Writ Petition, Industrial Dispute, Bank of India, Employee Dismissal, Delay and Laches, Perversity of Findings, Enquiry Records, Backwages, Reinstatement, Prejudice
 22 Jun, 2026
Listen in 01:05 mins | Read in 30:00 mins
EN
HI

Bank of India Vs. Sharad Rajaram Khadtare

  Bombay High Court WP-15893 OF 2025
Link copied!

Case Background

As per case facts, a bank employee was dismissed for grave misconduct involving fraudulent withdrawals from customer accounts. The employee raised an industrial dispute years after dismissal, by which time ...

Bench

Applied Acts & Sections

No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case

Hello! How can I help you? 😊
Disclaimer: We do not store your data.
Document Text Version

1

2026:CGHC:25359

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

WPC No. 3012 of 2026

Smt. Suraj Sadhelal Bhardwaj W/o Ghanshyam Bhardwaj Aged About

53 Years R/o Padawpara, Kargi Road, Kota, District- Bilaspur (C.G.)

... Petitioner

versus

1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Panchayat And Rural

Development Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur

(C.G.)

2 - Collector, Bilaspur District- Bilaspur (C.G.)

3 - Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

4 - Chief Executive Officer Jila Panchayat Bilaspur, District Bilaspur

(C.G.)

5 - Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur

(C.G.)

6 - Smt. Urmila Pradhan Janpad Member, Ward No. 09, Janpad

Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

7 - Shri Manohar Singh Raj Janpad Member, Ward No.06, Janpad

Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

8 - Shri Raghubir Armo Janpad Member, Ward No.07, Janpad

Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

9 - Shri Arvind Jaiswal Janpad Member, Ward No.12, Janpad

Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

10 - Shri Ramprasad Shrivas (Vicky Shrivas) Janpad Member, Ward

No.14, Janpad Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

2

11 - Smt. Neha Sachin Sahu Janpad Member, Ward No.08, Janpad

Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

12 - Shri Raghvendra Gahwai Janpad Member, Ward No.16, Janpad

Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

13 - Shri Alibaba Kashyap Janpad Member, Ward No. 25, Janpad

Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

14 - Shri Dharmendra Dewangan Janpad Member, Ward No.19, Janpad

Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

15 - Er. Manoj Maravi Janpad Member, Ward No.17, Janpad Panchayat

Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

... Respondents

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioner :Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate

For State :Mr. Anand Dadariya, Deputy Advocate

General

For Respondents No.9

and 14/Caveators

:Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate

assisted by Mr. Humanyu Kabeer,

Advocate

Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge

Order on Board

22.06.2026

1.Heard Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, learned counsel for the petitioner.

Also heard Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate

General appearing for the State as well as Mr. Prafull N. Bharat,

learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Humanyu Kabeer,

learned counsel appearing for the Caveators/respondents No.9

and 14.

2.By filing the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the

notice dated 08.06.2026 issued under Rule 3(1) of the

3

Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Sarpanch/Up-Sarpanch, Janpad

Panchayat Tatha Zila Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice-

President Ke Viruddh Avishwas Prastav) Rules, 1994 (for short,

‘Rules, 1994’), initiating proceedings for moving a no-confidence

motion against the petitioner, and has further sought quashing of

the consequential order dated 12.06.2026 passed by Respondent

No.2 (Collector, Bilaspur) in Case No.202606072100005, whereby

the meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion has

been fixed on 22.06.2026 without deciding the petitioner's

objection regarding the forged and fabricated signatures of

elected members on the requisition notice. It is the case of the

petitioner that the initiation and continuation of the impugned

proceedings are in breach of the mandatory provisions of the

Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (for short, ‘Act,

1993’) and the Rules of 1994 and, therefore, the impugned notice

dated 08.06.2026 and the consequential order dated 12.06.2026

deserve to be quashed and set aside as being illegal, arbitrary,

without jurisdiction and void ab initio. The petitioner has payed for

following relief(s):-

“10.1 Issue an appropriate writ, order or

direction quashing/set aside the impugned order

dated 12-06-2026 passed by Respondent No.2

(Collector, Bilaspur (C.G.)) (Annexure- P/1) in

Election Petition Case No. 20260607100005

whereby respondent no 2 has fixed date 22-06-

2026 for no confidence motion meeting against

4

the petitioner without following the due

procedure of law and also without considering

the objection raised by the petitioner.

10.2 Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction

directing Respondent No.2 (Collector, Bilaspur)

to first adjudicate and decide the petitioner's,

detailed objection dated 12.06.2026 (Annexure

P/1) regarding alleged forged and fabricated

signatures of elected members and alleged

illegality in initiation of no-confidence

proceedings, strictly in accordance with law,

before proceeding any further in the matter.

10.3 Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction

restraining the respondents from proceeding

further with the proposed no-confidence meeting

scheduled for 22.06.2026, or from taking any

coercive steps pursuant to the impugned order

dated 12.06.2026, until final adjudication of the

present writ petition.

