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Celebi Airport Services Vs. Union Of India

Delhi High Court W.P.(C) 6758/2025

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W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 1 of 94

$~J

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Judgment pronounced on: 07.07.2025

+ W.P.(C) 6758/2025 and CM APPL.30662/2025

CELEBI AIRPORT

SERVICES INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED .....Petitioner

versus

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents

+ W.P.(C) 6759/2025 and CM APPL.30664/2025

CELEBI DELHI CARGO

TERMINAL MANAGEMENT INDIA PVT. LTD. .....Petitioner

versus

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents

Presence:- Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. Sandeep

Sethi, Sr. Advocate, Mr. Darpan Wadhwa, Sr. Advocate, Ms.

Ritu Bhalla, Mr. Sarul Jain, Mr. Sidhartha Das, Mr. Gajanand

Kirodiwal, Mr. Aditya Rathee, Mr. Amer Vaid and Ms. Rea

Bhail, Advocates for petitioners.

Mr. Tushar Mehta, SG along with Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG,

Mr. Amit Tiwari, CGSC, Mr. Kanu Agarwal, Mr. Amit Gupta,

Mr. Bhuvan Kapoor, Mr. Aman, Mr. R. Prabhat, Mr. Saurabh

Tripathi, Mr. Vinay Yadav, Mr. Shubham Sharma, Mr. Ayush

Tanwar, Ms. Urja Pandey and Ms. Ayushi Srivastava,

Advocates for Union of India.

Ms. Anjana Gosain, Mr. Keshav Raheja, Ms. Shreya Manjari,

Advocates for R-1, 2, 3 and 5.

Mr. Sonal Kumar Singh, Advocate along with Mr. Ratik

Sharma, Mr. Parth Sindhwani, Mr. Yashvardhan Singh Gohil

and Mr. Puneet, Advocates for R-4.

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 2 of 94

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA

JUDGMENT

1. The present writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners being

aggrieved by the actions undertaken by the respondents, culminating in the

revocation of the petitioners‟ security clearance, and a directive to transfer

their employees to third parties.

2. W.P. (C) No. 6758 of 2025 has been filed by Celebi Airport Services

India Private Limited, a company incorporated under the Companies Act,

1956 and now governed by the Companies Act, 2013. The petitioner is

engaged in providing professional ground handling services at Indira Gandhi

International Airport (Delhi), Cochin International Airport, Bengaluru

International Airport, Rajiv Gandhi International Airport (Hyderabad), and

Goa International Airport. The petitioner operates pursuant to ground

handling agreements entered into with the respective airport operators.

3. W.P. (C) No. 6759 of 2025 has been filed by Celebi Delhi Cargo

Terminal Management India Private Limited, a company also incorporated

under the Companies Act, 1956 and governed by the Companies Act, 2013.

This petitioner is engaged in the business of providing cargo handling

services at the Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi, pursuant to a

Concession Agreement entered between the petitioner and Delhi

International Airport Limited (DIAL).

4. It is submitted that prior to entering into the said ground handling

agreements and the concession agreement, the respective petitioners

underwent background checks by national security agencies. Based on these

verifications, the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)/respondent no.3

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 3 of 94

granted the petitioners security clearances, which were renewed as recently

as 21.11.2022 for a period of five years.

5. In W.P. (C) No. 6758 of 2025, the petitioner is challenging order

dated 15.05.2025 passed by BCAS/ respondent no. 3 whereby the security

clearance provided in “r/o Celebi Airport Services India Pvt. Ltd, under the

category Ground Handling Agency” has been revoked.

6. Order dated 15.05.2025 is reproduced as under –

7. In W.P. (C) No. 6759 of 2025, the petitioner is challenging order

dated 15.05.2025 passed by BCAS/respondent no. 3 whereby the security

clearance provided in “r/o Celebi Delhi Cargo Terminal Management India

Pvt. Ltd under the category Regulated Agent” has been revoked.

8. Order dated 15.05.2025 is reproduced as under –

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 4 of 94

9. It is submitted that the said decision/s was taken unilaterally, without

furnishing any reasons, and more importantly, without affording the

petitioners any opportunity of being heard.

10. The petitioners are also challenging a communication dated

15.05.2025 issued by Regional Director, BCAS / respondent no. 5 which

provided that all Airport Entry Passes (AEPs) and Temporary Airport Entry

Pass (TAEPs) issued in favour of Celebi Airport Services India Pvt. Ltd.

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 5 of 94

shall be allowed for entry into the Airport as employees of M/s Air India

SATS Airport Services Pvt. Ltd and M/s Bird Worldwide Flight Services

Pvt Ltd. and all AEPs and TAEPs issued in favour of the Celebi Delhi Cargo

Terminal Management India Pvt. Ltd shall be allowed for entry into the

Airport as employees of M/s GMR Airports Limited due to operational

requirements.

11. Communication dated 15.05.2025 is reproduced as under –

―Sir,

Ref trailing mail.

It is clarified that:-

1) All AEPs and TAEPs issued in favour of Celebi Cargo Terminal

Management India Pvt. Ltd. (RA) shall be allowed for entry into Airport

as employees of M/s GMR Airports Limited (RA) due to operational

requirements and will remain valid till 19.05.2025.

2) All AEPs and TAEPs issued in favour of Celebi Airport Services India

Pvt. Ltd. (GHA) shall be allowed for entry into Airport as employees of

M/s Air India SATS Airport Services Pvt. Ltd and M/s Bird Worldwide

Flight Services Pvt Ltd. due to operational requirements and will remain

valid till 19.05.2025.

3). DIAL is directed to share list of employees of Celebi Airport Services

India Pvt. Ltd. (GHA) who are taken over by existing GHAs namely M/s

Air India SATS Airport Services Pvt. Ltd and M/s Bird Worldwide Flight

Services Pvt Ltd by return mail.

With Regards‖

12. The said impugned orders and communication were duly responded

by the petitioners on the same day.

