No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
A BOBBY ART INTERNATIONAL
v.
OM PAL SINGH HOON AND ORS.
MAY 1, 1996
B
[AM. AHMADI, C.J., S.P. BHARUf".:HA AND B.N. KRIPAL, JJ.]
Cinematograph Act, .1952 : Section 5-B.
Filmr;-Certification of-Held : Test is Film scenes should advance the
C message which the film intends to convey-A film that depicts consequences
of social evil can show the social evil itself which must be sufficient for the
purpose of the film-Guidelines issued by Central Government under S.
5-B(2) are broad standards and should not be read as a statute-Guidelines
require that human sensibilities are not offended by vulgarity, obscenity or
depravity, degrading or denigrating women-Ulhere the theme of the film is to
D condemn rape and degradation of and violence upon women, scenes of nudity
and
rape and use of expletives in aid of the theme to arouse revulsion against
the perpetrators and pity for the victim,
permissibl&-Cinematograph (Cer
tification) Rules, 1983, R 24-Constitution of India, 1950, Art, 19(2 ).
E
Section 5-C-Film certification-Grant of Appeal againsHnteiference
by High Court-Held: Appellate Tribunal had viewed film in true perspective
and, in compliance with requirements of guidelines, granted '.A' certifi
cate-High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction ought not to have inteifered
with view of Tribunal-Constitution of India, 1950, Art, 226.
p "Bandit Queen" is the story of a village child exposed from an early
age to the brutality
and lust of man. Married off to a man old enough to
be her father she was beaten and raped. The village boys made advances,
which she repulsed but the village panchayat found her guilty of enticement
of a village
boy because he was of high caste and she had to leave the
village.
She was arrested and, in the police station, filthily abused. Those
G who stood bail for her did so to satisfy their lust. She was kidnapped and
raped. During an act of brutality the rapist was shot dead and she found
an ally in her rescuer. With his assistance she beat up her husband,
violently. Her rescuer
was shot dead by one whose advances she had
spurned.
She was gang-raped by the rescuer's assailant and his ac-
H complices and they humiliated her in the sight of the village, a hundred
136
BOBBY ARTINTERNA110NAL v. O.P.S. HOON 137
men standing in a circle around the village well and watching her being A
stripped naked and made to walk around the circle and then made to draw
water.
And not one of the villagers helped her. To avenge herself upon her
persecutors, she joined a dacoits' gang and killed twenty Thakurs
of the
village. Ultimatdy, she surrendered aud was in jail for a number of year.
The
film was presented for certification to the Censor Board under
the Cinematograph
Act 1952. The Examining Co1nmittee of the Censor
Board referred it to the Revising Committee under Rule 24(1) of the
Cinematographic (Certification) Rules, 1983. The Revising Committee
recommended that the film be granted an 'A' certificate, subject to certain
excisions
and n1odifications.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Revising Committee, an appeal was
filed under Section
SC of the Cinematograph Act before the Appellate
Tribunal. The Tribunal comprised of a Chairman, a retired Judge of High
Court, and three ladies as members.
Upon the basis or a unanimous order
B
c
of the Tribunal, the film was granted an 'A' certificate. thereafter, the D
respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking to quash
the certificate granted to the
film and to restrain its exhibition in India.
The respondent contended
that though audiences were led to believe that
the film depicted the character of
"a former queen of ravines" also known
as Phoolan
Devi, the depiction was
"abhorr~nt and unconscionable and a
slur on the womanhood of India" and that the respondent and his com·
munity had been depicted in a most depraved way specially in the scene of
rape
by B, which scene was
"suggestive of the moral depravity of the Guijar
community". A Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition
and quashed the certificate granted to the
film Having viewed the film, a
Division Bench of the High Court examined it in regard
to. three aspects
viz. the frontal nudity scene relating to the incident of fetching water from
the
well which ran for two minutes, the scene
sho"ing the naked posterior
of the rapist and use of expletives. Overall, the Division Bench was of the
view that the Tribunal's order was vitiated by the use of the wrong tests
E
F
and dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant. Hence this G
appeal.
Allomng the appeal, this Court
HELD : 1.1. "Bandit Queen' is not a pretty story. It is the serious
and.sad story of a worm turning a village born female child becoming a
H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A dreaded dacuit. An innocent \Vho turns into a vicious criminal because lust
and brutality have affected her psyche so. The film levels an accusing finger
at members of society who had tormented the victim and driven her to become
a dreaded dacoit filled with the desire
to revenge. TI1e
Court should recognise
the message of a serious
film and apply this test to the individual scenes
B thereof; do they advance the message
? If they do they should be left alone,
with only the caution of an 'A' certificate. Adult Indian citizens as a
whole may
be relied upon to comprehend intelligently the message and react to it, not
to the possible titillation of some particular scene. [154-A-B]
c
1.2. The scene where she is humiliated, stripped naked, paraded,
made to draw water from the well, within the circle of a hundred men, the
exposure of
her breasts and genitalia to those men is intended by those
who strip her to demean her. The effect of so doing upon her could hardly
have been better conveyed than by explicitly showing the scene. Nakedness
does
not always arouse the baser instinct. 'Bandit Queen' tells a powerful
D human story and to that story the scene of her enforced naked parade is
central.
It helps to explain why she became what she did : her rage and
vendetta against the society
that had heaped indignities upon her. The rape
scene also helps to explain
why she became what she did. Rape is crude
and it crudity is what the rapist's bouncing bare posterior is meant to
E illustrate. Rape and sex
are not being glorified in the film. Quite the
contrary, it shows what a terrible,
and terrifying, effect rape and lust can
have
upou the victim. It focuses on the trauma and emotional turmoil of
the victim to evoke sympathy for her
and disgust for the rapist. Too much
need not be made o[ a few
s\vear words the like of which can be heard
F
everyday in every city, town and village street. No adult would be tempted
to use them because they
are used in this film.