10.4 Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction

declaring that the notice dated 08.06.2026

submitted under Rule 3(1) of the 1994 Rules is

not admissible in law unless and until

compliance of mandatory requirements under

Rule 3(3) of the said Rules and Section 28(3) of

the Act is properly established and recorded by

the Prescribed Authority.

10.5 Grant any other relief, order or direction

which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and

proper in the facts and circumstances of the

case in the interest of justice.

5

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a

duly elected President of Janpad Panchayat, Kota, District

Bilaspur, having assumed office in accordance with the provisions

of the Act, 1993 and the Rules framed thereunder. The petitioner

has been discharging her statutory functions and responsibilities

in accordance with law and continues to enjoy the democratic

mandate conferred upon her by the elected representatives of the

Janpad Panchayat. It is submitted that the democratic tenure of

an elected office-bearer cannot be curtailed except through strict

adherence to the procedure prescribed by statute, and any

deviation from the mandatory statutory requirements vitiates the

entire proceedings. It is submitted that the present petition has

been necessitated on account of the arbitrary, mechanical and

jurisdictionally defective action of Respondent No.2 in proceeding

with a no-confidence motion against the petitioner without first

satisfying himself regarding the legality and admissibility of the

notice dated 08.06.2026 submitted under Rule 3(1) of the Rules,

1994. Learned counsel submits that the very foundation of the

proceedings is under serious cloud inasmuch as specific

allegations were raised before the Collector that signatures of

certain elected members shown as signatories to the notice were

forged, fabricated and obtained without their voluntary consent.

4.Learned counsel submits that immediately upon obtaining

knowledge of the initiation of no-confidence proceedings, the

petitioner submitted a detailed objection before Respondent No.2

6

specifically pointing out that the signatures purportedly appearing

in the notice in the names of Smt. Urmila Pradhan, Er. Manoj

Maravi and Shri Raghubir Armo were not genuine and that the

said members had neither voluntarily supported nor participated in

the proposal seeking removal of the petitioner from office. It is

contended that once such a serious objection touching the very

maintainability of the notice was brought to the notice of the

Prescribed Authority, it became incumbent upon him to undertake

at least a prima facie verification regarding the authenticity of the

signatures before proceeding further in the matter. He further

submits that despite the gravity of the allegations involving forgery

and fabrication of signatures of elected representatives,

Respondent No.2 failed to conduct any inquiry whatsoever. No

opportunity was afforded to the concerned members to verify their

signatures, no factual verification was undertaken and no

adjudicatory exercise was carried out. Instead, Respondent No.2

proceeded in a wholly mechanical manner and fixed the meeting

for consideration of the no-confidence motion on 22.06.2026. It is

argued that such action demonstrates complete non-application of

mind and abdication of the statutory duty cast upon the

Prescribed Authority under Rule 3(3) of the Rules, 1994.

5.Learned counsel further submits that Rule 3(3) of the Rules, 1994

is couched in mandatory terms and obligates the Prescribed

Authority to satisfy himself regarding the admissibility of the notice

before proceeding to convene a meeting. The expression "shall

7

satisfy himself" employed in Rule 3(3) is not an empty formality

but a jurisdictional requirement. Unless such satisfaction is arrived

at after due application of mind to all relevant facts and objections,

the authority does not acquire jurisdiction to take the next step of

fixing the meeting. The satisfaction contemplated by the Rule is a

condition precedent and not a post facto exercise. It is submitted

that the statutory obligation to satisfy oneself regarding

admissibility necessarily includes an examination as to whether

the notice has been signed by the minimum number of elected

members prescribed under the proviso to Rule 3(1) of Rules,

1994. Where a specific allegation is raised that some of the

signatories have never signed the notice and that their signatures

have been forged, the authority cannot shut its eyes to such

allegations and mechanically proceed on the assumption that the

notice is valid. Such an approach defeats the very purpose of the

statutory safeguard incorporated under Rule 3 of Rules, 1994.

6.Learned counsel submits that if the signatures of the members

whose authenticity has been disputed are excluded from

consideration, the statutory requirement of support by not less

than one-third of the total elected members may not stand

satisfied. Consequently, the very jurisdictional foundation for

initiation of the no-confidence proceedings would cease to exist.

Therefore, determination of the genuineness of the signatures is

not a collateral issue but goes to the root of the matter and directly

affects the competence of the proceedings themselves. It is

8

further submitted that Respondent No.2 has failed to record any

satisfaction whatsoever regarding the admissibility of the notice as

mandated under Rule 3(3) of Rules, 1994. The impugned order

dated 12.06.2026 merely fixes the date of meeting and does not

disclose any consideration of the petitioner's objections, any

examination of the statutory requirements, or any reasoning

indicating formation of satisfaction regarding maintainability of the

motion. The impugned order is thus a non-speaking order passed

in complete disregard of the statutory scheme governing no-

confidence proceedings.

