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2026:CGHC:10682

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

Reserved on 28.01.2026

Delivered on 02.03.2026

ACQA No. 180 of 2020

Bhujrang Sai Paikara, S/o. Late Shri Bidhnath Sai Paikra, aged

about 45 years, r/o. Ward No. 10, Saraipali, PS & Tashil Saraipali,

District Mahasamund. ---- Appellant

Versus

1.State of Chhattisgarh through the Station House Officer, Police

Station Saraipali, District Mahasamund (CG).

2.Rajkumar Agrawal S/o Late Shri Prahalad Agrawal, aged about 57

years died and deleted vide court order dated 4-12-2025.

3.Saurabh Agrawal, S/o Shri Rajkumar Agrawal, aged about 26

years.

Both respondents No.2 & 3 are residents of Ward No.10,

Saraipali, Police Station and Tehsil Saraipali, District

Mahasamund (CG). ---- Respondents

(Cause Title taken from Case Information System)

For Appellant :Mr. Ayush Lall, Advocate.

For RespondentNo.1/State:Mr. Suresh Tandon, Panel Lawyer.

For Respondent No.3. :Mr. Rajendra Patel, Advocate.

(SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas)

(CAV Order)

1.The appellant has preferred this Acquittal Appeal under Section 372 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment of acquittal

dated 20-2-2020 (Annexure A/1) passed by the learned Special Judge

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under Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund in Special

(Atrocities) Sessions Trial No. H-11/2015 whereby the learned trial

Court has acquitted the accused/respondents No.2 and 3 for

commission of offence under Sections 294, 452, 388/34 of IPC and

Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short “the Act, 1989”).

2.Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 27.07.2014

complainant/appellant made a written complaint (Ex. P/4) before Police

Station Saraipali, District Mahasamund against respondents No.2 and

3 alleging that the complainant/appellant is working as Sub Engineer

in Public Works Department and resident of village Deori, District

Jashpur and his wife is also working as Teacher Panchayat. Out of

their earning they have purchased 23 acres of land situated at

Salhepali through registered sale deed 11-11-2011 from one

Jagbandhu Bhoi, resident of village Belmundi. It is also alleged that

after notice of the fact that the land has been purchased by him,

respondents No.2- Raj Kumar Agrawal and respondent No. 3- Saurabh

Agrawal forcibly entered into the house of the complainant, started

threatening, asking them about source of funds and extorted

Rs.5,00,000/- from him otherwise, news will be published in the

newspaper against them. They have also threatened that the sale

deed would be cancelled.

3.It is also the case of the complainant that the complainant & his wife

informed the accused/respondents No.2 and 3 that they have

purchased the land from their own earnings and they have not done

any illegal work, thereafter, respondent No.2 -Rajkumar Agrawal

abused him by caste and thereafter he left the house. The abuses

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uttered by respondent No.2- Rajkumar were heard by one Lalit Kumar

and other local residents. It has also been contended that son of Raj

Kumar Agrawal namely Soram Agrawal (Goyal) also published the

news against the complainant and started torturing them, therefore,

prayed for taking suitable action against them. On the basis of the

complaint dated 27.07.2014 (Ex.P/4), FIR has been registered against

respondents No. 2 & 3 for commission of offence under Sections 294,

452/34 along with Section 3 (1)(x) of the Act, 1989 reiterating the stand

contained in the complaint. The prosecution after usual investigation

has submitted the charge-sheet before Judicial Magistrate First Class,

Mahasamund on 21.09.2015 for commission of offence under Sections

294, 452, 385, 506, 34 of IPC and Section 3 (1)(x) of the Act, 1989

who has committed the case for trial to the Sessions Judge,

Mahasamund on 19.09.2015.

4.In order to bring home the guilt of accused/respondents, the

prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses namely- Sanjay

Kumar Das (PW/1), Lalit Kumar Barmate (PW/2), Arvind Gilhare

(PW/3), complainant Bhurang Sai Paikra (PW/4), Rupvati Paikra

(PW/5), Keshari Nandan (PW/6), G. Suresh Kumar Samant (PW/7),

Kartik Chand (PW/8), Manoj Kumar Baank (PW/9) & S.S. Paikra

(PW/10) and exhibited documents namely statement of witness

Sanjay Das (Ex.P/1), property seizure memo (Ex.P/2 & 3), Written

complaint to Thana Saraipali (Ex.P/4), FIR (Ex.P/5), Patwari Map

(ExP/6), Crime details form (Ex.P/7), Patwari Panchnama (Ex.P/8),

statement of witness Manoj Kumar Baank (Ex.P/9), officer order of

CEO National Highway, Raipur (Article A-1), order of Zila Panchayat,

Mahasamund (Article A/2) & certified copy of permanent caste

certificate (Article A/3).

