2024 INSC 411 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 50 26 OF 2023

BHIKCHAND S/O DHONDIRAM MUTHA (DECEASED)

THROUGH LRS. …. APPELLANT

VERSUS

SHAMABAI DHANRAJ GUGALE (DECEASED)

THROUGH LRS. ...RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

1. The legal issue in this appeal, concerns restitution of a

judgment debtor on a decree being varied, reversed, set aside

or modified as it is statutorily recognised in Section 144 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

1

The decree passed by the Trial

Court in the present case was varied by the appeal court.

1

‘CPC’

2

However, in the meantime, the decree was executed by sale of

the judgment debtor’s property on 23.09.1985 in favour of the

decree holders, including respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

2. After the decree was varied by the Appellate Court, the

appellant/judgment debtor applied for restitution by invoking

Section 144 CPC. The Trial Court, Appellate Court and the

second Appellate Court as well, under impugned judgment have

rejected the appellant/Judgment debtor’s application for

restitution inter alia on the ground that the original decree was

modified to the extent of interest payable and the judgment

debtor not having deposited any amount in the court after the

original decree and the property was put in auction, is not

entitled to restitution.

3. Before proceeding to deal with the legal issue, few

relevant facts need to be referred which are stated intra:

3.1. Dhanraj, the husband of t he original plaintiff -

Shamabai Dhanraj Gugale advanced loan of Rs. 8,000/- to the

original defendant – appellant/judgment debtor in the year

1969. Upon his failure to repay the debt, the original plaintiff

instituted a Special Civil Suit No. 255 of 1972 for recovery of

3

Rs. 10,880/- (Rs.8,000/- as principal amount + Rs. 2880/- as

accrued interest) along with interest @ 12% per annum

pendente lite and post decree and for other ancillary reliefs and

costs. On 15.02.1982, the 4

th

Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division,

Pune partly decreed the suit by awarding the principal amount;

pre-suit accrued interest; pendente lite and further interest at

the rate of 12% per annum till realization of the principal

amount and costs. The original plaintiff-decree holder preferred

appeal against rejection of part of the claim. In this appeal

(C.A. No. 1293 of 1986), the judgment debtor preferred cross

objections. During the pendency of the above first appeal, the

plaintiff-decree holder also preferred execution application

which came to be transferred to the court of Civil Judge, Senior

Division, Ahmednagar because the property belonging to the

judgment debtor against which the decretal amount was to be

recovered fell within the jurisdiction of Ahmednagar court. A

special Darkhast No. 100 of 1982 came to be filed in the

Ahmednagar court on 20.09.1982 . In these execution

proceedings, the decree holder sought attachment and sale of

the following properties of the judgment debtor for satisfaction

of the decree:

4

(1). The land situate at Mauje Davtakli, Taluka

Shevgaon, District Ahmednagar at Gut No. 72,

admeasuring approximately 9 Hectares 55 Are.

(approximately 24 acres);

(2). land situate at Mauje Davtakli, Taluka

Shevgaon, District-Ahmednagar at Gut No. 280,

admeasuring approximately 0 Hectare 48 Are.

(3). Three House Property bearing nos. 13, 23 and

8 situate at Mauje Devtakli, Taluka Shevgaon, District

Ahmednagar.

3.2. The civil appeal preferred by the original plaintiff

came to be dismissed by the district court on 02.08.1988 and

at the same time the defendant’s cross objections were allowed

to the extent of interest and cost. The appellate court reduced

the interest from 12% per annum to 6% per annum for both

pre-suit and pendente lite/future interest and further directed

the parties to bear their own costs. As a result, the appellate

decree, while retaining the principal decretal amount of Rs.

8,000/-, reduced the pre-suit interest from Rs. 2880/- to Rs.

1440/- and the pendente lite interest from Rs. 15360/- to Rs.

7680/- and denied costs of Rs. 1454/- altogether. The total

decretal amount of Rs.27694/ - thus stood reduced to R s.

17120/-.

3.3. Before the decision rendered by the appellate court

reducing the decretal amount, as above, the plaintiff/decree

5

holder executed the decree and the properties of the

defendant/judgment debtor as mentioned (supra) were put to

auction and were purchased by the original plaintiffs/decree

holders themselves for a sum of Rs. 34000/- in the auction

dated 09.08.1985 which was confirmed by the Executing Court

i.e. 2

nd

Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmednagar in Special

Darkhast No. 100 of 1982 on 23.09.1985. The first property in

auction admeasuring 24 acres was subsequently sold by the

plaintiff in favour of respondent no. 3 herein vide registered

sale deed dated 17.07.2009 for a sum of Rs.3.9 Lakhs.

3.4. on 29.01.1990, the present appellant/judgment

debtor moved an application for restitution under Section 144

CPC on the ground that the original decree having been varied,

substantially, the execution sale deserves to be set aside and

reversed by way of restitution. The appellant/judgment debtor

also deposited the entire decretal amount (as finally decreed by

the appeal court) in the Trial Court. As noted above, the courts

below have concurrently rejected the appellant/judgment

debtor’s application for restitution basing the reasoning that he

had not deposited any amount in court , when the suit was

6

originally decreed and the decree was put in execution, and not

even a part of the amount which was finally decreed by the

appeal court was deposited, hence, the principle of restitution is

not invokable.