7.Learned counsel submits that the provisions relating to no-

confidence motions must receive strict construction because they

have the effect of prematurely terminating the tenure of a

democratically elected office-bearer. While the right of elected

members to move a no-confidence motion is undoubtedly

recognized by law, the exercise of such right must strictly conform

to the procedure prescribed by statute. Any departure from the

mandatory requirements of the Act and Rules renders the

proceedings vulnerable to judicial review. It is argued that

Respondent No.2 has acted in excess of jurisdiction by

proceeding to fix the meeting date without first deciding the

petitioner's pending objections. Once objections affecting the

validity of the notice itself were raised, the authority was under a

legal obligation to consider and decide the same before taking

any further steps. Proceeding with the meeting without such

9

adjudication amounts to prejudging the issue and renders the

entire exercise arbitrary and legally unsustainable. It is further

submitted that the impugned action violates the principles of

natural justice. The petitioner has been denied a meaningful

opportunity to have her objections considered by the competent

authority. The right to raise objections against the validity of the

initiation of proceedings would become illusory if the authority is

permitted to ignore such objections and proceed directly to

convene the meeting. The failure to decide the objections has

caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and has deprived her of

the statutory safeguards available under the law.

8.Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned proceedings

suffer from manifest arbitrariness and are liable to be struck down

under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Collector was

expected to act as a statutory authority exercising quasi-judicial

functions requiring due application of mind. However, the manner

in which the impugned order has been passed demonstrates that

the authority treated the scrutiny contemplated under Rule 3(3) as

a mere ritualistic formality rather than a substantive safeguard

intended to protect the sanctity of democratic institutions. It is also

argued that the continuation of the proceedings despite the

pendency of serious objections relating to forged signatures would

result in irreversible consequences. Once the meeting is

convened and the motion is put to vote, the petitioner would suffer

grave and irreparable prejudice, even though the very initiation of

10

the proceedings may ultimately be found to be illegal. Therefore,

judicial intervention at this stage is not only permissible but

necessary to prevent abuse of the statutory process.

9.In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, learned counsel

for the petitioner submits that the notice dated 08.06.2026 and the

consequential order dated 12.06.2026 are vitiated by non-

application of mind, failure to exercise jurisdiction vested by law,

violation of Rule 3(3) of the Rules of 1994, breach of principles of

natural justice and arbitrariness. It is therefore prayed that this

Court may be quashed the impugned proceedings and the order

dated 12.06.2026 fixing the no-confidence meeting, and further

direct Respondent No.2 to first decide the petitioner's objections

regarding the genuineness of the signatures and admissibility of

the notice in accordance with law before taking any further steps

in the matter.

10.On 19.06.2026, when the matter was taken up for consideration,

this Court, considering the nature of controversy involved and the

allegations made by the petitioner regarding the validity of the no-

confidence proceedings, directed the concerned Sub-Divisional

Officer to remain personally present before this Court on the next

date of hearing.

11.In compliance with the aforesaid order, Mr. Nitin Tiwari, Sub-

Divisional Officer (Revenue), Takhatpur, and Mr. Pravesh Paikra,

Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kota, are present before this

11

Court today. Their presence has been secured for assisting the

Court with regard to the records and proceedings pertaining to the

impugned no-confidence motion and the action taken by the

Prescribed Authority pursuant thereto.

12.Per contra, learned State counsel appearing for Respondent

Nos.1 and 2 submits that the present writ petition is wholly

misconceived and premature and deserves to be dismissed at the

threshold. He submits that the proceedings for consideration of

the no-confidence motion have been initiated strictly in

accordance with the provisions contained in Section 28 of the Act,

1993 read with Rules, 1994. It is submitted that upon receipt of

the notice dated 08.06.2026 signed by the requisite number of

elected members of Janpad Panchayat, Kota, Respondent No.2,

being the Prescribed Authority, duly registered the proceedings

and initiated scrutiny in accordance with law. He would draw

attention of this Court to the original records produced before the

Court and submit that immediately after receipt of the notice on

08.06.2026, the Collector called for a clause-wise report from the

Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Kota regarding the

statutory requirements contemplated under Section 28(3) of the

Act, 1993, namely: (i) whether the requisite period from

assumption of office had elapsed; (ii) whether any previous no-

confidence motion had been moved and rejected within the

preceding year; and (iii) whether the remaining tenure of the office

was less than six months. Such exercise clearly demonstrates

12

due application of mind and compliance with Rule 3(3) of the

Rules, 1994. It is further submitted that on 12.06.2026, before

passing the order fixing the date of meeting, all ten elected

members who had signed the requisition for moving the no-

confidence motion, namely members representing Area Nos. 6, 7,

8, 9, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19 and 25, personally appeared before the

Prescribed Authority. The Chief Executive Officer, Janpad

Panchayat, Kota also remained present. The order-sheet dated

12.06.2026 specifically records that the signatory members

informed the Prescribed Authority that the notice had been

submitted with their free consent and that the signatures

appearing on the notice were verified and confirmed by them.

Therefore, the allegation raised by the petitioner regarding forged

or fabricated signatures stands completely belied by the

contemporaneous official record.

