2025 INSC 734 Crl Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 @ SLP(Crl.) 9493 of 2024 etc. Page 1 of 33

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2688 OF 2025

(arising out of Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 9493 of 2024)

Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi … Appellant

versus

Vidhi Rawal … Respondent

with

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2689 OF 2025

(arising out of Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 13896 of 2024)

J U D G M E N T

ABHAY S. OKA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The main question involved in the appeals is whether the

High Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482

of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, ‘the CrPC’) or

Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for

short, ‘the BNSS’) to quash proceedings initiated under Section 12

of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for

short ‘the DV Act, 2005’).

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FACTUAL ASPECTS

3. The two connected appeals involve a challenge to the common

order passed by the High Court rejecting the appellants’ prayer to

quash proceedings initiated under Section 12(1) of the DV Act,

2005. The appellant in the Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP(Crl)

9493 of 2024, Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi, is the respondent’s

brother-in-law whereas the appellants in the Criminal Appeal

arising out of SLP(Crl) 13896 of 2024, Prateek Tripathi,

Vivekanand Tiwari and Mira Tiwari, are the respondent’s husband,

father-in-law and mother-in-law respectively. Prateek Tripathi

married the Respondent, Vidhi Rawal, on 12

th December 2019 as

per Hindu rites and rituals at Dewas. After two years of marriage,

on 8

th December 2021, the respondent made a complaint to the

Station House Officer at the Police Station Women Consultancy

Centre, Dewas, against Prateek Tripathi, and Vivekanand Tiwari

alleging that dowry was demanded by them. On 7

th January 2022,

the respondent lodged FIR No.3 of 2022 at P.S Mahila Thana,

Dewas under Section 498A, 504, 506 and 34 of the IPC against the

appellants alleging mental and physical harassment on account of

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non-payment of dowry. The respondent claimed that on her return

from work in Johannesburg, South Africa, the appellants tortured

her, demanding a sum of Rs. 20 Lakh cash and a top model SUV

car.

4. Aggrieved by the threats, the respondent on 2

nd March 2022

filed an application against the appellants bearing MJCR No.

215/2022, before the District and Sessions Judge, Dewas, Madhya

Pradesh, under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005. She claimed that

Prateek Tripathi would beat her and throw her out of the house

while they were abroad. The respondent prayed for reliefs provided

under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act, 2005. The

appellants filed two separate petitions under Section 482 of the

CrPC to quash the application under Section 12 of the DV Act,

2005. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court

dismissed the quashing of the petitions on the ground that the

proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, being of a civil

nature, cannot be quashed.

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SUBMISSIONS

Appellants

5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants

submitted that the learned Magistrate has been conferred

jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19,

20, 21, 22 and 23 of the DV Act, 2005. The term Magistrate is

defined under Section 2(i) of the DV Act, 2005 to mean a Judicial

Magistrate of first class or, as the case may be, a Metropolitan

Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under the CrPC. Therefore, the

Court of a Judicial or Metropolitan Magistrate is a Criminal Court

constituted under the provisions of the CrPC.

6. The learned senior counsel further contended that, although

remedies under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 can be availed of

in a Civil Court or Family Court as per Section 26, Section 26

cannot be read to understand the scheme of the DV Act, 2005.

7. The learned senior counsel invited our attention to various

provisions under the CrPC where the nature of relief which can be

granted by the Courts is, in essence, a relief which can be granted

by a Civil Court. Similarly, certain provisions of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’), were pointed

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out by him, where the relief granted by a Civil Court can also be

granted in criminal proceedings. Therefore, the answer to the

question which arises for consideration is not dependent upon the

nature of the proceedings or the nature of the relief that can be

granted in those proceedings.

8. The learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of the High

Court of Allahabad in the case of Devendra Agarwal and 3

Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another

1 and a decision

of the High Court of Bombay in the case of Nandkishor Pralhad

Vyawahare v. Mangala

2. In these cases, the High Courts held

that an application under Section 482 CrPC is maintainable

against orders passed under the DV Act, 2005 to prevent abuse of

the process of Court and to secure the ends of justice. It is relevant

to point out that the case of Devendra Agarwal and 3 Others v.

