As per case facts, a bank employee was dismissed for grave misconduct involving fraudulent withdrawals from customer accounts. The employee raised an industrial dispute years after dismissal, by which time ...
1
2026:CGHC:25359
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 3012 of 2026
Smt. Suraj Sadhelal Bhardwaj W/o Ghanshyam Bhardwaj Aged About
53 Years R/o Padawpara, Kargi Road, Kota, District- Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Panchayat And Rural
Development Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur
(C.G.)
2 - Collector, Bilaspur District- Bilaspur (C.G.)
3 - Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
4 - Chief Executive Officer Jila Panchayat Bilaspur, District Bilaspur
(C.G.)
5 - Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur
(C.G.)
6 - Smt. Urmila Pradhan Janpad Member, Ward No. 09, Janpad
Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
7 - Shri Manohar Singh Raj Janpad Member, Ward No.06, Janpad
Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
8 - Shri Raghubir Armo Janpad Member, Ward No.07, Janpad
Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
9 - Shri Arvind Jaiswal Janpad Member, Ward No.12, Janpad
Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
10 - Shri Ramprasad Shrivas (Vicky Shrivas) Janpad Member, Ward
No.14, Janpad Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
2
11 - Smt. Neha Sachin Sahu Janpad Member, Ward No.08, Janpad
Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
12 - Shri Raghvendra Gahwai Janpad Member, Ward No.16, Janpad
Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
13 - Shri Alibaba Kashyap Janpad Member, Ward No. 25, Janpad
Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
14 - Shri Dharmendra Dewangan Janpad Member, Ward No.19, Janpad
Panchayat Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
15 - Er. Manoj Maravi Janpad Member, Ward No.17, Janpad Panchayat
Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner :Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate
For State :Mr. Anand Dadariya, Deputy Advocate
General
For Respondents No.9
and 14/Caveators
:Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Senior Advocate
assisted by Mr. Humanyu Kabeer,
Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
Order on Board
22.06.2026
1.Heard Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, learned counsel for the petitioner.
Also heard Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate
General appearing for the State as well as Mr. Prafull N. Bharat,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Humanyu Kabeer,
learned counsel appearing for the Caveators/respondents No.9
and 14.
2.By filing the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the
notice dated 08.06.2026 issued under Rule 3(1) of the
3
Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Sarpanch/Up-Sarpanch, Janpad
Panchayat Tatha Zila Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice-
President Ke Viruddh Avishwas Prastav) Rules, 1994 (for short,
‘Rules, 1994’), initiating proceedings for moving a no-confidence
motion against the petitioner, and has further sought quashing of
the consequential order dated 12.06.2026 passed by Respondent
No.2 (Collector, Bilaspur) in Case No.202606072100005, whereby
the meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion has
been fixed on 22.06.2026 without deciding the petitioner's
objection regarding the forged and fabricated signatures of
elected members on the requisition notice. It is the case of the
petitioner that the initiation and continuation of the impugned
proceedings are in breach of the mandatory provisions of the
Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (for short, ‘Act,
1993’) and the Rules of 1994 and, therefore, the impugned notice
dated 08.06.2026 and the consequential order dated 12.06.2026
deserve to be quashed and set aside as being illegal, arbitrary,
without jurisdiction and void ab initio. The petitioner has payed for
following relief(s):-
“10.1 Issue an appropriate writ, order or
direction quashing/set aside the impugned order
dated 12-06-2026 passed by Respondent No.2
(Collector, Bilaspur (C.G.)) (Annexure- P/1) in
Election Petition Case No. 20260607100005
whereby respondent no 2 has fixed date 22-06-
2026 for no confidence motion meeting against
4
the petitioner without following the due
procedure of law and also without considering
the objection raised by the petitioner.
10.2 Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction
directing Respondent No.2 (Collector, Bilaspur)
to first adjudicate and decide the petitioner's,
detailed objection dated 12.06.2026 (Annexure
P/1) regarding alleged forged and fabricated
signatures of elected members and alleged
illegality in initiation of no-confidence
proceedings, strictly in accordance with law,
before proceeding any further in the matter.
10.3 Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction
restraining the respondents from proceeding
further with the proposed no-confidence meeting
scheduled for 22.06.2026, or from taking any
coercive steps pursuant to the impugned order
dated 12.06.2026, until final adjudication of the
present writ petition.
10.4 Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction
declaring that the notice dated 08.06.2026
submitted under Rule 3(1) of the 1994 Rules is
not admissible in law unless and until
compliance of mandatory requirements under
Rule 3(3) of the said Rules and Section 28(3) of
the Act is properly established and recorded by
the Prescribed Authority.
10.5 Grant any other relief, order or direction
which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the
case in the interest of justice.
