2026 INSC 695 Page 1 of 30

Crl. Appeal @ SLP Crl. No.474 of 2026

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No. 3117 of 2026

(@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.474 of 2026)

Brajesh Kumar @ Birjesh Kumar Singh

...Appellant

Versus

The State of Bihar

...Respondent

J U D G M E N T

K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. A serious procedural deviation, resulting in a graver

travesty of justice is alleged; of two trials, from two final reports

on the same First Information Report, having been proceeded

with against seventeen persons leading to conviction of only one

of them in the second trial, despite the further investigation

having unearthed no evidence against the fifteen accused. The

appellant, the hapless husband of a woman who succumbed to

burn injuries in her matrimonial home, has been in the dock for a

quarter of a century on the accusation of marital cruelty and

dowry death. The prosecution is also blamed of having failed to

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bring in material evidence; adduced by the defense, which the

investigators ought to have detected before the charge sheet was

filed.

3. The two cases were clubbed together after considerable

evidence was led in both separately. Later, after further evidence

was adduced jointly, they were de-tagged and adjudicated

individually. In the first case the father-in-law and the mother-in-

law, the two accused arrayed, were acquitted. Fourteen family

members of the husband were acquitted in the second case

wherein the husband alone stood convicted. The impugned order

remanded the matter to the trial court on the premise of the

convicted accused not being present when the witnesses were

examined in the other case, before clubbing. The appeal is filed

by the sole accused who stood convicted.

4. The impugned order indicates that before clubbing, in the

instant case PW1 to PW6 were examined and after clubbing,

PW13 to PW15 and DW1 to DW5 were examined. The trial court

has also recorded that the oral testimonies of only those witnesses

examined in the presence of the accused in this case would be

evaluated to come to a just decision; scrupulously done avoiding

any prejudice to the accused. PW1 to PW6 examined herein are

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respectively PWs 1, 11, 3, 2, 12 & 4 in the first case; the first two,

associates of the family, then a cousin, two brothers and the father

of the deceased. PW13 proved the sanction order and PW14 &15

testifying in the joint trial were another brother of the deceased

and the Investigating Officer (I.O) respectively. PW5 to PW10

examined in the first case were not even cross-examined by the

two accused and their testimonies were completely eschewed

even in the first case, the order of acquittal in which is produced

as Annexure P-9.

5. The case stems from an incident of the year 2000 and we

were of the opinion that a remand at this stage would only prolong

the matter. Learned Counsel for the accused agreed to a

consideration on merits by this Court at the expense of losing one

appellate forum, i.e., the High Court, to which the learned State

Counsel also did not object. Hence, we proceed to consider the

matter on its merits.

6. The allegation arose from an incident where the wife of the

appellant was first taken to the District Hospital, Mirzapur from

her marital home on 13.04.2000 allegedly with 40% burns

sustained and then re-admitted to a private nursing home, at

Allahabad, where the poor lady succumbed a few days later. Was

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it accidental, as contended by the husband and the in-laws or

whether it was self-inflicted or induced, the causation being the

cruelty arising from incessant dowry demands, is the moot

question arising. The victim died on 02.05.2000 and an FIR was

registered at the Kotwali Police Station, Munger, whereunder is

situated the parental home of the deceased, on 01.06.2000. It

arrayed the husband and his brother as A1 & 2 and A3 to 17; the

other family members of which A5 was the father-in-law and A6

the mother-in-law. We have perused the FIR and also the charge

sheets in both the cases received from the trial court and obtained

translated copies. The FIR was registered on a complaint dated

15.05.2000 by the father, filed before the Chief Judicial

Magistrate’s Court, Munger, obviously one under Section 156(3)

of the Criminal Procedure Code (for brevity ‘CrPC’; with the year

of enactment, wherever relevant). FIR No.272 of 2000 dated

01.06.2000 resulted first, in Final Report No.625 of 2000 dated

31.10.2000 leading to Sessions Case No.592 of 2001 and then,

Final Report No.215 of 2005 dated 31.05.2005 which led to the

instant case numbered as Sessions Case No. 504 of 2006.

7. The complaint spoke of the marriage and the continued

demand of dowry of Rs.50,000/- despite sufficient gifts having

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been given by the bride’s family and the frequent complaints

made by the deceased when she came to her parental home.

