2026 INSC 983 Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 1 of 21

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1718 OF 2016

BHAG SINGH (D) THR. MAHANT KASHMIR SINGH …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

BASANT KAUR (D) THR. LRS. AND OTHERS ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

1. Applications seeking substitution of legal representatives of deceased

respondent nos.1, 2 and 5 are allowed, subject to all just exception after

condoning the delay and setting aside abatement in filing the substitution

applications.

2. The present Appeal arises out of a dispute relating to the title and

possession of agricultural land measuring 4 Kanals 18 Marlas, situated within

the revenue estate of Muktsar, Punjab. The competing claims of the parties

trace their origin to a registered sale deed dated 13.05.1965, on the one hand,

and an alleged prior dedication of the suit property in favour of Dera Bhai

Mastan Singh for Dharam-Arth (religious and charitable purposes), on the

other. The controversy, which commenced with the institution of a civil suit

in the year 1981, has traversed three stages of judicial scrutiny and

culminated in the present Appeal questioning the correctness of the judgment

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 2 of 21

dated 22.03.2011 rendered by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in RSA

No. 593/1985.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The original plaintiffs instituted Civil Suit No. 183-A of 1981 before the

Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Muktsar

1

, seeking a declaration

that they were owners in possession of land measuring 4 Kanals 18 Marlas,

comprised in Khewat No. 578, Khatauni No. 871, Rectangle No. 365, Killa

Nos. 3/3 and 4/1, together with a consequential decree of permanent

injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession.

Their claim of title was founded upon a registered sale deed dated 13.05.1965,

executed by Gajjan Singh and Baggu Singh, whereunder the suit property

was stated to have been conveyed to their predecessor. According to the

plaintiffs, possession had also been delivered contemporaneously with the

execution of the sale deed. It was, however, alleged that the revenue records

continued to reflect the name of Attar Singh Chela Bhai Gulab Singh in the

column of possession, although he had died nearly twenty years prior to the

institution of the suit. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendants were relying

upon these revenue entries to threaten interference with their lawful

possession, necessitating the institution of the suit.

4. The suit was resisted by the defendants, representing Dera Bhai Mastan

Singh, who denied both the plaintiffs' title and possession. Their principal

defence was that the suit property had ceased to be the private property of

the original proprietors long before the execution of the sale deed, having been

1

Hereinafter referred as ‘Trial Court’

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 3 of 21

irrevocably dedicated for Dharam-Arth in favour of the Dera. It was pleaded

that the revenue records consistently recorded Attar Singh Chela Bhai Gulab

Singh in possession as "gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth",

signifying possession without payment of rent for religious purposes, and that

such possession was held not in his individual capacity but on behalf of the

Dera. According to the defendants, upon the demise of Attar Singh,

possession continued uninterruptedly through the successive Mahants of the

Dera, namely Kishan Singh, Santa Singh and thereafter Bhag Singh, each

managing and cultivating the land in continuation of the religious institution's

possession. It was, therefore, asserted that the Dera had remained in

continuous, open and uninterrupted possession of the suit property for

several decades and had acquired ownership thereover. The defendants

further disputed the validity of the sale deed dated 13.05.1965, contending

that the vendors had no subsisting transferable interest after the property

had been dedicated to the Dera. It was also pleaded that, in any event, Gajjan

Singh and Baggu Singh together owned only one -half share in the suit

property, the remaining half admittedly belonging to Pritam Singh, and were

therefore incompetent to convey title to the entirety of the property.

5. By judgment and decree dated 22.01.1983, the Trial Court dismissed

the suit by principally relying upon the documentary evidence comprising the

revenue records, particularly the Jamabandi for the year 1945-46, which

recorded Attar Singh Chela Bhai Gulab Si ngh in possession of the suit

property as "gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth" . Reading the

revenue entries in conjunction with the subsequent Jamabandis and Khasra

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 4 of 21

Girdawaris placed on record, the Trial Court concluded that the property had

been dedicated by the original proprietors for religious and charitable

purposes in favour of Dera Bhai Mastan Singh, and that the possession

reflected in the name of Attar Singh was in his representative capacity as a

Mahant of the Dera rather than in his personal capacity. The Trial Court

further found that the continuity of possession of Dera through its successive

Mahants stood established from the material on record.

6. The Trial Court further held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish

that possession had ever passed pursuant to the sale deed dated 13.05.1965.

