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CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 1009-1010 of 2001

Appeal (crl.) 1013-1014 of 2001

PETITIONER:

C.B.I., A.H.D., PATNA

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

BRAJ BHUSHAN PRASAD & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/10/2001

BENCH:

K.T. Thomas, Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri & U.C. Banerjee

JUDGMENT:

THOMAS, J.

Leave granted.

The question is short but the range of consideration

got widened much. Answer to the question may be of

advantage to some accused and disadvantage to some other

accused who are involved in a large number of criminal

cases which are compendiously styled with the sobriquet

Bihar Fodder Scam Cases. These cases related to a series

of orchestrated fraudulent acts by which a staggeringly

huge amount of public money was plundered or looted after

creating fake bills and other false documents for the said

purpose, with the active participation or connivance of

several high ups in the administration of the State.

Though it is unnecessary now to mention the whopping sum so

plundered in each case, we are told that the aggregate of

them exceeds Rs.720 crores. The persons arraigned in the

cases include men who held high offices, besides the two

former Chief Ministers of Bihar (Lalu Prasad Yadav and Dr.

Jagannath Mishra).

The above indicated question winched to the fore on

the midnight of 15th November, 2000, when the erstwhile

State of Bihar got itself bifurcated into two States by the

Act of Parliament called The Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000

(for short the Act). One region of it became a new State

called Jharkhand while the remaining region became the

present State of Bihar.

We are told that 64 cases have been registered

relating to fodder scam. All the cases were directed to be

investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI

for short) pursuant to an order passed by the High Court of

Patna which was affirmed by this Court, with some

modifications as per the judgment in State of Bihar and

anr. vs. Ranchi Zila Samta party and anr. {1996 (3) SCC

682}. It is not disputed that 52 cases, out of the above,

involve withdrawal of huge sums of money from the

government treasuries situated in the territories now

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falling within Jharkhand State. Out of those 52 cases,

charge-sheets have been filed by the CBI before the

appointed day i.e. 15.11.2000 in 36 cases before the

Special Court situated at Patna. These appeals relate to

those 36 cases.

It was submitted on behalf of the CBI that those 36

cases stood transferred to the State of Jharkhand soon

after the midnight of 15.11.2000. That claim of the CBI

was resisted by some of the accused in those cases

(including Lalu Prasad Yadav and Dr. Jagannath Mishra) who

contended that none of those cases has been transferred.

Thus the simple question is whether all or any of those

cases stood transferred to the courts situated in the State

of Jharkhand on the midnight when the new State was born.

A Full Bench of three Judges of the Patna High Court

considered the question. By the impugned judgment the

learned Judges of the Full Bench of the High Court took the

view that none of the 36 cases has been transferred to

Jharkhand State, though one of the learned Judges of the

Full Bench held that 23 cases (out of the said 36 cases)

should have gone over to Jharkhand State. Thus the High

Court discountenanced the claim of the CBI regarding the 36

cases as per the impugned judgment.

It is admitted by both sides that the transfer of

cases as a sequel to the bifurcation of the erstwhile State

of Bihar is the result of the operation of a statutory

provision incorporated in the Act. Section 89 of the said

Act reads thus:

89(1) Every proceeding pending immediately

before the appointed day before a court

(other than the High Court), tribunal,

authority or officer in any area which on

that day falls within the State of Bihar

shall, if it is a proceeding relating

exclusively to the territory, which as from

that day is the territory of Jharkhand

State, stand transferred to the

corresponding court, tribunal, authority or

officer of that State.

(2) If any question arises as to whether

any proceeding should stand transferred

under sub-section (1), it shall be referred

to the High Court at Patna and the decision

of that High Court shall be final.

(3) In this section-

(a) proceeding includes any suit, case or

appeal; and

(b) corresponding court, tribunal, authority

or officer' in the State of Jharkhand

means-

(i) the court, tribunal, authority or

officer in which, or before whom, the

proceeding would have laid if it had been

instituted after the appointed day; or

(ii) in case of doubt, such court,

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tribunal, authority or officer in that

State, as may be determined after the

appointed day by the Government of that

State or the Central Government, as the case

may be, or before the appointed day by the

Government of the existing State of Bihar to

be the corresponding court, tribunal,

authority or officer.