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5.Statements of accused/respondents have been recorded under

Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which they denied the allegations leveled

against them and pleaded innocence and falsely implication. It has

also been contended that they have published the news as the

complainant and his wife have purchased the property illegally.

Accused/respondents No.2 and 3 in order to prove their innocence,

have exhibited documents namely statement of Bhujrang Sai (Ex.D/1),

statement of Lalit Kumar Barmarte (Ex.D-1-A), statement of Arvind

Gilhare (Ex.D/2), statement of Smt. Roopmati Painkra (Ex.D/4), Patrika

newspaper dated 1-7-2014 (Ex.D/5), Patrika newspaper Raipur dated

3-7-2014 (Ex.D/6) Patrika newspaper dated 7-7-2014 (Ex.D/7),

information under RTI (Ex.D/8 to 10), copy of the application (Ex.D/11),

postal receipt (Ex.D/12), covering letter of office of Collector,

Mahasamund (Ex.D/13), letter of office of Collector, Mahasamundd

(Ex.D/14), information regarding disaster management (Ex.D/15 &

16), information under RTI to SDO (Ex.D/17), final report (Ex.D/18),

affidavit of Jagbandhu Bhoi (Ex.D/19), letter to Deputy Registrar,

Saraipali, Mahasamund (Ex.D/20), reply of Deputy Registrar Saraipali

(Ex.D/21). Letter to SDO, Revenue, Saraipali (Ex.D/22) and reply of

SDO Revenue, Saraipali (Ex.D/23), identification card of Saurabh

Goyal (Ex.D/24).

6.Learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence and material

available on record vide its judgment dated 20.02.2020 has held that

the prosecution has failed to prove the case against

accused/respondents and thereby acquitted them for the offences as

mentioned in opening paragraph of the judgment. Being aggrieved and

dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of acquittal passed by the

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learned trial Court, the appellant/complainant has filed this Acquittal

Appeal challenging the same. During pendency of the appeal,

accused respondent No. 2-Raj Kumar Agrawal died, therefore, his

name has been deleted from the array of cause title of the appeal vide

order dated 4-12-2025.

7.Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that from the evidence

and material on record, the offence under Section 385 of IPC is clearly

made out still the trial Court has erred in acquitting them on a perverse

finding which is liable to be set aside by this Court. He would further

submit that respondents No.2 & 3 put the complainant in fear of injury

to commit extortion as they have threatened that if the amount of

Rs.5,00,000/- is not paid to them then news against the complainant

will be published in the newspaper, which is nothing but an extortion,

as such the provisions of Section 385 of IPC have been proved by the

prosecution still the trial Court erred in acquitting them. He would

further submit that the accused/respondents No. 2 & 3 in pre-

determined mind has forcibly entered into the house of the

complainant without his permission, therefore, the act committed by

the accused will definitely fall within the definition of criminal trespass

under Section 452 of the IPC for preparation of causing hurt to any

person.

8.He would further submit that the witness- Keshari Nandan (PW/6) has

seen the incident whereby the accused have abused them by caste,

therefore, it cannot be said that there is no material on record to record

such finding that the accused respondents have not committed the

aforesaid offence under the Act, 1989. He would further submit that the

appellant has submitted the caste certificate which was issued by the

competent authority ie., Sub Divisional Officer, Saraipali which is legal

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and in accordance with law laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in

case of Kumari Madhuri Patil Vs. Addl. Commissioner [(1994) 6

SCC 241], as such it should not be ignored by the learned trial Court

while acquitting the accused for the offence under the Act, 1989 as

despite knowing the fact that the appellant belongs to ST community,

the accused have abused him. Thus, he would submit that the finding

recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from perversity or illegality

and same is liable to be set aside and the accused be punished for the

offence which they have committed.