Although the sale deed contained a recital regarding delivery of possession,

no mutation or subsequent revenue entry reflected any change in possession,

nor was any satisfactory evidence produced to establish cultivation or

possession by the plaintiffs. The Court also drew an adverse inference from

the failure to examine Baggu Singh, one of the executants of the sale deed,

and held that the recital of delivery of possession, unsupported by

corroborative evidence, could not displace the long-standing revenue entries

showing possession of the Dera. It also found that the suit property had

already been dedicated to the Dera and, in any event, Gajjan Singh and Baggu

Singh together owned only one-half share in the property, the remaining half

belonging to Pritam Singh. They were, therefore, incompetent to convey title

to the entire property.

7. Aggrieved by the dismissal of suit, the plaintiffs preferred Civil Appeal

No. 37 of 1983 before the learned Additional District Judge, Faridkot

2

. Vide

2

Hereinafter referred to as ‘First Appellate Court’

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 5 of 21

judgment dated 25.01.1985, the appeal came to be dismissed and the findings

recorded by Trial Court were affirmed.

8. However, the First Appellate Court accepted the submission of the

plaintiffs to the limited extent that, since Attar Singh had died many years

earlier, the revenue entries could no longer be treated as reflecting his

personal possession. However, it rejected the inference that the plaintiffs had

thereby established possession in themselves. The First Appellate Court held

that Attar Singh's possession was referable to the Dera, and upon his demise

the succeeding Mahants continued in possession on behalf of the religious

institution. In this regard, it found the defendants' plea regarding succession

of possession through Kishan Singh, Santa Singh and thereafter Bhag Singh

to be consistent with the character of possession disclosed by the revenue

records.

9. The First Appellate Court further found that there was no revenue entry

recording the plaintiffs or their predecessor in possession of the suit property

either before or after the execution of the sale deed. It, therefore, concurred

with the Trial Court that the plaintiffs had failed to establish actual

possession or delivery of possession pursuant to the sale transaction.

Interpreting the expression "gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth", the

First Appellate Court held that the property had been dedicated for religious

purposes in favour of Dera Bhai Mastan Singh, and that such dedication

stood completed upon delivery of possession to the Dera. It observed that, in

the facts of the present case, no separate registered instrument was necessary

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 6 of 21

to complete the dedication once possession had been divested in favour of the

religious institution.

10. Aggrieved by the concurrent dismissal of the suit, the plaintiffs

preferred RSA No. 593 of 1985 before the High Court under Section 100 of

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

3

. The High Court framed the substantial

question of law as to whether the defendants could be declared owners in

possession merely on account of long possession without establishing the

essential ingredients of adverse possession, and whether the revenue entry

recording possession as "Bila Lagaan Bawajah Dharamarth" was, by itself,

sufficient to sustain such a claim.

11. Answering the question of law in favour of plaintiffs, the High Court

vide judgment and decree dated 22.03.2011, allowed the appeal, set aside the

concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Trial Court and the First

Appellate Court, and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs.

12. In doing so, the High Court noticed that the revenue records relied upon

by the defendants reflected the possession of Attar Singh Chela Bhai Gulab

Singh as "gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth", but observed that no

subsequent revenue entries had been produced showing that, after Attar

Singh's demise, the possession of the suit property came to be recorded in the

names of the succeeding Mahants. The High Court was of the view that the

Courts below had inferred continuity of possession in favour of the Dera

principally on the basis of presumptions drawn from the earlier revenue

3

For short ‘CPC’

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 7 of 21

entries, without corresponding documentary evidence reflecting possession

through the subsequent Mahants. It observed that the revenue entries, by

themselves, could not conclusively establish either a completed dedication of

the property in favour of the Dera or the acquisition of ownership by adverse

possession, particularly when the subsequent course of possession had not

been established through corresponding entries or other satisfactory

evidence.

13. The High Court further considered the plea as to whether the

defendants had perfected their title by adverse possession. In that context,

the High Court attached significance to the expression "gair marusi bila lagan

bawaja Dharam Arth" occurring in the revenue records. It held that the said

entry indicated that the possession of Attar Singh originated for religious

purposes without payment of rent and did not, in itself, disclose a hostile

assertion of ownership against the recorded proprietors. The High Court

observed that where possession is referable to permission or to an

arrangement under which a person is allowed to occupy land for a specified

purpose, the mere continuance of such possession over a long period does not

automatically mature into adverse possession. It was, therefore, incumbent

upon the defendants to establish by cogent evidence the point of time at which

such possession became hostile to the knowledge of the true owners. In the

absence of such evidence, the High Court held that the essential ingredients

of adverse possession remained unproved.

