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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 4532 of 2006

PETITIONER:

Avtar Singh Hit

RESPONDENT:

Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee and others

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/10/2006

BENCH:

K.G. Balakrishnan, G.P. Mathur & R.V. Raveendran

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 5188 of 2006)

With

Civil Appeal No. 4533 of 2006

(Arising out SLP (C) No. 5183 of 2006)

With

Civil Appeal No. 4534 of 2006

(Arising out SLP (C) No. 5184 of 2006)

With

Civil Appeal No. 4535 of 2006

(Arising out SLP (C) No. 5190 of 2006)

G.P. Mathur, J.

Leave granted.

2. These appeals have been filed challenging the judgment and

order dated 1.3.2006 passed by the Division Bench of Delhi High

Court by which Letters Patent Appeals were allowed and the

judgment and order of the learned single Judge disposing of four writ

petitions was set aside. The learned single Judge had allowed the writ

petitions and countermanded the election of the members of the

Executive Board of Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee,

which was held on 19.12.2005 and had issued a further direction that

fresh election be held on 14.2.2006.

3. The controversy raised in all the four appeals is identical and

for the sake of convenience we will refer to the facts of Civil Appeal

No. 4532 of 2006 (arising out SLP (C) No. 5188 of 2006) (Avtar

Singh Hit vs. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee and

others). The principal issue raised is regarding the validity of the

election held on 19.12.2005 for electing the members of the Executive

Board of Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (hereinafter

referred to as 'DSGMC'). In order to understand the controversy

involved it is necessary to make a brief reference to the relevant

statutory provisions.

4. The Parliament enacted The Delhi Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1971

(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to provide for the proper

management of the Sikh Gurdwaras and Gurdwara property in Delhi

and for matters connected therewith. Section 2(c) of the Act defines

"Committee" and it means the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management

Committee established under Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 provides

for establishment of a committee called the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara

Management Committee for the proper management and control of

the Gurdwaras and Gurdwara property. The Committee shall be a

body corporate with the name aforesaid having perpetual succession

and a common seal and shall by such name sue and be sued. Section

4 provides for composition of the Committee. Sub-section (a) of this

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Section provides that forty six members shall be elected from various

wards into which Delhi is divided in accordance with the provisions

of the Act. Besides them some members have to be co-opted and

nominated in the manner prescribed in the section. Section 5 provides

that the term of the office of the members of the Committee shall be

four years. Section 16 provides for the election of the office bearers

and members of the Executive Board. Sub-section (5) of Section 16

lays down that the President and the other members of the Executive

Board elected under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall hold

office for a term of one year but shall be eligible for re-election for

one more term only. The proviso to this sub-section says that an

outgoing office bearer or member shall continue in office until

election of his successor is held. Sub-section (6) of Section 16 lays

down that the election of the President and other office bearers and

members of the Executive Board under sub-section (1) or sub-section

(2) or any subsequent annual election to any of those offices shall be

held in such manner as may be prescribed by Rules. Section 40 of the

Act provides that the Committee may make regulations not

inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or the rules made

thereunder for carrying out its functions under the Act. Regulation

4(1), which has been made by the Committee and has some relevance

for the decision of the case reads is as under: -

"4. Meetings of the Committee/Executive Board

etc.

(1) Annual General Meeting

(i) Annual General Meetings of the Committee

shall be held in the month of September every year

to hold election of Office-bearers and members of

the Executive Board. The date of election once

announced by the President/General Secretary

shall not be postponed.

(ii) Among other items, the Annual General

Meetings shall consider and approve:

(a) Annual Report of the Committee;

(b) Annual Budget containing proposals for

1) Revised estimates of the current year;

2) Budget estimates for the next year;

(c) Audited statement of accounts of the last

year;

(d) Action taken on report for pending audit

paras;

(e) Format and the manner in which the

accounts shall be maintained in the next

financial year;

(f) Appointment of Auditors for the next year.

