1

Reserved.

Chief Justice's Court

Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 925 of 1983

Appellant :- Bansh Raj

Respondent :- State Of U.P.

Counsel for Appellant :- C.S. Saran,K.K. Sharma,Kamal Krishna

Counsel for Respondent :- D.G.A.,A.G.A.,N.D.Shukla

Hon'ble Govind Mathur,Chief Justice

Hon'ble Vivek Varma,J.

1.This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated

26.03.1983 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gyanpur,

Varanasi in S.T. No. 46 of 1981 by which he convicted the

appellant Bansh Raj @ Lalley under Section 302 IPC and

sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life.

2.In brief, facts of the case are that on 5.1.1981, a written

report (Ex-ka-1) was submitted by Sri Bihari Lal Pandey

(Informant/P.W.-1) at Police Station Aurai, District Varanasi

alleging therein that his uncle Sharda Prasad Pandey was

issue-less, he owned 1.5 Bigha of land. Bansh Raj @ Lalley

(accused/appellant) wanted Sharda Prasad Pandey to transfer

that land to him. However, he refused on the advice of

Informant's brother Sridhar Pandey. It antagonized the accused

appellant who entertained ill will against Sridhar Pandey. About

8 to 10 days, prior to the incident, Bansh Raj Pandey @ Lalley

abused and threatened the informant. The villagers intervened

and saved the situation. On account of this animosity, on

5.1.1981, at about 8 p.m. in the night when the informant, his

brother Sridhar Pandey, Rajpati Pandey and nephew Dinesh

Kumar Pandey were sitting around a fire ('Kaura'), in front of the

house of Sridhar, and a lantern was lit up, Banshraj Pandey @

Lalley suddenly turned up armed with a gun. He fired at

informant's brother Sridhar Pandey. The shot hit Sridhar

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Pandey in the stomach and he fell down. Hearing the noise of

gun fire and uproar, the villagers came and saw the incident.

3.On the basis of the written report (Ex-ka-1), the First

Information Report was lodged on 05.01.81 at 9.05 p.m, under

Section 307 IPC against the accused appellant at P.S. Aurai,

District Varanasi by P.W.-3 Sri Nath Ojha, Head Moharrir. An

entry was made in General Diary (Ex-Ka-4), the investigation

was entrusted to Ram Singh (P.W.-5).

4.The injured Sridhar Pandey was taken by the informant to

the police station Aurai. The Investigating Officer recorded the

statement of injured and informant. Thereafter the Injured was

taken by a constable to Aurai Hospital. The doctor at Aurai

Hospital referred him to Shiv Sundar Prasad Gupta Hospital,

Varanasi.

5.The injured, Sridhar Pandey succumbed to his injuries at

Shiv Shankar Prasad Gupta Hospital, Varanasi on 5.1.1981 at

10.35 p.m. The case was thereafter converted from Section 307

IPC to Section 302 IPC. Extract of this G. D. entry is available

on record as Ex-ka-5.

6.During the course of investigation, inquest was prepared.

The corpus of the deceased was subjected to autopsy. As per

Dr A. K. Garg, (P.W.-7), following ante-mortem injuries were

found:-

1. Wound of entrance 5 cm X 5 cm with irregular margins,

contused charring present throughout. This wound was

towards the left at the outer side of abdomen. A loop of

intestine was protruding.

2. Rupture of large intestine and small intestine.

3. Rupture of spleen

4. Rupture of left kidney

5. Blood present in the abdominal cavity about 1-1/4 litres.

6. Two pellets were recovered from the posterior wall of the

abdomen on right side. In the opinion of the doctor the

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injuries on the body of the deceased were sufficient to

cause his death.

7.P.W.-9 Sub Inspector Rajendra Prasad Rai, after

concluding the investigation submitted a charge sheet (Ex-Ka-

7) against the appellant Bansh Raj @ Lalley under Section 302

IPC. The then Addl. Sessions Judge indicted the appellant

under Section 302 IPC on 5.2.1982. Accused denied the charge

and claimed to be tried.