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 8 of 21

14. It is this judgment of the High Court which is the subject matter of

challenge in the present Appeal at the instance of the defendants (represented

through their legal representatives), who are appellants before this Court.

SUBMISSIONS OF PARTIES

15. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the High Court

committed a manifest error in reversing the concurrent findings of fact

recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court in exercise of

jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. It was submitted that both the

Courts below, upon a proper appreciation of the oral and documentary

evidence, had concurrently held that the suit property had long ago been

dedicated for Dharam-Arth purposes in favour of Dera Bhai Mastan Singh

and that the successive Mahants of the Dera had remained in uninterrupted

possession thereof. According to the learned counsel, such findings were pure

findings of fact and did not warrant interference in a second appeal.

16. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the revenue

records, commencing from the Jamabandi for the year 1945 –46 and

continuing thereafter, consistently described Attar Singh, Mahant of the Dera,

as being in possession as "gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth",

thereby clearly evidencing the dedication of the property in favour of the Dera.

In any event, it was urged that the Dera and its successive Mahants had

remained in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the suit

property for several decades and had, therefore, perfected title by adverse

possession.

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 9 of 21

17. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the

respondents-plaintiffs could not claim ownership over the entire suit property

on the strength of the sale deed dated 13.05.1965, inasmuch as the vendors,

namely, Gajjan Singh and Baggu Singh, together owned only one-half share

in the property, while the remaining one-half belonged to Pritam Singh. It was,

therefore, contended that the sale deed did not convey valid title to the entire

suit property and that the judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate

Court dismissing the suit were liable to be restored.

18. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs submitted

that the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court had committed a

fundamental error in law in treating the revenue entries as conclusive proof

of title and in presuming a completed dedication of the suit property solely on

the basis of the expression "gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth".

According to the learned counsel, the appellants had failed to establish, by

cogent evidence, either a valid dedication divesting the original proprietors of

ownership or any other independent source of title in favour of the Dera.

19. Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the plea of

adverse possession was wholly untenable in the absence of specific pleadings

and proof regarding the commencement and hostile character of the

possession. Mere long possession or continuation of revenue entries, it was

urged, could not satisfy the settled legal requirements governing acquisition

of title by adverse possession.

20. Lastly, the learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that the

High Court had not reappreciated the evidence as a First Appellate Court but

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 10 of 21

had interfered only after framing the substantial question of law and upon

finding that the concurrent findings of the Courts below were vitiated by an

erroneous application of the legal principles relating to dedication, adverse

possession and the evidentiary value of the revenue records. It was, therefore,

prayed that the present Appeal be dismissed.

ANALYSIS

21. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having

perused the material placed on record, the principal questions which arise for

consideration are:

a) Whether the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section

100 of the CPC, was justified in reversing the concurrent findings

recorded by the Courts below; and

b) Whether its conclusions regarding the nature of the defendants'

possession, the legal effect of the revenue entries describing such

possession as "gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth", and the

validity of the plaintiffs' claim under the sale deed dated 13.05.1965,

can be sustained in law.

The answer to these questions, however, necessarily depends upon whether

the findings concurrently recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate

Court were legally sustainable on the evidence available on record and

whether the appellants had ever succeeded in establishing that the suit

property was validly dedicated in favour of Dera Bhai Mastan Singh.

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 11 of 21

22. The case set up by the appellants rests substantially on two

foundations, firstly, it is asserted that the suit property had ceased to be the

private property of the original proprietors long prior to the execution of the

sale deed dated 13.05.1965, having been irrevocably dedicated for Dharam-

Arth in favour of Dera Bhai Mastan Singh. Secondly, it is pleaded that, in any

event, the Dera and its successive Mahants had remained in continuous

possession of the property for more than four decades and had, therefore,

perfected title by adverse possession. Both the Trial Court and the First

Appellate Court accepted these pleas and dismissed the suit. The High Court,

however, found that the conclusions so recorded were unsupported by the

legal requirements governing dedication and adverse possession and,

consequently, reversed the concurrent findings. The correctness of that

approach falls for our consideration.

