1   2026:HHC:12483 )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

RSA No. : 226 of 2025

Reserved on 09.04.2026

Decided on : 20.04.2026

Bisham Lal Garg ….Appellant.

Versus

Hardei & Ors. ...Respondents

_________________________________

Coram:

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma. Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

For the appellant Mr. Paresh Sharma, Advocate.

For the respondents Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, Sr. Advocate

with Ms. Sana Rana, Advocate, for

respondents No. 2(i) to 2(iv)

Respondent No.1 proceeded against

ex-parte vide order dated

07.08.2025

__________________________________

Romesh Verma, Judge

The present Regular Second Appeal arises out of

the judgment and decree as passed by the learned District

Judge, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. dated 24.12.2024,

whereby the appeal preferred by the present

appellant/plaintiff has been ordered to be dismissed and

the judgment and decree as passed by the learned Civil

Judge, ( Senior Division), Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, dated

06.12.2007 has been affirmed.

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2   2026:HHC:12483 )

2. The brief facts of the case are that the present

appellant has filed a suit for declaration and permanent

prohibitory injunction and in alternative, decree for

possession in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division),

Bilaspur, District Bilaspur . It was averred in the plaint that

the plaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit land

comprised in Khata/Khatoni No. 52/64, Khasra Nos. 76 and

77, measuring 0-3 bigha situated at Village Bamta, Pargana

& Tehsil Sadar, Bilaspur, as per the copy of jamabandi for

the year 1998-99.

3. It was averred that the plaintiff has purchased

the suit land from previous owner vide sale deed dated

16.11.1993 and thereafter he is in exclusive ownership and

possession of the same. It is further averred that since the

date of execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff is in

exclusive possession of the suit land and house situated

thereon and the defendants have got no right, title and

interest over the suit and the house. Further it was averred

that defendant No.1 in collusion with the revenue staff

misrepresented the facts and got mutation No. 287 entered

in her name through Assistant Collector First Grade in

Khasra No. 251/221/78/1 with respect to the land measuring

3   2026:HHC:12483 )

0-1 bigha on 28.07.1998 and that the land measuring 0-1

bigha was wrongly and illegally provided to her in the

revenue record by deducting the land from the suit land to

which neither the defendant No.1 was entitled under any

law nor the Assistant Collector 1

st

Grade Sadar was

empowered to do such illegal acts.

4. It was further averred that in the previous

revenue records, suit land has been mentioned in revenue

record in the name of previous owners and that the plaintiff

has constructed a cemented retaining wall to cover the suit

land and adjacent land of the plaintiff in the year 1995 and

the plaintiff is enjoying the same peacefully,

uninterruptedly and continuously. Further it was averred

that defendant No.1 had executed the sale deed illegally and

wrongly in favour of the defendant No.2 on 29.01.2001

pertaining to the land which she got illegally carved out in

her own name in collusion with the revenue authorities over

which the defendant No.1 was neither in possession nor the

said land belongs to her in any manner.

5. As per the averments as made in the plaint it

was stated that after the execution of the sale deed, the

defendant No.2 threatened the plaintiff that he will

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dispossess the plaintiff from the suit land as he has

purchased 0-1 bigha of the land which is in possession of

the plaintiff and falls in Khasra Nos. 76 and 77 and the

purchased land has been entered in Khasra No. 251/221.

Since the defendants No. 2 has threatened to dispossess the

plaintiff from the suit land, therefore, decree for

declaration was sought to the effect that the plaintiff is

exclusive owner in possession of the suit land since the

time of executing the sale deed pertaining to the land and

structure standing thereon and the sale deed dated

29.01.2001 executed by defendant No.1 in the name of

defendant No.2 as also changed revenue record is a nullity

being wrong, illegal and without any right, title or interest.

6. In alternative, it was prayed that in case during

the pendency of the suit, if defendants forcibly dispossessed

the plaintiff from the suit land or raised any construction

thereon, a decree for vacant possession after demolishing

the structure be passed in favour of the plaintiff.