4. Mr. D.N. Goburdhan, learned senior counsel

appearing for the appellant/judgment debtor has strenuously

urged that the auction purchaser, being the decree holder, in

the present case, is not entitled to any equity, which a bona

fide auction purchaser with no knowledge of the litigation, or

the pending appeal would have in such matter. Reliance is

placed on Binayak Swain vs. Ramesh Chandra Panigrahi &

Anr

2

. & Chinnamal & Ors. Vs. Arumugham & A nr

3

. It is

further argued that even an assignee of a decree holder/auction

purchaser (respondent no. 3 herein) cannot be equated with a

bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Reference is made

to the decision of this Court in Padanathil Rugmini Ama Vs.

P.K. Abdulla

4

. It is then argued that where a decree holder

himself is an auction purchaser, the sale cannot stand not only

in the case of reversal of a decree but also on any variation or

2

AIR 1966 SC 948

3

AIR 1990 SC 1828

4

(1996) 7 SCC 668

7

modification of it. It is submitted that the judgment debtor’s

right under Section 144 CPC is ignited immediately after

reversal or modification of the decree. Referring to South

Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. State of M.P. & Ors.

5

, it is

argued that the principles enshrined in Section 144 CPC have to

be given the widest possible meaning, therefore, even in case

of variation or modification of decree, restitution must follow.

Reference is also made to Chinnamal (supra).

5. Learned senior counsel for the appellant would highlight

that the decree holder in the present case enjoyed harvesting

24 acres of land for over 25 years and then sold the said land

for a sum of Rs. 39 lakhs on 17.07.2009 to respondent no. 3

who was gambling on the litigation. He had full knowledge of

the litigation which is reflected from the recital in the sale deed

(in para 4 of the sale deed) wherein he agreed that if the

decree holder loses the litigation, Rs. 39 lakhs would be paid

back to him (to the purchaser) without interest. This crucial

point was not noticed by the courts below as probably, the said

information was not made available to the court. Such

subsequent purchaser can never be treated as bona fide

5

(2003) 8 SCC 648

8

purchaser as held in the matter of Chinnamal (supra),

Gurjoginder Singh vs. Jaswant Kaur & Anr.

6

& Padanathil

(supra).

6. Per contra, Mr. Vinay Navare learned senior counsel

appearing for respondent nos. 1 and 2 would submit that even

assuming that the modified decree was for Rs. 17120/-, auction

sale by the Executing Court was inevitable and the appellant

cannot claim for setting aside the sale and his only right is to

recover the amount of difference i.e. Rs. 10574/- under Section

144 CPC. It is argued that the appellant/defendant remained

absent during the proceedings, and he entered into two

agreements to defraud the respondent/plaintiff which has been

noted by the Executing Court while rejecting his objections to

the attachment and sale of the said property. Insofar as the

valuation of the property mentioned in the attachment

Panchanama under Rule 54 of Order XXI it is argued that the

rule itself does not contemplate valuation at the time of

attachment. It is then argued that the contention regarding

hurried auction cannot be raised in the proceedings under

Section 144 CPC for which there are various provisions in Order

6

(1994) 2 SCC 368

9

XXI CPC which can be invoked in the course of the execution

proceedings. The appellant having not invoked any such

provisions, the same cannot be raised in proceeding under

Section 144 CPC. It is also submitted that Order XXI is a self-

contained code and Principal of Estoppel would apply because

the appellant, having accepted the conclusion of auction

proceedings and choosing not to challenge the same, is now

estopped from questioning the validity of the auction.

7. Learned counsel would further submit that the judgments

referred by the appellant in the matter of South Eastern Coal

Field (supra) has no application in the facts of the present

case. It is further put forth that difference in the value of the

property in the year 1985 and 2009 also cannot be allowed to

be raised, as it is alien to jurisprudence under Section 144 CPC.

According to the learned counsel, the provisions contained in

Section 144 CPC need to be read in correct perspective and

restitution can be ordered in appropriate case, when decree is

set aside, but restitution is not the only way of compensating

the party under Section 144 CPC. Laying emphasis on the

words “restitution or otherwise” in Section 144 CPC, it is

10

vehemently argued that the wordings clearly show such

legislative intention that restitution is not the only way of

compensating the party and the judgment debtor can be

granted relief by way of compensation or interest , in

appropriate case.

8. Mr. K. Parameshwar learned counsel appearing for

respondent no. 3 would submit that the said respondent ha d

purchased the subject property vide sale deed dated

17.07.2009 as a bona fide purchaser for value. He would refer

to the conduct of the appellant throughout the litigation

including the execution proceedings wherein he did not prefer

any appeal against the trial court’s decree nor against the

confirmation of sale by the Executing Court. It is argued that

the cases relied upon by the appellant/judgment debtor are in

respect of reversal of decree whereas the present is one of

variation of the decree and not of reversal.

9. Mr. Parameshwar would submit that the

appellant/judgment debtor is not entitled for restitution, and he

had no means to pay the reduced decretal amount, therefore,

the sale was inevitable. Reference is made to Kuppa Sankara

11

Sastri & Ors. Vs. Kakumanu Varaprasad & Anr.

7

so also

Lal Bhagwant Singh vs. Sri Kishen Das

8

& South Eastern

Coalfields Ltd. (supra).