13. It has also been pointed that a day prior to the passing of the

impugned orders the petitioners‟ holding company, Celebi Aviation

Holding, made a detailed representation on 14.05.2025 to BCAS/ respondent

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 6 of 94

no. 3. The said representation is reproduced as under-

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 7 of 94

14. However it is submitted that despite the same, no opportunity for

hearing was granted, nor was the representation responded to, before the

impugned actions were taken on 15.05.2025.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

15. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has submitted as under:-

i. The petitioners have been rendering ground handling and cargo

handling services at airports in India for the last 17 years, after

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 8 of 94

obtaining the requisite security clearances. It is submitted that the

petitioners‟ record has been unblemished, with no complaints against

its services, and that the security clearances granted to the petitioners

have never been recalled, suspended or terminated.

ii. It is submitted that the impugned orders dated 15.05.2025 are

violative of the principles of natural justice for the following reasons:

a) The impugned orders came as “a bolt from the blue”;

b) No show cause notice was given to the petitioners;

c) No opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioners;

d) The impugned orders do not disclose any reasons.

e) The impugned orders also violate the provisions of the Aircraft

(Security) Rules, 2023 (hereinafter ―2023 Rules‖), particularly Rule

12 which provides as follows:-

"12. Power to suspend or cancel security clearance and security

programme - (1) The Director General, after giving the entity an

opportunity of being heard, and for reasons to be recorded in writing,

may suspend for a period not exceeding one year or cancel or impose

conditions in respect of any security clearance granted or security

programme approved under these rules, where he has any reasonable

grounds to believe and considers such action necessary, in the interests

of national security or civil aviation security or if the entity has

contravened or failed to comply with any condition of security clearance

or security programme or provision of these rules.

(2) After conducting an enquiry by an officer authorised by the Director

General, the suspension may be revoked or the security clearance or

security programme may be cancelled."

The mandate of Rule 12 allows suspension or cancellation of a

security clearance by BCAS only:

 After affording the entity an opportunity of being heard;

 For reasons to be recorded in writing;

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 9 of 94

 Where BCAS has the discretion to either suspend the security

clearance for a period of one year, cancel it, or impose

conditions thereon; and

 If BCAS has reasonable grounds to believe that such action is

necessary in the interest of national security.

The 2023 Rules do not provide for any exception or exemption

from compliance with the mandatory requirements of Rule 12. The

provisions are ex facie mandatory, and there is nothing in the said

Rules to suggest or imply that compliance with Rule 12 is optional or

merely directive. It is submitted that compliance with the principles of

natural justice has been held to be mandatory even in the absence of

an express provision, particularly in cases where the impugned order

results in civil consequences or affects the civil rights of the

concerned entity. In the present case, the legal position is even

stronger, as there is an express provision, i.e., Rule 12 of the 2023

Rules, mandating compliance with the principles of natural justice.

iii. It is submitted that any order passed in violation of principles of

natural justice is void. The Impugned Orders, having been passed in

breach of the Rule 12 of the Aircrafts (Security) Rules 2011/2023,

which mandates compliance with the principles of natural justice, is

void, and not merely voidable or curable. It is settled law that any

order passed without affording a hearing to the affected party is

rendered void, a nullity, and non est; and no prejudice needs to be

proved as the denial of natural justice is, in itself sufficient prejudice.

In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned senior counsel for the

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 10 of 94

petitioners has relied upon the following judgments :

a) Union Carbide Corporation & Ors vs. UOI & Ors (1991) 4 SCC

584

b) RB Shriram Durga Prasad Vs. Settlement Commissioner, (1989) 1

SCC 628

c) In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr vs. Bal

Mukund Bairwa (2009)4 SCC 299

iv. Strenuous reliance has also been placed on Gorkha Security Services

vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), (2014) 9 SCC 105, in which the Supreme Court

has held as under:-

―16. It is a common case of the parties that the blacklisting has to be

preceded by a show cause notice. Law in this regard is firmly grounded

and does not even demand much amplification. The necessity of

compliance with principles of natural justice by giving the opportunity to

the person against whom action of blacklisting is sought to be taken has

a valid and solid rationale behind it. With blacklisting many civil and

stroke or evil consequences follow. It is described as a "civil death" of a

160. These are all accepted principles. Their wisdom, variety and universality in the discipline of law are well

established. Omission to comply with the requirements of the rules of Audi alterum partum, as a general rule vitiates a

decision. Where there is violation of natural justice no resultant or independent prejudice need to be shown as the

denial of natural justice is, in itself sufficient prejudice and it is no answer to say that even with observance of natural

justice the same conclusion would have been reached. The citizen "is entitled to be under the rule of law and not the

rule of discretion" and "to remit the maintenance of constitutional right to judicial discretion is to shift the foundations

of freedom from the rock to the sand".

7. We are definitely of the opinion that on the relevant date when the order was passed that is to say, 24-08-1977 the

order was a nullity because it was in violation of principles of natural justice. See in this connection the principles

enunciated by this court in State of Orissa v Dr. Binapani Dei as also the observations in administrative law by H. W. R

Wade, 5th edition, pp. 310-311 that the act in violation of the principles of natural justice or a quasi-judicial act in

violation of the principles of natural justice is void or of no value. In Ridge vs Baldwin and Anisminic Ltd. vs. Foreign

Compensation Commission the House of Lords in England has made it clear that a breach of natural justice nullifies

the order made in breach. If that is so then the order made in violation of the principles of natural justice was of no

value.......

35. Any order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice save and except certain contingencies of cases,

would be a nullity. In A.R.Antulay this court held: (SCC p 660, para 55)

"55.... No prejudice need to be proved for enforcing the fundamental rights. Violation of a fundamental right itself

renders the impugned action void. So also the violation of principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity".

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 11 of 94

person who is foisted with the order of blacklisting. Such an order is

stigmatic in nature and debar such a person from participating in

government tenders which means precluding him from the award of

government contracts.

xxx xxx xxx

21. The central issue, however pertains to the requirement of stating the

action which is proposed to be taken. The fundamental purpose behind

the serving of show-cause notice is to make the noticee understand the

precise case set up against him which he has to meet. This would require

the statement of imputations detailing out the alleged reaches and

defaults he has committed so that he gets an opportunity to rebut the

same. Another requirement according to us is the nature of the action

which is proposed to be taken for such a breach. That should also be

stated so that the notice is able to point out that proposed action is not

warranted in the given case even if the default stroke breaches complaint

of a not satisfactorily explained. When it comes to blacklisting this

requirement becomes all the more imperative having regard to the facts

that it is the harshest possible action.

22. The High Court has simply stated that the purpose of show-cause

notice is primarily to enable the noticee to meet the grounds on which the

action is proposed against him. No doubt, the High Court is justified to

this extent. However, it is equally important to mention as to what would

be the consequence if the noticee does not satisfactorily meet the ground

on which an action is proposed. To put it otherwise, we are of the

opinion that in order to fulfill the requirements of principles of natural

justice show-cause notice should meet the following two requirements

viz:

(i) The material/grounds to be stated which according to the department

necessitates and action;

(ii) particular penalty /action which is proposed to be taken. It is this

second requirement that the High Court has failed to omit.

