[2026:RJ-JP:28285]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2784/2021

URN: CRLMP / 5117U / 2021

Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/o Shri Hanuman Sahai,

Aged About 42 Years, Resident Of Plot No. 242, Taruchaya Nagar,

Opposite Airport, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj).

----Petitioner

Versus

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.

2. Additional Commissioner Income Tax, Central Circle 1,

Ncr Building, Bhagwan Dass Road, Statue Circle, C

Scheme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan- 302005.

3. Income Tax Officer, Ward 7(2), C-95, Baba Siddhanath

Bhawan Janpath Lal Kothi Jaipur, Rajasthan-302005.

----Respondents

Connected With

S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2570/2021

URN: CRLMP / 4724U / 2021

Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/o Shri Hanuman Sahai,

Aged About 42 Years, - Resident Of Plot No. 242, Taruchaya

Nagar, Opposite Airport, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj).

----Petitioner

Versus

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.

2. Additional Commissioner Income Tax, Central Circle 1,

Ncr Building, Bhagwan Dass Road, Statue Circle, C

Shceme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan-302005.

3. Income Tax Officer, Ward No. 7(2), Ncr Building, Bhagwan

Dass Road, Statue Circle, C Scheme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur,

Rajasthan-302005.

----Respondents

S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2571/2021

URN: CRLMP / 4725U / 2021

Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/o Shri Hanuman Sahai,

Aged About 42 Years, Resident Of Plot No. 242, Taruchaya Nagar,

Opposite Airport, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj).

[2026:RJ-JP:28285] (2 of 24) [CRLMP-2784/2021]

----Petitioner

Versus

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.

2. Additional Commissioner Income Tax, Central Circle 1,

Ncr Building, Bhagwan Dass Road, Statue Circle, C

Shceme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan-302005.

3. Income Tax Officer, Ward No. 7(2), Ncr Building, Bhagwan

Dass Road, Statue Circle, C Scheme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur,

Rajasthan-302005.

----Respondents

S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2575/2021

URN: CRLMP / 4732U / 2021

Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/o Shri Hanuman Sahai,

Aged About 42 Years, Resident Of Plot No. 242, Taruchaya Nagar,

Opposite Airport, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj).

----Petitioner

Versus

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.

2. Additional Commissioner Income Tax, Central Circle 1,

Ncr Building, Bhagwan Dass Road, Statue Circle, C

Shceme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan-302005.

3. Income Tax Officer, Ward No. 7(2), Ncr Building, Bhagwan

Dass Road, Statue Circle, C Scheme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur,

Rajasthan-302005.

----Respondents

S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2800/2021

URN: CRLMP / 5133U / 2021

Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/o Shri Hanuman Sahai,

Aged About 42 Years, Resident Of Plot No. 242, Taruchaya Nagar,

Opposite Airport, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj).

----Petitioner

Versus

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.

2. Additional Commissioner Income Tax, Central Circle 1,

Ncr Building, Bhagwan Dass Road, Statue Circle, C

Scheme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan- 302005.

3. Income Tax Officer, Ward 7(2), C-95, Baba Siddhanath

[2026:RJ-JP:28285] (3 of 24) [CRLMP-2784/2021]

Bhawan Janpath Lal Kothi Jaipur, Rajasthan-302005.

----Respondents

S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 2815/2021

URN: CRLMP / 5159U / 2021

Babloo Sharma Alias Pramod Sharma S/o Shri Hanuman Sahai,

Aged About 42 Years, Resident Of Plot No. 242, Taruchaya Nagar,

Opposite Airport, Tonk Road, Jaipur (Raj).

----Petitioner

Versus

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.p.

2. Additional Commissioner Income Tax, Central Circle 1,

Ncr Building, Bhagwan Dass Road, Statue Circle, C

Scheme, Ashok Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan- 302005.

3. Income Tax Officer, Ward 7(2), C-95, Baba Siddhanath

Bhawan Janpath Lal Kothi Jaipur, Rajasthan-302005.

