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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH,

SHIMLA

CWP No. 9629 of 2025

Reserved on 7.4.2026

Date of Decision 17.04.2026

Basant Lal ...Petitioner.

Versus

State of H.P. & Others. …Respondents.

Coram

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge.

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

Yes

For the Petitioner: M/s Mukul Sood and Het Ram Thakur,

Advocates.

For the Respondents: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General

with Mr.Ramakant Sharma, Additional

Advocate General for respondents No.

1 to 3.

Respondent No. 4 already ex-parte vide

order dated 29.7.2025.

Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge

Petitioner, by invoking jurisdiction of this High Court under

Article 226 of Constitution of India, has filed present petition for quashing

and setting aside the order dated 3.2.2025 passed by the Deputy

Commissioner, Mandi under Section 146(2) of the H.P.Panchayati Raj

1

Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment ?

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Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) whereby petitioner has

been disqualified from contesting the election for a period of 6 years and

to be elected as office bearer of the Panchayat etc.; and also for declaring

Section 146(2) of the Panchayati Raj Act as ultra vires to the Constitution

of India being arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the

Constitution of India.

2 Admitted facts are that petitioner was elected as Pardhan of

Gram Panchayat Pangna, District Mandi in Panchayati Raj Institutions’

elections held in November/December,2020. The said election was

assailed by respondent No.4 by filing Election Petition on various grounds

including that despite being well aware about pendency of Criminal Case

No. 38 of 2018 titled as State of HP vs. Shanta Devi against him in the

Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karsog, in case FIR No. 114 of

2017, petitioner did not disclose this information in his Nomination Form

on 17.2.2021. The Election Petition was allowed by the Sub Divisional

Officer (Civil), Karsog on 25.4.2022 declaring election of petitioner as

Pardhan, Gram Panchayat Pangna as null and void with finding that in his

Nomination Form, petitioner had deliberately concealed his criminal

antecedents especially information about pending criminal case against

him involving punishment of 2 years imprisonment which attracted the

provisions of Section 175(1((d)(iii) of the Act and willful concealment of

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information by the petitioner attracted his disqualification under the

provisions of the Section 122 (1)(n) of he Act providing disqualification of

the candidate from contesting the future elections for making false

declaration.

3 Appeal preferred by petitioner was dismissed by the Deputy

Commissioner, Mandi vide order dated 1.5.2023.

4 CWP No. 2854 of 2023 preferred by petitioner under Article

226 of the Constitution of India against aforesaid orders and declaration,

was dismissed by Single Bench on 16.10.2024.

5 LPA No. 361 of 2024 preferred by the petitioner was also

dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated

7.11.2024.

6 Vide impugned order dated 3.2.2025, Deputy

Commissioner, Mandi by invoking provisions of Section 146(1)(a) and

146(2) read with Section 131(2) of the Act had disqualified the petitioner

from being elected or continuing as office bearer of Panchayat for 6 years

and had declared the post of Pardhan of Gram Panchayat Pangna as

vacant.

7 The petitioner approached the Apex Court by filing SLP(C )

Dairy No. 1062 of 2025 wherein petitioner had also raised the issue of

passing of order dated 3.2.2025 by the Deputy Commissioner declaring

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him disqualified for 6 years with submission that it was harsh and

disproportionate to the nature of non-declaration of the particulars. The

Apex Court did not find any reason to interfere in the impugned judgment.

8 With respect to plea of petitioner that punishment imposed is

harsh and disproportionate punishment, particularly keeping in view the

nature of allegation attributed to him, the Apex Court had observed that

prima facie it seem to be harsh and disproportionate punishment,

however, issue was left open to be decided by the High Court if

petitioner, so advised to assail the order before the High Court.

9 Learned counsel for petitioner submits that disqualification

from contesting the elections for 6 years for non-disclosure of pendency

of criminal case, wherein petitioner also stands acquitted later on, is not

only harsh and disproportionate but also ultra vires to the Articles 14 and

21 of the Constitution of India. Further that Section 146(2) providing no

discretion to the concerned competent Authority to impose proportionate

punishment depending upon the nature of cause attracting disqualification

to contest to the post of and to continue as, office bearer of the

Panchayat is arbitrary as it leaves no room for imposing lesser penalty in

appropriate cases and therefore, this provision also deserves to be struck

down.

