2025 INSC 3 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10338 of 2023)

BERNARD FRANCIS JOSEPH VAZ

AND OTHERS …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA

AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal takes exception to the final judgment and

order dated 22

nd November 2022 in Writ Appeal No. 678 of

2022 (LA-KIADB) passed by the High Court of Karnataka at

Bengaluru, whereby the Division Bench of the High Court

dismissed the writ appeal filed by the appellants herein

against the judgment and order dated 18

th April 2022 in Writ

Petition No. 1627 of 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge

of the High Court dismissing their writ petition.

2

FACTS:

3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as

follows:

3.1. From 1995 to 1997, the appellants herein purchased

various residential sites at Gottigere Village, Uttarahalli Hobli,

Bengaluru South Taluk, Karnataka vide registered sale deeds

and became absolute owners of their respective sites.

3.2. On 3

rd April 1997, a Framework Agreement (hereinafter,

“FWA”) was executed between Government of Karnataka

(Respondent No. 1) and Nandi Infrastructure Corridor

Enterprise Ltd. (hereinafter, “NICE”) (Respondent No. 6)

envisaging the Infrastructure Corridor Project connecting

Bengaluru-Mysuru (hereinafter, “Bengaluru -Mysuru

Infrastructure Corridor Project” or “BMICP”). As per the FWA,

the State Government undertook to acquire about 13,237

acres of land from private persons and about 6,956 acres of

Government land. In all 20,193 acres of land was agreed to be

conveyed and transferred in favour of Respondent No. 6 (NICE)

for implementation of the BMICP.

3.3. On 14

th October 1998, Respondent No. 6 applied to

Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (hereinafter,

3

“KIADB”) (Respondent No. 2) to make available the lands for

the project.

3.4. On 29

th January 2003, a preliminary notification was

issued by Respondent No. 2 (KIADB) under sub-section (1) of

Section 28 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act,

1966 (hereinafter, “KIAD Act”) for acquiring lands for the

BMICP. Notices were issued under sub-section (2) of Section

28 of KIAD Act seeking objections from the land-owners. The

appellants also submitted their objections.

3.5. On 5

th July 2003, upon consideration of the objections to

the Preliminary Notification, the Final Notification was issued

by Special Deputy Commissioner KIADB (Respondent No. 3).

3.6. On 22

nd November 2005, the possession of the

appellants’ land was taken over by Respondent No. 2 (KIADB)

and subsequently handed over to Respondent No. 6 (NICE)

and its sister concern Nandi Economic Corridor Enterprises

Ltd. (NECE) (Respondent No. 7). However, no Award was

passed immediately for such acquisitions.

3.7. In 2009-10, the land-owners filed Writ Petitions before

the High Court of Karnataka with a prayer to quash the

acquisition notifications insofar as it relates to their lands. In

4

the alternative, the land-owners sought a direction to the

concerned authorities to allot residential sites of equal

dimension.

3.8. Vide judgment and order dated 15

th June 2011, a

Division Bench of the High Court held that the acquisition

notifications cannot be quashed at such a belated stage and

that there cannot be any direction for allotment of alternative

sites to the land-owners. In the result, the batch of Writ

Petitions filed by the land-owners were dismissed, however,

liberty was reserved to approach the concerned authorities if

any rehabilitation programme is specifically worked out or if

any welfare programme is generally available.

3.9. On 12

th February 2016, in terms of the judgment and

order of the High Court dated 15

th June 2011, some of the

land-owners submitted a representation inter-alia to the

Government of Karnataka, KIADB and NICE to frame a

rehabilitation scheme as mandatorily required under the FWA

and to allot alternative sites along with benefits under the

scheme at the earliest.

3.10. On non-consideration of their representation, the

landowners filed Writ Petitions before the High Court being

5

W.P. Nos. 49812-49863 of 2016 (LA-KIADB), with a prayer to

direct the State of Karnataka and KIADB to implement the

request made in the representation dated 12

th February 2016

at the earliest

3.11. Vide order dated 24

th March 2017, a learned Single

Judge of the High Court disposed of the Writ Petitions filed by

the land-owners by directing the State of Karnataka and

KIADB to consider their representation and pass appropriate

orders, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.

3.12. Alleging non-compliance of the order of the learned

Single Judge dated 24

th March 2017, Contempt Petitions being

C.C.C. No. 2434 of 2018 and C.C.C. No. 18-65 of 2019 came

to be filed by the land-owners.

3.13. During the pendency of the Contempt Petitions, the

Special Land Acquisition Officer-1, KIADB (BMICP), Bengaluru

(hereinafter, “SLAO”) (Respondent No. 4), on 22

nd April 2019,

passed an Award for payment of compensation in respect of

lands belonging to the erstwhile land-owners. In terms of the

legal opinion given by the Advocate General, Respondent No.

4 decided to postpone the date of Preliminary Notification from

29

th January 2003 to the year 2011 and decided to consider

6

the guideline rates prevailing in the said year and formulate

an award. An amount of Rs. 32,69,45,789/- was, accordingly,

awarded for 11 Acre 1.25 Guntas of land.

3.14. In view of the Award dated 22

nd April 2019, a

compliance report along with an endorsement came to be filed

by the KIADB in the contempt proceedings initiated by the

land-owners before the High Court. Therefore, a Division

Bench of the High Court, vide order dated 27

th November

2019, dismissed as withdrawn the Contempt Petitions with

liberty to challenge the endorsement in accordance with law.

3.15. On 19

th June 2019, Respondents No. 6 and 7

(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Project Proponents”)

filed Writ Petitions being W.P. No. 26085 of 2019 and W.P. No.

31407 of 2019 before the Karnataka High Court challenging

several Awards passed by the SLAO, including the Award

dated 22

nd April 2019. The Project Proponents were aggrieved

by the Award dated 22

nd April 2019 inasmuch as, on account

of delay not attributable to them, they are being called upon

to pay higher compensation. It was their contention that the

compensation should be determined on the basis of the

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market value of land as on the date of the Preliminary

Notification and that the date could not have been shifted.

3.16. On 5

th January 2021, the erstwhile land-owners

filed impleadment application in the Writ Petitions filed by the

Project Proponents. The appellants herein, thereafter, filed a

substantive Writ Petition being W.P. No. 1627 of 2021 on 1

st

June 2021. The appellants were aggrieved by the Award dated

22

nd April 2019 inasmuch as, even though their lands were

acquired in the year 2003, no compensation for such

acquisition has been disbursed to the appellants despite a

lapse of 18 years. It was their contention that the

compensation should be determined as per the current market

value of the lands.

3.17. Vide common judgment and order dated 18

th April

2022, a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court at

Bengaluru allowed the Writ Petitions filed by the Project

Proponents. The High Court quashed the Award dated 22

nd

April 2019 passed by Respondent No. 4 (SLAO). In view of the

decision in the Writ Petitions filed by the Project Proponents,

the Writ Petition filed by the appellants herein was disposed of

as the same did not survive for consideration inasmuch as the

8

Award dated 22

nd April 2019 was quashed. Ultimately, the

High Court directed the concerned authorities to pass fresh

awards in accordance with law and after providing sufficient

and reasonable opportunity to the parties as expeditiously as

possible and at any rate within a period of three months.

3.18. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants herein filed a Writ

Appeal being W.A. No. 678 of 2022 (LA-KIADB). Vide impugned

judgment and order dated 22

nd November 2022, the Division

Bench of the High Court dismissed the Writ Appeal filed by the

appellants herein. Hence, the present appeal by way of special

leave.