13.Learned State counsel submits that once all the signatories

personally appeared before the Prescribed Authority and affirmed

their signatures and support to the motion, no further inquiry was

warranted. The authority was fully satisfied regarding the

authenticity of the signatures and the validity of the requisition

notice. Consequently, the statutory requirement of satisfaction

under Rule 3(3) of the Rules, 1994 stood duly complied with

before the date of meeting was fixed. It is submitted that the

record further reveals that after obtaining the necessary report

and verification, the Prescribed Authority proceeded to appoint a

13

Presiding Officer in terms of Rule 4 of the Rules of 1994 and

appointed Shri Nitin Tiwari, Deputy Collector-cum-Sub-Divisional

Officer (Revenue), Takhatpur, to preside over the meeting

convened for consideration of the no-confidence motion.

Simultaneously, notices were directed to be issued to all twenty-

five elected members of the Janpad Panchayat informing them

about the date, time and place of the meeting scheduled on

22.06.2026. The Chief Executive Officer was directed to ensure

service of notices and furnish acknowledgements before the

authority. Thus, every procedural safeguard contemplated under

the Rules has been complied with.

14.Learned State counsel further submits that the petitioner's

contention that the Collector failed to examine admissibility of the

notice is factually incorrect and contrary to the official record. The

note-sheet and proceedings demonstrate that the authority

consciously examined the statutory requirements, called for

reports, secured the presence of the signatory members, verified

their signatures and thereafter fixed the date of meeting. The

impugned action therefore cannot be characterized as mechanical

or without application of mind. It is also submitted that a no-

confidence motion is fundamentally a matter concerning the

democratic will and confidence of elected representatives. The

Court ought not to interfere with the democratic process at an

intermediary stage unless there is a patent lack of jurisdiction or

violation of a mandatory statutory provision. In the present case,

14

the statutory procedure has been substantially and fully complied

with and therefore no interference under Article 226 of the

Constitution is warranted. He also submits that the allegations of

forgery made by the petitioner are bald, unsubstantiated and have

been raised only to stall the democratic process. The very

members whose signatures were disputed appeared before the

Prescribed Authority and affirmed the genuineness of their

signatures and support to the motion. Once such verification has

been recorded in official proceedings, the petitioner cannot seek

to frustrate the statutory process on the basis of mere allegations

unsupported by any cogent material. It is therefore submitted that

Respondent No.2 acted strictly within the bounds of statutory

authority and after recording due satisfaction regarding

admissibility of the notice. The appointment of the Presiding

Officer, issuance of notices to all members and fixation of the

meeting for 22.06.2026 were all consequential actions taken in

accordance with Section 28 of the Act, 1993 and Rules 3 and 4 of

the Rules, 1994. As such, the writ petition being devoid of merit

deserves to be dismissed.

15.At the outset, learned counsel appearing for caveator/respondent

Nos.9 and 14 vehemently opposed the writ petition and submitted

that the petition has been instituted with the sole object of

thwarting and delaying a democratically initiated no-confidence

motion. It is submitted that the requisite number of elected

members have voluntarily expressed loss of confidence in the

15

petitioner and have initiated the statutory process strictly in

accordance with law. Learned counsel would submit that all the

signatory members appeared before the Prescribed Authority and

affirmed their signatures as well as their intention to move the

motion. Therefore, the allegations of forged signatures are wholly

baseless, afterthoughts and have been raised only to create a

ground for judicial intervention. It is further submitted that once the

statutory requirements under Section 28 of the Act, 1993 and Rule

3 of the Rules, 1994 stood satisfied, the democratic process ought

not to be interdicted by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned

counsel accordingly prayed for dismissal of the writ petition with

costs.

16.I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length

and also perused the documents annexed to the writ petition.

17.Before adverting to the statutory scheme governing no-confidence

motions under the Act, 1993 and the Rules, 1994, it would be

apposite to notice the nature of challenge involved in the present

writ petition. The petitioner has called in question the notice dated

08.06.2026 submitted under Rule 3(1) of the Chhattisgarh

Panchayat (Sarpanch/Up-Sarpanch, Janpad Panchayat Tatha Zila

Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice-President Ke Viruddh

Avishwas Prastav) Rules, 1994 and the consequential order dated

12.06.2026 passed by the Prescribed Authority fixing 22.06.2026

16

as the date for consideration of the no-confidence motion against

the petitioner, who is the elected President of Janpad Panchayat,

Kota. A motion of no-confidence against Sarpanch and Up-

Sarpanch can only be passed in accordance with the provision of

Section 21 of the Act, 1993, which are reproduced thus:

"21. No-confidence motion against Sarpanch and

Up-Sarpanch- (1) On a motion of no-confidence

being passed by the Gram Panchayat by a

resolution passed by majority of not less than

three-fourth of the Panchas present and voting

and such majority is more than two-third of the

total number of Panchas constituting the Gram

Panchayat for the time being, the Sarpanch or

Up-Sarpanch against whom such motion is

passed, shall cease to hold office forthwith.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act

or the rules made thereunder a Sarpanch or an

Up-Sarpanch shall not preside over a meeting in

which a motion of no-confidence is dismissed

against him. Such meeting shall be convened in

such manner as may be prescribed and shall be

presided over by an officer of the Government as

the Prescribed Authority may appoint. The

Sarpanch or the Up-Sarpanch, as the case may

be, shall have a right to speak at, or otherwise to

take part in, the proceeding of the meeting.