9.On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 & 3

opposing the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant

would submit that presence of Lalit Barmate (PW/2) and Arvind Gilhare

(PW/3) at the time of incident is doubtful as has rightly been observed

by the learned Special Judge in paragraph 38 of the judgment which

cannot be found fault, therefore, finding of the learned trial Court is

legal and justified. He would further submit that S.S. Paikra (PW/10)

Investigating Officer is relative of the complainant as admitted by this

witness itself, therefore, the investigation carried out by him is doubtful.

He would further submit that there is delay of 10 days in lodging the

FIR and no proper explanation has been given by the appellant which

is fatal for the case of the prosecution as it clearly spells out that the

FIR has been lodged with intention to harass the accused. He would

further submit that the offence under Section 3 (1)(x) of the Act, 1989

cannot be held to be committed by the respondents No.2 & 3 as the

alleged incident took place in the house of the complainant which is

not in the public view, therefore, the provisions of Section 3(1)(x) of the

Act, 1989 are not attracted at all. It has also been contended that the

prosecution is unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the

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alleged incident has been taken place knowing the fact that the

complainant belongs to Scheduled Tribe community.

10.He would further submit that the learned trial Court on proper

appreciation of evidence, material on record, has recorded its finding

that the ingredients of offence under the Act, 1989 have not been

proved by the prosecution, thus, the acquittal of the accused is not

liable to be interfered with by this Court. Lastly, he would submit that as

per well settled provisions of law that once order of acquittal has been

passed, it should not be normally interfered unless the findings are so

perverse and even if two views are possible in which one of the views

is favourable to the accused, the same should not be interfered. He

would further submit that there are no such circumstances available on

record which entail this Court to exercise its power under Section 386

of the Cr.P.C. to interfere in the well reasoned finding recorded by the

trial Court while passing the judgment of acquittal in favour of the

accused. Thus, he would pray for dismissal of the appeal.

11.In support of his arguments, he has relied upon the decisions of this

Court in the case of Satrughan Singh Sahu Vs. State of

Chhattisgarh and others, [2022 (1) CGLJ 132] and the judgments

of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta

Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 13 SCC 657], Rathinam Vs. State

of Tamil Nadu [(2011) 11 SCC 140], Babu Sahebagouda & others

Vs. State of Karnataka [(2024) 8 SCC 149], H.D. Sundara & others

Vs. State of Karnataka [(2023) 9 SCC 581], Chandrappa & others

Vs. State of Karnataka [(2007) 4 SCC 415], Rajesh Prasad Vs.

State of Bihar & another [(2022) 3 SCC 47] & Constable 907

Surendra Singh & another Vs. State of Uttarakhand [Criminal

Appeal No. 355/2013].

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12.Learned counsel for the State has also supported the impugned

judgment passed by the learned trial Court and would pray for

dismissal of the appeal.

13.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material

available on record with utmost satisfaction.

14.From records of the trial Court as well as the first appellate court, the

Point emerged for determination of this Court is:-

Point :Whether the trial Court erred in acquitting the accused

under Section 385 of IPC & Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989

by perverse finding, is liable to be interfered with by this

Court?

15.To appreciate this Point, this Court has to not only minutely examine

the evidence as well as the provisions of law applicable in the facts of

the case i.e. Sections 383 & 385 of IPC which defines extortion and

putting person in fear of injury in order to commit extortion.

“Section 383- Extortion- Whoever intentionally puts any

person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and

thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver

to any person any property, or valuable security or anything

signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable

security, commits “extortion”.

Section 385- Putting person in fear of injury in order to

commit extortion- Whoever, in order to the committing of

extortion, puts any person in fear, or attempts to put any person

in fear, of any injury, shall be punished with imprisonment of

either description for a term which may extend to two years, or

with fine, or with both.”

16.From perusal of Section 383 of the IPC, the ingredients of ‘extortion’

are; as under:- (i) the accused must put any person in fear of injury to

that person or any other person; (ii) the putting of a person in such fear

must be intentional; (iii) the accused must thereby induce the person

so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or

anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable

security; (iv) such inducement must be done dishonestly. The terms

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‘dishonestly’, ‘illegally’ and ‘injury’ used in “Section 383 of the IPC and

in “Sections 24, 43 and 44 of the IPC respectively.