7. The suit was contested by the defendants by

filing joint written statement and preliminary objections

with regard to maintainability, cause of action, valuation

etc. were raised. All the averments as made in the plaint

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were refuted and it was pleaded that defendant No.2 is in

peaceful and exclusive possession of the suit land

measuring 0-1 bigha, which has been purchased by him

through a valid and registered sale deed from defendant

No.1.

8. It was denied that defendant No.2 is

threatening the plaintiff to dispossess him from the suit

land since the plaintiff is not in the physical possession of

the same . It was stated that the suit land measuring 0-1

bigha was in the ownership and possession of defendant

No.1 prior to the purchase of the same by defendant No.2. It

has been averred that defendant No.2 has got every right,

title and interest in the suit land to use the same in the

manner as he likes. Consequently, it was prayed that suit

filed by the plaintiff may be ordered to be dismissed.

9. The plaintiff filed replication to the written

statement filed by the defendants and the averments as

made in the plaint were reiterated.

10. The learned trial Court framed the issues on

19.12.2001 and 08.07.2002 in the following manner:

1. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession

of the suit land and the structure situated

therein in accordance with the registered sale

deed dated 16.11.1993, as alleged?...OPP.

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2. Whether the order of mutation No.287, dated

28.07.1998 passed by A.C. Ist Grade is null and

void and illegal as alleged? ...OPP.

3. Whether the sale deed executed by the

defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 on

29.01.2001 is illegal, null and void, as alleged? If

so, its effect?...OPP.

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of

injunction as prayed for against the

defendants?...OPP.

5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of

possession of the suit land in alternative in case

of his dispossession from the suit land during

the pendency of the suit, as alleged?...OPP.

6. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the

present form?...OPD.

7. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi and

cause of action to file the suit?...OPD.

8. Whether the suit has not been properly valued

for the purpose of Court fee and

jurisdiction?...OPD.

9. Whether the defendant No.2 is owner in

possession of 0-1 bigha out of the suit land

being its purchaser from the defendant No.1, as

alleged? ….OPD.

9-A.Whether in the previous revenue record

karilans of the suit land Khasra Nos. 76,77 were

shown as 5 and 5 which after the mutation have

been reduced to 4 and 4 by A.C. Ist Grade

arbitrarily and illegally and land measuring 1

biswa was wrongly and illegally created and was

wrongly deducted from the suit land, as

alleged?....OPP.

9-B.Whether the plaintiff has constructed a

cemented retaining wall to cover the suit land

and adjacent to the land in the year 1995 and

that he is enjoying the same peacefully,

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uninterruptedly without any interference from

any body, as alleged?...OPP.

10.Relief?

11. The learned trial Court directed both the parties

to adduce evidence in support of their contentions and vide

impugned judgment and decree dated 06.12.2007, the suit

filed by the present plaintiff was ordered to be dismissed.

12. Feeling dissatisfied, the present appellant

preferred an appeal in the Court of learned District Judge,

Bilaspur, District Bilaspur on 01.01.2008.Vide judgment and

decree dated 24.12.2024, learned District Judge, Bilaspur

dismissed the appeal as preferred by the plaintiff/appellant

affirming the findings of the learned trial Court.

13. Still feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff/appellant

has filed the present Regular Second Appeal.

14. It is contended by Mr. Paresh Sharma, learned

counsel for the appellant, that the judgments and decrees as

passed by the Courts below are erroneous and liable to be

quashed and set-aside. He has submitted that the Courts

below have not appreciated the point in controversy and

have rendered the findings which are unsustainable and

perverse.

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15. On the other hand, Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala,

learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Sana Rana,

Advocate appearing for respondents No. 2(i) to 2(iv), has

defended the judgments and decrees as passed by the Courts

below by stating that both the Courts below have rightly

appreciated the point in controversy and after taking into

consideration, each and every material aspect of the matter,

the judgments have been passed by the Courts below.

Further it is contended that there are concurrent findings

of fact by the Courts below which do not call for any

interference,therefore, the present appeal deserves to be

dismissed.

16. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties

and have gone through the case file carefully.

17. With the consent of the parties, the present

appeal is finally heard at the admission stage.