4. We have heard Shri R. Chandrachud, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants, Shri Atmaram N. S.

Nadkarni, learned Senior Counsel for Respondents No. 6 and

7, Shri Avishkar Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General

appearing for the State of Karnataka and Shri Purushottam

Sharma Tripathi for Respondents Nos. 2 to 5.

SUBMISSIONS:

5. Shri Chandrachud submitted that the Division Bench of

the High Court erroneously dismissed the Writ Appeal against

the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of the High

9

Court as “premature”. It is submitted that the Writ Appeal was

not premature as the appellants’ plea to shift the date for

considering the market value of land as on the date of the

Award and not as on the date of the Preliminary Notification

was rejected by the learned Single Judge and thus the issue

stood decided against the appellants. It is further submitted

that more than 21 years have passed since the Preliminary

Notification was passed acquiring the appellants lands and

they have not received any compensation yet for the same.

Relying on the judgments of this Court in Ram Chand and

Others v. Union of India and Others

1 and Tukaram Kana

Joshi and Others Through Power -of-Attorney Holder v.

Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and

Others

2, it is submitted that in exceptional cases, the

authorities must be directed to determine compensation on

the basis of market value of the land as on the date of the

Award by notionally shifting the date of the Preliminary

Notification. It is lastly submitted that the compensation be

determined as per the provisions contained in the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

1

(1994) 1 SCC 44 : 1993 INSC 315

2

(2013) 1 SCC 353 : 2012 INSC 503

10

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter, “2013

LA Act”) inasmuch as in terms of Section 30 of the KIAD Act,

the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (hereinafter,

“1894 LA Act”) have been made applicable mutatis mutandis

for the purposes of determination and award of compensation.

Reliance in this regard was placed by the learned counsel for

the appellants on the judgment of this Court in Maharashtra

State Road Transport Corporation v. State of

Maharashtra and Others

3.

6. Per contra, Shri Nadkarni for Respondents No. 6 and 7

submitted that between 2009 and 2012, the Project

Proponents wrote several letters to Respondent No. 2 (KIADB)

requesting for awards to be passed. It is further submitted that

as no awards were passed by the SLAOs, the Project

Proponents were constrained to file Writ Petition before the

High Court seeking direction to pass awards which was

allowed in 2013, thereafter, on non-compliance the Project

Proponents initiated contempt proceedings in 2015 as no

awards were still passed. It was, therefore, submitted that if

this Court is inclined to grant any relief in the form of

3

(2003) 4 SCC 200 : 2003 INSC 137

11

additional compensation or direct shifting of date as sought

for, it may be seen that there was no error or delay on part of

the Project Proponents, who have deposited compensation

with Respondent No.2 (KIADB) as per the agreement and

therefore any additional liability should fall on the State

Government and/or the KIADB. Relying on the judgment of

this Court in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute

Factory and Others

4, it is submitted that shifting of date can

only take place in very rare circumstances. It is further

submitted that there is no question of awarding compensation

under the 2013 LA Act and a completely new case has been

sought to be made out before this Court, which was not

contended before the learned Single Judge or Division Bench

of the High Court. It is lastly submitted that the appellants

never sought directions to the State Government/SLAO to

pass awards and that steps in that regard were taken only in

the year 2021 which was pursuant to the various proceedings

initiated by the Project Proponents.

7. Shri Singhvi for Respondent No. 1 submitted that the

appellants’ claims are premature and speculative, as they have

4

(2005) 13 SCC 477 : 2005 INSC 585

12

yet to exhaust remedies available under the ongoing award

proceedings. It is further submitted that the Division Bench of

the High Court in the impugned judgment and order, expressly

held that the issue of shifting the date of acquisition

notification can only be examined after the award has been

passed by the SLAO. It was, therefore, submitted that present

appeal is untenable at this stage.

8. Shri Purushottam Sharma Tripathi for Respondent Nos.

2 to 5 submitted that the SLAO passed the Award dated 22

nd

April 2019, on the basis of specific opinion tendered by the

learned Advocate General with regard to shifting of the date. It

is submitted that the learned Single Judge of the High Court,

upon consideration of the material placed before it, has

quashed the Award and directed the SLAO to pass fresh

awards within a stipulated timeframe. It is further submitted

that pursuant to the directions by the learned Single Judge of

the High Court, the SLAO has now passed fresh awards for the

acquired lands and if the appellants are aggrieved by the

compensation awarded, they may take such steps as are

permissible in law. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court

should not interfere with the concurrent findings of the

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learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High

Court.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS :

9. To consider the case of the appellants, it would be

appropriate to refer to the prayer clause of their Writ Petition

before the High Court. The appellants herein had filed Writ

Petition being W.P. No. 1627 of 2021 (LA-KIADB) with the

following prayers:

“WHEREFORE, the Petitioners most respectfully

prays that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to:

a. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ

of the same nature to quash and setting

aside the Impugned Award dated

22.04.2019 passed by the Respondent No.

4 bearing No. LAQ, SR/39 (26B, 10, 13,

14)/1998-99, 39 (30, 31, 37, 38,

40)/2002-03 SLAO -1, produced at

ANNEXURE – A;

b. Consequent to prayer (a) issue a writ of

mandamus or any other writ of the same

nature to direct the Respondents to issue

notice to Petitioners for determining

compensation and pass the Award as per

market value of land closest to date of

passing the Award;

c. Grant such other reliefs as this Hon’ble

Court deems fit in the above

circumstances of the case, in the interests

of justice and equity.”

14

10. It is relevant to note that prior to the appellants herein

Respondents No. 6 and 7 (Project Proponents) had also filed

Writ Petitions before the High Court. From a perusal of the

judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 18

th

April 2022, it is clear that the Project Proponents by way of

Writ Petitions being W.P. No. 26085 of 2019 and W.P. No.

31407 of 2019 had also challenged the awards. Therefore, in

the three writ petitions before the learned Single Judge, a

common question with regard to the legality, validity and

correctness of the Award dated 22

nd April 2019 was raised.

11. Before adverting to the findings of the learned Single

Judge on the legality of the Award dated 22

nd April 2019, it

would be appropriate to reproduce certain extracts from the

Award, as under:

“14. Valuation of land:

In the notification dated: 29/01/2003 issued under

Section 28(1) of the Survey number lands, based on

the above sales figures, the value is Rs. 2,90,532/-

per acre and the guidance value is Rs. 6.00 lakhs.

Therefore, if the guidance value is Rs. 6.00 lakhs

including all other allowances, this rate will be found

to be real and fair. Accordingly, it was decided and

declared the award on 05/07/2018 and submitted

for approval.

Chief Executive Officer and Executive Member

wrote a letter vide No. KIADB/CEO&EM/16/2019 -

20 dated 16/04/2019. Along with the said letter,

15

Government’s letter and Advocate General’s opinion

are attached, it is suggested to prepare the revised

award as per the opinion given by the Advocate

General and submit it for approval. In this regard,

this office letter No.

KIADB/BMICP/LAQ(1)/G.I/01/2019 -20 dated

22/04/2019 has been written to the Special Deputy

Commissioner, KIADB (BMICP) seeking clarification

on other issues that there is no scope for revising the

current decision. On 22/04/2019 as per the Chief

Executive Officer and Executive Member’s letter No.

KIADB/BMICP/LAQ/CR/31/2013 -14 dated

22/04/2019, it is said that it has been suggested to

submit again as per the Advocate General’s opinion

and based on the previous judgments of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in several cases regarding framing of

compensatory rate/award in land acquisition cases

that even for the lands acquired for BMICP scheme,

it has been again instructed to prepare a revised

decision immediately as per the rules and submit it

for the approval of the government. For revising the

award and not considering the preliminary

notification, the Advocate General in his legal

opinion dated 16/04/2019 has given the

following legal opinion:

“KIADB and the State do not have

any choice but to pass the award which

may be passed taking into account and

consideration the market value of the

property as on date.”