State of Uttar Pradesh and Another

1 has been referred to a

larger bench of the High Court of Allahabad in the case of Ram

Lotan Vishwakarma and Ors v. State of U.P and Anr

3.

1

Application u/s 482 NO. - 18994 OF 2024

2

2018 SCC OnLine Bom 923

3

2025 AHC-LKO 7572

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9. The learned senior counsel submitted that because an

application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, is maintainable

before a Criminal Court under the CrPC, it is amenable to the

inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the

CrPC.

Respondent

10. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submits

that proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, cannot be

quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC. He contended that the

High Court rightly held that the proceedings under the DV Act,

2005, are civil in nature. He relied upon the objects and reasons

of the DV Act, 2005, to submit that the Legislature intended the

proceedings thereunder to be civil in nature. The learned counsel

relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Kunapareddy

alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna

Kumari and Another

4, which held that proceedings under the DV

Act, 2005 are predominantly civil in nature.

4

2016 11 SCC 774

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11. The learned counsel argued that an application under

section 12 of the DV Act, 2005, is not a “complaint” under section

2(d) of the CrPC. Further, he argued that Sections 200 to 204 of

the CrPC do not apply to proceedings under the DV Act, 2005 and

a Magistrate cannot treat an application under the DV Act, 2005

as a complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC. The notice issued

to the respondent on an application under Section 12 of the DV

Act, 2005 is not a summons under Section 61 of the CrPC but is a

notice set out in Form VII of the Protection of Women from

Domestic Violence Rules, 2006 ( for short, ‘the DV

Rules 2006’). He supported the view taken by the High Court.

CONSIDERATION S

The provision of the DV Act, 2005

12. The DV Act, 2005 was enacted with the object of providing

more effective protection to the rights of women guaranteed under

the Constitution who are the victims of violence of any kind

occurring within the family. The DV Act, 2005, has been enacted

to tackle the menace of domestic violence faced by women in our

society. A very wide meaning has been assigned to the term

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‘domestic violence’ in the DV Act, 2005. Section 3 of the DV Act,

2005 reads thus:

“3. Definition of domestic violence.—For the purposes

of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of

the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case

it—

(a) harms or injures or endangers the health,

safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or

physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so

and includes causing physical abuse, sexual

abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic

abuse; or

(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the

aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any

other person related to her to meet any unlawful

demand for any dowry or other property or valuable

security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved

person or any person related to her by any conduct

mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or

(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether

physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.

Explanation I—For the purposes of this section,—

(i) “physical abuse” means any act or conduct

which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain,

harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair

the health or development of the aggrieved person

and includes assault, criminal intimidation and

criminal force;

(ii) “sexual abuse” includes any conduct of a sexual

nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or

otherwise violates the dignity of woman;

(iii) “verbal and emotional abuse” includes—

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(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and

insults or ridicule specially with regard to not

having a child or a male child; and

(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any

person in whom the aggrieved person is interested.

(iv) “economic abuse” includes—

(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial

resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled

under any law or custom whether payable under

an order of a court or otherwise or which the

aggrieved person requires out of necessity

including, but not limited to, household necessities

for the aggrieved person and her children, if any,

stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by

the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to

the shared household and maintenance;

(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of

assets whether movable or immovable, valuables,

shares, securities, bonds and the like or other

property in which the aggrieved person has an

interest or is entitled to use by virtue of the

domestic relationship or which may be reasonably

required by the aggrieved person or her children or

her stridhan or any other property jointly or

separately held by the aggrieved person; and

(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to

resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is

entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic

relationship including access to the shared

household.

Explanation II—For the purpose of determining

whether any act, omission, commission or conduct

of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence”

under this section, the overall facts and

circumstances of the case shall be taken into

consideration.”

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13. Even ‘domestic relationship’ has been defined widely under

clause (f) of Section 2 of the DV Act, 2005, which reads thus:

“(f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship

between two persons who live or have, at any point

of time, lived together in a shared household, when

they are related by consanguinity, marriage or

through a relationship in the nature of marriage,

adoption or are family members living together as

a joint family”

13.1 An aggrieved person has been defined in clause (a) of

Section 2, which reads thus:

“(a) aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or

has been, in a domestic relationship with the

respondent and who alleges to have been subjected

to any act of domestic violence by the respondent”

14. Chapter IV of the DV Act, 2005, lays down what kind of

reliefs can be granted to a person aggrieved who has been

subjected to any act of domestic violence. There are different

categories of reliefs which can be granted under the DV Act, 2005.