5
3.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a
duly elected President of Janpad Panchayat, Kota, District
Bilaspur, having assumed office in accordance with the provisions
of the Act, 1993 and the Rules framed thereunder. The petitioner
has been discharging her statutory functions and responsibilities
in accordance with law and continues to enjoy the democratic
mandate conferred upon her by the elected representatives of the
Janpad Panchayat. It is submitted that the democratic tenure of
an elected office-bearer cannot be curtailed except through strict
adherence to the procedure prescribed by statute, and any
deviation from the mandatory statutory requirements vitiates the
entire proceedings. It is submitted that the present petition has
been necessitated on account of the arbitrary, mechanical and
jurisdictionally defective action of Respondent No.2 in proceeding
with a no-confidence motion against the petitioner without first
satisfying himself regarding the legality and admissibility of the
notice dated 08.06.2026 submitted under Rule 3(1) of the Rules,
1994. Learned counsel submits that the very foundation of the
proceedings is under serious cloud inasmuch as specific
allegations were raised before the Collector that signatures of
certain elected members shown as signatories to the notice were
forged, fabricated and obtained without their voluntary consent.
4.Learned counsel submits that immediately upon obtaining
knowledge of the initiation of no-confidence proceedings, the
petitioner submitted a detailed objection before Respondent No.2
6
specifically pointing out that the signatures purportedly appearing
in the notice in the names of Smt. Urmila Pradhan, Er. Manoj
Maravi and Shri Raghubir Armo were not genuine and that the
said members had neither voluntarily supported nor participated in
the proposal seeking removal of the petitioner from office. It is
contended that once such a serious objection touching the very
maintainability of the notice was brought to the notice of the
Prescribed Authority, it became incumbent upon him to undertake
at least a prima facie verification regarding the authenticity of the
signatures before proceeding further in the matter. He further
submits that despite the gravity of the allegations involving forgery
and fabrication of signatures of elected representatives,
Respondent No.2 failed to conduct any inquiry whatsoever. No
opportunity was afforded to the concerned members to verify their
signatures, no factual verification was undertaken and no
adjudicatory exercise was carried out. Instead, Respondent No.2
proceeded in a wholly mechanical manner and fixed the meeting
for consideration of the no-confidence motion on 22.06.2026. It is
argued that such action demonstrates complete non-application of
mind and abdication of the statutory duty cast upon the
Prescribed Authority under Rule 3(3) of the Rules, 1994.
5.Learned counsel further submits that Rule 3(3) of the Rules, 1994
is couched in mandatory terms and obligates the Prescribed
Authority to satisfy himself regarding the admissibility of the notice
before proceeding to convene a meeting. The expression "shall
7
satisfy himself" employed in Rule 3(3) is not an empty formality
but a jurisdictional requirement. Unless such satisfaction is arrived
at after due application of mind to all relevant facts and objections,
the authority does not acquire jurisdiction to take the next step of
fixing the meeting. The satisfaction contemplated by the Rule is a
condition precedent and not a post facto exercise. It is submitted
that the statutory obligation to satisfy oneself regarding
admissibility necessarily includes an examination as to whether
the notice has been signed by the minimum number of elected
members prescribed under the proviso to Rule 3(1) of Rules,
1994. Where a specific allegation is raised that some of the
signatories have never signed the notice and that their signatures
have been forged, the authority cannot shut its eyes to such
allegations and mechanically proceed on the assumption that the
notice is valid. Such an approach defeats the very purpose of the
statutory safeguard incorporated under Rule 3 of Rules, 1994.
6.Learned counsel submits that if the signatures of the members
whose authenticity has been disputed are excluded from
consideration, the statutory requirement of support by not less
than one-third of the total elected members may not stand
satisfied. Consequently, the very jurisdictional foundation for
initiation of the no-confidence proceedings would cease to exist.
Therefore, determination of the genuineness of the signatures is
not a collateral issue but goes to the root of the matter and directly
affects the competence of the proceedings themselves. It is
8
further submitted that Respondent No.2 has failed to record any
satisfaction whatsoever regarding the admissibility of the notice as
mandated under Rule 3(3) of Rules, 1994. The impugned order
dated 12.06.2026 merely fixes the date of meeting and does not
disclose any consideration of the petitioner's objections, any
examination of the statutory requirements, or any reasoning
indicating formation of satisfaction regarding maintainability of the
motion. The impugned order is thus a non-speaking order passed
in complete disregard of the statutory scheme governing no-
confidence proceedings.