10. It is next argued by Mr. Parameshwar that the

appellant/judgment debtor is not entitled to restitution against

respondent no. 3 who purchased the property from the decree

holder. Reference is made to Chinnamal (supra) & Padanathil

(supra). Alternatively, it is argued by Mr. Parameshwar that

extent of variation in the decree/order is an important factor to

be considered by the Court in view of the language employed in

Section 144 CPC providing restitution will be made “so far as

may be ”in the context of“ insofar as a decree is varied or

reversed”. It is argued that the restitution to the judgment

debtor shall be in proportion to the variation/modification made

in the decree so that equitable justice is done to subsequent

purchaser as well. The conduct of the party and lapse of time

from the date of variation of decree and when the restitution is

going to be ordered as well as the third-party interest are other

factors which need to be considered while ordering restitution.

7

AIR 1948 MAD.12

8

(1953) SCR 559

12

ANALYSIS

11. The statutory mandate for restitution is contained in

Section 144 CPC which is reproduced hereunder:

“144. Application for restitution.—(1) Where and in so far

as a decree [or an order] is [varied or reversed in any

appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or

modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the Court

which passed the decree or order] shall, on the

application of any party entitled in any benefit by way of

restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be

made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the

position which they would have occupied but for such

decree [or order] or [such part thereof as has been

varied, reversed, set aside or modified]; and , for this

purpose, the Court may make any orders, including

orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of

interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits,

which are properly [consequential on such variation,

reversal, setting aside or modification of the decree or

order].

[Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section (1) the

expression “Court which passed the decree or order” shall

be deemed to include,— (a) where the decree or order

has been varied or reversed in exercise of appellate or

revisional jurisdiction, the Court of first instance; (b)

where the decree or order has been set aside by a

separate suit, the court of first instance which passed

such decree or order; (c) where the Court of first instance

has ceased to exist or has ceased to have jurisdiction to

execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree

or order was passed were instituted at the time of making

the application for restitution under this section, would

have jurisdiction to try such suit.]

(2) No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining

any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by

application under sub-section (1).”

13

The principle behind the order of restitution made after the

original decree is reversed or varied or modified has been

explained by this Court in the matter of South Eastern Coal

Fields (supra) in the following words in paras 26, 27 & 28:

“26. In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of

this submission. The word “restitution” in its etymological

sense means restoring to a party on the modification,

variation or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost

to him in execution of decree or order of the court or in

direct consequence of a decree or order (see Zafar

Khan v. Board of Revenue, U.P. [1984 Supp SCC 505 : AIR

1985 SC 39] ) In law, the term “restitution” is used in three

senses: (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its

rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits

derived from a wrong done to another; and (iii)

compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another.

(See Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edn., p. 1315). The Law of

Contracts by John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo has been

quoted by Black to say that “restitution” is an ambiguous

term, sometimes referring to the disgorging of something

which has been taken and at times referring to

compensation for injury done:

“Often, the result under either meaning of the

term would be the same. … Unjust

impoverishment as well as unjust enrichment is

a ground for restitution. If the defendant is

guilty of a non-tortious misrepresentation, the

measure of recovery is not rigid but, as in other

cases of restitution, such factors as relative

fault, the agreed-upon risks, and the fairness of

alternative risk allocations not agreed upon and

not attributable to the fault of either party need

to be weighed.”

The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognized in

Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section

144 CPC speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed,

set aside or modified but also includes an order on a par

with a decree. The scope of the provision is wide enough so

as to include therein almost all the kinds of variation,

14

reversal, setting aside or modification of a decree or order.

The interim order passed by the court merges into a final

decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favour of

a party, stands reversed in the event of a final decision

going against the party successful at the interim stage.

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the successful party

at the end would be justified with all expediency in

demanding compensation and being placed in the same

situation in which it would have been if the interim order

would not have been passed against it. The successful party

can demand (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the

opposite party under the interim order of the court, or (b) to

make restitution for what it has lost; and it is the duty of

the court to do so unless it feels that in the facts and on the

circumstances of the case, the restitution far from meeting

the ends of justice, would rather defeat the same. Undoing

the effect of an interim order by resorting to principles of

restitution is an obligation of the party, who has gained by

the interim order of the court, so as to wipe out the effect of

the interim order passed which, in view of the reasoning

adopted by the court at the stage of final decision, the court

earlier would not or ought not to have passed. There is

nothing wrong in an effort being made to restore the parties

to the same position in which they would have been if the

interim order would not have existed.

27. Section 144 CPC is not the fountain source of

restitution, it is rather a statutory recognition of a pre-

existing rule of justice, equity and fair play. That is why it is

often held that even away from Section 144 the court has

inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do

complete justice between the parties. In Jai

Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari [(1922) 49 IA 351: AIR 1922

PC 269] Their Lordships of the Privy Council said: (AIR p.

271)

“It is the duty of the court under Section 144 of the

Civil Procedure Code to ‘place the parties in the

position which they would have occupied, but for

such decree or such part thereof as has been varied

or reversed’. Nor indeed does this duty or

jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is

inherent in the general jurisdiction of the court to

act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances

towards all parties involved.”

15

Cairns, L.C. said in Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompte de

Paris [(1871) 3 PC 465: 7 Moo PCC NS 314: 17 ER 120]:

(ER p. 125)

“[O]ne of the first and highest duties of all courts

is to take care that the act of the court does no

injury to any of the suitors, and when the

expression, ‘the act of the court’ is used, it does

not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of

any intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the

court as a whole, from the lowest court which

entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the

highest court which finally disposes of the case.”

