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CGHC010249432026 2026:CGHC:30859

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

WPC No. 3547 of 2026

Order Reserved on 14.07.2026

Order Delivered on 21.07.2026

1 - Ayush College Of Polytechnic (Owned And Managed By Gram

Meduka Krishi Shikshan Samiti, Meduka), Village Meduka, Tahsil

Pendra Road, Distt. Gaurela Pendra Marwahi, Chhattisgarh.

(Through Its President Shri Ajay Jaiswal, S/o Shri

Awadhramjaiswal, Aged 51 Years, R/o Village Meduka, Post Darri,

Tahsil Pendra Road, Distt. Gaurela Pendra Marwahi, Chhattisgarh.)

... Petitioner(s)

versus

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Director Technical Education, H

O D Building, Block 3, Science And Technology Department, 3rd

And 4th Floor, Indravati Bhawan, Naya Raipur, Distt. Raipur,

Chhattisgarh. 492002.

2 - Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical University Through

Its Registrar, Newai, P.O. Newai, Bhilai, Distt. Durg, Chhattisgarh

491107.

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3 - All India Council For Technical Education Through Its Chairman,

Nelson Mandela Marg, Vasantkunj, New Delhi 110070.

... Respondents

(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)

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For Petitioner:- Mr. Kshitij Sharma, Advocate

For State :-Mr. Anand Dadariya, Dy. A.G.

For Respondent No.2:-Mr. Neeraj Choubey, Advocate

For Respondent No.3:-Mr. Ajit Singh, Advocate

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SB- Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

CAV Order

1.The petitioner seeks to impugn and challenge the

Communication dated 24.06.2026 (ANNEXURE P-1),

whereby the Respondent University has declined to grant

affiliation to the Petitioner Institution for Academic Session

2026-27 for the Diploma Course and subjects namely

Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering & Civil

Engineering.

2.Facts of the Case are that the petitioner is an educational

institution managed by a duly registered society engaged in

imparting technical education, including Diploma/Polytechnic

courses, and is affiliated with the competent authorities. For

the Academic Session 2026–27, the petitioner obtained

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Extension of Approval from the All India Council for Technical

Education (AICTE) by approval letter dated 16.03.2026 for 30

seats in Diploma (Civil Engineering) and 60 seats each in

Diploma (Electrical Engineering) and Diploma (Mechanical

Engineering). The petitioner institution also enjoys the

privileges of the respondent University under the provisions of

the Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical University Act,

2004 and has been regularly paying the prescribed affiliation

fee. Pursuant to the annual inspection conducted by the

respondent University on 21.04.2026, certain deficiencies

were communicated to the petitioner on 25.04.2026. The

petitioner claims to have promptly rectified the deficiencies,

submitted the requisite compliance report along with an

affidavit regarding ratification of the Principal and faculty

members in terms of Statute 19, and also underwent re-

inspection on 01.06.2026. Despite submission of full

compliance, no further communication was issued by the

respondent University. However, by the impugned

communication dated 24.06.2026, the respondent University

declined affiliation to the petitioner institution for the Academic

Session 2026–27 and declared it as a "Zero Admission"

institution, which has been assailed in the present writ petition

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as being arbitrary, illegal and violative of the applicable

statutory provisions.

3.Following reliefs have been prayed in this petition:-

“10.1 That the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to

issue appropriate writ/order/direction, call for the

entire records pertaining to the present case from

the Respondent authorities for its kind perusal.

10.2 That the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to

issue appropriate writ/order/direction quashing

the impugned Communication dated 24.06.2026

(ANNEXURE P-1), issued by the Respondent

University, since the same is also without

jurisdiction and suffers from ambiguity.

10.3 That the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to

issue appropriate writ/order/direction to the

respondent university, directing them to confer

affiliation to the petitioner institute to conduct the

Diploma / Polytechnic as per the AICTE approval.

10.4 That the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to

issue appropriate writ/order/direction to the

respondent university to allow the petitioner to

participate in counseling for academic session

2026-2027 for the Diploma / Polytechnic as per

the AICTE approval.

10.5 Costs of the petition.

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10.6 Any other relief(s), direction(s), which

Hon'ble the Court deems fit, and proper, in the

circumstances of the case.”