7.Learned counsel submits that the provisions relating to no-
confidence motions must receive strict construction because they
have the effect of prematurely terminating the tenure of a
democratically elected office-bearer. While the right of elected
members to move a no-confidence motion is undoubtedly
recognized by law, the exercise of such right must strictly conform
to the procedure prescribed by statute. Any departure from the
mandatory requirements of the Act and Rules renders the
proceedings vulnerable to judicial review. It is argued that
Respondent No.2 has acted in excess of jurisdiction by
proceeding to fix the meeting date without first deciding the
petitioner's pending objections. Once objections affecting the
validity of the notice itself were raised, the authority was under a
legal obligation to consider and decide the same before taking
any further steps. Proceeding with the meeting without such
9
adjudication amounts to prejudging the issue and renders the
entire exercise arbitrary and legally unsustainable. It is further
submitted that the impugned action violates the principles of
natural justice. The petitioner has been denied a meaningful
opportunity to have her objections considered by the competent
authority. The right to raise objections against the validity of the
initiation of proceedings would become illusory if the authority is
permitted to ignore such objections and proceed directly to
convene the meeting. The failure to decide the objections has
caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and has deprived her of
the statutory safeguards available under the law.
8.Learned counsel further submitted that the impugned proceedings
suffer from manifest arbitrariness and are liable to be struck down
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Collector was
expected to act as a statutory authority exercising quasi-judicial
functions requiring due application of mind. However, the manner
in which the impugned order has been passed demonstrates that
the authority treated the scrutiny contemplated under Rule 3(3) as
a mere ritualistic formality rather than a substantive safeguard
intended to protect the sanctity of democratic institutions. It is also
argued that the continuation of the proceedings despite the
pendency of serious objections relating to forged signatures would
result in irreversible consequences. Once the meeting is
convened and the motion is put to vote, the petitioner would suffer
grave and irreparable prejudice, even though the very initiation of
10
the proceedings may ultimately be found to be illegal. Therefore,
judicial intervention at this stage is not only permissible but
necessary to prevent abuse of the statutory process.
9.In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, learned counsel
for the petitioner submits that the notice dated 08.06.2026 and the
consequential order dated 12.06.2026 are vitiated by non-
application of mind, failure to exercise jurisdiction vested by law,
violation of Rule 3(3) of the Rules of 1994, breach of principles of
natural justice and arbitrariness. It is therefore prayed that this
Court may be quashed the impugned proceedings and the order
dated 12.06.2026 fixing the no-confidence meeting, and further
direct Respondent No.2 to first decide the petitioner's objections
regarding the genuineness of the signatures and admissibility of
the notice in accordance with law before taking any further steps
in the matter.
10.On 19.06.2026, when the matter was taken up for consideration,
this Court, considering the nature of controversy involved and the
allegations made by the petitioner regarding the validity of the no-
confidence proceedings, directed the concerned Sub-Divisional
Officer to remain personally present before this Court on the next
date of hearing.
11.In compliance with the aforesaid order, Mr. Nitin Tiwari, Sub-
Divisional Officer (Revenue), Takhatpur, and Mr. Pravesh Paikra,
Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Kota, are present before this
11
Court today. Their presence has been secured for assisting the
Court with regard to the records and proceedings pertaining to the
impugned no-confidence motion and the action taken by the
Prescribed Authority pursuant thereto.
12.Per contra, learned State counsel appearing for Respondent
Nos.1 and 2 submits that the present writ petition is wholly
misconceived and premature and deserves to be dismissed at the
threshold. He submits that the proceedings for consideration of
the no-confidence motion have been initiated strictly in
accordance with the provisions contained in Section 28 of the Act,
1993 read with Rules, 1994. It is submitted that upon receipt of
the notice dated 08.06.2026 signed by the requisite number of
elected members of Janpad Panchayat, Kota, Respondent No.2,
being the Prescribed Authority, duly registered the proceedings
and initiated scrutiny in accordance with law. He would draw
attention of this Court to the original records produced before the
Court and submit that immediately after receipt of the notice on
08.06.2026, the Collector called for a clause-wise report from the
Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Kota regarding the
statutory requirements contemplated under Section 28(3) of the
Act, 1993, namely: (i) whether the requisite period from
assumption of office had elapsed; (ii) whether any previous no-
confidence motion had been moved and rejected within the
preceding year; and (iii) whether the remaining tenure of the office
was less than six months. Such exercise clearly demonstrates
12
due application of mind and compliance with Rule 3(3) of the
Rules, 1994. It is further submitted that on 12.06.2026, before
passing the order fixing the date of meeting, all ten elected
members who had signed the requisition for moving the no-
confidence motion, namely members representing Area Nos. 6, 7,
8, 9, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19 and 25, personally appeared before the
Prescribed Authority. The Chief Executive Officer, Janpad
Panchayat, Kota also remained present. The order-sheet dated
12.06.2026 specifically records that the signatory members
informed the Prescribed Authority that the notice had been
submitted with their free consent and that the signatures
appearing on the notice were verified and confirmed by them.