This is also on the principle that a wrong order should not

be perpetuated by keeping it alive and respecting it (A.

Arunagiri Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami [(1971) 1 MLJ 220]). In

the exercise of such inherent power the courts have applied

the principles of restitution to myriad situations not strictly

falling within the terms of Section 144.

28. That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a

rule confined to an erroneous act of the court; the “act of

the court” embraces within its sweep all such acts as to

which the court may form an opinion in any legal

proceedings that the court would not have so acted had it

been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor

attracting applicability of restitution is not the act of the

court being wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the

court; the test is whether on account of an act of the party

persuading the court to pass an order held at the end as not

sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an advantage

which it would not have otherwise earned, or the other party

has suffered an impoverishment which it would not have

suffered but for the order of the court and the act of such

party. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts

and circumstances of a given case, may take into

consideration not only what the party excluded would have

made but also what the party under obligation has or might

reasonably have made. There is nothing wrong in the

parties demanding being placed in the same position in

which they would have been had the court not intervened by

its interim order when at the end of the proceedings the

court pronounces its judicial verdict which does not match

with and countenance its own interim verdict. Whenever

called upon to adjudicate, the court would act in conjunction

16

with what is real and substantial justice. The injury, if any,

caused by the act of the court shall be undone and the gain

which the party would have earned unless it was interdicted

by the order of the court would be restored to or conferred

on the party by suitably commanding the party liable to do

so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not

disastrous consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful

industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an

element of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants

may feel encouraged to approach the courts, persuading the

court to pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by

making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to be

heard and determined on merits and if the concept of

restitution is excluded from application to interim orders,

then the litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the

benefits yielding out of the interim order even though the

battle has been lost at the end. This cannot be

countenanced. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the

successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in

terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be

compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable

rate for the period for which the interim order of the court

withholding the release of money had remained in

operation.”

12. The principle explained by this Court in South Eastern

Coal Fields (supra) as extracted above is to the effect that

Section 144 CPC statutorily recognises a pre-existing rule of

justice, equity and fair play. That is why it is often held that

even away from Section 144 the court has inherent jurisdiction

to order restitution so as to do complete justice between the

parties as held by Privy Council in Jai Berham vs. Kedar Nath

Marwari

9

. It is also explained that the factor attracting

applicability of restitution is not the act of the court being

9

AIR 1922 PC 269

17

wrongful or a mistake or error committed by the court; the test

is whether on account of an act of the party persuading the

court to pass an order held at the end as not sustainable, has

resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not

have otherwise earned.

13. In the matter of Binayak Swain (supra), this Court held

that the obligation for restitution arises automatically on the

reversal or modification of the decree and necessarily carries

with it the right to restitution of all that has been done under

the erroneous decree; and the Court in making restitution is

bound to restore the parties, so far as they can be restored to

the same position they were in at the time when the Court by

its erroneous action had displaced them from.

14. Drawing the distinction between a decree holder who

himself is the auction purchaser and a third-party auction

purchaser, this Court in Binayak Swain (supra) approved an

earlier judgment of Privy Council in the matter of Zain-Ul-

Abdin Khan vs. Muhammad Asghar Ali Khan

10

to reiterate

that “great distinction between the decree-holders who came

10

(1888)ILR 10 ALL 166 (PC)

18

in and purchased under their own decree, which was afterwards

reversed on appeal, and the bona fide purchasers who came in

and bought at the sale in execution of the decree to which they

were no parties, and at a time when that decree was a valid

decree, and when the order for the sale was a valid order”. It is

categorically held that where the decree holder is himself the

auction purchaser, the sale cannot stand , if the decree is

subsequently set aside.

15. In the matter of Chinnamal (supra), this Court again

dealt with the distinction between the decree holder who

purchased the property in execution of his own decree, which is

afterwards modified or reversed, and a person who is not a

party to the decree. This Court held thus in paras 10 and 11:

“10. There is thus a distinction maintained between the

decree holder who purchases the property in execution of

his own decree, which is afterwards modified or reversed,

and an auction purchaser who is not party to the decree.

Where the purchaser is the decree holder, he is bound to

restore the property to the judgment debtor by way of

restitution but not a stranger auction purchaser. The latter

remains unaffected and does not lose title to the property

by subsequent reversal or modification of the decree. The

courts have held that he could retain the property since he

is a bona fide purchaser. This principle is also based on the

premise that he is not bound to enquire into correctness of

the judgment or decree sought to be executed. He is thus

distinguished from an eo nomine party to the litigation.

19

11. There cannot be any dispute on this proposition, and it

is indeed based on a fair and proper classification. The

innocent purchaser whether in voluntary transfer or judicial

sale by or in execution of a decree or order would not be

penalised. The property bona fide purchased ignorant of the

litigation should be protected. The judicial sales in particular

would not be robbed of all their sanctity. It is a sound rule

based on legal and equitable considerations. But it is difficult

to appreciate why such protection should be extended to a

purchaser who knows about the pending litigation relating to

the decree. If a person ventures to purchase the property

being fully aware of the controversy between the decree

holder and judgment debtor, it is difficult to regard him as a

bona fide purchaser. The true question in each case,

therefore, is whether the stranger auction purchaser had

knowledge of the pending litigation about the decree under

execution. If the evidence indicates that he had no such

knowledge he would be entitled to retain the property

purchased being a bona fide purchaser and his title to the

property remains unaffected by subsequent reversal of the

decree. The court by all means should protect his purchase.