4.Mr. Kshitij Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner, submitted that the respondent University has acted

wholly without jurisdiction in declining affiliation to the

petitioner institution despite the All India Council for Technical

Education (AICTE), the statutory authority under the AICTE

Act, 1987, having granted Extension of Approval for the

Academic Session 2026–27 after satisfying itself regarding

the institution's infrastructure, faculty, and other statutory

requirements. He contended that the role of the respondent

University, being merely an affiliating and examining body

under the Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical

University Act, 2004, is limited and it cannot sit in appeal over

the decision of AICTE or prescribe standards contrary to

those recognized by the apex regulatory body. It was further

argued that the impugned communication dated 24.06.2026

refusing affiliation and declaring the petitioner as a "Zero

Admission" institution is arbitrary, non-speaking, and has

been issued in complete violation of the principles of natural

justice, as no effective show-cause notice or opportunity of

hearing was afforded before taking such drastic action.

Learned counsel submitted that the petitioner had duly

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rectified the deficiencies pointed out during inspection,

submitted the requisite compliance report and affidavits, yet

the University failed to consider the same and did not specify

any surviving deficiencies in the impugned order. He further

contended that the inspection conducted by the respondent

University is contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme

Court in Rungta Engineering College Bhilai v. Chhattisgarh

Swami Vivekanand Technical University, as the University has

not aligned its inspection parameters with the AICTE

Regulations. It was lastly submitted that the impugned

decision was issued after commencement of the counselling

process, causing serious prejudice to the petitioner institution

and its prospective students, and therefore deserves to be

quashed.

5.Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General

appearing for the State, adopted the submissions advanced

on behalf of respondent No. 2 and submitted that the

impugned action has been taken by the respondent University

in exercise of its statutory powers under the Chhattisgarh

Swami Vivekanand Technical University Act, 2004 for

maintaining academic standards in technical education. It was

contended that no arbitrariness or illegality is attributable to

the State authorities warranting interference under Article 226

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of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the writ petition

deserves to be dismissed.

6.Mr. Neeraj Choubey, learned counsel appearing for

respondent No. 2–Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical

University, submitted that the impugned communication dated

24.06.2026 has been issued strictly in accordance with the

provisions of the Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical

University Act, 2004 and Statutes 18 and 19 framed

thereunder. He contended that the University, being the

statutory affiliating and examining body, is under a legal

obligation to maintain academic standards and ensure that

affiliated institutions possess the requisite infrastructure,

qualified faculty, regular Principal, laboratories, library and

other essential facilities before permitting admissions.

Learned counsel submitted that despite repeated inspections

and several opportunities extended over the years, including

the inspection dated 21.04.2026, communication of

deficiencies on 25.04.2026, issuance of a show-cause notice

dated 27.05.2026 and a subsequent re-inspection, the

petitioner failed to rectify major deficiencies, particularly the

absence of a regular Principal and adequate teaching faculty.

It was further submitted that the petitioner itself admitted, by

its communication dated 17.06.2026, that several faculty

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posts and the post of Principal remained vacant and had only

initiated the recruitment process immediately before

consideration of its affiliation application. He argued that the

Executive Council, after considering the inspection reports,

compliance reports and the petitioner's past conduct,

resolved to grant affiliation with "zero intake" for the Academic

Session 2026–27 to protect academic standards and the

interests of students, while leaving it open for the petitioner to

seek restoration of intake upon removal of deficiencies.

Learned counsel further contended that AICTE approval does

not automatically confer a right to affiliation and that the

University is competent to prescribe and enforce standards

consistent with its statutory powers. In support of his

submissions, he placed reliance upon the decisions of the

Supreme Court in Adarsh Shiksha Mahavidyalaya v. Subhash

Rahangdale, (2012) 2 SCC 425; A.P.J. Abdul Kalam

Technological University v. Jai Bharath College of

Management, (2021) 2 SCC 564 ; Jawaharlal Nehru

Technological University v. Crescent Educational Society,

2021 SCC OnLine SC 1105 ; Bharathidasan University v.

AICTE, (2001) 8 SCC 676; Association of Management of

Private Colleges v. AICTE, (2013) 8 SCC 271; State of

Rajasthan v. LBS B.Ed. College, (2016) 16 SCC 110; R.