Therefore, the allegation raised by the petitioner regarding forged
or fabricated signatures stands completely belied by the
contemporaneous official record.
13.Learned State counsel submits that once all the signatories
personally appeared before the Prescribed Authority and affirmed
their signatures and support to the motion, no further inquiry was
warranted. The authority was fully satisfied regarding the
authenticity of the signatures and the validity of the requisition
notice. Consequently, the statutory requirement of satisfaction
under Rule 3(3) of the Rules, 1994 stood duly complied with
before the date of meeting was fixed. It is submitted that the
record further reveals that after obtaining the necessary report
and verification, the Prescribed Authority proceeded to appoint a
13
Presiding Officer in terms of Rule 4 of the Rules of 1994 and
appointed Shri Nitin Tiwari, Deputy Collector-cum-Sub-Divisional
Officer (Revenue), Takhatpur, to preside over the meeting
convened for consideration of the no-confidence motion.
Simultaneously, notices were directed to be issued to all twenty-
five elected members of the Janpad Panchayat informing them
about the date, time and place of the meeting scheduled on
22.06.2026. The Chief Executive Officer was directed to ensure
service of notices and furnish acknowledgements before the
authority. Thus, every procedural safeguard contemplated under
the Rules has been complied with.
14.Learned State counsel further submits that the petitioner's
contention that the Collector failed to examine admissibility of the
notice is factually incorrect and contrary to the official record. The
note-sheet and proceedings demonstrate that the authority
consciously examined the statutory requirements, called for
reports, secured the presence of the signatory members, verified
their signatures and thereafter fixed the date of meeting. The
impugned action therefore cannot be characterized as mechanical
or without application of mind. It is also submitted that a no-
confidence motion is fundamentally a matter concerning the
democratic will and confidence of elected representatives. The
Court ought not to interfere with the democratic process at an
intermediary stage unless there is a patent lack of jurisdiction or
violation of a mandatory statutory provision. In the present case,
14
the statutory procedure has been substantially and fully complied
with and therefore no interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution is warranted. He also submits that the allegations of
forgery made by the petitioner are bald, unsubstantiated and have
been raised only to stall the democratic process. The very
members whose signatures were disputed appeared before the
Prescribed Authority and affirmed the genuineness of their
signatures and support to the motion. Once such verification has
been recorded in official proceedings, the petitioner cannot seek
to frustrate the statutory process on the basis of mere allegations
unsupported by any cogent material. It is therefore submitted that
Respondent No.2 acted strictly within the bounds of statutory
authority and after recording due satisfaction regarding
admissibility of the notice. The appointment of the Presiding
Officer, issuance of notices to all members and fixation of the
meeting for 22.06.2026 were all consequential actions taken in
accordance with Section 28 of the Act, 1993 and Rules 3 and 4 of
the Rules, 1994. As such, the writ petition being devoid of merit
deserves to be dismissed.
15.At the outset, learned counsel appearing for caveator/respondent
Nos.9 and 14 vehemently opposed the writ petition and submitted
that the petition has been instituted with the sole object of
thwarting and delaying a democratically initiated no-confidence
motion. It is submitted that the requisite number of elected
members have voluntarily expressed loss of confidence in the
15
petitioner and have initiated the statutory process strictly in
accordance with law. Learned counsel would submit that all the
signatory members appeared before the Prescribed Authority and
affirmed their signatures as well as their intention to move the
motion. Therefore, the allegations of forged signatures are wholly
baseless, afterthoughts and have been raised only to create a
ground for judicial intervention. It is further submitted that once the
statutory requirements under Section 28 of the Act, 1993 and Rule
3 of the Rules, 1994 stood satisfied, the democratic process ought
not to be interdicted by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned
counsel accordingly prayed for dismissal of the writ petition with
costs.
16.I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length
and also perused the documents annexed to the writ petition.