[154-C-H; 155-A]
1.3. The judgment under appeal does not take due note of the theme
of the film
and the fact that it condemns rape and the degradation of and
violence upon women
by showing their effect upon a village child, trans-
G forming her to a cruel dacoit obsessed with wreaking vengeance upon a
society
that has caused her so much psychological and physical hurt, and
that the scenes of nudity and rape and the use of expletives, so far as the
Tribunal
had permitted them, were in aid of the theme and intended not
to arouse
prurient or lascivious thoughts but revulsion against the per-
H petrators and pity for the victim. [155-H; 156-A-B)
-{
BOBBY ART INTERNAT10NAL v. O.P.S. HOON 139
2. A film that illustrates the conse11uences of a social evil necessarily A
must show that social evil. The guidelines must be interpreted in that light.
No film that extols the social evil or encourages it is permissible, but a
film that carries the message that the social evil is evil cannot be n1ade
impermissible on the ground that it depicts the social evil. At the same
time, the depiction must
be just suflicient
for the purpose of the film, the
drawing of the line
is best left to the sensibilities of the expert Tribunal.
The Tribunal
is a multi-member body. It is comprised of persons who
gauge public reactions to films and, except in cases of stark breach of
guidelines, should
be permitted to go about its task. The guidelines are
broad standards; they cannot
be read as one would read a statute. Within
B
the breadth of their parameters the certification authorities have discre- C
lion. [155-C-D; 153-C]
3. In the present case, apart from the Chairman, three me1nbers of
the Tribunal were women. It is hardly to be supposed that three women
would permit a film to be screened,
which denigrates women, insults D
Indian womanhood or is obscene or pornographic. It would appear from
its order
that the Tribunal took the view that it would do women some
good to see the film. The Tribunal had
viewed the film in true perspective
and bad, in
compliance with the rec1uirements of the guidelines, granted
to the film an 'A' certificate subject to the conditions it stated. The High
Court ought nut to have entertained the first respondent's writ petition
imp.ugning the grant of the certificate based as it was principally upon the
slurs allegedly cast
by the film on the Guljar community. Therefore, the "A" certificate issued to the film "Bandit Queen" upon the conditions
imposed
by Appellate Tribunal is restored. [155-E-H; 156-C]
KA. Abbas v.
Union of India, [1970]2 SCC 780; Raj Kapur v. State,
(1980) 1 SC 43; Samaresh Bose v.Amal Mitra, [1985] 4 SCC 289; State of
Bihar v. Shailaba/a Devi, [1952] SCR 654; Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union
of India, [1962] 3 SCR 842 and L!C v. Prof Manubhai D. Shah, (1992] 3
sec 637, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7522 of
1996 Etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.3.96 of the Delhi High Court
E
F
G
in L.P.A. No. 43 of 1996. H
A
B
c
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996j SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
M. Chandrasekharan, Additional Solicitor General, Soli J. Sorabjee,
H.N. Salve, Dr. Rajiv Dhavan, A.H. Desai, Shridhar Chitale, Mt>kul
Mudgal, Ms. Neeru Vaid, S. Muralidhar, Nikhil, Ms. Meenakshi, LR.
Singh, Dcvendra Singh, Nandan Sawhney, Indrabir S. Alag, Dr. A.K. Kaul,
Rakesh C. Agrawal, K.K. Kaul, K.S. Chauhan, T.C. Sharma, B.K. Prasad,
Aruneshwar Gupta, Ms. Namita Chadha, N. Ramachandran, Manish Garg,
for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
BHARUCHA, J. Special leave granted.
These appeals impugn the judgment and order of a Division Bench
of the High Court of Delhi in Letters Patent appeals. The Letters Patent
appeals challenged the judgment and order of a learned single Judge
allowing a writ petition. The Letters Patent appeals were dismissed, subject
to a direction to the Union of India (the second respondent). The writ
D petition was filed by the first respondent to quash the certificate of exhibi
tion awarded to the film
11
Bandit Queen
1
'
and to restrain its exhibition in
India.
The
film deals with the life of
Phoolan Devi. It is based upon a true
story. Still a child, Phoolan Devi was married off to a man old enough to
E be her father. She was beaten and raped by him. She was tormented by
the boys of the village; and beaten
by them when she foiled the advances
of one of them. A village
Panchayat called after the incident blamed
Phoolan Devi for attempting to entice the boy, who belonged to a higher
caste. Consequent upon the decision of the village panchayat, Phoolan Devi
F had to leave the village. She was then arrested by the police and subjected
to indignity and humiliation in the police station. Upon the intervention of
some persons she was released on bail; their intervention was not due to
compassion but to satisfy their carnal appetite. Phoolan Devi was thereafter
kidnapped by dacoits and sexually brutalised
by their leader, a man named
Babu Gujjar. Another member of the gang, Vikram Mallah, shot Babu
G Gujjar dead in a fit of rage while he was assaulting
Phoolan Devi. Phoolan
Devi was attracted by Vikaram Mallah and threw her lot in with him: Along
with Vikram Mallah she accosted her husband, tied him to a tree and took
her revenge by brutally beating him.
One
Shri Ram, the leader of a gang
of Thakurs, who had been released from jail, made advances to Phoolan
H Devi and was spurned. He killed Vikram Mallah. Having lost Vikram
'
BOBBY ARTINTERNATIONAL v. O.P.S. HOON [BHARUCHA,J.] 141
Mallah's protection, Phoolan Devi was Gang-raped by Sri Ram, Lalaram A
and others. She was stripped naked, paraded and made to fetch water from
the village
well under the gaze of the villagers, but no one came to her
rescue. To avenge herself upon her persecutors, she joined a dacoits' gang
headed
by Baba Mustkin. In avenging herself upon
Sri Ram, she humiliated
and killed twenty Thakurs of the village of Behmai. Ultimately, she sur
rendered and was in jail for a number of years.