18. It is the precise case of the plaintiff/appellant

that mutation No. 287 has been wrongly attested in favour

of defendant No.1 with respect to the suit land measuring 0-

1 bigha comprised in Khasra No. 251/221/70/78/1. It is a case

of the plaintiff/appellant that 0-1 bigha of the land was

wrongly deducted from the suit land and the same was

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wrongly shown in the ownership and possession of

defendant No.1 on the basis of the mutation No.287. The

deduction of one biswa of land out of the suit land and

thereafter execution of the sale deed in favour of defendant

No.2 dated 29.01.2001 has been challenged being null and

void.

19. In order to support his contention, the plaintiff

examined PW-1, Ram Lal, Ahalmad, who has stated that

with respect to correction of tatima, neither any application

was received nor any order was passed by the Assistant

Collector, 1

st

Grade on 17.07.1998.

20. Smt. Asha Sharma has been examined as PW-2.

In her deposition she has stated that she has sold the suit

land to Vijay Kumar, Chaman Lal and Dasaundi Ram from

Khasra No.76-77 vide sale deed dated 16.11.1993. She has

further stated that after the sale of the suit land, the

possession of the same was handed over to the plaintiff. She

has stated that on the spot, no land is owned and possessed

by the defendants.

21. The plaintiff himself got examined as Pw-3. He

has stated that he has purchased 3 biswa of land from

Dasaundi Ram and his brothers vide registered sale deed

10   2026:HHC:12483 )

Ext.PW2/A on 16.11.1993. There was already two storeyed

house constructed over the same . After the execution of

the sale deed, he got possession of the same and pursuant to

that necessary mutation was also attested.

22. As per plaintiff apart from that on 19.06.1984,

6 biswa of land was purchased by him for which mutation

No.147 was attested in his favour. He has stated that

defendant No.1 has sold the land from this Khasra Number

to about more than 20 persons. He has stated that adjoining

to the land of plaintiff, there is no land of the defendants

and that defendant No.1 in collusion with the revenue staff

has changed karukans and after changing the revenue

record the land of the plaintiff was deducted and was

incorporated in the land of defendant No.1.

23. The plaintiff has examined Shankar Dass as

PW-4. He has stated that he has seen the suit land and the

same was purchased from Dasaundi Ram etc and the

plaintiff is the owner in possession of same. He has further

stated that no land was left for Hardei, and the revenue

authorities, in connivance with the defendants, deducted

the plaintiff's land and entered it in the name of Defendant

No. 1.

11   2026:HHC:12483 )

24. In order to rebut the evidence of the plaintiff,

defendant Hardei entered into the witness box as DW-1

and she has stated that she is the owner in possession of

the suit land. She has further stated that she had sold the

suit property to defendant No.2 and the said land is vacant

on the spot. It is further stated that when she obtained the

possession of the same, she was beaten up. She sold the suit

land to defendant No.2 for a sum of Rs. 10,000/-. She got

correction of the said land and thereafter the same was

demarcated and the said demarcation was conducted by the

Kanungo and Patwari.

25. Similarly, the defendants examined DW-2

Inderpal, DW-3 Savitri Devi and DW-4 Nasib Singh.

26. It has come on record that except the bald

statement of the plaintiff, no concrete and substantial

evidence has been placed on record in order to substantiate

and corroborate that area measuring 0-1 bigha which was

sold by defendant No.1 to defendant No.2 is a part of Khasra

Nos. 76 and 77. The record shows that the plaintiff is the

owner in possession of Khasra Nos. 76 and 77 and it is the

case of the plaintiff that the revenue authorities in

collusion with the defendants excluded 1 biswa of the land

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from the suit land and the same was transferred to the

defendants illegally by virtue of the correction proceedings.

27. The plaintiff has not been able to establish that

the correction in the revenue entries was got done by

deducting 1 biswa of the suit land and that the same was

illegally shown to be owned and possessed by defendant

No.1.