17.Before adverting to the statutory scheme governing no-confidence
motions under the Act, 1993 and the Rules, 1994, it would be
apposite to notice the nature of challenge involved in the present
writ petition. The petitioner has called in question the notice dated
08.06.2026 submitted under Rule 3(1) of the Chhattisgarh
Panchayat (Sarpanch/Up-Sarpanch, Janpad Panchayat Tatha Zila
Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice-President Ke Viruddh
Avishwas Prastav) Rules, 1994 and the consequential order dated
12.06.2026 passed by the Prescribed Authority fixing 22.06.2026
16
as the date for consideration of the no-confidence motion against
the petitioner, who is the elected President of Janpad Panchayat,
Kota. A motion of no-confidence against Sarpanch and Up-
Sarpanch can only be passed in accordance with the provision of
Section 21 of the Act, 1993, which are reproduced thus:
"21. No-confidence motion against Sarpanch and
Up-Sarpanch- (1) On a motion of no-confidence
being passed by the Gram Panchayat by a
resolution passed by majority of not less than
three-fourth of the Panchas present and voting
and such majority is more than two-third of the
total number of Panchas constituting the Gram
Panchayat for the time being, the Sarpanch or
Up-Sarpanch against whom such motion is
passed, shall cease to hold office forthwith.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act
or the rules made thereunder a Sarpanch or an
Up-Sarpanch shall not preside over a meeting in
which a motion of no-confidence is dismissed
against him. Such meeting shall be convened in
such manner as may be prescribed and shall be
presided over by an officer of the Government as
the Prescribed Authority may appoint. The
Sarpanch or the Up-Sarpanch, as the case may
be, shall have a right to speak at, or otherwise to
take part in, the proceeding of the meeting.
(3) No-confidence motion shall not lie against the
Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch within a period of -
(i) One year from the date on which the
Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch enter their respective
17
office;
(ii) six months preceding the date on which the
term of office of the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch,
as the case may be, expires;
(iii) one year from the date on which previous
motion of no-confidence was rejected:"
18.A careful perusal of sub-section (3) of Section 28 of the Act, 1993
would reveal that the Legislature has consciously incorporated
certain statutory restrictions on the initiation of a no-confidence
motion against the President or Vice-President of a Janpad
Panchayat. The said provision places an embargo on the moving
of a no-confidence motion within one year from the date of
assumption of office, within six months preceding expiry of the
tenure, and within one year from the rejection of an earlier no-
confidence motion.
19.The object behind incorporating such restrictions is to ensure
stability in the functioning of local self-government institutions and
to prevent frivolous or repeated attempts to unsettle a
democratically elected office-bearer. It is for this reason that Rule
3(3) of the Rules, 1994 obligates the Prescribed Authority to
satisfy himself regarding the admissibility of the notice with
reference to Section 28(3) before proceeding further. The legality
of the impugned action, therefore, is required to be examined in
the light of the statutory scheme contained in Section 28 of the
Act, 1993 and the Rules framed thereunder.
18
20.Since the petitioner is holding the office of President, Janpad
Panchayat, Kota, the controversy in the present case is governed
by the provisions contained in Section 28 of the Chhattisgarh
Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, which deals with a motion of no-
confidence against the President or Vice-President of a Janpad
Panchayat. The legality of the impugned proceedings, therefore,
has to be examined in the backdrop of the said provision and the
Rules framed thereunder. Section 28 of the Act, 1993, being
relevant for adjudication of the present dispute, is reproduced
hereinbelow:-
"28. No-confidence motion against President or
Vice-President.— (1) On a motion of no-
confidence being passed by Janpad Panchayat
by resolution passed by a majority of not less
than three-fourth of the elected members
present and voting and such majority is more
than two-third of the total number of elected
members constituting the Janpad Panchayat for
the time being, the President or the Vice-
President against whom such resolution is
passed shall cease to hold office forthwith.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Act or the Rules made thereunder, a President
or a Vice-President shall not preside over a
meeting in which a motion of no-confidence is
discussed against him. Such meeting shall be
convened in such manner as may be prescribed
and shall be presided over by an officer of the
Government as the prescribed authority may
19
appoint. The President or the Vice-President, as
the case may be, shall have a right to speak at
or otherwise to take part in the proceeding of the
meeting.
(3) No-confidence motion shall not lie against
the President or Vice-President within a period
of—
(i) one year from the date on which the
President or Vice-President enters upon his
office;
(ii) six months preceding the date on which the
term of office of the President or Vice-President,
as the case may be, expires; and
(iii) one year from the date on which a previous
motion of no-confidence was rejected.
(4) If the President or the Vice-President, as the
case may be, desires to challenge the validity of
the motion carried under sub-section (1), he
shall, within ten days from the date on which
such motion was carried, refer the dispute to the
Director, Panchayat, who shall decide it, as far
as possible, within thirty days from the date on
which it was received by him and his decision
shall be final."
21.A careful perusal of Section 28 of the Act, 1993 would show that
while the statute recognizes the democratic right of elected
members to express lack of confidence in the President or Vice-
President of a Janpad Panchayat, it simultaneously incorporates
certain procedural safeguards and statutory restrictions governing
initiation and consideration of such motion. The validity of the
20
impugned proceedings, therefore, has to be tested on the
touchstone of the requirements contained in Section 28 of the Act,
1993 read with Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules, 1994.
22.The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Tintus Tigga
v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, 2012 SCC OnLine Chh
39, has held as under :-
“6. It is an admitted position that the no-
confidence motion was carried out against the
petitioner by thumping majority as 9 members
voted in favour of no-confidence motion and
only three against the no-confidence motion.