Before the appointed day (i.e. 15.11.2000) the

erstwhile State of Bihar comprised of all the territories

now included in the State of Jharkhand as well as the

territories retained with the present State of Bihar.

Jharkhand State is comprised mainly of three regions- (1)

North Chhotanagpur (2) South Chhotanagpur (3) Santhal

Pargana.

Government treasuries situated at Dhanbad, Ranchi and

Chaibasa were all located within Jharkhand area. The city

of Patna which was the capital of the undivided State of

Bihar falls within the region of the present State of

Bihar. Patna is now the capital of the present State of

Bihar. The above informations are useful for appreciating

the rival contentions.

It is admitted by both sides that in all the 36 cases

(involved here) the allegations pertained to the withdrawal

of crores of rupees made from the treasuries located in the

territories of Jharkhand area. Long before the division of

the State of Bihar courts were established for the trial of

offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for

short the PC Act). As per the notification issued by the

Government of Bihar on 19.4.1994, three courts of Special

Judges were created; one at Dhanbad, the second at Ranchi

and the third at Patna. The court so created at Dhanbad

was conferred with the jurisdiction over all areas under

the division of North Chhotanagpur. The court so created

at Ranchi was given jurisdiction over all areas under the

division of South Chhotanagpur. The court so created at

Patna was given the jurisdiction over the remaining

regions.

Another court of Special Judge was established at

Patna by notification issued by the Government on

22.5.1996, as per which jurisdiction was given over all

Patna areas barring north and south of Chhotanagpur. This

means, there were two courts at Patna having territorial

jurisdiction over the same areas. Yet another court of

Special Judge was established at Patna itself by

notification issued on 5.6.96. This court was conferred

with the territorial jurisdiction over the entire area of

the State of Bihar.

The court of Special Judge created by notification

dated 5.6.1996 could thus exercise jurisdiction over the

entire undivided State of Bihar at a time when a court

created earlier (as per notification of 19.4.1994) could

have exercised jurisdiction in the two regions which fell

within Jharkhand area. In other words, the last created

court was invested with the concurrent jurisdiction vis-à-

vis the jurisdiction exercisable by all other courts. This

last notification probably would have created problems for

the investigating agencies for determining which of the

courts to be chosen for filing charge-sheets under Section

4(2) of the PC Act, (where there are more Special Judges

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than one for such area the offences shall be tried by the

Special Judge as specified in this behalf by the Central

Government). But no such notification was issued by the

Central Government.

It was in the above situation that the Registrar of

the High Court sent a letter to the District and Sessions

Judge, Patna on 13.6.1996 directing him to inform the

Special Judge appointed as per the notification of 5.6.1996

to deal with all the cases pertaining to the Animal

Husbandry Scam (same as Fodder Scam) without any

restrictions of the area. The legal validity of the said

letter of the Registrar was doubted by the Full Bench of

the High Court in the impugned judgment. That letter was

assailed before us also on the premise that only the

Central Government has the power to specify, which out of

the two courts, can try any particular class of cases.

This is so provided in Section 4(2) of the PC Act.

Be that as it may, we would decide the present dispute

de hors the validity or otherwise of the said letter.

It is not disputed before us that the courts of the

Special Judges situated within Jharkhand area have

jurisdiction to try all the 36 cases now involved. The

High Court, as per the impugned judgment, considered the

question whether the court at Patna also has the

jurisdiction to try them. Various acts alleged against

different accused in such cases were highlighted and it was

found that the Special Court at Patna also had the

jurisdiction to try the offence in view of Section 179 and

Section 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short

the Code). The former section enables that the offence

involved may be enquired into or tried by a court within

whose local jurisdiction such offence had been done or the

consequence has ensued. Under the latter section offences

can be enquired into or tried by a court within whose local

jurisdiction either the main act was done or other acts

related to the main act were done. Taking cue from those

provisions learned Judges of the High Court found that

since the jurisdiction of the court at Patna was not

completely excluded (by virtue of certain allied acts

having been done at Patna) those proceedings cannot be held

to be exclusively relating to the Jharkhand State, and

therefore the cases could remain in the present State of

Bihar.