These reliefs can be sought either by making an application under

Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 or by making an application in

pending legal proceedings affecting aggrieved person before a Civil

Court, Family Court or a Criminal Court. The reliefs are provided

in Sections 17 to 22, which read thus:

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“17. Right to reside in a shared household .—(1)

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for

the time being in force, every woman in a domestic

relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared

household, whether or not she has any right, title or

beneficial interest in the same.

(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded

from the shared household or any part of it by the

respondent save in accordance with the procedure

established by law.

18. Protection orders.—The Magistrate may, after giving

the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity

of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that

domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place,

pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person

and prohibit the respondent from—

(a) committing any act of domestic violence;

(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic

violence;

(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved

person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school or

any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;

(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever,

with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or

written or electronic or telephonic contact;

(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank

accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties,

jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or

singly by the respondent, including her stridhan or any

other property held either jointly by the parties or

separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate;

(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or

any person who give the aggrieved person assistance from

domestic violence;

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(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection

order.

19. Residence orders.—(1) While disposing of an

application under sub-section (1) of Section 12, the

Magistrate may, on being satisfied that domestic violence

has taken place, pass a residence order—

(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any

other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved

person from the shared household, whether or not the

respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared

household;

(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the

shared household;

(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from

entering any portion of the shared household in which the

aggrieved person resides;

(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing

off the shared household or encumbering the same;

(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights

in the shared household except with the leave of the

Magistrate; or

(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of

alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as

enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for

the same, if the circumstances so require:

Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passed

against any person who is a woman.

(2) The Magistrate may impose any additional conditions

or pass any other direction which he may deem reasonably

necessary to protect or to provide for the safety of the

aggrieved person or any child of such aggrieved person.

(3) The Magistrate may require from the respondent to

execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing

the commission of domestic violence.

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(4) An order under sub-section (3) shall be deemed to be

an order under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and shall be dealt with

accordingly.

(5) While passing an order under sub-section (1), sub-

section (2) or sub-section (3), the court may also pass an

order directing the officer in-charge of the nearest police

station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to

assist her or the person making an application on her

behalf in the implementation of the order.

(6) While making an order under sub -section (1), the

Magistrate may impose on the respondent obligations

relating to the discharge of rent and other payments,

having regard to the financial needs and resources of the

parties.

(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge of the

police station in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has

been approached to assist in the implementation of the

protection order.

(8) The Magistrate may direct the respondent to return to

the possession of the aggrieved person her stridhan or any

other property or valuable security to which she is entitled

to.

20. Monetary reliefs.—(1) While disposing of an

application under sub-section (1) of Section 12, the

Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary

relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by

the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person

as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may

include, but is not limited to,—

(a) the loss of earnings;

(b) the medical expenses;

(c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or

removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved

person; and

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(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her

children, if any, including an order under or in addition to

an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for

the time being in force.

(2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall be

adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the

standard of living to which the aggrieved person is

accustomed.

(3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an

appropriate lump sum payment or monthly payments of

maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the case

may require.

(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for

monetary relief made under sub-section (1) to the parties

to the application and to the in-charge of the police station

within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent

resides.

(5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted to

the aggrieved person within the period specified in the

order under sub-section (1).

(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make

payment in terms of the order under sub-section (1), the

Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the

respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to

deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or

debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent,

which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary

relief payable by the respondent.

21. Custody orders .—Notwithstanding anything

contained in any other law for the time being in force, the

Magistrate may, at any stage of hearing of the application

for protection order or for any other relief under this Act

grant temporary custody of any child or children to the

aggrieved person or the person making an application on

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her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for

visit of such child or children by the respondent:

Provided that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that any

visit of the respondent may be harmful to the interests of

the child or children, the Magistrate shall refuse to allow

such visit.