But if it is shown by evidence that he was aware of the

pending appeal against the decree when he purchased the

property, it would be inappropriate to term him as a bona

fide purchaser. In such a case the court also cannot assume

that he was a bona fide or innocent purchaser for giving him

protection against restitution. No assumption could be made

contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case and any

such assumption would be wrong and uncalled for.”

16. Whether a third-party auction purchaser who had the

knowledge of the pending proceedings can resist restitution has

been answered against such auction purchaser in paras 14, 16

& 17 of Chinnamal (supra)

“14. This proposition, we are, however, unable to accept.

In our opinion, the person who purchases the property in

court auction with the knowledge of the pending appeal

against the decree cannot resist restitution. His knowledge

about the pending litigation would make all the difference

20

in the case. He may be a stranger to the suit, but he must

be held to have taken calculated risk in purchasing the

property. Indeed, he is evidently a speculative purchaser,

and, in that respect, he is in no better position than the

decree holder purchaser. The need to protect him against

restitution, therefore, seems to be unjustified. Similarly,

the auction purchaser who was a name lender to the

decree holder or who has colluded with the decree holder

to purchase the property could not also be protected to

retain the property if the decree is subsequently reversed.

16. This is also the principle underlying Section 144 of the

Code of Civil Procedure. It is the duty of all the courts as

observed by the Privy Council “as aggregate of those

tribunals” to take care that no act of the court in the

course of the whole of the proceedings does an injury to

the suitors in the court. The above passage was quoted in

the majority judgment of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S.

Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602, 672: 1988 SCC (Cri) 372] .

Mukharji, J., as he then was, after referring to the said

observation of Lord Cairns, said: (SCC p. 672, para 83)

“No man should suffer because of the mistake of

the court. No man should suffer a wrong by

technical procedure of irregularities. Rules or

procedures are the handmaids of justice and not

the mistress of the justice. Ex debito justitiae,

we must do justice to him. If a man has been

wronged so long as it lies within the human

machinery of administration of justice that

wrong must be remedied.”

17. It is well to remember that the Code of Civil Procedure

is a body of procedural law designed to facilitate justice

and it should not be treated as an enactment providing for

punishments and penalties. The laws of procedure should

be so construed as to render justice wherever reasonably

possible. It is in our opinion, not unreasonable to demand

restitution from a person who has purchased the property

in court auction being aware of the pending appeal against

the decree.”

17. In the matter of Padanathil Ruqmini Amma (supra),

this Court while dealing with somewhat similar fact situation (as

21

in the case in hand) wherein a decree holder himself became

the auction purchaser and later on leased out the property to a

third party who in turn sold to another one and then this man

again sold out to a fourth person, held thus in paras 10, 11, 14,

15,16 and 17:

“10. It is, however, contended by the respondent that he is

a lessee from the decree -holder auction-purchaser. The

appellant cannot seek restitution of properties leased to him

by the decree-holder auction-purchaser. The lease in his

favour is protected, he being a third party to the court

proceedings and the auction sale. This contention has been

upheld by the Kerala High Court and is challenged before us.

Now, under Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code where

and insofar as a decree or an order is varied or reversed or

is set aside, the court which passed the decree or order,

shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit

by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to

be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the

position which they would have occupied but for such decree

or order. For this purpose, the court may make such orders

including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment

of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits,

which are properly consequential on such variation,

reversal, setting aside or modification of the decree or order.

11. In the present case, as the ex parte decree was set

aside, the judgment-debtor was entitled to seek restitution

of the property which had been sold in court auction in

execution of the ex parte decree. There is no doubt that

when the decree-holder himself is the auction-purchaser in

a court auction sale held in execution of a decree which is

subsequently set aside, restitution of the property can be

ordered in favour of the judgment-debtor. The decree-holder

auction-purchaser is bound to return the property. It is

equally well settled that if at a court auction sale in

execution of a decree, the properties are purchased by a

bona fide purchaser who is a stranger to the court

proceedings, the sale in his favour is protected and he

cannot be asked to restitute the property to the judgment-

debtor if the decree is set aside. The ratio behind this

22

distinction between a sale to a decree-holder and a sale to a

stranger is that the court, as a matter of policy, will protect

honest outsider purchasers at sales held in the execution of

its decrees, although the sales may be subsequently set

aside, when such purchasers are not parties to the suit. But

for such protection, the properties which are sold in court

auctions would not fetch a proper price and the decree -

holder himself would suffer. The same consideration does

not apply when the decree-holder is himself the purchaser

and the decree in his favour is set aside. He is a party to the

litigation and is very much aware of the vicissitudes of

litigation and needs no protection.

14. In the case of Satis Chandra Ghose v. Rameswari

Dasi [AIR 1915 Cal 363: 20 CWN 665], the Calcutta High

Court relied upon these observations of the Privy Council

and held that the decree-holders and those who claim under

decree-holders will form one class as against strangers to

the decree who purchase in a court auction sale. The title of

a purchaser from one who has bought at the sale in

execution of his own decree is liable to be defeated when

the decree is subsequently set aside. The Calcutta High

Court said:

“The Court as a matter of policy has a tender

regard for honest purchasers at sales held in

execution of its decrees though the sales may be

subsequently set aside, where those purchasers

are not parties to the suit and the decree has not

been passed without jurisdiction. But the same

measure of protection is not extended to

purchasers who are themselves the decree -

holders; nor can the purchasers from such decree-

holders claim that the Court owes them any

duty….”