We may hasten to add that even if it is not specifically mentioned in the

show-cause notice but it can clearly and safely be discerned from the

reading thereof, that would be sufficient to meet this requirement.‖

It is submitted that even in cases of emergent situations where prompt

action may be necessary, the legal position remains that the principles of

natural justice must be complied with. While the notice may not be elaborate

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 12 of 94

and the opportunity of hearing need not be extensive, a substantive

opportunity must nonetheless be granted. The person concerned must be

informed of the allegations against them, and the material in support thereof

must also be shared. In this regard reliance is placed on the judgment of the

Supreme Court in S.L. Kapoor Vs Jagmohan & Ors (1980) SCC Online SC

272, wherein it has been held as under:

―11. Another submission of the learned Attorney General was that

Section 238(1) also contemplated emergent situations where swift action

might be necessary to avert disaster and that in such situations if the

demands of natural justice were to be met, the very object of the

provision would be frustrated. It is difficult to visualise the sudden and

calamities situations gloomily foreboded by the learned Attorney General

where there would not be enough breathing time to observe natural

justice at least in a rudimentary way. A municipal committee under the

Punjab municipal act is a public body consisting of both officials and

non-officials and one cannot imagine anything momentous being done in

a matter of minutes and seconds. And, natural justice may always be

tailored to the situation. Minimal natural justice, the barest notice and

the "littlest" opportunity in the shortest time may serve. The authority

acting under section 238(1) is the master of its own procedure. There

need be no oral hearing. It is not necessary to put every detail of the case

to the committee: broad ground sufficient to indicate the substance of the

allegations may be given. We do not think that even minimal natural

justice is excluded when alleged grave situations arise under section 238.

If indeed such grave situations arise the public interest can be sufficiently

protected by appropriate prohibitory and mandatory action under the

other relevant provisions of the statute in Sections 232 to 235 of the

Act......

xxx xxx xxx

24 ………In our view the principles of natural justice know of no

exclusionary rule depending on whether it would have made any

difference if natural justice had been observed. The non observance of

natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice

independently of the proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It

will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who has

been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on

admitted undisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under

the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its write

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 13 of 94

to compel the observance of natural justice not because it is not

necessary to observe natural justice but because courts do not issue futile

writs.......‖

Copious reliance has also been placed on the judgment of the

Supreme Court in Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India, 2023

INSC 324, particularly on the following observations therein:

―47. The judgment of this Court in Maneka Gandhi (supra) spearheaded

two doctrinal shifts on procedural fairness because of the

constitutionalising of natural justice. Firstly, procedural fairness was no

longer viewed merely as a means to secure a just outcome but a

requirement that holds an inherent value in itself. In view of this shift, the

Courts are now precluded from solely assessing procedural

infringements based on whether the procedure would have prejudiced the

outcome of the case. Instead, the courts would have to decide if the

procedure that was followed infringed upon the right to a fair and

reasonable procedure, independent of the outcome. In compliance with

this line of thought, the courts have read the principles of natural justice

into an enactment to save it from being declared unconstitutional on

procedural grounds. Secondly, natural justice principles breathe

reasonableness into the procedure. Responding to the argument that the

principles of natural justice are not static but are capable of being

moulded to the circumstances, it was held that the core of natural justice

guarantees a reasonable procedure which is a constitutional requirement

entrenched in Articles 14, 19 and 21. The facet of audi alterum partem

encompasses the components of notice, contents of the notice, reports of

inquiry, and materials that are available for perusal. While situational

modifications are permissible, the rules of natural justice cannot be

modified to suit the needs of the situation to such an extent that the core

of the principle is abrogated because it is the core that infuses

procedural reasonableness. The burden is on the applicant to prove that

the procedure that was followed (or not followed) by the adjudicating

authority, in effect, infringes upon the core of the right to a fair and

reasonable hearing.

xxx xxx xxx

58. MHA disclosed the material forming the opinion for denying of

security clearance solely to the High Court. The High Court instead of

deciding if any other less restrictive but equally effective means could

have been employed, straight away received the material in a sealed

cover without any application of mind. It is now an established principle

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 14 of 94

of natural justice that relevant material must be disclosed to the affected

party. This rule ensures that the affected party is able to effectively

exercise their right to appeal. When the state government claims

non-disclosure on the ground of public interest under Section 124 of the

Evidence Act, the material is removed from the trial itself. As opposed to

this method, when relevant material is disclosed in a sealed cover, there

are two injuries that are perpetuated. First, the documents are not

available to the affected party. Second, the documents are relied upon by

the opposite party (which is most often the state) in the course of the

arguments, and the court arrives at a finding by relying on the material.

In such a case, the affected party does not have any recourse to legal

remedies because it would be unable to (dis)prove any inferences from

the material before the adjudicating authority.

59. This form of adjudication perpetuates a culture of secrecy and

opaqueness, and places the judgment beyond the reach of challenge. The

affected party would be unable to ―contradict errors, identify omissions,

challenge the credibility of informants or refute false allegations‖. The

right to seek judicial review which has now been read into Articles 14

and 21 is restricted. A corresponding effect of the sealed cover procedure

is a non-reasoned order…...‖

Reliance has also been placed on paragraph 75 of Madhyamam

Broadcasting Ltd (supra) to contend that the observations of the Supreme

Court in Ex-Armymen's Protection Services (P) Ltd. v. Union of India,

(2014) 5 SCC 409, cannot be read so as to preclude/absolve the State from

its duty to act fairly merely because the issue involves consideration of

national security. The observations relied upon by the petitioners are as

under:-

―75.. The contention of the respondent that the judgment of this Court in

Ex-Armymen's Protection Services (supra) held that the principles of

natural justice shall be excluded when concerns of national security are

involved is erroneous. The principle that was expounded in that case was

that the principles of natural justice may be excluded when on the facts of

the case, national security concerns outweigh the duty of fairness. Thus,

national security is one of the few grounds on which the right to a

reasonable procedural guarantee may be restricted. The mere

involvement of issues concerning national security would not preclude

the State's duty to act fairly. If the State discards its duty to act fairly,

then it must be justified before the court on the facts of the case. Firstly,

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 15 of 94

the State must satisfy the Court that national security concerns are

involved. Secondly, the State must satisfy the court that an abrogation of

the principle(s) of natural justice is justified. These two standards that

have emerged from the jurisprudence abroad resemble the

proportionality standard. The first test resembles the legitimate aim

prong, and the second test of justification resembles the necessity and the

balancing prongs.‖

v. It is submitted that in terms of the dicta laid down in Madhyamam

Broadcasting Ltd (supra), it is incumbent on this Court to assess the

material cited by the authority in support of its plea of national security

and confidentiality, and to determine whether such a plea is genuine. It is

submitted that the matters concerning national security are justiciable,

and the authority cannot be given a carte blanche merely because

according to them national security was involved.