17.On a careful consideration of the above definitions and ingredients

what transpired is that if someone puts the others intentionally in fear

to any injury and thereby, dishonestly induces that person who has

been put into fear to deliver to the person any property or valuable

security or anything signed or sealed or which may be converted into

valuable security shall be liable to be punished for ‘extortion’. Thus,

what is necessary for constituting an offence of ‘extortion’ is that the

prosecution must prove that on account of being put in fear of injury,

the complainant has voluntarily delivered any particular property to the

accused putting him into fear. As such, if there was no delivery of

property to the accused then the most important ingredient for

constituting the offence of ‘extortion’ is not made out. Further, if a

person voluntarily delivers any property without there being any fear of

injury, an offence of ‘extortion’ cannot be said to have been committed

by the accused.

18.In the present case, from evidence of the complainant- Bhujrang Sai

(PW-4), it is quite vivid that he has nowhere stated in his evidence

before the trial Court that in view of fear caused by the accused, he

has given any money or deliver any property to the accused. As such

the basic ingredient to attract Section 383 of IPC is missing. Similarly,

wife of the complainant (PW-5) has also not adduced the evidence that

in pursuance of any fear, they have given any money or property to the

accused. The learned trial Court on the basis of evidence has recorded

its finding in paragraph 48 that the prosecution is unable to prove

beyond reasonable doubt that the accused have demanded Rs. 5 lacs

from the complainant and they have given it to the accused. Thus, the

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finding of the learned trial Court that the accused have caused fear

and in pursuance of that fear, the complainant has given the amount,

as such offence of extortion is not made out, cannot held to suffer

from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court.

19.What are the essential ingredients required to be proved by the

prosecution for proving extortion have been examined by Hon’ble the

Supreme Court in case of R.S. Nayak Vs. A.N. Antulay [(1986) 2 SCC

716] wherein it has been held in paragraph 60 as under:-

“60. Before a person can be said to put any person to fear of

any injury to that person, it must appear that he has held out

some threat to do or omit to do what he is legally bound to do in

future.

If all that a man does is to promise to do a thing which he is not

legally bound to do and says that if money is not paid to him he

would not do that thing, such act would not amount to an

offence of extortion. We agree with this view which has been

indicated in Habibul Razak v. King Emperor, AIR 1924 All

197. There is no evidence at all in this case that the

managements of the sugar cooperatives had been put in any

fear and the contributions had been paid in response to threats.

Merely because the respondent was Chief Minister at the

relevant time and the sugar co-operatives had some of their

grievances pending consideration before the Government and

pressure was brought about to make the donations promising

consideration of such grievances, possibly by way of

reciprocity, we do not think the appellant is justified in his

contention that the ingredients of the offence of extortion have

been made out. The evidence led by the prosecution falls short

of the requirements of law in regard to the alleged offence of

extortion. We see, therefore, no justification in the claim of Mr.

Jethmalani that a charge for the offence of extortion should

have been framed”.

20.It is well settled position of law that unless the offence of extortion as

defined under Section 383 of IPC is made out any offence relating to

extortion from Sections 383 to 388 of IPC will also not be made out.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Isaac Isanga Musumba Vs. State

of Maharashtra [2014 (15) SCC 357], has held in paragraphs 3 & 4 as

under:-

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“3. We have read the FIR which has been annexed to the writ

petition as Annexure P-7 and we find therefrom that the

complainants have alleged that the accused persons have

shown copies of international warrants issued against the

complainants by the Ugandan Court and letters written by

Uganda Ministry of Justice & Constitutional Affairs and the

accused have threatened to extort 20 million dollars (equivalent

to Rs. 110 crores). In the complaint, there is no mention

whatsoever that pursuant to the demands made by the

accused, any amount was delivered to the accused by the

complainants. If that be so, we fail to see as to how an offence

of extortion as defined in Section 383, IPC is made out. Section

383, IPC states that whoever intentionally puts any person in

fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby

dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any

person any property, or valuable security or anything signed or

sealed which may be converted into a valuable security,

commits ‘extortion’. Hence, unless property is delivered to the

accused person pursuant to the threat, no offence of extortion is

made out and an FIR for the offence under Section 384 could

not have been registered by the police.

4. We also find on the reading of the FIR, there is also an

allegation that on 18 April, 2013 between 1 p.m. and 5.30 p.m.

the accused persons illegally entered into the Head Office of the

Company at Fort and demanded 20 million dollars (equivalent to

Rs. 110 crores) saying that they have international arrest

warrants against the complainants and upon failure to pay the

said sum the complainants will have to face dire consequences.