22. Compensation orders.—In addition to other reliefs as

may be granted under this Act, the Magistrate may on an

application being made by the aggrieved person, pass an

order directing the respondent to pay compensation and

damages for the injuries, including mental torture and

emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence

committed by that respondent.”

Application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005

15. Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 reads thus:

“12. Application to Magistrate.—(1) An aggrieved

person or a Protection Officer or any other person on

behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application

to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under this

Act:

Provided that before passing any order on such

application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration

any domestic incident report received by him from the

Protection Officer or the service provider.

(2) The relief sought for under sub-section (1) may include

a relief for issuance of an order for payment of

compensation or damages without prejudice to the right

of such person to institute a suit for compensation or

damages for the injuries caused by the acts of domestic

violence committed by the respondent:

Provided that where a decree for any amount as

compensation or damages has been passed by any court

in favour of the aggrieved person, the amount, if any, paid

or payable in pursuance of the order made by the

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Magistrate under this Act shall be set off against the

amount payable under such decree and the decree shall,

notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time

being in force, be executable for the balance amount, if

any, left after such set off.

(3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in

such form and contain such particulars as may be

prescribed or as nearly as possible thereto.

(4) The Magistrate shall fix the first date of hearing, which

shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of

receipt of the application by the court.

(5) The Magistrate shall endeavour to dispose of every

application made under sub-section (1) within a period of

sixty days from the date of its first hearing.”

16. The term ‘Magistrate’ has been defined under Section 2(i)

which is as under:

“2(i) “Magistrate” means the Judicial Magistrate of the first

class, or as the case may be, the Metropolitan Magistrate,

exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (2 of 1974) in the area where the aggrieved person

resides temporaily or otherwise or the respondent resides or

the domestic violence is alleged to have taken place”

17. Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 makes a provision enabling

an aggrieved person, a Protection Officer or any other person on

behalf of an aggrieved person to make an application to the

learned Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs provided in Chapter

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IV. In exercise of the rule-making power under Section 37 of the

DV Act, 2005, the DV Rules, 2006 have been framed. Rule 6(1) of

the DV Rules, 2006 provides that every application of the

aggrieved person made under Section 12 shall be in Form II

appended to the Rules.

18. As can be seen from the scheme of the DV Act, 2005 and in

particular Section 12, it is not a complaint under Section 200 of

CrPC or Section 223 of the BNSS. While dealing with a complaint

under Section 200 of the CrPC, the learned Magistrate cannot

mechanically take cognizance of the offences alleged in the

complaint. To ascertain the truth about the allegations made in

the complaint, the learned Magistrate is required to examine the

complainant and witnesses, if any. Only after the learned

Magistrate is satisfied that a case is made out to proceed against

the accused, a process is issued and cognizance is taken. This is

also true about a complaint under Section 223 of the BNSS.

However, Section 223(2) of the BNSS takes it a step further. It

provides that no cognizance of an offence can be taken by the

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Magistrate without giving an opportunity of being heard to the

accused.

19. In case of an application under Section 12 of the DV Act,

2005, as provided in Sub -section (4) thereof, the learned

Magistrate is duty-bound to fix the first date of hearing, which

shall not ordinarily be beyond three days from the date of receipt

of the application by the Court. Section 13(1) provides that a

notice of the date fixed in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 12

shall be served on the respondent or any other person in the

manner laid down therein. Rule 2 of the DV Rules, 2006 lays down

the methods and means of service of notice issued under Section

13(1).

20. We may also note that under Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of

the DV Act, 2005, a power has been conferred on the learned

Magistrate to pass interim and ex-parte orders.

21. Therefore, an application under Section 12 of the DV Act,

2005, cannot be equated with a complaint within the meaning of

Section 200 of the CrPC (Section 223 of the BNSS). As provided in

Sub-section (4) of Section 12, read with Sub-section (1) of Section

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13, the normal rule is that a notice of hearing must be issued on

the application. The scheme of Section 12 is completely different

from Section 200 of the CrPC or Section 223 of the BNSS.

22. Section 28 of the DV Act, 2005 reads thus:

“28. Procedure.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in this

Act, all proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22

and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall be governed

by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(2 of 1974).