vi. It has also been contended by Mr. Rohatgi that the respondents have

acted in haste in the present matter and based its decision on public

perception rather than objective consideration. He submits that the same

is clearly not permissible and for this purpose reliance is placed on the

observations of the Supreme Court in S.G Jaisinghani vs U.O.I (1967)

SCC OnLine SC 6

, Zenit Mataplast Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra

(2009)10 SCC 388

and Nidhi Kaim and Anr. Vs. State of Madhya

14. In this context it is important to emphasise that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule

of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law discretion conferred

with executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view

means that decision should be made by application of known principles and rules and, in general such decisions should

be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle without any rule it

is unpredictable and such a decision in the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with Rule of law.........

27. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should not only be fair legitimate and above board but

should be without any affection or aversion. It should neither be suggestive of discrimination nor even apparently give

an impression of bias favoritism and nepotism. The decision should be made by the application of known principles

and rules and in general such decision should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is but if a decision is

taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken

in accordance with the rule of law........

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 16 of 94

Pradesh and Ors. (2017) 4 SCC 1

vii. During the course of arguments on 21.05.2025 and 23.05.2025, it was

specifically argued by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi that in absence of at least a

gist of the adverse material against the petitioners being provided, so as

to enable the petitioners to meet the case against it, it is not even

permissible for the Court to peruse the relevant security inputs which led

to the denial of security clearance. It is further submitted that in absence

of the petitioners being furnished at least with gist of allegations against

it, the petitioners are “fighting with its hands tied behind its back”. It is

vehemently submitted that the impugned action is required to be struck

down for violation of the basic and cardinal principles of natural justice.

In response to a specific query, it was stated that the petitioners do not

seek a post-decisional hearing.

viii. It is submitted that the twin aspect viz. non-providing of gist of

allegations to the petitioners and non-adherence to Rule 12 of the 2023

Rules, render the impugned action void ab initio.

ix. During the course of arguments on 23.05.2025, it was contended by Mr.

Rohatgi that the 2023 Rules cannot be circumvented under any

78. In view of the position expressed by this Court, in the above judgments, it was submitted, that public

perception should not be allowed to weigh so heavy, in the mind of a Court, as would prevent it, from rendering

complete justice. According to learned Counsel, taking into consideration public perception, would render effectuating

justice, extremely difficult. It was pointed out, that by sheer experience gained by Judges, they were fully equipped to

determine at their own whether or not the facts of a case required to be dealt with differently, Under Article 142-so as

to render complete justice.

79. It was also the contention of learned Counsel that public perception was usually not based on a complete

data of the dispute. And, unless the public was provided with the complete facts, and was required to consciously take a

call on the matter, the perception entertained by the public would be fanciful and imaginative and it would be full of

deficiencies and inadequacies and it may also be an opinion based on lack of rightful understanding.

80. We are of the view that public perception despite being of utmost significance cannot be sought except after

an onerous exercise. And that, any opinion, without the benefit of the entire sequence of facts, may not be a dependable

hypothesis. It is also true that disseminating full facts for seeking public opinion would be an immeasurably daunting

task. An endeavour, which was unlikely to yield any reasoned response, based on logic and rationale. We are

accordingly of the view, that the suggestion of learned Counsel needs to be respected, and we should attempt a

consideration at our own based on our experience and training, in adjudicating disputes of unlimited variety..............

and of inestimable proportions.

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 17 of 94

circumstance. It is pointed out that the power to issue directions under

Section 6 of the Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024 (hereinafter ―the

2024 Act‖) is hedged with the limitation that such directions must be

“consistent with the provisions of this Act and the Rules made therein”.

Further, Rule 62 of the 2023 Rules itself provides that any direction

issued by the Director General must be “consistent with the provisions of

the Act and the Rules made thereunder”. As such, it is contended that the

impugned action is not referable to the power conferred under Section 6

of the 2024 Act. It is submitted that the power to issue directions “as

contained in Section 6 of the 2024 Act” is found in multiple and various

legislations in India for example, Delhi Development Act, 1957, the New

Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994, UP Urban Planning and

Development Act, 1973.

x. Reliance is placed on Poonam Verma and Ors. Vs. Delhi development

Authority, (2007) 13 SCC 154

, to contend that the power to issue

directions is in respect of “Policy decision and general directions”. It is

submitted that the power to issue directions cannot be invoked in

individual cases. Furthermore, it is submitted that even if such a power

exists, it must be exercised in conformity with the applicable rules.

xi. During the course of rejoinder arguments, it was reiterated that the dicta

laid down in Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd (supra), clearly applies to

the present case and cannot be disregarded just because Madhyamam

13. Having failed to establish any legal right in themselves as also purported deficiency in services on the part of the

respondent before competent legal forums, they took recourse to remedies on administrative side which stricto sensu were not

available. It has not been shown as to on what premise the Central Government can interfere with the day to day affairs of the

respondent. Section 41 of the Act, only envisages that the respondent would carry out such directions that may be issued by

the Central Government from time to time for the efficient administration of the Act. The same does not take within its fold an

order which can be passed by the Central Government in the matter of allotment of flats by the Authority. Section 41 speaks

about policy decision. Any direction issued must have a nexus with the efficient administration of the Act. It has nothing to do

with carrying out of the plans of the authority in respect of a particular scheme.