The policy which prompts the extension of protection to the

strangers who purchase at court auctions is based on a need

to ensure that proper price is fetched at a court auction.

This policy has no application to sales outside the court. The

purchasers from a decree -holder auction-purchaser have

bought from one whose title is liable to be defeated. The

title acquired by the purchaser from the decree -holder is

similarly defeasible. The Court further observed: “… the

defeasibility of a decree-holder's title where the decree is ex

parte is of such common occurrence that the plea of a

purchaser for value without notice hardly applies”.

23

15. The same view has been reaffirmed by the Calcutta High

Court in the case of Abdul Rahman v. Sarat Ali [AIR 1916

Cal 710: 20 CWN 667] where it has been held that the

assignee of a decree-holder auction-purchaser stands in no

better position than his assignor. The special protection

afforded to a stranger who purchases at an execution sale is

not extended to an assignee of the decree-holder auction-

purchaser.

16. The distinction between a stranger who purchases at an

auction sale and an assignee from a decree -holder

purchaser at an auction sale is quite clear. Persons who

purchase at a court auction who are strangers to the decree

are afforded protection by the court because they are not in

any way connected with the decree. Unless they are assured

of title; the court auction would not fetch a good price and

would be detrimental to the decree -holder. The policy,

therefore, is to protect such purchasers. This policy cannot

extend to those outsiders who do not purchase at a court

auction. When outsiders purchase from a decree-holder who

is an auction-purchaser clearly their title is dependent upon

the title of decree-holder auction-purchaser. It is a

defeasible title liable to be defeated if the decree is set

aside. A person who takes an assignment of the property

from such a purchaser is expected to be aware of the

defeasibility of the title of his assignor. He has not

purchased the property through the court at all. There is,

therefore, no question of the court extending any protection

to him. The doctrine of a bona fide purchaser for value also

cannot extend to such an outsider who derives his title

through a decree-holder auction-purchaser. He is aware or is

expected to be aware of the nature of the title derived by

his seller who is a decree-holder auction-purchaser.

17. The High Courts of Patna, Madras and Kerala, however,

appear to have taken a different view. They have equated

an assignee from a decree-holder auction-purchaser with a

stranger auction-purchaser on the basis that an assignee

from a decree -holder auction-purchaser has to be

considered as a bona fide purchaser for value who should

not be allowed to suffer on account of the mistakes or

irregularities committed in a court of law. It is difficult to see

how an assignee from a decree -holder auction-purchaser

can be equated with a bona fide purchaser for value without

notice. He is aware of the nature of the title of his seller or

assignor. He is also aware that the title of his assignor or

24

seller is subject to the doctrine of restitution if the decree is

ultimately set aside particularly in a case where the decree

is an ex parte decree and there is a greater possibility of

such a decree being set aside. The reasons which prompt

the courts to protect strangers who purchase at court

auction sales also do not apply to assignees or purchasers

from a decree-holder auction purchaser. They purchase

outside the court system and cannot expect any protection

from the court. Their title is liable to be defeated if the title

of their seller or assignor is defeated. The view, therefore,

expressed by the Patna High Court in the case of Gopi

Lal v. Jamuna Prasad [AIR 1954 Pat 36:1 BLJ 406] , the

Madras High Court in S. Chokalingam Asari v. N.S. Krishna

Iyer [AIR 1964 Mad 404 : ILR (1964) 1 Mad 923] and the

cases cited therein as also by the Kerala High Court in the

case of Parameswaran Pillai Kumara Pillai v. Chinna

Lakshmi [1970 Ker LJ 450] is not the correct view. The High

Court, therefore, was not right in protecting the lease

created in favour of the respondent by Mohammed Haji who

was a decree-holder auction-purchaser at the sale in

execution of the ex parte decree which was subsequently

set aside.”

18. The judgment in Padanathil Ruqmini Amma

(supra), completely answers the argument raised by Mr. K.

Parameshwar, learned counsel for respondent no. 3 who has

purchased the property from decree holder on 17.07.2009 with

full knowledge of pending restitution proceedings as the same

is contained in the recital in para 4 of the sale deed. Thus, the

purchaser or the assignee from the decree holder is not entitled

to object restitution on the ground that he is a bona fide

purchaser.

25

19. We shall now deal with the arguments raised by Mr.

Navare, learned senior counsel that the valuation of the

attached properties as shown in the attachment panchanama

cannot be the basis to hold that the property of the judgment

debtor valued much more than the decretal sum has been sold

in execution. According to him, Rule 54 of Order XXI CPC does

not contemplate valuation at the time of attachment. This

argument is raised in answer to court’s query that when only a

sum of Rs. 27,694/- was to be realised why all the properties

i.e. three houses approximately valued at Rs. 25,700/-, 9 H 55

Are land valued at Rs. 75,000/- and third property admeasuring

0 H 48 Are valued at Rs. 5,000/- were put to auction.

20. The above stated three properties were attached under

Order XXI Rule 54 CPC and thereafter the Executing Court vide

its order dated 22.10.1982 (Annexure P/4) issued sale notice

under Order XXI Rule 66 CPC for sale of the attached property

by public auction. The object of attachment of immovable

property in course of execution of decree is for realisation of

the decretal amount by way of the sale of the attached property

under Order XXI Rule 66 CPC. The said rule (Order XXI Rule 66

26

CPC) provides for proclamation of sale by public auction. Sub-

rule (2) of Rule 66 CPC needs reference which is reproduced

hereinbelow:

“(2) Such proclamation shall be draw up after notice to the

decree-holder and the judgment-debtor and shall state the

time and place of sale, and specify as fairly and accurately

as possible-

(a) the property to be sold or, where a part of the property

would be sufficient to satisfy the decree, such part;

(b) the revenue assessed upon the estate or part of the

State, where the property to be sold is an interest in an

estate or in part of an estate paying revenue to the

Government;

(c) any incumbrance to which the property is liable;

(d) the amount for the recovery of which the sale is

ordered; and

(e) every other thing which the Court considers material for

a purchaser to know in order to judge of the nature and

value of the property:

Provided that where notice of the date for settling the

terms of the proclamation has been given to the judgement-

debtor by means of an order under rule 54, it shall not be

necessary to give notice under this rule to the judgment-

debtor unless the Court otherwise directs:

Provided further that nothing in this rule shall be

construed as requiring the Court to enter in the

proclamation of sale its own estimate of the value of the

property, but the proclamation shall include the estimate, if

any, given, by either or both of the parties.”

27

21. The above quoted provisions contained in sub-rule (2) of

Rule 66 of Order XXI CPC clearly mandates that the sale

proclamation should mention the estimated value of the

property and such estimated value can also be given under Rule

54 Order XXI CPC. The fact that the Court is also entitled to

enter in the proclamation of sale its own estimate of the value

of the property clearly demonstrates that whenever the

attached immovable property is to be sold in public auction the

value thereof is required to be estimated. In between Rule 54

to Rule 66 of Order XXI CPC, there is no other provision

requiring assessment of value of the property to be sold in

auction.

22. It is also important to bear in mind the provisions

contained in Rule 54(1) Order XXI read with Rule 66 of Order

XXI CPC wherein it is provided that either whole of the attached

property or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to

satisfy the decree shall be sold in auction. If there is no

valuation of the property in the attachment Panchanama and

there being no separate provision for valuation of the property

put to auction, it is to be understood that the valuation of the

28

property mentioned in attachment Panchanama prepared under

Rule 54 can always provide the estimated value of the property

otherwise the provisions enabling the court to auction only a

part of the property which would be sufficient to satisfy the

decree would be unworkable or redundant. In the case in hand,

the assessed value of all the attached properties is Rs.

1,05,700/- whereas the original decretal sum was Rs. 27,694/-

which is about 26.2% of the total value of the property.

Therefore, when only one of the attached properties was

sufficient to satisfy the decree there was no requirement for

effecting the sale of the entire attached properties.

23. In the matter of Balakrishnan vs. Malaiyandi Konar

11

this Court observed thus:

“9. The provision contains some significant words. They are

“necessary to satisfy the decree”. Use of the said expression

clearly indicates the legislative intent that no sale can be

allowed beyond the decretal amount mentioned in the sale

proclamation. (See Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v. Pujari

Padmavathamma [(1977) 3 SCC 337: AIR 1977 SC 1789].)

In all execution proceedings, the court has to first decide

whether it is necessary to bring the entire property to sale

or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy

the decree. If the property is large and the decree to be

satisfied is small the court must bring only such portion of

the property, the proceeds of which would be sufficient to

satisfy the claim of the decree-holder. It is immaterial

11

(2006) 3 SCC 49

29

whether the property is one or several. Even if the property

is one, if a separate portion could be sold without violating

any provision of law only such portion of the property should

be sold. This is not just a discretion, but an obligation

imposed on the court. The sale held without examining this

aspect and not in conformity with this mandatory

requirement would be illegal and without jurisdiction.

(See Ambati Narasayya v. M. Subba Rao [1989 Supp (2)

SCC 693].) The duty cast upon the court to sell only such

property or portion thereof as is necessary to satisfy the

decree is a mandate of the legislature which cannot be

ignored. Similar view has been expressed in S.

Mariyappa v. Siddappa [(2005) 10 SCC 235].

10. In S.S. Dayananda v. K.S. Nagesh Rao [(1997) 4 SCC

451] it was held that the procedural compliance with Order

21 Rule 64 of the Code is a mandatory requirement. This

was also the view expressed in Desh Bandhu Gupta v. N.L.

Anand [(1994) 1 SCC 131].”

24. In Ambati Narasayya vs. M. Subba Rao

12

this Court

has held that in auction sale this is obligatory on Court that

only such portion of property as would satisfy decree is sold

and not the entire property. This court observed thus in paras

6, 7 & 8:

“6. The principal question that has been highlighted before

us relates to the legality of the sale of 10 acres of land

without considering whether a portion of the land could have

been sold to satisfy the decree. It is said that the total sum

claimed in the execution was Rs 2395.50. The relevant

provision which has a bearing on the question is Rule 64

Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure and it reads as

follows: -

“Order XXI Rule 64: Power to order property

attached to be sold and proceeds to be paid to

persons entitled.—Any court executing a decree

may order that any property attached by it and

12

1989 supp (2) SCC 693

30

liable to sale, or such portion thereof as may seem

necessary to satisfy the decree, shall be sold, and

that the proceeds of such sale, or a sufficient

portion thereof, shall be paid to the party entitled

under the decree to receive the same.”