Note: Election of New Executive Board and Office-

bearers is to be held in accordance with the Rules framed

or to be framed under Clause (r) of Sub-Section (2) of

Section 39 of the Act.

(iii) The agenda papers for the Annual General

Meetings shall be circulated by the General

Secretary with approval of the Executive Board at

least 8 days before the date of meetings."

5. The issue involved in the present case is regarding the election,

which was held for electing the members of the Executive Board for

the year 2005-06. In the preceding year 2004-05, Shri Paramjit Singh

Sarna was elected as President and Shri Ravinder Singh Khurana was

elected as Secretary. According to Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna the

election was held on 19.12.2005 in which the new office bearers of

the Executive Board for the year 2005-06 were elected. There is no

dispute that at the relevant time the Committee which had to elect the

members of the Executive Board had 50 members and had the right to

elect the members of the Executive Board from amongst themselves.

6. After constitution of the new Executive Board for the year

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2005-06 had been announced as a result of election held on

19.12.2005 the appellant Shri Avtar Singh Hit filed Writ Petition (C)

No. 370 of 2006 in the Delhi High Court praying that the alleged

minutes of the meeting dated 19.12.2005 be quashed and a writ of

mandamus be issued directing the respondents to the writ petition to

hold fresh election of the Executive Board. The parties arrayed as

respondents to the writ petition are: -

1. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee

2. Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna, President

3. Shri Ravinder Singh Khurana, General Secretary

4. The Manager, Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management

Committee.

The same persons are arrayed as respondents in the present

appeal.

7. The main facts pleaded in the writ petition are as follows. The

last general elections were held on 30.6.2002 and a new Committee,

which is the present Committee in existence, was constituted. The

Executive Boards, which have life of only one year, were constituted

in the elections held on 24.7.2002, 22.9.2003 and 22.11.2004. As

respondent No. 2 in the writ petition did not hold a meeting of the

Committee for electing the members of the Executive Board after

expiry of the term of the earlier Board on 21.11.2005, seventeen

members of the Committee made representation to the General

Secretary on 28.11.2005 for holding of fresh election of the Executive

Board for the year 2005-06. Thereafter the General Secretary sent a

letter on the same day, i.e., on 28.11.2005 intimating that the meeting

of the Committee shall take place on 19.12.2005 to elect the office

bearers of the Executive Board. The Officiating President S. Baldev

Singh Rani Bagh sent a letter dated 1.12.2005 stating that the letter of

the General Secretary dated 28.11.2005, whereby it was informed that

the election shall be held on 19.12.2005, had been issued without any

authority. However, the General Secretary by his letter dated

7.12.2005 disputed the authority of the Officiating President and

reiterated that what had been conveyed by his letter dated 28.11.2005

was correct. Thereafter, Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna, respondent No. 2,

sent a letter to the members of the Committee on 8.12.2005 stating

that there are no records to indicate that the Executive Board had

taken any decision to hold the election. On 10.12.2005 the General

Secretary gave a reply that the Committee was under a legal

obligation to hold the election and the same would be held on

19.12.2005. A letter was also sent by him to all the members on the

same day intimating his decision to hold the meeting as scheduled. In

para 15 of the writ petition it is stated that in a meeting, which had

been called by Paramjit Singh Sarna, respondent No.2, on 15.12.2005,

the members passed a resolution that the election shall be held as

scheduled on 19.12.2005. This was followed by a communication

sent by respondent No. 3 on 16.12.2005 to all the members that as

intimated earlier vide letter dated 28.11.2005 the meeting shall take

place on 19.12.2005. Respondent No. 2 then sent a letter to the

members that the meeting for electing the members of the Executive

Board shall be held on 18.1.2006. In para 28 of the writ petition it is

stated that though respondent No. 3 was taking up a stand that the

order passed by him and communicated vide letter dated 28.11.2005

that the meeting shall be convened on 19.12.2005 was justified but

respondent No. 2 had taken a stand that the meeting shall be held on

18.1.2006. In para 29 of the writ petition it is averred that the

President in connivance with the General Secretary kept the members

of the Committee in a confused state of affairs and the position was

not clear till 16.12.2005. In para 32 of the writ petition it is alleged

that on account of aforesaid confusion the writ petitioner did not

attend the meeting on 19.12.2005 though he was very much interested

to contest the election for the office of the President but on account of

the confused state of affairs he was deprived of his valuable right to

participate and contest the election.