8.During the course of trial, the prosecution adduced nine

witnesses in support of its case, namely, P.W.-1 Bihari Lal

(informant/witness of fact/eye witness), P.W.-2 Dinesh Kumar

(witness of fact/eye witness), P.W.-3 Srinath Ojha (who

transcribed the chick report), P.W.-4 Sharda Prasad (motive

witness), P.W.-5 Sri Ram Singh (SI), P.W.-6 Sri Ram Sajiwan

Mishra (SO/Subsequent Investigating Officer), P.W.-8 Sri

Mahendra Nath Ram, constable and P.W.-9 Rajendra Prasad

Rai (SI) and exhibited several documents (Ex-Ka-1 to Ka-12).

9.The statement of appellant was recorded under Section

313 Cr.P.C., he denied the allegations and claimed false

implication due to previous enmity. He has taken plea of alibi

that he was admitted in Government Hospital at Jangiganj from

4.1.1981 to 8.1.1981 and to prove his defence, he adduced

three defence witness namely D.W.-1 Janardan Pandey, the

then pharmacist, D.W.-2 Dr M. P. Srivastava, and D.W.-3

Vishambhar Nath Pandey, the relative of accused appellant as

also Ex-Kha-1 (Bed Head Ticket) and Ex-Kha-2 (Discharge

Ticket).

10.The trial Court held that the prosecution was able to prove

guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly

convicted him for his having committed offence under Section

302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

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11.Sri Kamal Krishna, learned senior counsel for the

appellant submitted that prosecution has failed to prove the

manner and place of occurrence. He contests the place of

occurrence, since neither empty cartridge or pellets were found

at the incident site, nor the blood stained soil was found by the

Investigating Officer. He further submitted that the witnesses

who have claimed to be eye witness of the occurrence are

partisan and related witnesses and as such no reliance can be

placed on their testimony. He further submitted that the medical

evidence is at variance with ocular version of the witnesses,

because, the fire was said to be made from a distance of 5-6

steps yet charring was found present around the wound of the

deceased, which is not possible. All these factors, according to

the learned counsel for the appellant, are clearly suggestive of

the fact that the prosecution has failed to establish its case

beyond all reasonable doubts and the appellant was falsely

framed.

12.On the other hand learned A.G.A. opposing the said

arguments submitted that the ocular testimony of the

prosecution witnesses is not in any manner inconsistent with

the medical evidence and reliability of the eye witnesses of the

incident cannot be doubted as their presence at the place of

occurrence, which is just in front of their house, is quite natural

and there was no reason to spare the real culprit and falsely

implicate the appellant, therefore, the trial court has rightly held

that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable

doubts against the appellant and has rightly convicted him.

13.Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material on record.

14.The prosecution case rests on the evidence of PW-1 and

P.W.-2, who are the witnesses of fact and the eye witnesses.

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P.W-1 -Bihari Lal is the author of first information report. He is

brother of the deceased. This witness deposed that Sharda

Prasad was his real uncle. On the advice of his brother Sridhar

(deceased), Sharda Prasad refused to execute/transfer his land

in favour of accused appellant. As a result, the latter harboured

animosity against Sridhar Pandey. He asserted that on the

fateful day at about 8.00 p.m. when the informant along with

Sridhar, Rajpat and his nephew (P.W-2) were sitting around a

fire, the accused-appellant came with a gun and fired at

Sridhar. The shot hit him in the abdomen. This witness along

with other persons wrapped the wound of the injured with a

"Gamacha" (towel) and covered him with a "rajai " (blanket).

Thereafter, the injured was taken to Police Station Aurai and

First Information Report was lodged.