7. It is of importance to note from this provision that in all

execution proceedings, the court has to first decide whether

it is necessary to bring the entire attached property to sale

or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy

the decree. If the property is large and the decree to be

satisfied is small, the court must bring only such portion of

the property, the proceeds of which would be sufficient to

satisfy the claim of the decree holder. It is immaterial

whether the property is one, or several. Even if the property

is one, if a separate portion could be sold without violating

any provision of law only such portion of the property should

be sold. This, in our opinion, is not just a discretion, but an

obligation imposed on the court. Care must be taken to put

only such portion of the property to sale the consideration of

which is sufficient to meet the claim in the execution

petition. The sale held without examining this aspect and

not in conformity with this requirement would be illegal and

without jurisdiction.

8. In Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v. Pujari

Padmavathamma [(1977) 3 SCC 337, 340] this Court after

examining the scope of Rule 64 of Order XXI CPC has taken

a similar view: (SCC p. 340, para 3)

“Under this provision the executing court derives

jurisdiction to sell properties attached only to the

point at which the decree is fully satisfied. The

words ‘necessary to satisfy the decree’ clearly

indicate that no sale can be allowed beyond the

decretal amount mentioned in the sale

proclamation. In other words, where the sale

fetches a price equal to or higher than the amount

mentioned in the sale proclamation and is

sufficient to satisfy the decree, no further sale

should be held, and the court should stop at that

stage.”

25. It is, thus, settled principle of law that court’s power to

auction any property or part thereof is not just a discretion but

an obligation imposed on the Court and the sale held without

31

examining this aspect and not in conformity with this

mandatory requirement would be illegal and without

jurisdiction. In the case at hand, the Executing Court did not

discharge its duty to ascertain whether the sale of a part of the

attached property would be sufficient to satisfy the decree.

When the valuation of three attached properties is mentioned in

the attachment Panchanama, it was the duty of the Court to

have satisfied itself on this aspect and having failed to do so

the Court has caused great injustice to the judgment debtor by

auctioning his entire attached properties causing huge loss to

the judgment debtor and undue benefit to the auction

purchaser. The fact that the properties were sold for a sum of

Rs. 34,000/- would further demonstrate that the decree holder

who himself is the auction purchaser has calculatedly offered a

bid at Rs. 34,000/- despite being aware that the value of the

attached properties is Rs. 1,05,700/-.

26. In view of the above discussion, we are satisfied that the

present is a case where the decree is subsequently

modified/varied, and the decretal amount was reduced from Rs.

27,694/- to Rs. 17,120/-, the sale of all the three attached

32

properties was not at all required and further in the facts and

circumstances of the case variation of the decree read together

with the sale of the properties at a low price has caused huge

loss to the judgment debtor where restitution by setting aside

the execution sale is the only remedy available. It is not a case

where the restitution can be ordered appropriately or suitably

by directing the decree holder to make payment of some

additional amount to the judgment debtor to compensate him

for the loss caused due to sale of his properties. Doing so would

perpetuate the injustice suffered by the judgment debtor.

27. It has been argued that the execution sale cannot be set

aside at this stage when the judgment debtor has not paid any

amount to satisfy the original decree or the modified decree nor

he has challenged the legality of the auction sale on any

permissible ground as contemplated in Order XXI CPC.

However, we are not convinced with this submission made on

behalf of the learned counsel for the respondents for the reason

that we are not per se setting aside the execution sale as if the

present is the proceedings challenging the execution of the

decree by way of sale of the attached immovable properties of

33

the judgment debtor. We are concerned herewith and we have

confined ourselves to the core issue as to whether the present

is a fit and suitable case for exercising power under Section 144

CPC directing restitution in favour of the judgment debtor by

placing the parties in the position which they would have

occupied before such execution and for this purpose the Court

may make any order, as provided under Section 144 CPC. It is

in exercise of this power that we have considered the aspect of

execution of the decree by attachment of whole property when

part of the property could have satisfied the decree. This

examination was necessary to ascertain the extent of injury the

judgment debtor has suffered at the time of execution of the

original decree for Rs. 27,694/- opposite to the modified decree

for Rs. 17,120/-. The execution of a decree by sale of the entire

immovable property of the judgment debtor is not to penalise

him but the same is provided to grant relief to the decree

holder and to confer him the fruits of litigation. However, the

right of a decree holder should never be construed to have

bestowed upon him a bonanza only because he had obtained a

decree for realisation of a certain amount. A decree for

realisation of a sum in favour of the plaintiff should not amount

34

to exploitation of the judgment debtor by selling his entire

property.

28. For the foregoing, the appeal is allowed. The order dated

05.06.2017 passed by the High Court is set aside and the

appellants’ application under Section 144 CPC is allowed and

the sale of the attached properties belonging to the judgment

debtor is set aside and the parties are restored back to the

position where the execution was positioned before the

attachment of the immovable properties of the judgment

debtor. The execution of the modified decree, if not already

satisfied, shall proceed in accordance with law.

………………………………………J.

(HRISHIKESH ROY )

.......…………………………… …. J.

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

NEW DELHI;

May 14, 2024