23. At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between

proof of possession and proof of title. Revenue records, including Jamabandis

and Khasra Girdawaris, are undoubtedly relevant pieces of evidence for

determining the nature and continuity of possession. They neither create nor

extinguish title, nor can they, by themselves, constitute conclusive evidence

of ownership. The consistent view of this Court has been that entries in

revenue records are primarily maintained for fiscal purposes and are

admissible as evidence of possession, but they do not confer title to immovable

property. The question of ownership must ultimately be determined on the

basis of substantive evidence establishing the source of title. [See: Suraj

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 12 of 21

Bhan and Others vs. Financial Commissioner and Others

4

; Vadiyala

Prabhakar Rao and Others vs. Government of Andhra Prades h and

Others

5

]

24. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court principally relied upon

the revenue entry describing the possession of Attar Singh Chela Bhai Gulab

Singh as "gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth" and the continuation

of possession through successive Mahants to conclude that the property had

stood dedicated to Dera Bhai Mastan Singh. The First Appellate Court further

held that once possession had been delivered for Dharam-Arth purposes, the

dedication stood completed and no registered instrument was necessary. It

also observed that after the demise of Attar Singh, the succeeding Mahants

continued in cultivating possession of the property on behalf of the Dera.

25. In our considered opinion, the approach adopted by the Trial Court and

the First Appellate Court below cannot be sustained in law. A valid dedication

of immovable property to a religious or charitable institution undoubtedly

does not, in every case, require a formal deed if the law otherwise recognises

such dedication by unequivocal conduct. Nevertheless, the burden of

establishing such dedication squarely rests upon the party asserting it. The

Court must be satisfied that the owner had manifested a clear and

unequivocal intention to divest himself permanently of ownership and to vest

the property in the religious institution. Mere long possession of a Mahant or

an entry in the revenue records indicating cultivation for Dharam -Arth

4

(2007) 6 SCC 186 at Para 9.

5

2026 SCC OnLine SC 815 at Para 16 to 17.

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 13 of 21

purposes cannot, without more, be treated as conclusive proof that ownership

itself stood irrevocably transferred.

26. Equally significant is the fact that the appellants themselves sought to

derive title on two distinct juristic bases, namely, dedication and adverse

possession. The two doctrines proceed on fundamentally different legal

premises. If the property had already vested in the Dera by virtue of a

completed dedication, the question of subsequently perfecting title by adverse

possession would scarcely arise, for adverse possession necessarily proceeds

on the assumption that title initially vested in another and was thereafter

extinguished by hostile possession for the statutory period. The concurrent

findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court do not reconcile these

two distinct pleas, rather, both were accepted simultaneously as independent

sources of title. Such an approach overlooks the different legal requirements

governing each doctrine and renders the reasoning internally inconsistent.

27. Even assuming that the appellants failed to establish a completed

dedication of the suit property in favour of the Dera, it was independently

asserted that the Dera had, in any event, perfected title by adverse possession

on account of its continuous possession through successive Mahants for over

four decades. The Trial Court accepted the said plea and the First Appellate

Court affirmed that conclusion. The question which, therefore, arises is

whether the material on record satisfies the legal requirements necessary to

sustain such a plea.

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 14 of 21

28. In T. Anjanappa and Others vs. Somalingappa and Another

6

, this

Court reiterated that adverse possession contemplates possession which is

hostile to the title of the true owner. A person asserting such a plea must

establish by clear and unequivocal evidence that his possession was actual,

open, continuous and hostile, so as to amount to a denial of the true owner's

title. Mere long possession, however uninterrupted, is insufficient unless

accompanied by the requisite hostile animus. Where possession can be

referred to a lawful or permissive origin, it cannot be regarded as adverse

merely by lapse of time.

29. Tested on the aforesaid principles, we find ourselves unable to sustain

the conclusions recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The

entire case of the appellants proceeds on the premise that Attar Singh entered

into possession of the suit property as Mahant of Dera Bhai Mastan Singh for

Dharam-Arth purposes and that, upon his demise, possession continued

through the succeeding Mahants. If that be the appellants own case, the

origin of possession was never asserted to be hostile to the recorded

proprietors. On the contrary, the appellants themselves sought to explain

such possession as flowing from an earlier dedication of the property in favour

of the Dera. Possession founded upon such an assertion cannot, without

more, simultaneously be characterised as hostile possession so as to attract

the doctrine of adverse possession.