As per the opinion given by the present

Advocate General, the award has to be made at

current market rate equal to the current market rate.

In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several

cases has issued preliminary notification, final

notification and handed over the assets to the Claims

Department, but in the case where no award has

been made for ten years, it is appropriate to pay real

and fair land compensation to the land owners to

avoid injustice, in such cases, the date of preliminary

notification should be changed to the date of handing

16

over the assets to the Claims Department, which was

prevailing on that date. The order is to create a

judgment considering the market rate. The following

civil appeal cases of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have

been perused to form a award in this regard.

1. CA No. 7015-7018/2005 (Competent

Authority V/s Barangore Jute Factory

and Others)

2. SLP (Civil) No. 1787473/2004 (State of

M.P. V/s Onkar Prasad Patel)

3. CA No. 965/1979 with CA No.

3325/1984, 2185 -87/1980,

2381/1980, SLP No. 12352 -53/1984,

10572-74/1984 and others (Gauri

Shankar Gaur and others V/s State of

U.P. and others)

4. CA No. 2739/2000 with Nos.

2737/2000, 2738/2000, 2736/2000

Contempt Petition (C) No. 62/1999 (Haji

Saeed Khan and others V/s State of

U.P. and others).

In the above cases the Hon’ble Supreme Court

has ordered to change the preliminary notification to

the date of handing over of the asset or to an

appropriate date conducive to giving equitable relief

in cases where there is severe delay in adjudication.

Based on the above judgments of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, in the present case, the possession

of the land was handed over on 05/04/2004,

22/11/2005 and 25/11/2005, if the award is framed

considering the guideline rates of 2011 (sic), it is not

possible to give real and fair compensation to the

land owner.

Therefore, with a view to providing real and

fair land compensation to the landowners, it was

decided to postpone the date of preliminary

notification to the year 2011 and decided to

consider the guideline rates prevailing in the said

year and formulate an award as per the legal

17

opinion given by the Advocate General.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. It can thus be seen that the learned Advocate General

rendered an opinion on 16

th April 2019, wherein it was stated

that while passing the awards, the market value as on date

has to be taken on account of enormous delay in passing the

awards. KIADB forwarded the opinion to the Special Deputy

Commissioner (BMICP) and SLAO directing them to pass the

awards as per the opinion. On 22

nd April 2019, the SLAO wrote

letters to the Special Deputy Commissioner (BMICP) raising

certain queries with regard to passing of fresh awards and the

compensation to be calculated in view of awards already

passed by them and sent for approval on 3

rd November 2018.

In response to the said letters, the CEO of KIADB once again

addressed a letter dated 22

nd April 2019, to the Special Deputy

Commissioner (BMICP) and the SLAO instructing them to pass

the awards as directed in the opinion of the learned Advocate

General.

13. It can further be seen that the opinion of the learned

Advocate General as well as the judgments of this Court

referred to in the Award were the only two factors that were

18

taken into account for the purpose of passing the Award dated

22

nd April 2019, by Respondent No. 4 (SLAO) by

shifting/postponing the date of the Preliminary Notification to

the year 2011 and by considering the guideline rates prevailing

in the said year.

14. Aggrieved by the suo-motu shifting/postponing of the

date of the Preliminary Notification, the Project Proponents,

who as a result were called upon to pay higher compensation,

had filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. The appellants

herein filed an impleadment application in the Writ Petition

filed by the Project Proponents so also a substantive Writ

Petition with prayers referred to hereinbefore. Their grievance

was two-fold to quash the Award and to direct passing of an

Award as per market value of land closest to date of passing

the Award.

15. For the common prayer qua quashing of the Award dated

22

nd April 2019, it will be profitable to refer to the following

paragraphs of the judgment and order dated 18

th April 2022,

passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court:

“17.8 A perusal of the impugned awards will indicate

that the opinion of the learned Advocate General as

well as the judgments of the Apex Court referred to

19

in the awards were the only two factors that were

taken into account for the purpose of passing the

awards by the SLAOs. As stated supra, in so far as

the opinion of the learned Advocate General is

concerned, the same with regard to shifting of the

date to reckon the market value of the land from

the date of the preliminary notification to a later

date is concerned, the said opinion was beyo nd

the scope and ambit of the query put forth to him

and consequently, the said opinion could not

have been made the basis by the SLAOs to pass

the impugned awards.

X—X —X —X —X —X —X

17.10 The second factor/circumstance that has been

taken into account by the SLAOs to shift the date to

reckon the market value of the lands from the date of

the preliminary notification to a later/subsequent

dates is by placing reliance upon the following

decisions of the Apex Court viz.,

a. Competent Authority Vs. Barangor Jute

Factory C/w State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.

Onkar Prasad Patel – (2005) 13 SCC 47

b. Gaurishankar Gaur Vs. State of Uttar

Pradesh – (1994) 1 SCC 92; and

c. Haji Saeed Khan Vs. State of Uttar

Pradesh – (2001) 9 SCC 513.

17.11 In this context, it is relevant to state that as

can be seen from the aforesaid decisions as well as

various decisions of the Apex Court as well as this

Court referred to supra by both sides, that the

market value of the acquired lands has to be

taken as on the date of the preliminary

notification as contemplated under Section 11 of

the L.A. Act, 1894; it has been held that under

exceptional circumstances, where either the Apex

Court or High Courts came to the conclusion that

20

the acquisition proceedings themselves were

liable to be quashed on account of certain

illegalities or infirmities in the acquisition

process/procedure, it was permissible only for

the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under

Article 32/142 or the High Courts under Article

226 of the Constitution of India to shift the date

to a later/subsequent date; however, this power

to shift the date is available only to either the

Apex Court or the High Courts and not

definitely/certainly to the SLAOs or the State

Government; in other words, a perusal of the

decisions referred to supra, will indicate that in

cases, where the Apex Court as well as this Court

deemed it necessary to shift the date in order to

do complete and substantial justice, inherent

powers of the Courts were invoked and the dates

were shifted in order to ensure no hardship, loss

or prejudice would be caused to the land losers.

17.12 A perusal of the decisions relied upon by the

SLAOs in the impugned awards referred to supra, will

clearly indicate that in the said cases, the Apex Court

has invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction and powers

under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and in

the peculiar/special facts and circumstances

obtaining in the said cases, the Apex Court had

shifted the date to reckon the market value. The

SLAOs clearly fell in error in placing reliance upon

the said decisions of the Apex Court for the

purpose of shifting the date from the date of the

preliminary notification without appreciating

that the said shifting of the date by the SLAOs or

the State Government is not legally permissible

in law either under the provisions of the L.A. Act,

1894 or the KIAD Act or the Rules or by any

judicial precedent. It is also relevant to state that

even as per the aforesaid judgments, shifting of the

date from the date of the preliminary notification to

any later/subsequent date has been done only up to

the date of taking possession from the land losers. In

21

the instant case, the impugned awards disclose that

the SLAOs have shifted the date to a date

subsequent/later to the date of taking possession.