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the court from

laying down its own procedure for disposal of an

application under Section 12 or under sub-section (2) of

Section 23.”

22.1 It is true that the proceedings of an application under

Sections 12 and 23 are governed by the CrPC. However, Sub-

section (2) of Section 28 confers overriding power on the Court to

lay down its own procedure for the disposal of an application

under Section 12 or under Sub-section (2) of Section 23.

Jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 12

23. Now we come to the issue of jurisdiction of the Courts to

entertain applications under Section 12. Section 27 of the DV Act,

2005 deals with jurisdiction, which reads thus:

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“27. Jurisdiction.—(1) The court of Judicial Magistrate

of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the

case may be, within the local limits of which—

(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily

resides or carries on business or is employed; or

(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is

employed; or

(c) the cause of action has arisen,

shall be the competent court to grant a protection order

and other orders under this Act and to try offences

under this Act.

(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable

throughout India.”

(emphasis added)

23.1 So, the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or

the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, has jurisdiction

to entertain applications under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 as

can be seen from the provisions of Sections 12 and 27 read with

clause (i) of Section 2 of the DV Act, 2005.

24. There is one more provision of the DV Act which deals with

the power of other Courts (other than the Courts mentioned in

Section 27) to grant reliefs under the DV Act, i.e. Section 26 which

reads thus:

“26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—(1) Any

relief available under Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 may also

be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family

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court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and

the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before

or after the commencement of this Act.

(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for

in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved

person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil

or criminal court.

(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved

person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this

Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant

of such relief.”

(emphasis added)

24.1 Therefore, in a given case, in any legal proceedings pending

before a Civil Court or Family Court affecting the aggrieved

person, the reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 can be sought.

Similarly, in a Criminal Court other than the Courts of Judicial

Magistrate of the First Class and Metropolitan Magistrate, reliefs

under Sections 18 to 22 can be sought. For example, in

proceedings before a Court of Session, such reliefs can be sought

provided the proceeding affects the aggrieved person. We must

note here that Section 26 does not confer jurisdiction on Courts

other than the Courts mentioned in Section 27 to entertain an

application under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005. It only enables

the Courts mentioned therein to grant the reliefs under Sections

18 to 22 in the pending legal proceedings.

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25. Before we proceed further, we must clarify that in these

appeals, we are confining our adjudication to the question

whether the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section

482 of CrPC or Section 528 of the BNSS can be exercised to quash

proceedings arising out of an application under Section 12(1) filed

before the learned Magistrate in accordance with Section 27 of the

DV Act, 2005. We are not dealing with other legal proceedings in

which reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 are sought in the Courts

referred to in Section 26 of the DV Act.

CRIMINAL COURTS

26. Under the CrPC, Chapter II deals with the constitution of

Criminal Courts and Offices. The Courts of Session, Judicial

Magistrates of the First Class and in any metropolitan area,

Metropolitan Magistrates, Judicial Magistrates of the Second

Class and Executive Magistrates are Criminal Courts as provided

in Section 6 of the CrPC. Therefore, the Courts of Metropolitan

Magistrates and Judicial Magistrates of First Class, which are

empowered to entertain applications under Section 12 and to

grant reliefs under the DV Act, 2005, are Criminal Courts.

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Similarly, under the BNSS, Section 6 thereof provides that Courts

of Session, Judicial Magistrates of the First Class, Judicial

Magistrates of the Second Class and Executive Magistrates are

Criminal Courts. Under the BNSS, there is no category of

Metropolitan Magistrates. Therefore, the jurisdiction to entertain

a complaint vests in a Criminal Court under the CrPC.

The nature of proceedings under Section 12 of the D.V Act,

2005

27. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent tried to

rely upon the nature of proceedings under the DV Act, 2005. He

invited our attention to a decision of this Court in the case of

Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy

Swarna Kumari and Anr.

4 He relied upon paragraphs 11 and

12 of the said decision which read thus:

“11. We have already mentioned the prayers which

were made by Respondent 1 in the original petition

and Prayer A thereof relates to Section 9. However, in

Prayer B, Respondent 1 also sought relief of grant of

monthly maintenance to her as well as her children.