(3) No-confidence motion shall not lie against the

Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch within a period of -

(i) One year from the date on which the

Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch enter their respective

17

office;

(ii) six months preceding the date on which the

term of office of the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch,

as the case may be, expires;

(iii) one year from the date on which previous

motion of no-confidence was rejected:"

18.A careful perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 28 of the Act, 1993

would reveal that the Legislature has consciously incorporated

certain statutory restrictions on the initiation of a no-confidence

motion against the President or Vice-President of a Janpad

Panchayat. The said provision places an embargo on the moving

of a no-confidence motion within one year from the date of

assumption of office, within six months preceding expiry of the

tenure, and within one year from the rejection of an earlier no-

confidence motion.

19.The object behind incorporating such restrictions is to ensure

stability in the functioning of local self-government institutions and

to prevent frivolous or repeated attempts to unsettle a

democratically elected office-bearer. It is for this reason that Rule

3(3) of the Rules, 1994 obligates the Prescribed Authority to

satisfy himself regarding the admissibility of the notice with

reference to Section 28(3) before proceeding further. The legality

of the impugned action, therefore, is required to be examined in

the light of the statutory scheme contained in Section 28 of the

Act, 1993 and the Rules framed thereunder.

18

20.Since the petitioner is holding the office of President, Janpad

Panchayat, Kota, the controversy in the present case is governed

by the provisions contained in Section 28 of the Chhattisgarh

Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, which deals with a motion of no-

confidence against the President or Vice-President of a Janpad

Panchayat. The legality of the impugned proceedings, therefore,

has to be examined in the backdrop of the said provision and the

Rules framed thereunder. Section 28 of the Act, 1993, being

relevant for adjudication of the present dispute, is reproduced

hereinbelow:-

"28. No-confidence motion against President or

Vice-President.— (1) On a motion of no-

confidence being passed by Janpad Panchayat

by resolution passed by a majority of not less

than three-fourth of the elected members

present and voting and such majority is more

than two-third of the total number of elected

members constituting the Janpad Panchayat for

the time being, the President or the Vice-

President against whom such resolution is

passed shall cease to hold office forthwith.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this

Act or the Rules made thereunder, a President

or a Vice-President shall not preside over a

meeting in which a motion of no-confidence is

discussed against him. Such meeting shall be

convened in such manner as may be prescribed

and shall be presided over by an officer of the

Government as the prescribed authority may

19

appoint. The President or the Vice-President, as

the case may be, shall have a right to speak at

or otherwise to take part in the proceeding of the

meeting.

(3) No-confidence motion shall not lie against

the President or Vice-President within a period

of—

(i) one year from the date on which the

President or Vice-President enters upon his

office;

(ii) six months preceding the date on which the

term of office of the President or Vice-President,

as the case may be, expires; and

(iii) one year from the date on which a previous

motion of no-confidence was rejected.

(4) If the President or the Vice-President, as the

case may be, desires to challenge the validity of

the motion carried under sub-section (1), he

shall, within ten days from the date on which

such motion was carried, refer the dispute to the

Director, Panchayat, who shall decide it, as far

as possible, within thirty days from the date on

which it was received by him and his decision

shall be final."

21.A careful perusal of Section 28 of the Act, 1993 would show that

while the statute recognizes the democratic right of elected

members to express lack of confidence in the President or Vice-

President of a Janpad Panchayat, it simultaneously incorporates

certain procedural safeguards and statutory restrictions governing

initiation and consideration of such motion. The validity of the

20

impugned proceedings, therefore, has to be tested on the

touchstone of the requirements contained in Section 28 of the Act,

1993 read with Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules, 1994.

22.The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Tintus Tigga

v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, 2012 SCC OnLine Chh

39, has held as under :-

“6. It is an admitted position that the no-

confidence motion was carried out against the

petitioner by thumping majority as 9 members

voted in favour of no-confidence motion and

only three against the no-confidence motion.

7. The Collector, in the dispute referred under

section 21(4) of the Adhiniyam, has considered

the issues raised before him as well as before

this Court. The Collector has rightly come to the

conclusion that the date of receipt of notice

before convening the meeting of the Gram

Panchayat specifying date, time and place is

not to be counted from the date of receipt of the

notice, but from the date of its dispatch. It is not

in dispute that the notice was despatched on

18.08.2011 when it was decided to convene the

meeting of the Gram Panchayat on 26.08.2011.

8. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 of the Rules, 1994

which is in respect of issue of notice provides

for dispatch of notice shall be seven days

before the date of meeting. Seven days is

accordingly not to be counted from the date of

receipt of the notice, but from the date of its

21

dispatch. Rule 3 (3) of the Rules, 1994 reads as

under:

"3(3).. The notice of such meeting specifying

the date, time and place thereof shall be

caused to be despatched by him through the

Secretary of the Gram Panchayat or Chief

Executive Officer of the Janpad or Zila

Panchayat, as the case may be, to every

member of the Panchayat concerned seven

days before the meeting."

