As per case facts, the petitioner sought release from preventive detention, arguing that the fresh detention order was based on material from a previously quashed order and a new FIR ...
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:1:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M)
Date of Decision:24.08.2026
Bala
… Petitioner
Versus
U.T. Chandigarh and Others
... Respondents
-.-
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL
Present:-Mr. Harshit Sethi, Advocate,
Mr. Parvez Chaudhary, Advocate and
Mr. Digvijay Singh, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Tajeshwar Singh Sullar, Advocate,
Central Govt. Counsel, UOI.
Mr. Amit Jhanji, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Shashank Shekhar Suman, Advocate
for respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
-.-
VIRINDER AGGARWAL , J . (Oral)
1. The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking issuance of an
appropriate writ, particularly in the nature of Habeas Corpus, for her
immediate release from preventive detention pursuant to detention order
bearing No. HIII(2)-2025/15051 dated 01.11.2025 (Annexure P-9), passed
by the Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration.
1.1. The earlier detention order passed against the petitioner was
quashed by the Advisory Board vide order dated 08.07.2025 (Annexure P-
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:2:-
5), pursuant to which she was released from detention. However, shortly
thereafter, FIR No. 103 dated 04.08.2025 came to be registered against the
petitioner along with 21 other persons on the basis of alleged secret
information that the accused persons were engaged in the business of
narcotic drugs and that, upon search, recovery of contraband could be
effected. Significantly, no search was conducted, no recovery was effected,
no accused was arrested and, according to the petitioner, no meaningful
investigation followed. It is, therefore, alleged that the said FIR was
subsequently utilised merely to create fresh material against the petitioner
and to furnish a purported basis for passing another detention order.
1.2. It is further the petitioner's case that the fresh detention order
dated 01.11.2025 was founded substantially upon the material which had
already formed the basis of the earlier detention order quashed by the
Advisory Board, with the registration of FIR No. 103 dated 04.08.2025
being the only material circumstance subsequently introduced. The
petitioner was supplied the grounds of detention and was apprised of her
right to make a representation to the Detaining Authority and the Advisory
Board. She submitted representations dated 26.11.2025 before the
respective authorities. However, it was only on 16.12.2025, i.e. after a
substantial lapse of time, that she was informed of her statutory right to
make a representation to respondent No.5-Union of India through the Joint
Secretary to the Government of India. The petitioner accordingly
submitted her representation before the Central Government on
24.12.2025. The detention was thereafter confirmed by the Advisory
Board vide order dated 16.01.2026 and is to continue up to 31.10.2026.
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:3:-
1.3. The petitioner assails the detention principally on the ground
that there exists no live, proximate and rational nexus between the alleged
prejudicial activities relied upon by the Detaining Authority and the
necessity for her preventive detention. It is further contended that the
detention order substantially resurrects the very material which had earlier
failed to sustain the detention, while the subsequent FIR, allegedly relied
upon as the fresh circumstance, did not culminate in any recovery, search
or arrest.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner's
constitutional right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India has
been rendered illusory by the failure of the authorities to promptly and
effectively apprise her of her statutory right to make a representation to the
Central Government. It is contended that the delay of approximately 45
days in communicating such right caused serious prejudice to the
petitioner and materially impaired her constitutional safeguard against
preventive detention. It is further submitted that the representations
submitted by the petitioner were required to be considered with utmost
expedition and that any unexplained or unreasonable delay in their
disposal vitiates the continued detention. Reliance has been placed upon
the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaseela Shaji Vs. The
Union of India and Others, 2024 (9) SCC 53, Sarabjeet Singh Mokha
Vs. District Magistrate, Jabalpur and Others, 2021 (20) SCC 98 and
Alfiya A. Vs. State of Kerala & Ors., Law Finder ID No. 2956571.
3. Notice of motion was issued. Pursuant thereto, respondent-
Chandigarh Administration entered appearance and filed a detailed para-
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:4:-
wise reply to the writ petition. In its reply, the respondent-authorities have
raised the necessary preliminary objections and, while specifically
traversing and controverting the averments and grounds urged by the
petitioner, have sought to justify the impugned detention and the action
taken by the competent authorities in accordance with law. It has been
asserted that the detention of the petitioner is lawful and sustainable and
that no violation of the constitutional or statutory safeguards, as alleged,
has been occasioned. The respondents-authorities have accordingly prayed
for dismissal of the writ petition, being devoid of merit. The said reply,
together with the material placed on record in support thereof, has been
duly taken into consideration while adjudicating the present proceedings.