Under these circumstances, it is clear that the

impugned awards purporting to shift the date suffers

from several legal and factual infirmities and

illegalities which vitiate the impugned awards, which

deserve to be quashed on this ground also.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. It can thus be seen that the learned Single Judge of the

High Court, upon appreciation of the material placed on

record, was of the view that insofar as the opinion of the

learned Advocate General with regard to shifting of the date of

the preliminary notification to a later date is concerned, the

said opinion was beyond the scope and ambit of the query put

forth to him and consequently, the said opinion could not have

been made the basis by the SLAO to pass the Award. It is

further to be seen that the learned Single Judge of the High

Court after considering the provisions of 1894 LA Act, KIAD

Act and various decisions of this Court, observed that the

market value of the acquired land has to be taken as on the

date of the preliminary notification as contemplated under

Section 11 of the 1894 LA Act. Further, the learned Single

Judge of the High Court observed that only in exceptional

circumstances, where either this Court or the High Court

22

comes to the conclusion that the acquisition proceedings

themselves were liable to be quashed on account of certain

illegalities or infirmities in the acquisition process/procedure,

it was permissible only for this Court in exercise of its powers

under Article 32/142 or the High Courts under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India to shift the date to a

later/subsequent date. It was further observed that this power

to shift the date is available only to either this Court or the

High Courts and not definitely/certainly to the SLAOs or the

State Government.

17. We are in agreement with the findings of the learned

Single Judge of the High Court, inasmuch as the SLAO cannot

shift/postpone the date of preliminary notification. In case,

upon appreciation of the material placed on record if this

Court or the High Court, in exceptional circumstances, came

to the conclusion that the acquisition proceedings themselves

were liable to be quashed only then by exercising inherent

powers this Court under Article 32/142 or the High Courts

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India respectively can

shift/postpone the date of preliminary notification to a later

date. In our considered opinion, therefore, the learned Single

23

Judge of the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that

the Award dated 22

nd April 2019 be quashed and set aside and

ordered accordingly.

18. Having decided thus, in the Writ Petitions filed by the

Project Proponents, the learned Single Judge of the High Court

came to the conclusion that the Writ Petition filed by the

appellants herein before the High Court does not survive for

consideration and the same was, accordingly, disposed of.

19. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants herein filed an intra-

court appeal being Writ Appeal No. 678 of 2022 (LA-KIADB)

before the Division Bench of the High Court.

20. The Division Bench of the High Court vide impugned

judgment and order dated 22

nd November 2022 upon

consideration of the material placed before it, in paragraph 9,

observed thus:

“9. Further, the learned Single Judge held that the

SLAO has to determine the compensation as on the

date of issuing the preliminary notification as

contemplated under Section 11 of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894, and not to shift the date to a

later/subsequent date. The learned Single Judge has

set aside the award passed by the SLAO and directed

the SLAO to reconsider and pass award. The

grievance of the petitioner regarding shifting the

date at any later or subsequent date could be

considered only if award is passed by the SLAO.

24

The SLAO is yet to pass an award. The grievance

raised by the petitioner in this writ appeal is

premature. If the petitioner is dissatisfied with

the award to be passed by the SLAO, liberty is

reserved to the petitioner to raise the grounds

urged in this a ppeal in the appropriate

proceedings before the appropriate forum. The

question of considering the shifting of date from the

date of preliminary notification to any other date

would arise only when the award is passed. The

cause of action arose for the petitioner to raise the

said issue only after the award is passed. The shifting

of the date to a later/subsequent date is available

only to the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court, but

not to the SLAO or State Government…”

(emphasis supplied)

21. It can thus be seen that the Division Bench of the High

Court dismissed the Writ Appeal on the ground that the

learned Single Judge has set aside the award passed by the

SLAO and directed the SLAO to reconsider and pass award

and so the grievance regarding shifting the date at any later or

subsequent date could be considered only if an award is

passed by the SLAO. The Division Bench of the High Court

was, therefore, of the opinion that the grievance sought to be

raised in the writ appeal is premature and that the question of

considering the shifting of date of preliminary notification to

any other date would arise only when the award is passed.

25

22. In the present appeal, it was sought to be contended by

the learned counsel for the appellants that the Writ Appeal was

not pre-mature inasmuch as the prayer to shift the date for

considering the market value of the land as on the date of the

award and not as on the date of the preliminary notification

was rejected by the learned Single Judge of the High Court and

thus the issue stood decided against the appellants, as a

consequence of which the cause of action remained.

23. We are of the opinion that the contention of the learned

counsel for the appellants is liable to be accepted. We say so

because upon adjudication of the Writ Petitions filed by the

Project Proponents, the learned Single Judge of the High Court

came to the conclusion that the Award dated 22

nd April 2019,

is liable to be quashed and set aside and ordered accordingly.

However, upon consideration of the extant position of law, the

learned Single Judge further directed that the SLAO has to

determine the compensation as on the date of issuance of the

preliminary notification and not to shift the date to a

later/subsequent date. Therefore, the learned Single Judge of

the High Court while exercising inherent powers under Article

226 of the Constitution quashed and set aside the Award

26

dated 22

nd April 2019, but decided against granting relief to

the appellants by shifting/postponing the date of the

preliminary notification to a later/subsequent date. In our

opinion, therefore, the cause of action with regard to prayer

clause (b) of the Writ Petition filed by the appellants herein still

survives for consideration. The Division Bench of the High

Court should have, especially taking into consideration the

facts and circumstances of the present case , at least

considered the case of the appellants herein with regard to

said prayer. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the

impugned judgment and order dated 22

nd November 2022,

passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is liable to be

quashed and set aside on this short ground alone. We order

accordingly.

24. Having set aside the impugned judgment and order

passed by the Division Bench of the High Court on the

aforesaid ground, we shall now proceed to examine if the relief

sought by the appellants herein in prayer clause (b) of the Writ

Petition referred to hereinbefore is liable to be granted or not.

25. For the purpose of consideration of the relief sought by

the appellants herein, it will be appropriate to refer to a few

27

judgements of this Court on which reliance has been placed

by the learned counsel for the parties.

26. In the case of Ram Chand (supra), proceedings were

instituted for quashing the land acquisition proceedings,

which had been initiated between the years 1959 and 1965 by

issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the 1894 LA Act

but in which no awards were made upto the years 1979 -80,

although the declarations under Section 6 of the 1894 LA Act

had been made in the years 1966 and 1969. The question

sought to be answered by this Court in the aforesaid case was

as to if a person is paid compensation in the year 1980/81 at

the market rate prevailing twenty years back, will that be in

compliance of the constitutional and statutory mandate. In

this regard, this Court observed thus:

“14. … Ignoring the escalation of the market

value of the lands, especially near the urban

agglomeration or metropolitan cities, will amount

to ignoring an earthquake and courts can

certainly take judicial notice of the said fact. The

interest and the solatium, which have to be paid

under the provisions of the Act, are linked with the

market value of the land with reference to the date of

the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of

the Act. If a decision had been taken as early as in

the year 1966, by issuance of declarations under

Section 6, that the lands belonging to the

different cultivators, who held those lands within

28

the ceiling limit for cultivation, were needed for

public purpose, respondents should have taken

steps for completion of the acquisition

proceedings and payment of compensation at an

early date. In the present cases, unless a

justification is furnished on behalf of the

respondents, can it be said that the statutory power

of making an award under Section 11 has been

exercised within a reasonable time from the date of

the declaration under Section 6? Due to escalation

in prices of land, more so in this area, during the

preceding two decades, in reality, the market

rate, on the date of the notification under Section

4(1) is a mere fraction, of the rate prevailing at

the time of its determination in the Award.”