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8. The respondent No. 1 filed a short affidavit stating that

respondent No. 3 had sent a letter to all the members on 28.11.2005

that the meeting shall be held on 19.12.2005. The respondent No. 2

had also sent a letter dated 17.12.2005 to all the members of the

Committee that the Annual General Meeting of the members of the

DSGMC shall be held at 11.00 A.M. on 19.12.2005 and the said letter

was delivered to all the members of the Committee by 'Dak Rider'.

The elections were held as scheduled on 19.12.2005 wherein 35 out of

50 members participated and the new office bearers had been elected

with more than 2/3rd majority of the total membership of the

Committee. The new office bearers of the Executive Board had taken

over charge on the same day i.e. on 19.12.2005 but they had not been

impleaded as party to the writ petition. It was also pleaded that the

election of the office bearers could only be challenged by filing an

election petition in accordance with Section 31 of the Act and the

rules framed thereunder.

9. Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna, respondent No. 2, in the writ petition

also filed a short affidavit stating that 35 out of 50 members had taken

part in the meeting held on 19.12.2005. The writ petition was not

maintainable on the ground that the petitioner had an alternative

remedy of filing an election petition as provided in Section 31 of the

Act. It was further pleaded that the office bearers of the newly elected

Executive Board, who have been functioning since 19.12.2005,

having not been impleaded as party to the writ petition, the writ

petition was liable to be dismissed on ground of non-joinder of

necessary parties.

10. Shri Ravinder Singh Khurana, respondent No. 3, in the writ

petition filed a counter affidavit stating that after receipt of a

representation from over 1/3rd members of the Committee for holding

a fresh election, he issued a letter dated 28.11.2005 fixing 19.12.2005

as the date for convening the meeting and holding of elections and this

had been done by him in exercise of powers vested in him under the

Regulations. In fact, respondent No. 2, who was holding the office of

President, did not want to hold the election so that he could continue

in office. In para 7 of the counter affidavit it is stated that a meeting

of the Executive Board was held on 15.12.2005 wherein a decision

was taken to hold the elections on 19.12.2005 and accordingly a

communication was sent to all the members of the Committee.

However, respondent No. 2 held another meeting wherein only 8

members were present and a resolution was passed that the Secretary

had no authority to circulate the letter dated 28.11.2005 and it was

further resolved that the meeting shall be held on 7.1.2006. In para 9

of the counter affidavit it is averred that respondent No. 2 issued

another communication to the members of the Committee on

16.12.2005 stating that the meeting for electing the office bears of the

Executive Board would be held on 18.1.2006. Respondent No. 2 also

passed an order whereby he declared 19.12.2005 to be a holiday.

Lastly, it is averred that the respondent No. 2 had never agreed for

holding of elections on 19.12.2005 and had in fact fixed 18.1.2006 for

the said purpose and thus holding of the election on 19.12.2005 by

respondent No. 2 was arbitrary and mala fide exercise of powers.

11. The learned single Judge held that the writ petitions are replete

with approbation and reprobation of the two warring factions; that the

requirement of Regulation 4 had been met; that the motions of holding

of an election were factually completed on 19.12.2005; that the plea

taken by the petitioners that they did not have notice of the meeting

could not be accepted. He further held that the action of the General

Secretary in cancelling the election on the penultimate day was not

permissible and the manner in which the election had been concluded,

it had been reduced to a farce. Finally, it was held that the President's

decision to go along with the elections scheduled on 19.12.2005 was

given at the eleventh hour and it did not meet with the expectations of

law. The learned single Judge accordingly passed an order

countermanding and setting aside the election held on 19.12.2005 and

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further directed that the election shall be held on 14.2.2006.

12. Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna, respondent No. 2 in the writ petition

and Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee, respondent No.1

in the writ petition, preferred Letters Patent Appeals against the

decision of the learned single Judge. The Division Bench of the High

Court, after meticulously examining the material on record, held that

there was no confusion regarding the date of meeting as the total

number of members was only 50. It also held that the allegation that

15 members did not participate in the meeting because of any alleged

confusion could not be believed, more so in the light of the findings of

the learned single Judge that the elections were validly summoned. It

was further held that as more than 2/3rd members were present and

had elected the office bearers of the Executive Board, the result of the

election had not been materially effected and, therefore, the order

passed by the learned single Judge countermanding and setting aside

the election could not be sustained. The Division Bench did not go

into the question regarding the effect of non-joinder of the newly

elected members of the Executive Board to the writ petition but

expressed a prima facie view that its effect was not fatal. It further

held that despite the alternative remedy of election petition being

available, the writ petitions were maintainable.

13. Learned counsel for the appellants have submitted that there

was utter confusion regarding the date of the meeting in which the

new office bearers of the Executive Board had to be elected. Initially

Shri Ravinder Singh Khurana, Secretary, sent a communication dated

28.11.2005 stating that the meeting shall be convened on 19.12.2005

but the President Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna sent a letter on 8.12.2005

disputing the authority of the Secretary to convene a meeting. He

reiterated on 12.12.2005 that no meeting shall be held on 19.12.2005

and thereafter convened a meeting of all members on 15.12.2005 to

discuss the issue and fix a date for holding of the election. The

President subsequently fixed 7.1.2006 and then 18.1.2006 for the

purpose of holding the meeting. The Secretary, later on took a

different stand and sent telegrams to all the members of the

Committee on 18.12.2005 cancelling the date earlier fixed by him and

confirming the date fixed by the President, i.e., 18.1.2006. It has thus

been submitted that the contradictory stand taken by the President and

the Secretary and the confusion created thereby, the election held on

19.12.2005 was a farce and the learned single Judge had rightly

countermanded the same.

14. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that there

was no confusion as the Secretary had sent a communication on

28.11.2005 for holding the election on 19.12.2005. Though initially

the President Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna had challenged the authority

of the Secretary to fix the date for convening the meeting, but

subsequently he had himself intimated that the meeting shall be held

on 19.12.2005, as originally scheduled. Learned counsel has further

submitted that the fact that 35 out of 50 members participated in the

meeting and unanimously elected office bearers of the Executive

Board by more than 2/3rd majority itself demonstrated that there was

no confusion and the election was properly held. Learned counsel has

also submitted that at any rate in view of the contradictory stand and

divergent points of view projected by the rival parties, it was not a fit

case for interference by this Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution.

15. We have given our careful consideration to the submissions

made by learned counsel for the parties. The pleadings of the parties

and also the material placed in the writ petition clearly show that there

is a factual dispute. Whether some members of the Committee could

not participate in the meeting on account of the alleged confusing and

contradictory stand taken by the President and the Secretary is a

question of fact. The writ petitioner Shri Avtar Singh Hit has

specifically averred that he was keen to contest for the office of the

President but on account of the alleged confusion regarding the date

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of the meeting he could not participate in the same.

16. Part V of the Delhi Sikh Gurdwaras Act deals with Settlement

of Election and Other Disputes. Sections 31 and 33 of the Act, which

find place in Part V, read as under: -

"31. The provision of section 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22,

23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Delhi Municipal

Corporation Act, 1957, shall mutatis mutandis apply,

subject to such modifications as the Central Government

may by order direct, in relation to settlement of dispute

regarding election, corrupt practices and electoral

offences in respect of election or co-option of members

of the Committee.

33. (1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by

the District Judge may, within sixty days of the order,

prefer an appeal to the High Court at Delhi and the orders

of the High Court on such appeal shall be final and

conclusive.