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10 Section 131 provides that if any person, having been elected

as office bearer of Panchayat, subsequently becomes subject to any of

disqualification mentioned in Section 122 which is either not removable or

being removable but not removed, ceased to be such office bearer and

his office shall become vacant.

11 Section 122 provides disqualification and provision relevant

in present matter reads as under:-

“122. Disqualification-(1) A person shall be disqualified for

being chosen, as and for being, an office bearer, of a

Panchayat

(a) if he is so disqualified by or under any law for the time

being in force for the purpose of the election to the State

Legislature:

Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground

that he is less than 25 years, if he has attained the age of 21

years;

(b) to (m)……. ……. …….

(n) if he has made any false declaration as required under

this Act or the rules made thereunder…….”

12 Section 146 contains the provision for removal of office

bearer of the Panchayat. Relevant extract whereof is as under:-

“146. Removal of office bearers of Panchayats-(1) The

State Government in the case of office bearers of

Panchayats, the Divisional Commissioner having

jurisdiction, in the case of office bearers of Zila Parishad,

and the Deputy Commissioner having jurisdiction, in the

case of office bearers of Panchayat Samiti and Gram

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Panchayat, as the case may be after such enquiry as it may

deem fit to make at any time, remove an office bearer.

(a) if he has incurred any disqualification under this Act;

(b) ……

(1-A) The State Government, the Divisional Commissioner

or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, may, on

consideration of the enquiry report or if it thinks proper, for

reasons to be recorded in writing, revoke the suspension

order and instead of removing an office bearer, warn him to

be vigilant in the discharge of his duties or may also debar

him from taking part in any act or proceedings of the

Panchayats for the period of six months.

(2) A person who has been removed under sub-section (1)

shall forthwith cease to be a member of any other

Panchayat of which he is a member, such person shall also

be disqualified for a period of six years to be elected as

office bearer of a Panchayat under this Act.”

13 Though, learned counsel for petitioner, to substantiate his

plea with regard to harshness and disproportionate punishment provided

under Section 146 of the Act with reference to the nature of omission

committed by the petitioner, has referred the observations made by the

Apex Court but his such attempt is based upon the picking up of two lines

from the entire relevant paragraph whereas in totality, though prima facie

opinion has been expressed by the Apex Court but with clarification that,

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Apex Court had not expressed any final opinion on the merit of order. The

relevant paragraphs of order passed by the Apex Court are as under:-

“9. Having perused the submissions supplemented with the

record, we fail to find any merit as far as the petitioner’s

challenge to the impugned order(s) and judgment(s) of the

High Court are concerned. We say so for the reason that

the Regulations framed by the State Election Commission

have rightly been held by the High Court to be a piece of

subordinate legislation and, thus, the candidates contesting

the Panchayat election were obligated to comply with the

provisions of the same.

10. In any case, the misconduct attributed to the petitioner

does not require reference to any provision of the Act, Rules

or Regulations. It is a case where he deliberately filed a

false affidavit/undertaking concealing the factum of

pendency of criminal case against him. The concealment of

that material fact per se was a valid ground to annul his

election.

11. Turning lastly to the order dated 02.02.2025, by way of

which the petitioner has been precluded from contesting any

elections for the next 6 years, we do not want to express any

opinion on this order’s merits as it is a subsequent event

which was not subject matter of the challenge before the

High Court. That being said, in light of the fact that the

petitioner is stated to have been acquitted in the subject-

criminal case, it seems to us that barring him for 6 years

from contesting elections is prima facie harsh and

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disproportionate punishment to the nature of allegations

attributed to him. We hasten to clarify that these are only

prima facie observations at this stage. The petitioner, if so

advised, may challenge that order before the High Court in

the appropriate proceedings. Since we have not expressed

any final opinion on merits of that order, we wholly leave it to

the High Court’s discretion to take an appropriate view of the

matter.”