This prayer falls within the ambit of Section 20 of the

DV Act. In fact, Prayer A is covered by Section 18

which empowers the Magistrate to grant such a

protection which is claimed by Respondent 1.

Therefore, the petition is essentially under Sections 18

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and 20 of the DV Act, though in the heading these

provisions are not mentioned. However, that may not

make any difference and, therefore, no issue was raised

by the appellant on this count. In respect of the

petition filed under Sections 18 and 20 of the DV Act,

the proceedings are to be governed by the Code, as

provided under Section 28 of the DV Act. At the same

time, it cannot be disputed that these proceedings are

predominantly of civil nature.

12. In fact, the very purpose of enacting the DV Act was to

provide for a remedy which is an amalgamation of civil

rights of the complainant i.e. aggrieved person. Intention

was to protect women against violence of any kind,

especially that occurring within the family as the civil law

does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. It is

treated as an offence under Section 498-A of the Penal

Code, 1860. The purpose of enacting the law was to

provide a remedy in the civil law for the protection of

women from being victims of domestic violence and to

prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the

society.

.. .. .. .. …. .. .. .. ..”

(emphasis added)

28. Reliance is also placed by the respondent on a decision of

this Court in the case of Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi

5 and in

particular paragraph 50 which reads thus:

“50. In our view, the DV Act is a piece of civil code

which is applicable to every woman in India

irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social

background for a more effective protection of her

rights guaranteed under the Constitution and in order

to protect women victims of domestic violence

occurring in a domestic relationshi p. Therefore, the

5

(2022) 8 SCC 90

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expression “joint family” cannot mean as understood in

Hindu Law. Thus, the expression “family members living

together as a joint family”, means the members living

jointly as a family. In such an interpretation, even a girl

child/children who is/are cared for as foster children also

have a right to live in a shared household and are

conferred with the right under sub-section (1) of Section

17 of the DV Act. When such a girl child or woman

becomes an aggrieved person, the protection of sub -

section (2) of Section 17 comes into play.”

(emphasis added)

28.1 Thus, there is no doubt that, notwithstanding the penal

provisions in the form of Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter V, the

proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act, 2005, are

predominantly of a civil nature.

The power of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC

and Section 528 of the BNSS to quash proceedings under the

D.V Act,2005.

29. Under the scheme of the DV Act, 2005, the reliefs which are

provided in Sections 18 to 23 can be granted on an application

made by an aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other

person on behalf of the aggrieved person under Sub-section (1) of

Section 12. Thus, when the question of quashing proceedings

under the DV Act, 2005 pending before the learned Magistrate

arises, it is for quashing of an application under Section 12(1) of

the DV Act. We are examining the issue of jurisdiction of the High

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Court under Section 482 of the CrPC or Section 528 of the BNSS

in the context of quashing the proceedings initiated on an

application made under Section 12(1). We have already held that

an application under Sub-section (1) of Section 12 is completely

different from a complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC (Section

223 of the BNSS).

30. Now, we turn to Section 482 of CrPC, which reads thus:

“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court .—

Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the

inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as

may be necessary to give effect to any order under this

Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

30.1 The word ‘Court’ referred to in Section 482 is obviously a

Criminal Court within the meaning of Section 6 of CrPC which

includes a Court of a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan

Magistrate.

31. There are two parts of Section 482. Both parts save the

inherent powers of the High Court. The first part is applicable

where the power is exercised to make such orders as may be

necessary to give effect to any order under ‘this Code’. When a

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notice is issued on an application under Section 12(1), the learned

Magistrate does not pass any order under the CrPC. When orders

granting any of the reliefs under Sections 18 to 23 are passed, the

orders of the learned Magistrate are not under the CrPC.

Therefore, the first part of Section 482 cannot apply to

proceedings under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005.

32. The second part of Section 482 saves the inherent power of

the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court

or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, in a given

case where a learned Magistrate is dealing with an application

under Section 12(1), the High Court can exercise the power under

the second part of Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of

any Court or to secure the ends of justice. Hence, the High Court

can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash

proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or orders

passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.