(We have not viewed the
film. The story thereof as set out above
come from the judgment under appeal.)
B
The film is based on a book written by Mala
Sen called "India's C
Bandit Queen". The book has been in the market since the year 1991
without objection.
On 17th August, 1994, the film was presented for certification to the
Censor Board under the Cinematograph Act,
19S2. The Examining
Com
mittee of the Censor Board referred it to the Revising Committee under D
Rule 24(1) of the Cinematographic (Certification) Rules, 1983. On 19th
July,
199S, the Revising Committee recommended that the film be granted
an 'A' certificate, subject to certain excisions and n1odifications. (An 'A'
certification implies that the film may be viewed only by adults).
Aggrieved by the decision of the Revising Committee, an appeal
was
filed under Section SC of the Cinematographic Act before the Appellate
Tribunal.
It is constituted by virtue of the provisions of Section SD of the
Cinematograph Act and consists of a Chairman and members
who
__,,are
qualified to judge the effect of films on the the public".In the present case
the Tribunal
was chaired by Lentin, J., a retired Judge of the Bombay High
Court, and three ladies,
Smt. Sara Mohammad, Dr. Sarayu V. Doshi &
Smt. Reena Kumari, were its members.
E
F
The Tribunal's order states that the film "portrays the trials and
tribulations and the various humiliations (mental and physical) heaped on
G
her
(Phoolan Devi) from childhood onwards, which out of desperation and
misery drove her to dacoity and the revenge which she takes on her
tormentors and those
who had humiliated and tortured and had physically
abused her.
3.1. The tone and tenor of the dialogues in this
film reflect the H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1996J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A nuances locally and habitually used and spoken in the villages and in the
ravines of the Chambal, not berell of expletives used for force and effect
by way of nonnal and common parlance in those parts; these expletives are
not intended lo be taken literally. There is nothing sensual or sexual about
these expletives used
as they arc in ordinary and habitual course as part of
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
the language in those parts and express as
they <lo emotions such as anger,
rage, fn1'tration and the like, and represent as they do the color of the
various locales in this film."
The Tribunal accepted the argument of the appellant before it in
respect of certain scenes \.\'here exicisions or n1odifications had been re
quired. We shall rcstrir.:t ourselves to the Tribunal's findings on the scenes
which are presently in dispute, and to observations relating to the film as
a whole. A scene of policemen hitting Phoolan Devi with the butt of a gun
had been ordered to be deleted; the Tribunal said that the deletion "would
negate the very impact of this film in its emkavor to depict the maltreat
ment and cruelty heaped upon the victim
by the perpetrators, which
resulted
in
the forn1er turning her face against, and seeking revenge on, the
perpretrators of her humiliation and degradation. Deletion or even reduc.:
tion of this sequence would have a deleterious effect on the powerful
sequences which
follow, as it would also
leave the average audience be
wildered
as to the intensity of the bitterness the victim rightly feels towards
her tormentors." Another scene dealt with the rape of Phoolan Devi
by
Babu Gujjar. The sequence was in three parts and the appellant had
volunteered
to reduce the first two sequences
'
1
to the bare cinematic
necessity;"' the Tribunal did not accept this, having ascertained what was
meant. It directed that the second of the three sequences be deleted
altogether, and that there be a reduction
by
30% of the first sequence and
by 20% of the third sequence, with the qualification that the visuals of the
man's bare posterior in the first and third sequences be reduced to a flash.
Exception was taken before the Tribunal to the direction to reduce by 70%
the sequence of Phoolan Devi torturing her husband. The Tribunal found
that the sequence brought to the fore the ferocity of Phoolan Devi's hatred
and revulsion towards the man
who drove her to being the hunted dacoit
she becan1e.
Phoolan Devi's pent-up, anger, emotions and revulsion were
demonstrated
in the scene. It was a powerful scene the reduction of which
would negate
its impact. Much emphasis was laid before us upon the fact
that Phoolan
Devi is shown naked being paraded in the village after being
humiliated. The Tribunal observed that these
visuals could but create
BOBBY ART INTERNATIONAL v. O.P.S. HOON [Bl-JAR UCHA, J.] 143
sympathy towards the unfortunate woman in particular and revulsion A
,,._.,_ against the perpetrators of crimes against women in general. The sequence
was an integral part of the story. It was not sensual or sexual, and \Vas
intended to, as indeed il did, create revulsion in the minds of the average
audience towards the tormentors and oppressors of women. ''To delete or
even to reduce these climactic
visuals
1
1, the Tribunal said, '\vould be a
sacrilcgc
11
• It added,
11
4.9.1. While recommending the deletion of the visuals
arofestated, perhaps the Revising Committee momentarily forgot
"Sehindler's List" which was passed by the Board without a cut and despite
prolonged sequences of frontal nudity of men and women depicted therein,
and rightly so because the scenes of frontal nudity in that film were
intended to create a feeling of revulsion and a sense of horror that such
crimes could indeed be committed. Likewise in the present film." The
Tribunal permitted certain words of abuse in the vernacular lo
be retained
because of the context in which they were spoken and the persons
by whom
they were spoken :
"spoken as they are as colloquially and as part of their
B
c
daily life, it would be unfair on our part lo castigate the use of these words D
which we would other\vise have donc
11
•
Upon the basis of this unanimous order of the Tribunal, the film was
granted an 'A' certificate.
