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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 2056 of 1999

PETITIONER:

BHARATHIDASAN UNIVERSITY & ANR.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/09/2001

BENCH:

S. Rajendra Babu & Doraiswamy Raju.

JUDGMENT:

Raju, J.

The only and important question of law that arises for

consideration in this appeal is as to whether the appellant-University

created under the Bharathidasan University Act, 1981 [hereinafter

referred to as the University Act] having its area of operation over

the Districts of Tiruchirappalli, Thanjavur and Pudukkottai in the State

of Tamil Nadu, should seek prior approval of the All India Council for

the Technical Education [hereinafter referred to as AICTE] to start a

department for imparting a course or programme in technical

education or a technical institution as an adjunct to the University

itself to conduct technical courses of its choice and selection.

The Bharathidasan University Act, 1981 created the University

in question to provide, among other things, for instruction and training

in such branches of learning as it may determine; to provide for

research and for the advancement and dissemination of knowledge;

to institute degrees, titles, diplomas and other academic distinctions;

to hold examinations and to confer degrees, titles, diplomas and other

academic distinctions on persons who have pursued an approved

course of study in a University college or laboratory or in an affiliated

or approved college and have passed the prescribed examinations of

the University; to confer honorary degrees or other academic

distinction under conditions prescribed; and to institute, maintain and

manage institutes of research, University colleges and laboratories,

libraries, museums and other institutions necessary to carry out the

objects of the University, etc. In other words, it is a full-fledged

University recognized by the University Grants Commission also.

When the appellant-University commenced courses in

technology such as Information Technology & Management, Bio-

Engineering & Technology, Petrochemical Engineering &

Technology, Pharmaceutical Engineering and Technology, etc., the

AICTE filed a Writ Petition No.14558 of 1998 before the Madras High

Court seeking for a writ of mandamus to forebear the University

authorities from running/conducting any courses and programmes in

those technical courses. The sum and substance of the grievance as

well as the objection put forward was that the University did not apply

for and secure the prior approval for those courses before their

commencement by the University as envisaged under the All India

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Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 [hereinafter referred to as

the AICTE Act] and the statutory regulations made thereunder by

the AICTE, particularly Regulation No.4, which obligated even an

University to obtain such prior approval. The stand of the appellant-

University was, as it is now before us, that the appellant-University

will not fall under the definition of Technical Institution as defined

under Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act and consequently, the

regulations made for seeking prior approval of the AICTE even by the

Universities to commence a course or programme in technical

education or a new department for the purpose, were in excess of the

regulation-making powers of the AICTE and consequently, are null

and void and cannot be enforced against the appellant-University to

the extent it obligates even Universities to seek and secure such prior

approval from the AICTE.

The learned Single Judge has chosen to accept the stand of

the AICTE by applying and following the ratio of the decision of a Full

Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in M. Sambasiva

Rao alias Sambaiah & Ors. Vs. Osmania University, Hyderabad

rep. By its Registrar & Ors. [1997(1) Andhra Law Times 629] and

as a consequence thereof, ordered the cancellation of the admissions

made by the University. When the matter was pursued before a

Division Bench, the learned Judges in the Division Bench also felt

convinced of the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of the Andhra

Pradesh High Court and rejected the appeal, necessitating the

appellant-University to come to this Court. Since the approach

adopted by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench are on

the same lines as the one adopted by the Full Bench of the Andhra

Pradesh High Court, which the Madras High Court has also purported

to follow, it would be just and necessary to refer to the said decision

and also consider the correctness or otherwise of the ratio in the said

decision.

In M. Sambasiva Rao (supra), while adverting to the relevant

provisions of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, the

Andhra Pradesh State Council for Higher Education Act, the A.P.

