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CGHC010026722026 2026:CGHC:31433-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CRA No. 307 of 2026

1 - Baidyanath Manjhi S/o Late Rusi Manjhi Aged About 34 Years R/o

Tandapali Nayak Para Thana Koksara, Distt. Kalahandi Odisha.

2 - Mokarand Dhurva S/o Shri Diyari Dhurva Aged About 38 Years R/o

Chota Gohira Thana Koksara, Distt. Kalahandi Odisha.

--- Appellants

Versus

State of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Darbha, Distt. Bastar, Chhattisgarh.

--- Respondent

CRA No. 853 of 2026

Gopal Nayak S/o Late Darjo Nayak Aged About 38 Years R/o Kumjor

Uparpara, Police Station Jaipatna, District Kalahandi (Odisha)

--- Appellant

Versus

State of Chhattisgarh Through The Police Station Darbha, District

Jangdalpur (C.G.)

... Respondent

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Appellant

(In CRA No.307/2026)

:Mr. Vikas A. Shrivastava, Advocate

For Appellant

(In CRA No.853/2026)

:Ms. Sofia Khan, Advocate

For State/Respondent:Mr. Sumit Singh Deputy Government

Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge

Judgment on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice

23.07.2026

1.As both the criminal appeals arise from the common order dated

12.11.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge (NDPS Act),

Bastar at Jagdalpur in Special Criminal Case (NDPS Act) No.

13/2019, they were clubbed together, heard together, and are

being disposed of by this common judgment.

2.Criminal Appeal No. 307 of 2026 has been preferred by accused

Baidyanath Manjhi and Mokarand Dhurva, whereas Criminal

Appeal No. 853 of 2026 has been preferred by accused Gopal

Nayak, assailing the judgment of conviction and order of

sentence dated 12.11.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge

(NDPS Act), Bastar at Jagdalpur in Special Criminal Case (NDPS

Act) No. 13/2019, whereby all the appellants have been convicted

for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short,

"the NDPS Act") and sentenced to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for 15 years along with a fine of 1,00,000/- each

₹

.

In default of payment of fine, each of them has further been

directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.

3.The prosecution case, as unfolded before the learned Trial Court,

is that on 24.03.2019, Sub-Inspector, namely Vishnu Prasad

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Yadav (PW-10), who was then posted at Police Station Darbha,

District Bastar, received a confidential information from a reliable

informer to the effect that three persons were travelling in a white

Maruti Suzuki 800 car without a registration number plate

carrying a huge quantity of contraband ganja concealed in the

dickey as well as on the middle seat of the vehicle. It was further

informed that the said vehicle was proceeding from the Sukma-

Tongpal side towards Jagdalpur and would pass through National

Highway No.30. The information so received was immediately

reduced into writing in the daily diary and the superior police

officers were informed telephonically. Thereafter, in compliance

with the statutory requirements under the NDPS Act, PW-10

prepared the written information regarding receipt of the secret

information (Ex. P/6), the memorandum recording the inability to

obtain a search warrant (Ex. P/7) and the informer's information

panchnama (Ex. P/8). Two copies of the said documents were

forwarded through Constable Shridhar Pujari (PW-1) to the office

of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Police, Keshlur, and the relevant

entries regarding receipt thereof were duly made in the inward

register, which have been exhibited as Ex. P/1, Ex. P/8-C as well

as Ex. P/10-C.

4.The prosecution further alleged that PW-10 deputed Constable

Omkar Patra (PW-2) to secure the presence of two independent

witnesses. Pursuant thereto, Kamal Yadav (PW-7) and Dilip

Kumar Nag (PW-4) were summoned to the police station by

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issuing notices under Section 160 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘CrPC’), and after apprising them of

the secret information and the proposed search proceedings

under the NDPS Act, their written consent to act as independent

witnesses was obtained. Thereafter, PW-10, accompanied by the

police party, the independent witnesses, the NDPS investigation

kit, electronic weighing machine and sealing material, proceeded

towards NH-30 near the CRPF Camp at Kamanar for laying a

surveillance and interception. Ex. P/11 and Ex. P/30 are the

notices issued to the independent witnesses under Section 160 of

the CrPC.

5.According to the prosecution, while the police party was checking

vehicles near the CRPF Camp at Kamanar, a white Maruti Suzuki

800 car without a registration number plate, answering the

description furnished by the informer, approached the spot. The

vehicle was intercepted and three occupants were found

travelling therein. Upon enquiry, they disclosed their names as

Gopal Nayak, Baidyanath Manjhi and Mokarand Dhurva, who are

the present appellants. Before conducting the search, each of the

accused persons was individually informed of his legal right under

Section 50 of the NDPS Act through separate notices (Ex. P/13,

Ex. P/14 and Ex. P/15). Thereafter, the search of the vehicle was

carried out in the presence of the independent witnesses after

preparing the personal search panchnama (Ex. P/5) and the

search panchnama (Ex. P/17). During the search, twelve packets

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containing a substance suspected to be ganja were recovered

from the dickey and the middle portion of the vehicle. The

recovery was recorded in the seizure/recovery panchnama (Ex.

P/18). The recovered substance was identified by the witnesses,

on the basis of its smell, appearance and other physical

characteristics, to be ganja and the identification memorandum

was prepared as Ex. P/19.

6.The prosecution further alleged that notices under Section 67 of

the NDPS Act (Ex. P/42, Ex. P/43 and Ex. P/44) were served

upon the appellants requiring them to produce any lawful

authority or document permitting possession or transportation of

the contraband. Since none of the appellants could produce any

such document, the electronic weighing machine was first verified

by Head Constable Ajay Kumar Sahu (PW-5) through a

verification memorandum (Ex. P/20), whereafter the recovered

contraband was weighed in the presence of the witnesses. On

weighment, the total quantity of the contraband was found to be

140 kilograms contained in twelve packets. The weighment

memorandum (Ex. P/21), seizure memo (Ex. P/22) and sample

seal memorandum (Ex. P/23) were accordingly prepared and the

seized articles were duly sealed on the spot.

7.Since the recovered quantity was commercial in nature, the

appellants were informed of the grounds of their arrest by serving

notices under Section 52(1) of the NDPS Act (Ex. P/23),

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whereafter appellant Gopal Nayak was arrested vide arrest

memo Ex. P/24, appellant Baidyanath Manjhi vide Ex. P/25 and

appellant Mokarand Dhurva vide Ex. P/26. Intimation regarding

their arrest was also furnished to their respective family members

as reflected in Ex. P/46. During the course of investigation, the

Investigating Officer prepared the spot map (Ex. P/27), obtained

the Patwari map (Ex. P/28) and the Patwari panchnama (Ex.

P/29), recorded the statements of the prosecution witnesses

under Section 161 of the Code and deposited the seized

contraband in the Malkhana, the relevant entries whereof are Ex.