30. It is equally significant that neither the pleadings nor the evidence

disclose the point of time at which the appellants’ possession allegedly became

6

(2006) 7 SCC 570 at Para 12, 14, 15, 18 and 20.

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 15 of 21

hostile to the true owners. There is no pleading identifying the date from which

the title of the recorded proprietors was openly repudiated, nor is there

evidence demonstrating any overt act by which such hostility was asserted to

the knowledge of the true owners. The absence of these foundational

pleadings is not a mere technical defect. They constitute the very basis upon

which a plea of adverse possession rests. Unless the commencement of hostile

possession is pleaded and proved, the statutory period prescribed under the

Limitation Act, 1963 cannot even begin to run.

31. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court appear to have equated

long and uninterrupted possession with adverse possession. Such an

approach, with respect, overlooks the settled distinction between the two

concepts. Long possession may furnish evidence of physical occupation ,

however it does not, by itself, establish that such possession was adverse in

law. The doctrine of adverse possession does not reward longevity of

occupation alone. It protects only such possession as is accompanied by a

conscious and hostile assertion of ownership in denial of the rights of the true

owner. Unless the element of hostility is affirmatively established, the plea

must necessarily fail. [See: Government of Kerala and Another vs. Joseph

and Others

7

]

32. We also find that the revenue entries relied upon by the appellants do

not advance their case beyond proving possession. The description "gair

marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth" may legitimately indicate that the

possession was associated with religious or charitable purposes. However,

7

2023 SCC OnLine SC 961 at Para 35, 47 to 54.

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 16 of 21

such an entry neither records an assertion of hostile title nor evidences the

extinguishment of the ownership of the recorded proprietors. The evidentiary

value of a revenue entry cannot be stretched beyond the purpose for which it

is maintained. In the absence of independent evidence establishing hostile

possession, the said entries cannot, by themselves, sustain a decree founded

upon adverse possession.

33. The High Court, in our opinion, correctly appreciated this distinction.

It did not discard the revenue entries altogether, rather, it held that those

entries were insufficient, in law, to establish acquisition of ownership. The

High Court rightly noticed that the appellants had failed to establish the

essential ingredients of adverse possession, namely, the hostile character of

their possession and the unequivocal denial of the title of the true owners. To

that extent, the interference by the High Court was directed not against a pure

finding of fact but against an erroneous application of settled legal principles

to the evidence on record.

34. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the findings recorded by

the Trial Court and affirmed by the First Appellate Court, insofar as they hold

that the appellants had perfected title by adverse possession, cannot be

sustained. The High Court committed no error in setting aside those findings.

Nevertheless, we clarify that our conclusion does not proceed on the premise

that the respondents-plaintiffs thereby established an indefeasible title to the

entire suit property. The respondents’ claim under the registered sale deed

must still be examined independently, including the objection raised by the

appellants regarding the extent of the vendors' interest. The failure of the

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 17 of 21

appellants to establish a superior title cannot, by itself, enlarge the estate

conveyed under the sale deed beyond what the vendors were legally competent

to transfer.

35. This brings us to the effect of the sale deed dated 13.05.1965 executed

in favour of the predecessors-in-interest of the respondents. Learned counsel

appearing for the appellants laid considerable emphasis on the fact that the

sale deed dated 13.05.1965 could not have conveyed title to the entire suit

property, inasmuch as the ownership entries themselves disclosed that

Gajjan Singh and Baggu Singh together owned only one -half share, the

remaining one-half belonging to Pritam Singh. It was, therefore, contended

that the respondents could not claim ownership over the entirety of the suit

land on the strength of the said sale deed and that the Courts below had

rightly rejected their claim.

36. There can be no doubt with the proposition that a transferor cannot

convey a better title than what he himself possesses. To the extent the vendors

were not owners of the entire property, the sale deed could not operate to

transfer a larger estate than that lawfully vested in them. The objection raised

by the appellants in this regard, therefore, cannot be said to be without

substance. However, that is not the end of the controversy before us.

37. The present Appeal does not merely concern the extent of the interest

conveyed under the sale deed. The real issue is whether the appellants

established a better and superior title so as to defeat the respondents’ claim

altogether. It is a settled principle that where rival claims of ownership are

asserted, each party must succeed on the strength of its own title and not on

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 18 of 21

the weakness of the opponent's case.