9. In an identical matter, this Court, in Pilaram

Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarhi observed

as under:

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of

Jai Charan Lal Anal v. The State of U.P. (AIR

1968 SC 5 (v 55 C2) while dealing with the

provisions under Uttar Pradesh Municipalities

Act, 1916 provides for clear 7 days intervention

between date of dispatch of notice and date of

meting observed that "the sub-section says that

the District Magistrate shall send the notice not

less than seven clear days before the date of

the meeting and the word 'send' shows that the

critical date is the date of the despatch of the

notice. As the notice was sent on the 17th and

the meeting was to be called on the 25th, it is

obvious that seven clear days did intervene and

there was no breach of this part of the section".

The identical facts and provisions of law are

involved in the present case. The notice was

despatched on 22.8.2006 for the meeting to be

held on 30.08.2006. Thus, there were 7 clear

22

days between the date of despatch and the

date of meeting."

10. Election is the basic pillar of the democratic

elections. A candidate who participates in the

election process gets elected by majority of

votes polled in his favour. In a similar way,

when a no-confidence motion is carried against

an elected candidate, and the motion is carried

out by a clear majority, the same cannot be held

as illegal merely on the ground of some

technical defects and the allegations made by

the petitioner, which are not supported by any

documentary evidence, or otherwise. The no-

confidence motion has been passed by a clear

majority in a proper resolution held in presence

of the petitioner.

11. This Court, in Ghanshyam Yadav v.

Rameshwar Sahu, held that no prejudice,

whatsoever is caused in any manner when the

resolution was passed by overwhelming

majority. In the instant case, it is clear that the

members of the Gram Panchayat have lost faith

in the Sarpanch, and thus, he was removed by

no-confidence motion.”

23.Reverting to the facts of the present case, this Court finds from

the original record produced by the respondents that the notice

under Rule 3(1) of the Rules, 1994 was submitted before the

Prescribed Authority on 08.06.2026 by ten elected members of

Janpad Panchayat, Kota seeking to move a no-confidence motion

against the petitioner. The record further reveals that immediately

23

upon receipt of the said notice, the Prescribed Authority registered

the proceedings and called for a clause-wise report regarding the

statutory requirements contemplated under Section 28(3) of the

Act, 1993. Thereafter, on 12.06.2026, the signatory members

personally appeared before the Prescribed Authority and affirmed

both the notice and the signatures appended thereon. The

proceedings dated 12.06.2026 specifically record the presence of

all ten signatory members as well as the Chief Executive Officer,

Janpad Panchayat, Kota. Upon being satisfied regarding the

admissibility of the notice, the Prescribed Authority fixed

22.06.2026 at 12:00 noon as the date and time for convening the

meeting and issued consequential directions in accordance with

law. Thus, the material available on record clearly demonstrates

compliance with the requirements contemplated under Rule 3(3)

of the Rules, 1994.

24.So far as the principal contention of the petitioner regarding forged

and fabricated signatures is concerned, the same does not merit

acceptance in the facts of the present case. The original order-

sheet dated 12.06.2026 unequivocally records that all the

signatory members who had submitted the notice of no-

confidence motion remained present before the Prescribed

Authority and confirmed the genuineness of their signatures as

well as their intention to move the motion. Once the very

members whose signatures were disputed personally appeared

before the competent authority and verified the same, the

24

Prescribed Authority cannot be faulted for proceeding further with

the statutory process. In the considered opinion of this Court, the

allegation of forgery stood sufficiently addressed at the stage of

scrutiny undertaken by the Prescribed Authority and no further

adjudicatory exercise was required before fixing the date of

meeting.

25.This Court also finds that the notice of no-confidence motion

satisfies the statutory requirement prescribed under the proviso to

Rule 3(1) of the Rules, 1994. The record reflects that the notice

was signed by ten elected members of Janpad Panchayat, Kota.

Considering the total strength of twenty-five elected members, the

requirement of support by not less than one-third of the elected

members stood duly fulfilled. Apart from making bald allegations,

the petitioner has not placed any cogent material before this Court

to dislodge the official proceedings recording verification of

signatures by the signatory members themselves. Consequently,

the challenge to the very initiation of the no-confidence

proceedings cannot be sustained.

26.Equally significant is the fact that after recording satisfaction

regarding admissibility of the notice, the Prescribed Authority

proceeded to comply with all consequential statutory

requirements. Notices were directed to be issued to all twenty-five

elected members informing them about the date, time and venue

of the meeting. Shri Nitin Tiwari, Deputy Collector-cum-Sub-

25

Divisional Officer (Revenue), Takhatpur, was appointed as the

Presiding Officer under Rule 4 of the Rules, 1994 for conducting

the proceedings of the no-confidence motion. The meeting was

fixed for 22.06.2026 at 12:00 noon in the Meeting Hall of Janpad

Panchayat, Kota. The records thus disclose due compliance with

the statutory procedure prescribed under Section 28 of the Act,

1993 and Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules, 1994.