On 31st August, 1995, the film was screened, with English sub-titles, E
at the Siri Fort Auditorium on the occasion of the 27th International Film
Festival of India with the permission of the Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting. From 25th January,
1996, onwards, the censored film was
open lo public viewing at various cinema theatres in the country. On 27th January, 1.996, the first respondent filed the writ petition
before the Delhi High Court seeking to quash the certificate granted to the
fihn and to restrain its exhibition in India. The first respondent stated in
F
the writ petition that he was a Hindu and a Gujjar by caste. He was the
President of the Gujjar Gaurav Sansthan and involved in the welfare of the
Gujjar community. He had seen the
film when it was exhibited at the G
International Film Festival; he had felt aggrieved and his fundamental
rights had been violated. Though audiences were led to believe that the
filn1 depicted the character of
11
a former queen of ravines
11
also known as
Phoolan Devi, the depiction was "abhorrent and unconscionable and a slur
on the \VOn1anhood of India!!. The petitioner and his community had been H
A
B
c
D
E
144 SUPREME COURT REP OR TS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
depicted in a most depraved way specially in the scene of rape by Babu
Gujjar, which scene
was "suggestive of the moral depravity of the Gujjar community''. The film depicted the petitioner and his community as rapists
and the used of the name Babu Gujjar for the principal villain lowered the
reputation of the Gujjar community and the petitioner.
It lowered the
respect of the petitioner
in the eyes of society and his friends. The scene
of rape
was obscene and horrendous and cast a slur on the face of the
Gujjar community. The
film went beyond the limits of decency and lowered
the prestige and position of the woman
in general and the community of
Mahallas
in particular. The first respondent had been discriminated against
and Articles
14, 19 and 21 of the
Constitution had been violated.
The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the
certificate granted to the
film. He directed the
Censor Board to consider
the grant of an 'A' certificate to it after excisions and modifications in
accordance with his order had been made. Till a fresh certificate was
granted the screening of the film was injuncted.
The Division Bench,
in the judgment under appeal, upheld the view
taken by the learned single Judge. Having viewed the film, it examined it
in regard lo three aspects. The first dealt with the frontal nudity scene. The
scene, the Division Bench said, ran for a full
two minutes. The heroine was
stripped totally naked in the gaze of about a hundred villagers standing in
the circle at a distance around a well and she
was paraded nude from head
to toe all along the circle, with her front, including her private parts,
exposed. The Division Bench noted the findings of the Tribunal in regard
to this scene (which have been referred to above) and held,
"in the face of
a finding by the Appellate Tribunal of the scene creating revulsion, the only
inference could have been that the scene of total frontal nudity from top
to toes
was 'indecent' within Section 5-B and Article 19(2)". The scene also
offended the guidelines in para 2(ix), para 2(xi) and para 2(vii). The second
aspect that was considered by the Division Bench was that which showed
the naked posterior of Babu Gujjar in the rape scene. As noticed
by the
G
Division Bench by stop watch, this scene ran for about 20 seconds. It
showed sexual intercourse by the man and his physical movement, with his
posterior exposed. The High Court took that the view that the direction of
the Tribunal that the posterior should be shown as a flash was inconsistent
with retention of 70% and 80% of the first and third sequences as directed
H by the Tribunal. The scene of violent rape was disgusting and revolting and
BOBBY ARTINTERNATIONAL v. O.P.S.HOON [BHARUCHA,J.] 145
it denigrated and degraded women. The third aspect that the High Court A
concerned itself with was the use of expletives and it concluded that they
should be deleted. Over-all, the Division Bench
was of the view that the
Tribunal's order
was vitiated by the use of the wrong tests.
Section
5-B of the Cinematograph Act, which echoes Article 19(2),
states that a film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion
of the authority competent to grant
the certificate, the film or any part of
it
is against the interests of, inter alia, decency.
Under the provisions of
sub-section
(2) of Section 5-B the Central Government is empowered to
issue directions setting out the principles which shall guide the authority
competent to grant certificates in sanctioning films for public exhibition.
The guidelines earlier issued were revised in
1991. Clause (1) thereof
reads thus :
"1. The objectives of film certification will be to ensure that -
(a) the medium
of film remains responsible and sensitive to the
values and standards of society;
(b) artistic expression and creative freedom are not unduly curbed;
( c) certification is responsive to social change;
( d) the medium of film provides clean and healthy entertainments;
and
(
e) as far as possible, the film is of aesthetic value and cinematically
B
c
D
E
of a good
standard." F
Clause (2) states that the Board of Film Censors shall ensure that -
"(vii) human sensibilities are not offended by vulgarity, obscenity
or depravity;
xxx xxx xxx
(ix) scenes degrading or denigrating women in any manner are not
presented;
G
(ix) scenes involving sexual violence against won1en like attempt to H
146
A
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
rape, rape or any form of molestation or scenes of a similar natt:re
arc avoided, and if any such incident is germane to the theme, they
sh~ll be reduced to the minimum and no details are shown;
xxx xxx xxx"
B Clause (3) reads thus :
c
D
E
F
'The Board of Film Certification shall also ensure that
the film -
(i) is judged in its entirety from the point of view of the overall
impact; and
(ii)
is examined in the light of the period depicted in the film and
the contemporary standards of the country and the
peoplo to which
the
film
relates, provided that the film does not deprave the
morality of the audience."
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
film had been
scrutinised
by the Tribunal, which was an expert body constituted for that
purpose, and it had
pas;ed the test of such scrutiny. It was emphasised that
three members of the four-member Tribunal were ladies and they had not
found anything offensive in the
film as certified for adult viewing. The
guidelines, it
was submitted, required the film to be seen as a whole and,
seen as a whole, the
film did not offend either Section 5-B(i) or the
guidelines. The submission of learned counsel for the appellants was
supported by
the learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the
Union of India. Dr. Kou], learned counsel for the first respondent, sub-
mitted that the machinery under the Cinematograph Act was only for those
who had some concern with the making of the
film and that citizen who
were offended
by it were free to approach the High Court under Article
226. There were compelling reasons for the High Court to pass the order
that it did for the
film was abhorrent. What had also to be considered were
the individual episodes and the episodes depicting
full frontal nudity, rape
G and the use of swear words offended the requirements of sub-clauses (vii),
(ix) and (x) of the guidelines. The film violated the freedom of speech and
expression of the first respondent.