Universities Act, 1991, the AICTE Act and the All India Council for

Technical Education (Grant of approval for starting new Technical

Institutions, introduction of courses or programmes and approval of

intake capacity of seats for the courses or programmes) Regulations,

1994 [hereinafter referred to as `the Regulations], the High Court

arrived at a conclusion that the AICTE Act being a special law on a

particular category of education, overrides even the University Grants

Commission Act, which, in the opinion of the High Court, was in the

nature of a general law in regard to imparting of education by

Universities in general in respect of common matters covered

thereunder. In spite of both the Acts being those made by the

Parliament within its legislative competence even as later law, the

AICTE Act was held to be binding. As for the relative operation of the

AICTE Act and the State Act dealt with therein, it was held that the

AICTE Act occupied the field and that, therefore, the State Act has to

yield and consequently statutory regulations made are not only valid

and had the force of law as a subordinate legislation, but no question

of repugnancy between the Regulations and AICTE Act or any

alleged excess exercise of power in framing such regulations, arose

on the facts of the case having regard to the creation of the AICTE for

the proper planning and coordinated development of technical

education system throughout the country. The Andhra Pradesh High

Court was of the view that anybody or everyone of the authorities and

institutions concerned with a technical education all over the country

would fall within the meaning of Technical Institution as defined in

Section 2(h) of the AICTE Act and, therefore, be bound by the

authority of the AICTE under the AICTE Act and the Regulations

made thereunder. In coming to such conclusions, the Full Bench

tried to draw sustenance from the decisions of this Court reported in

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Unni Krishnan J.P. Vs. State of A.P. [1993(1) SCC 645] and State

of Tamil Nadu Vs. Adhiyaman Educational and Research

Institute and Ors. [1995(4) SCC 104].

Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the

appellant-University, urged that a university like the appellant as

defined under Section 2 (i) will not fall within the definition of a

technical institution contained in Section 2 (h) of the AICTE Act and,

therefore, equally stood outside the purview of Section 10 (1) (k) of

the said Act and consequently not obliged to seek for and obtain the

prior approval of the AICTE for starting a department or introducing

new courses or programmers. The regulations framed by the AICTE

for the same reason insofar as it obligates even universities to obtain

such prior approval, cannot be held to be binding or enforceable

against the appellant by the mere fact that the regulation specifically

states so, notwithstanding the provisions contained in the Act

stipulating to the contrary and any regulation so made will be void

and unenforceable. It was also urged that the decision of the Full

Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court does not lay down the

correct position of law and the decisions of this Court relied upon in

the said decision really do not lend any support to the principles

ultimately laid down therein and, therefore, the Madras High Court

ought to have considered the issues independently and not followed

the ratio of the Full Bench in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra). The

strong grievance ventilated on behalf of the appellant is that both the

Andhra Pradesh and Madras High Courts have failed to properly

construe the relevant provisions of the Act, applying the correct

principles of interpretation and also giving due consideration and

weight to the various stipulations contained in Section 10 which made

specific reference wherever the universities also have to adhere to

the provisions of the AICTE Act, Rules and Regulations. It was also

urged that no Rules or Regulations inconsistent with the provisions of

the Act could have been either made under the Act or sought to be

enforced, legitimately. Strong reliance has also been placed on the

decisions reported in S.K. Singh & Others vs V.V. Giri & another

(AIR 1970 SC 2097); D.K. Trivedi & Sons and others vs State of

Gujarat and others (AIR 1986 SC 1323) as also the very decision in

Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others vs State of Andhra Pradesh and

others [(1993) 1 SCC 645] and State of T.N. and another vs

Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute and others [(1995)

4 SCC 104] and Medical Council of India vs State of Karnataka

and others [(1998) 6 SCC 131].

Dr. J.P. Verghese, learned counsel for the AICTE, while

drawing sustenance from the reasoning of the judgment under

challenge as well as the Andhra Pradesh case, urged that having

regard to the overall functions and powers of the Council under the

Act to ensure proper planning and coordinated development of the

technical education system throughout the country, the qualitative

improvement of such education and regulation and proper

maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education

system and matters connected therewith envisaged under Section 10

of the Act particularly Section 10 (1) (k) read with Section 20 (1) (b) of

the ATE Act, the AICTE will have pervasive control over universities

also and consequently, the prior approval of AICTE has to be

obtained by even the universities like any other technical institution

for starting any new department or institute or commencing a new

course or programme in technical education. The totality of the

purpose and scheme, claimed to be underlying the enactment is said

to confer such sweeping powers over all functional activities relating

to technical education and the universities cannot claim immunity

from such obligation cast under the Act and the regulations made by

the AICTE. The sheet anchor of support for the respondent seem to

be the decision reported in State of T.N. and another vs Adhiyaman

Educational & Research Institute and others (supra) and Jaya Gokul

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Educational Trust vs Commissioner & Secretary to Government

Higher Education Department, Thiruvanathapuram, Kerala State

and another [(2000) 5 SCC 231], in addition to the decision of the

Andhra Pradesh High Court.