15.P.W-2 Dinesh Kumar, is son of the deceased. His

statement was recorded on 1.12.1982. His age as recorded on

the date of his deposition is 14 years. On the date of

occurrence this witness was aged about 12 or 13 years. The

trial Judge, however, before recording his evidence, tested his

ability to depose and after being satisfied that he was in a

position to depose, he recorded his evidence. His evidence,

therefore, cannot be doubted on the ground that he was a

minor at the time of occurrence. He had given a very consistent

statement about the occurrence. He stated that he along with

his uncle Bihari lal (informant), Rajpati and his father Sridhar

Pandey (deceased) were sitting around a fire when the

accused-appellant came with a gun in his hand and fired at his

father. His father fell down and the accused appellant, fled from

the spot towards west.

16.We have examined the testimony of P.W-2 Dinesh Kumar

very closely, we do not find any inconsistency in his deposition.

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17.P.W.-4 Sharda Prasad has been examined as motive

witness. He deposed that he earned his livelihood as a cloth

vendor in Calcutta. He owned 1.5 bigha of land. The accused

appellant wanted Sharda Prasad to transfer that land to him.

However, he refused on the advice of Sridhar Pandey. It

antagonized the accused appellant who threatened Sridhar

Pandey of dire consequences. During cross examination, this

witness remained firm and there was no inconsistency.

18.The prosecution case from the very inception, i.e. from

the registration of the First Information report, states that at the

time when the appellant had fired a shot, the deceased was

sitting in front of his house along with his brother Bihari and his

son Dinesh and one Rajpati and all of them were warming

themselves sitting around a fire. Their testimony remained

unshaken at the trial. The two eye witnesses Bihari (PW-1) and

Dinesh (PW-2) have also supported their depositions before the

trial court. The fact that the deceased and witnesses were

sitting around a fire has a ring of truth. It is a very common sight

in the villages that during winters, villagers, in the evening and

early morning sit around fire out-side their houses in the sahan

(court yard) to warm themselves. Thus the presence of the two

eye witnesses, PW-1 and PW-2 at the place and time is natural

and cannot be doubted. The presence of these two witnesses

at the scene of occurrence is established. Their testimony

cannot be discarded on the ground of their being partisan as

they are related to the deceased. Both these witness were

extensively cross examined regarding the manner of assault,

on the point of sufficiency of light at the time and place of

incident. Nothing adverse could be elicited from them during

such cross examination. The trial court has rightly relied on the

testimony of these two eye witnesses and we have no reason

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to hold other-wise

19.There is no rule of law, which requires rejection of

testimony of related witnesses. Once it is found by the court,

subsequent to analysis of such evidence that there is no reason

to disbelieve such witnesses then the mere fact that the

witnesses are interested, is not enough to reject the

prosecution case on this ground alone.

20.The Hon'ble Apex court in the case of State of Punjab v.

Karnail Singh reported in 2004 SCC (Cri) 135 has held as

under.

" 8. We may also observe that the ground that the witnesses

being close relatives and consequently, being partisan

witnesses, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This

theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh

v. State of Punjab [AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465] in

which surprise was expressed over the impression which

prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar that

relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through

Vivian Bose, J., it was observed: (AIR p. 366, para 25)

"25. We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the

High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses

requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an

observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are

women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their

testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the

reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are

unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal

cases and one which another Bench of this Court

endeavoured to dispel in — 'Rameshwar v. State of

Rajasthan [AIR 1952 SC 54 : 1952 Cri LJ 547] ' (AIR at p.

59). We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not

in the judgments of the courts, at any rate in the arguments

of counsel."

9. Again in Masalti v. State of U.P. [AIR 1965 SC 202 : (1965)

1 Cri LJ 226] this Court observed: (AIR pp. 209-10, para 14)

"But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that

evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the

ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses.

… The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole

ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of

justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how

much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial approach has

to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; but the plea

that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan

cannot be accepted as correct."