Shri Harish N. Salve, learned Solicitor General of

India, who argued for the CBI submitted that the entire

approach made by the High Court in the impugned judgment is

fallacious because the question whether the courts at Patna

also had jurisdiction from the angle of Section 179 or

Section 180 of the Code, is outside the purview of Section

89 of the Act. Learned Solicitor General submitted that

the question has to be determined by reference to Section

4(2) of the PC Act and not any provision of the Cr.P.C.

According to him, the test is this: If the same acts were

committed after the appointed day and cases have to be

instituted, would they have been filed in the courts

situated within Jharkhand State. If the result of the

above test is positive the operation of the statutory

provisions of the Act would only have resulted in the

present cases having been transferred to the State of

Jharkhand on the appointed day, according to Shri Harish N.

Salve.

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Shri Anoop Choudhary, learned senior counsel

(appearing for one of the respondents - accused in the

criminal cases) while supporting the arguments of the

Solicitor General further submitted that the legal concept

of cause of action was not envisaged in Section 89 of the

Act and as such the High Court fell into error by

countenancing some of the acts having been done at Patna

for the purpose of deciding that cause of action would have

arisen in that place also. Shri Sushil Kumar, learned

senior counsel appearing for another respondent - accused

supported the contentions of the learned Solicitor General.

Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel who argued

for Lalu Prasad Yadav, contended, inter alia, that the only

test is whether the proceedings sought to be transferred

related exclusively to the territory falling within the

Jharkhand State and on the facts it cannot be said, by any

stretch of imagination, that the cases related exclusively

to that territory, in view of the acts narrated in the

charge-sheets submitted in R.C. 20A, R.C.30 A and R.C. 64A.

He also submitted that the principle enunciated in Sections

178 to 180 of the Code can be applied and the criminal

misconduct alleged against Lalu Prasad Yadav cannot then be

said to relate exclusively to the Jharkhand State. He

pointed out that even according to the admitted position

the acts done by the public servants located in Patna as

well as in Jharkhand area have resulted in the commission

of offences and consequently the test of exclusivity

envisaged in Section 89 of the Act cannot absolve the

courts in Patna from jurisdiction to try the cases involved

in these appeals.

Shri P.S. Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing for

Dr. Jagannath Mishra, pointed out that the very fact that

CBI laid the charge-sheets in the Patna court was on

account of the position that the courts at Patna had

jurisdiction to try the case. He also submitted that the

question of jurisdiction must be considered in view of

Sections 179 and 180 of the Code and that the word

exclusively in Section 89 of the Act cannot have a

meaning other than to the exclusion of all others. Shri

Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned counsel arguing for some other

respondents, adopted the same contentions which has been

put forward by the two senior counsel mentioned above.

Section 89 of the Act deals with what should have

happened on the appointed day i.e. 15.11.2000 in respect of

every proceeding relating exclusively to the territory of

Jharkhand State. Every such proceedings shall stand

transferred to the corresponding court, tribunal, authority

or officer of Jharkhand State. Here the words relating

exclusively to the territory of Jharkhand State are the

decisive words. What is meant by the word exclusively in

this context, has now to be determined.

In Blacks Law Dictionary, the word exclusively is

shown to have multiple nuances or shades of meanings such

as only or solely or substantially all or for the greater

part. It also means to the exclusion of all others.

Learned counsel who propounded the view in favour of the

theory that the cases stood transferred to Jharkhand State

submitted that among the above different meanings the word

should be understood only as substantially all or for the

greater part because that is the most befitting to this

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context. Learned counsel on the other side submitted that

the meaning of the said word cannot be anything other than

to the exclusion of all others.

The lexicographer of Blacks Law Dictionary has

referred to the phrase exclusively used and quoted from

Salvation Army v. Hoehn (Mo., 354, Mo.107, 188 SW 2d 826)

as follows:

The phrase in provision exempting from

taxation properties exclusively used for

religious worship, for schools or for

purposes purely charitable, has reference to

primary and inherent as over against a mere

secondary and incidental use.