28. The defendants in order to prove their case have

placed on record documents Ext. D-1 to D-10 which show

that it is the defendants who are the owners in possession of

the suit land. Initially it was defendant No.1 and thereafter

after the sale, defendant No.2 has become the owner of the

said portion of the suit land. No evidence or material has

been placed on record to demonstrate that how the sale

deed as executed by Defendant No.1 in favour of defendant

No.2 is bad in the eyes of law save and except the bald

statement of the plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that

the land belonging to him, comprised in Khasra Nos. 76–77,

was sold by Defendant No. 1 on the basis of changes in the

revenue record, which were got effected by the revenue

authorities in collusion with the defendants. It has come on

record that after obtaining the demarcation, which was

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taken by defendant No.1, the area was carved out and

thereafter no measurement took place on the spot. The

plaintiff has failed to establish and prove that he is the

owner in possession of 1 biswas of land comprised in Khasra

No. 251/221/78/1. Nothing has been placed on record to

corroborate the said plea.

29. When asked a specific question, the learned

counsel failed to provide a satisfactory answer regarding the

basis on which it is claimed that the area of the plaintiff’s

land was reduced and allotted to defendant No. 1 by the

revenue authorities.

30 The learned Courts below have concurrently,

rightly and validly appreciated point in controversy since

the plaintiff has failed to prove his case beyond all

reasonable doubt.

31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of

judgments has held that the first appellate is the final court

of the fact. No doubt, second appellate court exercising the

power under Section 100 CPC can interference with the

findings of fact on limited grounds such as - (a) where the

finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in

ignorance of the relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it

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is based on misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse,

but that is not case in hand.

32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with

scope of interference under Section 100 in Civil Appeal Nos.

2843/2844/2010, titled Nazir Mohamed Vs. J. Kamala & ors

decided on 27.08.2020, held that a second appeal only lies

on a substantial question of law. It is not open to re-agitate

facts or to call upon the High Court to re-analyze or re-

appreciate evidence in a second appeal. Section 100 of the

Code of Civil Procedure restricts the right of second appeal

only to those cases, where a substantial question of law is

involved. Relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment read as

under:-

“25. A second appeal, or for that matter, any

appeal is not a matter of right. The right of

appeal is conferred by statute. A second appeal

only lies on a substantial question of law. If

statute confers a limited right of appeal, the

Court cannot expand the scope of the appeal. It

was not open to the Respondent-Plaintiff to

re-agitate facts or to call upon the High Court

to reanalyze or re-appreciate evidence in a

Second Appeal.

26. Section 100 of the CPC, as amended,

restricts the right of second appeal, to only

those cases, where a substantial question of

law is involved. The existence of a “substantial

question of law” is the sine qua non for the

exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of

the CPC.”

15   2026:HHC:12483 )

33. A question of law must arise from the

pleadings. It becomes substantial question of law, if it is

debatable, not previously settled by law of land or any

binding precedent, must have a material bearing on the

decision of the case. A pure finding of fact is not open to

challenge in second appeal even if appreciation of evidence

is palpably erroneous & finding of fact incorrect.

“29. The principles for deciding when a

question of law becomes a substantial

question of law, have been enunciated by a

Constitution Bench of this Court in Sir Chunilal

v. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co.

Ltd. 1 , where this Court held:-

“The proper test for determining whether a

question of law raised in the case is

substantial would, in our opinion,be whether

it is of general public importance or whether it

directly and substantially affects the rights of

the parties and if so whether it is either an 12

open question in the sense that it is not finally

settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or

by the Federal Court or is not free from

difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative

views. If the question is settled by the highest

court or the general principles to be applied in

determining the question are well settled and

there is a mere question of applying those

principles or that the plea raised is palpably

absurd the question would not be a substantial

question of law.”

30. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal 2, this Court

referred to and relied upon Chunilal v. Mehta

and Sons (supra) and other judgments and

summarised the tests to find out whether a

given set of questions of law were mere

16   2026:HHC:12483 )

questions of law or substantial questions of

law.

31. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of

this Court in Hero Vinoth (supra) are set out

hereinbelow:-

“21. The phrase ”substantial question

of law”, as occurring in the amended

Section 100 CPC is not defined in the

Code. The word substantial, as

qualifying ”question of law”, means

of having substance, essential, real, of

sound worth, important or

considerable. It is to be understood as

something in contradistinction with-

technical, of no substance or

consequence, or academic merely.