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21.On the reliability of testimony of a child witness, the

Hon'ble Apex Court in Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate v. State of

Maharashtra, (2008) 12 SCC 565 has held as under:

10. "6. … The Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'the Evidence

Act') does not prescribe any particular age as a

determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent

one. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Evidence Act

envisages that all persons shall be competent to testify,

unless the court considers that they are prevented from

understanding the questions put to them or from giving

rational answers to these questions, because of tender

years, extreme old age, disease—whether of mind, or any

other cause of the same kind. A child of tender age can be

allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand

questions and give rational answers thereto. This position

was concisely stated by Brewer, J. in Wheeler v. United

States [40 L Ed 244 : 159 US 523 (1895)] . The evidence of

a child witness is not required to be rejected per se, but the

court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with

close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality

thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon.

(See Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka [(2001) 9 SCC

129 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 413] .)

7. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra [(1997)

5 SCC 341 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 685] it was held as follows:

(SCC p. 343, para 5)

'5. … A child witness if found competent to depose to the

facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of

conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the

evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section

118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to

understand the questions and able to give rational answers

thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility

thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case.

The only precaution which the court should bear in mind

while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the

witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must

be like any other competent witness and there is no

likelihood of being tutored.'

The decision on the question whether the child witness has

sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who

notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of

intelligence, and the said Judge may resort to any

examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and

intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of

an oath. The decision of the trial court may, however, be

disturbed by the higher court if from what is preserved in the

records, it is clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This

precaution is necessary because child witnesses are

amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make-

believe. Though it is an established principle that child

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witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and

liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is

also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their

evidence the court comes to the conclusion that there is an

impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of

accepting the evidence of a child witness."

The above position was highlighted in Ratansinh

Dalsukhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat 4 , SCC pp. 67-68,

paras 6-7. Looked at from any angle the judgments of the

trial court and the High Court do not suffer from any infirmity

to warrant interference.

22.It is worthwhile to mention here, that during the trial the

defence made an effort to challenge the place of occurrence

itself. Firstly, on the ground that the Investigating Officer did not

find blood stains at the place of occurrence, and secondly, that

empty cartridge and pellets were also not found at the place of

occurrence.

23.The first submission that blood was not found at the

scene of occurrence and the incident had not taken place, at

the place where prosecution has alleged, cannot be accepted.

In this regard it would be relevant to refer to the testimony of

PW-1 and PW-2. They both deposed that as soon as the

deceased received gun shot wound, he pressed the wound by

his hand and just thereafter 'Gamachha' (cloth towel) was tied

around the wound in order to stop the blood from oozing and

spilling. Further, the injured was, thereafter, also wrapped in a

blanket (razai). Thus, the possibility of blood falling on the

ground becomes remote. It is also evident from the statement

of the Doctor (PW-7) that he found huge collection of blood, i.e.,

1-1/4 ltrs. of blood in the abdominal cavity of the deceased.

Thus, it appears that the blood spill on the ground was

prevented by promptly binding the wound with the "Gamachha".

Consequently the blood got accumulated inside the deceased's

body. There is nothing to doubt the correctness of the testimony

of these witnesses.

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24.The Supreme Court Court in Nirmal Singh and another

Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2005) 9 SCC 725 dealing with

such a situation has held as-

"……….. in view of the explanation offered by the

prosecution witnesses it appears probable that no blood

had fallen on the ground at the place of occurrence and in

any event, if some blood had fallen at the place of

occurrence which the Investigating Officer failed to notice

that by itself would not be fatal to the prosecution case."

25.The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court helps the

prosecution and as such the absence of blood at the place of

occurrence would be of no help to the defence and the

submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the

place of incident is not proved, cannot be accepted.

26.However, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument

that some blood had fallen at the place occurrence the

possibility of blood stains on the ground being withered away by

the foot steps of the persons assembled there at, cannot be

ruled out, particularly when the evidence on record shows that

just after the incident large number of persons had assembled

at the place of occurrence. This could also be the reason that

the Investigating officer did not find blood stains at the place of

occurrence.