P/31 and Ex. P/32. The Dehati Nalishi (Ex. P/33) and the formal

First Information Report (Ex. P/34) were thereafter registered.

8.The prosecution also undertook the inventory and sampling

proceedings in accordance with Section 52-A of the NDPS Act by

obtaining the requisite orders from the competent Court. The

sample was thereafter forwarded to the Regional Forensic

Science Laboratory, Jagdalpur for chemical examination. The

forwarding letter is Ex. P/52 and the chemical examination report

is Ex. P/55, wherein the sample marked 'A-1' was opined to be

ganja (cannabis). During investigation, correspondence was also

made with the Transport Authorities and the Maruti Suzuki

showroom to ascertain the ownership of the vehicle used in the

commission of the offence. Upon completion of the investigation

and after collecting all documentary and oral evidence, a charge-

sheet was filed before the Special Court against all the three

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accused persons for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)

(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act.

9.In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution examined ten

witnesses, namely, Shridhar Pujari (PW-1), Omkar Patra (PW-2),

Chaituram Nag (PW-3), Dilip Kumar Nag (PW-4), Ajay Kumar

Sahu (PW-5), Rajesh Sinha (PW-6), Kamal Yadav (PW-7),

Praveen Kumar Joshi (PW-8), Lalji Sinha (PW-9) and the

Investigating Officer Vishnu Prasad Yadav (PW-10), and proved

as many as sixty-one documents (Ex. P/1 to Ex. P/61) in support

of its case.

10.After the prosecution evidence was concluded, the statements of

the appellants under Section 313 of the CrPC were recorded,

wherein they denied all the incriminating circumstances

appearing against them, pleaded false implication and did not

examine any witness in defence.

11.Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the entire oral and

documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution and after

critically examining the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

as well as the documentary exhibits proved on record, the

learned Special Judge came to the conclusion that the

prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the

appellants beyond all reasonable doubt. The learned Trial Court

found that the recovery of commercial quantity of contraband

ganja from the conscious possession of the appellants stood duly

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proved and that the statutory requirements contemplated under

the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act, 1985 had been substantially complied with.

Accordingly, the learned Trial Court convicted all the appellants

for the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS

Act and sentenced them in the manner indicated in the opening

part of this judgment.

12.Feeling dissatisfied and aggrieved by the judgment of conviction

and the order of sentence dated 12.11.2025 passed by the

learned Special Judge (NDPS Act), Bastar at Jagdalpur in

Special Criminal Case (NDPS Act) No.13/2019, the appellants

have preferred the present criminal appeals under Section 415(2)

of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding

to Section 374(2) of the CrPC), assailing the findings recorded by

the learned Trial Court. The appellants have questioned the

correctness, legality and propriety of the impugned judgment,

contending that the findings of conviction are contrary to the

evidence available on record and suffer from serious legal and

factual infirmities. Hence, these appeals.

13.Mr. Vikas A. Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the

appellants in Criminal Appeal No.307 of 2026, assailed the

impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence by

submitting that the learned Trial Court has committed a manifest

error of law as well as of fact in recording the finding of guilt

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against the appellants. It is contended that the conviction is not

founded upon legally admissible and trustworthy evidence, but is

based on mere assumptions, presumptions and surmises.

According to the learned counsel, the prosecution has failed to

establish the foundational facts necessary for bringing home the

charge under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act beyond all

reasonable doubt and, therefore, the finding of conviction

recorded by the learned Trial Court deserves to be set aside. He

further submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate

the settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that however grave

the suspicion may be, the same cannot substitute legal proof. It is

argued that the prosecution evidence, when scrutinized in its

proper perspective, suffers from material contradictions,

omissions and procedural irregularities, which create a serious

doubt regarding the prosecution story. However, instead of

extending the benefit of doubt to the appellants, the learned Trial

Court erroneously accepted the prosecution case in its entirety

without subjecting the evidence to the degree of scrutiny required

in a prosecution under the stringent provisions of the NDPS Act.

14.Mr. Shrivastava next contended that the mandatory safeguards

prescribed under the provisions of the NDPS Act have not been

duly complied with by the investigating agency. Referring to the

evidence of the Investigating Officer, Vishnu Prasad Yadav (PW-

10), and the documentary evidence brought on record, it is

submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish strict

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compliance of the statutory procedure contemplated under

Sections 42, 50, 52 and 57 of the NDPS Act. Though the

prosecution has relied upon the written information regarding

receipt of secret information (Ex. P/6), the memorandum

regarding inability to obtain a search warrant (Ex. P/7), the

informer information panchnama (Ex. P/8), the notices issued

under Section 50 of the NDPS Act (Ex. P/13 to Ex. P/15), the

seizure memo (Ex. P/22), the arrest memos (Ex. P/24 to Ex.

P/26), and the report sent to the superior authorities (Ex. P/9),

learned counsel submits that the prosecution has failed to

satisfactorily establish their due compliance in accordance with

law. It is further submitted that the prosecution has examined two

independent witnesses, namely, Dilip Kumar Nag (PW-4) and

Kamal Yadav (PW-7), to lend credibility to the alleged search and

seizure proceedings. However, according to learned counsel,

their testimonies are not free from material contradictions and

inconsistencies and do not inspire confidence. It is argued that

the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the

discrepancies appearing in their evidence and erroneously

discarded the infirmities pointed out by the defence. It is

submitted that once the evidence of the independent witnesses

becomes doubtful, the prosecution case rests substantially upon

the testimonies of police witnesses alone, which, in the facts of

the present case, required greater caution and corroboration

before being relied upon.

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15.Mr. Shrivastava also submitted that the prosecution has failed to

establish an unbroken chain of circumstances regarding the

seizure, sealing, custody and forwarding of the alleged

contraband to the Forensic Science Laboratory. Though reliance

has been placed upon the seizure memo (Ex. P/22), sample seal

memorandum (Ex. P/23), Malkhana Register entries (Ex. P/31

and Ex. P/32), forwarding letter (Ex. P/52) and the FSL report

(Ex. P/55), the evidence led by the prosecution is, according to

him, insufficient to rule out the possibility of tampering with the

seized material. Lastly, Mr. Shrivastava submitted that even

assuming, without admitting, that the conviction is sustainable,

the sentence imposed upon the appellants is unduly harsh and

disproportionate to the facts and circumstances of the case. It is,

therefore, prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction and

order of sentence be set aside and the appellants be acquitted of

all the charges. In the alternative, it is prayed that the sentence

awarded to the appellants be suitably reduced in accordance with

law.