The decision of this Court most relevant to the appeals before us was
delivered by a Constitution Bench in KA. Abbas v. The Union of India &
H Anr., [1970] 2 S.C.C. 780. It related to a documentary film entitled "A Tale
--..:.::::
BOBBY ARTINTERNATIONAL v. 0.P.S. HOON [BHARUCHA,J.] 147
of Four Cities". The appellant contended in a petition under Article 32 that A
he was entitled to a certificate for unrestricted public exhibition thereof.
What Hidayatullah, C.J., speaking for the Court, said needs to be
reproduced :
"49. We may now illustrate our meaning how even the items
mentioned in the directions may figure in
films subject either to
their artistic merit or their social value over-weighing their offend-
ing character. The task of the censor
is extremely delicate and his
duties cannot be subject
of an exhaustive set of commands
estab
lished by prior ratiocination. But direction is necessary to him so
that he does not sweep within the terms of the directions vast areas
of thought, speech and expression of artistic quality and social
purpose and interest. Our standards must be so framed that
we
are not reduced to a level where the protection of the least capable
B
c
and the most depraved amongst us determines what the morally
healthy cannot view or read. The standards that
we set for our D
censors must make a substantial allowance in favour of freedom
thus leaving a vast area for creative art to interpret
life and society
with some of its foibles along with what
is good. We must not look
upon such human relationships
as banned in toto and for ever from
human thought and must give scope for talent to put them before
society. The requirements of art and literature include within
themselves a comprehensive view of social life and not only in its
ideal form and the line
is to be drawn where the average moral
man begins to feel embarrassed
or disgusted at a naked portrayal
E
of life without the redeeming touch of art or genius or social value.
If the depraved begins to see in these things more than what an
average person would, in much the same way, as, it is wrongly said,
F
a
FrenChman sees a woman's legs in everything, it cannot be
helped. In our scheme of things ideas having redeeming social or
artistic va]ue must also have importance and protection for their
growth. Sex and obscenity are not always synonymous and it is
wrong to classify sex as essentially obscene or even indecent or G
immoral. It should be our concern, however, to prevent the use of
sex designed to play a commercial role by making its own appeal.
This draws in the censor's scissors. Thus audiences in India can
be expected to view with equanimity the story of Oedipus son of
Latius who committed patricide and incest with his mother. When H
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148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
the seer Tiresias exposed him, his sister Jocasta committed suicide
by hanging herself and Oedipus put out his own eyes. No one after
viewing these episodes would think that patricide or incest with
one's
own mother is permissible or suicide in such circumstances
or tearing out one's
own eyes is a natural consequence. And yet if
one goes
by the Jetter of the directions the film cannot be shown.
Similarly, scenes depicting leprosy
as a theme in a story or in a
documentary are not necessarily outside the protection.
If that
were
so Verrier Elwyn's
Phulmat of the Hills or the same episode
in Henryson's Testament of Cressaid (from where Verrier Elwyn
borrowed the idea) would never see the light
of the day. Again
carnage and bloodshed may have historical value and the depiction
of such scenes as the
Sack of Delhi by Nadirshah may be permis
sible, if handled delicately and as part of an artistic portrayal of
the confrontation with Mohammad Shah Rangila. If Nadir Shah
made golaothes of skulls, must we leave them out of the story
because people must be made to
view a historical theme without
true history
? Rape in all its nakedness may be objectionable but
Voltaire's Candide would be meaningless without Cunegonde's
episode with the soldier and the story of Lucrece could never be
depicted on the screen. 50. Therefore it is not the elements of rape, leprosy, semal im
morality with should attract the censor's scissors but how the theme
is handled by the producer. It must, however, be remembered that
the cinematograph
is a powerful medium and its appeal is different.
The horrors of war as depicted in the famous etchings of Goya do
not horrify one
so much as the same scenes rendered in colour
and with sound and movement would do. We may view a documen
tary
on the erotic tableaux from our ancient temples with
equanimity or read the Kamasutra but a documentary from them
as a practical sexual would be abhorrent.
51. We have said all this to show that the items mentioned in the
directions arc not
by themselves defective. We have adhered to
the
43 points of
T.P. O'Connor framed in 1918 and have made a
comprehensive list of what
may not be shown. Parliament has left
this task to the Central Government and,
in our opinion, this could
be done. But Parliament has not legislated enough, or has the
c.
BOBBY ARTINTERNATIONAL v. O.P.S. HOON [BHARUCHAJ.] 149
Central Government filled in the gap. Neither has separated the
artistic and the socially valuable from that which
is deliberately
indecent, obscene, horrifying or corrupting. They have not
indi
cated the need of society and the freedom of the individual. They
have thought more of the depraved and less of the ordinary moral
man. In their desire to keep films from the abnormal, they have
excluded the normal. They have attempted to bring down the
public motion picture to the level of home movies."
In Raj Kapoor & 01'·. v. State of Ors., [1980] 1 S.C.C. 43, this Court
\Vas dealing \Vith a.pro bona public prosecution against the producer, actors
A
B
and others connected with a film called "Satyam, Sivam, Sundaram" on the C
ground of prurience, moral depravity and shocking erosion of public
decency. A petition to quash the proceedings
was moved and
procedural
complications brought the matter to this Court. One of the questions
considered
was : when can a film to be publicly exhibited be castigated as
prurient and obscene and violative of norms against venereal depravity.
Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Court, said, D
11
Art, morals and la\v's manacles on aesthetics are a sensitive
subject where jurisprudence meets other social sciences and never
goes alone to bark and bite because State-made strait-jacket is an
inhibitive prescription for a free country unless enlightened society
E
actively participates in the administration of justice to aesthetics.
9. The world's greatest paintings, sculptures, songs
and dances,
India's lustrous heritage, the Konaraks and Khajurahos, lofty epics,
luscious
in patches, may be asphyxiated by law, if prudes an prigs
and
State moralists prescribe paradigms and prescribe F
heterodoxies ......... .