Even during the pregnancy of the victim, she is said to have been

harassed which resulted in the childbirth occurring in the

parental home of the mother. The misdeeds continued even after

the son was born and there was also an allegation of forced

abortion, eventually leading to the death at the marital home. It

was also alleged that since the marital family was very influential

the entire incident was hushed up. In addition to the husband, his

relatives, including immediate in-laws, were arrayed only for

reason of the marital home having housed a joint family.

8. In the Final Report of 31.10.2000 after a brief narration of the

complaint of constant demands of dowry pursuant to the marriage

of the daughter of the complainant with Brijesh Kumar, it was

categorically stated that on investigation, the allegation of

offences under Sections 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, the IPC) and Sections 3/4 of

the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (DP Act) appeared to be true. It

was noticed that the father-in-law and mother-in-law were in

judicial custody and that the Superintendent of Police (S.P) had

directed charge-sheet to be filed against the said accused

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considering the investigation against them as completed and

directed investigation against the other 15 persons in the FIR to

be continued. The charge-sheet first filed against the two accused

gave rise to Sessions Case No.592/2001, which ended in acquittal

of both the accused by judgment dated 17.12.2012. On the very

same day, Annexure P10 judgment dated 17.12.2012 was passed

in Sessions Case No.504/2006 wherein the first accused alone was

convicted, and the other 14 accused acquitted. Sessions Case

No.504 of 2006 arose from a final report filed by a different I.O

after further investigation finding no further evidence against the

15 accused remaining.

9. Issues arise of the trial court having taken cognizance based

on a closure report filed by the I.O finding no evidence against

the 15 persons who were not charged at the first instance; urged,

placing reliance on Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi

Police Station

1 and two trials having been proceeded with on the

very same allegation of dowry death of the wife of the appellant

herein. The first charge sheet filed; Exhibit C2, despite finding

the offences made out against all the 17, charged only the two who

were in judicial custody on the directions of the S.P who also

1

2024 SCC OnLine SC 58

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directed further investigation against the others; such directions

being clearly impermissible. The second final report marked as

Annexure C3 states that no evidence was found available on the

record against all the others and there was no cause to raise a

supplementary charge against the 15 accused, by another officer

who was not examined before the trial court.

10. We are quite conscious of Section 158 of the CrPC which

provides that a report be sent to the Magistrate through a superior

officer of police, if the State Government by general or special

order so directs. Apposite would be reference to Section 173 (3)

which provides in such circumstances that the report should be

submitted through that superior officer to the Magistrate and

pending orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer-in-charge of

the police station to make further investigation. Pertinently, the

facts of the present case reveal that the report itself was filed by

the officer-in-charge of the police station which makes it clear that

there was no special or general order passed by the State

Government under Section 158. Further, pertinent is the fact that

herein the FIR was registered on the complaint forwarded under

Section 156(3) on the directions of the CJM. The order of the S.P

hence was clearly without any authority.

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11. Mariam Fasihuddin

1 frowned upon a supplementary

charge sheet filed without any new material unearthed by the

investigating agency; wherein the further investigation directed

was with respect to the dropping of two offences under the IPC.

However, here the first charge sheet finds material against the

other accused also which makes it imperative that we dwell upon

the primacy of the Court which takes cognizance.

12. H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi

2 was concerned with an

investigation carried out under the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1947, by a police officer below the rank of a Deputy

Superintendent of Police, which could have been carried out only

with the order of a Magistrate. It was held that investigation is the

first step, followed by cognizance and then the trial itself. But an

invalid investigation does not nullify the cognizance or the trial

based thereon, since a defect or illegality in investigation has no

bearing on the cognizance taken or the trial. Though a police

report under Section 190 of the CrPC is the material on which

cognizance is taken, a valid or legal police report is not the

foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. If,

therefore, cognizance is in fact taken on a police report vitiated

2

(1954) 2 SCC 934

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by breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, the

trial cannot be set aside merely on that ground, unless the

illegality in the investigation is shown to have brought about

miscarriage of justice as provided under Section 537 of the CrPC

of 1898 (Section 465 of CrPC of 1973). Finding also that the

invalidity of an investigation is not to be completely ignored by

the court during trial, it was held that if the breach of such a

mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the court at

a sufficiently early stage, the court, while not declining

cognizance, will have to take necessary steps to get the illegality

cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such reinvestigation

as the circumstances of an individual case may call for.

13. Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra

3 emphasized the

prerogative of the I.O while carrying out an investigation into an

offence reported, as juxtaposed with the powers of the

jurisdictional court in taking cognizance. The learned Judges

dealt with Sections 154 to 176 of the CrPC of 1898 under the

heading ‘Information to the Police and their powers to investigate’

together with Section 190, relating to the jurisdiction of the

criminal court in inquiries and trials; which are almost in pari

3

1967 SCC OnLine SC 107

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materia with CrPC of 1973. Finding very elaborate provisions

made for securing an investigation into a reported offence,

without causing any harassment to the accused and at the same

time completion without unnecessary or undue delay, it was held

that the manner and method of conducting the investigation are

left entirely to the police and the Magistrate has no power to

interfere with the same. After investigation, if the officer finds no

sufficient evidence or reasonable grounds justifying forwarding

the accused to the Magistrate, Section 169 provides that the

accused shall be released on his executing a bond to appear

before the Magistrate.

14. On the other hand, if sufficient evidence or reasonable

grounds are found to make out an offence, then the accused has

to be forwarded to the Magistrate under Section 170 if the offence

is bailable or otherwise released on bond requiring his

appearance before the Magistrate. However, be it invocation of

Section 169 or Section 170 the police officer has to submit a report

to the Magistrate under Section 173, either a closure report;

finding no offence made out or a charge sheet; with material

allegations based on valid evidence leading to the offence. It was

categorically held relying on King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir

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Ahmad

4 that the functions of the judiciary and the police are

complementary and not overlapping, leaving each to exercise its

own functions, subject only to the right of the court to intervene in

an appropriate case. When the jurisdictional court has no right to

interfere less said the better about the interference made by a

superior officer, herein the S.P, especially when the I.O forms an

opinion that a case for trial is made out.

15. It was categorically held that the formation of opinion as to

whether or not there is a case to place the accused on trial is

exclusively with the officer in charge of the investigation. If a

closure report is filed; finding no case made out, it is not open to

the Magistrate to direct the police to file a charge sheet. It was

also clarified that this is not to say that the Magistrate is absolutely

powerless since the Magistrate is competent to proceed to take

cognizance of the offence, on the materials revealed in the

investigation, under Section 190 which imports a judicial

discretion on the Magistrate to receive such report under Section

173. The Magistrate, hence, is not bound to accept the opinion of

the police that there is no case to place the accused on trial as it

4

71 IA 203, 212

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is always open to take a contrary view on the facts disclosed in

the report.

16. Ram Naresh Prasad v. State of Jharkhand

5 held that when

the police file a report, colloquially termed a ‘closure report’;

finding no sustainable case made out, the Court cannot direct a

charge sheet to be filed, but could always take cognizance on the

basis of the material in the report or direct further investigation.

H.S. Bains v. State (U.T. of Chandigarh)

6 & Ramswaroop Soni v.

State of M.P.

7 reiterated that when a closure report is filed finding

no offence made out, the Court has three options; (i) to accept the

same and close the proceedings or (ii) take cognizance of the

matter on the materials in the report or (iii) direct further

investigation. It is thus open to the Magistrate on submission of a

closure report to look into the material facts disclosed in the

report and form an opinion as to whether it constitutes an offence

and take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b). To

buttress this position, Abhinandan Jha

3 made reference to Section

169 of the Code which provides that even if the police officer finds

on investigation that there is no reasonable ground or sufficient

5

(2009) 11 SCC 299

6

(1980) 4 SCC 631

7

(2020) 18 SCC 327

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evidence to put the accused on trial, the officer while releasing

the accused has to take a bond for appearance before the

Magistrate, if required. The primacy of the Court to take

cognizance or deny it is the law discernible from the very

provisions of the CrPC.

17. In the instant case the first charge sheet was filed only

against the two accused and investigation was continued against

the other 15 accused arrayed in the FIR, on instructions of the S.P,

which should have been left to the Court taking cognizance,

especially when the charge sheet found a trial enabled against all

the accused. On submission of the first charge sheet and if there

is felt a need for further investigation, ideally it should have been

done with the orders of the Court and the commencement of trial

ought to have awaited the completion of such investigation. But

the cognizance taken by the Court against the fifteen accused, on

the basis of the subsequent final report cannot be faulted since

though the report on further investigation found no fresh material,

the first report found the offence made out against all the accused,

which was also before Court when the closure report was

considered.