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 18 of 94

Broadcasting Ltd (supra) dealt with a situation involving security

clearance for a television channel, whereas the present case concerns

ground handling and cargo handling operations at an airport.

xii. It is further submitted that paragraph 9 of the security clearance granted

to the petitioners vide order dated 21.11.2022 in terms of which the

“Director General, BCAS reserves right to revoke the security clearance

at any time without assigning any reasons thereof, in the interest of

national/civil aviation security”, does not detract from the mandatory

requirements of Rule 12. It is submitted that Rule 12 cannot be construed

as merely directory. In the circumstances, it is submitted that the petition

is liable to be allowed.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

16. Learned Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents, submits as

under:-

i. The respondents have been conferred with wide-ranging plenary

powers under the statutory scheme of both the Aircraft Act, 1934

(“1934 Act”) and the Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024 (“2024

Act”). Section 5A(1A) of the 1934 Act, and Section 6 read with

Section 10 of the 2024 Act, unequivocally empower the Central

Government and relevant authorities to act decisively in matters

concerning the security of India and the security of civil aviation

operations. Specifically, under Section 5A(1A) of the 1934 Act, the

Director General of Bureau of Civil Aviation Security is authorised

to, issue directions, by order, with respect to matters specified in

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 19 of 94

clauses (gc) and (qc) of sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the 1934 Act,

in any case where the Director General of Bureau of Civil Aviation

Security is satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the interest of the

security of India or to ensure the security of civil aviation operations.

Similarly, under the 2024 Act, the Director General of Bureau of Civil

Aviation Security is authorised to issue directions, by order, with

respect to matters specified in clauses (o) and (ze) of sub-section (2)

of Section 10 of the 2024 Act, in any case where he is satisfied that

such action is necessary in the interest of national security or civil

aviation safety. This statutory framework confirms that the power

exercised in such cases is plenary in nature and is not contingent upon

preconditions such as those laid down in Rule 12 of the Aircraft

(Security) Rules, 2023, which, in any event, cannot limit powers

conferred under the parent legislation.

ii. It is submitted that the petitioner is a company engaged in providing

ground handling services at various airports in India, having direct

access to every part of an airport, including aircraft, passengers, and

sensitive zones such as the tarmac. The petitioner, therefore, has

unrestricted access to critical areas of civil aviation and directly

interacts with passengers from the moment they enter the airport until

they board the aircraft, including access to the cargo hold. The

existence of plenary powers in such a context is intended to address

any emergent situations, given the intrinsically sensitive nature of the

subject matter. Further, as a matter of legislative practice, such

plenary powers are preserved by authorities in laws governing

sensitive sectors, since the grants made under such frameworks are

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 20 of 94

not substantive legislative creations of rights, but rather confer

privileges. Accordingly, the grant of permission to provide ground

handling services under the relevant scheme constitutes a privilege

extended by the respondent authorities, one that can be withdrawn for

valid reasons arising from national security concerns.

iii. It is submitted that these powers are also aligned with India‟s

international obligations under Annexure 17 of the Convention on

International Civil Aviation (12th Ed., 2022), which mandates

contracting states to ensure civil aviation security, including control of

access to restricted areas and the conduct of background checks on

individuals. The petitioner, being a ground handling agency with

access to sensitive airport zones and aircraft, operates in a domain

where national security concerns may necessitate swift executive

action. The grant of such privileges is administrative in nature and

revocable; it does not constitute a vested legal right.

iv. It is submitted that while the petitioners argue that the lack of an

opportunity to be heard violates the principles of natural justice, it is

trite law that such principles are not absolute and must yield to

considerations of national security. In Ex-Armymen's Protection

Services (P) Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court held that in subject

matters of aviation where a national security concerns arises, the

observance of the principles of natural justice may be excluded, as

national security is a matter of executive policy, not judicial

determination. This view has been consistently reaffirmed, including

in Digi Cable Network (India) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4

SCC 451, and Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. (supra), wherein the

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 21 of 94

Court emphasised the limited scope of judicial scrutiny when

executive decisions are based on national security grounds.

Specific attention is drawn to the following observations made in

Ex-Armymen’s Protection Services (P) Ltd. (supra) –

―15. It is difficult to define in exact terms as to what is "national

security". However, the same would generally include socio-political

stability, territorial integrity, economic solidarity and strength,

ecological balance, cultural cohesiveness, external peace, etc.

16. What is in the interest of national security is not a question of law. It

is a matter of policy. It is not for the court to decide whether something is

in the interest of the State or not. It should be left to the executive. To

quote Lord Hoffman in Secy of State for Home Deptt. v. Rehman [(2003)

1 AC 153: (2001) 3 WLR 877: (2002) 1 All ER 122 (HL)]: (AC p. 192C)

"... [in the matter] of national security is not a question of law. It is

a matter of judgment and policy. Under the Constitution of the

United Kingdom and most other countries, decisions as to whether

something is or is not in the interests of national security are not a

matter for judicial decision. They are entrusted to the executive."

17. Thus, in a situation of national security, a party cannot insist for the

strict observance of the principles of natural justice. In such cases, it is

the duty of the court to read into and provide for statutory exclusion, if

not expressly provided in the rules governing the field. Depending on the

facts of the particular case, it will however be open to the court to satisfy

itself whether there were justifiable facts, and in that regard, the court is

entitled to call for the files and see whether it is a case where the interest

of national security is involved. Once the State is of the stand that the

issue involves national security, the court shall not disclose the reasons

to the affected party.‖

Reliance is also placed in case of Sublime Software Ltd. v. Union of

India, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4640, wherein this Court has held as under:

"7. At the outset it is to be stated that in matters of national security,

principles of natural justice can be given a go-by. It is well settled that

the right to a fair hearing may have to yield to overriding considerations

of national security. According to Sir William Wade [H.W.R. William

Wade and C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (10th Edn.. Oxford

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 22 of 94

University Press Inc., 2009) 468-470], any restriction, limitation or

exception on principles of natural justice is "only an arbitrary

boundary". To quote further:

"The right to a fair hearing may have to yield to overriding

considerations of national security. The House of Lords recognised

this necessity where civil servants at the government

communications headquarters, who had to handle secret

information vital to national security, were abruptly put under new

conditions of service which prohibited membership of national

trade unions. Neither they nor their unions were consulted, in

disregard of an established practice, and their complaint to the

courts would have been upheld on ground of natural justice, had

there not been a threat to national security. The factor which

ultimately prevailed was the danger that the process of

consultation itself would have precipitated further strikes,

walkouts, overtime bans and disruption generally of a kind which

had plagued the communications headquarters shortly beforehand

and which were a threat to national security. Since national

security must be paramount, natural justice must then give way.