27.The next submission that empty cartridge and pellets

were not found at the place occurrence and thus again the

place of occurrence appears doubtful, also cannot be accepted,

inasmuch as, in the present case only one shot was fired and it

is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant after firing

from his gun again loaded another cartridge. The evidence on

record suggests that after making a single shot at the

deceased, the appellant fled from the place of occurrence. So

far as the absence of pellets at the place of occurrence is

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concerned in that regard we may say observe that the shot was

fired was from a close range, as charring is present around the

wound and the pellets had entered the body of the deceased.

Moreover, there is no exit wound on the body of the deceased.

The possibility of the pellets being found at the place of

occurrence is also ruled out by melee and the rush of people at

the site of the incident after the crime. Even other-wise, nothing

could be elicited from the cross-examination of the eye

witnesses, PW-1 and PW-2 which may create doubt about the

place and manner of occurrence.

28.In the case of Lakhan Sao Vs. State of Bihar & anor

2002 Crl. L.J. 2959 (SC), it has been propounded that non-

recovery of fire arm or cartridge does not detract from the case

of the prosecution, where the direct evidence is acceptable

29.An effort has also been made by the counsel for the

appellant to suggest that since medical evidence is at variance

with ocular version, the medical evidence be believed and

ocular evidence be disbelieved and it be inferred that the

prosecution witnesses had not seen the incident. In this regard

according to the ocular testimony the shot was fired at the

deceased from a distance of 5-6 steps and if this ocular

testimony is to be believed then charring around the wound of

the deceased would not occur, as for charring to occur the fire

would have been made from a distance of 3-4 feet. In our

considered opinion, the variance in distance in the present case

is so minor that it would hardly affect ocular testimony. Even

otherwise if we take into consideration the length of the gun,

which is generally about 3 feet long, there would be no variance

in the distance, as then the distance would be 3-4 feet.

30.Now, coming to the plea of alibi as set up by the accused-

appellant, his version in this regard is that he was not present in

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the village on the date and time of the occurrence, as he

remained admitted in Government Hospital at Jangiganj from

4.1.1981 to 8.1.1981. To prove his defence version the

appellant had produced three defence witness, namely,

Janardan Pandey (DW-1), the then pharmacist of the hospital,

Dr M. P. Srivastava (DW-2) who gave treatment to the appellant

and Vishambhar Nath Pandey (DW-3), a relative of accused

appellant, who is alleged to have got the appellant admitted in

the hospital. The appellant in his statement under section 313

Cr.P.C had stated that on 3.1.1981 he had gone to village

Sunaicha where his sister was married. There he fell ill in the

night of 3.1.1981 and in the morning of 4.1.1981 his relative

Vishambhar Nath Pandey (DW-3) took him to hospital at

Jangiganj where he remained admitted until he was discharged

there from on 8.11.1981. The trial Court has discarded that plea

stating that accused can very easily go the place of occurrence

on the date of incident and after committing the crime can

return to the hospital within an hour. We have also examined

the statement of DW-3. He deposed that village Sahsepur

where the incident had taken place is 14-15 kms. away from the

hospital where appellant was admitted and the two places are

connected by a pitch road (pukka road). He has also asserted

that the said distance of 14-15 kms. would be shortened by 2-3

kms if one takes the journey via Jagarnathpur. On the basis of

such an evidence on record the trial court rightly held that the

appellant can very easily go to the place of occurrence on the

date of incident and after committing the crime can return to the

hospital within an hour. Besides the above the register on which

the plea of alibi is based, on the face of it, does not inspire

confidence. Though at Government Hospital, Katra, Varanasi

the accused appellant claims to have been admitted on 4.1.81,

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neither prior to that date nor subsequent to that date there is

any entry of any other patient being admitted in the month of

January. The defence also did not produce any other evidence

to establish the existence of any earlier register/record of

patient admission. Also the appellant did not adduce any

evidence of any medicine having been actually issued to him by

the hospital, though D.W.-2 Dr. M.P. Srivastava had stated so.