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18. There could be claimed an irregularity but there is no

illegality, miscarriage of justice or prejudice caused to the

accused since split trials, in the same offence is not unheard of,

which we will now deal with. Useful reliance can be placed on the

decision of this Court in Banwari v. State of U.P.

8, wherein the two

accused were convicted under charges of Sections 302 & 307 read

with Section 34 of the IPC. The Magistrate committed three cases

to the Sessions Court two with respect to the two murders and the

other for attempt to murder, all by gunshot injuries. The Sessions

Court modified the charges and consolidated the three cases,

permitting evidence to be adduced in the first case and relied on

that evidence in the other two cases. The incidents occurred in

quick succession and this Court held that though Section 235 is

not applicable, joint trial was justified under Sections 234 & 239 of

the Code. When separate commitments are made of distinct

offences not coming within the exception to Section 233, they

cannot be tried at one trial. But, if there are separate commitment

orders; (i) of persons who could be tried together or (ii) of the

same person for offences which could be tried together, the

accused could still be tried at one trial. Persons accused of

8

1962 SCC OnLine SC 98

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committing a particular offence or offences jointly or in the course

of the same transaction are not put up for trial at the same time,

oftener than ever for reason of some being not available. When

they are later made available and subsequently committed, the

Sessions Judge is not bound to have two separate trials, one with

respect to each commitment, if the trial in the first instance has not

commenced.

19. A committal order just gives the Sessions Court cognizance

over the trial of the persons committed and is not the basis of the

cognizance taken for trial. If there is no prejudice to the accused,

multiple committal orders can be consolidated to try the accused

at one trial, provided it is justified under Sections 233 to 239 of the

CrPC of 1898 (Sections 218 to 223 of the CrPC of 1973). It was held

that ‘…the validity of a joint trial before the Sessions Judge is

dependent on the fact whether the provisions of the Code justify one

joint trial or not’ (para 25). The above discussion makes it crystal

clear that the opinion in the final report filed is not decisive of the

cognizance and the committal order/s is/are not determinative of

whether the trial is single/separate/joint; which is at the exclusive

discretion of the Court.

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20. Herein, though triable together, before the report of further

investigation was filed, the first trial commenced. Despite the

futile exercise of a joint trial in between, the cases were separated

before final adjudication. The relevant witnesses led on behalf of

the prosecution and the defence were identical and no prejudice

is caused to the accused, which persuades us to consider the

matter on its merits.

21. It is distressing that no postmortem was conducted of the

deceased who died in the hospital at Allahabad nor is any wound

certificate produced. A person who sustained serious burn

injuries having been admitted to the hospital, intimation would

have gone to the jurisdictional police station; both at Mirzapur

and Allahabad but not produced or even enquired into. It is also

pertinent that the witnesses examined to prove the allegations are

the friend of the father of the deceased (PW1), the father-in-law of

one of the brothers of the deceased (PW2), her brothers (PWs 3

to 5 & 14) and her father (PW6). The testimonies of all the

prosecution witnesses indicate that though the incident occurred

on 13.04.2000 they were informed only on 21.04.2000; effectively

controverted in the defense evidence.

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22. Be that as it may, PW1 says that the information was passed

on to PW6 on 22.04.2000 and he along with PW6 went to see the

victim at the hospital on 22.04.2000. PW2 deposed that his son-in-

law i.e. PW14, the brother of the deceased went to the hospital at

Allahabad on 26.04.2000 and met the victim. PW14 however

deposed that on 22.04.2000 he saw his sister, completely burned,

at Allahabad and on 30.04.2000 his father returned to Munger for

arranging money for the treatment of his sister. It is also the

testimony of the brothers and the father of the deceased that on

02.05.2000 when the victim died, a hasty cremation was

conducted, to avoid a postmortem.

23. It is very unlikely that having reached the hospital long

before the death, the family members of the victim would have

abandoned the victim in the company of her in-laws against whom

allegations are raised of dowry demands. What is more

disturbing is that the I.O has not attempted to bring out what

transpired after the victim sustained the burns especially since

the incident occurred at Mirzapur, where she was first admitted

to the District Hospital and then later taken to a hospital at

Allahabad where she succumbed after a few days’ hospitalization.