However, it is clear that the

legislature has chosen not to qualify

the scope of “substantial question of

law” by suffixing the words ”of

general importance” as has been

done in many other provisions such as

Section 109 of the Code or Article 133

(1) (a) of the Constitution. The

substantial question of law on which

a second appeal shall be heard need

not necessarily be a substantial

question of law of general

importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram

Ditta [(1927-28) 5I5 IA 235 : AIR 1928

PC 172] the phrase substantial

question of law as it was employed in

the last clause of the then existing

Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the

Amendment Act, 1973) came up for

consideration and their Lordships

held that it did not mean a substantial

question of general importance but a

substantial question of law which was

involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal

case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 :

AIR1962 SC 1314] the Constitution

Bench expressed agreement with the

following view taken by a Full Bench

of the Madras High Court in

17   2026:HHC:12483 )

Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony

Veeraju [AIR 1951 Mad 969 : (1951) 2

MLJ 222 (FB)] : (Sir Chunilal case

[1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC

1314] , SCR p. 557)

“When a question of law is fairly

arguable, where there is room for

difference of opinion on it or where

the Court thought it necessary to deal

with that question at some length and

discuss alternative views, then the

question would be a substantial

question of law. On the other hand if

the question was practically covered

by the decision of the highest court or

if the general principles to be applied

in determining the question are well

settled and the only question was of

applying those principles to the

particular fact of the case it would not

be a substantial question of law.”

32. To be “substantial”, a question of law

must be debatable,not previously settled by

the law of the land or any binding precedent,

and must have a material bearing on the

decision of the case and/or the rights of the

parties before it, if answered either way.

33. To be a question of law “involved in the

case”, there must be first, a foundation for it

laid in the pleadings, and the question should

emerge from the sustainable findings of fact,

arrived at by Courts of facts, and it must be

necessary to decide that question of law for a

just and proper decision of the case.

34. Where no such question of law, nor even a

mixed question of law and fact was urged

before the Trial Court or the First Appellate

Court, as in this case, a second appeal cannot

be entertained, as held by this Court in

Panchagopal Barua v. Vinesh Chandra

Goswami.

35. Whether a question of law is a substantial

one and whether such question is involved in

the case or not, would depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case. The paramount

18   2026:HHC:12483 )

overall consideration is the need for striking a

judicious balance between the indispensable

obligation to do justice at all stages and the

impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation

in the life of any lis. This proposition finds

support from Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam

Tiwari .

36. In a Second Appeal, the jurisdiction of the

High Court being confined to substantial

question of law, a finding of fact is not open to

challenge in second appeal, even if the

appreciation of evidence is palpably

erroneous and the finding of fact incorrect as

held in Ramchandra v. Ramalingam .An

entirely new point, raised for the first time,

before the High Court, is not a question

involved in the case, unless it goes to the root

of the matter.

37. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC

relevant for this case may be summarised thus

:

(I) An inference of fact from the recitals or

contents of a document is a question of fact,

but the legal effect of the terms of a document

is a question of law. Construction of a

document, involving the application of any

principle of law, is also a question of law.

Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a

document or wrong application of a principle

of law in construing a document, it gives rise

to a question of law.

(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that

the case involves a substantial question of

law, and not a mere question of law. A

question of law having a material bearing on

the decision of the case (that is, a question,

answer to which affects the rights of parties to

the suit) will be a substantial question of law,

if it is not covered by any specific provisions of

law or settled legal principle emerging from

binding precedents, and, involves a debatable

legal issue.

19   2026:HHC:12483 )

(iii) A substantial question of law will also

arise in a contrary situation, where the legal

position is clear, either on account of express

provisions of law or binding precedents, but

the Court below has decided the matter, either

ignoring or acting contrary to 14 such legal

principle. In the second type of cases, the

substantial question of law arises not because

the law is still debatable, but because the

decision rendered on a material question,

violates the settled position of law.

