amount or as to the apportionment of the compensation,

then the Central Government shall deposit the amount of compensation

before the Tribunal and the claim by any person, who claims to be

interested person shall be entitled to prefer such claim before the Tribunal.

Therefore, it appears that the question that whether the plaintiff being sister

of defendant Nos.1 and 2 and being the aunt of defendants Nos.3 to 9 is

entitled to any share in compensation can very well be raised by her in

terms of Section 14(2) read with Section 17(2) of Act of 1957. Since the

title of the land now vests in the Central Government upon issuance of

Notification under Section 10 of Act of 1957, therefore, the only question

that now remains is the right of the plaintiff to receive share in

compensation, and nothing else.

15. The counsel for the respondents have relied on judgement of the

Bombay High Court in Sandeep (Supra). In the aforesaid judgement, the

Single Bench of Bombay High Court has held that the Tribunal cannot

determine the questions of title where the questions involved decision on

important civil and property rights, and therefore, this decision must

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necessarily be that of the Civil Court. However, the Bombay High Court

seems to have skipped the provision of Section 14(2), though quoted in the

order, that the Tribunal shall consist of a person who is or has been or is

qualified to be Judge of High Court, implying thereby that he would be a

person of legal acumen and not be a quasi-judicial authority.It is informed

that at present the Tribunal is handed headed by a serving Principal District

Judge.

16. The same issue has been considered by the Patna High Court and

by the Jharkhand High Court. The High Court of Patna in the case of

Somra Manjhl alias Somaru Manjhlvs Central Coal fields Ltd. and

Others, 1996 SCC OnLine Pat 648 has categorically held that once the

main purpose of the suit is nothing but getting compensation, then the suit

cannot be said to be maintainable even if it is a suit seeking declaration of

title and interest in the suit property. It has been held that such matters can

very well be agitated before the Tribunal under Section 17 of Act of 1957

and suits have to be held to be barred under Section 26 of the Act of 1957.

The Patna High Court has held as under:-

“3. The suit was contested by filing separate written

statements by defendants No. 1 to 5 and also by defendant No.

6. Juridictional point was raised by defendant No.6 referring

to bar under Sec. 26 of the Act. Though it has not been

stated/averred specifically about the notifications being made

by the Central Government under the Act or no challenge has

been made regarding the acquisition under the Act and

notifications being made but it appears that the plaintiff

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artistically designed the plaint for avoiding the title being

transferred of the lands to the Central Government but the

main purport of the suit is nothing but getting compensation in

lieu of the acquisition in favour of the plaintiff instead of

defendant No. 6.

4. When the notification is being made as is stated

specifically in the written statement then practically there

cannot be any scope of declaration of title of the plaintiff over

the suit land without challenging the notification itself. For

payment of compensation, the Act itself is a self-contained Act

giving all provisions as to how the compensation is to be made

by the original owner. If the rightful owner is deprived of

compensation then he had got scope to agitate the matter and

the Central Government in appropriate case is to constitute a

tribunal for the purpose of disbursement of compensation

under Sec. 17 of the Act and there is also a provision of

appeal against the decision of the Tribunal before the High

Court under Sec.,20 of the Act. When once acquisition is made

regarding disbursement of compensation and other matters

ancillary to can be decided within the scope of the Act itself

and such power has been barred under Sec. 26 of the Act of

the Civil Court's jurisdiction. It is well settled law that Civil

Court's jurisdiction is vast and the same cannot be curtailed

unless there is a specific bar put by any other self-contained

Act.

5. It is the contention of Mr. N.K. Prasad, learned

counsel appearing for on behalf of the plaintiff, that such sort

of jurisdiction points is mixed question of law and facts and in

the present case, the same being a complicated one, the

learned court below and committed error of law in deciding

this jurisdictional matter when the suit was proceeding for

hearing and two witnesses have already been examined for

and on behalf of the plaintiff. His further submission is that

this jurisdictional point was never raised by the defendant

Nos. 1 to 5 but the same was only raised by defendant No. 6, a

private defendant and the same ought not to have been

entertained at such belated stage of the suit. Jurisdictional

point that too in respect of territorial jurisdiction can be

raised by the Court itself even if there is no point being raised

from the side of the contesting parties. I do not find any

jurisdictional error when the court took up the matter

although at a belated stage.

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6. Now the point in question is whether a person

deprived of compensation for acquisition under the Act is

entitled to come to a Civil Court or not. Definitely, the bar put

under Sec. 26 of the Act deprives the plaintiff from coming

with such point. I have already mentioned that the main

purport of the plaint was to get compensation and service of

one of the dependants of the plaintiff in lieu of acquisition

although the question of title was raised only to bring the suit

within the fold of the Civil Court. The trick of pleadings and

the camouflage of the reliefs are not decisive in the matter but

the space of the question or the effect of the reliefs are to be

considered to decide the jurisdiction point. Reference in this

connection may be made to the case of Vatticherukuru Village

Panchayat v. Nori Madhusudan, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228. In

the present case it appears that the reliefs claimed in the suit

are nothing but the question as to who is entitled to

compensation either the plaintiff or defendant No. 6 vis-a-

vis as to whose title was there over the acquired land at the

time of acquisition and this matter is exclusively within the

jurisdiction of the particular tribunal to be set up for the

purpose under Sec. 17 of the Act. The Civil Court can have no

jurisdiction as per bar being created under Sec. 26 of the Act.