14. I am satisfied that the Film Censor Board, acting under Section
5-A, is specially entrusted to screen off the silver screen pictures
which offensively invade or deprave public morals through over- G
sex. There is no doubt -and Counsel on both sides agree -that a
certificate
by the high-powered Board of Censors with specialised
composition and statutory mandate
is not a piece of utter
incon
sequence. It is relevant material, important in its impact, though
not infallible in its verdict. But the Court is not barred from trying
the case because the certificate
is not conclusive. Nevertheless, the H
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150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l996J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
magistrate shall not brush aside what another tribunal has, for
similar purpose, found. May be, even a rebuttable presumption
arises in favour
of the
statutnry certificate but could be negatived
by positive evidence. An act of recognition of moral worthiness by
a statutory agency is not opinion evidence but an instance or
transaction where the fact
in issue has been asserted,
recognised
or affirmed.
15. I am not
persuaded that once a certificate under the
Cinematograph Act
is issued the
Penal Code, pro tanto, will hang
limp. The court
will examine the film and
judge whether its public
display, in the given time and crime, tu breaches public morals or
depraves basic decency as to offend the penal provisions. Statutory
expressions are not petrified by time but must be updated by
changing ethos ~ven as popular ethics arc nut absolutes but abide
and evolve as cornn1unity consciousness enlivens and escalates.
Surely, the satwa of society must rise progressively if mankind i.s
to move lo\vards its tin1elcss destiny and this can be guaranteed
only if lhe ultimate value-vision is rooted in the unchanging basics,
"fruth -Goodness -Beauty, Satyam, Sivam, Sun<laran1. The relation
between Reality and Relativity must haunt the Court's evaluation
of obscenity, expressed in society's pervasive humanity, not la\v's
penal prescriptions. Social scientists and spiritual scientists will
broadly agree thal inan lives not alone by mystic squints, ascetic
chants and austere abnegation but by luscious love of Beauty,
sensuous joy of companionship and moderate non-denial of normal
demands of the Ocsh. Extremes and excesses boomerang although
some crazy artists and lilm directors do practise Oscar Wilde's
observation : "Moderation is a fatal thing. Nothing succeeds like
excess".
In San1aresh Bose and Anr. v. Ania! .Afitra and Anr., [ l985J 4 S.C.(~.
289, this Court \Vas concerned \vith a normal entitled "Prajapati"; it was
G published in Sarodiya Desh, which was read by Bengalis of both sexes and
almost of
all ages all over
India. A complaint was longed that the novel
was obscene and had the tendency to corrupt the morals of its readers.
This Court said :
H
"A vulgar \Vriting is not necessarily obscene. Vulgarity arouses a
•
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BOBBY ART INTERNATIONAL v. O.P.S. HOON [BHARUCHA,J.) 151
feeling of disgust and revulsion and also boredom but does not A
have the effect of depraving, debasing, and corrupting the morals
of any reader of the novel, whereas obscenity has the tendency to
deprave
and corrupt those
\Vhose 111inds are open to such i1nmoral
inf111ences. We n1ay observe that characters like Sukheni Shikha,
the father and the brothers of Sukhen, the business executives and
others portrayed
in the book arc not just figments of the author's
imagination. Such characters
are often to be seen in real life in the
society. The author who is a powerful writer has used his skill in
focussing the attention of the readers on such characters in society
B
c
and lo describe the situation more eloquently has had used uncon
ventional and slang words
so that in the light of the author's
understanding, the appropriate emphasis
is there on the problems.
If we place ourselves in the position of the author and judge the
novel from his point of
view, we find that the author intends to
expose various
evils and ills pervading the society and to pose with
particular emphasis the problems which ail and
afflict the society
in various spheres. He has used his own technique, skill and choice D
of words which may in his opinion, serve properly the purpose of
the novel.
J f
\Ve place ourselves in the position of readers, \vho are
likely to read this book, -and we must not forget that in this class
of readers there
will probably be readers of both sexes and of all
ages between teenagers and the aged, - we feel that the readers as
a
class \.Vill rea<l the book \vith a sense of shock, and disgust and
we do not think that any reader on reading this book would become
depraved, debased and encouraged to lasciviousness. It i". quite
possible that they con1c across such characters and such situations
in life and have faced them of may have to face them in life. On
a very anxious consideration and after carefully applying our judi
cial mind making an objective assessment of the novel
we do not
think that it can be said with an assurance that the novel
is obscene
merely because slang and unconventional words have been used
in the book
in which there have been emphasis on sex and descrip-
E
F
tion of female bodies and there are the narrations of feelings, G
thoughts and actions in vulgar language. Some portions of the book
may appear to be vulgar and readers of cultured
artd refinded taste
may
fell shocked and disgusted. Equally in some portions, the
words used and description given may not appear to be in proper
taste.
In some places there may have been an exhibition of bad
taste leaving
it to the readers of experience and maturity to draw H
152
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
the necessary inference but certainly not sufficient to bring home
lo the adolescents any suggestion which is depraving or lascivious.
We have to bear in mind that the author has
written this novel
which came
to be published in the Sarodiya Dcsh for all classes
of readers and it cannot be right to insist that the standard should
always be for the writer to see that the adolescent may not
be
brought into contact with sex. It a reference to sex by itself in any
novel
is considered to be obscene and not fit to be read
by
adolescents, adolescents will not be in a position to read any novel
and "will have to read books which are purely religious".
C In The State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi, [1952] S.C.R. 654, Mahajan,
J. said that a writing had to be considered as a whole and in a fair and free
and liberal spirit, not dwelling too much upon isolated passages or upon a
strong word here and there, and an endeavour
had to be made to gather
the general effect which the whole composition would have
on the mind of
the public. Mukherjee, J., concurring with Mahajan, J., observed that the
D writing had to be looked at as a whole without laying stress on isolated
passages
or particular expressions used here and there and that the Court
had to take into consideration what effect the writing was likely to produce
on the minds of the readers for whom the publication
was intended.