(iv) The general rule is, that High Court will

not interfere with the concurrent findings of

the Courts below. But it is not an absolute

rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions

are where (i) the courts below have ignored

material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii)

the courts have drawn wrong inferences from

proved facts by applying the law erroneously;

or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the

burden of proof. A decision based on no

evidence, does not refer only to cases where

there is a total dearth of evidence, but also

refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a

whole, is not reasonably capable of

supporting the finding.”

34. In Hero Vinoth (minor) vs. Seshammal,

(2006) 5 SCC 545, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held

as under:

“18. It has been noted time and again that

without insisting for the statement of such a

substantial question of law in the

memorandum of appeal and formulating the

same at the time of admission, the High Courts

have been issuing notices and generally

deciding the second appeals without adhering

to the procedure prescribed under Section 100

of the CPC. It has further been found in a

number of cases that no efforts are made to

20   2026:HHC:12483 )

distinguish between a question of law and a

substantial question of law. In exercise of the

powers under this section in several cases, the

findings of fact of the first appellate court are

found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept

in mind that the right of appeal is neither a

natural nor an inherent right attached to the

litigation. Being a substantive statutory right,

it has to be regulated in accordance with law

in force at the relevant time. The conditions

mentioned in the section must be strictly

fulfilled before a second appeal can be

maintained and no court has the power to add

or to enlarge those grounds. The second

appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable

grounds. The concurrent findings of facts will

not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise

of the powers under this section. Further, a

substantial question of law has to be

distinguished from a substantial question of

fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and

Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR

1962 SC 1314) held that : "The proper test for

determining whether a question of law raised

in the case is substantial would, in our

opinion, be whether it is of general public

importance or whether it directly and

substantially affects the rights of the parties

and if so whether it is either an open question

in the sense that it is not finally settled by this

Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal

Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for

discussion of alternative views. If the question

is settled by the highest court or the general

principles to be applied in 23 determining the

question are well settled and there is a mere

question of applying those principles or that

the plea raised is palpably absurd the question

would not be a substantial question of law."

19. It is not within the domain of the High

Court to investigate the grounds on which the

findings were arrived at, by the last court of

fact, being the first appellate court. It is true

that the lower appellate court should not

ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the

21   2026:HHC:12483 )

trial court in respect of credibility but even

where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by

the trial court, the same is no ground for

interference in second appeal when it is found

that the appellate court has given satisfactory

reasons for doing so. In a case where from a

given set of circumstances two inferences of

fact are possible, one drawn by the lower

appellate court will not be interfered by the

High Court in second appeal. Adopting any

other approach is not permissible. The High

Court will, however, interfere where it is found

that the conclusions drawn by the lower

appellate court were erroneous being contrary

to the mandatory provisions of law applicable

or its settled position on the basis of

pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or

was based upon inadmissible evidence or

arrived at by ignoring material evidence.

20. to 22 xx xx xx xx

23. To be "substantial" a question of law must

be debatable, not previously settled by law of

the land or a binding precedent, and must

have a material bearing on the decision of the

case, if answered either way, insofar as the

rights of the parties before it are concerned. To

be a question of law "involving in the 24 case"

there must be first a foundation for it laid in

the pleadings and the question should emerge

from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at

by court of facts and it must be necessary to

decide that question of law for a just and

proper decision of the case. An entirely new

point raised for the first time before the High

Court is not a question involved in the case

unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will,

therefore, depend on the facts and

circumstance of each case whether a question

of law is a substantial one and involved in the

case, or not; the paramount overall

consideration being the need for striking a

judicious balance between the indispensable

obligation to do justice at all stages and

22   2026:HHC:12483 )

impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation

in the life of any lis.”

35. All the points raised and urged in the

instant Second Appeal are purely question of fact. No

question of law much less the substantial question of

law is involved in the present appeal.

Appellant/defendant has failed to demonstrate any

perversity in the impugned judgments and decrees,

therefore, the present appeal being devoid of any merit,

deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.

Pending miscellaneous application (s), if

any, shall also stand disposed off.

(Romesh Verma),

Judge

20.04.2026 (veena)