(2) The provisions of section 5 and 12 of the

Limitation Act, 1963, shall, so far as may be, apply to

appeals under this section."

Sections 15 to 20 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957

(hereinafter referred to as 'the DMC Act') provide for resolution of

disputes regarding elections by filing an election petition. Sections 15

and 16 of the DMC Act read as under: -

"15. Election petitions.-- (1) No election of a councilor

shall be called in question except by an election petition

presented to the court of the district judge of Delhi within

fifteen days from the date of the publication of the result

of the election under section 14.

(2) An election petition calling in question any such

election may be presented under any of the grounds

specified in section 17 by any candidate at such election,

by any elector of the ward concerned or by any councilor.

(3) A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition

all the candidates at the election.

(4) An election petition--

(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material

facts on which the petitioner relies;

(b) shall, with sufficient particulars, set forth the

ground or grounds on which the election is called

in question; and

(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the

manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 (5 of 1908), for the verification of pleadings.

16. Relief that may be claimed by the petitioner.-- (1) A

petitioner may claim--

(a) a declaration that the election of all or any of the

returned candidates is void, and

(b) in addition thereto, a further declaration that he

himself or any other candidate has been duly

elected.

(2) The expression "returned candidate'' means a candidate

whose name has been published in the Official Gazette under

section 14.

Section 17 of the DMC Act gives grounds for declaring the elections

to be void. Section 19 of the DMC Act lays down powers of the

District Judge which includes the power to declare the election of all

or any of the returned candidates to be void. Section 22 of the DMC

Act defines corrupt practices for the purpose of the Act. Thus a

complete machinery for settlement of election disputes is provided in

the DMC Act which provisions by virtue of Section 31 of the Delhi

Sikh Gurdwaras Act are applicable for settlement of disputes

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regarding elections under the said Act.

17. It is well settled principle that where elections are conducted in

accordance with the provisions of a statute and the statute also

provides a remedy of settlement of election disputes by filing an

election petition before a tribunal, it is that remedy alone which

should be availed of and recourse cannot be taken to proceedings

under Article 226 of the Constitution. This view has been taken in

series of decisions rendered by this Court. The earliest decision was

rendered in N.P. Ponnuswami vs. The Returning Officer AIR 1952 SC

64 by a Bench of six learned Judges. In this case the nomination

paper of the appellant for election to Madras Legislative Assembly

was rejected by the Returning Officer. The appellant challenged the

rejection of the nomination paper by filing a writ petition in the High

Court which was dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to

interfere with the order of the Returning Officer on account of Article

329(b) of the Constitution, which says that no election to either House

of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a

State shall be called in question except by an election petition

presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided

for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature. In

appeal this Court examined the question whether the writ petition

would be maintainable at the initial state against an order rejecting the

nomination paper. Certain observations made in para 9 of the reports

are relevant and they are being reproduced below: -

"The law of elections in India does not

contemplate that there should be two attacks on matters

connected with election proceedings, one while they are

going on by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the

High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution (the

ordinary jurisdiction of the Courts having been expressly

excluded), and another after they have been completed by

means of an election petition. Any matter which has the

effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only

at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a

special tribunal and should not be brought up at an

intermediate stage before any Court.............................."

In para 12 it was observed: -

"Where a right or liability is created by a statute

which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy

provided by that statute only must be availed of.

It will be a fair inference from the provisions of the

Representation of the People Act to draw that the Act

provides for only one remedy, that remedy being by an

election petition to be presented after the election is over,

and there is no remedy provided at any intermediate

stage."

In Mohinder Singh Gill vs. The Chief Election Commissioner,

AIR 1978 SC 851, it was held that if during the process of election, at

any intermediate or final stage, the entire poll has been wrongly

cancelled and a fresh poll has been wrongly ordered, that is a matter

which may be agitated after declaration of the result on the basis of

the fresh poll, by questioning the election in the appropriate forum by

means of an election petition in accordance with law.