The learned court below had rightly held that the Civil Court

has got no jurisdiction to try the plaintiff's suit. It appears

from the order of this Court in relation to the present dispute

in C.W.J.C. No. 1307 of 1990 (R) raised by defendant No. 6

regarding payment of compensation that no tribunal was set

up for the purpose of deciding compensation as there were no

other claimants except defendant No. 6. If the plaintiff feels

that he has been deprived of getting legitimate right of

compensation, then he is at liberty to move the appropriate

authorities for setting up of a tribunal u/Sec. 17 of the Act and

if the same is being denied, he can have the liberty to move

before an appropriate forum for redressal of his grievance,

but it is maintained that the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction

for redressal of the grievance of the plaintiff.”

17. The same issue was raised by the High Court of Jharkhand also

in S.A. No.201/2005 (Most. Shanti Devi& others vs. Md. Abdul and

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others) decided on 28.11.2022. The Jharkhand High Court has held as

under:-

“17. So far as the contention of Mr. Amar Kumar

Sinha, learned counsel for the respondents that learned

tribunal constituted under the provisions of the said Act, has

no power to adjudicate the title of the contesting parties is

concerned, a plain reading of the Section 17(2) of the said

Act, goes to show that interalia, in case of dispute in title

between the claimants for compensation, the Central

Government shall deposit the amount of compensation with

the tribunal and Section 14 (5) of the said Act envisages the

procedure which is to be adopted by the tribunal and one

should not loose sight of the fact about the stature of the

person who constitute the tribunal, being a person who is or

has been or qualified to be a judge of a High Court, which in

other words means a person of experienced judicial mind

having all the expertise and traits that is required to

adjudicate every aspects of law involved in the matters before

such tribunal. Unlike the revenue statutes or unlike the

statutes of settlement operation, there is no provision in Coal

Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 that

in case of dispute of title, the matter be referred to the civil

court rather the power vested under Section 14(8) upon the

tribunal, has empowered it to exercise the powers of a civil

court while trying the suit under the Code of Civil Procedure,

for the purpose of summoning, discovery and production of

documents, reception of evidence on affidavits, requisitioning

any public record and issuing commissions for examination of

witnesses. The vesting of all such powers on the tribunal and

under the circumstances discussed above, leads one to only

corollary that learned tribunal under the Coal Bearing Areas

(Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 can adjudicate the

disputed title of claimants in respect of acquired property

before it at least to the limited extent of as to which of the

disputing parties are entitled to the compensation amount

deposited by the Central government with it. Hence, this court

is not persuaded by the submissions made by the learned

counsel for the respondents that learned tribunal constituted

under Section 14 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and

Development) Act, 1957 does not have the power to

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adjudicate the title of the claimants in respect of the acquired

property.

18.Now coming to the judgment of SomraManjhi @

SomaruManjhi vs. Central Coal Fields Ltd. &Ors. (supra) is

concerned, in that well discussed judgment, after taking all the

relevant laws, the Hon’ble Patna High Court has come to the

conclusion that the suit for adjudication of right, title, interest

and possession over the lands acquired under the provisions

of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act,

1957, cannot be entertained by the Civil Court in view of the

burden of jurisdiction of the civil court contained under

Section 26 of the said Act.

19. As rightly, submitted by Mr. P.P.N. Roy, learned

seniorcounsel for the appellant, this court does not find, after

carefully going through both the Exhibit C and C/1 that

therein, it has been mentioned that the compensation has been

fixed according to the agreement of the representatives of the

land owners, as claimed by learned trial court in paragraph

57 of its judgment. The same is an error of record committed

by the trial court; as such claim of the trial court is not a fact

rather the Exhibit C/1 goes to show that such compensation

has been quantified by the officers deputed by the State

Government.

20.Under such circumstances, this court has no

hesitation in holding that the civil court has no jurisdiction to

try the instant suit, the suit land of which is a land admittedly

acquired under the provisions of the Coal Bearing Areas

(Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 and admittedly

notices for receipt of the compensation under the said Act, has

already been issued by the concerned authority. Hence, the

sole substantial question of law is answered in affirmative by

holding that in the instant case, the civil court has no

jurisdiction to try the suit, in view of Section 26 of the Coal

Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957.”

18. Looking to the scheme of Act of 1957, and most particularly

Section 14, 17 and 26 thereof, this Court is in agreement with the view

taken by Patna and Jharkhand High Courts. It is clear that in the present

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case, once the suit has been filed after issuance of Notification under

Section 10 of Act of 1957 and the land stood vested in the Central

Government prior to filing of the suit, therefore, the suit is clearly not

maintainable and is barred by law and it was a fit case where the trial Court

ought to have exercised the jurisdiction vested in it under Order 7 Rule 11

CPC and avoided trying a suit, which is patently barred by law.

19. Consequently, the revision is allowed. The order of the trial

Court is set aside. The application filed by the petitioner under Order 7

Rule 11 CPC is allowed and the plaint stands rejected on the ground of the

suit being barred by Section 26 of Act of 1957. Parties to bear their own

costs.

(VIVEK JAIN)

JUDGE

rj

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