----Respondents

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Prakul Khurana

Mr. Aryan Kukkar

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Manvendra Singh Shekhawat, PP

Mr. Sandeep Pathak

Ms. Jaya Pathak

Ms. Shafali Sharma

JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND

Order

1.Date of conclusion of arguments 22/07/2026

2.Date on which the order was reserved 22/07/2026

3.

Whether the full order or only the operative part is

pronounced

Full

Judgment

4.Date of pronouncement 28/07/2026

Reportable

For convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided in the

following parts: -

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INDEX

(1)Factual Matrix ……………………………………………………..4

(2)Submissions of counsel for the petitioner:……………… .5

(3)Submission on behalf of the respondents:.. ……………..7

(4)Discussions and Analysis:……………. ………………………..9

(5)Conclusion:…………………………………………………….… ..23

(6)Parting Remarks:………………………………………………..2 4

Factual Matrix:

1.Since common question of law and facts are involved in all

these criminal misc. petitions, hence, with the consent of counsel

for the parties, these matters are taken up together for final

disposal and are being decided by this common order.

2.In all these criminal misc. petitions, the petitioner-Babloo

Sharma has made a prayer for quashing of the proceedings

pending against him before the Court of Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate (Economic Offence), Jaipur Metropolitan-II for the

offence punishable under Section 276CC of the Income Tax Act,

1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1961").

3.For the sake of convenience, the prayer mentioned in SB

Criminal Misc. Petition No.2784/2021 has been taken into

consideration and the same reads as under:

“It is, therefore, humbly prayed that your

Lordship may be pleased to quash the prosecution

proceedings pending before the Learned Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offence) Jaipur

Metropolitan-Jaipur-I under Section 276CC of Income

Tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2006-07 in Case

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No. 71/2013, Titled As, "Additional Commissioner

Income Tax, Central Circle 1, Jaipur Vs. Babloo

Sharma" against the petitioner.

Any other appropriate order/direction, which this

Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts

and circumstances of the present case may kindly be

passed in favour of the petitioner.”

Submissions of counsel for the petitioner:

4.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a search was

conducted on 18.11.201 0 by the Income Tax Department

(hereinafter referred to as respondent-Department) at the

business and residential premises of the company-M/s Gold Sukh

Trade India Limited and its Directors, wherein the petitioner is also

one of the directors. Thereafter, a notice dated 09.08.2011, under

Section 153A of the Act of 1961 was issued by the respondent-

Department to the petitioner to file his Income Tax Returns, which

came to be received by the petitioner on 11.08.2011. Learned

counsel submits that the Income Tax Returns were supposed to be

submitted within a period of 35 days from the date of receipt of

the aforesaid notice. Learned counsel further submits that on

06.12.2010 and 19.01.2011, the petitioner sent two letters to the

respondent-Department for providing him copies of the material

seized during the course of search along with the panchnama and

statements recorded by the search party. Learned counsel submits

that despite the aforesaid repeated requests of the petitioner,

when the desired documents were not supplied to him, on

19.10.2011, a letter was once again sent by the petitioner to the

respondent-Department for providing the aforesaid documents.

5.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that till date, the

aforesaid desired documents have not been supplied to the

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petitioner by the respondent-Department, but a note has been

appended by the respondent-Department at the bottom of the

petitioner’s letter dated 19.10.2011, indicating therein the fact

that the representative of the petitioner has received the desired

documents, but in fact, these documents were never received by

his authorised representative. Learned counsel submits that in the

reply to the instant petition, a document has been placed on

record to show that certain documents were supplied by the

respondent-Department to the authorised representative of the

petitioner on 21.11.2011. Learned counsel submits that the letter

written by VKJ and Company (Chartered Accountants) dated

21.11.2011 does not give any reference of the case pertaining to

the petitioner and even the name of the petitioner is not

mentioned therein. Hence, it is clear that the desired documents

were never supplied to the petitioner. He further submits that

even at the time of filing of the complaint against the petitioner,

no documentary evidence was produced on record to show that

the desired documents were ever supplied to the petitioner. He

further submits that as per the mandate contained under Section

132 of the Act of 1961, the respondent-Department was supposed

to supply the copy of panchnama, statements recorded by the

search party and all the annexures prepared during the search

proceedings, but aforesaid exercise was not done and

straightaway, a notice was issued without supplying copies of the

same to the petitioner.