33. Now, the question is what is the scope of interference under

Section 482 with the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005. We

must make a distinction between proceedings initiated on the

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basis of an application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005,

which are predominantly of a civil nature and the proceedings

before the Criminal Court for prosecuting a person for any offence.

Setting criminal law in motion has very serious consequences

affecting the liberty of a human being, as the person against whom

criminal law is set in motion can be arrested and sentenced to

undergo imprisonment.

34. We have already referred to the objects and reasons of the

DV Act, 2005, which are reproduced in the decision of this Court

in the case of Kunapareddy alias Nookal

a Shanka Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari and Anr

4.

The basic object of the DV Act, 2005, is to protect women from

being victims of domestic violence and also to prevent the

occurrence of domestic violence in society. It seeks to protect the

right of women to reside in their matrimonial home or shared

household. Therefore, there is a provision for passing a Residence

Order under Section 19. Section 18 provides for granting

Protection Orders, which are essentially to prevent the

commission of acts of domestic violence against women. The

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orders which can be passed under Section 20 are with the object

of compensating a woman for loss caused due to domestic

violence. The custody orders regarding children are also

essentially to prevent domestic violence. Even Section 22 provides

for passing compensation orders for the injuries, including mental

torture and emotional distress, caused by acts of domestic

violence. If a complaint is entertained under Section 12(1), the

erring respondent cannot be punished as is understood in

criminal law. He can be subjected to various orders as provided in

Sections 18 to 23. A respondent in the application can be

prosecuted only if he commits a breach of a protection order or an

interim protection order. Therefore, the consequences of

entertaining an application under Section 12(1) are not as drastic

as the consequences of setting criminal law in motion. No doubt,

orders that can be passed under the DV Act, 2005, can also be

very drastic, but in proceedings under Section 12(1), a respondent

cannot be sentenced to suffer imprisonment or a fine as in a

criminal trial.

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35. When it comes to exercise of power under Section 482 of the

CrPC in relation to application under Section 12(1), the High

Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005 is a

welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women

who suffer from domestic violence and for preventing acts of

domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section

12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect.

Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross

illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High

Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with

proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under

Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the

exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC while

dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV

Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be

defeated.

36. We must also note here that against an order passed by a

learned Magistrate, there is an appeal provided under Section 29

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to the Court of Session. In contrast, generally, there is no remedy

of appeal available against an order taking cognisance of an

offence or an order issuing process. This is another reason why

the High Court should exercise caution when exercising its

inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings under Section 12 of

the D.V. Act, 2005.

37. There are decisions of the High Courts taking a view that the

jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC is not available to

quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) of DV

Act, 2005. The decisions are primarily based on the premise that

proceedings under Section 12(1) are predominantly of a civil

nature. The said view is not correct for the reasons set out earlier.

38. Before we part with this Judgment, we must mention here

that one of us (Abhay S. Oka, J) is a party to a Judgment dated

27

nd October, 2016 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition

2473 of 2016 in which the view taken is that remedy under

Section 482 of the CrPC is not available for quashing the

proceedings under Section 12(1) of the DV Act,2005. This view

was found to be incorrect by a full Bench of the same High Court.

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As judges, we are duty-bound to correct our mistakes in properly

constituted proceedings. Even for Judges, the learning process

always continues.

39. To conclude, the view taken in the impugned order of the

High Court that a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC for

challenging the proceedings emanating from Section 12(1) of the

DV Act, 2005 is not maintainable, is not the correct view. We hold

that High Courts can exercise power under Section 482 of CrPC

(Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the proceedings emanating

from the application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005,

pending before the Court of the learned Magistrate. However,

considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts

should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an

application under Section 12(1). Normally, interference under

Section 482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or

injustice.

40. Accordingly, we quash the order dated 9

th May, 2024, passed

by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Miscellaneous

Criminal Case Nos. 52308 of 2022 and 3363 of 2023 and restore

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the said petitions to the file of the High Court. The restored

petitions shall be heard afresh and disposed of by the High Court

in the light of what we have held in this Judgment.

41. The appeals are allowed accordingly.

..…………………...J.

(Abhay S. Oka)

..…………………... J.

(Ujjal Bhuyan)

New Delhi;

May 19, 2025.