27.From a cumulative consideration of the pleadings of the parties,

the original records produced before this Court and the statutory

provisions governing the field, this Court is satisfied that the

Prescribed Authority has acted strictly within the four corners of

the Act, 1993 and the Rules, 1994. The records unmistakably

reveal that the notice under Rule 3(1) of the Rules, 1994 was

submitted on 08.06.2026 by ten elected members of Janpad

Panchayat, Kota and, upon receipt thereof, the Prescribed

Authority called for the requisite report regarding the statutory

requirements contemplated under Section 28(3) of the Act, 1993.

28.The proceedings dated 12.06.2026 further demonstrate that all

the signatory members personally appeared before the

Prescribed Authority and verified their signatures as well as their

intention to move the no-confidence motion against the petitioner.

Thus, the allegation that the proceedings were initiated on the

basis of forged or fabricated signatures is not borne out from the

official record. On the contrary, the contemporaneous proceedings

26

clearly establish due verification of the requisition notice by the

signatories themselves.

29.This Court further finds that after recording satisfaction regarding

the admissibility of the notice, the Prescribed Authority proceeded

in accordance with Rule 3 and Rule 4 of the Rules, 1994 by fixing

the meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion on

22.06.2026 at 12:00 noon in the Meeting Hall of Janpad

Panchayat, Kota. The record further discloses that notices were

directed to be served upon all twenty-five elected members of the

Janpad Panchayat, including the petitioner, on 12.06.2026.

Simultaneously, Shri Nitin Tiwari, Deputy Collector-cum-Sub-

Divisional Officer (Revenue), Takhatpur, was duly appointed as

the Presiding Officer for conducting the meeting in accordance

with law. The procedural steps undertaken by the Prescribed

Authority thus clearly indicate due compliance with the statutory

requirements governing the initiation and conduct of a no-

confidence motion against the President of a Janpad Panchayat.

30.In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the entire process leading to the convening of the

meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion has been

undertaken in accordance with the provisions of Section 28 of the

Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 and Rules 3 and 4

of the Rules, 1994. No procedural irregularity, jurisdictional error,

violation of any mandatory statutory provision, or arbitrariness has

27

been demonstrated so as to warrant interference by this Court in

exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India. Consequently, this Court finds no illegality in the

proceedings initiated pursuant to the notice dated 08.06.2026 or

in the order dated 12.06.2026 passed by Respondent No.2 fixing

the date of the meeting for consideration of the no-confidence

motion.

31.Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be

and is hereby dismissed.

32.There shall be no order as to costs.

33.Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall also stand

disposed of.

Sd/-

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

Judge

Yogesh

Description

Bombay High Court on Delayed Industrial Disputes: No Advantage for Employee's Own Wrong

In a significant ruling from the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, a Writ Petition filed by the Bank of India has been allowed, overturning the Industrial Tribunal's decision concerning a long-standing Industrial Dispute. This case, WP-15893 OF 2025, presided over by Justice Sandeep V. Marne, delves into critical questions surrounding the impact of inordinate delay in raising industrial disputes, the destruction of inquiry records due to the passage of time, and the concept of 'perversity' in inquiry findings. The judgment, now prominently featured on CaseOn, serves as a crucial precedent for understanding the interplay between employee misconduct, employer accountability, and the consequences of laches in legal proceedings.

The Core Issue: Delay vs. Due Process

The central question before the High Court was whether an employee, dismissed from service for grave misconduct, who then raises a highly belated industrial dispute, can be allowed to benefit from their own delay. Specifically, can such an employee's dismissal be set aside merely because the employer is unable to produce complete inquiry proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal years later, due to the natural destruction of old records?

A Stale Claim's Journey

The Respondent, a Clerk at Bank of India, was dismissed on October 18, 2000, following a disciplinary inquiry into allegations of fraudulent withdrawals and misappropriation of customers' funds. The charges were serious, involving substantial amounts. The domestic inquiry, conducted from March to May 2000, found the charges proven, and the dismissal was upheld on appeal in September 2001. A parallel criminal prosecution, however, resulted in the Respondent's acquittal in June 2013. Only then, 13 years after his dismissal, did the Respondent raise a demand for reinstatement on August 10, 2013. The Central Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal in June 2014, but the Respondent further delayed, filing his Statement of Claim four years later, in April 2018. By the time the preliminary issues were decided by the Tribunal, 24 years had passed since the dismissal.

During the Tribunal proceedings, the Bank faced a challenge: due to the extensive delay and its standard record retention policies, it was unable to produce the complete original inquiry records, including depositions of witnesses. The Industrial Tribunal, while acknowledging the fairness and legality of the initial inquiry, deemed the Enquiry Officer's findings 'perverse' solely because these complete records were not available for scrutiny. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the termination illegal and directed the Bank to pay full backwages and continuity of service until superannuation.

Legal Principles at Play

No Bar of Limitation for Industrial Disputes (But with a Catch)

While Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not prescribe a specific period of limitation for making a reference, courts have consistently held that such a reference must pertain to an 'existing' industrial dispute, not a 'stale' or 'dead' claim. The concept of laches, or unreasonable delay, becomes crucial here.