The same view has been taken in regard to the elections held in

accordance with some statutory provision where Article 329(b) of the

Constitution is not applicable and they are not governed by

Representation of the People Act. In K.K. Shrivastava vs. Bhupendra

Kumar Jain AIR 1978 SC 1703, the dispute related to election to Bar

Council of Madhya Pradesh under the Indian Advocates Act and Rule

31 of Election Rules framed by Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh

provided that all disputes arising under the Rule shall be decided by a

tribunal to be known as an election tribunal. The defeated candidate

approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution

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challenging the validity of the election which was allowed by the

High Court. This Court set aside the judgment of the High Court with

the following observations: -

"Where there is an appropriate or equally

efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hands off.

This is more particularly so where the dispute relates to

an election. Still more so where there is a statutorily

prescribed remedy which almost reads in mandatory

terms.

In Gujarat University vs. Shri N.U. Rajguru AIR 1988 SC 66,

the dispute related to election to the Court of Gujarat University.

Some teachers challenged the holding of elections by means of a writ

petition before the High Court which was allowed. In appeal this

Court set aside the judgment of the High Court with the following

observations: -

"It is well settled that where a statute provides for

election to an office, or an authority or institution and if it

further provides a machinery or forum for determination

of dispute arising out of election, the aggrieved person

should pursue his remedy before the forum provided by

the statute. While considering an election dispute it must

be kept in mind that the right to vote, contest or dispute

election is neither a fundamental or common law right

instead it is a statutory right regulated by the statutory

provisions. It is not permissible to invoke the jurisdiction

of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution by-

passing the machinery designated by the Act for

determination of the election dispute. Ordinarily the

remedy provided by the statute must be followed before

the authority designated therein. But there may be cases

where exceptional or extraordinary circumstances may

exist to justify by-passing the alternative remedies."

There are several other decisions where the same view has been

taken. S.T. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan AIR 1988 SC 616 is a case

relating to election to the office of Chairman of a panchayat union

under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 where it was held that the

parties who are aggrieved by the result of the election can question the

validity of an election by an election petition which is an effective

alternative remedy and it is not appropriate for the High Court to

interfere with the election process.

C. Subrahmanyam vs. K. Ramanjaneyullu 1998 (8) SCC 703 is

a case relating to election under the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj

Act and in a short judgment it was observed that the main question for

decision being the non-compliance of a provision of the Act which is

a ground for an election petition in Rule 12 framed under the Act, the

writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not have

been entertained for this purpose.

In Ashok Kumar Jain vs. Neetu Kathoria 2004 (12) SCC 73, a

writ petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution

challenging the election held under Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj

Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972. This Court observed that Section 66-A of

the said Act provided that an election under the Act could be

challenged only by presenting an election petition and except in some

exceptional extraordinary circumstances normally remedy under

Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the election by filing a

writ petition would not be available.

Umesh Shivappa Ambi vs. Angadi Shekara Basappa 1998 (4)

SCC 529 is a case relating to election of President, Vice-President and

Chairman, etc., under the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act,

wherein the High Court in a writ petition under Article 226 of the

Constitution set aside the order by which the nomination of the first

respondent therein was rejected. This Court reversed the judgment of

the High Court with the following observation :-

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"Once an election is over, the aggrieved candidate

has to pursue his remedy in accordance with the

provisions of law and the High Court will not ordinarily

interfere with the elections under Article 226. The High

Court will not ordinarily interfere where there is an

appropriate or equally efficacious remedy available,

particularly in relation to election disputes."

Similar view has been taken in Harnek Singh vs. Charanjit

Singh 2005 (8) SCC 383 which is a case relating to election of

Chairman of Gram Panchayat and the judgment of the High Court by

which the order of the Returning Officer was set aside in a writ

petition was reversed.