Learned Solicitor General invited our attention to the

observations made by Devancy, J. of the Minnesota Supreme

Court, in Anoka County v. City of St. Paul (1999 American

Law Reports 1137). In that case learned Judges were dealing

with Article 9 Section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution

which exempted public property used exclusively for any

public purpose from taxation. It was argued that since

the city was in part, at least engaging in a private

business, the land upon which the water works were located

were not used exclusively for a public purpose and hence

the entire water works should be taxed. The said argument

was repelled by the following words:

We do not agree. The word exclusively as

here used means substantially all or for

the greater part. This word must be a given

a practical construction.

We may point out that the aforesaid observation has

been profitably used by the editors of Corpus Juris

Secundum (vide Page 113 of Volume 33). In Words and

Phrases an extract from American Management Association

vs. Assessors of Town of Madison (406 NYS 583) has been

reproduced thus:

Term exclusively, as used in provision of

Real Property Tax Law exempting from

taxation real property owned by a

corporation organized or conducted

exclusively for educational purposes and

used exclusively for such purpose, means

primarily.

Yet another extract from Klamath Irrigation Dist. v.

Employment Division (534 P.2d 190) has also been quoted

like this:

Word exclusively within statutory

provision defining agricultural labor exempt

from payment of unemployment compensation

taxes as including all services performed in

connection with operation or maintenance of

ditches, canals, reservoirs or waterways not

owned or operated for profit used

exclusively for supplying and storing water

for farming purposes, operates to relieve an

irrigation district of its burden of paying

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tax if none of its water is sold for a

profit and if organization is devoted

primarily or principally or in large

part to delivering water for farm purposes,

and if nonfarm purposes to which water is

put are not substantial.

We pointed out the above different shades of meanings

in order to determine as to which among them has to be

chosen for interpreting the said word falling in Section 89

of the Act. The doctrine of Noscitur a sociis (meaning of

a word should be known from its accompanying or associating

words) has much relevance in understanding the imports of

words in a statutory provision. The said doctrine has been

resorted to with advantage by this Court in a number of

cases vide Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. A

Rajappa {1978 (2) SCC 213}, Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd.

vs. CCE {1990 (3) SCC 447}, Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. vs. CCE

{1993 Supp.(3) SCC 716, K. Bhagirathi G. Shenoy & ors.

vs. K.P. Ballakuraya & anr. {1999 (4) SCC 135}, Lokmat

Newspapers (P) Ltd. vs. Shankarprasad {1999 (6) SCC 275}.

If so, we have to gauge the implication of the words

proceeding relating exclusively to the territory from the

surrounding context. Section 89 of the Act says that

proceeding pending prior to the appointed day before a

court (other than the High Court), tribunal, authority or

officer shall stand transferred to the corresponding

court, tribunal, authority or officer of the Jharkhand

State. A very useful index is provided in the section by

defining the words corresponding court, tribunal,

authority or officer in the State of Jharkhand as this:

The court, tribunal, authority or officer

in which or before whom the proceeding would

have laid if it had been instituted after

the appointed day.

Look at the words would have laid if it had been

instituted after the appointed day. In considering the

question as to where the proceeding relating to the 36

cases involved in these appeals would have laid, had they

been instituted after the appointed day, we have absolutely

no doubt that the meaning of the word exclusively should

be understood as substantially all or for the greater part

or principally.

We cannot overlook the main object of Section 89 of

the Act. It must not be forgotten that transfer of

criminal cases is not the only subject covered by the

section. The provision seeks to allocate the files or

records relating to all proceedings, after the bifurcation

if they were to be instituted after the appointed day. Any

interpretation should be one which achieves that object and

not that which might create confusion or perplexity or even

bewilderment to the officers of the respective States. In

other words, the interpretation should be made with

pragmatism, not pedantically or in a stilted manner. For

the purpose of criminal cases, we should bear in mind the

subject matter of the case to be transferred. When so

considering, we have to take into account further that all

the 36 cases are primarily for the offences under the PC

Act and hence they are all triable before the courts of

Special Judges. Hence, the present question can be

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determined by reference to the provisions of PC Act.