6.Learned counsel submits that since the aforesaid desired

documents were not supplied to the petitioner, he was not in a

position to file Income Tax Returns, hence, under these

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circumstances, the petitioner has not committed any offence for

which the impugned complaints have been submitted against him.

7.In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed

reliance upon the following judgments:-

1.Lal Saraf Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. reported

in 1997 SCC OnLine Pat 731;

2.Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Vs.

V.K. Gupta reported in [2020] 424 ITR 602

(Delhi);

3.The Income Tax Officer, Ward-2 Vs.

Rajendra Prasad Vaish reported in 2024 SCC

OnLine Raj 933

8.Lastly, it has been prayed that the impugned proceedings

arising out of the aforesaid complaint be quashed.

Submission on behalf of the respondents:

9.Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent-Department opposed the arguments raised by learned

counsel for the petitioner and an objection has also been taken

with regard to inordinate delay of 8 years in filing the instant

petitions. Learned counsel submits that the complaint was

submitted against the petitioner in the year 2013, while these

criminal misc. petitions have been submitted in the year 2021,

i.e., after a delay of 8 years without giving any justified reason for

approaching this Court at such a belated stage. Learned counsel

submits that no request was made by the petitioner prior to expiry

of the period of limitation of submission of the Income Tax Return.

The 35-day time period, as mentioned in the notice dated

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09.08.2011, received by the petitioner on 11.08.2011, came to be

expired on 15.09.2011, while the petitioner wrote a letter to the

respondent-Department for the first time on 19.10.2011 and the

desired documents were supplied to his authorized representatives

on the same day, i.e. 19.10.2011. Learned counsel submits that

the petitioner is raising a dispute regarding receipt of the desired

documents by his authorized representative. Although, the

signatures of the petitioner’s authorized representative appeared

to be a match, but still, the question whether the aforesaid

desired documents were received by the petitioner’s authorized

representative or not is a disputed question of fact, which cannot

be adjudicated by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction,

contained under Section 482 Cr.P.C. He submits that whatever

arguments have been raised by the learned counsel for the

petitioner, in his defence, would be appreciated by the Trial Court,

at the appropriate stage of trial. The defence of the accused

cannot be looked into and appreciated by this Court by conducting

a mini trial or making fishing & roving enquiry. He submits that

now the case is posted before the Trial Court for recording of

evidence of the witnesses. He further submits that at the time of

search, the mandate contained under Section 132 of the Act of

1961 was complied with.

10.In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the

respondent-Department has placed reliance upon the following

judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court:-

1.Anukul Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &

Anr. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060;

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2.Digvijaysinh Himmatsinh Jadeja Vs. The

State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in (2023) 20 SCC

398;

3.HMT Watches Ltd. Vs. M.A. Abida & Anr.

reported in (2015) 11 SCC 776; &

4.Rajiv Thapar & Ors. Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor

reported in (2013) 3 SCC 330.

11.Lastly, he argued that in view of the submissions made

hereinabove, these criminal misc. petitions submitted by the

petitioner be dismissed.

Discussions and Analysis:

12.Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and

perused the material available on record.

13.Perusal of the record indicates that as many as six different

complaints have been submitted against the petitioner under

Section 276CC of the Act of 1961 with the allegation of non-filing

of the revised Income Tax Returns for the assessment years 2005-

06, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, 2009-10 & 2010-11 within the

time prescribed in the notice dated 09.08.2011 issued to him

under Section 153A of the Act of 1961, i.e., on or before

15.09.2011. This notice was issued to the petitioner on

09.08.2011 and the same was received by him on 11.08.2011,

whereby the 35-days time period mentioned in the aforesaid

notice expired on 15.09.2011.

14.As per the provisions of Section 276CC of the Act of 1961, if

a person willfully fails to furnish the Income Tax Return by the due

date, then the same amounts to violation of the aforesaid Section.

Section 276CC of the Act of 1961 reads as under:-

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276CC. Failure to furnish returns of income.