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Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 1823; and

Dental Council of India v. Hedgewar Smruti Rugna Seva

Mandal, (2017) 13 SCC 700, to contend that an affiliating

University is entitled to insist upon compliance with statutory

norms and even prescribe standards higher than the

minimum prescribed by AICTE, and that the writ petition is not

maintainable in view of the statutory remedy of appeal

available under Statute 18.

7.Mr. Ajit Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.

3–All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE),

submitted that AICTE has granted Extension of Approval to

the petitioner institution for the Academic Session 2026–27 in

accordance with the AICTE Act, 1987 and the applicable

Approval Process Handbook after verifying compliance with

the prescribed norms. It was further submitted that the

question of grant or refusal of affiliation falls within the domain

of the affiliating University under the relevant State enactment

and statutes, and AICTE leaves the issue to be adjudicated

by this Court in accordance with law.

8.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material available on record.

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9.It would be apposite to consider Statute No. 18 of the

Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical University, which

governs the admission of colleges to the privileges of the

University and the withdrawal or refusal of such privileges.

The Statute prescribes the procedure for grant, continuation,

refusal and withdrawal of affiliation, requiring inspection of the

institution, communication of deficiencies, issuance of a

notice to the concerned institution, consideration of its

explanation, and thereafter a decision by the Executive

Council. It further provides a statutory remedy of appeal

against an order withdrawing or refusing affiliation.

“Clause 9 of the Statute No.18- (1) Wherever

as a result of a prejudicial report or otherwise

the Executive Council considers it necessary to

initiate action for the withdrawal of all or any of

the privileges granted to an institution/College,

the Executive Council shall issue a notice to

the Governing Body or the Government as the

case may be, apprising the said body of the

intention of the Executive Council and requiring

the said body to show cause why action as

intended should not be taken.

Provided that where an

institution/College is admitted to the privileges

of the University for a definite period and the

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admission is not extended for a further period,

it shall not amount to withdrawal of privileges.

(2) The notice under sub-para (1) shall state:

(a) the reasons for which the intended action is

contemplated; and

(b) the period within which the reply to the

show cause notice must reach the Registrar of

the University.

(3) The Executive Council, for reasons

considered sufficient by it may extend the

period for reply from time to time but the total

period shall not exceed three months.

(4) On receipt of the reply of the show cause

notice within the period allowed to the

institution/College under sub-statute (2) and

(3), the Executive Council may consider the

matter in the light of the reply and

representation made, if any, by the

institution/College concerned, and if no such

reply is received, it may consider the matter on

the expiration of the said period, and may after

consulting the Academic Council/Standing

Committee of the Academic Council make such

order as may appear to it proper including the

withdrawal of all or any of the privileges

granted to the institution/College.

(5) Where a resolution withdrawing wholly or

partially the privileges granted to an

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institution/College is passed by the Executive

Council, a copy of the same shall be sent to the

Government, Chairman of the Governing Body

of the institution/College concerned who may

make an appeal to the Chancellor against such

a resolution and the decision of the Chancellor

in such appeal shall be final.”

10. From a perusal of the aforesaid provisions, particularly

Clause 9(1) of Statute No. 18, it is apparent that whenever

the Executive Council proposes to withdraw or curtail any

privilege granted to an institution, or proposes to take any

action prejudicial to the institution, it is mandatory to issue a

prior notice to the Governing Body of the institution. Such

notice must clearly disclose the intention of the Executive

Council to take the proposed action, specify the reasons on

which such action is contemplated, and call upon the

institution to show cause as to why the proposed action

should not be taken. The notice must also stipulate the time

within which the reply is required to reach the Registrar of the

University. Though the Executive Council may, for sufficient

reasons, extend the time for submission of the reply, such

extension cannot exceed three months. Thereafter, upon due

consideration of the show-cause notice, the explanation

submitted by the institution, and after consultation with the

Academic Council, wherever required, the Executive Council

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may take an appropriate decision, including withdrawal of any

privilege or affiliation granted to the institution, in accordance

with law.