16.Ms. Sofia Khan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant

Gopal Nayak in Criminal Appeal No.853 of 2026, vehemently

assailed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of

sentence by contending that the same is wholly unsustainable in

law as well as on facts. According to the learned counsel, the

findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are perverse,

contrary to the evidence available on record and based upon an

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erroneous appreciation of the oral as well as documentary

evidence. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to

establish the essential ingredients of the offence punishable

under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act and, therefore, the

conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant deserve to be

set aside. She submitted that the prosecution has utterly failed to

establish the conscious possession of the alleged contraband by

the appellant. It is argued that neither the recovery nor the

seizure of the alleged contraband from the exclusive or conscious

possession of the appellant has been proved beyond reasonable

doubt. The learned Trial Court, according to the learned counsel,

has mechanically accepted the prosecution version without there

being any cogent evidence establishing the appellant's conscious

possession of the seized contraband.

17.Ms. Khan further submitted that the prosecution case stands

seriously weakened on account of the fact that both the

independent seizure witnesses, namely, Dilip Kumar Nag (PW-4)

and Kamal Yadav (PW-7), did not support the prosecution case in

material particulars. Their evidence, according to the learned

counsel, does not corroborate the version put forth by the

prosecution regarding the alleged search, seizure and recovery

proceedings. It is contended that despite the independent

witnesses having failed to lend support to the prosecution story,

the learned Trial Court erroneously relied solely upon the

interested testimonies of the police officials to record the

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conviction. Such an approach, according to the learned counsel,

is contrary to the settled principles governing criminal trials,

particularly under the stringent provisions of the NDPS Act. It is

further contended that the testimony of the Investigating Officer,

Vishnu Prasad Yadav (PW-10), suffers from material

contradictions, omissions and inconsistencies, which strike at the

very root of the prosecution case. According to the learned

counsel, these contradictions have not been properly appreciated

by the learned Trial Court, which has accepted the evidence of

the Investigating Officer without subjecting it to the strict scrutiny

required in prosecutions under the NDPS Act.

18.Ms. Khan next submitted that the prosecution has failed to

establish the safe custody of the seized contraband from the time

of its seizure till its production before the competent authority and

subsequent dispatch to the Forensic Science Laboratory. Though

reliance has been placed upon the seizure memo (Ex. P/22),

sample seal memorandum (Ex. P/23), the Malkhana Register

entries (Ex. P/31 and Ex. P/32), the forwarding letter to the

Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex. P/52) and the chemical

examination report (Ex. P/55), the prosecution has failed to

establish an unbroken chain of custody so as to eliminate every

possibility of tampering with the seized articles. It is, therefore,

argued that the entire prosecution case stands vitiated. She

further submitted that the Investigating Officer himself admitted

during his deposition before the learned Trial Court that

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photographs of the inventory proceedings were not taken. It is

contended that such omission assumes significance in view of

the mandatory safeguards envisaged under Section 52-A of the

NDPS Act relating to inventory, sampling and certification by the

Magistrate. It is also pointed out that whereas the prosecution

case is that 140 kilograms of ganja was allegedly seized from the

vehicle, during the inventory proceedings the quantity was found

to be only 137.930 kilograms, which creates a serious and

unexplained discrepancy in the prosecution case. According to

the learned counsel, the prosecution has offered no satisfactory

explanation for the variation in weight, thereby rendering the

alleged recovery itself doubtful.

19.It is contended by Ms. Khan that the prosecution has failed to

establish strict compliance with the mandatory provisions of the

NDPS Act. It is argued that the mandatory requirements

contained in Sections 42, 50, 52 and 52-A of the Act have not

been complied with in their true letter and spirit. Though the

prosecution has relied upon the written information regarding

receipt of secret information (Ex. P/6), the memorandum

regarding inability to obtain a search warrant (Ex. P/7), the

notices issued under Section 50 of the NDPS Act (Ex. P/13 to Ex.

P/15), the inventory proceedings and the subsequent

correspondence with the Special Court (Ex. P/49 to Ex. P/54), the

evidence led by the prosecution is insufficient to establish due

compliance with the mandatory statutory safeguards. It is

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submitted that no valid inventory of the seized contraband was

prepared and duly certified by the Magistrate in the manner

contemplated under law and, therefore, the entire prosecution

case stands vitiated. She further contended that the prosecution

has completely failed to prove compliance with the provisions of

Section 42 of the NDPS Act relating to recording and forwarding

of the secret information to the superior officer in the manner

required by law. It is submitted that the evidence adduced by the

prosecution falls short of proving complete compliance with the

statutory mandate, thereby vitiating the search and seizure

proceedings.

20.Lastly, it is submitted by Ms. Khan that the learned Trial Court has

overlooked the fact that none of the independent witnesses has

supported the prosecution case and that the conviction has been

recorded solely on the basis of the evidence of police officials. In

the absence of reliable corroboration from independent witnesses

and in view of the various procedural lapses, material

contradictions and unexplained discrepancies in the prosecution

case, the appellants were entitled to the benefit of doubt. It is,

therefore, prayed that the impugned judgment of conviction and

order of sentence be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of

the charge levelled against him.

21.Per contra, Mr. Samir Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General

appearing for the respondent/State, vehemently opposed the

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submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants

in both the appeals and supported the impugned judgment of

conviction and order of sentence. He submitted that the learned

Trial Court has meticulously appreciated the entire oral and

documentary evidence available on record and has rightly

recorded the finding of guilt against the appellants. According to

the learned State counsel, the impugned judgment is based on

proper appreciation of evidence and does not suffer from any

illegality, perversity or infirmity warranting interference by this

Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

22.Mr. Singh further submitted that the prosecution has successfully

established that on the basis of a reliable secret information, the

police party intercepted the vehicle in question and recovered

140 kilograms of ganja, which is a commercial quantity, from the

conscious and joint possession of the appellants. He submitted

that the entire search and seizure proceedings were conducted in

the presence of independent witnesses and after due compliance

with the mandatory procedural safeguards prescribed under the

NDPS Act. The prosecution has proved the written information

regarding receipt of secret information (Ex. P/6), the

memorandum recording inability to obtain a search warrant (Ex.

P/7), the informer information panchnama (Ex. P/8), the notices

issued under Section 50 of the NDPS Act (Ex. P/13 to Ex. P/15),

the search and seizure panchnamas (Ex. P/17 and Ex. P/18), the

seizure memo (Ex. P/22), the arrest memos (Ex. P/24 to Ex.

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P/26), as well as the subsequent reports submitted to the

superior officers, thereby establishing due compliance with the

statutory requirements. He also submitted that merely because

the independent witnesses did not fully support the prosecution

case, the otherwise reliable testimony of the official witnesses

cannot be discarded. It is contended that there is no rule of law

that the evidence of police personnel is inherently unreliable or

requires corroboration in every case. The evidence of the police

witnesses, particularly that of the Investigating Officer Vishnu

Prasad Yadav (PW-10), finds due corroboration from the

contemporaneous documentary evidence proved on record and

inspires complete confidence. It is submitted that the learned Trial

Court has rightly relied upon their testimonies after finding them

to be trustworthy and credible.