7. The Collector, in the dispute referred under
section 21(4) of the Adhiniyam, has considered
the issues raised before him as well as before
this Court. The Collector has rightly come to the
conclusion that the date of receipt of notice
before convening the meeting of the Gram
Panchayat specifying date, time and place is
not to be counted from the date of receipt of the
notice, but from the date of its dispatch. It is not
in dispute that the notice was despatched on
18.08.2011 when it was decided to convene the
meeting of the Gram Panchayat on 26.08.2011.
8. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 of the Rules, 1994
which is in respect of issue of notice provides
for dispatch of notice shall be seven days
before the date of meeting. Seven days is
accordingly not to be counted from the date of
receipt of the notice, but from the date of its
21
dispatch. Rule 3 (3) of the Rules, 1994 reads as
under:
"3(3).. The notice of such meeting specifying
the date, time and place thereof shall be
caused to be despatched by him through the
Secretary of the Gram Panchayat or Chief
Executive Officer of the Janpad or Zila
Panchayat, as the case may be, to every
member of the Panchayat concerned seven
days before the meeting."
9. In an identical matter, this Court, in Pilaram
Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarhi observed
as under:
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of
Jai Charan Lal Anal v. The State of U.P. (AIR
1968 SC 5 (v 55 C2) while dealing with the
provisions under Uttar Pradesh Municipalities
Act, 1916 provides for clear 7 days intervention
between date of dispatch of notice and date of
meting observed that "the sub-section says that
the District Magistrate shall send the notice not
less than seven clear days before the date of
the meeting and the word 'send' shows that the
critical date is the date of the despatch of the
notice. As the notice was sent on the 17th and
the meeting was to be called on the 25th, it is
obvious that seven clear days did intervene and
there was no breach of this part of the section".
The identical facts and provisions of law are
involved in the present case. The notice was
despatched on 22.8.2006 for the meeting to be
held on 30.08.2006. Thus, there were 7 clear
22
days between the date of despatch and the
date of meeting."
10. Election is the basic pillar of the democratic
elections. A candidate who participates in the
election process gets elected by majority of
votes polled in his favour. In a similar way,
when a no-confidence motion is carried against
an elected candidate, and the motion is carried
out by a clear majority, the same cannot be held
as illegal merely on the ground of some
technical defects and the allegations made by
the petitioner, which are not supported by any
documentary evidence, or otherwise. The no-
confidence motion has been passed by a clear
majority in a proper resolution held in presence
of the petitioner.
11. This Court, in Ghanshyam Yadav v.
Rameshwar Sahu, held that no prejudice,
whatsoever is caused in any manner when the
resolution was passed by overwhelming
majority. In the instant case, it is clear that the
members of the Gram Panchayat have lost faith
in the Sarpanch, and thus, he was removed by
no-confidence motion.”
23.Reverting to the facts of the present case, this Court finds from
the original record produced by the respondents that the notice
under Rule 3(1) of the Rules, 1994 was submitted before the
Prescribed Authority on 08.06.2026 by ten elected members of
Janpad Panchayat, Kota seeking to move a no-confidence motion
against the petitioner. The record further reveals that immediately
23
upon receipt of the said notice, the Prescribed Authority registered
the proceedings and called for a clause-wise report regarding the
statutory requirements contemplated under Section 28(3) of the
Act, 1993. Thereafter, on 12.06.2026, the signatory members
personally appeared before the Prescribed Authority and affirmed
both the notice and the signatures appended thereon. The
proceedings dated 12.06.2026 specifically record the presence of
all ten signatory members as well as the Chief Executive Officer,
Janpad Panchayat, Kota. Upon being satisfied regarding the
admissibility of the notice, the Prescribed Authority fixed
22.06.2026 at 12:00 noon as the date and time for convening the
meeting and issued consequential directions in accordance with
law. Thus, the material available on record clearly demonstrates
compliance with the requirements contemplated under Rule 3(3)
of the Rules, 1994.
24.So far as the principal contention of the petitioner regarding forged
and fabricated signatures is concerned, the same does not merit
acceptance in the facts of the present case. The original order-
sheet dated 12.06.2026 unequivocally records that all the
signatory members who had submitted the notice of no-
confidence motion remained present before the Prescribed
Authority and confirmed the genuineness of their signatures as
well as their intention to move the motion. Once the very
members whose signatures were disputed personally appeared
before the competent authority and verified the same, the
24
Prescribed Authority cannot be faulted for proceeding further with
the statutory process. In the considered opinion of this Court, the
allegation of forgery stood sufficiently addressed at the stage of
scrutiny undertaken by the Prescribed Authority and no further
adjudicatory exercise was required before fixing the date of
meeting.