Account
had
also lo be taken of the place, circumstances and occasion of
E the publication, as a clear appreciation of the back[,'TOund in which the
words were used was of very great assistance in enabling the court to view
them in their proper perspective.
F
G
In Sakal
Papers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v., Union of India, [1962] 3 S.C.R.
842, a Constitution Bench held that the only restrictions which can be
imposed on the rights of an individual under Article 19(l)(a) were those
which clause (2) of Article
19 permitted and no other. This was reiterated
in
Life
Insurance Corporation of India v. Prof Manubhai D. Shah, [1992] 3
s.c.c. 637.
The guidelines aforementioned have been carefully drawn. They
require the authorities concerned with film certification to be responsive
to the values and standards of society and take note of social change. They
are required to ensure that
!!artistic expression and creative freedom are
not unduly curbed". The film must be "judged in its entirety from the point
H of view of its over-all impact". It must also be judged in the light of the
BOBBY ARTINTERNATIONAL v. 0.P.S.HOON[BHARUCHA,J.] 153
period depicted and the contemporary standards of the people to whom it A
relates, but it must not deprave the morality of the audience. Clause 2
requires that human sensibilities are not offended
by vulgarity, obscenity
or depravity, that scenes degrading or denigrating women are not
presented and scenes of sexual violence against women arc avoided, but if
such scenes are germane
to the theme, they be reduced to a minimum and B
not particularised.
The guidelines are broad standards. They cannot be read
as one
would read a statute. Within the breadth of their parameters the certifica-
tion authorities have discretion. The specific sub-ciauscs of clause 2 of the
C
guidelines cannot overweigh the sweep of clause 1 and 3 and, indeed of
sub-clause
(ix) of Clause (2). Where the theme is of social relevance, it
must be allowed to prevail.
Such a theme does not offend human sen
sibilities nor extol the degradation or denigration of women.
It is to this
end that sub-clause
(ix) of clause 2 permits scenes of sexual violence
against
women, reduced to a minimum and without details, if relevant to
the theme. What that minimum and lack of details should be is left to the
good sense of the certification authorities, to the determined in the Jight
of the relevance of the social theme of the film.
'Bandit Queen' is the story of a village child exposed from an early
age lo the brutality and lust of man. Married off to a man old enough to
be her father she
is beaten and raped. The village boys make advances
which she repulses; but the village panchayat finds her guilty of enticement
of a village boy because he
is of high caste and she to leave the village.
She
is arrested and, in the police station, filthily abused. Those who stand bail
for her do so to satisfy their lust. She is kidnapped and raped. During an
D
E
F
act_ of brutality the rapist is shot dead and she finds an ally in her rescuer.
With
his assistance she beats up her husband, violently. Her rescuer is shot
dead
by one whose advances she had spurned.
She is gang-raped by the
rescuer's assailant and
his accomplices and they humiliate her in the sight G
of the village : a hundred men stand in a circle around the village well and
watch the humiliation, her being stripped naked and walked around the
circles and then made
to draw water. And not one of the villagers helps
her.
She burns with anger, shame and the urge for vengeance. She gets it,
and kills many Thakurs too. H
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A It is not a pretty story. There are no syrupy songs or pirouetting
round trees.
It is
the serious and sad story of a worm turning : a village
born female child becoming a dreaded dacoit. An innocent who turns into
a vicious criminal because lust and brutality have affected her psyche so.
The
film levels an accusing finger at members of society who had tor-
B mented Phoolan Devi and driven her to become a dreaded dacoit filed with
the desire to revenge.
c
It is in this light that the individual scenes have to be viewed.
First, the scene where she
is humiliated, stripped naked, paraded,
made to draw water from the
well, within the circle of a hundred men. The
exposure of her breasts and genitalia to those men
is intended by those
who strip her to demean her. The effect of so doing upon her could hardly
been better conveyed than by explicitly showing the scene. The object of
doing
so was to titillate the cinema-goer's lust but to arouse in him
D sympathy for the victim and disgust for the perpetrators. The revulsion that
Tribunal referred to
was not at Phoolan Devi's nudity but at the sadism
and heartlessness of those
who had stripped her naked to rob her of every
shred of dignity. Nakedness does not
always arouse the baser instinct. The
reference
by the Tribunal to the film 'Schindler's List' was apt. There is a
E
F
scene in it of rows of naked men and women, shown frontally, being led
into the gas chambers of a Nazi concentration camp. Not only are they
about to die but they have been stripped
in their last moments of the basic
dignity of human beings. Tears are a likely reaction; pity, horror and a
fellow feeling of shame are certain, except in the pervert
who might be
aroused. We do not censor to protect the pervert or to assuage the
susceptibilities of the over-sensitive. 'Bandit Queen' tells a powerful human
story and to that story the scene of Phoolan Devi's enforced naked parade
is central. It helps to explain why Phoolan Devi became what she did : rage
and vendetta against the
society that had heaped indignities upon her.
G The rape scene also helps to explain why Phoolan Devi became what
she did. Rape
is crude and its crudity is what the rapist's bouncing bare
posterior
is meant to illustrate. Rape and sex are not being glorified in the
film. Quite the contrary. It shows what a terrible, and terrifying, effect rape
an lust can have upon the victim.
It focuses on the trauma and emotional
H turmoil of the victim to evoke sympathy for her and disgust for the rapist.
BOBBY ARTINTE!{NA110NAL v. O.P.S. HOON [BHARUCHA,J.] 155
Too much need not, we think, be made of a few swear words the like A
of which can be heard every day in every city, town and village street. No
adult would be tempted to use them because they are used in this film.
In sum, we should recognise the massage or a serious film and apply
this test
to the individual scenes thereof : do they advance the message
'!