If a person willfully fails to furnish in due time the

return of fringe benefits which he is required to

furnish under sub-section (1) of section 115WD or by

notice given under sub-section (2) of the said section

or section 115WH or the return of income which he is

required to furnish under sub-section (1) of section

139 or by notice given under clause (i) of sub-section

(1) of section 142 or section 148 or section 153-A, he

shall be punishable,-

(i) in a case where the amount of tax, which

would have been evaded if the failure had not been

discovered, exceeds twenty five hundred thousand

rupees, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which

shall not be less than six months but which may

extend to seven years and with fine;

(ii) in any other case, with imprisonment for a

term which shall not be less than three months but

which may extend to two years and with fine:

Provided that a person shall not be proceeded

against under this section for failure to furnish in due

time the return of fringe benefits under sub-section

(1) of section 115WD or return of income under sub-

section (1) of section 139

-(i) for any assessment year commencing prior

to the 1st day of April, 1975; or

(ii)for any assessment year commencing on or

after the 1st day of April, 1975, if -(a) the return is

furnished by him before the expiry of the assessment

year; or

(b) the tax payable by such person, not being a

company, on the total income determined on regular

assessment, as reduced by the advance tax or self-

assessment tax, if any, paid before the expiry of the

assessment year, and any tax deducted or collected at

source, does not exceed ten thousand rupees.

15.Section 153A of the Act of 1961 deals with the provisions of

assessment in case of search or requisition. Section 153A of the

Act of 1961 reads as under:-

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“153A. Assessment in case of search or

requisition.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 139,

section 147, section 148, section 149, section 151 and

section 153, in the case of a person where a search is

initiated under section 132 or books of account, other

documents or any assets are requisitioned under

section 132A after the 31st day of May, 2003, the

Assessing Officer shall—

(a) issue notice to such person requiring him to

furnish within such period, as may be specified in the

notice, the return of income in respect of each

assessment year falling within six assessment years

[and for the relevant assessment year or years]

referred to in clause (b), in the prescribed form and

verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth

such other particulars as may be prescribed and the

provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply

accordingly as if such return were a return required to

be furnished under section 139;

(b) assess or reassess the total income of six

assessment years immediately preceding the

assessment year relevant to the previous year in which

such search is conducted or requisition is made [and

for the relevant assessment year or years]:

Provided that the Assessing Officer shall assess

or reassess the total income in respect of each

assessment year falling within such six assessment

years [and for the relevant assessment year or years]:

Provided further that assessment or

reassessment, if any, relating to any assessment year

falling within the period of six assessment years [and

for the relevant assessment year or years] referred to

in this [sub-section] pending on the date of initiation

of the search under section 132 or making of

requisition under section 132A, as the case may be,

shall abate:

Provided also that the Central Government may

by rules made by it and published in the Official

Gazette (except in cases where any assessment or

reassessment has abated under the second proviso),

specify the class or classes of cases in which the

Assessing Officer shall not be required to issue notice

for assessing or reassessing the total income for six

assessment years immediately preceding the

assessment year relevant to the previous year in which

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search is conducted or requisition is made [and for

the relevant assessment year or years]:

Provided also that no notice for assessment or

reassessment shall be issued by the Assessing Officer

for the relevant assessment year or years unless—

(a) the Assessing Officer has in his possession

books of account or other documents or evidence

which reveal that the income, represented in the form

of asset, which has escaped assessment amounts to or

is likely to amount to fifty lakh rupees or more in the

relevant assessment year or in aggregate in the

relevant assessment years;

(b) the income referred to in clause (a) or part

thereof has escaped assessment for such year or

years; and

(c) the search under section 132 is initiated or

requisition under section 132A is made on or after the

1st day of April, 2017.

(2) If any proceeding initiated or any order of

assessment or reassessment made under sub-section

(1) has been annulled in appeal or any other legal

proceeding, then, notwithstanding anything contained

in sub-section (1) or section 153, the assessment or

reassessment relating to any assessment year which

has abated under the second proviso to sub-section

(1), shall stand revived with effect from the date of

receipt of the order of such annulment by the Principal

Commissioner or Commissioner:

Provided that such revival shall cease to have

effect, if such order of annulment is set aside.”