23.Mr. Singh submitted that the prosecution has successfully

established the chain of custody of the seized contraband. The

seized ganja was duly weighed, sealed, deposited in the

Malkhana, and thereafter sent for chemical examination in

accordance with law. The prosecution has proved the relevant

Malkhana register entries (Ex. P/31 and Ex. P/32), the

correspondence relating to inventory and sampling under Section

52-A of the NDPS Act (Ex. P/49 to Ex. P/54), and the report of the

Regional Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex. P/55), which

conclusively establishes that the sample sent for examination

was found to be ganja. Thus, according to the learned State

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counsel, the prosecution has established an unbroken chain of

custody leaving no scope for any allegation of tampering. It is

further submitted that the alleged contradictions and omissions

pointed out by the appellants are insignificant in nature and do

not go to the root of the prosecution case. According to the

learned State counsel, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses,

when read as a whole, consistently establishes the recovery of

commercial quantity of ganja from the vehicle occupied by the

appellants. Minor discrepancies, if any, are natural and do not

affect the substratum of the prosecution case. The learned Trial

Court has, therefore, rightly rejected the defence contentions.

24.Lastly, Mr. Singh submitted that the prosecution has proved the

guilt of the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt and that the

learned Trial Court has recorded well-reasoned findings based

upon proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence.

Since the appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity,

illegality or material irregularity in the impugned judgment, no

interference is called for by this Court. It is, therefore, prayed that

both the criminal appeals, being devoid of merit, deserve to be

dismissed and the judgment of conviction and order of sentence

passed by the learned Trial Court be affirmed.

25.We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable

length and have also carefully perused the entire record of the

case, including the impugned judgment, oral and documentary

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evidence adduced before the learned Trial Court, as well as the

material placed on record in the present appeal.

26.After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length, perusing

the record of the case and carefully examining the evidence

available on record, the following point arises for determination in

the present appeal:

"Whether the prosecution has been able to

establish beyond reasonable doubt that on

24.03.2019, on National Highway No. 30 near the

CRPF Camp at Kamanar, within the jurisdiction of

Police Station Darbha, District Bastar (C.G.), the

appellants, namely, Baidyanath Manjhi, Mokarand

Dhurva and Gopal Nayak, were found in conscious

and joint possession of 140 kilograms of ganja, a

commercial quantity of contraband, allegedly

recovered from the dickey and middle portion of

the Maruti Suzuki 800 car in which they were

travelling, in contravention of the provisions of the

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,

1985 and the Rules, Orders or licence conditions

framed thereunder, thereby committing an offence

punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,

1985?"

27.At this stage, it would also be apposite to examine the

applicability of the provisions contained under Section 43 of the

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, which

deals with the powers of seizure and arrest in a public place.

Section 43 of the NDPS Act confers authority upon officers

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empowered under Section 42 of the Act to seize any narcotic

drug, psychotropic substance or controlled substance in any

public place or while the same is in transit, if the officer has

reason to believe that an offence punishable under the Act has

been committed. The said provision further authorises the officer

to detain and search any person whom he has reason to believe

to have committed such offence and, if such person is found to

be in unlawful possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic

substance, to arrest him. The explanation appended to Section

43 clarifies that the expression “public place” includes any public

conveyance, hotel, shop or any other place intended for use by,

or accessible to, the public at large. Section 43 of the NDPS Act

provides the powers of seizure and arrest in public place which

reads as under:

“43. Power of seizure and arrest in public

place- Any officer of any of the departments

mentioned in section 42 may:-

(a) seize in any public place or in transit, any

narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or

controlled substance in respect of which he has

reason to believe an offence punishable under

this Act has been committed, and, along with

such drug or substance, any animal or

conveyance or article liable to confiscation

under this Act, any document or other article

which he has reason to believe may furnish

evidence of the commission of an offence

punishable under this Act or any document or

other article which may furnish evidence of

holding any illegally acquired property which is

liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under

Chapter VA of this Act;

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(b) detain and search any person whom he has

reason to believe to have committed an offence

punishable under this Act, and if such person

has any narcotic drug or psychotropic

substance or controlled substance in his

possession and such possession appears to

him to be unlawful, arrest him and any other

person in his company.

Explanation- For the purposes of this section,

the expression public place" includes any

public conveyance, hotel, shop, or other place

intended for use by, or accessible to, the

public.”

28.In the matter of Firdoskhan Khurshidkhan v. State of Gujarat

and Another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 680, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court while considering the issue regarding Section 42 of the

NDPS Act, has held in paragraph 18, which reads as under :-

"18. Section 42 of the NDPS Act deals with

search and seizure from a building,

conveyance or enclosed place. When the

search and seizure is effected from a public

place, the provisions of Section 43 of the NDPS

Act would apply and hence, there is no merit in

the contention of learned counsel for the

appellants that non-compliance of the

requirement of Section 42(2) vitiates the search

and seizure. Hence, the said contention is

noted to be rejected."

29.Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of

Haryana v. Jarnail Singh and Others, 2004 (5) SCC 188 has

held in paragraphs 9 and 10 of its judgment by observing as

follows :-

"9. Sections 42 and 43, therefore, contemplate

two different situations. Section 42

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contemplates entry into and search of any

building, conveyance or enclosed place, while

Section 43 contemplates a seizure made in any

public place or in transit. If seizure is made

under Section 42 between sunset and sunrise,

the requirement of the proviso thereto has to be

complied with. There is no such proviso in

Section 43 of the Act and, therefore, it is

obvious that if a public conveyance is searched

in a public place, the officer making the search

is not required to record his satisfaction as

contemplated by the proviso to Section 42 of

the NDPS Act for searching the vehicle

between sunset and the sunrise.

10. In the instant case there is no dispute that

the tanker was moving on the public highway

when it was stopped and searched. Section 43

therefore clearly applied to the facts of this

case. Such being the factual position there was

no requirement of the officer conducting the

search to record the grounds of his belief as

contemplated by the proviso to Section 42.

Moreover it cannot be lost sight of that the

Superintendent of Police was also a member of

the searching party. It has been held by this

Court in M. Prabhulal vs. Assistant Director,

Directorate of Revenue Intelligence : (2003) 8

SCC 449 that where a search is conducted by

a gazetted officer himself acting under Section

41 of the NDPS Act, it was not necessary to

comply with the requirement of Section 42. For

this reason also, in the facts of this case, it was

not necessary to comply with the requirement

of the proviso to Section 42 of the NDPS Act."