The charge-sheets in all these cases were filed in the

court of the Special Judge at Patna when the State of Bihar

remained undivided prior to 15.11.2000. By the notification

dated 5.6.1996 (supra) that court was conferred with the

territorial jurisdiction to try all cases falling under the

PC Act. Added to it when the Registrar of the High Court

of Patna directed (rightly or wrongly) the District and

Sessions Judge to see that all cases relating to Animal

Husbandry Scam (same as Bihar Fodder Scam cases) should be

filed in that court, the CBI had no option in the matter

except to file all those cases before the court at Patna.

There is no dispute that on 15.11.2000 the court at Patna

was divested of its jurisdiction over the territories

falling within the Jharkhand State.

Section 4 of the PC Act relates to the jurisdiction of

the court for trial of offences under that Act. The first

sub-section of Section 4 declares that notwithstanding

anything contained in the Code or in any other law, the

offences punishable under the PC Act can be tried only by

the Special Judge, appointed under Section 3(1) of the PC

Act. Now sub-section (2) of Section 4 is the important

provision and it is extracted below:

Every offence specified in sub-section (1)

of section 3 shall be tried by the special

Judge for the area within which it was

committed, or, as the case may be, by the

special Judge appointed for the case, or,

where there are more special Judges than one

for such area, by such one of them as may be

specified in this behalf by the Central

Government.

Thus, the only court which has jurisdiction to try the

offences under the PC Act is the court of Special Judge

appointed for the areas within which such offences were

committed. When such an offence is being tried sub-section

(3) enables the same Special Judge to try any other offence

which could as well be charged against that accused in the

same trial. So the pivot of the matter is to determine the

area within which the offence was committed.

For that purpose it is useful to look at Section 3(1)

of the PC Act. It empowers the Government to appoint

Special Judge to try two categories of offences. The first

is, any offence punishable under this Act and the second

is, any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or

any abetment of any of the offences specified in the first

category. So when a court has jurisdiction to try the

offence punishable under the PC Act on the basis of the

place where such offence was committed, the allied offences

such as conspiracy, attempt or abetment to commit that

offence are only to be linked with the main offence. When

the main offence is committed and is required to be tried

it is rather inconceivable that jurisdiction of the court

will be determined on the basis of where the conspiracy or

attempt or abetment of such main offence was committed. It

is only when the main offence was not committed, but only

the conspiracy to commit that offence or the attempt or the

abetment of it alone was committed, then the question would

arise whether the court of the Special Judge within whose

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area such conspiracy etc. was committed could try the case.

For our purpose it is unnecessary to consider that aspect

because the charges proceed on the assumption that the main

offence was committed.

What is the main offence in the charges involved in

all these 36 cases? It is undisputed that the main offence

is under Section 13(1)(c) and also Section 13(1)(d) of the

PC Act. The first among them is described thus:

A public servant is said to commit the

offence of criminal misconduct,-

(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently

misappropriates or otherwise converts for

his own use any property entrusted to him

or under his control as a public servant

or allows any other person to do so.

The next offence is described like this:

A public servant is said to commit the

offence of criminal misconduct,-

(d) if he,-

(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains

for himself or for any other person any

valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(ii) by abusing his position as a public

servant, obtains for himself or for any

other person any valuable thing or pecuniary

advantage; or

(iii) while holding office as a public

servant, obtains for any person any valuable

thing or pecuniary advantage without any

public interest.

We have no doubt in our mind that the hub of the act

envisaged in first of those two offences is dishonestly or

fraudulently misappropriates. Similarly the hinge of the

act envisaged in the second section is obtains for

himself or for any other person, any valuable thing or

pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means.

The above acts were completed in the present cases

when the money has gone out of the public treasuries and

reached the hands of any one of the persons involved.

Hence, so far as the offences under Section 13(1)(c) and

Section 13(1)(d) are concerned the place where the offences

were committed could easily be identified as the place

where the treasury concerned was situated. It is an

undisputed fact that in all these cases the treasuries were

situated within the territories of Jharkhand State.

Thus, when it is certain where exactly the offence

under Section 13 of the PC Act was committed it is an

unnecessary exercise to ponder over the other areas wherein

certain allied activities, such as conspiracy or

preparation, or even the prefatory or incidental acts were

done, including the consequences ensued.