8

Consequently, even if the respondents’

title under the sale deed were confined only to such interest as the vendors

were legally competent to convey, that circumstance would not, by itself,

establish that ownership had vested in the appellants. The burden of proving

the pleaded dedication or acquisition of title by adverse possession continued

to rest upon the defendants throughout.

9

Since, for the reasons already

recorded, those pleas remain unsubstantiated in law, the appellants cannot

derive any advantage merely by pointing out imperfections in the respondents’

title.

38. We are also unable to overlook that the concurrent findings recorded

by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court proceeded substantially on

the assumption that the appellants had established ownership in

consequence of dedication coupled with long possession. Once that

foundational premise is found to be legally unsustainable, the consequential

conclusion invalidating the respondents’ claim in its entirety necessarily

becomes vulnerable. The question as to the exact extent of the interest

conveyed under the sale deed is distinct from the question whether the

appellants had established ownership over the entire suit property. The

former cannot be answered merely by presuming the latter.

39. This brings us to the challenge urged on behalf of the appellants,

namely, that the High Court exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction under

8

See: Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan vs. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale (Dead) and Others,

(2007) 6 SCC 737 at Para 13.

9

See: Dharampal (Dead) Through Legal Representatives vs. Punjab Wakf Board and Others,

(2018) 11 SCC 449 at Para 35 to 40.

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 19 of 21

Section 100 of the CPC by interfering with concurrent findings of fact. The

submission, at first blush, appears attractive. However, a closer scrutiny of

the judgments under appeal before the High Court would demonstrate that

the interference was not founded upon a mere reappreciation of evidence but

upon the erroneous application of settled legal principles by the Courts below.

40. The scope of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC is well settled to

require elaborate discussion. In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai

Sopan Gujar and Others

10

, which was further relied upon recently in

A. Shahul Hameed vs. N. Malligarjuna and Others

11

, wherein this Court

has authoritatively held that although the High Court cannot ordinarily

disturb concurrent findings of fact, such findings do not enjoy immunity

where they are vitiated by a misapplication of law, are founded upon no

evidence, ignore material evidence, or proceed on an erroneous understanding

of settled legal principles. In such circumstances, the existence of a

substantial question of law furnishes a valid foundation for interference under

Section 100 of the CPC.

41. Examined in the light of the aforesaid principles, we find that the High

Court did not reassess the evidence merely because another view was

possible. The High Court examined whether the legal ingredients necessary to

sustain the findings of dedication and adverse possession had at all been

established on the evidence relied upon by the Courts below. It noticed that

the revenue entries had been treated as conclusive proof of ownership and

10

(1999) 3 SCC 722 at Para 4 and 5

11

2026 SCC OnLine SC 969 at Para 11 to 11.4.

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 20 of 21

that long possession had been equated with adverse possession without

examining the indispensable requirement of hostile animus. These were not

pure findings of fact but conclusions drawn upon an erroneous

understanding of settled principles of law. The High Court was, therefore,

justified in correcting those errors after entertaining the second appeal.

42. We are, however, of the view that certain observations made by the High

Court regarding the legal effect of the revenue entries require to be understood

in their proper perspective. We clarify, as stated earlier, that an entry

describing possession as "gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth" is

neither conclusive proof of a completed dedication nor conclusive proof of

permissive possession. As held by this Court in Suraj Bhan (supra) and

recently in Vadiyala Prabhakar Rao (supra), such an entry constitutes an

important piece of evidence bearing upon the nature of possession, but its

legal effect must always be determined in conjunction with the surrounding

circumstances and the entirety of the evidence on record. Subject to this

clarification, we find no infirmity in the ultimate conclusion reached by the

High Court.

43. In view of the foregoing analysis, we are of the view that the appellants

failed to establish either that the suit property had irrevocably vested in Dera

Bhai Mastan Singh by a complete dedication or that title had subsequently

been perfected by adverse possession in accordance with law. The concurrent

findings recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court proceeded

upon an erroneous application of the governing legal principles and were,

therefore, liable to be interfered with. The High Court rightly exercised its

Civil Appeal No. 1718 of 2016 Page 21 of 21

jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC setting aside those findings. We

accordingly affirm the judgment and decree dated 22.03.2011 passed by the

High Court, though for the reasons indicated hereinabove, and find no ground

warranting interference in the present Appeal.

44. The Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.

………………………………………J.

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

………………………………………J.

(SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR )

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 10, 2026.