16.The case of the petitioner is that a search was conducted at

the business and residential premises of the company-M/s Gold

Sukh Trade India Limited and its Directors, including the

petitioner, on 18.11.2010 and the notice under Section 153A of

the Act of 1961 was issued to him on 09.08.2011 by the

respondent-Department and the same was received by him on

11.08.2011. By way of the aforesaid notice, directions were issued

to the petitioner to file Income Tax Return within 35 days of

receipt of the aforesaid notice. However, it is the case of the

petitioner that the copies of the material seized during the course

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of search along with the panchnama and statements recorded by

the search party were not provided to him by the respondent-

Department, as per the Taxpayers’ Charter. Hence, under these

circumstances, the petitioner sent the letters dated 06.12.2010

and 19.01.2011 to the respondent-Department, requesting for

providing him copies of the aforesaid desired documents.

However, these documents were not supplied to him, hence, again

on 19.10.2011, a letter was sent by the petitioner to the

respondent-Department with the request for providing him the

desired documents, but the same were still not supplied to him.

Therefore, he could not file the Income Tax Returns and hence,

there was no willful default on his part.

The above facts have been contended and disputed by the

respondent-Department on the ground that they have not

received the aforementioned letters dated 06.12.2010 and

19.01.2011. It is the case of the respondent-Department that the

first letter received by them was the one dated 19.10.2011 and

the desired documents were supplied to the authorized

representative of the petitioner on the very same day, i.e. on

19.10.2011.

It is also the case of the respondent-Department that again

on 21.11.2011, the desired documents were supplied to the

authorized representative of the petitioner when the same letter

was received on 21.11.2011. This fact has been disputed and

denied by the petitioner.

17.Now the questions that remain for consideration of this Court

are “Whether the petitioner requested the respondent-Department

on 06.12.2010 and 19.01.2011 for furnishing the seizure

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documents, panchnama etc. or not?; Or “Whether for the first

time this request was made on 19.10.2011, i.e., after expiry of 35

days on 15.09.2011?; Or “Whether the desired documents were

supplied to the authorized representative of the petitioner or not?”

All these questions are disputed questions of facts which are

required to be proved by both the sides by leading evidence in this

regard.

18.At this initial stage, this Court while exercising its inherent

jurisdiction contained under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not supposed to

conduct a “mini-trial” or “fishing enquiry” or weigh the sufficiency

of the evidence. Certainly, this task falls within the domain of the

Trial Court and is supposed to be undertaken by the Trial Court

itself at the appropriate stage of trial.

19.The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajiv Thapar

(supra) has held in paras 25 to 28, which reads as under:-

25.Section 482 CrPC is being extracted hereunder:

“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court .—

Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the

inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may

be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to

prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice.”

The discretion vested in a High Court under Section 482

CrPC can be exercised suo motu to prevent the abuse of

process of a court, and/or to secure the ends of justice.

26. This Court had an occasion to examine the matter in

State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [(2005) 1 SCC 568 :

2005 SCC (Cri) 415] (incidentally the said judgment was

heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent

complainant), wherein it was held thus: (SCC p. 581, para 29)

“29. Regarding the argument of the accused having to face

the trial despite being in a position to produce material of

unimpeachable character of sterling quality, the width of the

powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code and

Article 226 of the Constitution of India is unlimited whereunder

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in the interests of justice the High Court can make such orders

as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the

parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal case [State of Haryana v.

Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426].”

27. Recently, this Court again had an occasion to examine

the ambit and scope of Section 482 CrPC in Rukmini Narvekar

v. Vijaya Satardekar [(2008) 14 SCC 1 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri)

721] wherein in the main order it was observed that the width

of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, was unlimited. In

the said judgment, this Court held that the High Court could

make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the

process of any court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

In a concurring separate order passed in the same case, it was

additionally observed that under Section 482 CrPC, the High

Court was free to consider even material that may be produced

on behalf of the accused, to arrive at a decision whether the

charge as framed could be maintained. The aforesaid

parameters shall be kept in mind while we examine whether the

High Court ought to have exercised its inherent jurisdiction

under Section 482 CrPC in the facts and circumstances of this

case.

28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under

Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is

not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the

allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the

accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty

the defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if the

accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in

the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it

would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial.