3.1. Respondent No.5/Union of India, through the Joint Secretary,
Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, PITNDPS Unit, New Delhi,
has filed a detailed reply asserting due compliance with the statutory
procedure under Section 9 of the PITNDPS Act, 1988. It is submitted that
the Advisory Board duly considered the petitioner’s case and
representation, afforded her personal hearing on 05.01.2026 and opined
that sufficient cause existed for her detention. The representation dated
24.12.2025, along with the comments of the Detaining Authority and other
relevant material, was duly considered by the competent authority and
rejected vide Memorandum dated 02.06.2026 (Annexure R-1).
Accordingly, the answering respondent No.5 denies any deliberate,
unexplained or unreasonable delay and prays for dismissal of the writ
petition.
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:5:-
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterates that the petitioner
was not promptly informed of her right to make a representation to the
Central Government and that the representations submitted by her were
not dealt with and decided with the expedition mandated by Article 22(5)
of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, contended that the continued
detention of the petitioner stands vitiated for violation of the constitutional
safeguards governing preventive detention. Reliance has been placed upon
the judgments noticed hereinbefore.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the Chandigarh
Administration and the Union of India submits that mere delay in
consideration or disposal of a representation does not, ipso facto,
invalidate preventive detention, provided such delay is satisfactorily
explained and does not demonstrate any want of due diligence on the part
of the competent authority. It is contended that the representations of the
petitioner were duly processed and considered with reasonable
promptitude and that no unexplained or extraordinary delay has been
occasioned so as to render the detention constitutionally infirm. Reliance
has been placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Licil
Antony Vs. State of Kerala and Another, 2014 (1) SCC 326.
6. In order to appreciate the rival submissions and examine
whether the constitutional mandate governing preventive detention has
been duly adhered to, it would be apposite to notice, in a chronological
sequence, the material dates and events emerging from the record, which
are reproduced hereunder:-
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:6:-
i.
The earlier detention order passed against the petitioner was set
aside by the Advisory Board vide order dated 18.07.2025
(Annexure P-5).
ii.
Thereafter, FIR No. 103 dated 04.08.2025, under Section 21 of
the NDPS Act, came to be registered at Police Station Sector-
39, Chandigarh.
Iii.
After a lapse of approximately three months from the
registration of the aforesaid FIR, the fresh detention order under
Section 3 of the PITNDPS Act was passed on 01.11.2025.
iv.
On 03.11.2025, the petitioner was apprised of her right to make
a representation to the Home Secretary, Chandigarh
Administration, being the Detaining Authority, as well as to the
Chief Secretary, Chandigarh Administration and the Advisory
Board.
v.
The petitioner submitted her representations before the
aforesaid authorities on 26.11.2025.
vi.
It was only on 16.12.2025 that the petitioner was apprised of her
right to make a representation to the Central Government.
Vii.
The petitioner thereafter submitted her representation to the
Central Government on 24.12.2025.
viii.
The U.T. Home Department, on 14.01.2026, called for
comments from the Sponsoring Authority in respect of the
petitioner's representation dated 26.11.2025.
ix.
In the meantime, the Advisory Board passed the order
confirming the petitioner's detention on 16.01.2026.
x.
The comments of the Sponsoring Authority were furnished on
30.01.2026.
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:7:-
xi.
The Chandigarh Administration forwarded the petitioner's
representation dated 24.12.2025 to the Central Government on
03.02.2026.
xii.
The Chief Secretary, Chandigarh Administration, rejected the
representation dated 26.11.2025, recording that the Home
Secretary had already rejected the same on 23.02.2026.
xiii.
The Home Secretary/Detaining Authority rejected the
representation dated 26.11.2025 on 25.02.2026.
xiv.
The petitioner's representation addressed to the Central
Government was received in the PITNDPS Division of the
Central Government on 16.03.2026.
xv.
Thereafter, on 18.03.2026, the Central Government called for
para-wise comments and the relevant material of the Advisory
Board from the Chandigarh Administration.
Xvi.
The Chandigarh Administration furnished the requisite
comments and material to the Central Government on
24.05.2026.
xvii.
Ultimately, the Central Government rejected the petitioner's
representation dated 24.12.2025 on 02.06.2026.