If they do they should be left alone, with only the caution of an 'A'
certificate, Adult Indian citizens as a whole may be relied upon to com
prehend intelligently the message and react to
it, not to the
possible
titillation of some particular scene.
A
film that illustrates the consequences of a social evil necessarily
must that social
evil. The guidelines must be interpreted in that light. No
film that extols the social evil or encourages it is permissible, but a film
B
c
that carries the message that the social evil is evil cannot be made imper
missible
on the ground that it depicts the social evil. At the same time, the
depiction must be just sufficient for the purpose of the
film. The drawing D
of the line
is best left to the sensibilities of the export Tribunal. The
Tribunal
is a multi-member body. It is comprised of persons who gauge
public reactions to films and, except in cases of stark breach of guidelines,
should be permitted to go about its task.
In the present case, apart from the Chairman, three members of the
Tribunal were women.
It is hardly to be supposed that three women would
permit a
film to be screened which
denib>rates women, insults Indian
womanhood or
is obscene or pornographic. It would appear from its order
that the Tribunal took the
view that it would do women some good to see
the
film.
E
F
We are of the opinion that the Tribunal had viewed the film in true
perspective and had,
in compliance with the requirements of the
guid~lines,
granted to the film an "A" certificate subject to the conditions it stated. We
think that the High Court ought not
to have entertained the 1st G
respondent's writ petition impugning the grant of the certificate based as
it
was principally upon the slurs allegedly cast by the film on the Gujjar
community. We find that the judgment under appeal does not take due
note of the theme of the
film and the fact that it condemns rape and the
degradation of and violence upon women
hy showing their effect upon a H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996j SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A village child, transforming her to a cruel dacoit obsessed with wreaking
vengeance upon a society that
has caused her so much psychological and
physical hurt, an that the scenes of nudity and rape and the use of
expletives, so far
as the Tribunal had permitted them, were in aid of the
theme and intended not to arouse prurient or lascivious thoughts but
B revulsion against the perpetrators and pity for the victim.
c
The appeals are allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is
set aside. The 1st respondent's writ petition is dismissed. The
11
A
11
certifi
cate issued to film "Bandit Queen" upon the conditions imposed by the
Appellate Tribunal
is restored.
The 1st respondent shall pay to each appellant the costs of his
appeal.
v.s.s. Appeals allowed.
The landmark Supreme Court ruling in Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon stands as a pivotal moment in Indian cinematic history and jurisprudence, fundamentally shaping the discourse on artistic freedom versus public morality. This celebrated case, available in full on CaseOn, scrutinizes the scope of censorship under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, and sets a crucial precedent for how courts should interpret films that tackle sensitive social issues. The judgment delves into the controversial film “Bandit Queen,” based on the life of Phoolan Devi, and questions whether graphic depictions of social evils, intended to condemn them, can be censored for indecency.
The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in revoking the ‘A’ (Adults Only) certificate granted to the film “Bandit Queen” by the Film Certification Appellate Tribunal (FCAT). The petitioners argued that scenes of frontal nudity, rape, and the use of expletives were obscene, denigrated women, and offended public decency, thus violating the Cinematograph Act, 1952. This raised a fundamental question: Should a film depicting the brutal consequences of social evils be censored simply because it shows the evil itself? Can the judiciary interfere with the decision of an expert body like the FCAT, which had deemed the film fit for public viewing with an 'A' certificate?
The Court's decision was guided by several key legal provisions and principles:
The Supreme Court conducted a nuanced analysis, strongly favouring the film's artistic and social context over a literal interpretation of censorship guidelines. The bench, which had not viewed the film, based its analysis on the story and the findings of the expert Tribunal.
The Court emphasized that “Bandit Queen” was not a “pretty story.” It was a serious and tragic narrative of how a young, innocent village girl, subjected to relentless brutality and societal oppression, transforms into a dreaded dacoit. The film’s purpose was not to titillate but to level an “accusing finger” at the society that created her. The Court held that a film illustrating the consequences of a social evil must necessarily show that evil. To prohibit its depiction would be to silence important social commentary.
The judgment systematically addressed the scenes the High Court found objectionable:
Navigating the complex arguments and precedents in this case can be challenging. For legal professionals and students looking to quickly grasp the core reasoning, resources like the CaseOn.in 2-minute audio briefs provide a concise and effective way to analyze such detailed rulings, saving valuable time while ensuring a thorough understanding.
A significant part of the Court’s reasoning was its deference to the FCAT, an expert multi-member body. The Court noted that the Tribunal, which included a retired High Court Judge as Chairman and three women, had viewed the film in its “true perspective.” It concluded that the High Court, by acting as a super-censor and examining scenes out of context (even using a stopwatch), had overstepped its jurisdiction. The task of drawing the line, the Court asserted, is best left to the sensibilities of the expert Tribunal.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring the 'A' certificate issued by the Appellate Tribunal. It held that the High Court had failed to appreciate the film's central theme: a condemnation of rape, degradation, and violence against women. The scenes of nudity and rape, far from being gratuitous, were in aid of this theme, intended to arouse revulsion against the perpetrators and pity for the victim, not prurient thoughts.
In essence, the Supreme Court ruled that a film's message and overall impact must be the primary test for certification. Scenes that are integral to the narrative and advance a socially relevant theme cannot be deemed obscene merely because they are graphic or disturbing. The Court established that art that depicts social evils to critique them is not the same as art that glorifies them, and judicial bodies should exercise restraint in interfering with the decisions of expert censorship authorities.
This case is a cornerstone of media and entertainment law in India. For law students and legal professionals, it offers critical insights into:
This judgment serves as a vital reminder that the law must protect not just pleasant and agreeable speech, but also that which is uncomfortable, disturbing, and socially critical.
Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. The information provided is based on the court judgment in Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon. For specific legal issues, please consult with a qualified legal professional.
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