This is so because it would result in giving finality to the

accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without

allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence

to substantiate the same. The converse is, however, not true,

because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not

subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would

still be in a position to succeed by establishing his defences by

producing evidence in accordance with law. There is an endless

list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal

position that in a case where the prosecution/complainant has

levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charge(s)

levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie

evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial

must be held.”

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20.Even in the case of HMT Watches Ltd. (supra) , the

Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the disputed question of facts

would be determined by the Trial Court and the defence of the

accused would not be looked into and adjudicated under Section

482 Cr.P.C. It has been held in paras 10 to 15, which reads as

under:-

“10. Having heard the learned counsel for the

parties, we are of the view that the accused

(Respondent 1) challenged the proceedings of criminal

complaint cases before the High Court, taking factual

defences. Whether the cheques were given as security

or not, or whether there was outstanding liability or

not is a question of fact which could have been

determined only by the trial court after recording

evidence of the parties. In our opinion, the High Court

should not have expressed its view on the disputed

questions of fact in a petition under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, to come to a conclusion

that the offence is not made out. The High Court has

erred in law in going into the factual aspects of the

matter which were not admitted between the parties.

The High Court further erred in observing that Section

138(b) of the NI Act stood uncomplied with, even

though Respondent 1 (accused) had admitted that he

replied to the notice issued by the complainant. Also,

the fact, as to whether the signatory of demand

notice was authorised by the complainant company or

not, could not have been examined by the High Court

in its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure when such plea was controverted

by the complainant before it.

11. In Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Rajvir

Industries Ltd., (2008) 13 SCC 678, this Court has

made the following observations explaining the

parameters of jurisdiction of the High Court in

exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure: (SCC pp. 685-87, paras

17 & 22)

“17. The parameters of jurisdiction of the High

Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482

of the Code of Criminal Procedure is now well settled.

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Although it is of wide amplitude, a great deal of

caution is also required in its exercise. What is

required is application of the well-known legal

principles involved in the matter.

* * *

22. Ordinarily, a defence of an accused although

appears to be plausible should not be taken into

consideration for exercise of the said jurisdiction. Yet

again, the High Court at that stage would not

ordinarily enter into a disputed question of fact. It,

however, does not mean that documents of

unimpeachable character should not be taken into

consideration at any cost for the purpose of finding

out as to whether continuance of the criminal

proceedings would amount to an abuse of process of

court or that the complaint petition is filed for causing

mere harassment to the accused. While we are not

oblivious of the fact that although a large number of

disputes should ordinarily be determined only by the

civil courts, but criminal cases are filed only for

achieving the ultimate goal, namely, to force the

accused to pay the amount due to the complainant

immediately. The courts on the one hand should not

encourage such a practice; but, on the other, cannot

also travel beyond its jurisdiction to interfere with the

proceeding which is otherwise genuine. The courts

cannot also lose sight of the fact that in certain

matters, both civil proceedings and criminal

proceedings would be maintainable.”

12. In Rallis India Ltd. v. Poduru Vidya Bhushan ,

(2011) 13 SCC 88, this Court expressed its views on

this point as under: (SCC p. 93, para 12)

“12. At the threshold, the High Court should not

have interfered with the cognizance of the complaints

having been taken by the trial court. The High Court

could not have discharged the respondents of the said

liability at the threshold. Unless the parties are given

opportunity to lead evidence, it is not possible to

come to a definite conclusion as to what was the date

when the earlier partnership was dissolved and since

what date the respondents ceased to be the partners

of the firm.”

13.In view of the law laid down by this Court as

above, in the present case the High Court exceeded

[2026:RJ-JP:28285] (18 of 24) [CRLMP-2784/2021]

its jurisdiction by giving its opinion on disputed

questions of fact, before the trial court.

14.Lastly, it is contended on behalf of Respondent 1

that it was not a case of insufficiency of fund, as such,

ingredients of the offence punishable under Section

138 of the NI Act are not made out. We are not

inclined to accept the contention of the learned

counsel for Respondent 1. In this connection, it is

sufficient to mention that in Pulsive Technologies (P)

Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 13 SCC 18, this Court

has already held that instruction of “stop payment”

issued to the banker could be sufficient to make the

accused liable for an offence punishable under Section

138 of the NI Act. Earlier also in Modi Cements Ltd. v.