18. As discussed earlier the pleadings of the parties show that the

dispute raised was purely factual in nature as to whether some

confusion had been created regarding the date fixed for holding of the

meeting of the Committee for electing the office bearers of the

Executive Board. The dispute could more appropriately be resolved

by examination of oral evidence to be led by the parties. The writ

petitioner Avtar Singh Hit claimed that on account of the confusion in

dates he could not attend the meeting though he was very keen to

participate in the meeting and contest for the office of the President of

the Executive Board. In view of the nature of the dispute raised the

proper remedy for the petitioner was to file an election petition as

provided in Section 31 of the Act where parties could have got

opportunity to lead oral evidence. No exceptional or extraordinary

circumstances were disclosed which could justify recourse to the

extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution and for

not availing the remedy provided by the statute. We are, therefore, of

the opinion that on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the

writ petitions ought not to have been entertained for resolving the

dispute relating to election and on this count alone the writ petitions

were liable to be dismissed.

19. The respondents in their counter affidavits, which were filed

before the High Court, took a specific plea that the new office bearers

of the Executive Board, who had been elected in the meeting held on

19.12.2005, had taken charge and were functioning. In all the four

writ petitions, the office bearers of the newly elected Executive Board

were not made parties. On the contrary Shri Paramjit Singh Sarna and

Shri Ravinder Singh Khurana, who were the President and the

Secretary respectively of the earlier Executive Board, were arrayed as

respondents to the writ petition. In the counter affidavit filed on

behalf of respondent No. 2 to the writ petition a specific plea was

taken that the office bearers of the newly elected Executive Board had

not been impleaded as respondents to the writ petition and their rights

would be adversely affected if any relief is granted to the writ

petitioner. In spite of such clear assertion in the counter affidavit, the

writ petitioner did not choose to implead the newly elected office

bearers of the Executive Board.

20. In our view no relief could have been granted to the writ

petitioner on account of the fact that the newly elected office bearers

of the Executive Board, who would have been affected by the decision

of the writ petitions, were not impleaded as party to the writ petitions.

In Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia vs. Additional Member, Board of

Revenue, Bihar AIR 1963 SC 786, it was observed that where in a

petition for a writ of certiorari made to the High Court, only the

tribunal whose order was sought to be quashed was made a party but

the persons who were parties before the lower tribunal and in whose

favour the impugned order was passed were not joined as parties; the

writ petition was incompetent and had been rightly rejected by the

High Court. In Prabodh Verma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1985

SC 167, it was held: -

"A High Court ought not to hear and dispose of a

writ petition under Article 226 without the persons who

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would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it

as respondents or at least some of them being before it as

respondents in a representative capacity if their number is

too large to join them as respondents individually, and, if

the petitioners refuse to so join them, the High Court

ought to dismiss the petition for non-joinder of necessary

parties."

In Ishwar Singh v. Kuldip Singh & Ors. (1995) Supp. (1) SCC

179, it was held that a writ petition challenging selection and

appointment to some posts without impleading the selected candidates

was not maintainable. This view has been reiterated in Arun Tewari

& Ors. v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh & Ors. AIR 1998 SC 331.

21. This being the settled legal position the non-impleadment of the

newly elected office bearers of the Executive Board was fatal and no

relief could have been granted to the writ petitioners. The result of

granting any relief in the writ petitions, as was done by the learned

single Judge, was that the members of the newly elected Executive

Board lost the office which they were holding without affording them

an opportunity to present their case which is clearly impermissible in

law. The writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on this count as

well.

22. Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel for the appellant

has submitted that absence of notice to even one member may vitiate

the proceedings of the meeting which was convened on 19.12.2005

and in the present case some members were not served with the

statutory notice. It is not necessary for us to examine this question as

we have held above that the writ petitions filed by the appellants

herein were not maintainable having regard to the controversy raised

which was purely factual in nature and could more appropriately be

decided in an election petition which remedy was provided by the

Delhi Sikh Gurdwaras Act and also on the ground that the writ

petition was not competent as necessary parties were not impleaded as

respondents to the same.

23. For the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in these

appeals, which are hereby dismissed with costs.