It is because of this allegation in the FIR, the offence under

Section 441, IPC is alleged to have been committed by the

accused persons. On reading Section 441, IPC we find that

intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any

person in possession of property is a necessary ingredient of

the offence of criminal trespass. It is not disputed that there was

a business transaction between the accused persons and the

complainants. Hence, if the accused persons have visited the

premises of the complainants to make a demand towards their

dues, we do not think a case of ‘criminal trespass’ as defined in

Section 441, IPC is made out against the accused persons”.

21.From perusal of the aforesaid judgments passed by Hon’ble the

Supreme Court and the evidence brought on record before the trial

Court, it is quite vivid that no valuable assets have been delivered to

the accused by the complainant because of extortion, threaten,

pressure created by the accused. Since the essential ingredients of

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Section 383 of IPC is not made out, the order of acquittal which is

based upon proper appreciation of evidence and material on record, is

not liable to be interfered by this Court. Thus, the acquittal of the

respondents for alleged commission of offence under Section 385 of

IPC, is affirmed.

22.To examine whether the finding recorded by the trial Court acquitting

the accused from the clutches of offence under the Act, 1989, it is

essential for this Court to attract the provisions of Section 3(1)(x) of the

Act, 1989 (before substitution of sub-section 1 (Substituted by Act 1 of

2016 w.e.f. 26.01.2016) which reads as under:-

“3 Punishments for offence of atrocities- (1)Whoever, not

being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—

(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a

member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place

within public view.”

23.From perusal of above-stated position of law, it is quite vivid that

Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 is attracted when the reason for the

intentional insult or intimidation by the accused to the person who is a

member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, is proved by the

prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the offence

under Section 3(1)(x) cannot stand merely on the fact that the

informant/complainant is a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled

Tribe unless the prosecution is able to prove that insult or intimidation

is with the intention to humiliate such a member of the community then

only, it can be held that the offence has been committed by the

accused. As such, it is not enough that if complainant belongs to

Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, the offence can be made out

under the Act, 1989.

24.It is also well settled position of law that there should be sufficient

evidence brought on record by the prosecution that such insult or

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intimidation towards the complainant must be on the account of such

person being a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. To

further clarify it is pertinent to mention here that mere knowledge of the

fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a

Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(x) and as per

Section 3(1)(x), merely abusing a member of a Scheduled Caste or a

Scheduled Tribe is not enough. At the same time, saying caste name

would also not constitute an offence. In other words, to constitute an

offence under Section 3(1)(x) it would be necessary that the accused

abuses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe “by the

caste name” in any place within public view. Thus, the allegations must

reveal that abuses were laced with caste name, or the caste name had

been hurled as an abuse with intention of humiliation as well.

25.The provisions of the Act, 1989 has recently come up for consideration

before Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Shajan Skaria Vs. The

State of Kerala & another [2024 INSC 625] wherein it has been held

in paragraphs 60, 61 & 62 as under:-

“60. Thus, the dictum as laid aforesaid is that the offence under

Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not established merely on the

fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or

a Scheduled Tribe, unless there is an intention to humiliate such

a member for the reason that he belongs to such community. In

other words, it is not the purport of the Act, 1989 that every act

of intentional insult or intimidation meted by a person who is not

a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe to a person

who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would

attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 merely because it is

committed against a person who happens to be a member of a

Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. On the contrary, Section

3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where the reason for the

intentional insult or intimidation is that the person who is

subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled

Tribe. We say so because the object behind the enactment of

the Act, 1989 was to provide stringent provisions for punishment

of offences which are targeted towards persons belonging to the

SC/ST communities for the reason of their caste status.

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a. Meaning of the expression “intent to humiliate” appearing in

Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989

61. The words “with intent to humiliate” as they appear in the

text of Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to

the caste identity of the person who is subjected to intentional

insult or intimidation. Not every intentional insult or intimidation

of a member of a SC/ST community will result into a feeling of

caste-based humiliation. It is only in those cases where the

intentional insult or intimidation takes place either due to the

prevailing practice of untouchability or to reinforce the

historically entrenched ideas like the superiority of the “upper

castes” over the “lower castes/untouchables”, the notions of

‘purity’ and ‘pollution’, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or

intimidation of the type envisaged by the Act, 1989.