Kuchil Kumar Nandi, (1998) 3 SCC 249, this Court has

clarified that if a cheque is dishonoured because of

stop payment instruction even then the offence

punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act gets

attracted.

15.For the reasons as discussed above, we find that

the High Court has committed grave error of law in

quashing the criminal complaints filed by the

appellant in respect of the offence punishable under

Section 138 of the NI Act, in exercise of powers under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by

accepting factual defences of the accused which were

disputed ones. Such defences, if taken before the trial

court, after recording of the evidence, can be better

appreciated.”

21.Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court

in the case of Anukul Singh (supra) that disputed and factual

appreciation of evidence of both sides is beyond the scope of

jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and it has been

held in paras 9.2 to 11.3 as under:-

“9.2. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that

this Court has consistently held that at the stage of

charge sheet, factual disputes and appreciation of

evidence are beyond the scope of inquiry under Section

482 Cr.P.C. The veracity of allegations is a matter for

trial. Reliance was placed on Md. Allauddin Khan v.

State of Bihar, wherein this Court observed:

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“17. In our view the High Court had no

jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence of the

proceedings under of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, because whether there are

contradictions or/and inconsistencies in the

statements of the witnesses is essentially an

issue relating to appreciation of evidence

and the same can be gone into by the

Judicial Magistrate during Trial when the

entire evidence is adduced by the parties.”

9.3. Placing reliance on the above principle, it was

submitted that the impugned order dated 22.10.2019 passed

by the High Court dismissing the appellant's Section 482

petition suffers from no illegality. The High Court correctly

recorded as follows:

“No material irregularity in the procedure

followed by Court below has been pointed

out. It is not a case of grave injustice

justifying interference in this application at

this stage. In view thereof, I do not find any

illegality or infirmity in impugned charge

sheet. This application lacks merit and is

accordingly dismissed.”

9.4. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel

contended that a cognizable offence is clearly made out

from the material gathered during investigation; the

matter is under trial; and if the appellant has any

defence, the same can only be established before the

trial Court. The proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

cannot be invoked to short-circuit the trial process.

Accordingly, the present Criminal Appeal is devoid of

merit and liable to be dismissed.

10. We have heard the rival submissions and

perused the materials available on record including the

judgments relied by them.

11. Before adverting to the facts of the present

case, it is necessary to recapitulate the settled legal

[2026:RJ-JP:28285] (20 of 24) [CRLMP-2784/2021]

principles governing the exercise of inherent powers

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is well established that

though the High Court possesses wide and plenary

inherent jurisdiction, such power is not unbridled or

unlimited, but circumscribed by self-imposed restraints

evolved through judicial pronouncements.

11.1. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan

Lal, at paragraph 102, laid down illustrative categories

where quashing of proceedings is justified. These are:

“(1) Where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if

they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case

against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first

information report and other materials, if

any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a

cognizable offence, justifying an

investigation by police officers under Section

156(1) of the Code except under an order of

a Magistrate within the purview of Section

155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations

made in the FIR or complaint and the

evidence collected in support of the same do

not disclose the commission of any offence

and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but

constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no

investigation is permitted by a police officer

without an order of a Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 155(2) of the

Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR

or complaint are so absurd and inherently

improbable on the basis of which no prudent

person can ever reach a just conclusion that

there is sufficient ground for proceeding

against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar

engrafted in any of the provisions of the

Code or the Act concerned (under which a

criminal proceeding is instituted) to the

institution and continuance of the

proceedings and/or, where there is a

specific provision in the Code or the Act

concerned, providing efficacious redress for

the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is

manifestly attended with mala fide and/or

where the proceeding is maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for

wreaking vengeance on the accused and

with a view to spite him due to private and

personal grudge.”

The categories in Bhajan Lal are illustrative and not

exhaustive, but they provide guiding principles to

balance two competing considerations - (a) preventing

abuse of process of law, and (b) ensuring that criminal

proceedings are not stifled at the threshold on disputed

questions of fact.