14 It would also apt to refer pronouncement of the Apex Court

in Poonam vs. Dule Singh and others reported in AIR 2025 SC 5497,

relevant paragraphs whereof are as under:-

“15. It is an admitted position that, the petitioner failed to

disclose her conviction for the offence punishable under

Section 138 of the Act of 1881 and that she had been

sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one year. It is also

not disputed that on 09.09.2022 when the petitioner

submitted her affidavit as required by Rule 24-A (1) of the

Rules of 1994, her conviction was in force. The petitioner

was therefore obligated to furnish information about her

conviction and consequently being sentenced to

imprisonment for a period of one year. She however failed to

do so. Pertinently, Rule 24-A (1) requires a declaration to be

made of an order or conviction, irrespective of the quantum

of sentence imposed. In other words, the material

information to be furnished is the fact of any conviction

suffered by a candidate. It is therefore clear that by failing to

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disclose her previous conviction, the petitioner furnished

false and incorrect information as regards her criminal

antecedents. As a result the verification of her affidavit was

false and incorrect despite the fact that the petitioner had full

knowledge of her conviction which she had subjected to

further challenge. As a consequence, the ground under

Section 22 (1) (d) (iii) of the Act of 1961 became available

for declaring her election to be void. Further, as a result of

such false information being furnished by the petitioner in

her affidavit filed under Rule 24-A (1) of the Rules of 1994,

her nomination paper was improperly accepted.

These factual aspects have been considered by

the trial Court and thereafter affirmed by the High Court in

exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. This factual position

was not contested by the learned Senior Advocate for the

petitioner. It is thus clear that by failing to disclose her

conviction and consequent sentence of imprisonment for a

period of one year, a ground for declaring her election as

Councillor became available to the first respondent.

….. ….. ….. ….

19. It is now necessary to deal with the contention

raised on behalf of the petitioner that notwithstanding her

conviction, the same was not for committing a serious

offence or one touching upon moral turpitude. The

conviction being under Section 138 of the Act of 1881, the

petitioner was not liable to be unseated for her conviction for

a minor offence.

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We are unable to accept this contention which

seeks to dilute the fact of non-disclosure of the petitioner’s

conviction in the nomination form. Rule 24A-(1) requires a

candidate to disclose any order of conviction suffered by him

by filing an affidavit along with the relevant information

before the Returning Officer. The format of the affidavit

prescribed under the Rules of 1994 requires a disclosure as

regards conviction and sentence of imprisonment for a

duration of one year and more. The validity of Rule 24-A(1)

of the Rules of 1994 has not been subjected to any

challenge. It would therefore have to be treated as valid. Its

compliance has been made mandatory as failure to furnish

such information along with an affidavit as prescribed visits a

candidate with the consequence of non-compliance of the

provisions of the Rules of 1994. This in turn is a ground to

challenge the election of the returned candidate. In absence

of any provision in the Rules of 1994 that would enable the

Court to condone such non-compliance or exempt its

compliance on the ground that the conviction was for a non-

serious offence or one not involving moral turpitude,

adopting such course as urged would do violence to the Act

of 1961 and the Rules of 1994.

….. ….. ……. …….

21. The plea raised by the petitioner that her election could

not be set aside in the absence of it being proved that the

result of the election had been materially affected on

account of the improper acceptance of her nomination form

need not detain us. Once it is found that there has been

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non-disclosure of a previous conviction by a candidate, it

creates an impediment in the free exercise of electoral right

by a voter. A voter is thus deprived of making an informed

and advised choice. It would be a case of suppression/non-

disclosure by such candidate, which renders the election

void.

…… ……. …… …...

25. We may now indicate why discretion under Article

136 of the Constitution of India does not deserve to be

exercised in the present case. The Constitution Bench in

Pritam Singh vs. State (AIR 1950 SC 169) while explaining

the scope and powers of the Court under Article 136 has

held that:

“Generally speaking, this Court will not grant

special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special

circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has

been done and that the case in question presents features

of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision

appealed against.”