25.This Court also finds that the notice of no-confidence motion
satisfies the statutory requirement prescribed under the proviso to
Rule 3(1) of the Rules, 1994. The record reflects that the notice
was signed by ten elected members of Janpad Panchayat, Kota.
Considering the total strength of twenty-five elected members, the
requirement of support by not less than one-third of the elected
members stood duly fulfilled. Apart from making bald allegations,
the petitioner has not placed any cogent material before this Court
to dislodge the official proceedings recording verification of
signatures by the signatory members themselves. Consequently,
the challenge to the very initiation of the no-confidence
proceedings cannot be sustained.
26.Equally significant is the fact that after recording satisfaction
regarding admissibility of the notice, the Prescribed Authority
proceeded to comply with all consequential statutory
requirements. Notices were directed to be issued to all twenty-five
elected members informing them about the date, time and venue
of the meeting. Shri Nitin Tiwari, Deputy Collector-cum-Sub-
25
Divisional Officer (Revenue), Takhatpur, was appointed as the
Presiding Officer under Rule 4 of the Rules, 1994 for conducting
the proceedings of the no-confidence motion. The meeting was
fixed for 22.06.2026 at 12:00 noon in the Meeting Hall of Janpad
Panchayat, Kota. The records thus disclose due compliance with
the statutory procedure prescribed under Section 28 of the Act,
1993 and Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules, 1994.
27.From a cumulative consideration of the pleadings of the parties,
the original records produced before this Court and the statutory
provisions governing the field, this Court is satisfied that the
Prescribed Authority has acted strictly within the four corners of
the Act, 1993 and the Rules, 1994. The records unmistakably
reveal that the notice under Rule 3(1) of the Rules, 1994 was
submitted on 08.06.2026 by ten elected members of Janpad
Panchayat, Kota and, upon receipt thereof, the Prescribed
Authority called for the requisite report regarding the statutory
requirements contemplated under Section 28(3) of the Act, 1993.
28.The proceedings dated 12.06.2026 further demonstrate that all
the signatory members personally appeared before the
Prescribed Authority and verified their signatures as well as their
intention to move the no-confidence motion against the petitioner.
Thus, the allegation that the proceedings were initiated on the
basis of forged or fabricated signatures is not borne out from the
official record. On the contrary, the contemporaneous proceedings
26
clearly establish due verification of the requisition notice by the
signatories themselves.
29.This Court further finds that after recording satisfaction regarding
the admissibility of the notice, the Prescribed Authority proceeded
in accordance with Rule 3 and Rule 4 of the Rules, 1994 by fixing
the meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion on
22.06.2026 at 12:00 noon in the Meeting Hall of Janpad
Panchayat, Kota. The record further discloses that notices were
directed to be served upon all twenty-five elected members of the
Janpad Panchayat, including the petitioner, on 12.06.2026.
Simultaneously, Shri Nitin Tiwari, Deputy Collector-cum-Sub-
Divisional Officer (Revenue), Takhatpur, was duly appointed as
the Presiding Officer for conducting the meeting in accordance
with law. The procedural steps undertaken by the Prescribed
Authority thus clearly indicate due compliance with the statutory
requirements governing the initiation and conduct of a no-
confidence motion against the President of a Janpad Panchayat.
30.In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the entire process leading to the convening of the
meeting for consideration of the no-confidence motion has been
undertaken in accordance with the provisions of Section 28 of the
Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 and Rules 3 and 4
of the Rules, 1994. No procedural irregularity, jurisdictional error,
violation of any mandatory statutory provision, or arbitrariness has
27
been demonstrated so as to warrant interference by this Court in
exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. Consequently, this Court finds no illegality in the
proceedings initiated pursuant to the notice dated 08.06.2026 or
in the order dated 12.06.2026 passed by Respondent No.2 fixing
the date of the meeting for consideration of the no-confidence
motion.
31.Accordingly, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be
and is hereby dismissed.
32.There shall be no order as to costs.
33.Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
In a significant ruling from the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, a Writ Petition filed by the Bank of India has been allowed, overturning the Industrial Tribunal's decision concerning a long-standing Industrial Dispute. This case, WP-15893 OF 2025, presided over by Justice Sandeep V. Marne, delves into critical questions surrounding the impact of inordinate delay in raising industrial disputes, the destruction of inquiry records due to the passage of time, and the concept of 'perversity' in inquiry findings. The judgment, now prominently featured on CaseOn, serves as a crucial precedent for understanding the interplay between employee misconduct, employer accountability, and the consequences of laches in legal proceedings.
The central question before the High Court was whether an employee, dismissed from service for grave misconduct, who then raises a highly belated industrial dispute, can be allowed to benefit from their own delay. Specifically, can such an employee's dismissal be set aside merely because the employer is unable to produce complete inquiry proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal years later, due to the natural destruction of old records?