We have bestowed our thoughtful consideration to the

submissions made on either side. When the legislative intent is found

specific mention and expression in the provisions of the Act itself, the

same cannot be whittled down or curtailed and rendered nugatory by

giving undue importance to the so-called object underlying the Act or

the purpose of creation of a body to supervise the implementation of

the provisions of the Act, particularly when the AICTE Act does not

contain any evidence of an intention to belittle and destroy the

authority or autonomy of other statutory bodies, having their own

assigned roles to perform. Merely activated by some assumed

objects or desirabilities, the Courts cannot adorn the mantle of

legislature. It is hard to ignore the legislative intent to give definite

meaning to words employed in the Act and adopt an interpretation

which would tend to do violence to the express language as well as

the plain meaning and patent aim and object underlying the various

other provisions of the Act. Even in endeavouring to maintain the

object and spirit of the law to achieve the goal fixed by the legislature,

the Courts must go by the guidance of the words used and not on

certain pre-conceived notions of ideological structure and scheme

underlying the law. In the statement of objects and reasons for the

AICTE Act, it is specifically stated that the AICTE, was originally set

up by a Government resolution as a National Expert Body to advice

the Central and State Governments for ensuring the coordinated

development of technical education in accordance with approved

standards was playing an effective role, but, However, in recent

years, a large number of private engineering colleges and

polytechnics have come up in complete disregard of the guidelines,

laid down by the AICTE and taking into account the serious

deficiencies of even rudimentary infrastructure necessary for

imparting proper education and training and the need to maintain

educational standards and curtail the growing erosion of standards

statutory authority was meant to be conferred upon AICTE to play its

role more effectively by enacting the AICTE Act.

Section 2(h) defines `technical institution for the purposes of

the Act, as follows:-

technical institution means an institution, not

being a University, which offers courses or

programmes of technical education, and shall

include such other institutions as the Central

Government may, in consultation with the

Council, by notification in the Official Gazette,

declare as technical institutions

Since it is intended to be other than a University, the Act

defines in Section 2(i) `University to mean a University defined

under clause (f) of Section 2 of the University Grants Commission

Act, 1956 and also to be inclusive of an institution deemed to be a

University under Section 3 of the said Act. Section 10 of the Act

enumerates the various powers and functions of the AICTE as also

its duties and obligations to take steps towards fulfillment of the

same. One such as envisaged in Section 10(1)(k) is to grant

approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction of

new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies

concerned. Section 23, which empowers the Council to make

regulations in the manner ordained therein emphatically and

specifically, mandates the making of such regulations only not

inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and the rules. The Act, for

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all purposes and throughout maintain the distinct identity and

existence of `technical institutions and `universities and it is in

keeping tune with the said dichotomy that wherever the University or

the activities of the University is also to be supervised or regulated

and guided by the AICTE, specific mention has been made of the

University alongside the technical institutions and wherever the

University is to be left out and not to be roped in merely refers to the

technical institution only in Sections 10, 11 and 22(2)(b). It is

necessary and would be useful to advert to Section 10(1)(c),(g),(o)