The Crown must, however, satisfy the court that national security

is at risk. Despite the constantly repeated dictum that 'those who

are responsible for the national security must be the sole Judges of

what the national security requires', the court will insist upon

evidence that an issue of national security arises, and only then

will it accept the opinion of the Crown that it should prevail over

some legal right.""

v. It is submitted that the Court has further held that such exclusions

may be implicit in law and need not be expressly stated. The principle

has jurisprudential support, including from UK judgments like Secy.

of State for Home Deptt. v. Rehman, (2003) 1 AC 153. It is

submitted that while judiciary is empowered to examine the material

in a sealed cover to ensure fairness, such material need not be

disclosed to the affected party. It is averred that the petitioners‟

reliance on Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. (supra), is misplaced, as

that case was grounded in free speech under Article 19(1)(a), unlike

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 23 of 94

the present matter, which pertains to ground handling operations

where no fundamental right is directly engaged.

vi. It is contended that the doctrine of proportionality is inapplicable in

the present case. The petitioners, being juristic entities wholly owned

by Turkish companies, cannot invoke rights under Article 19 of the

Constitution. It is submitted that the Supreme Court has consistently

held that the fundamental rights under Article 19 are available only to

Indian citizens. Therefore, the proportionality analysis applicable in

cases involving free speech or privacy does not govern the present

factual scenario.

vii. It is the case of the respondents that in matters involving national

security, the obligation to disclose reasons is necessarily subject to the

overriding imperative of public interest. Courts have long

acknowledged the need to strike a balance between the principles of

administrative transparency and the demands of national security. In

Conway v. Rimmer, (1968) AC 910, a view later adopted by the

Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87,

it was held that disclosure may be legitimately withheld if it would

cause greater harm to public service or jeopardise national safety.

Similarly, in R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 119, the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that the Court must determine

which aspect of public interest, transparency or national security,

takes precedence in a given case. In the present matter, the

respondents have submitted the relevant material to this Court in

sealed cover, in accordance with established judicial practice, thereby

ensuring effective judicial review while safeguarding sensitive and

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 24 of 94

classified information.

viii. It is submitted that the petitioners‟ reliance on Rule 12 of the 2023

Rules is misplaced, as the Rule does not prescribe any penal

consequence for non-compliance and must, therefore, be construed as

directory rather than mandatory. Moreover, even where the term

“shall” is used in statutory language, the Courts have, in various

instances, interpreted such provisions as directory, particularly where

strict adherence would defeat the object of the legislation or result in

procedural deadlock. The objective of Rule 12 cannot override the

broader statutory mandate conferred under Sections 6 and 10 of the

2024 Act. In cases involving national security, Rule 12 must be

interpreted in a manner that advances, rather than frustrates, the

statutory purpose.

ix. It is submitted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in

Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. (supra) far from supporting the case

of the petitioners, in fact reinforces the case of the respondents. It is

submitted that the said judgment affirms that the principles of natural

justice may be excluded, on grounds of national security; the said

national security considerations would outweigh the duty of fairness.

In this regard reliance is placed on the following observations of

Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. (supra), which reads as under:-

"75 The contention of the respondent that the judgment of this Court in

Ex-Armymen‘s Protection Services (supra) held that the principles of

natural justice shall be excluded when concerns of national security are

involved is erroneous. The principle that was expounded in that case was

that the principles of natural justice may be excluded when on the facts of

the case, national security concerns outweigh the duty of fairness. Thus,

national security is one of the few grounds on which the right to a

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 25 of 94

reasonable procedural guarantee may be restricted. The mere

involvement of issues concerning national security would not preclude

the state‘sduty to act fairly. If the State discards its duty to act fairly, then

it must be justified before the court on the facts of the case. Firstly, the

State must satisfy the Court that national security concerns are involved.

Secondly, the State must satisfy the court that an abrogation of the

principle(s) of natural justice is justified. These two standards that have

emerged from the jurisprudence abroad resemble the proportionality

standard. The first test resembles the legitimate aim prong, and the

second test of justification resembles the necessity and the balancing

prongs.

xxx xxx xxx

L Conclusion and Directions

170 In view of the discussion above, the appeals are allowed and the

order of the MIB dated 31 January 2022 and the judgment of the High

Court dated 2 March 2022 are set aside. We summarise our findings

below:

xxx xxx xxx

(ii) The challenge to the order of the MIB and judgment of the High

Court on procedural grounds is allowed for the following reasons:

xxx xxx xxx

(supra) and Digi Cable Network (supra) held that the principles of

natural justice may be excluded when on the facts of the case, national

security concerns overweigh the duty of fairness;‖

x. It is submitted that the doctrine of proportionality, which is usually

applied in the context of infringement of Fundamental Rights under

Article 21 and 19, would not apply in the present case. It is further

submitted that in any event, Article 19 rights are not available to the

petitioners since the petitioners are wholly owned and controlled by a

Turkish incorporated companies. Additionally, the petitioners are not

natural person/s. It is submitted that the well-settled position of law is

that a foreign company cannot invoke Fundamental Rights under

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 26 of 94

Part-III of the Constitution. Additionally, the juristic persons are not

entitled to Fundamental Rights under Article 19 of the Constitution.

In this regard reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court

in case of Divl.Forest Officer v. Bishwanath Tea Co. Ltd., 1981 3

SCC 238, British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh,

AIR 1964 SC 1451, State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v.

Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1963 SC 1811, Tata Engineering and

Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1964 6 SCR 885, Indian

Social Action Forum (INSAF) v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine

SC 310 and Star India Private Ltd. v. The Telecom Regulatory

Authority of India and Others, 2008 146 DLT 455.

xi. It is submitted that the Supreme Court has recognised that the Rules

of natural justice are not rigid and inflexible and requires suitable

modulation in appropriate circumstances. In this regard reliance is

placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Karnataka SRTC v.

S.G. Kotturappa, 2005 3 SCC 409, Board of Mining Examination

and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee, 1977 2 SCC 256, M Sarat

Kumar Dash v. Biswajit Patnaik, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 434 and

Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary

Education v. K.S. Gandhi, 1991 2 SCC 716.

xii. It is further submitted that an exception ought to be carved out under

Rule 12 of the Airport Security Rules, 2023 and statutory exclusions

must be read into the said rules. In this regard, reliance is placed on

paragraph 17 of the judgment in Ex-Armymen’s Protection Services

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 27 of 94

(P) Ltd. (supra)

xiii. It is further submitted that Rule 12 of the 2023 Rules must be

construed to be directory and not mandatory since no consequence is

provided for breach thereof. It is submitted that in any enactment in

general, a provision is mandatory when consequence of

non-compliance is provided and generally directory, when

consequence of non-compliance is not provided. It is submitted that

no such consequence is stipulated in Rule 12 and therefore, the

provision is merely directory in nature, especially in cases wherein

national security concerns come to the force.

xiv. Lastly, it is emphasised that Clause 9 of the Security Clearance

renewal order dated 21.11.2022, itself provides for “cancellation

without assigning any reasons thereof”. Thus, it is submitted that even

while granting the Security Clearance, the right to cancel/withdraw

the same “without assigning any reason” was expressly reserved. It is

submitted that the same is necessitated on account of inherent national

security and civil aviation security considerations.

xv. It is submitted that the present situation cannot be equated with one

where only the civil rights of citizens are involved, without any

interplay of national security considerations. In the circumstances, it

is submitted that the present petition is liable to be dismissed.