62. We would like to refer to the observations of this Court in

Ram Krishna Balothia (supra) to further elaborate upon the idea

of “humiliation” as it has been used under the Act, 1989. It was

observed in the said case that the offences enumerated under

the Act, 1989 belong to a separate category as they arise from

the practice of ‘untouchability’ and thus the Parliament was

competent to enact special laws treating such offences and

offenders as belonging to a separate category. Referring to the

Statements of Objects and Purposes of the Act, 1989 it was

observed by this Court that the object behind the introduction of

the Act, 1989 was to afford statutory protection to the Scheduled

Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, who were terrorized and

subjected to humiliation and indignations upon assertion of their

civil rights and resistance to the practice of untouchability. For

this reason, mere fact that the person subjected to insult or

intimidation belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe

would not attract the offence under Section 3(1)(r) unless it was

the intention of the accused to subject the concerned person to

caste-based humiliation.”

26.From the records, it is quite vivid that the prosecution has produced the

permanent caste certificate to prove caste of the appellant but this is

not the sole evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt regarding

offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, 1989 as the complainant (PW-

4) in his examination-in-chief in paragraph 4 has only stated that the

accused have entered forcibly in his house and thereafter they have

abused him but he has nowhere stated that the accused have

humiliated the complainant by caste in a place which is a public view

knowing that the complainant belongs to ST community. As such, to

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attract the offence, the relevant material has not been produced by the

prosecution as such the learned trial Court has not committed any

illegality in acquitting the accused under the Act, 1989.

27.So far as the offence under Section 452 of IPC is concerned, the

prosecution should prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused

have trespassed the complainant’s house having made preparation for

causing hurt to the complainant or for assaulting the complainant or his

wife or for wrongfully restraining them or for putting them in fear for

hurt or assault then only the offence under Section 452 of IPC can be

made out against the accused, therefore, the question arises as to

what is meant by words "having made preparation" as mentioned in

Section 452 of IPC and as to when a person can be said to have made

"preparation" before committing the house trespass.

28.Black's Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition) defines "preparation" as

under:-

The act or process of devising the means necessary to commit a

crime. Similarly Concise Oxford English dictionary (Twelfth Edition)

defines "preparation" as "The action or process of preparing or being

prepared something done to get ready for an event or undertaking."

29.In the context of Section 452 of IPC "having made preparation",

Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in case of Fakir Chandra De

and others Vs. Emperor, [1921 SCC Online Cal 208], in paragraphs

3 & 6 has held as under:-

"3. Neither the trying Magistrate nor the learned Sessions

Judge who heard the appeal have given their reasons for

holding that Section 452, Penal Code, 1860, is applicable to the

facts of the present case, on the findings there can be no doubt

that house trespass was committed, since it is found that the

three accused entered the verandah of the complainant's

house and dragged him out. But no further fact is found from

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which it can be held that the accused committed house

trespass having made preparation for causing hurt to any

person or for assaulting any person. From the charge framed it

would appear that the Trying Magistrate misunderstood the

provisions of Section 452 since it charges the accused with

having trespassed into the shop of the complainant for the

purpose of assaulting the complainant. This being established

would not be sufficient to support a conviction under Section

452, though it might be for a conviction of the three petitioners

under Section 448, Penal Code, 1860.

6. We, therefore, make this Rule absolute to this extent. The

conviction of the petitioners under Section 452 are altered to

convictions under Section 448, Penal Code, 1860, and the

sentence of each of the petitioners under this section will be a

fine of Rs. 50 each with one fortnight's rigorous imprisonment in

default of payment. The sentence on the petitioner Fakir under

Section 379, Penal Code, 1860, is reduced to a fine of Rs. 50

with one fortnight's rigorous imprisonment in default of

payment. The order as to compensation to complainant will

remain unchanged."

30.Again Single Bench of Rajashthan High Court in case of Dalchand Vs.

State [1964 SCC Online Raj 159] in paragraph 6 has held as under:-

"6. Taking up the first branch of the argument, I must observe

that there is a considerable force in it and it must be accepted.

It is well settled that there must be clear evidence of

preparation for causing hurt to sustain a conviction under sec.