30.In the matter of Kallu Khan vs. State of Rajasthan, 2021 (19)

SCC 197, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :-

"12. After hearing and on perusal of record and

the evidence brought, it is apparent that on

apprehending the accused, while making

search of the motor cycle, 900 gm of smack

23

was seized to which seizure and sample

memos were prepared, as proved by the

departmental witnesses. In the facts of the

case at hand, where the search and seizure

was made from the vehicle used, by way of

chance recovery from public road, the

provisions of Section 43 of the NDPS Act would

apply. In this regard, the guidance may be

taken from the judgments of this Court in S. K.

Raju (supra) and S.K. Sakkar (supra).

However, the recovery made by Pranveer

Singh (PW6) cannot be doubted in the facts of

this case.

13. Now reverting to the contention that the

motor cycle seized in commission of offence

does not belong to accused, however seizure

of the contraband from the motor cycle cannot

be connected to prove the guilt of accused. The

Trial Court on appraisal of the testimony of

witnesses, Constable Preetam Singh (PW1),

Constable Sardar Singh (PW2), S.I. Pranveer

Singh (PW6) and ConstableRajendra Prasad

(PW8), who were members of the patrolling

team and the witnesses of the seizure, proved

beyond reasonable doubt, when they were on

patrolling, the appellant came driving the

seized vehicle from opposite side. On seeing

the police vehicle, he had taken back the motor

cycle which he was riding. However, the police

team apprehended and intercepted the

accused and made the search of vehicle, in

which the seized contraband smack was found

beneath the seat of the vehicle. However, while

making search at public place, the contraband

was seized from the motor cycle driven by the

accused. Thus, recovery of the contraband

from the motor cycle of the appellant was a

chance recovery on a public road. As per

Section 43 of NDPS Act, any officer of any of

the departments, specified in Section 42, is

having power of seizure and arrest of the

accused from a public place, or in transit of any

narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or

24

controlled substance. The said officer may

detain in search any person whom he has

reason to believe that he has committed an

offence punishable under the provisions of the

NDPS Act, in case the possession of the

narcotic drug or psychotropic substance

appears to be unlawful. Learned senior counsel

representing the appellant is unable to show

any deficiency in following the procedure or

perversity to the findings recorded by the Trial

Court, affirmed by the High Court. The seizure

of the motor cycle from him is proved beyond

reasonable doubt, therefore, the question of

ownership of vehicle is not relevant. In the

similar set of facts, in the case of Rizwan Khan

(supra), this Court observed the ownership of

the vehicle is immaterial. Therefore, the

argument as advanced by learned senior

counsel is of no substance and meritless."

31.Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the

aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is

evident that the alleged recovery of the contraband was effected

from a Maruti Suzuki 800 car, without a registration number plate,

which was intercepted by the police party on National Highway

No.30 near the CRPF Camp at Kamanar, within the jurisdiction of

Police Station Darbha, District Bastar.

32.Admittedly, the recovery was not effected from any building,

enclosed place or private premises but from a vehicle intercepted

on a public road, which is a public place within the meaning of

Section 43 of the NDPS Act. The prosecution case itself is that

the appellants were travelling in the said vehicle when it was

intercepted and, upon search, twelve packets containing ganja

were recovered from the dickey as well as the middle portion of

25

the vehicle. Therefore, the search and seizure having been

conducted at a public place, the provisions contained in Section

43 of the NDPS Act are attracted and not those contained in

Section 42 of the Act. Consequently, the principal contention

advanced on behalf of the appellants regarding non-compliance

of Section 42 of the NDPS Act is liable to be rejected.

33.Even otherwise, the evidence on record clearly establishes that

prior to proceeding for the search operation, the Investigating

Officer, Vishnu Prasad Yadav (PW-10), had reduced the secret

information into writing and had taken all necessary steps as

contemplated under the NDPS Act. The written information

regarding receipt of the secret information (Ex. P/6), the

memorandum recording the grounds for conducting search

without obtaining a warrant (Ex. P/7) and the informer's

information panchnama (Ex. P/8) were prepared

contemporaneously.

34.The prosecution has further proved that copies thereof were

forwarded through Constable Shridhar Pujari (PW-1) to the office

of the Sub-Divisional Officer of Police, Keshlur, and the

corresponding entries acknowledging receipt of the said

documents have also been proved on record. Thus, the

prosecution has satisfactorily established that the information

received by PW-10 was duly reduced into writing and

communicated to the superior officer before the search and

26

seizure proceedings were undertaken. Hence, even assuming

that the provisions of Section 42 were applicable, the evidence on

record sufficiently demonstrates substantial compliance thereof.

35.The next question which arises for consideration is whether the

prosecution has succeeded in proving the recovery and seizure

of the contraband from the conscious and joint possession of the

appellants. It is true that the independent witnesses, namely, Dilip

Kumar Nag (PW-4) and Kamal Yadav (PW-7), have not fully

supported the prosecution case on all material particulars.

However, it is by now well settled that merely because

independent witnesses have turned hostile or have not supported

the prosecution in its entirety, the evidence of official witnesses

cannot be discarded solely on that ground. If the testimony of the

police officials is found to be trustworthy, cogent and reliable, the

same can safely form the basis of conviction. There is no legal

principle that the testimony of official witnesses requires

independent corroboration in every case.

36.In the present case, the evidence of the Investigating Officer

Vishnu Prasad Yadav (PW-10), who conducted the search,

seizure and investigation, receives substantial corroboration from

the evidence of Shridhar Pujari (PW-1), Omkar Patra (PW-2),

Ajay Kumar Sahu (PW-5), Rajesh Sinha (PW-6), Praveen Kumar

Joshi (PW-8) and Lalji Sinha (PW-9), besides the

contemporaneous documentary evidence prepared during the

27

course of investigation. The search panchnama (Ex. P/17),

recovery panchnama (Ex. P/18), identification memorandum (Ex.

P/19), weighment memorandum (Ex. P/21), seizure memo (Ex.

P/22), sample seal memorandum (Ex. P/23), arrest memos (Ex.

P/24 to Ex. P/26) and the other contemporaneous documents

lend complete assurance to the prosecution version. Nothing

substantial has been elicited during the cross-examination of

these witnesses to suggest that they were actuated by any ill-will

or ulterior motive to falsely implicate the appellants in a serious

offence under the NDPS Act. Their evidence on material

particulars has remained consistent, natural and inspires

confidence.

37.The evidence further reveals that during the search of the Maruti

Suzuki 800 car, twelve packets containing suspected ganja were

recovered from the dickey as well as the middle portion of the

vehicle occupied by the appellants. The contraband was weighed

on an electronic weighing machine after its verification by Head

Constable Ajay Kumar Sahu (PW-5), and the total weight of the

recovered contraband was found to be 140 kilograms, which is

admittedly a commercial quantity. Thereafter, the contraband was

seized under the seizure memo (Ex. P/22), representative

samples were drawn and sealed in accordance with the

prescribed procedure, and the remaining contraband was also

duly sealed at the spot. The appellants have not been able to

point out any material contradiction or discrepancy in the

28

prosecution evidence so far as the actual recovery of the

contraband from the vehicle is concerned.