17. Thus, in a situation of national security, a party cannot insist for the strict observance of the principles of natural

justice. In such cases, it is the duty of the court to read into and provide for statutory exclusion, if not expressly

provided in the rules governing the field. Depending on the facts of the particular case, it will however be open to the

court to satisfy itself whether there were justifiable facts and in that regard, the court is entitled to call for the files and

see whether it is a case where the interest of national security is involved. Once the state is of the stand that the issue

involves national security, the court shall not disclose the reasons to the affected party.

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 28 of 94

ANALYSIS AND REASONING

17. Admittedly, the petitioners require a security clearance for providing

ground handling services at airport/s where it operates. Admittedly also, the

services provided by the petitioners enable it to have access to high

security/sensitive areas of the airport/s. A ground handling agent, inter alia,

provides ramp handling services which include aircraft services, aircraft

cleaning, loading and unloading of passenger baggage for both passenger

and commercial aircraft, loading and unloading of cargo etc.

18. In addition, a ground handling agent provides traffic handling

services, which encompass manning of check-in counters, verification of

travel documents, marshaling at airport/s, transportation of passengers and

baggage from the aircrafts to the terminal building and vice versa.

19. Given that the petitioners have untrammeled access to sensitive/high

security areas of the airports, there is no controversy that a security

clearance is required for the petitioners to provide the concerned ground

handling and cargo services.

20. Rule 15 of the Aircraft (Security) Rules, 2011 framed in exercise of

the powers conferred by Section 4 read with Section 5 of the Aircrafts Act,

1934, specifically provides that “no ground handling service provider shall

be allowed to provide ground handling in any aerodrome without obtaining a

security clearance and approval of its security programme from the Director

General”.

21. In the Aircraft (Security Rules), 2023 (hereinafter ―Rules 2023‖)

framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 4, 5, 10(2), 10A, 10B,

12, 12A, 12B read with Section 14 of the Aircrafts Act 1934, it was

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 29 of 94

specifically provided as under:

―15. Operation of entities at aerodrome.—No aerodrome operator shall

himself operate at the aerodrome or allow any entity or person to

operate, provide services or facilities, at security restricted areas of an

aerodrome without obtaining security clearance and approval of security

programme as applicable and specified by the Director General.‖

22. Rule 12 of the Rules 2023 also specifically provides as under:

“12. Power to suspend or cancel security clearance and security

programme.—(1) The Director General, after giving the entity an

opportunity of being heard, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, may

suspend for a period not exceeding one year or cancel or impose

conditions in respect of any security clearance granted or security

programme approved under these rules, where he has any reasonable

grounds to believe and considers such action necessary, in the interests of

national security or civil aviation security or if the entity has contravened

or failed to comply with any condition of security clearance or security

programme or provision of these rules.

(2) After conducting an enquiry by an officer authorised by the Director

General, the suspension may be revoked or the security clearance or

security programme may be cancelled.‖

23. The primary contention on behalf of the petitioners is that the

cancellation of the petitioners‟ security clearance is not in consonance with

the procedure contemplated under the aforesaid Rule 12 of the Rules, 2023,

inasmuch as no opportunity of hearing whatsoever was afforded to the

petitioners. It is emphasized that the principles of natural justice, on which

the aforesaid Rule 12 is predicated, are sacrosanct, and the infraction thereof

renders the impugned action null and void.

Principles of Natural Justice are the cornerstone of our Constitutional

Framework ; however, their application is contextual and cannot be put

in a straitjacket

24. There can be no cavil with the proposition that the principles of

natural justice are sacrosanct and flow from the principle of reasonableness

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 30 of 94

that is embedded in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is now

well-settled that the principle of reasonableness that is guaranteed under

Article 14 of the Constitution of India runs through the entire chapter of

fundamental rights guiding the exercise of both procedural and substantive

limitations.

25. In Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, the Court,

relying on R.C. Cooper Vs. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248, it was

observed as under -

"5…….. we find that even on principle the concept of reasonableness

must be projected in the procedure contemplated by Article 21, having

regard to the impact of Article 14 on Article 21.

xxx xxx xxx

7………The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as

philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness

pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure

contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in

order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be "right and just and

fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no

procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be

satisfied.

xxx xx x xxx

82. So I am convinced that to frustrate Article 21 by relying on any

formal adjectival statute, however, flimsy or fantastic its provisions be, is

to rob what the constitution treasures. Procedure which deals with the

modalities of regulating, restricting or even rejecting a fundamental right

falling within Article 21 has to be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to

effectuate, not to subvert, the substantive right itself. Thus understood,

―procedure‖ must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish or bizarre. A

valuable constitutional right can be canalised only by civilised processes.

You cannot claim that it is a legal procedure if the passport is granted or

refused by taking lots, or deal of fire or by other strange or mystical

methods. Nor is it tenable if life is taken by a crude or summary process

of enquiry. What is fundamental is life and liberty. What is procedural is

the manner of its exercise. This quality of fairness in the process is

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 31 of 94

emphasised by the strong word ―established‖ which means ―settled

firmly‖ not wantonly or whimsically. If it is rooted in the legal

consciousness of the community it becomes ―established‖ procedure.

And ―law‖ leaves little doubt that it is normae regarded as just since law

is the means and justice is the end.

83. Is there supportive judicial thought for this reasoning? We go back to

the vintage words of the learned Judges in A.K. Gopalan and zigzag

through R.C. Cooper to S.N. Sarkar and discern attestation of this

conclusion. And the elaborate constitutional procedure in Article 22

itself fortifies the argument that ―life and liberty‖ in Article 21 could not

have been left to illusory legislatorial happenstance. Even as relevant

reasonableness informs Articles 14 and 19, the component of fairness is

implicit in Article 21. A close-up of the Gopalan case is necessitous at

this stage to underscore the quality of procedure relevant to personal

liberty.