11. From the perusal of the documents placed on record, it

appears that the respondent University had, from time to time,

issued communications pointing out deficiencies in the

petitioner institution, particularly with regard to the availability

of regular faculty members and the Principal, and the

petitioner was well aware of such deficiencies. However, a

reading of Clause 9(1) of Statute No. 18 makes it evident that

where the University proposes to pass any order prejudicial to

an institution, including withdrawal or refusal of the privileges

of affiliation, it is mandatory for the Executive Council to issue

a prior show-cause notice to the concerned institution

specifically disclosing its intention to take such action and

calling upon the institution to show cause as to why the

proposed action should not be taken. Such notice must not

only communicate the proposed action but must also set out

the reasons forming the basis of the contemplated decision,

thereby affording the institution an effective opportunity to

submit its explanation before any adverse decision is taken.

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12. From perusal of the entire record, it appears that before

passing the impugned prejudicial order dated 24.06.2026,

whereby the intake capacity of the petitioner institution for the

Academic Session 2026–27 in the Diploma Courses of

Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering and Civil

Engineering was declared as "Zero Admission", the

procedure prescribed under Statute No. 18 of the

Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical University has not

been followed in its true letter and spirit.

13. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent

University that sufficient opportunities were granted to the

petitioner institution for removal of the deficiencies pointed out

vide communications dated 25.04.2026 and 28.05.2026.

However, the said communications cannot be treated as

compliance of the mandatory requirement contemplated

under Clause 9(1) of Statute No. 18. The said provision

specifically requires that before taking any action which is

prejudicial to the interest of an affiliated institution, including

withdrawal, curtailment or refusal of the privileges of

affiliation, the Executive Council is required to issue a specific

notice indicating the proposed action, the grounds on which

such action is contemplated, and thereafter provide an

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effective opportunity to the institution to submit its

explanation.

14. In the present case, from the documents available on

record, it does not appear that any such prior notice was

issued to the petitioner institution informing it that the

University was contemplating declaration of "Zero Admission"

for the Academic Session 2026–27 on account of the alleged

deficiencies and calling upon the petitioner to show cause

against such proposed action. The impugned decision,

therefore, has been taken without adhering to the mandatory

statutory procedure prescribed under Statute No. 18.

15. It is well settled that when an authority is required to act

in a particular manner under a statute or statutory regulation,

such authority is bound to follow the procedure prescribed

therein and cannot act in disregard of the same. The

requirement of issuance of notice, consideration of reply and

thereafter taking a decision is not an empty formality but is

intended to ensure fairness and compliance with the

principles of natural justice, particularly when the decision has

serious civil consequences for the institution.

16. In the matter of Mackinnon Mackenzie and Company

Limited vs. Mackinnon Employees Union (2015) 4 SCC

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544, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held vide para 41 as

under:-

“41. Further in in Sharif-ud-Din 13 it was held as

under by this Court: (SCC Pp. 406-07, para 9)

"9. The difference between a mandatory rule

and a directory rule is that while the former

must be strictly observed, in the case of the

latter substantial compliance may be sufficient

to achieve the object regarding which the rule is

enacted. Certain broad propositions which can

be deduced from several decisions of courts

regarding the rules of construction that should

be followed in determining whether a provision

of law is directory or mandatory may be

summarised thus: The fact that the statute uses

the word 'shall' while laying down a duty is not

conclusive on the question whether it is a

mandatory or directory provision. In order to find

out the true character of the legislation, the

court has to ascertain the object which the

provision of law in question has to subserve and

its design and the context in which it is enacted.

If the object of a law is to be defeated by non-

compliance with it, it has to be regarded as

mandatory. But when a provision of law relates

to the performance of any public duty and the

invalidation of any act done in disregard of that

provision causes serious prejudice to those for

whose benefit it is enacted and at the same

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time who have no control over the performance

of the duty, such provision should be treated as

a directory one. Where, however, a provision of

law prescribes that a certain act has to be done

in a particular manner by a person in order to

acquire a right and it is coupled with another

provision which confers an immunity on another

when such act is not done in that manner, the

former has to be regarded as a mandatory one.

A procedural rule ordinarily should not be

construed as mandatory if the defect in the act

done in pursuance of it can be cured by

permitting appropriate rectification to be carried

out at a subsequent stage unless by according

such permission to rectify the error later on,

another rule would be contravened. Whenever

a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be

done in a particular manner and also lays down

that failure to comply with the said requirement

leads to a specific consequence, it would be

difficult to hold that the requirement is not

mandatory and the specified consequence

should not follow." (emphasis supplied)”

17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Babu

Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 422 has

held that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed

under any statute, and the same is not followed, then the

action suffers from nullity in the eye of the law, the relevant

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paragraphs of the abovesaid case are extracted hereunder:

(SCC pp. 432-33, paras 31-32)

"31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that

if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed

under any statute, the act must be done in that

manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is

traccable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor (1875)

LR 1 Ch D 426 which was followed by Lord Roche

in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC

253(2) who stated as under: (Nazir Ahmad

case22, IA pp. 381-82)

*... where a power is given to do a certain thing in

a certain way, the thing must be done in that way

or not at all.