The Burden of Proof with Unreasonable Delay

The High Court emphasized that when a claim is adjudicated after a significant delay, especially when the claimant is responsible for that delay, the burden of producing relevant documents, or at least copies, should fall upon the claimant. The employer cannot be penalized for non-preservation of documents beyond a reasonable period, particularly when the claimant acted negligently in pursuing their remedy.

Prejudice to the Employer: The Laches Doctrine

Referring to the Apex Court's judgment in SBI, Chairman, State Bank of India and another Versus. M.J. James¹, the High Court reiterated that delay and laches can cause serious prejudice to the opposing party. This prejudice often manifests as lost or untraceable evidence and witnesses, preventing a fair defense. The court must consider whether the delayed action was a calculated move to gain an unfair advantage.

Criminal Acquittal vs. Departmental Findings

A well-settled principle of law is that criminal prosecution and departmental inquiries operate on different footings. They have distinct purposes (punishment vs. discipline) and standards of proof (beyond reasonable doubt vs. preponderance of probabilities). Therefore, an acquittal in a criminal trial does not automatically negate or set aside the findings of guilt in a departmental inquiry, provided the latter was conducted fairly and based on sufficient evidence.

The High Court's Analysis: Rewarding Negligence?

Justice Marne critically analyzed the Industrial Tribunal's approach, highlighting several errors.

Unjustified Perversity Finding

The High Court found that the Tribunal's declaration of the Enquiry Officer's findings as 'perverse' was flawed. The perversity was based solely on the Bank's inability to produce complete records 24 years later, not on an actual scrutiny of the evidence originally presented to the Enquiry Officer. The court noted that the Respondent was a participant in the original inquiry and would have received copies of depositions and documents at that time, yet failed to produce them before the Tribunal.

The Cost of Delay: Destroyed Records and Untraceable Witnesses

The Bank, as a nationalized institution, was justified in destroying records after a reasonable period, especially when the dismissal had not been challenged for 13 years. The inordinate delay meant that original witnesses, many of whom were Bank customers, became untraceable, preventing the Bank from proving the charges *de novo* before the Tribunal. This constituted severe prejudice, directly attributable to the Respondent's delay.

For legal professionals, quickly grasping the nuances of such judgments is critical. This is where CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs prove invaluable, allowing practitioners to swiftly analyze the core arguments and rulings of cases like WP-15893 OF 2025 without getting bogged down in extensive reading.

Respondent's Responsibility and Adverse Inference

The High Court observed that the Respondent was solely responsible for the protracted delay, both in raising the dispute and in pursuing the reference before the Tribunal. Instead of penalizing the Bank for the consequences of this delay, the Tribunal, in effect, rewarded the Respondent for his own 'wrong'. The court suggested that an adverse inference should have been drawn against the Respondent for his failure to produce documents he undoubtedly possessed during the initial inquiry.

The Gravity of Misconduct

The judgment also underscored the serious nature of the misconduct, particularly for a bank employee who is expected to uphold a higher standard of honesty and integrity, as established in cases like Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Reg. Bank & Anr Versus. Munna Lal Jain². The fraudulent withdrawal and misappropriation of customer funds were grave offenses, justifying the dismissal.

The Verdict: Setting Aside Erroneous Orders

In light of these considerations, the Bombay High Court concluded that the Industrial Tribunal's orders were unsustainable. The Writ Petition was allowed, and:

  • The Industrial Tribunal's order dated August 9, 2024, on preliminary Issue No. 2 (holding Enquiry Officer's findings perverse) was set aside, and it was affirmed that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were not perverse.
  • The final judgment and order dated January 23, 2025, passed by the Industrial Tribunal, which declared the dismissal illegal and awarded backwages and continuity of service, was also set aside.

Why This Judgment Matters for Legal Professionals

This judgment is an essential read for lawyers and law students alike, offering crucial insights into several areas of labor and administrative law:

  • Timeliness in Industrial Disputes: It reinforces the principle that while no strict limitation period applies, inordinate delay without proper justification can be fatal to a claim, especially when it causes significant prejudice to the employer.
  • Employer's Record Retention Policies: The ruling implicitly validates the practice of destroying old records after a reasonable period, emphasizing that employers are not expected to preserve documents indefinitely, particularly in the absence of ongoing legal challenges.
  • Understanding 'Perversity' in Inquiry Findings: It clarifies that a finding of perversity must stem from a genuine assessment of the evidence on record, not merely from the employer's inability to reproduce records years later due to the claimant's own delay.
  • Burden of Proof with Laches: The judgment highlights the shifting burden of proof onto a claimant who approaches the courts after considerable delay, particularly when crucial evidence from the other party is no longer available.
  • Distinction between Criminal and Departmental Proceedings: It reiterates the fundamental difference between criminal acquittal and disciplinary action, affirming that the former does not automatically invalidate the latter.
  • Judicial Discretion and Equity: The court's decision underscores the principle that courts should not reward litigants for their own negligence or allow them to take advantage of circumstances created by their own inaction.

This case serves as a stern reminder of the importance of prompt action in legal matters and the potential repercussions of allowing claims to become stale.

Disclaimer

All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances.

Legal Notes

Add a Note....