38.The prosecution has also successfully established the safe

custody of the seized contraband and the chain of custody till its

examination by the Forensic Science Laboratory. The seized

articles were deposited in the Malkhana immediately after seizure

and the relevant Malkhana register entries have been duly

proved. Subsequently, proceedings under Section 52-A of the

NDPS Act were undertaken before the competent Court,

representative samples were drawn and duly sealed, and the

samples were thereafter forwarded to the Regional Forensic

Science Laboratory, Jagdalpur for chemical examination. The

FSL report (Ex. P/55) unequivocally confirms that the sample sent

for examination was ganja (cannabis). The defence has failed to

establish any missing link in the chain of custody or any

circumstance giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of

tampering with the seized contraband or the representative

samples.

39.The contention advanced on behalf of the appellants regarding

non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act also does not

merit acceptance. In the present case, the recovery of the

contraband was not effected from the personal search of any of

the appellants but from the Maruti Suzuki 800 car in which they

were travelling. The alleged contraband was recovered from the

29

dickey and the middle portion of the vehicle and not from the

person of the appellants. Therefore, the mandatory requirement

of Section 50 of the NDPS Act relating to personal search is not

attracted. Nevertheless, the prosecution has proved on record

that notices under Section 50 of the NDPS Act (Ex. P/13, Ex.

P/14 and Ex. P/15) were served upon all the appellants before

the search was conducted. Thus, even by way of abundant

caution, the investigating agency had informed the appellants of

their legal rights, and no prejudice whatsoever can be said to

have been caused to them.

40.It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court that the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act are

attracted only in cases involving personal search of a person and

not in cases where recovery is made from a vehicle, container,

bag or other article. Therefore, the alleged non-compliance of

Section 50 does not render the recovery illegal. The legal position

in this regard has been authoritatively settled by the Supreme

Court. In Madan Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2003) 7

SCC 465, the Supreme Court has explained the concept of

possession under the NDPS Act and has held that once

possession of a contraband article is established, the burden

shifts upon the accused to explain that such possession was not

conscious and held as under :-

“16. A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it

only applies in case of personal search of a

30

person. It does not extend to search of a

vehicle or a container or a bag, or premises.

(See Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra

and Anr. (JT 1999 (8) SC 293), The State of

Punjab v. Baldev Singh (JT 1999 (4) SC 595),

Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana (2001(3)

SCC 28). The language of Section 50 is

implicitly clear that the search has to be in

relation to a person as contrasted to search of

premises, vehicles or articles. This position was

settled beyond doubt by the Constitution Bench

in Baldev Singh's case (supra). Above being

the position, the contention regarding non-

compliance of Section 50 of the Act is also

without any substance.

***

21. It is highlighted that unless the possession

was coupled with requisite mental element, i.e.

conscious possession and not mere custody

without awareness of the nature of such

possession, Section 20 is not attracted.

22. The expression 'possession' is a

polymorphous term which assumes different

colours in different contexts. It may carry

different meanings in contextually different

backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed

in Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal

Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja and

Ors. (AIR 1980 SC 52), to work out a

completely logical and precise definition of

"possession" uniformally applicable to all

situations in the context of all statutes.

23. The word 'conscious' means awareness

about a particular fact. It is a state of mind

which is deliberate or intended.

24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. The State of M.P.

(AIR 1972 SC 1756) possession in a given

case need not be physical possession but can

be constructive, having power and control over

the article in case in question, while the person

whom physical possession is given holds it

subject to that power or control.

25. The word 'possession' means the legal right

31

to possession (See Health v. Drown (1972) (2)

All ER 561 (HL). In an interesting case it was

observed that where a person keeps his fire

arm in his mother's flat which is safer than his

own home, he must be considered to be in

possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of

Caithness (1976 (1) All ER 844 (QBD).

26. Once possession is established the person

who claims that it was not a conscious

possession has to establish it, because how he

came to be in possession is within his special

knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a

statutory recognition of this position because of

presumption available in law. Similar is the

position in terms of Section 54 where also

presumption is available to be drawn from

possession of illicit articles”

41.Similarly, in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar,

(2005) 4 SCC 350, it has been held that the search of a bag,

briefcase or container carried by the accused cannot be treated

as a personal search and therefore the provisions of Section 50

would not apply in such a situation and observed as under :-

“11. A bag, briefcase or any such article or

container, etc. can, under no circumstances, be

treated as body of a human being. They are

given a separate name and are identifiable as

such. They cannot even remotely be treated to

be part of the body of a human being.

Depending upon the physical capacity of a

person, he may carry any number of items like

a bag, a briefcase, a suitcase, a tin box, a

thaila, a jhola, a gathri, a holdall, a carton, etc.

of varying size, dimension or weight. However,

while carrying or moving along with them, some

extra effort or energy would be required. They

would have to be carried either by the hand or

hung on the shoulder or back or placed on the

head. In common parlance it would be said that

32

a person is carrying a particular article,

specifying the manner in which it was carried

like hand, shoulder, back or head, etc.

Therefore, it is not possible to include these

articles within the ambit of the word "person"

occurring in Section 50 of the Act.

12. An incriminating article can be kept

concealed in the body or clothings or coverings

in different manner or in the footwear. While

making a search of such type of articles, which

have been kept so concealed, it will certainly

come within the ambit of the word "search of

person". One of the tests, which can be applied

is, where in the process of search the human

body comes into contact or shall have to be

touched by the person carrying out the search,

it will be search of a person. Some indication of

this is provided by Sub-section (4) of Section

50 of the Act, which provides that no female

shall be searched by anyone excepting a

female. The legislature has consciously made

this provision as while conducting search of a

female, her body may come in contact or may

need to be touched and, therefore, it should be

done only by a female. In the case of a bag,

briefcase or any such article or container, etc.,

they would not normally move along with the

body of the human being unless some extra or

special effort is made. Either they have to be

carried in hand or hung on the shoulder or back

or placed on the head. They can be easily and

in no time placed away from the body of the

carrier. In order to make a search of such type

of objects, the body of the carrier will not come

in contact of the person conducting the search.

Such objects cannot be said to be inextricably

connected with the person, namely, the body of

the human being. Inextricable means incapable

of being disentangled or untied or forming a

maze or tangle from which it is impossible to

get free.