The Respondent, a Clerk at Bank of India, was dismissed on October 18, 2000, following a disciplinary inquiry into allegations of fraudulent withdrawals and misappropriation of customers' funds. The charges were serious, involving substantial amounts. The domestic inquiry, conducted from March to May 2000, found the charges proven, and the dismissal was upheld on appeal in September 2001. A parallel criminal prosecution, however, resulted in the Respondent's acquittal in June 2013. Only then, 13 years after his dismissal, did the Respondent raise a demand for reinstatement on August 10, 2013. The Central Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal in June 2014, but the Respondent further delayed, filing his Statement of Claim four years later, in April 2018. By the time the preliminary issues were decided by the Tribunal, 24 years had passed since the dismissal.
During the Tribunal proceedings, the Bank faced a challenge: due to the extensive delay and its standard record retention policies, it was unable to produce the complete original inquiry records, including depositions of witnesses. The Industrial Tribunal, while acknowledging the fairness and legality of the initial inquiry, deemed the Enquiry Officer's findings 'perverse' solely because these complete records were not available for scrutiny. Consequently, the Tribunal declared the termination illegal and directed the Bank to pay full backwages and continuity of service until superannuation.
While Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not prescribe a specific period of limitation for making a reference, courts have consistently held that such a reference must pertain to an 'existing' industrial dispute, not a 'stale' or 'dead' claim. The concept of laches, or unreasonable delay, becomes crucial here.
The High Court emphasized that when a claim is adjudicated after a significant delay, especially when the claimant is responsible for that delay, the burden of producing relevant documents, or at least copies, should fall upon the claimant. The employer cannot be penalized for non-preservation of documents beyond a reasonable period, particularly when the claimant acted negligently in pursuing their remedy.
Referring to the Apex Court's judgment in SBI, Chairman, State Bank of India and another Versus. M.J. James¹, the High Court reiterated that delay and laches can cause serious prejudice to the opposing party. This prejudice often manifests as lost or untraceable evidence and witnesses, preventing a fair defense. The court must consider whether the delayed action was a calculated move to gain an unfair advantage.
A well-settled principle of law is that criminal prosecution and departmental inquiries operate on different footings. They have distinct purposes (punishment vs. discipline) and standards of proof (beyond reasonable doubt vs. preponderance of probabilities). Therefore, an acquittal in a criminal trial does not automatically negate or set aside the findings of guilt in a departmental inquiry, provided the latter was conducted fairly and based on sufficient evidence.
Justice Marne critically analyzed the Industrial Tribunal's approach, highlighting several errors.
The High Court found that the Tribunal's declaration of the Enquiry Officer's findings as 'perverse' was flawed. The perversity was based solely on the Bank's inability to produce complete records 24 years later, not on an actual scrutiny of the evidence originally presented to the Enquiry Officer. The court noted that the Respondent was a participant in the original inquiry and would have received copies of depositions and documents at that time, yet failed to produce them before the Tribunal.
The Bank, as a nationalized institution, was justified in destroying records after a reasonable period, especially when the dismissal had not been challenged for 13 years. The inordinate delay meant that original witnesses, many of whom were Bank customers, became untraceable, preventing the Bank from proving the charges *de novo* before the Tribunal. This constituted severe prejudice, directly attributable to the Respondent's delay.
For legal professionals, quickly grasping the nuances of such judgments is critical. This is where CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs prove invaluable, allowing practitioners to swiftly analyze the core arguments and rulings of cases like WP-15893 OF 2025 without getting bogged down in extensive reading.
The High Court observed that the Respondent was solely responsible for the protracted delay, both in raising the dispute and in pursuing the reference before the Tribunal. Instead of penalizing the Bank for the consequences of this delay, the Tribunal, in effect, rewarded the Respondent for his own 'wrong'. The court suggested that an adverse inference should have been drawn against the Respondent for his failure to produce documents he undoubtedly possessed during the initial inquiry.
The judgment also underscored the serious nature of the misconduct, particularly for a bank employee who is expected to uphold a higher standard of honesty and integrity, as established in cases like Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Reg. Bank & Anr Versus. Munna Lal Jain². The fraudulent withdrawal and misappropriation of customer funds were grave offenses, justifying the dismissal.
In light of these considerations, the Bombay High Court concluded that the Industrial Tribunal's orders were unsustainable. The Writ Petition was allowed, and:
This judgment is an essential read for lawyers and law students alike, offering crucial insights into several areas of labor and administrative law:
This case serves as a stern reminder of the importance of prompt action in legal matters and the potential repercussions of allowing claims to become stale.
All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances.
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