Having considered the entire matter, we are not

persuaded to hold that the petitioner has made out an

exceptional case for this Court to hold that notwithstanding

the failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose her

conviction leading to the sentence of imprisonment of one

year, such lapse should be condoned. The information

furnished in her affidavit filed under Rule 24-A(1) of the

Rules of 1994 has been found to be incorrect and false. The

petitioner rests on her subsequent acquittal in appeal, which

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event occurred after her election. She did not step into the

witness box to explain her inadvertence, which is now

sought to be put forward. The plain reading of Rule 24-A(1)

and its requirement does not admit of any doubt

whatsoever. Moreover, both the Courts have concurrently

found that the petitioner failed to disclose her conviction

without any justifiable reason. In these facts therefore, no

special or exceptional case has been made out by the

petitioner for this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Article

136 of the Constitution of India. In the passing, we may

observe that the petitioner had contested the bye election

that had occasioned by her removal and she lost the same.”

15 In present case, it is apparent from the observations made

by the Apex Court that no merit was found in petitioner’s challenge to the

impugned order concerned, and that candidate contesting the Panchayat

elections is obligated to comply with provisions of regulations framed by

the Election Commission and further that it is a case where petitioner

deliberately filed a false affidavit undertaking concealing the pendency of

criminal case pending against him and concealment of that material fact

per se was a valid ground to annul his elections.

16 We are not in agreement with plea of petitioner that

punishment is harsh and disproportionate and thus Section 146(2) of the

Act is liable to be struck down being arbitrary for not providing any room

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for exercise of discretion by competent Authority depending upon the

nature of ground for which Panchayat Officer suffers disqualification, for

the reason that 6 years’ disqualification has been provided with a purpose

because any punishment provided for a period less than 5 years may

render the disqualification to contest the elections redundant because in

the Panchayati Raj Institutions, elections are held after completion of 5

years tenure and in case of disqualifying a person for a period less than 5

years, such person despite having suffered such disqualification to

contest the elections, shall be able to contest the next Panchayat

elections and there shall be no elections, which would not be contested

by him.

17 In our considered opinion, the intent of Legislature is very

clear that person disqualified from contesting the elections must, at least,

suffer disqualification for next Panchayat elections. The candidate offering

him for public service is expected to act honestly and disclose all

particulars carefully with responsibility and also having due regard to the

sanctity of declaration to be made in Nomination Form. It is not a case

where information required to be disclosed was so remotely connected

with the petitioner that there was possibility of ignorance of such fact, but

it is a case where he himself was facing the trial in a case pending before

the Judicial Magistrate First Class. A candidate desirous to be Head of

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the Panchayat as Pardhan is expected to disclose everything honestly. It

is irrelevant that such declaration would not have rendered him

disqualified to contest the elections or would not have resulted into

rejection of Nomination Form. He has been declared disqualified not for

the nature of offence involved in criminal case pending against him or for

conviction or gravity of offence, but he has been declared disqualified for

false declaration made in Nomination Form which must be taken

seriously.

18 Based on 10

th

Century Common Era, inscriptions found at

Uthiramerur in District Kanchipuram, Tamil Nadu, the Chola Kingdom

implemented a strict electoral system known as Kudavolai that included

rigorous disqualification for candidates and their families to ensure

accountability. If an elected member (member of a village committee) was

found guilty of corruption, theft, incest, or failing to submit accounts, he

was disqualified and in some interpretations of the inscriptions, their

relatives were also barred from contesting elections. Various reports

indicate that the restrictions extended to a wide range of family members,

including siblings, parents, children and in-laws of the offender. Records

show that those who served on committees were barred from contesting

for the next three generations or in some cases, the disqualification of kin

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was for seven generations. The village assembly could recall

representatives if they failed in their duties.

19 In fact, for corrupt practices in the election process,

punishment should be harsher and therefore, we are of the opinion that

such disqualification as provided under Section 146(2) of the Act is not

harsh or disproportionate.

In view of above discussion, we find no merit in petition and

accordingly, petition is dismissed. All pending miscellaneous

application(s) also stand disposed of accordingly.

(Vivek Singh Thakur),

Judge.

(Ranjan Sharma),

Judge.

17

th

April, 2026

(ms)