6.2. The aforesaid chronology assumes significance in the context
of the constitutional safeguard embodied in Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India. The record reveals that although the detention order
was passed on 01.11.2025, the petitioner was apprised of her statutory
right to make a representation to the Central Government only on
16.12.2025, i.e. after an unexplained and substantial delay of
approximately 45 days. Such belated communication of a vital
constitutional safeguard directly bears upon the petitioner's effective and
meaningful exercise of the right to make a representation against her
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:8:-
preventive detention. The question, therefore, is whether such delay, in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation demonstrating due diligence on the
part of the detaining authorities, has impaired the constitutional guarantee
under Article 22(5). In this regard, reliance has been placed upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Alfiya A. Vs. State of Kerala
& Ors. (supra), wherein the legal position has been enunciated as under:-
“17. It has already been noted that Article 22(5) of the Constitution
casts upon the authority making the order of detention two distinct
obligations, and that the second of them is to afford the detenu the
earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.
That opportunity carries with it, as a necessary concomitant, the
obligation of the authority to inform the detenu of the persons or
bodies to whom he may address his representation. Where the
order of detention has been made by an officer specially
empowered under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act, the detenu is
entitled to make a representation to that officer, who made the
order and who is competent to revoke it, and he must be informed
of that right. That such a right, distinct from the right to represent
to the State Government, to the Advisory Board and to the Central
Government, enures to the detenu and must be made known to him,
was settled by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Kamleshkumar
Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India,1995(4) SCC 51, in relation to
this very Act among others. The failure to inform the detenu of it
renders the opportunity to represent incomplete and deprives him
of a valuable safeguard.”
7. In the present case, the chronology noticed hereinbefore
discloses a delay of approximately 45 days in apprising the petitioner of
her constitutional right to make a representation to the Central
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:9:-
Government. Such a safeguard is not a matter of formality but constitutes
an integral facet of the protection guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Alfiya A.
Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. (supra), the obligation to communicate the
detenue’s right to make a representation to the Central Government is
independent of any question of prejudice and is required to be discharged
by the detaining authority in accordance with law. The constitutional
obligation cannot be diluted on the premise that the detenue may have
otherwise acquired knowledge of such right or may have independently
submitted a representation to the Central Government.
7.1. The significance of prompt compliance assumes greater
importance in proceedings under the PITNDPS Act, which authorises
preventive detention not by way of punishment for a proved offence, but
on the basis of a subjective satisfaction regarding the necessity of
preventing a person from engaging in prejudicial activities in future.
Preventive detention thus constitutes an exceptional inroad into the
fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. The procedural safeguards engrafted in Article
22(5), therefore, require strict, meaningful and expeditious compliance,
and cannot be treated as mere technicalities.
7.2. Once the law casts an affirmative obligation upon the
authorities to apprise the detenue, at the earliest possible opportunity, of
her right to make a representation to the Central Government, any
substantial and unexplained delay in communicating such right assumes
constitutional significance. The responsibility lies squarely upon the
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:10:-
detaining authorities and cannot be shifted upon the detenue on the ground
that she ultimately came to know of the right or exercised it subsequently.
The effectiveness of the constitutional safeguard lies in its timely
communication, enabling the detenue to exercise the right at the earliest
and thereby secure expeditious consideration of her challenge to the
detention.
7.3. Equally, the constitutional mandate does not end with the
communication of the right. A representation, once made, is required to be
considered and decided with utmost expedition and without avoidable or
unexplained delay. In matters involving preventive detention, where
liberty stands curtailed without a judicial determination of guilt, every
authority entrusted with consideration of the representation is
constitutionally obligated to act with the highest degree of diligence and
promptitude. Any unexplained hiatus in the decision-making process must,
therefore, be examined with corresponding strictness. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Alfiya A. Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. (supra) has
reiterated the aforesaid principles, the relevant portion whereof reads as
under:-
“20. There is also an unexplained delay in dealing with the
representation. Even if the order of confirmation dated 19.03.2026
is treated as the first decision upon the representation dated
13.02.2026, a period of 34 days had elapsed before such
consideration. A further period of eight days elapsed before the
rejection was communicated to the detenu on 27.03.2026. No
separate order deciding the representation has been placed before
us. Nor has any satisfactory or day-to-day explanation been
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:11:-
furnished for the time taken either to consider the representation or
to communicate the decision. The general statement that the
representation was examined together with the opinion of the
Advisory Board does not explain the delay. It instead reinforces the
conclusion that the representation was not treated as an
independent constitutional process requiring immediate attention.”
8. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that delay in
consideration of a representation does not, ipso facto, vitiate preventive
detention, provided such delay is satisfactorily explained and is
demonstrably attributable to circumstances beyond the control of the
concerned authority. However, where the delay remains unexplained or
reflects want of diligence, the constitutional safeguard under Article 22(5)
is rendered illusory. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaseela Shaji Vs. The
Union of India and Others (supra), while reiterating the principles
enunciated in Tara Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 1981 (1)
SCC 416, has held that unexplained delay in transmitting a representation
from the jail to the competent authority constitutes gross negligence and
extreme callousness in dealing with the representation of a detenue. In
Tara Chand (supra), a delay of one month and five days in forwarding the
representation by the jail authorities to the Government was held to
demonstrate gross negligence and extreme callousness. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court further underscored that the obligation of the appropriate
Government or the Detaining Authority to afford the detenue the earliest
opportunity to make a representation and to consider the same with
expedition is distinct and independent of its obligation to place the
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:12:-
representation, along with other relevant material, before the Advisory
Board for enabling it to form its opinion.
9. The insistence upon expedition in the consideration of a
representation is not merely procedural but flows from the constitutional
mandate itself. In Vijay Kumar Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, 1982
(2) SCC 43, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that a delay of 14 days in
transmitting the representation from Jammu to Srinagar, followed by a
further delay of 19 days in deciding the same, was sufficient to vitiate the
detention. The decision reinforces the principle that, once a representation
is made, every stage through which it is required to travel must be
traversed with the requisite promptitude and diligence.
10. The constitutional character of the right of representation has
been repeatedly emphasised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In Sk. Abdul
Karim and Others Vs. State of West Bengal, 1969 (1) SCC 433, it was
unequivocally held that the right of representation guaranteed under
Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India constitutes a valuable
constitutional right and is not a mere formality. The corresponding
obligation of the authorities is, therefore, required to be discharged in its
true constitutional spirit and not as a ritualistic or mechanical exercise.
10.1. In Rashid S.K. Vs. State of West Bengal, 1973 (3) SCC 476,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the imperative of prompt
consideration of a representation made by a detenue and emphasised that
the constitutional obligation under Article 22(5) casts a duty upon the
competent authority to consider such representation with the requisite
urgency. The continued detention of a person without ensuring timely and
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:13:-
meaningful consideration of the representation would run contrary to the
very purpose of the constitutional safeguard and, where the delay remains
unexplained, would render the detention constitutionally unsustainable.
Relevant extract is as under:-
“The ultimate objective of this provision can only be the most speedy
consideration of his representation by the authorities concerned, for,
without its expeditious consideration with a sense of urgency the basic
purpose of affording earliest opportunity of making the representation is
likely to be defeated. This right to represent and to have the
representation considered at the earliest flows from the constitutional
guarantee of the right to personal liberty-the right which is highly
cherished in our Republic and its protection against arbitrary and
unlawful invasion."
10.2. In Jaseela Shaji Vs. The Union of India and Others (supra),
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while reiterating the constitutional imperative
of expeditious consideration of a representation made by a detenue, has
held as under:-
“70. We may only reiterate what has been laid down in the earlier
judgments of this Court that the Prison Authorities should ensure
that the representations are sent to the Competent Authorities
immediately after the receipt thereof. In the present era of
technological development, the said representation can be sent
through email within a day. It is further needless to reiterate that
the Competent Authority should decide such representation with
utmost expedition so that the valuable right guaranteed to the
detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution is not denied. In the
matters pertaining to personal liberty of the citizens, the
Authorities are enjoined with a constitutional obligation to decide
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:14:-
the representation with utmost expedition. Each day's delay
matters in such a case.”
10.3. In Sarabjeet Singh Mokha Vs. District Magistrate, Jabalpur
and Others (supra), the detention order was passed on 11.05.2021 and
approved by the State Government on 13.05.2021. The detenue submitted
representations before the District Magistrate, the State Government and
the Central Government on 18.05.2021, which were communicated to the
respective authorities on 20.05.2021. Thereafter, para-wise comments
were called for on 02.06.2021 and were furnished on 10.06.2021, whereas
the representation was ultimately rejected by the Union Home Secretary
only on 24.06.2021. Taking note of the aforesaid chronology, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the delay in consideration of the representation
had deprived the detenue of the valuable constitutional/statutory right to
have his representation considered with the requisite expedition, thereby
rendering the continued detention legally unsustainable.
11. Having regard to the aforesaid chronology and the principles
governing preventive detention, this Court finds that the constitutional
safeguards guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India have not been complied with in their true letter and
spirit. In the first instance, there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay
of approximately 45 days in apprising the petitioner of her right to make a
representation to the Central Government. Such belated communication
necessarily curtailed the petitioner's opportunity to avail herself of an
important constitutional safeguard at the earliest possible stage and cannot
be treated as a mere procedural irregularity.