which would go to show that Universities are mentioned alongside the

`technical institutions and clauses (k),(m),(p),(q),(s) and (u) wherein

there is conspicuous omission of reference to Universities and

reference being made to technical institutions alone. It is equally

important to see that when the AICTE is empowered to inspect or

cause to inspect any technical institutions in clause (p) of sub-section

(1) of Section 10 without any reservation whatsoever, when it comes

to the question of universities it is confined and limited to ascertaining

the financial needs or its standards of teaching, examination and

research. The inspection may be made or cause to be made of any

department or departments only and that too, in such manner as may

be prescribed as envisaged in Section 11 of the Act. Clause (t) of

sub-section (1) of Section 10 envisages the AICTE to only advice the

UGC for declaring any institution imparting technical education as a

deemed University and not do any such thing by itself. Likewise,

clause (u) of the same provision which envisage the setting up of a

National Board of Accreditation to periodically conduct evaluation of

technical institutions or programmes on the basis of guidelines,

norms and standards specified by it to make recommendation to it, or

to the Council, or to the Commission or to other bodies, regarding

recognition or de-recognition of the institution or the programme. All

these vitally important aspects go to show that the AICTE created

under the Act is not intended to be an Authority either superior to or

supervise and control the Universities and thereby super impose itself

upon such Universities merely for the reason that it is imparting

teaching in technical education or programmes in any of its

Departments or Units. A careful scanning through of the provisions

of the AICTE Act and the provisions of the UGC Act in juxtaposition,

will show that the role of AICTE vis-à-vis the Universities is only

advisory, recommendatory and a guiding factor and thereby sub-

serve the cause of maintaining appropriate standards and qualitative

norms and not as an authority empowered to issue and enforce any

sanctions by itself, except submitting a Report to the UGC for

appropriate action. The conscious and deliberate omission to enact

any such provision in the AICTE Act in respect of Universities is not

only a positive indicator but should be also one of the determining

factors in adjudging the status, role and activities of AICTE vis-à-vis

Universities and the activities and functioning of its departments and

units. All these vitally important facets with so much glaring

significance of the scheme underlying the Act and the language of the

various provisions seem to have escaped the notice of the learned

Judges, their otherwise well-merited attention and consideration in

their proper and correct perspective. The ultra activist view

articulated in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) on the basis of

supposed intention and imagined purpose of the AICTE or the Act

constituting it, is uncalled for and ought to have been avoided, all the

more so when such an interpretation is not only bound to do violence

to the language of the various provisions but also inevitably render

other statutory authorities like UGC and Universities irrelevant or

even as non-entities by making the AICTE a super power with a

devastating role undermining the status, authority and autonomous

functioning of those institutions in areas and spheres assigned to

them under the respective legislations constituting and governing

them.

In Unni Krishnans case (supra), this Court was not concerned

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with issues of the nature now sought to be raised and the

observations made therein in the context of disputes pertaining to the

powers, rights and extent to which the State Legislature or

Government could interfere, regulate or prohibit the rights to establish

and run professional colleges cannot be taken out of their context and

purpose to be pressed into service in this case. As a matter of fact,

even this Court, which formulated a scheme to prevent evils of

capitation fees etc., specifically excluded from its purview colleges

run by the Government and the Universities. Equally, the

consideration in Adhiyaman Engineering College case (supra), the

question was as to the relative scope and extent of control of a

professional engineering college by the State Government in the

teeth of the AICTE Act and the powers exercisable by the AICTE

under the provisions of the said Act, Rules and Regulations made

thereunder. The decisions, the correctness of which are under our

consideration in this case, have not kept into consideration before the

nature and character of the issues raised in the two decisions of this

Court noticed above before relying upon the observations contained

therein in dealing with the rights of an university constituted under a

State enactment, which, apart from the enactment constituting it, is

governed by the provisions of the UGC Act, also made by the

Parliament. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M.

Sambasiva Raos case (supra) has unduly oversimplified and

underscored the status, position, as well as the importance of the

UGC by stating that the UGC was concerned only with the object of

providing grants and financial assistance to educational institutions

and serving as a recommendatory and regulatory body completely

loosing sight of its superior, vital and exclusive role ordained to it by

the Parliament itself as an expert body in regard to Co-ordination

and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or

research and scientific and technical institutions, and the standards

of teaching and examination in universities, even in the absence of

the UGC and that too without a proper and comparative consideration

of the relative scope and effect of the respective role of the UGC as

well as the AICTE.

It is by now well-settled that Parliament has enacted the

University Grants Commission Act, 1956 as well as the AICTE Act,

1987 in the purported exercise of the powers envisaged in Entry 66 of

List-I of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution of India, which reads as

Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for

higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions.