84. Procedural safeguards are the indispensable essence of liberty. In

fact, the history of personal liberty is largely the history of procedural

safe guards and right to a hearing has a human-right ring. In India,

because of poverty and illiteracy, the people are unable to protect and

defend their rights; observance of fundamental rights is not regarded as

good politics and their transgression as bad politics. I sometimes

pensively reflect that people's militant awareness of rights and duties is a

surer constitutional assurance of Governmental respect and response

than the sound and fury of the ―question hour‖ and the slow and unsure

delivery of court writ. ―Community Consciousness and the Indian

Constitution‖ is a fascinating subject of sociological relevance in many

areas.

85. To sum up, ―procedure‖ in Article 21 means fair, not formal

procedure. ―Law‖ is reasonable law, not any enacted piece. As Article 22

specifically spells out the procedural safeguards for preventive and

punitive detention, a law providing for such detentions should conform to

Article 22. It has been rightly pointed out that for other rights forming part

of personal liberty, the procedural safeguards enshrined in Article 21 are

available. Otherwise, as the procedural safeguards contained in Article 22

will be available only in cases of preventive and punitive detention, the

right to life, more fundamental than any other forming part of personal

liberty and paramount to the happiness, dignity and worth of the

individual, will not be entitled to any procedural safeguard save such as a

legislature's mood chooses. In Kochuni [Kavalappara Kottarathil

Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080, 1093 :

(1960) 3 SCR 887 : (1961) 2 SCJ 443.] the Court, doubting the correctness

of the Gopalan decision on this aspect, said:

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 32 of 94

―Had the question been res integra, some of us would have been inclined

to agree with the dissenting view expressed by Fazal Ali, J.

xxx. xxx xxx

89. It is a mark of interpretative respect for the higher norms our

founding fathers held dear in effecting the dearest rights of life and

liberty so to read Article 21 as to result in a human order lined with

human justice. And running right through Articles 19 and 14 is present

this principle of reasonable procedure in different shades. A certain

normative harmony among the articles is thus attained, and I hold Article

21 bears in its bosom the construction of fair procedure legislatively

sanctioned. No Passport Officer shall be mini-Caesar nor Minister

incarnate Caesar in a system where the rule of law reigns supreme.

90. My clear conclusion on Article 21 is that liberty of locomotion into

alien territory cannot be unjustly forbidden by the establishment and

passport legislation must take processual provisions which accord with

fair norms, free from extraneous pressure and, by and large, complying

with natural justice. Unilateral arbitrariness, police dossiers, faceless

affiants, behind-the-back materials, oblique motives and the inscrutable

face of an official sphinx do not fill the ―fairness‖ bill — subject, of

course, to just exceptions and critical contexts. This minimum once

abandoned, the Police State slowly builds up which saps the finer

substance of our constitutional jurisprudence. Not party but principle

and policy are the key-stone of our Republic.

91. Let us not forget that Article 21 clubs life with liberty and when we

interpret the colour and content of ―procedure established by law‖ we

must be alive to the deadly peril of life being deprived without minimal

processual justice, legislative callousness despising ―hearing‖ and fair

opportunities of defence. And this realization once sanctioned, its exercise

will swell till the basic freedom is flooded out. Hark back to Article 10 of

the Universal Declaration to realize that human rights have but a verbal

hollow if the protective armour of audi alteram partem is deleted. When

such pleas are urged in the familiar name of pragmatism, public interest

or national security, courts are on trial and must prove that civil liberties

are not mere rhetorical material for lip service but the obligatory essence

of our hard-won freedom. A Republic— if you can keep It—is the caveat

for Counsel and Court. And Tom Paine, in his Dissertation on first

Principles of Government, sounded the tocsin:

―He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy

from oppression; for if he violates this duty, be establishes a precedent

that will reach to himself.‖

Phoney freedom is not worth the word and this ruling of ours is not

confined to the petitioner but to the hungry job-seeker, nun and nurse,

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 33 of 94

mason and carpenter, welder and fitter and, above all, political dissenter.

The last category, detested as unreasonable, defies the Establishment's

tendency to enforce through conformity but is the resource of social

change. ―The reasonable man‖, says G.B. Shaw:

―adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to

adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all process depends on the

unreasonable man. [ George Bernard Shaw in Maxims for Revolutionists]

‖

―Passport‖ peevishness is a suppressive possibility, and so the words of

Justice Jackson (U.S. Supreme Court) may be apposite:

―Freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That

would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to

differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order. [West Virginia

State Board of Education v. Barnette, 391 US 624 (1943)] ‖

92. Under our constitutional order, the price of daring dissent shall no

be passport forfeit.

93. The impugned legislation, Sections 5, 6 and 10 especially, must be

tested even under Article 21 on canons of processual justice to the people

outlined above. Hearing is obligatory—meaningful hearing, flexible and

realistic, according to circumstances, but not ritualistic and wooden. In

exceptional cases and emergency situations, interim measures may be

taken, to avoid the mischief of the passportee becoming an escapee

before the hearing begins. ―Bolt the stables after the horse has been

stolen‖ is not a command of natural justice. But soon after the

provisional seizure, a reasonable hearing must follow, to minimise

procedural prejudice. And when a prompt final order is made against the

applicant or passport holder the reasons must be disclosed to him almost

invariably save in those dangerous cases where irreparable injury will

ensue to the State. A Government which revels in secrecy in the field of

people's liberty not only acts against democratic decency but busies itself

with its own burial. That is the writing on the wall if history were

teacher, memory our mentor and decline of liberty not our unwitting

endeavour. Public power must rarely hide its heart in an open society

and system.

26. The judgment in Maneka Gandhi (supra) established that the

procedural fairness is an ongoing constitutional mandate and that the

principles of natural justice must be read into any procedure that affects

fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Further, it

has been observed in Madhyamam (supra) as under:-

W.P.(C) 6758/2025 & W.P.(C) 6759/2025 Page 34 of 94

―47. The judgment of this Court in Maneka Gandhi (supra) spearheaded

two doctrinal shifts on procedural fairness because of the

constitutionalising of natural justice. Firstly, procedural fairness was no

longer viewed merely as a means to secure a just outcome but a

requirement that holds an inherent value in itself. In view of this shift,

the Courts are now precluded from solely assessing procedural

infringements based on whether the procedure would have prejudiced

the outcome of the case. Instead, the courts would have to decide if the