13. The scope and ambit of Section 50 of the

Act was examined in considerable detail by a

33

Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Baldev

Singh 1999 (6) SCC 172 and para 12 of the

reports is being reproduced below :

"12. On its plain reading, Section 50 would

come into play only in the case of a search of

a person as distinguished from search of any

premises etc. However, if the empowered

officer, without any prior information as

contemplated by Section 42 of the Act makes

a search or causes arrest of a person during

the normal course of investigation into an

offence or suspected offence and on

completion of that search, a contraband

under the NDPS Act is also recovered, the

requirements of Section 50 of the Act are not

attracted."

The Bench recorded its conclusion in para 57

of the reports and sub- paras (1), (2), (3) and

(6) are being reproduced below :

“57. On the basis of the reasoning and

discussion above, the following conclusions

arise: (1) That when an empowered officer or

a duly authorized officer acting on prior

information is about to search a person, it is

imperative for him to inform the person

concerned of his right under sub-section (1)

of Section 50 of being taken to the nearest

gazetted officer or the nearest Magistrate for

making the search. However, such

information may not necessarily be in writing.

(2) That failure to inform the person

concerned about the existence of his right to

be searched before a gazetted officer or a

Magistrate would cause prejudice to an

accused.

(3) That a search made by an empowered

officer, on prior information, without informing

the person of his right that if he so requires,

he shall be taken before a gazetted officer or

a Magistrate for search and in case he so

opts, failure to conduct his search before a

gazetted officer or a Magistrate may not

vitiate the trial but would render the recovery

34

of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the

conviction and sentence of an accused,

where the conviction has been recorded only

on the basis of the possession of the illicit

article, recovered from his person, during a

search conducted in violation of the

provisions of Section 50 of the Act.

***

(6) That in the context in which the protection

has been incorporated in Section 50 for the

benefit of the person intended to be

searched, we do not express any opinion

whether the provisions of Section 50 are

mandatory or directory, but hold that failure to

inform the person concerned of his right as

emanating from sub-section (1) of Section 50,

may render the recovery of the contraband

suspect and the conviction and sentence of

an accused bad and unsustainable in law."

14. The above quoted dictum of the

Constitution Bench shows that the provisions of

Section 50 will come into play only in the case

of personal search of the accused and not of

some baggage like a bag, article or container,

etc. which he may be carrying.”

42.The same principle has been reiterated in Ajmer Singh v. State

of Haryana, (2010) 3 SCC 746, wherein the Supreme Court held

that recovery of contraband from a bag carried by the accused

does not amount to personal search of the accused. The

Supreme Court has again reiterated the said principle in Arif

Khan @ Agha Khan v. State of Uttarakhand, (2018) 18 SCC

380 and Baljinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2019) 10 SCC

473, holding that the requirement of informing the accused of his

right under Section 50 arises only in cases of personal body

search and not when the recovery is made from a bag, container

35

or other article carried by the accused. In such circumstances,

the search is treated as search of an article and not of the person

of the accused. The Supreme Court has held as follows :-

“13. The law is thus well settled that an illicit

Article seized from the person during personal

search conducted in violation of the safe-

guards provided in Section 50 of the Act cannot

by itself be used as admissible evidence of

proof of unlawful possession of contra-band.

But the question is, if there be any other

material or Article recovered during the

investigation, would the infraction with respect

to personal search also affect the qualitative

value of the other material circumstance ?

14. At this stage we may also consider

following observations from the decision of this

Court in Ajmer Singh v. State of Haryana

[(2010) 3 SCC 746]:

"15. The learned Counsel for the Appellant

contended that the provision of Section 50 of

the Act would also apply, while searching the

bag, briefcase, etc. carried by the person and

its non-compliance would be fatal to the

proceedings initiated under the Act. We find

no merit in the contention of the learned

Counsel. It requires to be noticed that the

question of compliance or non-compliance

with Section 50 of the NDPS Act is relevant

only where search of a person is involved

and the said Section is not applicable nor

attracted where no search of a person is

involved. Search and recovery from a bag,

briefcase, container, etc. does not come

within the ambit of Section 50 of the NDPS

Act, because firstly, Section 50 expressly

speaks of search of person only. Secondly,

the Section speaks of taking of the person to

be searched by the gazetted officer or a

Magistrate for the purpose of search. Thirdly,

this issue in our considered opinion is no

36

more res Integra in view of the observations

made by this Court in Madan Lal v. State of

H.P. [(2003) 7 SCC 465]. The Court has

observed: (SCC p. 471, para 16)

16. A bare reading of Section 50 shows that

it only applies in case of personal search of a

person. It does not extend to search of a

vehicle or a container or a bag or premises

(see Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra

[(1999) 8 SCC 257], State of Punjab v.

Baldev Singh-[(1999) 6 SCC 172] and

Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana [(2001) 3

SCC 28]). The language of Section 50 is

implicitly clear that the search has to be in

relation to a person as contrasted to search

of premises, vehicles or articles. This

position was settled beyond doubt by the

Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh case

(1999) 6 SCC 172 Above being the position,

the contention regarding non-compliance

with Section 50 of the Act is also without any

substance."

15. As regards applicability of the requirements

Under Section 50 of the Act are concerned, it is

well settled that the mandate of Section 50 of

the Act is confined to "personal search" and not

to search of a vehicle or a container or

premises.

16. The conclusion (3) as recorded by the

Constitution Bench in Para 57 of its judgment in

Baldev Singh clearly states that the conviction

may not be based "only" on the basis of

possession of an illicit Article recovered from

personal search in violation of the requirements

Under Section 50 of the Act but if there be

other evidence on record, such material can

certainly be looked into.”

43.Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the

aforesaid settled principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, this Court finds no substance in the contention

37

advanced on behalf of the appellants regarding alleged non-

compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. A careful scrutiny of

the prosecution evidence reveals that the alleged recovery of the

contraband was not effected from the personal search of any of

the appellants. The prosecution case consistently is that on the

basis of a secret information, the police party intercepted a Maruti

Suzuki 800 car without a registration number plate on National

Highway No.30 near the CRPF Camp at Kamanar, within the

jurisdiction of Police Station Darbha, District Bastar. Upon search

of the said vehicle, twelve packets containing contraband ganja

were recovered from the dickey as well as the middle portion of

the vehicle. Thus, the recovery in the present case was from a

conveyance in which the appellants were travelling and not from

their physical person.

44.The testimony of Vishnu Prasad Yadav (PW-10), the Investigating

Officer, duly corroborated by the evidence of Shridhar Pujari (PW-

1), Omkar Patra (PW-2), Ajay Kumar Sahu (PW-5), Rajesh Sinha

(PW-6), Praveen Kumar Joshi (PW-8) and Lalji Sinha (PW-9),

coupled with the contemporaneous documentary evidence,

clearly establishes that the contraband was recovered from the

Maruti Suzuki 800 car occupied by the appellants. The search

panchnama (Ex. P/17), recovery panchnama (Ex. P/18),

identification memorandum (Ex. P/19), weighment memorandum

(Ex. P/21), seizure memo (Ex. P/22), sample seal memorandum

38

(Ex. P/23) and the arrest memos (Ex. P/24 to Ex. P/26) fully

corroborate the oral testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

Though notices under Section 50 of the NDPS Act (Ex. P/13 to

Ex. P/15) were served upon the appellants before conducting the

search, the prosecution case nowhere suggests that any narcotic

substance was recovered from their personal search.