It was permissible for the Parliament to enact a law with the object

and aim of co-ordination and determination of standards among a

particular class or category of institutions, which may deal with

different kinds of education and research as also scientific and

technical institutions of different disciplines and specialised branches

of even such disciplines. The Parliament, while enacting the AICTE

Act, was fully alive to the existence, in full force and effect the

provisions of the UGC Act, 1956, which specifically dealt with the co-

ordination and determination of standards at university level of

institutions as well as institutions for higher studies of the category or

class other than but deemed to be universities and yet roped into the

definition of technical institution only institutions not being a

University as defined in Section 2(i). Apart from so defining technical

Institutions so as to be exclusive of University even in empowering

the AICTE to do certain things, special care seems to have been

conspicuously and deliberately taken to make specific mention of

universities, wherever and whenever alone the AICTE was expected

to interact with universities and University Departments as well as its

constituent Institutions. In the statement of objects to the AICTE Act,

the evil sought to be curbed was stated to be the coming up

indiscriminately of number of private engineering colleges and

polytechnics in complete disregard of the guidelines resulting in

diluted standards, unplanned growth, inadequate facilities and lack of

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infra-structural facilities in them and not of any anomalies arising out

of any university bodies or UGC to even think of either sidelining or

subjugating them by constituting AICTE. The guarded language

employed for the said purpose and deliberate omission to refer to the

universities in Section 10 (1) (k) of the AICTE Act while empowering

AICTE to accord approval for starting new technical institutions and

introduction of new programmes or courses by or in such institutions

cannot be ignored to be of any insignificance. A careful analysis of

the various provisions contained in Sections 10,11 and 22 will further

go to show that the role of interaction conferred upon AICTE vis-a-vis

Universities is limited to the purpose of ensuring the proper

maintenance of norms and standards in the technical education

system so as to conform to the standards laid down by it, with no

further or direct control over such universities or scope for any direct

action except bringing it to the notice of the UGC or other authorities

only, of any lapses in carrying out any directions of the AICTE in this

regard, for appropriate action. While stating that autonomy of

universities should not mean a permission for authoritarian

functioning, the High Courts by the construction placed by them have

virtually allowed such authoritarianism to the AICTE to such an extent

as to belittle the importance and elegant role assigned to the

universities in the Educational system of the country and rendered

virtually subordinate to the AICTE. In our view, that does not seem

to be the object of creating AICTE or passing of the AICTE Act. Such

construction as has been placed by the Court in M. Sambasiva Raos

case (supra) which found favour of acceptance of the Court in the

present case ought to have been avoided and the same could neither

be said to have been intended or was ever in the contemplation of the

Parliament nor should the UGC and the universities been relegated to

a role subordinate to the AICTE. The UGC and universities have

always had and have an accepted and well-merited role of Primacy to

play in shaping as well as stepping up a co-ordinated development

and improvement in the standards of education and research in the

sphere of education. When it is only Institutions other than

universities which are to seek affiliation, it was not correct to state in

the decisions under challenge that an University, which cannot grant

affiliation to a technical institution, cannot grant the same to itself.

Consequently, the conclusions rendered based on the principles for

classifying enactments into `general law and `special law to keep

them within their respective limits or area of operation are not

warranted and wholly uncalled for and do not merit our approval or

acceptance.

The AICTE cannot, in our view, make any regulation in exercise

of its powers under Section 23 of the Act, notwithstanding sub-section

(1), which though no doubt enables such regulations being made

generally to carry out the purposes of the Act, when such power is

circumscribed by the specific limitation engrafted therein to ensure

them to be not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and the

rules. So far as the question of granting approval, leave alone prior

or post, Section 10(1)(k) specifically confines the limits of such power

of AICTE only to be exercised vis-à-vis technical institutions, as

defined in the Act and not generally. When the language is specific,

unambiguous and positive, the same cannot be over-looked to give

an expansive meaning under the pretext of a purposive construction

to perpetuate an ideological object and aim, which also, having

regard to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the AICTE Act,

are not warranted or justified. Therefore, the regulation insofar as it

compels the universities to seek for and obtain prior approval and not

to start any new department or course or programme in technical

education (Regulation 4) and empower itself to withdraw such

approval, in a given case of contravention of the regulations

(Regulation 12) are directly opposed to and inconsistent with the

provisions of Section 10(1)(k) of the Act and consequently void and

unenforceable.