(emphasis supplied)

27. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case

has observed that the respondents therein should have taken

steps for completion of the acquisition proceedings and

payment of compensation at an early date. It was further

observed that due to escalation in prices of land, more so in

the area in question, during the preceding two decades, in

reality, the market rate, on the date of the notification under

Section 4(1) of the 1894 LA Act is a mere fraction of the rate

prevailing at the time of its determination in the Award. This

Court, however, in the aforesaid case was also dealing with a

challenge to the acquisition proceedings itself. In this regard,

this Court observed thus:

29

“16. On behalf of the respondents, it was pointed out

that the petitioners have approached this Court only

after making of the awards, or when awards were to

be made, having waited for more than fourteen years,

without invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court

under Article 226 or of this Court under Article 32.

It is true that this Court has taken note of delay

on the part of the petitioners concerned in

invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court or of

this Court for quashing the land acquisition

proceedings on the ground that the proceedings

for acquisition of the lands in question have

remained pending for more than a decade, in the

cases of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1975)

4 SCC 285] and Ramjas Foundation v. Union of

India [1993 Supp (2) SCC 20 : AIR 1993 SC 852].

According to us, the question of delay in invoking the

writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226

or of this Court under Article 32, has to be considered

along with the inaction on the part of the authorities,

who had to perform their statutory duties. Can the

statutory authority take a plea that although it has

not performed its duty within a reasonable time, but

it is of no consequence because the person, who has

been wronged or deprived of his right, has also not

invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this

Court for a suitable writ or direction to grant the relief

considered appropriate in the circumstances? The

authorities are enjoined by the statute concerned to

perform their duties within a reasonable time, and as

such they are answerable to the Court why such

duties have not been performed by them, which has

caused injury to claimants. By not questioning, the

validity of the acquisition proceedings for a long

time since the declarations were made under

Section 6, the relief of quashing the acquisition

proceedings has become inappropriate, because

in the meantime, the lands notified have been

developed and put to public use. The lands are

being utilised to provide shelter to thousands and

to implement the scheme of a planned city, which

is a must in the present set-up. The outweighing

30

public interest has to be given due weight. That

is why this Court has been resisting attempts on

the part of the landholders, seeking quashing of

the acquisition proceedings on ground of delay in

completion of such proceedings. But, can the

respondents be not directed to compensate the

petitioners, who were small cultivators holding lands

within the ceiling limit in and around Delhi, for the

injury caused to them, not by the provisions of the

Act, but because of the non-exercise of the power by

the authorities under the Act within a reasonable

time?”

(emphasis supplied)

28. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case

observed that by not questioning the validity of the acquisition

proceedings for a long time since the declarations were made

under Section 6 of the 1894 LA Act, the relief of quashing the

acquisition proceedings has become inappropriate, because in

the meantime, the lands notified have been developed and put

to public use. It was further observed that the lands are being

utilized to provide shelter to thousands and to implement the

scheme of a planned city, which is a must in the present set-

up and that the outweighing public interest has to be given

due weight.

29. Ultimately, this Court in paragraph 27 of the aforesaid

case, taking into consideration the interest of the public,

instead of quashing the proceedings for acquisition, directed

31

that the petitioners therein shall be paid an additional amount

of compensation to be calculated at the rate of 12% per

annum, after expiry of two years from August 23, 1974, till the

date of the making of the awards by the Collector, to be

calculated with reference to the market value of the lands in

question on the date of the notifications under sub-section (1)

of Section 4 of the 1894 LA Act.

30. In the case of Haji Saeed Khan and Others v. State of

U.P. and Others

5, land was acquired for the purposes of

construction of a housing colony under the “Planned

Development Scheme” in Village Dhimri Pargana, District

Moradabad by the Moradabad Development Authority. The

challenge to the land acquisition proceedings before the High

Court in the aforesaid case was dismissed. Aggrieved thereby,

this Court was called upon to adjudicate the lis. This Court,

having regard to the peculiar facts of the aforesaid case,

instead of deciding the matter on merits, suggested to the

counsel on both sides that it would be reasonable in the

interests of justice if they agreed that the market value of the

property could be fixed by treating 15

th June, 1998, i.e., the

5

(2001) 9 SCC 513

32

date of taking possession as the date of notification under

Section 4(1) of the 1894 LA Act instead of the actual date of

notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 LA Act i.e., 30

th

March, 1995. When the suggestion came from the Bench, the

counsel appearing on both sides accepted the suggestion from

the Court. Accordingly, this Court upheld the judgment and

order of the High Court, thereby the land acquisition

proceedings were upheld with modification to the limited

extent qua the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the

1894 LA Act shifted to the date of taking possession.

31. In the case of Barangore Jute Factory (supra), the

subject matter of the appeals before this Court was the

compulsory acquisition of certain lands by the Central

Government by a notification dated 11

th June 1998 under

Section 3-A of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter,

“NH Act”). The landowners challenged the acquisition of their

land on various grounds before the Calcutta High Court. The

Division Bench of the High Court by a judgment and order

dated 7

th April 2004, disposed of the writ-petition holding the

impugned notification regarding compulsory acquisition of

land to be bad in law, however, keeping in view the fact that

33

possession of the acquired land had already been taken by the

authorities, the High Court felt that no useful purpose would

be served by quashing the notification. The High Court also

took note of the power of the acquiring authority to issue a

fresh notification for acquisition of the land which could only

lead to possible increase in the amount of compensation

payable to the owners. Keeping these aspects in view, it

ordered that an additional amount of compensation

(calculated at 30% over and above the above the compensation

already determined) be awarded to the landowners. Aggrieved

by the judgment and order of the Calcutta High Court, three

appeals by way of special leave were filed before this Court.

The first by the competent authority qua validity of acquisition

notification, second by the National Highways Authority of

India (hereinafter, “NHAI”) qua award of additional

compensation to the landowners and third by the landowners

qua the acquisition notification not being quashed in spite of

having been declared as illegal.

32. The acquisition of land in the aforesaid case was under

the NH Act. The power to acquire land is contained in Section

3-A of the NH Act. According to sub-section (1) of Section 3-A

34

of the NH Act, where the Central Government is satisfied that

for a public purpose any land is required for building,

maintenance, management or operation of a national highway

or part thereof, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette,

declare its intention to acquire such land. Sub-section (2) of

Section 3-A of the NH Act provides that every notification

under sub-section (1) thereof shall give a brief description of

land. Under sub-section (3) of Section 3-A of the NH Act, the

competent authority is required to cause the substance of the

notification to be published in two local newspapers, one of

which will be in a vernacular language. The acquisition

notification in the aforesaid case was challenged on the ground

that it does not give a brief description of the land sought to

be compulsorily acquired. This Court, upon consideration of

the acquisition notification, observed thus:

“5. …So far as the question whether the impugned

notification meets the requirement of Section 3-A(1)

of the Act regarding giving brief description of land is

concerned, we have already shown that even though

plot numbers of lands in respect of each mouza are

given, different pieces of land are acquired either as

whole or in part. Wherever the acquisition is of a

portion of a bigger piece of land, there is no

description as to which portion was being acquired.

Unless it is known as to which portion was to be

acquired, the petitioners would be unable to

understand the impact of acquisition or to raise any

35

objection about user of the acquired land for the

purposes specified under the Act or to make a claim

for compensation. It is settled law that where a

statute requires a particular act to be done in a

particular manner, the act has to be done in that

manner alone. Every word of the statute has to be

given its due meaning. In our view, the impugned

notification fails to meet the statutory mandate. It is

vague. The least that is required in such cases is that

the acquisition notification should let the person

whose land is sought to be acquired know what he is

going to lose. The impugned notification in this case

is, therefore, not in accordance with the law.”

33. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case

observed that it is settled law that where a statute requires a

particular act to be done in a particular manner, the act has to

be done in that manner alone. It can further be seen that this

Court held that the acquisition notification therein failed to

meet the statutory mandate and that it was vague. It was

further held that the least that was required was that the

acquisition notification therein should have let the person

whose land was sought to be acquired know what he was going

to lose. It was, therefore, held that the acquisition notification

was not in accordance with law.

34. Having held that the notification regarding acquisition of

land was invalid because it failed to meet the statutory

requirements and also having found that taking possession of

36

the land of the landowners in the aforesaid case in pursuance

to the acquisition notification was not in accordance with law,

the question that arose for the consideration of this Court was

as to what relief can be granted to the landowners. In that

regard, this Court observed thus:

“14. … The High Court rightly observed that the

acquisition of land in the present case was for a

project of great national importance i.e. the

construction of a national highway. The construction

of a national highway on the acquired land has

already been completed as informed to us during the

course of hearing. No useful purpose will be served

by quashing the impugned notification at this stage.

We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that the

acquiring authority can always issue a fresh

notification for acquisition of the land in the event of

the impugned notification being quashed. The

consequence of this will only be that keeping in view

the rising trend in prices of land, the amount of

compensation payable to the landowners may be

more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about

the quantum of compensation payable to the

landowners. Quashing of the notification at this stage

will give rise to several difficulties and practical

problems. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as

against the problems involved in quashing the

impugned notification, we are of the view that a

better course will be to compensate the landowners,

that is, the writ petitioners appropriately for what

they have been deprived of. Interests of justice

persuade us to adopt this course of action.”

37

35. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case

observed that the Calcutta High Court rightly observed that

the acquisition of land was for a project of great national

importance i.e., the construction of a national highway. This

Court further observed that the construction of a national

highway on the acquired land had already been completed. It

was further observed that no useful purpose would be served

by quashing the acquisition notification at this stage.

Pertinently, this Court observed that the acquiring authority

could always issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the

land in the event the acquisition notification therein was

quashed and that the consequence of that would only be that

the amount of compensation payable to the landowners may

be more. Therefore, this Court observed that the ultimate

question would be about the quantum of compensation

payable to the landowners. Having observed so, this Court

held that the better course would be to compensate the

landowners appropriately for what they have been deprived of

and that the interests of justice persuade this Court to adopt

that course of action. The relief, therefore, granted by this

38

Court in the aforesaid case was molded in the form of

paragraph 15, which reads as under:

“15. Normally, compensation is determined as

per the market price of land on the date of

issuance of the notification regarding acquisition

of land. There are precedents by way of judgments

of this Court where in similar situations instead

of quashing the impugned notification, this Court

shifted the date of the notification so that the

landowners are adequately compensated.

Reference may be made to:

(a) Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar

Johri [(1992) 1 SCC 328]

(b) Gauri Shankar Gaur v. State of

U.P. [(1994) 1 SCC 92]

(c) Haji Saeed Khan v. State of U.P. [(2001)

9 SCC 513]

In that direction the next step is what should be

the crucial date in the facts of the present case

for determining the quantum of compensation.

We feel that the relevant date in the present case

ought to be the date when possession of the land

was taken by the respondents from the writ

petitioners. This date admittedly is 19-2-2003.

We, therefore, direct that compensation payable

to the writ petitioners be determined as on 19-2-

2003, the date on which they were deprived of

possession of their lands. We do not quash the

impugned notification in order not to disturb

what has already taken place by way of use of the

acquired land for construction of the national

highway. We direct that the compensation for the

acquired land be determined as on 19 -2-2003

expeditiously and within ten weeks from today and

the amount of compensation so determined, be paid

to the writ petitioners after adjusting the amount

already paid by way of compensation within eight

weeks thereafter. The claim of interest on the

39

amount of compensation so determined is to be

decided in accordance with law by the appropriate

authority. We express no opinion about other

statutory rights, if any, available to the parties in

this behalf and the parties will be free to exercise

the same, if available. The compensation as

determined by us under this order along with

other benefits, which the respondents give to

parties whose lands are acquired under the Act,

should be given to the writ petitioners along with

what has been directed by us in this judgment.”

(emphasis supplied)

36. It can thus be seen that this Court in the aforesaid case

observed that normally, compensation is determined as per

the market price of land on the date of issuance of the

notification regarding acquisition of land but there are

judgments of this Court where in similar situations instead of

quashing the impugned notification, this Court shifted the date

of the notification so that the landowners are adequately

compensated. This Court directed that compensation payable

to the landowners be determined as on t he date when

possession of land was taken by the respondents therein i.e.,

19

th February 2003.

37. In the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra), the land

situated in Village Shirwame, Taluka and District Thane,

stood notified under Section 4 of the 1894 LA Act on 6

th June

1964 for establishment of Ulhas Khore Project i.e., a project

40

for industrial development. However, no subsequent

proceedings were taken up thereafter, and the acquisition

proceedings lapsed. The respondent -authorities therein

realised, in 1981, that grave injustice had been done to the

appellants therein and so a fresh notification under Section 4

of the 1894 LA Act was issued on 14

th May 1981. However, no

further proceedings were initiated and therefore, such

proceedings also died a natural death. In the aforesaid case,

when the appellants therein reached this Court, this Court in

unequivocal terms observed that even after the right to

property ceased to be a fundamental right, taking possession

of or acquiring the property of a citizen most certainly

tantamounts to deprivation and such deprivation can take

place only in accordance with “law”, as the said word has

specifically been used in Article 300-A of the Constitution. In

paragraph 22 of the aforesaid case, this Court observed that

the concerned-State therein came forward with a welcome

suggestion stating that in order to redress the grievances of

the appellants therein, the respondent authorities would

notify the land in dispute under Section 4 of the 1894 LA Act

and that the market value of the land in dispute would be

41

assessed as it prevails on the date on which Section 4

notification is again published in the Official Gazette.

38. In the aforesaid case of Tukaram Kana Joshi (supra),

this Court observed that the right to property is now considered

to be not only a constitutional or a statutory right but also a

“human right”. It was further observed that human rights are

considered in the realm of individual rights, such as right to

health, right to livelihood, right to shelter and employment,

etc. This Court further observed that now, however, human

rights are gaining an even greater multifaceted dimension and

that the right to property is considered very much to be a part

of such new dimension.

39. It would be appropriate to refer to two recent

pronouncements of this Court on the right to property.

40. This Court, in the case of Vidya Devi v. State of

Himachal Pradesh and Others

6, while surveying the earlier

judgments on the issue, has observed thus:

“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her

property in 1967, when the right to property was a

fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III

of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to

private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose,

6

(2020) 2 SCC 569 : 2020 INSC 23

42

(1953) 2 SCC 688 : AIR 1954 SC 92] , which could

not be deprived without due process of law and upon

just and fair compensation.

12.2. The right to property ceased to be a

fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth

Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be

a human right [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013)

1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] in a welfare

State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A

of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no

person shall be deprived of his property save by

authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a

citizen of his property except in accordance with the

procedure established by law. The obligation to pay

compensation, though not expressly included in

Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. [K.T.

Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC

1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 414]

12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private

property, without following due process of law, would

be violative of a human right, as also the

constitutional right under Article 300-A of the

Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment

in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur

Chenai [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius

Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627] , wherein this

Court held that: (SCC p. 634, para 6)

“6. … Having regard to the provisions

contained in Article 300 -A of the

Constitution, the State in exercise of its

power of “eminent domain” may interfere

with the right of property of a person by

acquiring the same but the same must be

for a public purpose and reasonable

compensation therefor must be paid.”

(emphasis supplied)

12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy [N.

Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy , (2008) 15

SCC 517] , this Court held that: (SCC p. 526, para

21)

43

“21. If the right of property is a human right

as also a constitutional right, the same

cannot be taken away except in accordance

with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution

protects such right. The provisions of the

Act seeking to divest such right, keeping

in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of

the Constitution of India, must be strictly

construed.”

(emphasis supplied)

12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of

U.P. [Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P.,

(2011) 9 SCC 354 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 673] , this

Court recognised the right to property as a basic

human right in the following words: (SCC p. 379,

para 30)

“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence

and by different political thinkers that some

amount of property right is an

indispensable safeguard against tyranny

and economic oppression of the

Government. Jefferson was of the view that

liberty cannot long subsist without the

support of property. “Property must be

secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was

the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the

view that property itself is the seed-bed

which must be conserved if other

constitutional values are to flourish, is the

consensus among political thinkers and

jurists.”

(emphasis supplied)

12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of

Gujarat [Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of

Gujarat, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596] , this Court held as

follows: (SCC p. 627, para 48)

“48. … In other words, Article 300-A only

limits the powers of the State that no

person shall be deprived of his property

save by authority of law. There has to be

44

no deprivation without any sanction of law.

Deprivation by any other mode is not

acquisition or taking possession under

Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no

law, there is no deprivation.”

(emphasis supplied)

12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been

forcibly dispossessed of her property without any

legal sanction, and without following due process of

law, and depriving her payment of just

compensation, being a fundamental right on the date

of forcible dispossession in 1967.

12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant

or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the

acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete

lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily

divesting the appellant of her property by the State.

12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of

law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of

their property without the sanction of law. Reliance

is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram

Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC,

(2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein

it was held that the State must comply with the

procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other

permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare

State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to

itself a status beyond what is provided by the

Constitution.

12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh

Kumar [State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011)

10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the

right to property is now considered to be not only a

constitutional or statutory right, but also a human

right. Human rights have been considered in the

realm of individual rights such as right to shelter,

livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights

have gained a multi-faceted dimension.

………………

45

12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so

compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its

jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not

defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975)

1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]”

41. In the case of Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram and

Others

7, this Court observed thus:

“D. Role of the State under Article 300-A of the

Constitution

43. The Right to Property in our country is a net of

intersecting rights which has been explained by this

Court in Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal

Kumar Shah, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 968. A division

bench of this Court identified seven non-exhaustive

sub-rights that accrue to a landowner when the State

intends to acquire his/her property. The relevant

observations of this Court under the said judgment

are reproduced below:

“…27.

… Seven such sub-rights can be identified,

albeit non-exhaustive. These are : i) duty of

the State to inform the person that it

intends to acquire his property - the right to

notice, ii) the duty of the State to hear

objections to the acquisition - the right to be

heard, iii) the duty of the State to inform the

person of its decision to acquire - the right

to a reasoned decision, iv) the duty of the

State to demonstrate that the acquisition is

for public purpose - the duty to acquire only

for public purpose, v) the duty of the

State to restitute and rehabilitate - the

right of restitution or fair

compensation, vi) the duty of the State

to conduct the process of acquisition

7

2024 SCC OnLine 2598 : 2024 INSC 709

46

efficiently and within prescribed

timelines of the proceedings - the right

to an efficient and expeditious process,

and vii) final conclusion of the proceedings

leading to vesting - the right of

conclusion…”

[Emphasis Supplied]

This Court held that a fair and reasonable

compensation is the sine qua non for any acquisition

process.

44. In Roy Estate v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 12

SCC 194; Union of India v. Mahendra Girji, (2010) 15

SCC 682 and Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak, (1984) 1

SCC 125, this Court underscored the importance of

following timelines prescribed by the statutes as well

as determining and disbursing compensation

amount expeditiously within reasonable time.

45. The subject land came to be acquired by invoking

special powers in cases of urgency under Section

17(4) of the 1894 Act. The invocation of Section 17(4)

extinguishes the statutory avenue for the landowners

under Section 5A to raise objections to the

acquisition proceedings. These circumstances

impose onerous duty on the State to facilitate justice

to the landowners by providing them with fair and

reasonable compensation expeditiously. The seven

sub-rights of the landowners identified by this Court

in Kolkata Municipal Corporation (supra) are

corresponding duties of the State. We regret to note

that the amount of Rs. 3,05,31,095/- determined as

compensation under the Supplementary Award has

not been paid to the landowners for a period of more

than two years and the State of Himachal Pradesh as

a welfare State has made no effort to get the same

paid at the earliest.

46. This Court has held in Dharnidhar Mishra

(D) v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC

932 and State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011)

10 SCC 404 that the right to property is now

considered to be not only a constitutional or

47

statutory right, but also a human right. This Court

held in Tukaram Kana Joshi thr. Power of Attorney

Holder v. M.I.D.C., (2013) 1 SCC 353 that in a welfare

State, the statutory authorities are legally bound to

pay adequate compensation and rehabilitate the

persons whose lands are being acquired. The non-

fulfilment of such obligations under the garb of

industrial development, is not permissible for any

welfare State as that would tantamount to uprooting

a person and depriving them of their

constitutional/human right.

47. That time is of the essence in determination and

payment of compensation is also evident from this

Court's judgment in Kukreja Construction

Company v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine

SC 2547 wherein it has been held that once the

compensation has been determined, the same is

payable immediately without any requirement of a

representation or request by the landowners and a

duty is cast on the State to pay such compensation

to the land losers, otherwise there would be a breach

of Article 300-A of the Constitution.

48. In the present case, the Government of Himachal

Pradesh as a welfare State ought to have proactively

intervened in the matter with a view to ensure that

the requisite amount towards compensation is paid

at the earliest. The State cannot abdicate its

constitutional and statutory responsibility of

payment of compensation by arguing that its role was

limited to initiating acquisition proceedings under

the MOU signed between the Appellant, JAL and

itself. We find that the delay in the payment of

compensation to the landowners after taking away

ownership of the subject land from them is in

contravention to the spirit of the constitutional

scheme of Article 300A and the idea of a welfare

State.

49. Acquisition of land for public purpose is

undertaken under the power of eminent domain of

the government much against the wishes of the

owners of the land which gets acquired. When such

48

a power is exercised, it is coupled with a bounden

duty and obligation on the part of the government

body to ensure that the owners whose lands get

acquired are paid compensation/awarded amount as

declared by the statutory award at the earliest.

50. The State Government, in peculiar

circumstances, was expected to make the requisite

payment towards compensation to the landowners

from its own treasury and should have thereafter

proceeded to recover the same from JAL. Instead of

making the poor landowners to run after the powerful

corporate houses, it should have compelled JAL to

make the necessary payment.”

42. Right to Property ceased to be a Fundamental Right by

the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978,

however, it continues to be a human right in a welfare State,

and a constitutional right under Article 300 -A of the

Constitution.

43. Article 300-A of the Constitution provides that no person

shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The

State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in

accordance with the procedure established by law.

44. This Court in the aforesaid case of Vidya Devi (supra)

observed that in a democratic polity governed by the rule of

law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their

property without the sanction of law. It was further observed

49

that the State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law

cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by

the Constitution.

45. Recently, this Court in the aforesaid case of Ultra-Tech

Cement Ltd. (supra) observed that the Government as a

welfare State ought to have proactively intervened in the

matter with a view to ensure that the requisite amount

towards compensation is paid at the earliest. It was further

observed that the State cannot abdicate its constitutional and

statutory responsibility of payment of compensation by

arguing that its role was limited to initiating acquisition

proceedings. It was, therefore, observed that the delay in the

payment of compensation, in accordance with law, to the

landowners after taking away ownership of the subject land

from them is in contravention to the spirit of the constitutional

scheme of Article 300-A and the idea of a welfare State.