On the plea of alibi the settled legal position is that such a plea

can succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far

away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the

place where the crime was committed.

31.In the case of State of Haryana Vs. Sher Singh 1981

Cr.L.J. 230 (SC) has observed that if an accused takes the plea

of alibi, he must establish it.

32.In the case of Dudh NathPandey Vs. State of Uttar

Pradesh AIR 1981 SC-911, it was held that plea of alibi can

succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far away at

the relevant time that he could not be present at the place

where the crime was committed.

33.The said proposition of law has been reiterated in the

case of Binay Kumar Singh Vs. State of Bihar (1997) 1 SCC-

283. The apex court observed that the burden of proving an

alibi is entirely on the accused and strict proof is required for

establishing an alibi. In this context, we may reproduce a few

paragraphs of the said judgment.

"22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an exception

(special or general) envisaged in the Penal Code, 1860 or

any other law. It is only a rule of evidence recognised in

Section 11 of the Evidence Act that facts which are

inconsistent with the fact in issue are relevant. Illustration (a)

given under the provision is worth reproducing in this

context:

'(a) The question is whether A committed a crime at Calcutta

on a certain day. The fact that, on that date, A was at Lahore

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is relevant.'

23. The Latin word alibi means 'elsewhere' and that word is

used for convenience when an accused takes recourse to a

defence line that when the occurrence took place he was so

far away from the place of occurrence that it is extremely

improbable that he would have participated in the crime. It is

a basic law that in a criminal case, in which the accused is

alleged to have inflicted physical injury to another person,

the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused

was present at the scene and has participated in the crime.

The burden would not be lessened by the mere fact that the

accused has adopted the defence of alibi. The plea of the

accused in such cases need be considered only when the

burden has been discharged by the prosecution

satisfactorily. But once the prosecution succeeds in

discharging the burden it is incumbent on the accused, who

adopts the plea of alibi, to prove it with absolute certainty so

as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of

occurrence. When the presence of the accused at the scene

of occurrence has been established satisfactorily by the

prosecution through reliable evidence, normally the court

would be slow to believe any counter-evidence to the effect

that he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened. But

if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality

and of such a standard that the court may entertain some

reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene when

the occurrence took place, the accused would, no doubt, be

entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that

purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be laid down

that, in such circumstances, the burden on the accused is

rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict proof is required

for establishing the plea of alibi."

(emphasis supplied)

34.We thus endorse the said finding of the trial Court and it

has committed no error in rejecting the plea of alibi of the

appellant. Even otherwise, the ailment of the appellant for

which he was admitted in the said hospital is fever and pain in

chest and stomach. DW-3 has stated that no one of the family

of the appellant had visited hospital to attend him, which shows

that the ailment of the appellant was not serious enough. In fact

the story of alibi as set up by the appellant does not inspire

confidence and we disbelieve the same. Here we may also say

that once the prosecution, through reliable evidence, has

satisfactorily established presence of accused at the scene of

15

occurrence we would not believe any counter evidence that the

accused-appellant was elsewhere when the occurrence

happened.

35.In view of our above discussion we hold that the guilt of

the appellant stood fully proved and his appeal lacks merit and

deserves to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed and

impugned judgment and order dated 26.03.1983 of the trial

court is hereby affirmed. Appellant, who is on bail, is directed to

surrender immediately. His bail is cancelled and sureties are

discharged. Trial court is also directed to get the appellant

arrested and send him to jail to serve out the sentence awarded

by it as affirmed by this judgment.

36.Office will certify this order to the court concerned within

15 days. Trial court shall thereafter communicate compliance of

this judgment within a month thereafter.

Order Date :- 17.10.2019

RavindraKSingh

(Vivek Varma,J.) (Govind Mathur, C.J.)