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The fact that the regulations may have the force of law or when

made have to be laid down before the legislature concerned do not

confer any more sanctity or immunity as though they are statutory

provisions themselves. Consequently, when the power to make

regulations are confined to certain limits and made to flow in a well

defined canal within stipulated banks, those actually made or shown

and found to be not made within its confines but outside them, the

courts are bound to ignore them when the question of their

enforcement arise and the mere fact that there was no specific relief

sought for to strike down or declare them ultra vires, particularly when

the party in sufferance is a respondent to the lis or proceedings

cannot confer any further sanctity or authority and validity which it is

shown and found to obviously and patently lack. It would, therefore,

be a myth to state that regulations made under Section 23 of the Act

have Constitutional and legal status, even unmindful of the fact that

anyone or more of them are found to be not consistent with specific

provisions of the Act itself. Thus, the regulations in question, which

the AICTE could not have made so as to bind universities/UGC within

the confines of the powers conferred upon it, cannot be enforced

against or bind an University in the matter of any necessity to seek

prior approval to commence a new department or course and

programme in technical education in any university or any of its

departments and constituent institutions.

To put it in a nutshell, a reading of Section 10 of AICTE Act will

make it clear that whenever the Act omits to cover a `University, the

same has been specifically provided in the provisions of the Act. For

example, while under clause (k) of Section 10 only `technical

institutions are referred to, clause (o) of Section 10 provides for the

guidelines for admission of students to `technical institutions and

`Universities imparting technical education. If we look at the

definition of a `technical institution under Section 2(h) of the Act, it is

clear that a `technical institution cannot include a `University. The

clear intention of the Legislature is not that all institutions whether

University or otherwise ought to be treated as `technical institutions

covered by the Act. If that was the intention, there was no difficulty

for the Legislature to have merely provided a definition of `technical

institution by not excluding `University from the definition thereof and

thereby avoided the necessity to use alongside both the words

`technical institutions and University in several provisions in the Act.

The definition of `technical institution excludes from its purview a

`University. When by definition a `University is excluded from a

`technical institution, to interpret that such a clause or such an

expression wherever the expression `technical institution occurs will

include a `University will be reading into the Act what is not provided

therein. The power to grant approval for starting new technical

institutions and for introduction of new courses or programmes in

consultation with the agencies concerned is covered by Section 10(k)

which would not cover a `University but only a `technical institution.

If Section 10(k) does not cover a `University but only a `technical

institution, a regulation cannot be framed in such a manner so as to

apply the regulation framed in respect of `technical institution to

apply for Universities when the Act maintains a complete dichotomy

between a `University and a `technical institution. Thus, we have to

focus our attention mainly to the Act in question on the language

adopted in that enactment. In that view of the matter, it is, therefore,

not even necessary to examine the scope of other enactments or

whether the Act prevails over the University Act or effect of competing

entries falling under Entries 63 to 65 of List-I vis-à-vis Entry 25 of List-

III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

The fact that initially the syndicate of the appellant-university

passed a resolution to seek for approval from AICTE and did not

pursue the matter on those lines thereafter or that the other similar

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entities were adopting such a course of obtaining the same and that

the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra)

taken a particular view of the matter are not reasons which can be

countenanced in law to non-suit the appellant. Nor such reasons

could be relevant or justifying factors to draw any adverse finding

against and deny relief by rejecting the claims of the appellant-

university. We also place on record the statement of the learned

senior counsel for the appellant, which, in our view, even otherwise is

the correct position of law, that the challenge of the appellant with

reference to the Regulation in question and claim of the AICTE that

the appellant-university should seek and obtain prior approval of the

AICTE to start a department or commence a new course or

programme in technical education does not mean that they have no

obligation or duty to conform to the standards and norms laid down

by the AICTE for the purpose of ensuring co-ordinated and integrated

development of technical education and maintenance of standards.

For all the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal and

consequently set aside the judgment under challenge by dismissing

the writ petition filed in the High Court. Having regard to the position

of law declared by us, the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court

reported in M. Sambasiva Raos case (supra) cannot also be

considered to lay down the correct position of law. No costs.

J.

[ S. Rajendra Babu ]

J.

[ Doraiswamy Raju ]

September 24, 2001.