In this context it is useful to refer to Section 181

of the Code which falls within Chapter XIII, comprising of

provisions regarding jurisdiction of the criminal courts in

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inquiries and trials. Section 181 pertains to place of

trial in case of certain offences. Sub-section (4) thereof

deals with the jurisdiction of the courts if the offence

committed is either criminal misappropriation or criminal

breach of trust. At least four different courts have been

envisaged by the sub-section having jurisdiction for trial

of the said offence and any one of which can be chosen.

They are: (1) the court within whose local jurisdiction the

offence was committed; (2) the court within whose local

jurisdiction any part of the property which is the subject

of the offence was received; (3) the court within whose

local jurisdiction any part of the property which is the

subject of the offence was retained; and (4) the court

within whose local jurisdiction any part of the property

which is subject of the offence was required to be returned

or accounted for, by the accused.

Now, observe the distinction between Section 181(4) of

the Code and Section 4(2) of the PC Act. When the former

provision envisaged at least four courts having

jurisdiction to try a case involving misappropriation the

latter provision of the PC Act has restricted it to one

court i.e. the Court of the Special Judge for the area

within which the offence was committed. No other court

is envisaged for trial of that offence. We pointed out

above that when the charge contains the offence or offences

punishable under the PC Act as well as the offence of

conspiracy to commit or attempt to commit or any abetment

of any such offence, the court within whose local

jurisdiction the main offence was committed alone has

jurisdiction.

Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel contended

that Section 4(2) of the PC Act does not override the

provisions of the Code regarding jurisdiction because among

the four sub-sections included in Section 4 of the said

Act, only first and the last sub-sections are tagged with

the non obstante words notwithstanding anything contained

in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In his submission the

fact that sub-section (2) is freed from the non obstante

words would indicate that the provisions of the Code can as

well be read with that sub-section. In that context

learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to Section 178

to 180 of the Code, showing that different courts having

domain over different local areas have concurrent

jurisdiction to inquire into or try the offences and hence

the trial is permissible in any one of them.

Absence of a non obstante clause linked with Section

4(2) of the PC Act does not lead to a conclusion that the

sub-section is subject to the provisions of the Code. A

reading of Section 4(2) of the Code (not PC Act) gives the

definite indication that the legal position is the other

way round. Section 4 of the Code is regarding trial of

offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws. Sub-

section (1) of it relates only to offences under the Indian

Penal Code. Sub-section (2) relates to all offences under

any other law. It is useful to read the said sub-section

at this stage:

All offences under any other law shall be

investigated, inquired into, tried, and

otherwise dealt with according to the same

provisions, but subject to any enactment for

the time being in force regulating the

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manner or place of investigating, inquiring

into, trying or otherwise dealing with such

offences.

Thus, if the PC Act has stipulated any place for trial

of the offence under that Act the provisions of the Code

would stand displaced to that extent in regard to the place

of trial. We have, therefore, no doubt that when the

offence is under Section 13(1)(c) or Section 13(1)(d) of

the PC Act the sole determinative factor regarding the

court having jurisdiction is the place where the offence

was committed.

A decision of the Kerala High Court, among the various

decisions cited before us, has been relied upon by both

sides highlighting the observations therein. In Banwarilal

Jhunjhunwalla and ors. vs. Union of India (AIR 1959 Kerala

311) P.T. Raman Nayar, J. (as the learned Chief Justice

then was) had to consider the question of jurisdiction of a

court regarding the offence under Section 5(2) of the PC

Act of 1947 in junction with a few other penal code

offences. The facts in that case were that two accused

entered into contracts at New Delhi for the supply of

timber for the Central Railways Administration. But the

consignees of the timber were at Bombay, Hyderabad and

Jhansi. For the supply of timber, bills were passed and

payments were made at New Delhi as per cheques which were

encashed at Bombay. But the supply of low quality of

timber was made within the State of Kerala. Certificate for

good quality of such timber was issued at different places

situated in the State of Kerala by one Thomson, Inspecting

Officer of the Railway Board, Bombay. The said officer,

along with other accused were prosecuted before the court

of a Special Judge at Kerala for the above-mentioned

offences. The main accused - Thomson - raised the question

regarding jurisdiction of that court situated at Kerala.