The explanation of the relatives of the deceased is only that the

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accused are very influential in Allahabad which however does not

prevent an I.O from inquiring in the neighboring State while

carrying out an investigation, bringing to light the facts as they

existed.

24. As far as the testimonies are concerned, all the witnesses

rest content with a bland refrain about the demand of a dowry of

Rs.50,000/- commenced from the date of marriage till her death.

Admittedly, a son was born to the couple in the meanwhile, and

the son was kept with the father after the death of the mother.

PW15 is the I.O who does not speak anything worthwhile as to the

investigation carried out. His deposition, as found from the

impugned order marks the FIR and describes the marital home of

the deceased and records that there is no incident reported at the

police station at Mirzapur where the marital home is situated. The

statement of the doctor at the hospital at Allahabad in which the

victim was treated is said to have been recorded but the said

person was not summoned as a witness for the prosecution. It was

also stated that on enquiries made at the police station having

jurisdiction over the location in which the hospital is located, he

was informed that a statement of the victim was recorded before

the Magistrate. It is further deposed that it was not produced since

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it was not provided; clearly a lackadaisical approach. What

assumes significance is that the I.O. categorically deposes that

but for the family members of the complainant, none in the

neighborhood came forward to speak of a n acrimonious

marriage, quite relevant in the context of the defense set up by

the accused.

25. The accused examined himself as DW1 and four others.

DW2 is the doctor working in the hospital at Allahabad in which

the victim was treated. DW3 produced the register from the

District Hospital Mirzapur. DW4 was the emergency medical

officer who examined the victim at the first instance when she was

brought to the District Hospital. DW5 was the Executive

Magistrate, the Upzilaadhikari, Sadar, Allahabad who recorded

the dying declaration. The defense set up a plea of false

implication by the family members of the deceased by reason of

the refusal of the husband to marry the sister of the deceased;

quite probable viewed in the context of a complaint having been

filed at Munger on 15.05.2000, despite the offence having

occurred on 13.04.2000 at Mirzapur and the death on 02.05.2000

at Allahabad.

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26. DW4 was the emergency medical officer of the Barrister

Yusuf Imam District Hospital, Mirzapur where the victim was first

taken at 01.00 am. It was deposed that she was brought by her

husband, and she was found to be fully conscious having

superficial and deep burns on both hands, face, chest, abdomen

and the back with the general condition recorded as poor. His

opinion was of 40% burns, and he testified that he took two right

thumb impressions of the patient on the accident register,

produced as Ext. J by DW3, the custodian of the register. DW4

categorically stated that no finger of the patient was injured,

contrary to the statement of PW14 that all the 10 fingers of his

sister were burned when he saw her on 22.04.2000, further

validating the defense of false implication since it is an attempt to

invalidate the dying declaration.

27. DW5 categorially states that he had taken down the

statement of the victim which was marked as Exhibit 1/2. The

witness spoke of the statement having been recorded in the

words of the deceased and admitted that he had not taken the

signature of the victim since she was not in a position to affix her

signature. He also did not take the right-hand thumb impression

of the woman. DW2 corroborated the statement of DW5 since he

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was on duty at the time the Magistrate took the statement of the

victim on 16.04.2000. He identified the writing and the signature

of the SDM and affirmed the certification made of the victim being

conscious and fit to give her statement. The statement of the

deceased absolves her in-laws and speaks of an accident having

occurred when she was boiling milk for her child. The rubber

pipe of the gas stove got disconnected and the flames engulfed

her chest when she immediately switched off the gas. She rolled

on the ground and cried out and then ran to the room in which her

husband was watching television. Her husband immediately tried

to douse the fire with a floor mat and so did the other family

members who finally put out the fire by throwing water on her.

She categorically stated that none of her in-laws were responsible

for the accident.

28. We would, for the moment, not reckon the dying declaration

which absolves the accused in toto. It is trite that a dying

declaration though delicate, is a crucial piece of evidence if found

to be trustworthy from the overall circumstances, enabling a

conviction on that basis alone. However, when the dying

declaration is exculpatory in nature, then necessarily the entire

evidence would have to be analysed and if the other

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circumstances form a complete chain, the exculpatory statement

of the deceased will have to be treated with some circumspection

or at times eschewed completely. In the present case, from the

evidence at least it is clear that when the dying declaration was

recorded, the deceased was admitted to the hospital and looked

after by her husband and in-laws. The statements made in the

above circumstances, presumably when the injured victim was

looked after entirely by the accused will have to be treated with

some circumspection and hence, we do not place any reliance on

the same, at this point.