46. In the aforesaid case of Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. (supra),

this Court further observed that acquisition of land for public

purpose is undertaken under the power of eminent domain of

the government much against the wishes of the owners of the

land which gets acquired. It was, therefore, observed that

50

when such a power is exercised, it is coupled with a bounden

duty and obligation on the part of the government body to

ensure that the owners whose lands get acquired are paid

compensation/awarded amount as declared by the statutory

award at the earliest.

47. It will also be appropriate for the purpose of the present

discussion to refer to the judgment of this Court, in the case

of K. Krishna Reddy and Others v. Special Deputy

Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar,

Andhra Pradesh

8, specifically in paragraph 12, observed

thus:

“12. We can very well appreciate the anxiety and

need of claimants to get compensation here and now.

No matter what it is. The lands were acquired as far

back in 1977. One decade has already passed. Now

the remand means another round of litigation. There

would be further delay in getting the compensation.

After all money is what money buys. What the

claimants could have bought with the compensation

in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps, not even one

half of it. It is a common experience that the

purchasing power of rupee is dwindling. With rising

inflation, the delayed payment may lose all charms

and utility of the compensation. In some cases, the

delay may be detrimental to the interests of

claimants. The Indian agriculturists generally have

no avocation. They totally depend upon land. If

uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They

are left high and dry. They have no savings to draw.

8

(1988) 4 SCC 163 : 1988 INSC 265

51

They have nothing to fall back upon. They know no

other work. They may even face starvation unless

rehabilitated. In all such cases, it is of utmost

importance that the award should be made without

delay. The enhanced compensation must be

determined without loss of time. The appellate power

of remand, at any rate ought not to be exercised

lightly. It shall not be resorted to unless the award is

wholly unintelligible. It shall not be exercised unless

there is total lack of evidence. If remand is

imperative, and if the claim for enhanced

compensation is tenable, it would be proper for the

appellate court to do modest best to mitigate

hardships. The appellate court may direct some

interim payment to claimants subject to adjustment

in the eventual award.”

48. It cannot be gainsaid that the appellants herein have

been deprived of their legitimate dues for almost 22 years ago.

It can also not be controverted that money is what money

buys. The value of money is based on the idea that money can

be invested to earn a return, and that the purchasing power of

money decreases over time due to inflation. What the

appellants herein could have bought with the compensation in

2003 cannot do in 2025. It is, therefore, of utmost importance

that the determination of the award and disbursal of

compensation in case of acquisition of land should be made

with promptitude.

52

49. We find that in the present case, the appellants were

required to knock at the doors of the courts on number of

occasions during the period of last twenty-two years. The

appellants have been deprived of their property without paying

any compensation for the same in the said period of last

twenty-two years. As already discussed hereinabove, the

appellants had purchased the plots in question for

construction of residential houses. Not only have they not

been able to construct, but they have also not been even paid

any compensation for the same. As discussed hereinabove,

though Right to Property is no more a fundamental right, in

view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of

India, it is a constitutional right. A person cannot be deprived

of his property without him being paid adequate compensation

in accordance with law for the same.

50. In the present case, it can clearly be seen that there is no

delay which can be attributed to the appellants in not getting

compensation, but it was on account of the lethargic attitude

of the officers of the State/KIADB that the appellants were

deprived of compensation.

53

51. Only after the notices were issued in the contempt

proceedings, the compensation was determined by the SLAO

on 22

nd April 2019 taking guideline values prevailing in the

year 2011 for determining the market value of the acquired

land.

52. No doubt that as already observed by us hereinabove, we

do not find any error in the approach adopted by the learned

Single Judge of the High Court in holding that the SLAO could

not have shifted the date and it could have been done only by

this Court in exercise of powers under Article 32/142 of the

Constitution of India or by the High Court under Article 226

of the Constitution of India. However, the learned Single Judge

of the High Court instead of relegating the appellants to again

go through the rigors of determination by SLAO, ought to have

exercised powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to do

complete justice. Even the Division Bench of the High Court

on a hyper technical ground has non-suited the appellants.

53. In that view of the matter, we find that it is a fit case

wherein this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142

of the Constitution should direct shifting of the date for

54

determination of the market value of the land in question of

the appellants.

54. If the compensation to be awarded at the market value

as of the year 2003 is permitted, it would amount to permitting

a travesty of justice and making the constitutional provisions

under Article 300-A a mockery.

55. Since the State/KIADB was in deep slumber from 2003

to 2019 and acted for the first time only after the notices were

issued in contempt proceedings, we find that though SLAO

had no power to shift the date for determination of market

value, he had rightly done so. The learned Single Judge of the

High Court also does not say that the determination of

compensation to be awarded by shifting of the date by the

SLAO to that of 2011 was unjust but only sets aside the award

on the ground that SLAO had no jurisdiction to do so.

56. There is another reason for doing so. If on account of the

inordinate delay in paying the compensation and thereby

depriving the constitutional right to the appellants under

Article 300-A, the land acquisition proceedings are quashed,

the only recourse available to the State/KIADB in order to save

the project will be to now issue a fresh acquisition notification

55

by invoking the provisions as applicable under the 2013 LA

Act which would entail huge expenditure to the public

exchequer.

57. We, therefore, in exercise of power of this Court under

Article 142 of the Constitution of India, find it appropriate in

the interest of justice that the SLAO be directed to determine

the compensation to be awarded to the appellants herein on

the basis of the market value prevailing as on 22

nd April 2019.

The appellants shall also be entitled to all the statutory

benefits as are available to them under the 1894 LA Act. This

shall be without prejudice to the rights/contentions of either

party, in case they make a reference before an appellate

authority, if they are so aggrieved by the fresh determination

of compensation by the SLAO. We further clarify that, any

other award which may have been passed pursuant to the

directions of the learned Single Judge of the High Court shall

stand nullified by this judgment.

58. Respondent Nos.6 and 7 contend that they cannot be

imposed with a liability for this huge additional expenditure.

It is their contention that the delay in determination of

compensation and payment of the same is not attributable to

56

them but is on account of inaction on the part of the State and

KIADB. We clarify that we are not observing anything about

the inter se dispute between the State and KIADB on the one

hand and Respondent Nos.6 and 7 on the other hand ,

inasmuch as the same shall be governed by the FWA and/or

any other agreement between them . We only say that

Respondent Nos.6 and 7, will be at liberty to take recourse to

such remedies as are available to them in law for redressal of

their inter se dispute.

59. In the result, the appeal is disposed of in the following

terms:

(i) The judgment and order passed by the Division Bench

of the High Court dated 22

nd November 2022 in Writ

Appeal No. 678 of 2022 (LA-KIADB) is quashed and set

aside;

(ii) The writ petition filed by the appellants herein before

the High Court being W.P. No. 1627 of 2021 is allowed;

(iii) The SLAO shall pass a fresh award taking the market

value prevailing as on 22

nd April 2019 within a period

of two months from today after hearing the parties;

57

(iv) The appellants herein shall be entitled to all statutory

benefits as are available to them in law;

(v) The rights of parties to challenge the award in

reference, if they are aggrieved by it, shall remain

open; and

(vi) As we have not expressed our opinion on the claims, if

any, of Respondent Nos.6 and 7 against the

State/KIADB qua the delay in passing the award by

the SLAO, Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are at liberty to

take such steps as are permissible in law in case they

are aggrieved by the award to be passed by the SLAO.

60. Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.

..............................J.

(B.R. GAVAI)

..............................J.

(K. V. VISWANATHAN)

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 02, 2025.