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:15:-
12. The infirmity is further compounded by the subsequent delay
in consideration of the representations. The representation dated
24.12.2025 addressed to the Central Government remained pending until
02.06.2026, i.e. for a period exceeding five months, which reached the
concerned division of Central Government after a delay of nearly 3
months on 16.03.2026. Likewise, the representations dated 26.11.2025
were considered by the Chief Secretary only on 23.02.2026 and by the
Home Secretary/Detaining Authority on 25.02.2026, after a lapse of nearly
three months. The record does not disclose any cogent, compelling or
legally acceptable explanation commensurate with the magnitude of these
delays. There is delay at every step i.e. informing about rights, forwarding
of representations, furnishing of comments and decision of
representations. In the age of instant communication this delay in
decision of representation of 3 months and 5 months respectively amount
to flagrant violation of mandatory provisions of Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India and denial of Fundamental Right of detenue.
13. In matters of preventive detention, where personal liberty
stands curtailed without a prior adjudication of guilt, the constitutional
obligation to communicate the right of representation and to consider such
representation with the utmost expedition assumes heightened
significance. The right under Article 22(5) is a substantive constitutional
safeguard and the authorities entrusted with its implementation are
required to act with due diligence, promptitude and a sense of urgency.
The cumulative effect of the unexplained delay in apprising the petitioner
of her right to approach the Central Government and the subsequent
CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M) -:16:-
inordinate delay in transmission and consideration of the representations
by the competent authorities has, in the considered opinion of this Court,
rendered the continued detention of the petitioner constitutionally
unsustainable.
14. Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed. The
detention order dated 01.11.2025 and the consequential continued
detention of the petitioner are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be set
at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case.
15. In view of the final adjudication of the principal matter, all
pending miscellaneous and connected applications, if any, arising
therefrom or ancillary thereto, shall stand disposed of accordingly. No
separate or further order is called for in respect thereof.
( VIRINDER AGGARWAL )
24.08.2026 JUDGE
Gaurav Sorot
Whether reasoned / speaking?Yes / No
Whether reportable? Yes / No
In a significant judgment, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has allowed a Preventive Detention India case, quashing a detention order due to flagrant violations of constitutional safeguards. This ruling, stemming from a Habeas Corpus Petition, reinforces the strict compliance required under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Legal professionals and students can find the full details of this critical decision, CRWP-1001-2026 (O&M), on CaseOn, highlighting its importance in preventive detention jurisprudence.
The petitioner, referred to as Bala, invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, seeking her immediate release from preventive detention. Her detention was pursuant to an order dated 01.11.2025, passed by the Home Secretary, Chandigarh Administration. This fresh detention order followed an earlier one that had been quashed by the Advisory Board on 08.07.2025, leading to her release. Shortly after, a new FIR (No. 103 dated 04.08.2025) was registered, forming the basis for the subsequent detention. The petitioner argued that this new FIR lacked substance, with no search, recovery, or arrest, suggesting it was merely a pretext to create fresh material for re-detention.
The primary issues before the High Court were:
The High Court relied on several constitutional provisions and Supreme Court precedents:
The High Court meticulously examined the chronology of events, which revealed significant and unexplained delays at multiple stages:
The Court highlighted that these delays, particularly in an “age of instant communication,” constituted a “flagrant violation of mandatory provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and denial of Fundamental Right of detenu.” The record provided no cogent, compelling, or legally acceptable explanation for the magnitude of these delays.
For legal professionals seeking to quickly grasp the nuances of such rulings, CaseOn.in offers 2-minute audio briefs that concisely summarize the core arguments and outcomes of these specific judgments. This feature is particularly helpful for busy practitioners needing rapid insights into complex legal analyses.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court concluded that the cumulative effect of the unexplained delays—in apprising the petitioner of her right to approach the Central Government and the subsequent inordinate delays in transmission and consideration of her representations by competent authorities—rendered her continued detention constitutionally unsustainable.
Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed, and the detention order dated 01.11.2025, along with the consequential continued detention, was quashed. The petitioner was ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, provided she was not required in any other case.
This judgment serves as a critical reminder of the stringent procedural safeguards enshrined in Article 22(5) of the Indian Constitution concerning preventive detention. For lawyers, it underscores the importance of meticulously scrutinizing the timelines and communications involved in detention cases, particularly regarding the detenu's right to representation. Any unexplained delay, however seemingly minor, can vitiate the entire detention. For law students, this case offers a practical illustration of how fundamental rights operate in preventive detention, emphasizing the judiciary's role in upholding personal liberty against arbitrary state action and the severe consequences of administrative lethargy.
All information provided in this analysis is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues.
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