29. Even then we cannot but opine that the testimonies were in

the nature of a soulless reiteration of a demand of Rs.50,000/-,

having been made right from the inception of the marital life till

the death occurred. The defense produced certificates of

investments made in the joint names of the husband and the wife

which are produced at Annexure P2 & P3; far exceeding the

demand alleged. DW1, the accused himself mounted the box to

speak of an idyllic marriage and narrated the incident, producing

Exhibit A, the medical certificate indicating that his left hand was

also scorched in the episode, while trying to save his wife. The

accused also testified of informing his father-in-law on 14.04.2000

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at 09:18 am through telephone, the call receipt evidencing the

same marked as Exhibit B. He had also sent telegrams on the

same day at 08:35 am, the receipts of which were marked as

Exhibit C and D. The Kisan Vikas Patra and National Saving

Certificates taken out in the joint name of himself and his wife, as

also the LIC policy in his name, with his wife as the nominee were

produced. The documents relating to the treatment of the

deceased were marked as Exhibit E to E/4 and the receipts with

respect to the expenses incurred were also marked as Exhibit G

to G/14. The prescriptions during the treatment were also

exhibited as Exhibit H to H/3, belying the very contention of PW6

having returned to his village to arrange finance for his

daughter’s treatment.

30. The trial court found that the entire documents from the

hospital were not produced and it is not clear as to what

medicines were administered to the patient, which in fact ought

to have been procured and produced by the prosecution. The

dying declaration was rejected on the ground that the same was

not forwarded through the jurisdictional CJM, the same having

been received at the trial court, as directly forwarded from the

office of the ADM. The efficacy of the dying declaration was

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further doubted since DW5 had not recorded it in the question-

and-answer form. As to the demand of dowry, the trial court relied

on the testimony of the witnesses regarding the demand made of

Rs.50,000/- from 1995 till 1999. It was found that the time when

the victim was taken to the hospital is 1:00 am on 14.04.2000 and

there is discrepancy between the time of incident and the time

claimed by the defense.

31. As we observed, the testimony regarding the dowry

demand is a bland repetition of a demand having been made of

Rs.50,000/- right after the marriage till the year 1999, which the

family of the deceased did not comply with. The defense on the

other hand has proof of investments in the joint names of the

husband and the wife which belies the above contention. The

husband had also taken a LIC policy in the name of himself with

the wife as the nominee. A child was also born to the couple in

the period in which the sustained demand of dowry of Rs.50,000/-

is said to have been continued. The I.O., PW15, categorically

stated that except the family members there was no other witness,

from the neighborhood coming forward to testify as to the marital

discord between the couple. The I.O. has practically not carried

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out any investigation in Mirzapur or Allahabad and has merely

described the marital house in great detail in his testimony.

32. The enquiries carried out at the police station having

jurisdiction over the hospital, where the death occurred, clearly

indicates a dying declaration having been made which was not

produced by the prosecution. The dying declaration was

recorded by an Executive Magistrate and the doctor of the

hospital, in which the victim was admitted, certified her fitness to

make such a declaration. There is no hard and fast rule that a

dying declaration should be in the question-and-answer form.

The dying declaration, even if not reckoned to absolve the

husband and the family members, at least raises a reasonable

doubt regarding their culpability coupled with the other

circumstances.

33. The family of the victim reached the hospital long before

her death and it is very unlikely that they left their child alone

when they were arranging money for her treatment. The

treatment receipts and the receipts of bills paid as produced by

DW1 puts paid the contention that PW6 left the hospital to his

native place to arrange money for the treatment. In any event,

there is no reason for the family having left en bloc leaving the

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victim alone, especially in the custody of the in-laws when there

was allegation of incessant dowry demands by the in-laws.

34. Neither was a postmortem conducted nor was there an

immediate FIR registered, at least in the hometown of the victim.

The exact time when the fire occurred is discernible only from the

statement in the dying declaration that it was around 10:45 pm.