11.2. Equally, this Court has consistently cautioned

that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under

Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot embark upon a “mini-trial”

or weigh the sufficiency of evidence, which falls within

the domain of the trial Court. The scope of enquiry is

confined to whether, on a plain reading of the

FIR/complaint and accompanying material, the

ingredients of the alleged offence are disclosed. [See:

Rajiv Thapar v. Madal Lal Kapoor, HMT Watches v.

Abida, and Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. the

State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and others].

11.3. In Md. Allauddin Khan v. State of Bihar, it

was reiterated that appreciation of contradictions or

inconsistencies in witness statements lies within the

exclusive domain of the trial Court and not in

proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Similarly, in CBI

[2026:RJ-JP:28285] (22 of 24) [CRLMP-2784/2021]

v. Aryan Singh, it was emphasized that the High Court

had exceeded its jurisdiction by examining the merits

of the prosecution's case and holding that charges were

not proved, which is a matter strictly for trial.”

22.Had it been the case of the petitioner that he sent two letters

dated 06.12.2010 and 19.01.2011 to the respondent-Department

with a request for providing him the seizure documents,

panchnama, etc. and had it been his case that even after receipt

of the notice under Section 153A of the Act of 1961, the same

request was made prior to expiry of 35 days, the situation might

have been different for appreciating the arguments of the

petitioner.

23.Since, no documentary evidence or proof in this regard has

been placed on the record by the petitioner to show even prima

facie that the needful exercise was done at his end to show his

bonafides, the situation could have been different. But not a single

document/letter dated 06.12.2010 & 19.01.2011 has been placed

on record in support of the contentions. Simply a reference of

those letters is given in the letter dated 19.10.2011, which has

been placed on record. The fact of submitting and sending the

letters dated 06.12.2010 & 19.01.2011 by the petitioner to the

Department has been seriously disputed by the respondents.

24.Furthermore, no document has been placed on record by the

petitioner to demonstrate that from the date of issuance and

receipt of notice under Section 153A of the Act of 1961 and before

the expiry of the period mentioned therein, i.e., in between

09.08.2011/11.08.2011 to 15.09.2011, any such request was

made by the petitioner to the respondent-Department for

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providing him the search/seizure documents, panchnama, etc. for

submission of the revised returns.

25.Hence, in absence of such prima facie evidence, it cannot be

presumed that the petitioner was ‘innocent’ or not or that non-

filing of the Income Tax Return within the prescribed time was

willful or not? and Whether there was any ‘mensrea’ in the mind

or on the part of the petitioner or not? All these questions are

disputed questions of facts which need to be proved and

established by the petitioner and the respondents at the

appropriate stage of the trial and certainly these disputed

questions of facts would be appreciated by the Trial Court at the

appropriate stage by evaluating the evidence led by both the

sides.

26.It is a well-established principle of law that at the stage of

quashing the proceedings, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., at the stage

of taking cognizance and even at the stage of framing of charge,

only prima facie case is required to be seen. The defence of the

accused is not supposed to be looked into, at this initial stage and

the same would be appreciated by the Trial Court at the

appropriate stage of the trial.

C onclusion:

27.In view of the discussions made hereinabove, this Court finds

no merits and substance in these petitions and the judgments

relied upon by the petitioner would not apply at this stage because

in all these judgments, there was appreciation of evidence before

the Trial Court and accordingly, benefit of the same was extended

to the accused persons by giving them benefit of doubt.

[2026:RJ-JP:28285] (24 of 24) [CRLMP-2784/2021]

Hence, the instant petitions are liable to be and are hereby

rejected. Stay applications and all pending applications, if any,

also stand rejected.

Parting Remarks:

28.Before parting with this order, it is made clear that whatever

has been observed by this Court is not an expression of opinion by

this Court on the merits of the case. The Trial Court is directed to

decide all the pending matters, on the basis of the evidence led by

both the sides and on the basis of the merits, without being

influenced by any of the opinions or expressions made by this

Court, while passing the instant order.

29.Parties are left free to bear their own costs.

30.Let a copy of this order be placed separately in each file of

the misc. petitions.

(ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J

25-30/Karan