45.It is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court that the safeguard contemplated under Section 50 of the

NDPS Act is attracted only when the search is of the person of

the accused and not when the recovery is effected from a vehicle,

container, bag or any other article or conveyance. Since the

recovery in the present case was effected from the dickey and

the middle portion of the Maruti Suzuki 800 car and not from the

personal search of any of the appellants, the provisions of

Section 50 of the NDPS Act are not attracted to the facts of the

present case. Consequently, the argument advanced on behalf of

the appellants on the alleged violation of Section 50 of the NDPS

Act deserves to be rejected.

46.Equally untenable is the contention regarding non-compliance of

Section 42 of the NDPS Act. As already noticed, the search and

seizure were conducted on National Highway No.30, a public

road, after intercepting the vehicle in question. Therefore, the

search falls within the ambit of Section 43 of the NDPS Act. Even

otherwise, the prosecution has proved that immediately upon

39

receipt of the secret information, Vishnu Prasad Yadav (PW-10)

reduced the information into writing vide Ex. P/6, prepared the

memorandum Ex. P/7 and informer information panchnama Ex.

P/8, and transmitted the information to the superior officer

through Constable Shridhar Pujari (PW-1). Thus, even assuming

that Section 42 was applicable, the prosecution has satisfactorily

established substantial compliance thereof.

47.Having bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival

submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and

upon re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence

available on record, this Court finds no reason to differ from the

conclusions arrived at by the learned Trial Court. The prosecution

evidence, when appreciated as a whole, clearly establishes that

the appellants were travelling together in the Maruti Suzuki 800

car from which 140 kilograms of ganja, a commercial quantity,

was recovered. The recovery stands proved by the cogent,

consistent and trustworthy evidence of the official witnesses,

which is duly corroborated by the contemporaneous documentary

evidence prepared during the course of investigation.

48.The prosecution has also been successful in establishing the

complete chain of events commencing from receipt of the secret

information, constitution of the police party, interception of the

vehicle, search and seizure of the contraband, preparation of the

necessary panchnamas, weighment and sealing of the seized

40

contraband, deposit of the seized articles in the Malkhana,

drawing of representative samples under the proceedings

contemplated by Section 52-A of the NDPS Act and forwarding of

the samples to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory. The

FSL report (Ex. P/55) unequivocally confirms that the

representative sample sent for examination was ganja. The

defence has not been able to establish any break in the chain of

custody or any circumstance creating a reasonable doubt

regarding the identity or integrity of the seized contraband.

49.Much emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel for the

appellants on the fact that the independent witnesses, namely,

Dilip Kumar Nag (PW-4) and Kamal Yadav (PW-7), did not fully

support the prosecution case. In the opinion of this Court, the

said circumstance, by itself, is insufficient to discard the otherwise

reliable prosecution evidence. It is now a settled principle of

criminal jurisprudence that conviction can be based upon the

testimony of official witnesses if the Court finds their evidence to

be trustworthy and free from material infirmities. In the present

case, nothing substantial has been elicited in the cross-

examination of the prosecution witnesses to establish any motive

for false implication of the appellants. Their evidence on all

material particulars remains consistent and inspires confidence.

50.Equally devoid of merit is the contention regarding the alleged

discrepancy in the quantity of the contraband during the inventory

41

proceedings and the alleged absence of photographs of the

inventory proceedings. The representative samples were drawn

under the orders of the competent Court in accordance with

Section 52-A of the NDPS Act and thereafter forwarded for

forensic examination. The FSL report confirms the seized

substance to be ganja. No material prejudice has been

demonstrated to have been caused to the appellants on account

of the alleged procedural irregularities, nor has the defence

established that the seized contraband was tampered with at any

stage of the investigation. The integrity of the seized articles has

remained intact throughout.

51.The learned Trial Court has meticulously examined the oral as

well as documentary evidence available on record and has

assigned cogent, convincing and legally sustainable reasons

while recording the finding of guilt against the appellants. This

Court does not find any perversity, misreading of evidence,

material irregularity or error of law in the appreciation of evidence

undertaken by the learned Trial Court warranting interference in

the present appeals. The findings recorded by the learned Trial

Court are fully supported by the evidence on record and are in

consonance with the settled principles governing prosecutions

under the NDPS Act.

52.The prosecution having successfully established the foundational

facts regarding the recovery of 140 kilograms of ganja, a

42

commercial quantity, from the vehicle occupied by the appellants,

the statutory presumptions under Sections 35 and 54 of the

NDPS Act stand attracted. The appellants have failed to rebut the

said presumptions either by leading defence evidence or by

eliciting any material circumstance during the cross-examination

of the prosecution witnesses so as to probabilise their innocence.

In the absence of any plausible explanation regarding their

possession of the contraband, the finding recorded by the learned

Trial Court that the appellants were in conscious and joint

possession of the seized contraband cannot be faulted.

53.In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable

doubt that the appellants were found in conscious and joint

possession of 140 kilograms of ganja, a commercial quantity,

recovered from the Maruti Suzuki 800 car intercepted on National

Highway No.30 near the CRPF Camp at Kamanar, in

contravention of the provisions of the NDPS Act.

54.The learned Special Judge has rightly held the appellants guilty

of the offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS

Act. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated

12.11.2025 do not suffer from any legal infirmity, perversity or

material irregularity warranting interference by this Court in

exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

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55.For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving

the charge against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt.

The findings recorded by the learned Special Judge (NDPS Act),

Bastar at Jagdalpur are based on proper appreciation of the oral

as well as documentary evidence available on record and do not

suffer from any perversity, illegality or material irregularity

warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellants for the

offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and the sentence

imposed upon them are hereby affirmed.

56.Consequently, Criminal Appeal No.307 of 2026 preferred by

appellants Baidyanath Manjhi and Mokarand Dhurva and

Criminal Appeal No.853 of 2026 preferred by appellant Gopal

Nayak, being devoid of merit, are hereby dismissed. The

appellants are reported to be in custody. They shall continue to

undergo the sentence awarded to them by the learned Trial

Court.

57.Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the

concerned Superintendent of Jail, where the appellants are

undergoing their jail sentence to serve the same on the

appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the

present judgment passed by this Court by preferring the

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appeal(s) before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance

of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court

Legal Services Committee.

58.Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be

transmitted to the Trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary

information and compliance.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)

Judge Chief Justice

Anu