The time stated could only be an approximation and there would

have been some time taken in arranging a transport and taking

her to the hospital, first to the District Hospital at Mirzapur where

the Doctor deposes, the victim was brought at 1 am. There was no

attempt by the prosecution to bring forth the distance between

the marital house of the deceased and the hospital. The victim was

transferred to a higher medical center at Allahabad on the very

same day for better treatment; all of which was carried out by the

husband, as is indicated from the documents produced. The oral

evidence led by the prosecution fails to prove the case set up of

a demand of dowry or the animosity the husband is alleged to

have been harboring against the wife. The hollow statement made

of demand of dowry echoed listlessly by the witnesses; all

relatives of the victim, raise not a grain of doubt but a sea of

suspicion regarding the entire story set up.

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35. The prosecution has failed to establish the constant

demands of dowry, a bitter matrimony or any other circumstance

which could lead to a conclusion that the family of the husband or

the husband alone had instigated or perpetrated the crime of

dowry death or subjected her to cruelty leading to the death.

Sadly, the prosecution has completely failed to bring forth the

nature of the burn injuries suffered by the victim, which could

have, on analysis by a forensic expert, garnered an expert

opinion as to whether it was a homicide, a case of fatal self-harm

or as argued by the defence, purely accidental. We have to

emphasise in this context the absence of the postmortem and

unsatisfactory explanation offered on that count.

36. The case set up by the defence of the husband having

declined the entreaties of the family of the wife to marry her sister

assumes relevance, especially in the context of the delayed FIR

registered at the home town of the deceased while her marital

home, where the incident occurred was at Mirzapur and she

succumbed at a hospital in Allahabad. The defence evidence led,

also indicate a happy marriage and a caring husband; which has

not been controverted effectively by the prosecution in cross

examination. In the circumstances of the valid defence evidence,

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we could also rely on the dying declaration, exculpating the

accused, as a corroborative piece of evidence, making

believable the version of accidental burn injuries.

37. The defence evidence was given a complete go by without

any valid reasons, despite the substantive testimonies and

credible documents produced, remaining uncontroverted. The

prosecution has failed to establish the charges beyond

reasonable doubt and the attendant circumstances coupled with

the defence evidence brings forth a probable hypothesis of

innocence. The trial courts would do well to bestow equal

attention to the defence evidence as that bestowed on the

prosecution evidence. There is no cause to approach the defence

evidence with distrust, suspicion or even scepticism. The accused

is not obliged to prove his/her innocence and if a reasonable

doubt is raised either from the unsatisfactory evidence led by the

prosecution or from the evidence led by the defence its benefit

should inure to the accused; which is the reasonable hypothesis

of innocence as laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State

of Maharashtra

9. A valid defence plea, substantiated through

testimonies of independent witnesses and documents, as in this

9

(1984) 4 SCC 116

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case, tested alongside the sketchy evidence led on behalf of the

prosecution ought to have raised the judicial antenna of caution

especially when the standard of proof is that of proof beyond

reasonable doubt. As held in Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab

10 in

travelling from ‘may be true’ to ‘must be true’ the whole of the

distance should be paved with ‘legal, reliable and unimpeachable

evidence’.

38. Before leaving the matter, we are constrained to notice the

clear travesty of justice which has occurred in the above case,

putting on the dock seventeen persons for reason only of having

marital ties with the victim who, in all probability, sustained burn

injuries in an accidental fire at her matrimonial home. The High

Court also should have bestowed better care in disposing of a

criminal appeal from a conviction for an offence alleged to have

been committed a quarter century back. The casual approach is

evident from the remand order made for reason only of lack of

opportunity to cross-examine certain witnesses, which

testimonies were inconsequential and the impugned order of the

Sessions Court having considered only those witnesses led in the

trial of the accused, appellant herein.

10

(1957) 1 SCR 953

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39. We allow the appeal and acquit the appellant/accused

reversing the order of conviction passed by the Sessions Court

and the order of remand passed by the High Court. We had

released the accused on bail, which if carried out, the bail bonds

shall stand cancelled. It goes without saying that if the accused is

still in custody, he shall be released forthwith if not wanted in any

other case.

40. Pending application (s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……....……………………. J.

(SANJAY KUMAR)

...…….……………………. J.

(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI

JULY 13, 2026.