452 Penal Code, 1860. The fact that a person entered another

man's house and committed an assault does not necessarily

presuppose such preparation, for it may be a case of post hoc

ergo propter hoc, The materials on the record of this case show

that the fight between the parties developed on account of the

complainant having protested against the collection of stones

by the accused. The fight was sudden and during the course of

the fight the accused took a 'salia' of the cart and inflicted blow

upon the complainant. In the circumstances of the case, it is

difficult to infer that the accused had made preparation for

causing hurt to the complainant. Mr. Singhi appearing for the

State made no attempt to counter argument on this aspect of

the case."

31.Hon'ble Apex Court in Abhayanand Mishra Vs. State of Bihar [1961

SCC Online SC 67], in paragraph 17 while dealing with term

"preparation" has held as under:-

"17. ........................... The distinction between preparation to

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commit a crime and an attempt to commit it was indicated by

quoting from Mayne's Commentaries on the Indian Penal Code

to the effect:

"Preparation consists in devising or arranging the means or

measures necessary for the commission of the offence; the

attempt is the direct movement towards the commission after

the preparations have been made."

32.Hon'ble the Supreme Court in case of State of MP Vs. Mahendra @

Golu [(2022) 12 SCC 442] in paragraph 14 has defined term

"preparation" as under:-

"14........................ If no overt act is attributed to the accused to

commit the offence and only elementary exercise was

undertaken and if such preparatory acts cause a strong

inference of the likelihood of commission of the actual offence,

the accused will be guilty of preparation to commit the crime,

which may or may not be punishable, depending upon the intent

and import of the penal laws"

17. The word "makes any preparation" point to acts done prior

to a commencement of the execution of the guilty purpose. "The

making of preparation" should be shown to the satisfaction of

the Court by some act, such as, the collection of arms, men,

provisions etc., which, coupled with other circumstances, plainly

manifest the intention to commit the offence. No hard and fast

rule can be laid down that any particular act or any particular

kind of steps towards the commission of an offence are

necessary to constitute " preparation". When one person

intends in his mind to commit an offence and having so

intended does some act towards achieving that end, he has

made preparation for committing that offence.

33.Thus, as per the law discussed above, the preparation means in

devising or arranging the means or measure necessary for

commission of the offence. Whether any overt-act for recording

conviction under Section 452 of IPC would amount to "having made

preparation" would depend on the facts and circumstances of each

case. The law requires that accused should have done some act to get

ready for committing the offence. In the present case, from evidence of

complainant (PW-4) and his wife (PW-5), it is not proved that any

preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restrain has been done by the

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accused which is essential ingredient to attract the Section 452 of IPC,

therefore, the acquittal of the accused by the trial Court for commission

of offence under Section 452 of IPC, cannot be held to suffer from

perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court. Even from

the evidence of the complainant, it is not proved that on account of

extortion money or any valuable asset has been handed over to the

accused by the complainant which may lead to record a finding that on

account of preparation of house-trespass, the extorted money has

been given to the accused. Thus, acquittal of the accused from the

charges under Section 452 of IPC cannot be found fault.

34.From the above stated discussion, evidence on record, it is quite vivid

that the view of the trial Court cannot be held to suffer from illegality or

perversity. From the material brought on record by the prosecution, it

cannot be held that the case of conviction has been made out, as such

the trial Court has committed patent illegality warranting interference

by this Court. The impugned order does not fall within the parameters

set out by Hon’ble the Supreme Court with regard to interference by

the appellate Court in the acquittal appeal. Hon’ble the Supreme Court

in case of Rajesh Prasad Vs. State of Bihar & another [(2022) 3

SCC 471] has held in paragraph 28 as under:-

“28. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled

out the following general principles regarding the powers of the

appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of

acquittal in the following words:

“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the

following general principles regarding powers of the appellate

court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal

emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate

and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is

founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,

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restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an

appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own

conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling

reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong

circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc.

are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate

court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are

more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the

reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to

curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to

come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case

of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the

accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to

him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence

that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is

proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the

accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his

innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by

the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of

the evidence on record, the Comment appellate court should not

disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

35.Thus, there is no perversity or illegality in the impugned order of

acquittal warranting interference by this Court, therefore, the Point

determined by this Court is answered against the appellant and in

favour of respondents No. 2 & 3.

36.Consequently, the instant appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be

dismissed and accordingly, it is hereby dismissed.

Sd/-

(Narendra Kumar Vyas)

Judge

Raju