Learned Judge held that taking the first offence under

Section 5(2) of the PC Act, alleged to have been committed

by Thomson, there can be little doubt that it was committed

within the State of Kerala where he passed inferior jungle

wood as timber of the contract quality and issued false

certificates to that effect.

It was argued before the learned Judge that the

conspiracy took place outside the State of Kerala and hence

Section 180 of the Code would apply. Repelling the said

contention learned Judge said thus:

The application of S.180, Criminal

Procedure Code is even more certain. A

conspiracy like an abetment is not an act

which is inherently an offence. It is its

relation to the other act which is its

object that makes it an offence. Taking

this particular case, it is by reason of the

relation of the conspiracy to the act

contemplated, namely, the commission of an

offence under S.5(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, that makes the conspiracy an

offence; and that is so whether that other

act is done or not. For one act to be

related to another it is enough if that

other act is in contemplation, it is not

necessary that it should be actually

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committed.

The said decision relied on by both sides would thus

support the proposition that the place of jurisdiction

would be determinative by reference to the place where the

main offence was committed. The fact that other allied

acts were committed at different places would be hardly

sufficient to change the venue of the trial to such other

places.

Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel cited the

decisions in Dhaneshwar Narain Saxena vs. The Delhi

Administration {1962 (3) SCR 259}, M. Narayanan Nambiar vs.

State of Kerala {1963 Supple.(2) SCR 724}, The State of

Gujarat vs. Manshankar Prabhashankar Dwivedi {1972 (2) SCC

392}, Major S.K. Kale vs. State of Maharashtra {1977 (2)

SCC 394} and Union of India vs. Maj. I.C. Lala etc. etc.

{1973 (2) SCC 72}. In all these decisions the consideration

was focussed on the different ingredients needed for

constituting the offence. But in none of those cases a

question dealing with the situation like the present one

had to be considered. In K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran

Vaidhyan Balan and anr., {1999 (7) SCC 510} (cited by the

learned senior counsel) the question considered was whether

a particular court has jurisdiction to try the offence

under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. That

decision also is not of any help in reaching an answer to

the crucial question involved in these appeals.

Shri P.S. Mishra, learned senior counsel cited the

decisions in Purushottamdas Dalmia vs. The State of West

Bengal {1962 (2) SCR 101} and L.N. Mukherjee vs. The State

of Madras {1962 (2) SCR 116}. In the former it was held

that the court which has jurisdiction to try the offence of

conspiracy could also deal with the overt acts done

pursuant to the conspiracy. The latter decision is

concerned with the converse position. In the light of the

discussions made above it is immaterial whether such other

court would also have jurisdiction in the circumstances of

those cases.

Shri P.S. Mishra, learned senior counsel invited our

attention to the decision of this Court in Banwari lal

Jhunjhunwala and ors. vs. Union of India and anr. {1963

Supple.(2) SCR 338}. We may point out that this is the

same case in which the Kerala High Court had decided the

question of jurisdiction in the decisions cited supra.

When an offshoot of the said case reached this Court the

question focussed here was whether different bills created

for the purpose of cheating would have been treated as

relating to distinct offences warranting separate charges

to be framed. We do not find any aid from the said

decision for the question involved in the present cases.

We are now coming to the final conclusion. In our

considered view all the 36 cases involved in these appeals

stood transferred to the corresponding courts situated

within the territories of the Jharkhand State on the

appointed day (i.e. 15.11.2000) by the operation of Section

89 of the Act. We therefore, direct the Registrar of the

High Court of Patna to instruct the officers concerned for

despatching the records of all these 36 cases, to the

corresponding courts at Jharkhand State forthwith. We also

direct the Registrar of the High Court of Jharkhand to do

whatever is needed for reaching such records in the

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appropriate courts.

To avoid the confusion and repetition of the exercise,

we make it clear that the evidence already recorded in any

of the 36 cases will be treated as evidence recorded by the

proper court having jurisdiction. In other words, the

Special Judge need not call the witnesses already examined

over again for repetition of what has already come on

record.

The impugned judgments are set aside and the appeals

are disposed of accordingly.

J

[ K.T. Thomas ]

J

[ Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri ]

J

[ U.C. Banerjee ]

October 5, 2001.