32. This rule has since been approved by this

Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of

Vindhya Pradesh 19 and again in Deep Chand v.

State of Rajasthan23, These cases were

considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in

State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh24 and the rule laid

down in Nazir Ahmad case22 was again upheld.

This rule has since been applied to the exercise of

jurisdiction by courts and has also been

recognised as a salutary principle of administrative

law."

(emphasis supplied)

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42. Apart from the said decisions, this Court has

followed the Privy Council of 1939 and

Chancellor's decisions right from the year 1875

which legal principle has been approved by this

Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of

Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322 and the same

has been followed until now, holding that if a

statutory provision prescribes a particular

procedure to be followed by the authority to do an

act, it should be done in that particular manner

only. If such procedure is not followed in the

prescribed manner as provided under the statutory

provision, then such act of the authority is held to

be null and void ab initio in law. In the present

case, undisputedly, the statutory provisions of

Section 25-FFA of the ID Act have not been

complied with and therefore, consequent action of

the appellant Company will be in violation of the

statutory provisions of Section 25-FFA of the ID

Act and therefore, the action of the Company in

retrenching the workmen concerned will amount to

void ab initio in law as the same is inchoate and

invalid in law.”

18. Likewise, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of

Supertech Limited vs. Emerald Court Owner Resident

Welfare Association and Others (2023) 10 SCC 817 had

held as under:-

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“14. Further, there is another legal principle which

is applicable in the present case. It is that where a

power is given to do a certain thing in a certain

way, the thing must be done in that way or not at

all and that other methods of performance are

necessarily forbidden [Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) LR 1

Ch D 426]. Hence, when a statute requires a

particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it

must be done in that manner or not at all and other

methods of performance are necessarily forbidden

[Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, 1936 SCC OnLine

SC 46 ; AIR 1960 SC 801]. This d Court too, has

adopted this maxim [Parbhani Tranport Coop.

Society Ltd. v. RTA, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 46 ;

AIR 1960 SC 801]. This rule provides that an

expressly laid down mode of doing something

necessarily implies a prohibition on doing it in any

other way.”

19. This Court is conscious of the fact that the University,

being the affiliating and examining authority, is entitled to

ensure maintenance of academic standards and take

appropriate measures in case an institution fails to fulfil the

prescribed requirements. However, such power is required to

be exercised strictly in accordance with the procedure

established under the governing statute. The statutory

authority itself having framed the procedure, it cannot be

permitted to bypass the same while taking an adverse

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decision against an affiliated institution. It is a settled principle

of law that where a power is conferred by a statute to do a

particular thing in a particular manner, the same must be

done in that manner alone or not at all, and all other modes of

performance are necessarily forbidden. Therefore, once

Statute No. 18 prescribes the procedure for taking any action

prejudicial to an affiliated institution, the respondent University

was under a statutory obligation to adhere to the same in its

letter and spirit.

20. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the settled legal

position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the

impugned communication dated 24.06.2026 declaring the

petitioner institution as a "Zero Admission" institution for the

Diploma Courses of Mechanical Engineering, Electrical

Engineering and Civil Engineering cannot be sustained, as

the same has been issued in violation of the mandatory

procedure prescribed under Statute No. 18 of the

Chhattisgarh Swami Vivekanand Technical University. The

action of the respondent University, having been taken in a

manner contrary to the procedure expressly prescribed by the

governing Statute, is legally unsustainable and deserves to

be quashed.

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21. However, this Court has not examined the merits of the

allegations regarding the deficiencies pointed out by the

respondent University or as to whether such deficiencies

have actually been cured by the petitioner institution. The said

issues are left open to be considered by the competent

authority in accordance with law after following the procedure

prescribed under the relevant statute.

22. Resultantly, the petition is allowed to the aforesaid

terms.

sd/-

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

Judge

Vishakha